Polygraph

CHAPTER 31
Part I
THE POLYGRAPH
INTRODUCTION
The use of the lie detector (in its various forms and applications) is very controversial in the
private sector in general, and in the United States there are significant prohibitions regarding
it’s use in the corporate setting. Courts are very reluctant to allow lie detector results into
testimony because of their unreliability. The federal U.S. Employee Polygraph Protection Act
of 1988 (EPPA) significantly curtailed the use of all types of lie detector devices in the private
sector. The purpose of this chapter is to provide additional information for the modern security
practitioner regarding the background and use of the polygraph, and its limitations, both from
a legal and scientific point of view.
Since its inception, there have been several changes in the polygraph’s equipment, interview-
ing techniques and judicial interpretation. This update will address the voice stress analyzer,
which is considered a very questionable device—even more so than the polygraph. Security
practitioners must maintain a high degree of skepticism of any device purporting to verify
the veracity of statements made by subjects in an investigation.
In order to provide an overview of the use of such devices, this chapter will also look at the
three most common types of questions used when conducting interviews with these devices.
And last, the chapter will examine the broad interpretation of the Employee Polygraph Protec-
tion Act of 1988, and admissibility of the lie detector pursuant to the Daubert decision and
the Federal Rules of Evidence 702.
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DETECTION OF DECEPTION/Part I
THE POLYGRAPH
A SHORT HISTORY
For about 70 years the polygraph has been the most widely recognized and best known
modern instrument designed to detect deception. It is based on the assumption that an
identifiable physical reaction can be attributed to a specific emotional stimulus. As early as
the third century B.C., Erasistratus, a Greek physician and anatomist, reported that emotion
caused a quickening of the pulse. The first attempt to use a scientific instrument as an aid
in detecting lies dates back to 1895, when Italian criminologist, Cesare Lombroso, claimed
success in determining the guilt or innocence of suspected criminals by noting whether their
blood pressure or pulse changed during the interrogation.
In the book On the Witness Stand, published in 1908, Harvard psychology professor Hugo
Munsterberg discussed detecting lies by recording physiological changes. In 1914 changes in
breathing rates were linked to attempts at deception by another Italian criminologist, Vittorio
Benussi. The following year William Moulton Marston, a criminal lawyer and student of
Munsterberg, began systematic research at the Harvard Psychological Laboratory into the
correlation between lying and changes in blood pressure.
During World War I, Marston headed a committee of psychologists formed by the National
Research Council to look into the known deception tests and report on their possible usefulness
in counterintelligence activities. Using a sphygmomanometer, or blood pressure cuff, Marston
conducted experiments by taking intermittent readings of blood pressure during interroga-
tions. After a number of experiments, the committee concluded that the Marston blood
pressure test was 97% reliable. It recommended that Marston be appointed special assistant
to the Secretary of War, with authority to use his method in spy cases. War Secretary Newton
D. Baker took no action on the recommendation, but the committee’s work aroused the
interest of a young psychologist, John A. Larson, who was connected with the Berkeley,
California police force.
In 1921 Larson devised an instrument capable of simultaneously recording blood pressure,

pulse rates and respiratory changes, which was the forerunner of today’s polygraph. Working
under Berkeley Police Chief August Vollmer (sometimes called the father of scientific police
work in this country), Larson used his device with reported success on hundreds of criminal
suspects. He was later joined on the Berkeley force by a young man named Leonard Keeler.
Keeler, a Stanford University psychology major, was destined to become the best known
expert in the field. In 1926, he developed an improvement of Larson’s apparatus. Keeler
continued refining his device, which he named the Keeler polygraph, incorporating into it a
feature for measuring changes in the skin’s resistance, commonly known as ‘‘galvanic skin
response.’’ He also developed polygraph interrogation techniques while at Northwestern
University’s scientific crime detection laboratory from 1930 until 1938.
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THE POLYGRAPH
THE OPERATION OF THE INSTRUMENT

Several different types of polygraph instruments produce recordings of physiological changes
that may be interpreted by a trained operator. The most important factors in the use of such
an instrument are the examiner and his or her ability, experience, training, education and
integrity, all of which are essential elements for success as an effective operator.
The term polygraph refers to the multiple-pen instrument which records the subject’s responses
on a continuous roll of paper. Contemporary polygraph equipment simultaneously measures
three responses: breathing pattern, blood pressure and pulse, and skin resistance to external
current. The instrument is electrically-operated and measures an individual’s emotional reac-
tions by recording involuntary changes that occur under stress. It relies on the commonly
recognized belief that it takes more effort to lie than to tell the truth, and that guilt feelings
and anxiety induced by lying produce recognizable physiological changes in the liar. Virtually
all individuals who attempt to conceal the truth may experience certain specific emotions and
various bodily changes in blood pressure, pulse rate, respiration and perspiration rates.1 A
polygraph is imprecisely referred to as a lie detector, but it does not detect lies—only some
physiological reactions of individuals which experience has shown to be associated with attempts
at deception—this is an important point that all security practitioners should note.
When attaching the polygraph to the individual to be examined, one or two pneumograph
tubes are fastened around the chest, a blood pressure cuff is fastened around an arm and
electrodes are attached to fingers. The pneumograph tubes consist of corrugated rubber. One
end is sealed, and the other is connected to the instrument by a thick-walled rubber tube
smaller in diameter than the pneumograph tube. As the circumference of the chest and
abdomen increase when air is inhaled, the pneumograph tubes stretch. When the individual
being tested exhales, they contract. This movement produces pressure changes inside the
pneumograph tubes, which in turn are transmitted to the recording pens on the instrument.
The rubber cuff installed on the arm is inflated to a median pressure between the individual’s
normal systolic and diastolic readings. Changes in blood pressure cause an increase or
decrease in cuff pressure which is recorded on the instrument.2
The electrodes attached to the hand or fingers cause a small amount of current to pass
through the hand or fingers, and a galvanograph unit on the polygraph records the variations
in the electrical current flow caused by electro-chemical changes in the conductance of the
skin surface.
1
Exceptions might be persons for whom lying does not produce psychological stress. Such persons might not believe that
truth is a moral requirement, or might be under the influence of a substance which suppresses such a belief, or might
be ill.
2
Good results have also been obtained using cuffs at pressures of 70 mm Hg or less. These low pressure cuffs are more
comfortable for the test subject.

THE POLYGRAPH
POLYGRAPH USES
Polygraph testing has been commonly utilized in business, in government organizations and
in law enforcement agencies. The estimated number of tests given for business purposes had
at one time ranged from 300,000 to 500,000 per year.3 A study by the American Civil Liberties
Union on the use of the polygraph in private industry noted that the reason for its popularity
was that this was regarded as one of the quickest and most cost-effective methods of verifying
background information on applicants. Polygraphs are not now available to most private
employers for screening, but when they were, they were most widely used by businesses
which sold or distributed drugs or manufactured high value items, as well as banking, insur-
ance, metal and oil industries, food processing and vending, meat packing, automobile manu-
facturing, mail order and other retail operations.
In 1965, the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information issued
a report on hearings held to determine the amount, kind and desirability of polygraph testing
in agencies of the federal government. The report reflected that 19 agencies reported the
use of polygraphs in conducting agency business, advancing reasons of security, criminal
infractions, misconduct, personnel screening and medical measurements.4 The total number
of government tests conducted did not include tests of CIA and NSA employees and job
applicants. Those agencies classified their figures as security information.
As a response to these hearings and further expressions of congressional concern, federal

agencies have been operating since 1965 under civil service regulations governing the use of
polygraphs. The regulations limit the use of polygraphs for screening to agencies with intelli-
gence or counter-intelligence missions directly affecting national security, and then only if
the agency receives written authorization from the chairman of the Office of Personnel
Management.
Examinations are generally utilized in three ways. Probably the best known is used in connec-
tion with criminal cases where the objectives is to identify the guilty individual.
A second use is to test employees on a periodic basis. Employees are warned in advance that
they will be checked periodically. The objective of such testing is to identify employees guilty
of violations of trust. This type of testing is regarded as highly intrusive by many who question
the routine use of polygraph.
3
Use in business has been sharply reduced since passage of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C.
2001, et seq.).
4
Hearings on Use of Polygraphs as ‘‘Lie Detectors’’ by the Federal Government before the Foreign Operations and
Government Information Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, Tenth Report, 89th Congress,
First Session, (1965), pp. 19-30.

THE POLYGRAPH
The third use is in the selection of personnel as one element of the pre-employment screening
process (now available only to a limited class of private employers5). Business and industrial
enterprises formerly, and law enforcement agencies, as well as some government organizations
currently utilize this type of testing. Until passage of the federal law,6 this type of test accounted
for most U.S. polygraph use.
A number of polygraph tests were given international publicity in the early 1970s during the
Watergate investigation. Egil Krogh, Jeb Stuart Magruder and Charles Colson were all tested
concerning their involvement in the case. Mr. Colson described in some detail the tests he
took in his book Born Again.7
CONDUCTING THE TEST

Experienced polygraph operators prefer to conduct tests at their own facilities under condi-
tions they control. The individual to be tested may be seated in a waiting area and have an
opportunity to read polygraph literature. The reactions to these readings may be observed
by a secretary or receptionist who reports them, particularly any indication of skepticism or
acceptance, to the examiner prior to his or her encounter with the individual to be tested.
As the result of the readings, the person to be examined may carry into the test a belief in
the reliability, accuracy and even the infallibility of the polygraph. Examiners maintain that
it is important and helpful in obtaining good responses for an individual to be convinced
that lies will be detected, thus heightening sensitivity to the questions so there is a better
likelihood of clearly perceived physiological changes. An experiment was conducted for the
Defense Department to determine what effect faith in the polygraph had to do with the
success of a test. The study concluded that a belief in the machine’s accuracy did aid the
detection of responses under certain types of questioning.8
The individual to be tested is next brought into the testing area. This is usually a quiet, private,
semi-soundproof room. Expert examiners advise that outside distractions or stimuli should
be avoided and that the room should be plainly or conservatively decorated to avoid distracting
the attention of the person. It is recommended that the person being tested not face windows,
pictures or wall hangings during the examination. The light level in the room should provide
comfortable illumination with no glare, and there should be adequate ventilation with an
even, comfortable temperature.
5
Limited exemptions under the 1988 Act are available to security companies and drug manufacturers. (29 U.S.C. 2006(e)
and (f).
6
Note 3, supra.
7
Charles W. Colson, Born Again. (New York: Bantam Books, Inc.) Published by arrangement with Chosen Books Publishing
Co., Ltd., 1977. See pages 104 through 107, pages 230 and 231.
8
Martin T. Orne and Richard I. Thackery, Methodological Studies in Detection of Deception; Clearinghouse for Federal
Scientific and Technical Information, Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.

THE POLYGRAPH
Some examination rooms are designed with an observation room and a two-way mirror
installed in the common wall between the two rooms. This permits an observer (in addition
to the examiner) to observe the test without being noticed. The examination room may also
be equipped with a concealed microphone, wired to a speaker in the observation room so
that the observer can also hear what is taking place in the testing room. The dialogue between
the subject and operator can also be recorded on audio or video tape for later confirmation
of the test’s voluntary character and any admissions the subject made.
Polygraph authorities state that such an arrangement is desirable for the following reasons:
● First, an examiner can be protected against the possibility of accusations of misconduct,

such as physical abuse or sexual advances, by having a second person observing or a
tape recording of the session. Any accusations can be refuted in this way;
● Second, examiners being trained can gain practical experience by observing actual tests;
● Third, an individual in the custody of the police can be guarded during a test with this
technique.
If the test is to be heard or witnessed by an observer, written consent should be obtained

from the individual being tested because of statutory prohibitions in some states against the
use of surreptitious listening devices.
The pre-test stage of questioning the subject is the most important stage in the polygraph
process. The examiner must obtain a complete and thorough history of the subject. The
history should address physical, emotional and value orientated aspects. Physical factors
includes a review of the subjects medications, injuries and physical abnormalities. Delving
into the subject’s emotional state may produce additional insight, such as a history of bi-
polar disorder. Last, a probe of the subject’s value system may uncover such things as religion,
philosophy and group affiliations.
The examiner should make every effort to instill confidence in the operator and the instrument,
and to alleviate the subject’s nervousness. It is entirely natural for an individual to be nervous,
and an extremely nervous person does not make a suitable subject for an examination.
Establishing good rapport or a sympathetic relationship is an important challenge for the
examiner before starting the examination.
Next, as a part of the preliminary interview, the examiner reviews questions to be asked of
the person being tested. Thus, the subject will not only be familiar with the questions, but
will know in what order they will be asked. Questions are constructed so that only a ‘‘yes’’
or ‘‘no’’ answer is required from the individual. Polygraph experts claim that giving subjects
this advance information materially helps the examiner because as relevant questions are

THE POLYGRAPH
asked, tension increases and physiological reactions speed up. Also, the more the individual
attempts to control reactions, the worse they get, because such reactions are normally under
the control of the autonomic nervous system. An individual who is telling the truth will soon
stop reacting and become more calm as the test proceeds.
At the conclusion of the preliminary interview, the individual is connected to the polygraph.
Usually the first questions are routine ones, such as ‘‘Is your name Joe?’’, ‘‘Are you an American
citizen?’’, ‘‘Do you live at such-and-such address?’’ Most people will react calmly to such
questions. A note is made of how the lines, as recorded by the polygraph pens, are laid out.
Then usually, a broad control question may be asked, to see how much variation might be
obtained in the line pattern. Such questions are designed to create a probability that the
subject will lie or be unsure of the truthfulness of the answer. The following are questions
of this type:
● ‘‘Have you ever taken anything from your place of employment?’’
● ‘‘Have you ever taken anything from a store you didn’t pay for?’’
● ‘‘Do you drink alcoholic beverages to excess?’’
● ‘‘Have you answered all my questions truthfully?’’
Most people have something to hide, no matter how small, in one of these areas. In between
control questions, questions specific to the inquiry are asked, often incorporating information
that only the individual may know.
VOICE STRESS ANALYZER
Historical Development
The voice stress analyzer, or stress analyzer as it is sometimes termed, was introduced as a
commercial product in the United States in March, 1971.9 The first model, the PSE or Psycho-
logical Stress Evaluator, was developed by two former U.S. Army officers, Lt. Col. Allan Bell and
Lt. Col. Charles McQuiston, who collaborated on a design based upon a need for verification of
POW interrogations done during the Vietnam War. Earlier research during World War II had
indicated a connection between stress and certain vibrational frequencies associated with
the human voice. The research identified changes in the character of inaudible frequency
modulations present during periods of psychological stress. Although inaudible, the changes
were capable of being graphically displayed after conversion from audio frequency wave
forms to display visual patterns.
9
Bell, Allan D., Jr., in A Decade of Controversy; Security Management, ASIS, Arlington, VA, March 1981.

THE POLYGRAPH
Related research, led by Lawrence Kersta of Bell Laboratories in the 1960s, successfully
demonstrated that the frequency spectrum covered by the human voice could be graphed
so as to display the actual frequency sounded by a word or syllable (the vertical graph axis)
over the time required to complete the utterance (the horizontal axis). Later studies and
validation efforts conducted in the late 1960s by Dr. Oscar Tosi of Michigan State University
and the Michigan State Police, among others, showed that comparisons of internal characteris-
tics in voice spectrographs could enable the successful identification of an individual speaker
based upon known and questioned voice spectrograms.
In making such identifications, it was noted that different speakers uttering the same words,
syllables or phonemes produce distinctively varied spectrograms. The same person, uttering
the same word, phrase or phoneme at different times also produces distinctively different
spectrograms. But the intrapersonal differences (same speaker, different times) are not as
great as the interpersonal differences (different speakers). Moreover, while intrapersonal
differences occur, they are not of such magnitude or character as to make an identification
impossible. In other words, the same speaker, uttering the same sound on different occasions,
will produce different but characteristically similar spectrograms which will be clearly distin-
guishable from those made by any other speaker. This repetitive similarity permits the conclu-
sion that a questioned sample was made by a speaker from whom a known exemplar is
available.
Utilizing the spectrographic display of the audio frequencies as the method of graphic voice
representation, McQuiston and Bell isolated the particular frequency band that had been
shown to be associated with psychological stress and developed a device which would permit
identification and analysis of those particular frequencies in any given speech sample. The
device marketed to do this job was the PSE, and it was introduced by Dektor Counterintelli-
gence and Security, Inc., a company formed by McQuiston and Bell and then located in
Springfield, Virginia. Other companies formed and quickly marketed other stress analyzers,
all nominally operating on the same or similar physiological principles but employing different
engineering or product design features.
PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION 10
The voice stress analyzer is founded upon two physiological phenomena which involve and
affect the human voice (the reliability of which is still highly questionable). The first is that
there is characteristically present in all human speech utterances certain inaudible frequencies
associated with muscular movements, in addition to the audible speech frequencies. Normal,
10
Some of the following material was taken from Edson, Robert K., The Dektor Psychological Stress Evaluator; 1976,
unpublished.

