LOMBRES, Angelica Beatrice

2015121814
CE134P/E02

CPR 5
Steel Connection Timber Failure

https://www.researchgate.net/figure/The-Siemens-Arena-roof-structure-after-the-collapse-of-
two-trusses-An-intact-truss-can_fig1_266604387?
fbclid=IwAR0sy1Y47nprdzE99ASyoMY0RglyjlwwVM3DSQ7Cwps-RC-T_ZxSQDhn-Tg
http://webarchiv.ethz.ch/cost-
e55/Documents/restricted/trondheim/WGIII/wg3_mandersen_siemens_arena.pdf
Reaction Paper
 With this kind of failure in steel and timber connections, we can see what happened in the
Siemens Arena. The area was opened in 2001 and last 2003, the rooftop crumbled, because of an
error in structure calculation and the new rooftop of the said arena was fortified with linking
cords. On one morning two brackets in the top of Siemens Arena out of nowhere had fallen,
which can be seen in the figure above, then it happened only a couple of months after the
initiation of the arena and a couple of days before a significant occasion ought to have occurred.
The supports were crafted by two glulam wood curves with vertical connectors and the upper
curve was essentially presented to pressure and the lower curve to strain with the flat part of the
pressure and pressure strength were slew at the corner links by concealed steel plates associated
with the two curves by added pins and a couple of jolts. The structure was revealed up as an
exquisite weak building with a free range of 73 meters over the arena so the separation between
the brackets were around 12 m according to the article. The primary result of a weak structure
would have been the expansion of oblique solidness and this could have caused active failure,
following the breakdown of one bracket, prompting enormous increment in roundabout results of
danger so truth be told, the 12 m long purlins between the brackets were just modestly fixed,
with the result that a distress of one support ought not start active breakdown.
As all supports had a lot of lower quality than required by the failure of a fellow
component, it may be reasonable for assumption that the degree of the breakdown was not
lopsided to the reason and the aftereffect of a plan could have been an expansion in transversal
inflexibility, which could have caused active breakdown of the structure so the failure transpired
without notice at once with basically no wind and as it were a couple of millimeters of time off.
An experiment indicated that the issue could be restricted to one basic cross-section at the corner
in the strain curve where the quality was seen as somewhere in the range of 25 and 30% of the
necessary quality so by the way that engineers botched the design, the cross-area was not
considered at all in the plan so the data likewise uncovered that the strength of the supports was
definitely not guaranteed adequately, and that the nature of the components were most certainly
not as determined. These issues did not add to the failure and the breakdown did not uncover any
obscure doubts, so the primary question is that such a crucial miscalculation of the civil
engineers could pass the quality evaluation of the structure.