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26 March 2004

Of Bell Bottoms and Lungis

Peasant Participation in the War

Afsan Chowdhury
What were peasants doing in a war that built an urban priorities dominated state? It's even
more puzzling because by all accounts the majority of the irregulars Mukti Bahini in popular
imagination were peasants, the villagers armed with rage and decrepit rifles, bearded and
barely literate and essentially unused to urban language, clothes and culture. Neither official
history nor academic work has dealt with this strange journey from the plough fields to the
battlefield.

I have used the term bell-

bottoms -- trousers flared at the
bottom of the wearing leg- not
in any pejorative sense but as a
term which encapsulates a
dominant cultural construction.
Because it does portray a
particular class of warriors who
after the war benefited and took
control of the main city and by
extension the State. The
sartorial is also a description of
social inclusiveness and
exclusion. This also doesn't
apply to the 90 percent of the
freedom fighters who seem to
be literally left without
narratives of their history. Significantly, our intellectuals have not looked into the issue that
deals with peasant involvement in the war. There is no ambiguity about it during the war.
The construction of the leadership during the war was largely of the same nature that exists
in any post-colonial situations where one group of political elites fill the space vacated by
another. There were of course some progress especially in the alliance of the formal state
representations -- executive and military -- under political leadership, but peasant
representation was largely absent.

In this case structural representation could have become a major issue in the discourse but
its absence has not been a matter of intellectual concern.

The use of the term 'jonojuddha" -- people's war -- rather frequently nowadays is even
more puzzling unless one can say that this is again an appropriation process, an attempt of
representation in history that has become necessary by using such terms. Have they not
bothered to explain because they can't explain why lungi clad peasants participated in a war

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which was led by bell-bottom wearing urban freedom fighters? Metaphorically speaking of
course.

Participation, choice and social coercion

There were two major sources of social participation in Bangladesh during this phase. One,
during the elections of 1970 where majority of the people voted Awami League (AL) to the
status of the majority party. Later, AL's victory threatened the state power sharing
mechanism, as a result the Pakistani- Islamabad elite decided to go for military action in
Dhaka to prevent transfer of this shift to a new elite. The urban mass upsurge was also
trickling into the rural areas. This was the first contact between the two.

The March connection: From the city to villages

This process of connectivity between the urban and the rural intensified after March 25/26
when terrified Dhaka citizens sought refuge in the rural areas and later people began to
organize resistance to the Pakistan army based on non-Dhaka resources to Pakistan who
found that the mopping up operations had to be taken all over including rural Bangladesh.

"We knew that at a point there would be some violence against the people but we definitely
didn't expect what we saw on and after March 26." Zillur Rahman (AL Leader to the BBC
radio series titled "Bangladesh 1971". 2002-2003.)

In a way the Pakistan army achieved its goal because the sheer terror that was generated
on that night convinced the bloodthirstiness of the intent of the Pakistan army. Even till
today, March 25 is the worst night of all though in terms of scale and suffering a single
morning in many places shed more blood. It was meant to cow down the misunderstood
intent of the Bengali people. The nervous Pakistan army thought Dhaka was what mattered
and the people could be shocked into surrender. Instead, it triggered resistance. And
unleashed a host of forces which ultimately overwhelmed Pakistan and its army.

Peasant response to the crisis by providing to political and military leadership who had gone
to the villages, was crucial in setting up the platform of resistance. This ultimately defined
the nature of subsequent war and commitment of India's support which made the critical
difference. Historians seem to have largely ignored the significance of this interaction that
the sanctuary-seeking people had with the villagers that led to the construction of
convergences and created the nationalist defense.

The hospitality and open house policy of the peasants and the entry of large populations
into the rural areas were not without expenses and other social costs to the peasantry. This
is an ignored part of the war-contribution. While dominant narratives either fail to recognise
this in war value terms, the historians perceive this as expected behaviour reducing it to
rural hospitality terms. They are unable to link it to the huge logistical support provided by
the rural people to the military representatives of the nationalist movement. The rural
population acted as the funding source and supplier of the first phase which made the later
phases possible. This is all the more significant in the context of India's refusal to support
the war in the late March to early April.