THE POLYGRAPH
audible frequencies are amplitude modulated and are typically those between 70 Hz (typical
lowest frequency in a male, bass voice) and about 1,000 Hz (typical highest frequency of a
female, soprano voice). Individual voices have been found to exceed those range limits. Male
voices tend to graph with weighting to the lower end of the spectrum and female voices
toward the higher end.
The government and later private research on voice stress found that in addition to these
normal components of uttered sound there existed a superimposed pattern in the frequency
modulated frequencies between 8 Hz and 12 Hz. This pattern, inaudible because the lowest
frequency in the audible range is considered to be 20 Hz, was regarded as the result of very
small oscillations of the striated muscles comprising the voice mechanism. Such movements
were termed physiological tremors or micro-tremors. It was concluded that these muscle
vibrations were produced by the autonomic nervous system and were generally not the result
of central nervous system effort or subject to conscious control by the speaker. It was also
found that stress had a specific effect on these micro-tremors in that it tended to reduce
their amplitude. The relationship discovered was an inverse one, in that the greater the stress,
the less evident the micro tremors.11
As the tremors were initially not voluntarily produced, they should normally be present and,
with multiple samples from a given speaker, their customary amplitude in that speaker
(somewhere between 8 and 12 Hz) could be established. More important to the efforts at
deception detection, is, all speakers, when not stressed, should show some continuing evi-
dence of the micro-tremor frequencies and at some amplitude within the general average
range of amplitudes developed through research. Absence or lower than average amplitudes
for the micro-tremor frequencies was considered evidence of the presence of psychological
stress (i.e., some conscious factor which was affecting the nonconscious production of
micro-tremors).
These findings led to the development of the voice stress analyzer, which takes a tape recorded
sample of speech, feeds the tape to a network of filters, frequency discriminators and demodu-
lators, processes the signal and displays the result as an isolated tracing on a continuous
strip chart. The tracing indicates the specific frequencies and their respective amplitudes
over the time period required to utter the sound. If the analyzer is functioning properly, it
should produce the same chart pattern when the same voice sample is taken from the same
tape recorder at the same settings on the recorder, and the analyzer is used in exactly the
same mode at the same settings for each sample.
11
Research showed that the inverse relationship between speaker stress and the FM 8-12 Hz micro-tremors resulted when
stress caused sustained tensing of the striated muscles in the mouth, throat, neck and head.

THE POLYGRAPH
POLYGRAPH vs. VOICE STRESS

In September of 1996, the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute issued a position
statement on voice stress analysis. With the aid of standard laboratory voice equipment
and software, and the computer Voice Stress Analyzer (VSA), they identified three basic
conclusions:
1. To date, no credible evidence in information furnished by the manufacturers, the scien-

tific literature, or in our own research, that voice stress analysis is an effective investigative
tool for determining deception.
2. A very few studies have found that voice stress analysis worked better than chance at
detecting deception. Unfortunately, these results are not consistent, nor are the reported
accuracies nearly as good as those normally reported for the polygraph. Hundreds of
studies have shown that when properly trained examiners use the polygraph under
controlled conditions, their decisions can be highly accurate in discriminating between
truthful and deceptive people.
3. The preponderance of evidence indicates the polygraph is far more accurate at detecting
deception than is voice stress analysis. No Department of Defense agency uses any form
of voice stress analysis for investigative purposes.
INTERVIEWING TECHNIQUES
A successful polygraph examination depends on the skill and preparation of the examiner.
Traditionally, the polygraph examiner will rely on three examination techniques.
First, and oldest, developed is the relevant-irrelevant (R-I) technique. The R-I technique
operates under the assumption that the subject’s physiological responses will be stronger to
relevant questions than to irrelevant questions. Relevant questions are those which have the
tendency to prove the facts of the subject matter. Irrelevant questions can be anything other
than the subject matter. Under the R-I technique, the subject’s deception is determined by
physiological responses to the relevant questions as opposed to the irrelevant questions
posed. A truthful interviewee should provide similar, but not identical responses to both
relevant and irrelevant questions. The deceptive subject physiological responses will be greater
when the questions are relevant. The R-I technique has been known to be unreliable as it
produces a great number of false positive results.
Second, and most widely used is the control question (CQ) technique. The CQ technique
involves asking the subject questions which are irrelevant to the subject matter. The examiner
asks a series of three different questions designed to induce physiological responses as well
as false denials from the subject. The series involve questions which are neutral, control and

THE POLYGRAPH
relevant. Primarily, the neutral questions are asked to obtain a chart reading when the subject
is answering truthfully.
Control questions are asked for the sole purpose of inducing a stressful event. Usually, they
will allude to the subject matter of the purposeful examination. They afford the examiner
the opportunity to measure the physiological responses of the interviewee. The theory is that
a truthful subject will have no difficulty in telling the truth after being asked a relevant
question, but it will be difficult to give a false response to a control question. Although the
CQ technique is widely used and most preferred today, the scientific community is still divided
regarding the reasonableness of the principles under the CQ technique.
Last, polygraph examiners frequently use the directed lie control (DLC) technique. To some
extent, the DLC and the CQ technique are similar. Both techniques produce a greater physio-
logical response in the subject to control questions and a deceptive interviewee will show
greater responses to relevant questions. Dr. David Raskin, a noted expert in the area of
polygraph examinations believes that the DLC technique is just as reliable as the CQ technique.
Moreover, Dr. Raskin believes that the DLC is easier to administer.
DOS AND DON’TS

An experienced examiner who is well regarded as a polygraph educator and authority has
identified the following situations as those in which a polygraph examination is not indicated:12
● When the prospective examinee declines to submit to examination voluntarily;
● When there are other investigative leads which should logically be pursued first;
● After the subject has made a complete confession—unless there is some logical reason
for believing the confession to be false;
● After a victim has admitted having made a false allegation, unless there is some logical
reason for believing the admission to be false;
● When the prospective examinee is known to be mentally incompetent, has serious

heart or lung problems, is a known drug addict, is in chronic pain, is taking prescribed
stimulants or depressants, or has a record of past mental/emotional illness requiring
extended psychiatric care, etc. Examination of such persons, or of women who are either
three or more months pregnant or are having a menstrual period, produces highly
questionable results.
12
Richard O. Arther, director, National Training Center of Polygraph Science, 200 West 57th St., New York, NY 10019.

THE POLYGRAPH
This same authority has listed the following Do’s and Don’ts for investigators and others who
are not polygraphers but who may plan to utilize a polygraph examination as an adjunct to
an incident investigation.
● Do interrogate and, if possible, use a neutral approach. Obtain an electronically recorded

tape or written statement from the prospective examinee before requesting the polygraph
examination. Don’t interrogate the examinee immediately before the examination.
● Do point out the effectiveness of the polygraph technique.
● Don’t describe it as infallible.
● Do withhold detailed information about the incident from the examinee.
● Do tell the prospective examinee how experienced and highly qualified your examiner is.
● Don’t attempt to explain the examination to him; this is the function of the examiner.
● Do tell the prospective examinee of your personal confidence in the polygraph. Don’t
be a self-styled expert. (In other words, don’t state that only certain types of questions
will be asked, don’t describe polygraph theory or procedures, don’t tell him or her what
questions might be asked, don’t discuss the length of the test, and don’t volunteer the
information that polygraph results may be inadmissible in court. These are all functions
of the examiner, who is trained in handling examinee questions without risking the
outcome of the examination.)
● Do recognize the value of a polygraph test, as it might affect your case.
● Don’t use it, or ever request it, as a crutch because you didn’t properly interrogate. Be
prepared to interrogate further if the examiner tells you the results were deceptive—
not truthful.
● Do tell the non-deceptive—truthful—examinee that he or she will be informed of the

results when the examiner has completed analysis of the charts.
● Don’t tell the examinee the results unless the examiner tells you to do so.
● Don’t attempt to obtain a written statement or taped confession from the untruthful
examinee immediately after the examination. Don’t delay or postpone reinterview of an
untruthful examinee, and don’t assume a confession to the examiner is enough.
● Do advise a prospective examinee to get a good night’s sleep, and to refrain from the
use of drugs or overindulgence in alcohol the night before the examination.
● Don’t state that he or she can’t be tested without a good night’s sleep or that use of
drugs or alcohol could confuse the test, because these could be the outs the examinee
is looking for, and cause him or her to do exactly what you’re advising not to do.
● Do ask the examiner any questions which may be bothering you.

THE POLYGRAPH
● Don’t assume that the examiner does not want to discuss the polygraph test or the case.
● Do work with your examiner as a team member.
● Don’t assume that the examiner prefers to go it alone.
● Do concentrate on primary issues, and advise the examiner of the basic issue you
want resolved.
● Don’t present the examiner with a long list of questions you’d like answers to. A polygraph
examination must be confined to a few selected questions, and only the examiner can
determine what they should be.
● Do confine your request to specific issues which must be resolved.
● Don’t expect the examiner to conduct a witch hunt for you.
● Do respect the examiner’s opinion for what it is—an aid to your investigation.
● Don’t expect the examiner to give you all the answers. The best he or she can do is tell
you whether or not the examinee actually believes what he or she is saying. For example,
a rape victim who identifies a suspect as her assailant because she actually believes he
was the offender will appear truthful on the polygraph, even if she has incorrectly
identified an innocent person.
● Do confine your examination to one specific offense.
● Don’t attempt to clear several crimes with one examination. To work properly, each
specific examination must pertain to one incident or offense. Incorporating more than
one contaminates procedure and nullifies results.
● Do tell the examiner all you know or can find out about your subject.
● Don’t hold back information regarding the subject’s past record, mental condition, use
of drugs, etc., as this can only cloud issues and adversely affect results. The examiner is
working for you, not against you.
● Do level with your examiners.
● Don’t conceal investigative techniques or other means you’ve utilized in developing

information. For example, intentional concealment of facts, such as the subject having
been hypnotized, psychologically advised about breath control, muscular control, etc.,
or having taken pills to calm his or her nerves, is both unethical and unfair to the
examiner and can also hurt your case.
● Do accept the polygraph technique for what it is—an invaluable aid to your investigation
when its use is indicated.
● Don’t assume it can answer all questions or resolve all issues. It cannot do your work
for you, but it can help you if properly utilized.

THE POLYGRAPH
BEHAVIOR OF UNTRUTHFUL AND TRUTHFUL INDIVIDUALS

Physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists and other diagnosticians have always recognized the
importance of a person’s behavior in arriving at a final diagnosis. A polygraph examiner’s
interpretation of an individual’s test results is so important that to be successful, the examiner
must recognize the value of behavior as an essential part of his or her diagnostic technique.
UNTRUTHFUL BEHAVIOR
During a five-year study period conducted by one authority, it was found that approximately
one out of five subjects who were untruthful attempted to distort the polygraph test results.13
Wiggling toes, applying muscle pressure, moving arms, coughing, sniffing, yawning, changing
the breathing rate and unsolicited talking were some of the methods used for this purpose.
As a part of this study, this same polygraph authority listed the various characteristics demon-
strated by individuals who were untruthful. It was found that individuals who were not telling
the truth were usually not anxious to take a polygraph test. Some of the other characteristics
noted are discussed in the paragraphs that follow.
Those individuals who were untruthful frequently attempted to postpone the dates of examina-
tions. Also, those being examined in personnel (screening) investigations exhibited a tendency
to be late for appointments or failed to appear on the dates of appointments.
In the examination room, the individual who was untruthful often appeared to be very worried
and highly nervous. The nervousness was indicated in a variety of ways such as by acting
aggressively, having a resentful attitude, appearing to be in a shocked condition, experiencing
mental blocks, being evasive, having an extremely dry mouth, continually sighing or yawning,
refusing to look the examiner in the eye and moving about. Some were overly friendly or polite.
Some seemed to feel it was necessary to explain before the examination why their responses
might mislead the examiner into believing that they were not being truthful. Some complained
of being nervous, and when that did not impress the examiner, they further emphasized their
nervous condition or mentioned a physical defect which they may or may not actually have
had. Also, some assured the examiner that they were religious; they hoped the examiner
would regard them as truthful for that reason.
Some claimed the apparatus was causing them physical pain in the hope that the examiner
would turn off the instrument, remove the apparatus and report that the individual could
not be examined because of pain sensitivity. Others found that complaint of pain provided
13
Material which follows is from Truth and Deception, by John E. Reid, and Fred E. Inbau; 1977, Williams & Wilkins Co.,
page 293 et seq., used by permission.

THE POLYGRAPH
them with an excuse for not sitting still, which would have a tendency to prevent the examiner
from obtaining a suitable recording. Or they hoped that the examiner, when interpreting
their responses, would decide incorrectly that their untruthful responses were pain responses
and would turn in a favorable report.
As a polygraph test is unpleasant for most persons not telling the truth, they will usually
indicate a desire to leave the examining room as soon as possible. They may ask prematurely
if the examination is completed, complain that the examination is taking much too long,
attempt to be released by alleging that they have another appointment, or refuse to continue
with the examination.
TRUTHFUL BEHAVIOR
It was found during this five-year study that those who are truthful are generally glad to have
an opportunity to prove it. It was found that such individuals often volunteered to be examined.
Some individuals who were truthful also indicated they were nervous. However, when assured
by the examiner that this would not have any effect on test results, they were readily convinced
and made no further mention of the problem. Also, truthful individuals were usually sincere
and straightforward and they freely entered into discussions with the examiners. They were
also completely cooperative during the tests and did not attempt to distort the record being
made by the machine.
QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING OF EXAMINERS

It has been estimated that there are several thousand polygraph examiners operating in the
private sector in the United States. Highly qualified, experienced examiners, however, readily
admit that there are unskilled, poorly trained examiners who are giving tests, and that this
can affect the results.
It has already been stressed that the examiner is a key factor in any polygraph test. The
examiner must have proper training and adequate experience to understand the theory on
which the instrument is based and must be aware of the device’s limitations. Because of this,
polygraph operators should be well educated individuals of high moral character and sound
emotional temperament, should be selected carefully, trained properly and receive effective
supervision.

THE POLYGRAPH
Although adequate training is essential, authorities claim:14
An examiner must be an intelligent person, with a reasonably good educational background—

preferably a college degree. He should have an intense interest in the work itself, a good practical
understanding of human nature, and suitable personality traits which may be evident from his
otherwise general ability to get along with people and to be well liked by his friends and associates.
No amount of training or experience will overcome the lack of these necessary qualifications.
Many persons now functioning as polygraph examiners do not possess these basic qualifications.
They should never have been encouraged to embark upon such a career. Unfortunately, however,
a number of established examiners have conducted schools for trainees and have followed a
practice of accepting as students practically anyone who applied with the necessary tuition fee
or who had been selected by his own police department or other governmental agency, or by a
private business company, to attend school at his employer’s expense.
A person with a better than average intelligence, a fair educational ground, and a good practical
understanding of human nature will inevitably make more mistakes than a trained individual
with the necessary basic qualifications. The basic unqualified examiner is the one who, in view
of his own personal shortcomings, will feel impelled to make a definite diagnosis in practically
every case, and for that reason is more likely to make outright mistakes. To him an indefinite
report is an admission of personal failure. He is also less likely to succeed in private practice as
a polygraph examiner if he makes such an attempt, and with a realization of impending failure
he will be more receptive to rendering opinions favorable to that side in a controversy or investiga-
tion which is prepared to pay the higher price for a suitable opinion.
No experienced examiner who values the status of the technique or his own reputation should
accept for training, at any price, individuals who are basically unqualified.
An examiner’s training period should be six months. For the first three months the trainee
should receive specialized instruction in interviewing techniques, behavior symptoms, ques-
tion formulation, test procedures, operation of the instrument, physiological, psychological
and legal aspects, and post-examination interrogation techniques. During the second three
months the trainee should conduct examinations under the direct supervision of experienced
examiners who are the instructors.
An earlier Congressional study which demonstrated variances among government agencies

as to minimum age, educational requirements, grade or rank and investigative experience,
concluded that: ‘‘There are no uniform criteria for selecting government polygraph operators,
and training procedures are even more inconsistent. Both are completely inadequate, since
the operator is by far the most important factor in the polygraph technique.’’15
The same report recommended that as ideal minimum requirements, a polygraph exam-
iner should:
14
Reid & Inbau, op. cit., page 304.
15
The Use of Polygraphs and Similar Devices by Federal Agencies,’’ Committee on Government Operations, House of
Representatives Report 94-795, January 1976, page 32.

THE POLYGRAPH
1. Be at least 25 years of age;
2. Be a college graduate from an accredited school;
3. Have at least five years of investigative experience;
4. Undergo a complete background investigation, satisfactory completion of psychological

tests and a psychiatric review;
5. Be of a high moral character and sound emotional temperament.
Provisions of the Office of Personnel Management’s Federal Personnel Manual (FPM) pertinent
to the use of polygraphs currently include a requirement that agencies subject to the provisions
of the FPM establish adequate standards for the selection and training of examiners, but do
not prescribe such standards. Accordingly, an agency using polygraphs may establish its own
standards for qualifying individuals as polygraph examiners. As a result, substantial differences
exist in the specific criteria that agencies have imposed upon themselves.
Units of the Department of Defense generally accept the 25-year minimum age as one criterion,
as well as a requirement that the examiner be a citizen. Another agency gives its age criterion
as a preference for ‘‘maturity consistent with about 30 years of age’’; still another states that
examiners should be between 25 and 40 years of age. In neither of these latter two instances
is citizenship a stated requirement. The criteria for polygraph examiners in two other agencies
are silent on the points of both minimum age and citizenship.
Various combinations of formal education and experience—involving type, level and dura-
tion—are acceptable to different agencies to meet their minimum requirements for selection
as polygraph examiners. Some agencies do not define standards as to how an individual will
be judged in terms of moral character and emotional temperament. At least one prescribes
that polygraph examiner designees themselves be subjected to a polygraph examination and
a psychological assessment. Minimum grades and rank held by polygraph examiners still
differ among the agencies. Clearly, the standards for selection of individuals to be trained as
government polygraph examiners still are not uniform.
Currently, all of the polygraph examiners employed by federal agencies (except for the CIA)
have been trained at the Department of Defense Institute, Fort McClellan, Alabama. That
training program, which was established in July, 1951, was originally eight weeks in duration,
but was later lengthened to 14 weeks. In addition to the 14-week formal training phase, each
examiner-trainee must serve an internship prior to certification as a polygraph examiner.
The facility at Fort McClellan trains polygraph examiners for the Army, Air Force, Navy,
Marines, Department of the Treasury and the U.S. Postal Service—26 agencies in all. It has
also trained polygraph examiners for the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Security Agency,

THE POLYGRAPH
U.S. civilian police agencies, Canadian Defense Forces, the Philippine Army, the Republic of
Korea Army, the Pakistani Army, the Republic of China Army and the Venezuelan Army. The
institute graduates between 40 and 60 basic course trainees a year and between 300 and
400 continuing education trainees, persons sent at their agencies’ expense for upgrade or
refresher training.
Until 1992 the institute had arrangements with Jacksonville State University for awarding a
Master of Science in Forensic Psychophysiology to those graduates who completed the
required curriculum.
APPLICATIONS LIMITED BY LEGISLATION

The use of the Voice Stress Analyzer has been prohibited in the private work place setting
for firms regulated under the Federal Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (see Appendix A to
part IV of this Chapter). The exemptions to that act which do permit such firms to use the
polygraph in incident investigations (subject to all the safeguards specified in the act) do not
permit use of any device but the polygraph. The Stress Analyzer is, therefore, not available to
interstate commerce employers in general for any employment related purpose. The Stress
Analyzer also may not be used by interstate employers in the controlled substance and security
fields as a screening device for applicants or incumbent employees. The exemptions in these
cases also are limited to the polygraph (as defined in the act). Use of the Voice Stress Analyzer
in the private sector for purposes other than employment screening or incident investigations
is not regulated under the federal act. Use in the public sector is specifically excluded
from coverage.
Beside the federal prohibition, a number of states already have local statutes prohibiting the
Stress Analyzer. These states are also listed in Appendix A to Chapter 31, Part IV. It is expected
that other states will enact similar legislation in the future. Such laws would apply to purely
intrastate employers who would not be subject to the federal act. In the case of the state
laws, it may be any use of the Stress Analyzer which is prohibited, not just use in the
employment context. (For example, the California penal code, Section 637.3, forbids any
person to use any system which records or examines voiceprints or voice stress patterns of
another person, to determine the truth or falsity of that person without express, prior, written
consent from such person.) Also, states which do not regulate the polygraph in employment
situations (e.g., New York, except for a limited prohibition against Consumer Reporting
Agencies keeping reports of polygraph or other lie detector results in file) or which permit
the polygraph but regulate its use (e.g., Wisconsin), may prohibit the Stress Analyzer. A larger
number of states, which, in express terms, only prohibit use of the polygraph, do use catchall
language such as ‘‘polygraph, lie detector or similar test or examination’’ (e.g., Maryland,
Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia, et. al.) or define lie detector or lie detector test so as

THE POLYGRAPH
to include the polygraph and any other device, mechanism or instrument whose purpose is
to verify truth or render a diagnostic opinion concerning honesty (Massachusetts).
Notwithstanding the federal and state prohibitory statutes, there remain many areas in which
the use of the Stress Analyzer is still available. In interstate commerce and in states prohibiting
it only in the employment context, the Stress Analyzer is still available in litigation preparation,
sales/purchase situations and various forms of personal communication. As the federal poly-
graph act and most prohibitory state acts either exclude or exempt government from coverage,
it is likely that the very bodies which prohibit both the polygraph and the Stress Analyzer in
the private sector will continue to be the biggest users of both kinds of devices. Despite record
statements dealing with the unreliability of these devices as the reason for prohibition, the
real reason seems to be political or sociological.
BROAD INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EPPA

When Congress enacted the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, it did so broadly.
The EPPA was stretched to its outer bounds when the court held that a employer violated
the EPPA by requesting a tape-recording of the employee’s voice.16 The court in the immediate
case opined that a tape recording used in conjunction with either: polygraph, deceptograph,
Voice Stress Analyzer, psychological stress evaluator or any device which renders a ‘‘diagnostic
opinion’’ regarding honesty or dishonesty, is considered a ‘‘lie detector’’ for purposes of
the EPPA.
EMPLOYER STATUS
For purposes of the EPPA, the determination of ‘‘employer status’’ is of great importance.
The General Prohibitions of the EPPA provide that employers may not ask or cause an
employee to submit to a lie detector test; except in certain circumstances.17 Employers can
maintain ‘‘employer status’’ even when using an independent polygraph examiner.
One such court has ruled that an employer is defined as ‘‘any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee or prospective employee.’’18
Further, another court ruled if an examiner decides which employees may be polygraphed,
and under what circumstances polygraph examinations are permissible, the examiner has
‘‘employer status’’ pursuant to the EPPA.19
16
Veazey v. Communications & Cable, Inc.; 194 F. 3d 850(7th Cir. 1999).
17
29 U.S.C, Section 2001 et seq; 29 CFR 801.
18
James v. Professionals’ Detective Agency, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 1013(N.D. III. 1995).
19
Rubin v. Tourneau, Inc.; 797 F. Supp. 247(S.D.N.Y. 1992).

THE POLYGRAPH
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE LIE DETECTOR

Since the landmark decision of Frye v. United States, the admissibility of the lie detector was
decided on the basis of the ‘‘general acceptance’’ test. The ‘‘general acceptance’’ test estab-
lished that the admissibility of expert scientific evidence depends on its acceptance by the
scientific community. Today, the ‘‘general acceptance’’ test has for the most part been replaced
by the Daubert decision20 and the Federal Rules of Evidence 702(FRE 702).
Since 1993, the admissibility of expert scientific evidence is analyzed by the methodology
used by the expert. Moreover, the Daubert analysis pertains only to cases submitted before
the Federal Court system. However, the Supreme Court in Daubert opined that when seeking
the admissibility of evidence such as the lie detector; the trial judge may consider five
nonexclusive factors. The trial judge may consider: (1) whether the technique or theory can
be or has been tested; (2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review
and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory; (4) the
existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) the degree to which the tech-
nique or theory has been generally accepted within the scientific community.21
Further, in its analysis of Daubert the Supreme Court recognized that Federal Rules of Evidence
702 may also be a crucial factor in determining admissibility of expert scientific evidence.
Federal Rules of Evidence 702 pertains to expert testimony. Under FRE 702, the trial judge
must ensure that the expert’s testimony is ‘‘scientific knowledge’’ capable of ‘‘assisting the
trier of the fact.’’ Once it is determined that the proposed testimony meets this standard of
assisting the jury; the trial judge may then admit the lie detector exam. So, while previous
attempts of admitting the lie detector would fail under the Frye standard as ‘‘unreliable;’’ such
evidence can be admitted under the theories of Daubert and Federal Rules of Evidence 702.
20
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
21
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutcals, Inc. at 2796-2798.

THE POLYGRAPH
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Abrams, Stanley; The Complete Polygraph Handbook; 1989, Lexington Books.
Ansley, Norman; Accuracy and Utility of Polygraph Testing; 1984, Dept. of Defense, Washing-
ton, DC. (Reprinted by the American Polygraph Association).
Ansley, Norman and Stanley Abrams; The Polygraph Profession; 1980, American Polygraph
Association.
Barefoot, J. Kirk; Ed.; The Polygraph Technique; 1972, American Polygraph Association, Chatta-
nooga, TN.
Barland, Gordon, Norman Ansley and Frank Horvath; Truth and Science, 2nd Ed. [Index to
international literature on the detection of deception and the polygraph]; 1983, American
Polygraph Association.
Casey, Verna; Lie Detectors and Detection: A Selected Bibliography, 1985-1987; 1988; Vance
Bibliographies.
Clifton, Charles; Deception Detection: Winning the Polygraph Game; 1991, Paladin Press;
Boulder, CO.
Edson, Robert D.; The Dektor Psychological Stress Evaluator (Voice Stress Analyzer); April 1976,
unpublished, submitted to Human Services College of the National Graduate University.
Employee Polygraph Protection Act; 1987, 100th Congress, 1st session, House report 100-208.
Employee Testing Resource Guide; Vol. I 1988, Vol. II 1990; Bureau of National Affairs, Washing-
ton, DC.
Ferguson, Robert J., and Chris Gugas; Preemployment Polygraphy; 1984, Charles C. Thomas
Publishers, Springfield, IL.
Ferguson, Robert J.; The Scientific Informer; 1971, Charles C. Thomas Publishers, Spring-
field, IL.
Finch, James H. and Norman Ansley; Quick Reference Guide to Polygraph Admissibility, Licens-
ing Laws and Limiting Law; 14 Ed.; 1989, American Polygraph Association.
French, Scott R., and Paul Van Houten; Never Say Lie: How to Beat the Machines; 1987, Paladin
Press, Boulder, CO.
Gugas, Chris; The Silent Witness: A Polygraphist’s Casebook; 1979; Prentice-Hall; Englewood
Cliffs, NJ.
Larson, Lex. K.; Employment Screening; 1994, Matthew Bender & Co., Albany, NY. (See espe-
cially Chapter 6.)

THE POLYGRAPH
Matte, James A.; The Art and Science of the Polygraph Technique; 1980, Charles C. Thomas
Publishers, Springfield, IL.
Polygraphs and Employment; 1985, Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, DC.
Raskin, David C, Barland, Gordon H., and Podlesny, John A.; Validity and Reliability of
Detection of Deception; 1978, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice,
LEAA, USDOJ, Washington, DC.
Shepard, Ira M., and Robert L. Duston; Thieves at Work: An Employer’s Guide to Combating
Workplace Dishonesty; 1988, Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, DC.
Taylor, Joseph F. and Michie, Lawrence: Scientific Interrogation: Hypnosis, Polygraphy, Narcoa-
nalysis, Voice Stress Analysis; 1984, Clark Boardman Callaghan, Deerfield, IL.
Thomas, Ralph D.; The Lie-Detection Training Manual; 1985.
Watts, Tim J.; A Selected Bibliography on Workplace Privacy; 1991, Vance Bibliographies, Public
Administration Series #P3023.
PERIODICALS
Security Management, American Society for Industrial Security, Arlington, VA.
— Ball, Terry J.; The Polygraph’s Part in Prosecuting; 10/91.
— Bell, Allan, D., Jr.; The PSE: A Decade of Controversy; 3/81.
— Beller, Peter W.; Polygraph is Plagued By Misconceptions; 8/79.
— Belt, Peter and Holden, John A.; Polygraph Use Among Major U.S. Corporations.
— Brobst, Karen E. and Brock, Randolph D. III; A Winning Combination; 3/87.
— Buckley, Joseph Paul III; Honestly, It’s the Truth; 6/86.
— Capps, Michael H.; Can We Still Pick Out the Bad Apples?; 6/89.
— Cowden, Gary W.; Preemployment Screening: Is Polygraph the Answer?; 3/88.
— Crowley, Carolyn H.; The Truth About Polygraph; 12/82.
— Fergerson, Ronald; Shaping a Polygraph Policy, Part 2; 11/87.
— Hopper, Dennis L.; What Investigators Need to Know About the Polygraph; 5/85.
— Is the Polygraph Suited to Preemployment Screening?; 8/85.
— Kennedy, Daniel B.; Detecting Deception or Deceiving Ourselves; 3/84.
— Linehan, John G.; Another View of the Decade of Controversy; 5/81.

THE POLYGRAPH
— Peters, Robert B.; A Hard Look At Voice Analyzers; 10/80.
— Phannenstill, Richard J.; Polygraph Passes the Test; 8/83.
— The Ways and Means of Screening; 7/90.
— Tranquilizing the Polygraph; [Summary of Research into the Effects of Drugs and Alcohol
on Polygraph Testing]; 10/85.
— Westbrook, Lisa; Polygraph Update; 7/87.