In the later stages, as the war became more organised, the price for participation became
very high and a part of the peasantry also joined the war and after the war was over
returned to the villages from where they came. They came from famished lands and
returned to scorched fields. Today, they can't explain why they participated and the sense
of regret is high. "We gave our sons but other than independence, what did we get?" asks
Dariya Begum from Kushtia ("Tahader Juddho", a video on women and war 2001).

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Although the state could not have been born without them, it did not share the spoils of
victory with them, not even gallantry awards.

Dhaka, the peasant and the student

To link Dhaka with the construction of popular imaginations, nature of the state and role of
locations in determining that link is important. East Pakistan was a primate city province
that became a primate city-state. Dhaka was the center and symbol of victory and defeat
during and after 71.

Dhaka was in the domain of Sector 2 under Maj. Khaled Musharraf and Maj.Haider and
naturally drew the largest number of young recruits from Dhaka into its HQ at Agartala.
Since Dhaka was the center of attention in international attention, guerilla activities in
Dhaka was obviously carried out by boys belonging to the city itself. A significant event in
Chilmari could hardly compete with a bomb blast in Dhaka in impact, so media attention
and military concern was highest here. Just as the Pak army attacked Dhaka, the Mukti
Bahini also did their best to show to the world that it was not in the Pak army's total control.
The battle for Dhaka thus constructed its symbolic value, the conquest of Dhaka became
synonymous with Bangladesh. And the construction of Bangladesh became inextricably
linked to Dhaka. It's not a coincidence that most of the powerful elite that ultimately has
ruled Bangladesh/Dhaka, also came from the sector that was responsible for guerilla
activities in Dhaka wars and largely run by Dhaka boys. The Dhaka of 1970 determined the
Dhaka of 1971 and the Dhaka of today.

It was not intended to be so but eventually reflected the various state construction
processes. The peasants first sustained the population movement to rural areas. Next it
made possible the most significant initial resistance that displayed to the world in general
and India in particular, that this was a popular uprising able to support a guerilla war
leading to a December intervention.

Peasants as outsider after the war

Subsequently, when the guerilla war began the peasantry played several roles including that
of major suppliers of shelter, resources, information and porters. Of course they played the
role of soldiers too. "The enemy was in a school building top floor. A group of policemen
supported by over a hundred razakars were there. The thana chief from Tangail had
declared never to give up alive. We had taken casualties but they were protected by
sandbags. A young boy who had been trained in India was hit and killed. As we hadn't eaten
the entire day, we asked the local boys to get some food. They ran desperately to get
bread, eggs etc. As this young boy- around 12 years old- was running in the open field, his
arms full of food, he was shot dead. He died with all the food strewn around him. I started
to fire at the protecting bags and slowly they gave away. Then we picked them off one by
one. When they saw their leaders gone, they started to flee. By then the villagers had
gathered. The razakars and others jumped into the river but the villagers caught them and
killed about 200 of them" describes Md. Sultan, Air Force NCO who escaped from Pak jail to
return home and fight in Barisal. (Bangladesh 1971, BBC series 2002-3)

Maj. Quamrul (retd) has written a book on the warriors of 1971 --'Jonjuddher Gonojoddha' -
- which is a limited but a laudable effort. It may be in fact a good description of how the
peasantry got involved in a war that wasn't essentially theirs. Not that anybody lacked
patriotism or enthusiasm but the post 1971 situation should not be seen as an accident. All
kinds of laments and explanations notwithstanding, it was a war led by bell bottom wearers.
Peasants in lungi who got involved were inevitably going to be denied their right given the
nature of the state. Bangladesh had to reward the urban elites who had taken its charge

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and there was no representation of the rural poor in the history writing or making history.
...................................................................................................
The author, an eminent columnist has done extensive research on 1971.

[https://archive.thedailystar.net/suppliments/indp2004/indp06.htm]

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