CHAPTER 31
Part III
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The voice stress analyzer, or stress analyzer as it is sometimes termed, was introduced as a
commercial product in the United States in March, 1971.1 The first model, the PSE or Psycho-
logical Stress Evaluator, was developed by two former U.S. Army officers, Lt. Col. Allan Bell and
Lt. Col. Charles McQuiston, who collaborated on a design based upon a need for verification of
POW interrogations done during the Vietnam War. Earlier research during World War II had
indicated a connection between stress and certain vibrational frequencies associated with
the human voice. The research identified changes in the character of inaudible frequency
modulations present during periods of psychological stress. Although inaudible, the changes
were capable of being graphically displayed after conversion from audio frequency wave
forms to display visual patterns.
Related research, led by Lawrence Kersta of Bell Laboratories in the 1960s, successfully
demonstrated that the frequency spectrum covered by the human voice could be graphed
so as to display the actual frequency sounded by a word or syllable (the vertical graph axis)
over the time required to complete the utterance (the horizontal axis). Later studies and
validation efforts conducted in the late 1960s by Dr. Oscar Tosi of Michigan State University
and the Michigan State Police, among others, showed that comparisons of internal characteris-
1
Bell, Allan D., Jr., in A Decade of Controversy; Security Management, ASIS, Arlington, VA, March 1981.
Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-III-1

DETECTION OF DECEPTION/Part III
tics in voice spectrographs could enable the successful identification of an individual speaker
based upon known and questioned voice spectrograms.
In making such identifications, it was noted that different speakers uttering the same words,
syllables, or phonemes produce distinctively varied spectrograms. The same person, uttering
the same word, phrase, or phoneme at different times also produces distinctively different
spectrograms. But the intrapersonal differences (same speaker, different times) are not as
great as the interpersonal differences (different speakers). Moreover, while intrapersonal
differences occur, they are not of such magnitude or character as to make an identification
impossible. In other words, the same speaker, uttering the same sound on different occasions,
will produce different but characteristically similar spectrograms which will be clearly distin-
guishable from those made by any other speaker. This repetitive similarity permits the conclu-
sion that a questioned sample was made by a speaker from whom a known exemplar is
available.
Utilizing the spectrographic display of the audio frequencies as the method of graphic voice
representation, McQuiston and Bell isolated the particular frequency band that had been
shown to be associated with psychological stress and developed a device which would permit
identification and analysis of those particular frequencies in any given speech sample. The
device marketed to do this job was the PSE, and it was introduced by Dektor Counterintelli-
gence and Security, Inc., formed by McQuiston and Bell and then located in Springfield,
Virginia. Other companies formed and quickly marketed other stress analyzers, all nominally
operating on the same or similar physiological principles but employing different engineering
or product design features. Since 1978, the firms marketing stress analyzer devices have
changed. The original Dektor has been replaced by Allan Bell Enterprises, Inc. and now
operates in Savannah, GA. Current addresses for the main suppliers are provided later in
this chapter.
PRINCIPLE OF OPERATION 2
The voice stress analyzer is founded upon two physiological phenomena which involve and
affect the human voice. The first is that there is characteristically present in all human speech
utterances certain inaudible frequencies associated with muscular movements, in addition
to the audible speech frequencies. Normal, audible frequencies are amplitude modulated
and are nominally those between 70 Hz (typical lowest frequency in a male, bass voice) and
about 1,000 Hz (typical highest frequency of a female, soprano voice). Individual voices have
2
Some of the following material was taken from Edson, Robert K., The Dektor Psychological Stress Evaluator; 1976,
unpublished.
31-III-2 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International

been found to exceed those range limits. Male voices tend to graph with weighting to the
lower end of the spectrum and female voices toward the higher end.
The government and later private research on voice stress found that in addition to these
normal components of uttered sound there existed a superimposed pattern in the frequency
modulated frequencies between 8 Hz and 12 Hz. This pattern, inaudible because the lowest
frequency in the audible range is considered to be 20 Hz, was regarded as the result of very
small oscillations of the striated muscles comprising the voice mechanism. Such movements
were termed physiological tremors or micro-tremors. It was concluded that these muscle
vibrations were produced by the autonomic nervous system and were generally not the result
of central nervous system effort or subject to conscious control by the speaker. It was also
found that stress had a specific effect on these micro-tremors in that it tended to reduce
their amplitude. The relationship discovered was an inverse one, in that the greater the stress,
the less evident the micro tremors.3
As the tremors were initially not voluntarily produced, they should normally be present and,
with multiple samples from a given speaker, their customary amplitude in that speaker
(somewhere between 8 and 12 Hz) could be established. More important to the efforts at
deception detection, all speakers, when not stressed, should show some continuing evidence
of the micro-tremor frequencies and at some amplitude within the general average range of
amplitudes developed through research. Absence or lower than average amplitudes for the
micro-tremor frequencies was considered evidence of the presence of psychological stress (i.e.,
some conscious factor which was affecting the nonconscious production of micro-tremors).
These findings led to the development of the voice stress analyzer, which takes a tape recorded
sample of speech, feeds the tape to a network of filters, frequency discriminators and demodu-
lators, processes the signal and displays the result as an isolated tracing on a continuous
strip chart. The tracing indicates the specific frequencies and their respective amplitudes
over the time period required to utter the sound. If the analyzer is functioning properly, it
should produce the same chart pattern when the same voice sample is taken from the same
tape recorder at the same settings on the recorder, and the analyzer is used in exactly the
same mode at the same settings for each sample.
VARIATIONS IN APPROACH
Although the original analyzer, the PSE (for Psychological Stress Evaluator) from Dektor,
functioned in the manner just described, other manufacturers later introduced different
devices which operated on similar or quite different principles. One model, the Mark I Voice
3
Research showed that the inverse relationship between speaker stress and the FM 8-12 Hz micro-tremors resulted when
stress caused sustained tensing of the striated muscles in the mouth, throat, neck and head.

Analyzer (later modified and marketed as the Mark II) by Law Enforcement Associates, Inc.,
of Medford, NJ introduced an instant display feature in which a digital, numerical equivalent
of the analogue spectrogram is provided. The Mark II was also portable at 29 pounds when
contained in its attache carrying case.
Another device was manufactured between 1976 and 1978 by Hagoth Corp., formerly of
Issaquah, WA. Hagoth produced two devices, the HS-1 and the HS-2. The former displayed
its results as a needle position on a meter. Extreme needle deflection in one position meant
extreme stress; extreme deflection in the other meant minimum stress. An early analysis of
this model4 noted that it utilized an electronic circuit known as a Phase Locked Loop (PLL)
for demodulating the voice signal to recover frequencies in the 10 Hz range. The report noted
that the PLL was designed to demodulate a continuous carrier signal (e.g., musical radio
programs) which did not contain strong out-of-band components. It further noted that PLL
devices had erratic initial outputs while first locking on to the carrier, and erratic outputs
when it encountered out-of-band signals. As the human voice is not a continuous signal
but stop and start, and because the target frequencies were in the 10 Hz range while the
accompanying audible voice signals were in the 80 to 1,000 Hz range, significantly out of the
10 Hz band, there were the two causes of erratic output. The evaluation concluded that in
comparisons of multiple tape recordings of the same signal source, the HS-1 displayed widely
varying results attributable to the HS-1 system itself, and was likely to exceed changes in
normally expected stress patterns. It observed that such output would be misinformation
and could lead to faulty conclusions about the actual stress condition of the speaker.
The HS-1 was succeeded by the HS-2, also from Hagoth. In this later model, direct measure-
ment was not made of the base frequency spectrum at the 10 Hz level but of harmonics of
those frequencies. These signals (now intermixed with the higher frequencies in the audible
spectrum) were extracted and analyzed to determine the relative strength (comparative ampli-
tude) of the stress frequencies harmonics. The results were displayed in a series of red and
green LEDs. An output weighted in the green LED area was regarded as high in stress band
frequencies and, therefore, the voice sample was relatively free of stress. A signal weighted
in the red LED area was regarded as low in stress band frequencies and, therefore, the voice
sample was stressed. The degree of stress was proportional to the preponderance of the red
LED display.
4
Undated report by Dektor Counterintelligence and Security, Inc. entitled liability Test of Hagoth HS-1 Scanner.

RELIABILITY AND ACCURACY

Despite the fact that stress analyzers were apparently widely utilized in the private sector5
as well as by law enforcement agencies, their use remained a controversial issue because
critics question their reliability and accuracy.
Polygraph traditionalists are particularly critical of the stress analysis technique, stating that
it measures only one physiological variable, while the polygraph measures three (as explained
in Part I of this Chapter). Polygraph authorities take the position that it would be possible
for an individual to defeat the stress analyzer by controlling emotions and not reflecting
stress. With the polygraph, an individual would be required to control three physiological
variables, and it is extremely unlikely that any one individual would have that capability. But
the former president of the International Society of Stress Analysts claims that the stress
analyzer ‘‘measures at least thirteen different parameters of psychophysiological stress
(including those that the polygraph measures).’’6
THE KUBIS STUDY

Probably the most widely quoted study of a comparison of the stress analyzer and the
polygraph, as well as the most controversial, was conducted by Joseph F. Kubis of Fordham
University for the U.S. Army.7 This study compared the polygraph with the PSE and the Mark
II. The conclusion of the study was that neither of the two voice analysis devices could be
accepted as valid lie detectors. The following is quoted from the summary and conclusions
of the report:
The major purpose of this research was to evaluate the voice-analysis technique, as represented by
two existing types of instrument, for its suitability in lie detection applications. The basis for
evaluation was a comparison of voice-analysis techniques against an established technique, the
polygraph, in terms of the success of each in detecting lying responses. Additionally, the results
obtained with the voice analysis instruments were compared to those yielded by trained polygraph
operators, and [by] auxiliary experimenters making their judgments on the basis of direct observation
of the behavior (verbal and nonverbal) of subjects being interrogated. Essentially the findings
indicated the clear inferiority of voice analysis, in its present state of development, not only to the
polygraph, but also to judgments made on the basis of simply observing subjects’’ behavior.
The Experiment
The experimental procedure involved the execution of a simulated theft of money by a pair of
subjects, one of whom served as a lookout for the other, the thief. For each ‘‘guilty’’ pair, there
was also an ‘‘innocent’’ subject who knew only that a theft had been committed. Each such triad
5
At least until the effective date of the 1988 Employee Polygraph Protection Act (29 U.S.C. 2001-2009).
6
Letter from John W. Heisse, Jr., M.D., President of International Society of Stress Analysis, dated November 27, 1978.
7
Joseph F. Kubis, Comparison of Voice Analysis and Polygraph as Lie Detection Procedures, Technical Report No. LWL-
CR-03B70, U.S. Army Land Warfare Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, August 1973.

was interrogated immediately following the commission of the ‘‘crime,’’ and the judges’’ task
was to determine the roles played by each: who was the Thief, who the Lookout, and who the
Innocent Suspect.
Tape recordings of all the interrogations were made for voice-analysis purposes. Additionally,
polygraph records were made of the interrogations of approximately eighty percent of the triads.
The remaining triads were questioned without the polygraph.
Interrogation proceeded in three stages. First, subjects responded to a questionnaire of the Relevant-
Irrelevant type. Second, they took a modified Peak-of-Tension test involving the exact amount of
money that was stolen. Third, subjects were given an Association test to two series of words, which
included critical words relating to the crime. The interrogation was conducted by two persons, the
Examiner who actually posed the questions, and a Tape Monitor whose function was to control
the volume for the tape recording.
Analysis
Following the interrogations, decisions as to the role played by each member of a triad of subjects
were made in a variety of ways by a number of researchers associated with the experiment in
different capacities. The Examiners and Tape Monitors made judgments immediately following
the interrogation, using as the basis for their judgments their overall, global ‘‘impressions’’ of
the subjects’’ behavior during interrogation. Additionally, during the polygraph examination the
Examiners could see the chart printout as questioning proceeded but had limited opportunity to
note the details of the record at this time.
Approximately two weeks after an interrogation, each of the Examiners made a careful, formal
analysis of the polygraph records, using established criteria in which they had been trained. They
analyzed the records in sets of three (triads) and indicated which record was that of the Thief, the
Lookout, and the Innocent Suspect.
At a later time, two other experienced polygraph operators (not actual Examiners of the subjects)
also analyzed the polygraph records. These raters evaluated each record on an individual basis,
independently of any other records, and rendered a judgment as to the role that subject played in
the experiment.
The third type of evaluation involved the analysis of the tape recordings by each of two current
voice-analysis techniques: the Dektor Psychological Stress Evaluator (PSE) distributed by George F.
Cake Co. and the Voice Stress Analyzer (VSA) manufactured by Decision Control, Inc. In point of
time, the behavior of the subject was evaluated first; his polygraph chart, second; and his voice
recording, last.
Results: Polygraph & Observation

The results may be summarized as follows. On the basis of immediate global impression, both
Examiners and Tape Monitors identified subjects’’ roles in the ‘‘theft’’ to a significantly high degree,
with the Examiners, who could see the polygraph charts, not surprisingly doing somewhat better
than the Tape Monitors. The accuracy with which these immediate impressionistic judgments could
be made provides evidence that the paradigm of the simulated theft is a valid experimental procedure
for lie detection research in that it does in fact induce differentially detectable behavior in subjects.
Analysis of the polygraph records produced the following results. Evaluating the records they had
obtained in triads, Examiners attained an overall accuracy of seventy-six percent. Each role (Thief,
Lookout, Innocent Suspect) was identified with approximately equal success.
There was some indication of differential detectability of lying according to sex of the subject; the
Examiners were notably more accurate in evaluating the records of male than of female subjects
(eighty-three percent versus sixty-five percent). The reason for this difference is not readily apparent.

The success of the Examiners leaves no doubt that the polygraph was an effective instrument of
detection in their hands, of sufficient precision to discriminate degrees of guilt (Thief vs. Lookout),
as well as distinguishing guilt from innocence. Here, again, this success supports the validity of the
simulated theft as an experimental paradigm in the study of differential emotional reactivity.
When the polygraph charts were analyzed on an individual basis (not in triads) by the two other
experienced polygraph operators who had not participated in the actual interrogation, subjects’’
roles in the experiment were again identified with a significant degree of accuracy. On the other
hand, the constraints of individual analysis did produce accuracies somewhat lower than those
obtained in triad analysis by the Examiners (fifty to sixty percent versus useventy-six percent).
Errors, when made, tended to be in the direction of an ‘‘innocent’’ verdict. Contrary to the results
obtained in triad analysis, accuracy with female subjects was slightly, but not significantly, higher
than with male subjects.
Results: Voice Analysis

The results obtained with the voice recordings were generally insignificant. The operator of the
Dektor Psychological Stress Evaluator analyzed the tapes on both an individual and a by-triads
basis. Working with individual records, he obtained accuracies close to thirty-three percent, a value
almost identical with chance expectation. In the triad analysis, the PSE analyst did worse with
polygraph subjects (nineteen percent accuracy). But he did significantly better with non-polygraph
subjects, attaining an acceptably high accuracy of fifty-three percent. It is possible that the absence
of stresses, attendant upon being fitted up with the polygraph attachments, produced clearer voice
records for the non-polygraph subjects.
This cannot be the entire explanation, however, for the overall poorer showing of the PSE. For
example, the nine polygraph triads evaluated by PSE analysis with an accuracy of nineteen percent,
were identified by the Examiners with an accuracy more than twice as great (forty-four percent).
As for the non-polygraph subjects’’ records, the fifty-three percent accuracy of the PSE operator was
surpassed by even the Tape Monitors, who obtained eighty-three percent accuracy in their immediate
global judgments of these triads. In some, the PSE analysis yielded either insignificant or noncompeti-
tive results.
The Voice Stress Analyzer generated a numerical value for each ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No’’ response during
the interrogation. These values were transformed into judgments comparable to those obtained
from the PSE analyst. It was found that neither polygraph nor non-polygraph subjects attained a
significantly greater value than the chance expectation of thirty-three percent. But the trend observed
with the PSE, toward slightly greater accuracy with non-polygraph subjects, was also apparent
with the VSA.
The conclusion of this research is that neither of the presently existing voice-analysis instruments
may be accepted as valid ‘‘lie detectors’’ within the constraints of an experimental paradigm.
REBUTTALS TO KUBIS STUDY

Dr. Heisse took issue with the results of the Kubis research. He indicated in 1976 in a
copyrighted paper, as well as in an article published that same year in Security World, that
there were serious experimental design weaknesses in the study.8 The following paragraphs
have been extracted from Dr. Heisse’s paper:
8
John W. Heisse, Jr., M.D., Audio Stress Analysis: A Validation and Reliability Study of the Psychological Stress Evaluator,
February 1, 1976; and Does Audio Stress Analysis Work? Security World, May 1976.

The Kubis Study contracted by the Army Land Warfare Laboratory casts more vagueness on the
polygraph and the PSE than any recent document. The distribution list of the Kubis Study would
lead one to believe that the study had been accepted as authentic by the Army; but, in a later letter
to Congressman Froehlich on 31 January 1974 the Army through spokesman John L. Naler states:
‘‘. . . the Army is not in a position to either validate or refute the evaluations or conclusions
reached by the report’s author, and thus release of the report does not indicate Army acceptance
or endorsement of the findings and conclusions of the study.’’
Unfortunately this study has been circulated widely and has been cited on numerous occasions to
emphasize the fact that the PSE as an instrument is invalid. Actually the Kubis Study found the
polygraph had a fifty-two percent validity or just about random chance. The PSE record of thirty-
two percent demonstrates that the results of the PSE evaluation are more than one standard
deviation below random chance. In this situation, experimental design error must be considered
the predominant factor. The best results came from the observers — 74.7 percent from global
observations.
As early as 1972 Kradz did a validation study of the PSE and with the polygraph.9 Of 43 subjects
he had a correlation of 100 percent between the polygraph and the PSE . . .
Dahm 10 in 1974 polled persons utilizing the polygraph and the Psychological Stress Evaluator
simultaneously. Of 5,045 replies there were 5,037 times that the PSE and the polygraph agreed.
This is an agreement rate of 99.8 percent . . .
Kriete and Stanley11 simultaneously utilizing the polygraph and the PSE found an excellent correla-
tion between these two instruments. In 193 cases they found an agreement of 97.4 percent between
the polygraph and the PSE . . .
The Secretary of State of the State of Florida appointed a hearing examiner, William G. O’Neill,
Esquire, to hold public hearings on the PSE and the polygraph.12 Hearings were held in Miami,
Florida and in Jacksonville, Florida. The question posed by the hearing examiner was: ‘‘Has the
PSE been demonstrated to perform the functions it is purported to perform?’’
The conclusion is: ‘‘There is no question that the Psychological Stress Evaluator (PSE) in the hands
of a competent, trained operator is equally as credible as the polygraph.’’
In an article published in 1981, Allan Bell, co-developer of the PSE, himself faulted the Kubis
study on the grounds that: 1) none of the Fordham students participating had any PSE training;
2) the study used a ‘‘game’’ rather than a real life model; 3) only 19 percent of the contracted
work was actually completed by Kubis; and 4) the test site was subject to disturbing air-
craft noise.13
According to literature distributed by Dektor describing the PSE, the device has been tested
not only for the validity of the instrument and chart interpretation criteria, but also for the
9
M. Kradz, The Psychological Stress Evaluator—A Study, Subcommittee of the Committee of the Government Operations,
House of Representatives. The Use of Polygraphs and Similar Devices by Federal Agencies. Hearing, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess.,
June 4 and 5, 1974. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974, pages 244-254.
10
A. E. Dahm, Study of the Field Use of the Psychological Stress Evaluator; Subcommittee of the Committee of the Government
Operations, House of Representatives, ‘‘The Use of Polygraphs and Similar Devices by Federal Agencies’’; Hearing, 93rd
Cong., 2nd Sess., June 4 and 5, 1974. U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash., DC. 1974, pages 255-267.
11
R. Kriete and R. Stanley, A Comparison of the Psychological Stress Evaluator and the Polygraph; presented at the First
Annual Seminar of the International Society of Stress Analysts, Chicago, 1974.
12
W. C. O’’Neill, Report of the Special Hearing Officer of the Secretary of State of Florida Regarding Public Hearings of the
Department of State, State of Florida [concerning the] Psychological Stress Evaluator. Secretary of State, Tallahassee,
Florida, 1974.
13
A Decade of Controversy, etc., Note 1, supra.

limits of its applicability. The four tests outlined below are intended to indicate the accuracy
of the PSE as described by Dektor.
The first test series performed used the TV program, ‘‘To Tell the Truth’’ for subjects. Since
only the statement, ‘‘My name is ,’’ was evaluated, no compari-
son with known truth or known stress was possible, thereby requiring chart interpretation
on an absolute basis. This series also tested for narrative responses. Twenty-five segments
of three subjects each were evaluated. In each segment, two subjects lied and one told the
truth about his name. Of the subject evaluations, 75 were correctly called, for a success rate
of 94.7 percent.
The second test series, in conjunction with initial demonstrations of the PSE, consisted of
traditional lie-detection tests (Peak of Tension and General Question Tests). Both Yes/No
and narrative answers were given. This series evaluated very low stress levels, because the
‘‘lie’’ was invited and no jeopardy or real anxiety was involved. Of 24 tests, containing 180
evaluated elements, all elements were correctly called in 22, providing a success rate of 91
percent on a total test basis.
The third test series was performed on actual felony suspects by a Maryland County police
chief polygraph examiner using the PSE and the polygraph simultaneously. Lie detection
questioning techniques were employed, as well as a complex test structure, inasmuch as
‘‘guilty knowledge’’ as well as innocence and guilt was of interest to the police department.
Twenty-six cases containing 162 relevant elements have been corroborated by confession or
investigation. This series was a real-world high-stress test situation, in which PSE evaluation
provided the subsequently corroborated correct results in all elements for a success figure
of 100 percent.
The fourth test series was structured to provide for comparison, reaction to presumed emotion-
producing words and presumed neutral words. Subjects read aloud words from each group
randomly presented on 3 5 cards. Of 53 elements in the seven tests, 52 were correctly
identified as to word group, for a success rate of 98.4 percent.
SOME COMPARISONS WITH THE POLYGRAPH
PHYSICAL CONTACT
The first thing of note when comparing the voice stress analyzer and the polygraph is that
there is no requirement for any physical attachments to be made to the stress analyzer test
subject while several (generally three) attachments are required for the polygraph. It is admit-

ted, even by the most enthusiastic polygraph advocate, that the attachments are not comfort-
able. The need to conduct at least one test, generally at least 45 minutes in length, and the
possibility in any given case that a second test would be necessary almost assure that the
polygraph test subject will have a degree of discomfort from mild to acute. To the degree
that a comfortable, relaxed environment contributes to eliminating stress not directly related
to deception, the stress evaluator setting would seem to be more favorable.
REMOTE TESTING
Flowing from the lack of physical attachment is the theoretical possibility that the stress
analyzer can be used at a distance (as with a telephone conversation) and even covertly,
without knowledge of the subject. In fact, during the early promotion activities introducing
some of the stress analyzer devices, much was made of the value of such instruments in
determining the veracity of such a diverse group as government officials making public (or
private) statements, a salesperson making a sales pitch, a litigation adversary talking about
settlement, and a potential customer talking about a purchase. One could, it might be imag-
ined, use the device in almost any situation involving a speaker, whether or not speaking
directly to the evaluator, whether or not present or absent and whether or not visible to the
evaluator. The potential covert applications seem, to some, far more interesting than the use
of stress analyzers with a subject aware of the test.
But Allan Bell, himself, pointed out that ‘‘it is possible to do stress analysis without the subject
being present and, in fact, without his knowledge. [But] the lack of controls in some of these
situations limits the usefulness of this approach to lie detection.’’14
CONTROL OF THE TEST INTERVIEW

It should be noted that stress, the factor being tested for, can be caused by a multitude of
things. Fear of being discovered in deception is only one. For example, a person might be
observing a street scene out a window while carrying on a phone conversation. An automobile
accident, assault, or other dramatic occurrence in the street could produce stress and the
stress momentarily causes some or all of the physiological symptoms probed by both the
polygraph and the stress analyzer. But if the stress analyzer was used on a voice sample
recorded just at the moment of stress, and if the speech sample, itself, did not contain any
reference to the stress inducing incident, a wrong conclusion might be drawn that the stress
was deception related. With the polygraph, it would not be likely that external stressors
would enter the test environment inasmuch as a skilled polygraphist would maintain a
14
Ibid.

psychologically ‘‘clean’’ test site. Even if the stressors did occur, they would be apparent to
the polygraphist.
If it also agreed that to be certain that the stress detected by any laboratory type instrument
is truly associated with deception and not some other cause, the subject needs to be handled
in such a way that other stress sources are identified and eliminated. That is, a guided
interview by a skilled analyst is needed to isolate the significant stress and relate it to deception
alone by a series of appropriate questions, narrowing the area of exploration and eliminating
extraneous or unrelated sources of stress. This technique can be used with either the polygraph
or the stress analyzer, provided that the setting is a controlled interview.
A controlled interview does not, of itself, require that the subject know a deception test is in
progress, but it must provide the interviewer with control of the environment and the opportu-
nity to ask all questions needed to isolate the stress noted and correlate it to deception. As
the polygraph test subject knows of the test, that problem is solved at the outset. For the
stress evaluator subject, it can be solved given a skilled operator and the right test conditions.
But it is likely that in a case in which the subject is ignorant of the test purpose, some event
or condition will arise which will prevent the analyst from maintaining sufficient control or
asking all the required questions. In any case, the idea that the stress evaluator can be used
on a voice sample which was not obtained under controlled conditions is generally decried
by competent operators.
RANGE OF INTERVIEW
Another respect in which the polygraph and stress analyzer are dissimilar is in the range of
the interview. Typically, the polygraph subject is asked to limit answers to either ‘‘Yes’’ or
‘‘No’’ and to avoid narrative or anecdotal answers during the actual test. Such answers are
often elicited during pre- and post-test interviews, however, in which the analyst is trying to
expand or confirm apparent test results through admissions made voluntarily by the subject.
With the stress analyzer, the interview need not be limited to this format as long as it remains
controlled and relevant to the topic being explored. Moreover, the stress evaluator subject
need not wait the 15 to 20 seconds between answers customary in the polygraph test to
permit reactions to return to a normal base line. This can make for a more natural interview.
It is also argued by some apologists for the stress evaluator that the shorter interval between
questions and answers makes the connection between psychological (conscious) response
to the questions and the autonomic nervous system (nonconscious) response more effective.
This last point is disputed by a number of stress evaluator adversaries.
It can be seen that there are significant differences in technique and application between
the stress analyzer and the polygraph, and while there appears to be a greater degree of

freedom with the former, it is accompanied by a real potential for test biasing and erroneous
conclusions. It appears that the case for covert use of the stress evaluator is not a strong one.
Absent any debate as to the basic reliability and validity of the instrument, it would probably
be most accurate in a controlled environment, which though not as highly structured as that
involving the polygraph, would certainly require that the subject be aware that a test was
in progress.
SUPPLIERS CURRENTLY MARKETING STRESS EVALUATORS

Among the larger distributors of voice stress analyzers and stress evaluators is the successor
of one of the earliest suppliers—Dektor. The firm has become Allan Bell Enterprises, Inc. and
now markets the PSE 2000, which currently lists for $7,500. The firm is located at 4148
Amsterdam Circle, Savannah, GA 31406; telephone (912) 238-0075.
Other suppliers currently offering some version of the stress analyzer are listed in the Security
Industry Buyers Guide published by American Society for Industrial Security and Phillips
Business Information, Inc. As the Guide is updated annually, it is suggested that the current
edition be consulted for supplier listings.
APPLICATIONS LIMITED BY LEGISLATION

It must be remembered that the use of the voice stress analyzer has been prohibited in the
private work place setting for firms regulated under the Federal Polygraph Protection Act of
1988 (see Appendix A to part IV of this Chapter). The exemptions to that act which do permit
such firms to use the polygraph in incident type investigations (subject to all the safeguards
specified in the act) do not permit use of any device but the polygraph. The stress analyzer
is, therefore, not available to interstate commerce employers in general for any employment
related purpose. Neither may the stress analyzer be used by interstate employers in the
controlled substance and security fields as a screening device for applicants or incumbent
employees. The exemptions in these cases also are limited to the polygraph (as defined in the
act). Use of the voice stress analyzer in the private sector for purposes other than employment
screening or incident investigations is not regulated under the federal act. Use in the public
sector is specifically excluded from coverage.15
Beside the federal prohibition, a number of states already have local statutes prohibiting the
Stress Analyzer. These states are also listed in Appendix A to Part IV. It may be expected that
other states will enact similar legislation in the future. Such laws would apply to purely
15
29 U.S.C. 2006(a).

intrastate employers who would not be subject to the federal act. In the case of the state
laws, it may be any use of the stress analyzer which is prohibited, not just use in the employ-
ment context. (For example, the California penal code, Section 637.3, forbids any person to
use any system which records or examines voiceprints or voice stress patterns of another
person, to determine the truth or falsity of that person without express, prior, written consent
from such person.) Also, states which do not regulate the polygraph in employment situations
(e.g., New York, except for a limited prohibition against Consumer Reporting Agencies keeping
reports of polygraph or other lie detector results in file) or which permit the polygraph but
regulate its use (e.g., Wisconsin), may prohibit the stress analyzer. A larger number of states,
which, in express terms, only prohibit use of the polygraph, do use catchall language such
as ‘‘polygraph, lie detector, or similar test or examination’’ (e.g., Maryland, Alaska, Delaware,
District of Columbia, et al.) or define lie detector or lie detector test so as to include the
polygraph and any other device, mechanism, or instrument whose purpose is to verify truth
or render a diagnostic opinion concerning honesty (Massachusetts).
Notwithstanding the federal and state prohibitory statutes, there remain many areas in which
the use of the stress analyzer is still available. In interstate commerce and in states prohibiting
it only in the employment context, the stress analyzer is still available in litigation preparation,
sales/purchase situations, and various forms of personal relationships. As the federal poly-
graph act and most prohibitory state acts either exclude or exempt government from coverage,
it is likely that the very bodies which prohibit both the polygraph and the stress analyzer in
the private sector will continue to be the biggest users of both kinds of devices. Another
indicator that despite record statements dealing with the unreliability of these devices as the
reason for prohibition, the real reason seems to be political or sociological.

BOOKS
Edson, Robert D., The Dektor Psychological Stress Evaluator (Voice Stress Analyzer); April 1976,
unpublished, submitted to Human Services College of the National Graduate University
in partial support of a master of arts degree.
Employee Polygraph Protection Act; 1987, 100th Congress, 1st session, House report 100-208.
Employee Testing Resource Guide; Vol. I 1988, Vol. II 1990, Bureau of National Affairs, Washing-
ton, DC.
French, Scott R., and Van Houten, Paul, Never Say Lie: How to Beat the Machines, 1987,
Paladin Press, Boulder, CO.
Larson, Lex. K., Employment Screening; 1994, Matthew Bender & Co., Albany, NY. (See espe-
cially Chapter 6.)
Polygraphs and Employment; 1985, Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, DC.
Shepard, Ira M., and Duston, Robert L., Thieves at Work: An Employer’s Guide to Combating
Workplace Dishonesty; 1988, Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, DC.
Watts, Tim J., A Selected Bibliography on Workplace Privacy; 1991, Vance Bibliographies, Public
Administration Series #P3023.
PERIODICALS
Security Management, American Society for Industrial Security, Arlington, VA.
— Bell, Allan, D., Jr.; The PSE: A Decade of Controversy; 3/81.
— Kennedy, Daniel B.; Detecting Deception or Deceiving Ourselves; 3/84.
— Linehan, John G.; Another View of the Decade of Controversy; 5/81.
— Peters, Robert B.; A Hard Look At Voice Analyzers; 10/80.

CHAPTER 31
Part IV
LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
THE LEGAL CLIMATE BEFORE 1988

The polygraph had become increasingly popular in the U.S., both in law enforcement and
in the private economy, and was used extensively by private employers as a means of applicant
screening. It was reported that in 1978, between 200,000 and 500,000 tests were administered.
In 1982 this number had grown to 1 million, and by 1986 it had reached 2 million, of which
98% were in the private sector and 75% of those were for applicant screening.1
For many years the legal and ethical status of the polygraph in the U.S. has been an item of
major contention. The arguments have arisen in a number of contexts, including the following:
● May use of the polygraph properly be compelled in employment or security clearance

situations?
● May polygraph evidence be admitted in judicial proceedings?
● Does nonconsensual use of the polygraph violate constitutional rights?
● Does use of the polygraph violate general norms of propriety and improperly have a
degrading or humiliating effect on persons who are tested?
1
Hearings on S. 1815, Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources (Prohibited Use of Lie Detectors), 99th Congress,
2d Session, 4/23/86.
Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-IV-1

DETECTION OF DECEPTION/Part IV
● Is the polygraph accurate and reliable enough to permit adverse determinations on no

other information?
● Does the polygraph unreasonably violate privacy rights?
THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT

Over the past 25 years the U.S. Congress and various state legislatures have repeatedly
considered proposals to ban or limit the use of the polygraph in public and business contexts.
Gradually, the number of state legislatures prohibiting or limiting its use has increased until,
at the present time, 27 states and the District of Columbia have such restrictive legislation.
A listing of these jurisdictions and a citation to the relevant section of the laws is contained
in Appendix B to this Chapter. Prior to passage of the federal polygraph statute, discussed
below, interested persons would consult state laws when deciding whether to institute employ-
ment-related polygraph testing. That research will no longer be determinative because the
majority of cases will now be governed by the new federal statute. State laws may be more
restrictive than the federal statute, however, so in some cases their provisions will still be
relevant.
FEDERAL POLYGRAPH LEGISLATION

Until the 1988 session of the 100th Congress, polygraph bills introduced in either the Senate
or the House had failed of passage. Nevertheless, sentiment grew in favor of such legislation
and a polygraph bill was reported out of conference as a substitute for H.R. 1212. It was
signed by President Ronald Reagan on June 27, 1988 as Public Law 100-347 and become
effective December 28, 1988. With some exceptions, the act prohibits any private employer
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce, or producing goods for interstate commerce,
from requiring or requesting any employee or prospective employee to take or submit to any
lie detector test, or from using the results of any lie detector test.
This federal law, because of its effect throughout the U.S. and because it invokes such a
blanket ban on use of all types of lie detectors, has been the most significant legislation in
this field. The complete text of the act is codified at 29, U.S.C. 2001, et seq.
The act does not preempt state laws or the provisions of any collective bargaining agreements
which prohibit lie detector tests or are more restrictive than the federal law in regard to lie
detectors. The state laws noted in Appendix B will therefore remain in full vigor and effect,
and it is possible that other states may enact more restrictive polygraph laws, primarily to
regulate intrastate employers.
31-IV-2 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International

PROVISIONS OF THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION

ACT
For the purpose of the commentary to follow, references to sections of the act will be by U.S.
C. section numbers, as amended. Comments are made only concerning selected portions of
the act. All affected persons should read and be familiar with the entire act.
SECTION 2001(3)—DEFINITIONS
This section defines lie detector to include polygraph, deceptograph, voice stress analyzer,
psychological stress evaluator or similar device, whether mechanical or electrical, which is
used or whose results are used to reach an opinion as to the honesty or dishonesty of an
individual. The inclusive approach makes it clear that Congress was aware of and meant to
proscribe all the devices mentioned. The distinction among devices is important, also, because
in later sections which except certain private sector employers or situations from coverage
of the act, the exception is applied only to the polygraph and not to any other form of
lie detector.
SECTION 2001(4)—DEFINITIONS
This section defines polygraph as an instrument which, as a minimum, continuously, visually,
permanently and simultaneously records changes in cardiovascular (blood pressure), respira-
tory (breathing) and electrodermal (skin electrical property) patterns. Single feature devices
or even multiple feature devices which do not meet this criterion will not be treated as
polygraphs (although they would remain under the general term lie detector if they were used
to support diagnostic opinions regarding honesty.
SECTION 2002—PROHIBITIONS
These are the main provisions of the chapter. Unless exempted in Section 2006, no employer
subject to the act may:
1) Require, request, suggest, or cause any employee or prospective employee to take or

submit to any lie detector (note: not just polygraph) test; or
2) Use, accept, refer to, or inquire concerning the results of any lie detector test of any
employee or prospective employee; or
3) Discharge, discipline, discriminate against, or deny or threaten to deny employment or

promotion to:

a) any employee or prospective employee who refuses, declines or fails to take a lie
detector test; or
b) discriminate against any employee or prospective employee on the basis of the

results of any lie detector test; or
4) Commit or threaten to commit any of the foregoing acts against any employee or
prospective employee because such person has filed any complaint or instituted any
proceeding under the chapter, testified in any such proceeding, or exercised any rights
under the chapter personally or on behalf of any other person.
SECTION 2003—NOTICE OF PROTECTION

Covered employers must prominently post a notice prepared by the Secretary of Labor
notifying employees of pertinent provisions of the chapter.
SECTION 2004—AUTHORITY
Confers upon the Secretary of Labor the authority to enforce the chapter, make regulations
to carry it out and utilize subpoenas in any hearings or investigations.
SECTION 2005—ENFORCEMENT
Civil penalties up to $10,000 for violation of any provisions of the chapter are permitted, as
are actions for injunctions by the Secretary in U.S. District Courts. Any employee or prospective
employee affected by a violation of the chapter may bring any action in any federal or state
court of competent jurisdiction, for any legal or equitable relief required, including but not
limited to employment, reinstatement, promotion and back wages or lost benefits, plus court
costs and attorney’s fees. This section also prohibits waiver of any rights under the chapter
unless done as part of a written settlement agreed to and signed by the parties to any pending
action or complaint under the chapter. (Note: This means that any waiver obtained prior to
a test or after a test but prior to the filing of a complaint would be of no effect.)
SECTION 2006—EXEMPTIONS
Government and National Security Exemptions
1) Government. The chapter exempts the government at all levels, federal, state and local,
from coverage of the act.

2) National Defense and Security. The chapter also enumerates several categories of experts,
contractors and consultants (or their employees) to the Departments of Defense and
Energy, and to the CIA, DIA and NSA and FBI to whom the federal government, in
the performance of intelligence or counterintelligence functions, may administer lie
detector tests.
Ongoing Investigations
This limited exemption is of interest to all employers covered by the chapter because it
establishes the conditions under which tests are permitted in connection with actual losses.
An employer, otherwise prohibited from testing by the act, may administer tests if all of the
following conditions are met:
● The test is limited to the polygraph;
● The test is in connection with an ongoing investigation of economic loss or injury

to the employer’s business, such as theft, embezzlement, misappropriation, industrial
espionage or sabotage.
● The employee tested had access to the property involved in the loss.
● The employer has a reasonable suspicion that the tested employee was involved.
● The employer provides a written statement to the persons tested, before administration
of the test, which:
1) identifies the matter being investigated and the basis for testing particular employees;
2) is signed by a person other than the polygraphist, authorized to bind the employer;
3) is retained by the employer for at least three years; and
4) contains an identification of the specific loss or injury, and a statement that the
employee tested had access, and a statement describing the employer’s reasonable
suspicion that the employee was involved.
SECTION 2006(e)—SECURITY SERVICES EXEMPTION

This is another exemption of limited effect but of general interest. It applies to the commercial
security services of the private sector and permits testing by private employers if all the
following conditions exist:
● The employer’s primary business purpose consists in providing armored car, security
alarm or other uniformed or plainclothes security personnel.
● The employer’s function includes the protection of:

1) facilities, materials or operations having a significant impact on U.S. national security

or the health or safety of any state (to include electric or nuclear power and public
water supply facilities, and radioactive or toxic materials and public transportation,
all to be particularly described in regulations to be issued); or
2) currency, negotiable instruments, precious commodities or instruments or proprietary

information.
● The test is conducted with respect to a prospective employee who will be employed
directly in the described functions.
● The test is a polygraph test (i.e., not any other lie detector.)
SECTION 2006(f)—DRUG SECURITY EXEMPTION

This exemption applied to testing by any employer manufacturing, distributing or dispensing
controlled substances in any of the first four schedules of the Controlled Substances Act. It
applies if all the following conditions exist:
● The test is a polygraph test.
● When conducted with respect to a prospective employee, that employee will have direct
access to the manufacture, storage, distribution or sale of the controlled substance.
● With respect to current employees, the test is given in connection with an ongoing
investigation of criminal or other misconduct involving loss affecting the controlled
substance, and the tested employee had access to the person or property which is the
subject of the investigation.
SECTION 2007(a)—RESTRICTIONS ON EXEMPTIONS

The ongoing investigation exemption will not apply if the employee is discriminated against
in any way on the basis only of an analysis of a polygraph chart or a refusal to take a polygraph
test without other evidence. The evidence of reasonable suspicion needed to administer the
polygraph test may also serve as additional evidence to support employment action. The
security services and drug security exemptions will not apply if the refusal to take a test or
the analysis of a polygraph test chart is used as the sole basis for an adverse employment
action against the employee or prospective employee.

SECTION 2007(b)—RIGHTS OF EXAMINEE

The ongoing investigation, security services and drug security exemptions will not apply
unless all the following conditions are met:
● The examinee can terminate the test at any time.
● Degrading or needlessly intrusive questions are not asked.
● No question is asked concerning;
1) religious beliefs or affiliations,
2) opinions or beliefs on racial matters,
3) political beliefs or affiliations,
4) any matter relating to sexual behavior,
5) labor union beliefs, affiliations or lawful activities.
● No test is conducted if there is sufficient, written medical evidence of a condition or

treatment that might cause abnormal responses.
● Prior to the test the examinee is given written notice of the date and place and of the
right to consult with counsel or an employee representative.
● Prior to the test the examinee is informed in writing of:
1) the nature of the tests and the instrument involved;
2) whether the test area contains a two way mirror or camera or other device through
which the test can be observed;
3) whether any other device, including one to record or monitor the test, will be used;
4) that the employer or employee (with mutual knowledge) may record the test.
● Prior to the test the examinee signs a written notice:
1) that the test cannot be required as a condition of employment;
2) that any statement made during the test may constitute additional evidence support-
ing adverse employment action;
3) of the limitations imposed by the act;
4) of the examinee’s rights if the test is not done in accordance with the act;
5) of the employer’s legal rights, including the right to disclose to the government
information from the test involving admission of criminal conduct.
● Prior to the test the examinee is allowed to review all questions to be asked during the
test and is informed of the right to terminate the test at any time.

During the test the examiner does not ask any question relevant during the test that was
not presented in writing for review prior to the test.
● After the test but prior to any adverse employment action the employer:
1) conducts further interviews of the applicant on the basis of test results;
2) provides the examinee with a written copy of any opinion or conclusion from the
test and a copy of the questions asked and the chart responses.
● The test shall be at least ninety minutes long and the polygraph operator shall not
conduct more than five such tests on the test day.
SECTION 2007(c)—QUALIFICATIONS OF EXAMINERS

The exemptions discussed in the preceding paragraph will not apply unless the polygraph
examiner: 1) possesses a valid polygraph license if required in the state; 2) maintains a mini-
mum $50,000 bond or equivalent professional liability insurance; 3) renders any opinion or
conclusions in writing and solely on the basis of an analysis of the charts; 4) does not include
any information other than admissions, case facts and interpretation of the charts relevant
to the purpose and stated objectives of the test, or any recommendation concerning employ-
ment of the examinee; 5) maintains all charts and other test related records for three years
after the test.
SECTION 2008—DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

The examinee may disclose to anyone information developed during the polygraph test.
The examiner may only disclose 1) to the examinee or person designated in writing by the
examinee, 2) to the employer who requested the test, to any court, government agency,
arbitrator or mediator in accordance with due process of law, pursuant to an order from a
court of competent jurisdiction.
An employer (other than the government or consultants, experts or contractors to the govern-
ment) who requested the test may disclose in the same fashion as the examiner or to a
government agency (without a court order) but only so much of the information as is an
admission of criminal conduct.
SECTION 2009—EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS AND AGREEMENTS

Except for its government and national defense and security exemptions, the act does not
preempt any state or local law or collective bargaining agreement that prohibits lie detectors
or is more restrictive as to lie detector tests.

FINAL RULES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

The DOL rules discussed here are codified at 29 C.F.R. 801, et seq., amended as of 1992. Every
numbered section of the statute has a matching section in the rules, but the rules refer to
the statute by the original act section numbers, not by the U.S.C. section numbers. Since the
sequence of the provisions under both the public law and in the U.S. code is the same, there
should not be any confusion in reading the rules against either. In the following commentary
only some rules which amplify or clarify otherwise ambiguous provisions of the statute will
be noted. The C.F.R. section numbers are used. Readers are referred to the text of the rules
themselves for detailed information.
Section 801.1 Purpose and Scope

This section points out that even in the limited exemptions permitted under the statute only
the polygraph and no other form of lie detector may be used.
Section 801.2 Definitions

The rules point out that paper and pencil or oral ‘‘honesty’’ tests are not included in the
coverage of the polygraph act.
Section 801.3 Coverage

The act extends to all employees of covered employers, regardless of citizenship status, and
to foreign corporations operating in the U.S.
801.4 Prohibitions
An employer who cooperates with police in their use of polygraph tests of employees does
not violate the act as long as the cooperation is passive and the employer does not participate
in the testing or reimburse police for testing.
The simulated use of a polygraph by an employer so as to lead an individual to believe an

actual test is being conducted is violative of the act.
Section 801.6 Notice of Protection

The notice which employers must post can be obtained from the local offices of the Wage
and Hour Divisions of the DOL.

Section 801.8 Employment Relationship

An employer may not discriminate against a former employee who quit rather than take a
polygraph exam by providing or threatening to provide bad references in the future.
Section 801.12 Investigations Exemption

An employer may not use this exemption for continuous or random testing. There must be
a specific incident or activity. The example is given of an inventory shortage. That, alone,
would not be enough to support a polygraph exam. If additional information were obtained
giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the employee to be polygraphed were the culprit,
then an exam would be permitted.
The misappropriation of confidential or trade secret information is cited as a specific incident

which would constitute direct economic loss to the employer.
Indirect losses by an employer include the use of the employer’s business to commit a crime,
such as check kiting or money laundering. The mere occurrence of a criminal act on employee
premises, such as a drug sale in the parking lot, would not be enough. Losses from uninten-
tional or otherwise lawful conduct (e.g., losses from vehicle or workplace accidents or routine
cash register shortages) would not be such as to permit polygraph exams.
Although the act does not prohibit the use of medical tests to determine the presence of
alcohol of controlled substances, a polygraph exam may not be used for that purpose, even
if such substance might have contributed to an employer loss, as in a vehicle accident.
Section 801-13 Controlled Substances Exemption

The exemption applies only to employers licensed by the DEA to manufacture, distribute or
dispense a controlled substance. As it applies only to employers registered with the DEA, it
does not apply to truck drivers and warehouse personnel whose possession is in the normal
course of their business or employment and whose employers are not DEA-registered. To
test prospective employees under this exemption, they must be under consideration for a
job in which the employee would have an opportunity to divert controlled substances. To
test incumbent employees, there need only be access to a person or to property which is the
subject of an ongoing investigation. Direct access to a controlled substance would not be
required; random or opportunistic access would be enough.
The example is given of employees in a supermarket having a pharmacy. Those personnel

assigned to the pharmacy would have ‘‘direct access’’ to controlled substances whereas
those personnel whose duties did not involve handling controlled substances but did require

occasional entry into the pharmacy would have ‘‘access.’’ Other supermarket personnel whose
duties did not require ore permit entry into the pharmacy would not have ‘‘access.’’
801-14 Security Services Exemption

The rules make clear that for screening purposes, polygraph tests may only be given to
prospective employees under this exemption. Qualified employers may use polygraph tests
on incumbent employees under the incident investigations exemption.
It is required that at least 50% of a business’s revenue come from the type of security services
mentioned in the act for this exemption to apply. A firm which provided its own security
service but was primarily engaged in other activity would not qualify.
When applying the statute’s requirement that protected facilities have a significant impact
on the U.S. or a state or subdivision, the facilities may be either private or government, but
their importance to national or state welfare cannot be minor. An employer whose business
is not specifically mentioned in 29 U.S.C. 2006(e) may petition the administrator of the Wage
and Hour Division for an interpretation that it is covered but must do this before administering
any polygraph tests.
The rules define the term ‘‘proprietary information’’ used in the statute as meaning trade
secret type data.
Applicants to be ‘‘employed to protect’’ the enumerated types of assets or activities must

hold positions such that they would have at least an opportunity to cause or participate in
a breach of security. Prospects for custodial or maintenance type jobs, not involving the
sensitive type locations or assets, would not be covered.
801.20 Restrictions on Exemptions

An otherwise exempt employer who discharges or disciplines an employee after an investiga-
tive polygraph test must have, in addition to the test results, independent evidence that the
employee had access, that there was reasonable suspicion pointing to that employee, and/
or that the employee made admissions before, during or after the exam.
An employer who takes adverse employment action after a polygraph test or in the face of
a refusal to be tested must have a bona fide reason in addition to and independent of analysis
of the test or of the refusal. Such reasons could include conventional background data from
prior employment, education and the like, or statements made by the employee or prospect
before, during or after the test.

ADMISSIBILITY OF POLYGRAPH RESULTS IN EVIDENCE
LACK OF SCIENTIFIC ACCEPTANCE

The first known case where an attempt was made to introduce polygraph testimony in a trial
was U.S. vs. Frye in 1923.2 The polygraph evidence submitted was banned because of the
polygraph’s lack of acceptance in the scientific community. This case established the precedent
for rejecting the results of deception tests in many later cases.
The courts, over the years, continued to reject polygraph evidence. As a typical example, ten
years after the Frye decision, in a Wisconsin case,3 the defense counsel attempted to introduce
polygraph evidence to establish the defendant’s alibi to a robbery charge. The court refused,
and upon appeal the Wisconsin Supreme Court sustained the ruling and held that although
the polygraph ‘‘may have some utility at present, or may ultimately be of great value in the
administration of justice . . .. a too hasty acceptance of it during this stage of its development
may bring complications and abuses that will overbalance whatever utility it may be assumed
to have.’’
POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE ADMITTED

In 1938, a New York court allowed a jury to consider the findings of a polygraph examiner
in a robbery case.4 In that case Father Walter Summers, chairman of the Department of
Psychology at Fordham University, employed a galvanometer to examine the defendant. His
findings were that the defendant was truthful in his denial that he had participated in the
robbery with which he was charged. Father Summers testified that his approach was 100%
accurate when used with persons accused of committing a criminal act. The court permitted
the jury to consider the findings over the objection of the prosecution and Kenny, the defen-
dant, was acquitted. There was no appeal, and so the appellate court did not have an opportu-
nity to rule on this decision.
But in another New York case the same year, the defendant asked for an examination by
Father Summers on the same instrument used in the Kenny case in an effort to prove he
was not involved in a murder.5 This request was denied by the trial court, which indicated
that the validity was not sufficiently established to warrant judicial acceptance. This decision
was later affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals.
2
U.S. vs Frye, 293 F.1013, CA/DC, 1923.
3
State vs Bohner, 210 Wisc 651, 246 NW 314.
4
People vs Kenny, 167 Misc. 51 (1938).
5
People vs Forte, 279 N.T. 204, 10 NE2d 31 (1938)

Authorities writing about the lack of acceptance of polygraph testimony generally agree that
the reason is that the polygraph has not been scientifically accepted. Unlike other scientifically
accepted techniques such as radar, intoxication and ballistics tests, polygraph results meet
with resistance in court because the technique has not been adequately supported by expert
testimony indicating its validity. One text indicates that judicial recognition of the polygraph
would be forthcoming if there were general acceptance by an appropriate group of specialists
within the general field of psychology, and even that the group might be, for the most part,
polygraph examiners.6
SUMMARY OF THE STATE LAWS

The current rules on admissibility of polygraph evidence vary among the states. Some hold
it inadmissiable on any basis. Some hold it admissible as long as a proper foundation is laid.
(That means that the nature and scientific acceptability of the polygraph is demonstrated to
the court through proper testimony before the polygraph evidence, itself, is introduced.)
Some hold it admissible on stipulation of the parties. (A stipulation is either a writing signed
by both parties or their counsels in which an agreement as to facts or the admissibility of
some evidence is stated, or an oral agreement between the parties, made in open court under
the oversight of the presiding judge.) Some states have not articulated a clear rule yet but
have only decided cases in which polygraph evidence was a collateral issue.
The following summary, by state, indicates the position as of the date of the case cited.
Readers are cautioned that in any specific situation in which the current state rule on polygraph
evidence is important, a down-to-date search be made of the local cases. The rule does change.
6
John E. Reid and Fred E. Inbau, Truth and Deception, 1977, the William and Wilkins Co., Baltimore, MD.

STATE RULE CASE DATE

AL Admissible, stipulation Wynn vs State, 423 So.2d 294 1982
AK Not admissible Pulakis vs State, 476 P.2d 474 1970
AZ Not admissible State vs Melendez, 588 P.2d 294 1978
AR Admissible Tanner vs State, 532 S.W.2d 163 1976
CA Admissible, stipulation People vs Adams, 53 Cal.App. 1981
CO Not admissible People vs Anderson, 637 P.2d 354 1981
CT No direct rule. Inadmissible on State vs Traub, 187 A.2d 230 1962
collateral issue.
DE Admissible Whalen vs State, 434 A.2d 1346 1980
FL Admissible, stipulation Codie vs State, 313 So.2d 754 1975
GA Admissible, stipulation Smiley vs State, 296 S.E.2d 209 1982
IL Not admissible People vs Baynes, 430 N.E.2d 1070 1981
IN Admissible, stipulation Minneman vs State, 441 N.E.2d 673 1982
IA Admissible, stipulation State vs Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570 1980
KS Admissible, stipulation State vs Lassley, 545 P.2d 383 1976
KY Admissible, stipulation Colbert vs Comnwlth, 306 So.2d 825 1957
LA Not admissible State vs Catanese, 368 So.2d 975 1979
ME Not admissible State vs Edwards, 412 A.2d 983 1980
MD Not admissible Akonom vs State, 394 A.2d 1213 1978
MA Admissible, stipulation Comnwlth vs Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120 1974
MI Not admissible People vs Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171 1977
MN Admissible in civil cases State vs Goblirsch, 246 N.W.2d 12 1976
MS Not admissible Harrison vs State, 307 So.2d 557 1975
MO Not admissible State vs Walker, 616 S.W.2d 89 1981
MT Not admissible State vs Turley, 521 P.2d 690 1974
NE Not admissible State vs Steinmark, 239 N.W.2d 495 1976
NV Admissible, stipulation State vs Aguilar, 639 P.2d 533 1982
NH Not admitted in this case State vs LaForest, 207 A.2d 429 1965
NJ Admitted, stipulation State vs South, 346 A.2d 437 1972
NM Admissable State vs Dorsey, 539 P.2d 204 1975
NY Admissible People vs Prado, 365 N.Y.S.2d 1975 1975
NC Not admissible State vs Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351 1983
ND Admissible, stipulation State vs Olmstead, 260 N.W.2d 880 1978
OH Admissible State vs Souel, 372 N.E.2d 1318 1978
OK Not admissible Fulton vs State, 541 P.2d 871 1975
OR Not admissible State vs Brown, 687 P.2d 751 1984
PA Not admissible Comnwlth vs Brockington, 455 A.2d 1983
627
SC Admissible State vs Cannon, 197 S.E.2d 678 1973
SD Not admissible State vs Watson 1976
TN Not clear. Not admissible Grant vs State, 374 S.W.2d 391 1963
without stipulation.

STATE RULE CASE DATE

TX Not admissible Lewis vs State, 500 S.W.2d 167 1973
UT Admissible, stipulation State vs Rowley, 386 P.2d 126 1963
VA Not admissible Jones vs Comnwlth, 204 S.E.2d 247 1974
WA Admissible, stipulation State vs Renfro, 639 P.2d 737 1982
WV Not admissible State vs Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39 1979
WI Not admissible State vs Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628 1981
WY Admissible, stipulation Cullin vs State, 565 P.2d 445 1977
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The federal circuit courts of appeals have tended to regard the decision on admissibility of
polygraph evidence to be within the discretion of the trial court. But they are not uniform
in this position. The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to hear any polygraph case. The circuit
court attitudes and the current cases which stated it are shown below. When the circuit court
allows trial court discretion, various results emerge from the district courts in the circuit.
CIRCUIT POSITION CASE

1st Trial court discretion. May exclude U.S. vs Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, (1981)
2d Trial court may exclude. U.S. ex rel. Sadoway vs Fay, 284 F.2d
426 (1960)
3rd Not admissible (District Court Case) U.S. ex rel. Szocki vs Cavell, 156 F.
Supp. 179, (1957)
4th Trial court discretion. May exclude. U.S. vs Webster, 639 F 2d 174, (1981)
5th Trial court discretion. Admissible if U.S. vs Lanza, 491 F.2d U.S. vs
proper foundation laid. Most often 272(1972); Clark, 598 F.2d 944
not admitted (1979)
6th Trial court exclusion upheld but U.S. vs Fife, 573 F.2d 369, (1976)
But admissible on stipulation. People vs Perini, 659 F.2d 730 (1981)
7th Admissible at trial court discretion. U.S. vs Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, (1977)
8th Inadmissable under controlling law. U.S. Earley, 657 F.2d 195 (1981)
9th Admissible or not, at trial court’s U.S. vs Demma, 523 F.2d 981 (1975)
discretion. U.S. vs Eden, 659 F.2d 1376 (1981)
10th Generally excluded but might be U.S. vs Hunter, 672 F.2d 815 (1982)
admitted on a strong foundation.
CA/DC Generally excluded U.S. vs Frye (Note 2, supra) U.S. vs
Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050 (1974)

MILITARY AND OTHER COURTS AND BOARDS
The Military
The use of polygraph evidence in courts martial is prohibited by the Manual for Courts
Martial. Polygraph results, however, play a significant role in pretrial hearings. The results of
polygraph examinations may be given consideration by the convening authority when the
results of a court martial are reviewed. The sentence may be reduced or reversed based on
the polygraph results. Military appellate courts will not consider polygraph results.
Examiners, Administrative Law Judges, Commercial Arbitrators

Hearing examiners and arbitrators may admit the results of polygraph examinations, but the
majority tend not to accept them. In a National Transportation Safety Board case7 the judge
was faced with conflicting testimony as to whether the defendant or someone else was flying
an airplane when the defendant’s license was suspended. The judge admitted the testimony
of a polygraph examiner and in commentary said that the polygraph evidence was ‘‘probative
but not conclusive.’’
Labor Arbitrators
Labor arbitrators have generally excluded polygraph evidence and have ruled against attempts
to punish or dismiss employees for refusal to submit to testing, or for negative results obtained
under suspicious circumstances, or those in which guilt has not been established by other
sources.8 The reliability of the polygraph is a common basis for most decisions, but many
arbitration cases have reached the issues of constitutional rights and invasions of privacy. In
B. F. Goodrich vs. Teamsters Local 743,9 the arbitrator held that an employee’s consent to
take a polygraph examination was not reason enough for following the use of the results,
because the pressure to consent in the employment setting amounted to a compulsion
to submit.
Lag Drug Co. vs. Teamsters Local 72310 went even farther in expressing a lack of confidence
in the polygraph, holding that due to the evidence of the procedure’s inaccuracy, and to
constitutional objections11 an employee could not be dismissed for refusing to be tested, even
though he had signed an agreement as a condition of employment to take a test at any time.
7
FAA vs Stix, Nat’l Trans. Safety Bd., Docket SE-3246, 12/13/76.
8
See B.F. Goodrich Co. vs. Teamsters Local 743, 36 Lab. Arb. 553 (1961); Lag Drug Co. vs. United Steelworkers Local 1133,
31 Lab. Arb. 355 (1958); Marathon Electric Manufacturing Corp. vs. Local 1116, UAW, 31 Lab. Arb. 1040 (1959); In re Skaggs-
Stone, Inc., and Teamsters Local 853, 40 Lab. Arb. 1273 (1963).
9
1136 Lab. Arb. 553 (1961).
10
1239 Lab. Arb. 1121 (1962).
11
There is no constitutional issue in a private employment setting. (Ed. Even arbitrators make this mistake.)

Even more critical comments were made against the polygraph in General American Transport
Corporation vs. United Steelworkers Local 1133.12 The following has been extracted from the
opinion in that case:
If we admit such an encroachment upon the personal immunity of an individual, where in principle
can we stop? Suppose medical discovery in the future evolves a technique whereby the truth may
infallibly be secured from a witness by trepanning his skull and testing the functions of the brain
beneath. No one could contend that the witness could be forced against will to undergo such a
major operation at the imminent risk of his life, in order to secure evidence in a suit between
private parties. How then can be forced to undergo a less dangerous operation, and at what point
shall the line be drawn? To my mind, it is not the degree of risk to life, health, or happiness which
is the determining factor, but the fact of the invasion of the constitutional right to privacy.
Ironically, although the arbitrator was imaginative in the comparison used, he also committed
the error of assuming that constitutional safeguards apply between private parties.
QUALIFICATIONS OF EXAMINERS AS EXPERT WITNESSES

Courts vary a great deal in rulings as to whether a polygraph examiner can be considered an
expert witness. The Oregon Court of Appeals, when considering admissibility of a stipulated
examination, took the position that an otherwise qualified examiner who had conducted only
81 examinations was not an expert. The reason—the state licensing law required experience
with 200 cases for a general license.13
But in another case,14 an examiner with limited experience was allowed to testify about the
results of a stipulated examination when his testimony was verified by a national expert.
The defendant was also able to present an expert examiner to challenge the results of the
stipulated test.
Generally, an examiner can expect to be asked to produce evidence of training at a polygraph

training course accredited by the American Polygraph Association, and to have a license
issued by a state. The examiner should also be prepared to show that he or she has conducted
at least 200 polygraph examinations and has at least a baccalaureate degree from a recognized
college or university. Some jurisdictions may allow substitution of five years of law enforcement
experience for some or all of the college education. If the required number of polygraph
examinations cannot be shown, an examiner might show that a qualified, experienced instruc-
tor was present during an examination, and that they both agreed on the technique employed
and the conclusions reached. A court may be satisfied if both testify.
12
1431 Lab. Arb. 355 (1958).
13
State vs. Tavernier, 555 P. 2d 481 (1976).
14
Cullin vs. State, 565 P. 2d 445 (1977).

An examiner should also be prepared to show membership in one or more professional

societies, such as the American Polygraph Association, a state polygraph association, the
Society for Psychophysiological Research, the American Psychological Association, or similar
organizations. Membership in a state polygraph association is more meaningful if that organi-
zation has specific standards for membership and requires that an examination be passed
before membership is granted. Presentation of papers at scientific meetings and the publica-
tion of papers in scientific journals also enhances an examiner’s qualifications as an expert.
It is important that an examiner regularly attend seminars and advance courses to keep up
with the state of the art.
OTHER CONCEPTS IN DETECTION DECEPTION

It has been suggested by detection deception authorities that other physiological responses,
such as face temperature, respiration, electrocardiograph, and electroencephalograph should
be studied.
A professor at Kent State University in Ohio was reported to have discovered a lie detection
technique that works by examining change in retina color, plus change in pupil size and in eye
focus, to determine emotional response to stimuli-like questioning.15 Thus, the conventional
retinoscope functions as a lie detector. It is said to work as well on an intoxicated or drugged
individual as on other persons. The method was used temporarily to screen applicants for
campus police jobs at Kent State University.
The same report states that the Weizmann Institute of Rehovot, Israel, has reported develop-
ment of a ‘‘microwave respiration monitor’’ to determine truthfulness remotely and without
the knowledge of the subject. This device, used in addition to the polygraph by Israeli police,
measures palpitations of the stomach by use of microwave. The theory is that lying produces
an increased rate of respiration, which can be detected by increased movement of the stomach.
The device offers the possibility of widespread, random, remote, and surreptitious ‘‘truth
verification’’ because there are no attachments connected to the individual being examined.
A beam of light is focused on the stomach of the subject, and each time the body moves as
a result of breathing a change in the microwave is recorded.
Another possible test that has been suggested involves the cardiovascular system. One tech-
nique uses an infrared detector to measure blood flow through the carotid artery. This test
is based on the fact that there is an increase of blood flow to the brain during stress, tension,
and emotion.
15
The Use of Polygraphs and Similar Devices by Federal Agencies, Committee on Government Operations, House of
Representatives Report 94-795, January 1976, page 7.

Measurement of respiration is another technique that has been suggested. By use of infrared,
the amount of carbon dioxide in an individual’s expelled breath is checked. The level of
carbon dioxide is an indication of the individual’s index of stress.
Another respiratory measurement involves transducers which direct sonic beams toward the
individual’s thoracic area. This technique operates on the Doppler principle. (For a concise
description of the Doppler principle, please see Chapter 5 of this Manual, ‘‘Alarm Sensors.’’)
The respiratory movements interfere with the sonic energy directed at the individual and are
registered on an instrument designed for this type of testing. Using the Doppler principle
for the measurement of other body movements or tremors has also been utilized by one
researcher.
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There have been numerous reports of unethical examiners asking improper questions during
an examination, such as those having to do with an individual’s personal or sexual behavior.16
Similar conduct by incompetent examiners has also generated criticism in this area. In
addition, even a well-trained, competent examiner can, if unethical, produce results that
would indicate deception when there is none.
The American Polygraph Association and the International Society of Stress Analysts have
adopted codes of ethics, and have established criteria for membership in their respective
organizations. In addition, these organizations are endeavoring to improve the technical
competency of the field in general. Standards have been established and legislation proposed.
But it is not necessary that an individual join these organizations, nor adhere to the accepted
standards, to become established as an examiner. Such an individual need only take a mini-
mum of training, purchase the necessary equipment, and establish a place from which to
work. Except in the states having regulatory statutes, there is no other requirement. Ethical
and competent examiners agree that, because of this, there are incompetent examiners
operating, and their improper conduct and abuses reflect unfavorably on the reputations
and credibility of everyone in the field.
The following is quoted from an American Polygraph Association publication:17
The facts show that an examination by a competent and ethical polygraphist is both reasonable
and an effective technique for protecting public rights. It should not be used for frivolous matters,
and it should not be used for unethical probing into personal questions of sex, religion, or politics
that have no bearing on the issue under examination. Violations of ethical considerations in the
use of the polygraph should be prosecuted vigorously in the public interest.
16
Such questions are now prohibited in the limited exam exemptions permitted by the federal Employee Polygraph
Protection Act.
17
The Polygraph Technique, American Polygraph Association, 1973, page 6.

Critics have also declared that any attempt to penetrate the inner being of an individual is
improper. One writer has stated that such penetration violates human dignity and is abusive,
degrading, and humiliating.18
INTIMIDATION
Intimidation is another criticism that has been directed at the use of deception detection
devices. It has been charged that an individual has a tendency to be coerced into taking a
test even if physically afraid, or for other good reasons does not desire to take a test. According
to critics, subtle pressures are exerted on an individual, such as fear that a refusal to submit
to an examination will result either in a conclusion of guilt or an indication that an attempt
is being made to conceal derogatory information.19
CLANDESTINE USE OF VOICE ANALYZER

In addition to the general criticism of deception detection devices already outlined, specific
criticism has been directed at the voice analyzer or Psychological Stress Evaluator because
it can be used clandestinely. Distributors of such devices advertise that they can be utilized
to analyze telephone conversations, or that any conversation can be recorded and later
checked. Because it is not necessary to attach the voice analyzer to the person being examined,
as is required with the polygraph, an examination can be conducted at any time without the
individual being checked ever knowing about it.
Critics of this technique point out that conducting examinations without the knowledge of
the individual being examined is a violation of that person’s right to privacy. They state that
this technique can have a far-reaching, damaging effect on communications in general if
adequate controls are not in effect. Some have predicted that the widespread, uncontrolled
abuse could result in a society watched over by an Orwellian ‘‘Big Brother.’’ Some states have
specifically prohibited the voice stress analyzer in a pre-employment context. (See Appendix
‘‘B’’). The new federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act regulates the voice stress analyzer
as a ‘‘lie detector.’’ (See Appendix ‘‘A’’, Section 2001(3) of the statute).
18
N.Y. Civil Liberties Union testimony before House Committee on Employment Opportunities, 1985.
19
This problem will also abate under the federal polygraph law as taking of a polygraph exam cannot be made a condition
of employment or continued employment.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
FIRST, FOURTH, FIFTH, AND NINTH AMENDMENTS

Opponents of deception detection techniques claim that their use infringes on individual
liberties and the protections guaranteed by the Constitution. Although the right to privacy
is not one of the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, it has been held that
it is an implicit right, intended by the Constitution and its framers.
The basic issue is the right to privacy, and the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments
are quoted to illustrate the validity and the source of this right. It is argued that the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech is violated when deception detection devices
are used, as are the Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures,
and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Ninth Amendment specifies
that other fundamental rights are not to be denied just because they are not expressly
specifically listed in the Constitution.
It must be remembered that the question of constitutional immunity under the U.S. Constitu-
tion is significant only when the complaint involves a government action. Actions of private
employers or other private enterprises do not raise federal constitutional questions. (See
Chapter 20-1 of this Manual, ‘‘Framework of the U.S. Legal System.’’)
THE ATTITUDE OF ORGANIZED LABOR

Representatives of organized labor have long maintained that the machinery for protection
of employees against abuses of deception detection techniques is inadequate, and that such
testing should be outlawed. According to the AFL-CIO, ‘‘Some well-meaning employers have
been duped by the ‘myth of infallibility’ created by the purveyors of deception detection
devices and have been led to use the machine in attempts to prevent or reduce real or alleged
theft, pilferage and embezzlement.’’20
Job seekers and employee groups and unions are generally displeased with the use of lie
detectors. They complain that such testing, or the threat of it, can be used by management
as a union-breaking device. They suggest that employers could and should rely instead
upon less obtrusive means, such as employment interviews and references, to answer their
legitimate inquiries. The most strenuous objections raised by employees to the practice of
polygraph testing are that the tests violate one’s personal pride and dignity, invade privacy,
violate the right against self-incrimination, and undermine the American principle of a pre-
sumption of innocence until guilt is proven. The federal polygraph law has quieted much of
labor’s former call for change.21
20
Privacy, Polygraphs and Employment, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, November 1974.
21
Among its provisions is one that says the act does not preempt collective bargaining agreements which prohibit or are
more restrictive of lie detectors than the federal law. (29 U.S.C. 2009.)

The NLRB
The National Labor Relations Board has rejected union contentions that the utilization of
the polygraph technique constitutes an unfair labor practice.22 The labor law only protects
against dismissals or discrimination because of union membership or activities, or other
collective activities; it does not prohibit the use of polygraph technique to uncover employee
dishonesty.23
Arbitrators Accept Some Testing

Many union contracts, of course, provide for the arbitration of labor disputes. Most arbitrators
who have been faced with the problem of deception detection tests have refused to consider
the results of polygraph tests and have also declined to view unfavorably an employee’s
refusal to submit to an examination. In one of the early and most quoted cases, the employer
had directed some employees to submit to polygraph examinations in order to determine
which of the group of employees had been turning in false production reports. The arbitrator
came to the conclusion that the company could not require the employees to submit, citing
three major objections: first, the polygraph’s scientific reliability was not yet fully established;
second, its use was a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination; and third, its use
constituted an unwarranted invasion of privacy.24
The arbitrator who decided that case suggested that despite these objections, an examination
might be permitted where suspicion was already directed toward a particular employee or
where the employee consented. But this view has been generally rejected by other arbitrators.
In one case, the arbitrator ruled that an employee had the right to refuse to submit to
an examination although he had signed a pre-employment agreement to submit to future
examinations, and despite a post-employment release specifically authorizing a dismissal of
the employee should he refuse to submit.25 The arbitrator ruled that incompetent evidence
could not be made competent by consent. The same arbitrator also refused, in a later case,
to permit an employee to offer test results in evidence.
A few arbitrators have permitted the results of a polygraph examination to be used as evidence,
on the theory that an employee who consents to an examination tacitly agrees that the results
be given consideration in detecting the validity of the charges or suspicion under investigation.
Some arbitrators have admitted examination results into proceedings but have placed minimal
or no reliance upon them.
22
For a more detailed discussion and citations of cases, please see John E. Reid and Fred E. Inbau, Truth and Deception,
1977, the Williams and Wilkins Company, Baltimore, MD, page 352.
23
Administrative Decision of the General Counsel of the NLRB, Case No. F-816, 43 L.R.R.M. 1377 (1958) reaffirmed in SR-
211, 45 L.R.R.M. 1074 (1959).
24
General American Transportation Corp. Lab. Arb., 31:355, Chicago 1958.
25
Such an agreement would be unlawful today under 29 U.S.C. 2005(d).

A few decisions rejecting the use of test results have indicated, however, that if the bargaining
contract had provided for such tests, the outcome would have been different. In one case,
six plant guards were discharged for failure to take polygraph examinations after the theft of
televisions from a plant. The union contract stated that the guards were to cooperate in the
investigation of theft or other security matters. The polygraph technique was considered by
the arbitrator to be one method of investigation; he held that the failure to submit to it
constituted insubordination, since the right to refuse had been waived in the contract.
Local unions have requested examinations on occasion, and those examinations have been
useful and in some instances indispensable.
ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

The American Civil Liberties Union has taken the position that no individual should be
required, by moral or legal compulsion, to submit to a ‘‘lie detector’’ test because ‘‘a number’’
of constitutional amendments are violated by the testing procedure.

Abrams, Stanley. A Polygraph Handbook for Attorneys, 1977, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath
and Company, Lexington, MA.
Ansley, Norman and Garwood, Maria, The Accuracy and Utility of Polygraph Testing, 1984,
U.S. Dept. of Defense, Washington, DC.
American Polygraph Association Publications, Suite 408, Osborne Office Center, Chatta-
nooga, TN.
—Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in Criminal and Civil Cases, 1978.
—Ansley, Norman, Quick Reference Guide to Polygraph Admissibility, Licensing Laws

and Limiting Laws, 10th Ed.
—Ansley, Norman and Pumphrey, Janet, Justice and the Polygraph, 1985.
—APA Newsletter, Published bimonthly.
—Bailey, F. Lee, Zuckerman, Roger E., and Pierce, Kenneth R., The Employee Polygraph
Protection Act: A Manual for Polygraph Examiners and Employers, 1989.
—Polygraph—Journal of the APA, Published quarterly.
—Truth and Science—A Bibliography, 1977.
Arther, Richard O., The Scientific Investigator, 4th Pntg. 1976, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield,
IL. (See Chapter IV and Appendices ‘‘A’’ and ‘‘B.’’)
Federal Labor Laws, 16th Ed., 1994, West Publishing Co., Inc. Minneapolis, MN.
Larson, Lex K., Employment Screening, 1994, Matthew Bender & Co., Albany, NY.
Polygraphs and Employment, A BNA Special Report, 1985, Bureau of National Affairs Washing-
ton, DC.
Reid, John E. and Inbau, Fred E., Truth and Deception, 2d Ed., 1977, the Williams and Wilkins
Company, Baltimore, MD.
Privacy, Polygraphs and Employment, 1974, a study prepared by the staff of the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress.
The Use of Polygraphs and Similar Devices by Federal Agencies, 13th Report, 1976, Committee
on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, 94th Congress, Report No. 94-
795, U.S. Government Printing Office Publications, Washington, DC 20402.

APPENDIX A
EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION
Title 29 U.S.C. Chapter 22, Sections 2001 to 2009
SECTION 2001. DEFINITIONS

As used in this Chapter:
(1) Commerce—The term ‘‘commerce’’ has the meaning provided by section 3(b) of
this title.
(2) Employer—The term ‘‘employer’’ includes any person acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee or prospective employee.
(3) Lie Detector—The term ‘‘lie detector’’ includes a polygraph, deceptograph, voice stress
analyzer, psychological stress evaluator, or any other similar device (whether mechani-
cal or electrical) that is used, or the results of which are used, for the purpose of
rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an individual.
(4) Polygraph—The term ‘‘polygraph’’ means an instrument that—
(A) records continuously, visually, permanently, and simultaneously changes in cardio-

vascular, respiratory, and electrodermal patterns as minimum instrumentation
standards; and
(B) is used, or the results of which are used, for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic
opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an individual.
(5) Secretary—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means the Secretary of Labor.
SECTION 2002. PROHIBITIONS ON LIE DETECTOR USE

Except as provided in section 2006 and 2007 of this title, it shall be unlawful for any employer
engaged in or affecting commerce or in the production of goods for commerce—
(1) directly or indirectly, to require, request, suggest, or cause any employee or prospective
employee to take or submit to any lie detector test;
(2) to use, accept, refer to, or inquire concerning the results of any lie detector test of any
employee or prospective employee;
Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-IV-A1

(3) to discharge, discipline, discriminate against in any manner, or deny employment or

promotion to, or threaten to take any such action against
(A) any employee or prospective employee who refuses, declines, or fails to take or
submit to any lie detector test, or
(B) any employee or prospective employee on the basis of the results of any lie detector
test; or
(4) to discharge, discipline, discriminate against in any manner, or deny employment or

promotion to, or threaten to take any such action against, any employee or prospective
employee because—
(A) such employee or prospective employee has filed any complaint or instituted or
caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this Chapter,
(B) such employee or prospective employee has testified or is about to testify in any
such proceeding, or
(C) of the exercise by such employee or prospective employee, on behalf of such

employee or another person, of any right afforded by this chapter.
SECTION 2003. NOTICE OF PROTECTION

The Secretary shall prepare, have printed, and distribute a notice setting forth excerpts from,
or summaries of, the pertinent provisions of this act. Each employer shall post and maintain
such notice in conspicuous places on its premises where notices to employees and applicants
to employment are customarily posted.
SEC. 5. AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY

(a) IN GENERAL—The Secretary shall—
(1) issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out
this chapter;
(2) cooperate with regional, state, local, and other agencies, and cooperate with and
furnish technical assistance to employers, labor organizations, and employment
agencies to aid in effectuating the purposes of this chapter; and
(3) make investigations and inspections and require the keeping of records necessary
or appropriate for the administration of this chapter.
(b) SUBPOENA AUTHORITY—For the purpose of any hearing or investigation under this
chapter, the Secretary shall have the authority contained in sections 49 and 50 of title 15.
31-IV-A2 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International

SECTION 2005. ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS

(a) CIVIL PENALTIES—
(1) IN GENERAL—Subject to paragraph (2), any employer who violates any provision
of this chapter may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $10,000.
(2) DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT—In determining the amount of any penalty under

paragraph (1), the Secretary shall take into account the previous record of the
person in terms of compliance with this chapter and the gravity of the violation.
(3) COLLECTION—Any civil penalty assessed under this subsection shall be collected
in the same manner as is required by subsections (b) through (e) of section 1853 of
this title with respect to civil penalties assessed under subsection (a) of such section.
(b) INJUNCTIVE ACTIONS BY THE SECRETARY—The Secretary may bring an action under
this section to restrain violations of this act. The Solicitor of Labor may appear for and
represent the Secretary in any litigation brought under this chapter. In any action
brought under this section, the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction,
for cause shown, to issue temporary or permanent restraining orders and injunctions
to require compliance with this chapter, including such legal or equitable relief incident
thereto as may be appropriate, including, but not limited to, employment, reinstate-
ment, promotion, and the payment of lost wages and benefits.
(c) PRIVATE CIVIL ACTIONS—
(1) LIABILITY—An employer who violates this chapter shall be liable to the employee
or prospective employee affected by such violation. Such employer shall be liable
for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate, including, but not limited
to, employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of lost wages and ben-
efits.
(2) COURT—An action to recover the liability prescribed in paragraph (1) may be
maintained against the employer in any federal or state court of competent jurisdic-
tion by an employee or prospective employee for or on behalf of such employee,
prospective employee, and other employees or prospective employees similarly
situated. No such action may be commenced more than three years after the date
of the alleged violation.
(3) COSTS—The court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party (other than
the United States) reasonable costs, including attorney’s fees.
(d) WAIVER OF RIGHTS PROHIBITED—The rights and procedures provided by this act
may not be waived by contract or otherwise, unless such waiver is part of a written
settlement agreed to and signed by the parties to the pending action or complaint
under this chapter.

SECTION 2006. EXEMPTIONS

(a) NO APPLICATION TO GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYERS—This chapter shall not apply
with respect to the United States Government, any state or local government, or any
political subdivision of a state or local government.
(b) NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY EXEMPTION.
(1) NATIONAL DEFENSE—Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit the

administration, by the federal government, in the performance of any counterintelli-
gence function, of any lie detector test to—
(A) any expert or consultant under contract to the Department of Defense or any
employee of any contractor of such department; or
(B) any expert or consultant under contract with the Department of Energy in
connection with the atomic energy defense activities of such department or
any employee of any contractor of such department in connection with
such activities.
(2) SECURITY—Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit the administra-

tion, by the federal government, in the performance of any intelligence or counterin-
telligence function, or any lie detector test to—
(A)(i) any individual employed by, assigned to, or detailed to, the National Security
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the Central Intelligence Agency,
(ii) any expert or consultant under contract to any such agency,
(iii) any employee of a contractor to any such agency,
(iv) any individual applying for a position in any such agency, or
(v) any individual assigned to a space where sensitive cryptologic information

is produced, processed, or stored for any such agency; or
(B) any expert, or consultant (or employee of such expert or consultant) under
contract with any federal government department, agency, or program
whose duties involve access to information that has been classified at the
level of top secret or designated as being within a special access program
under section 4.2(a) of Executive Order 12356 (or a successor Executive
order).
(c) FBI CONTRACTORS EXEMPTION—Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to pro-

hibit the administration, by the federal government, in the performance of any counter-
intelligence function, of any lie detector test to an employee of a contractor of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice who is engaged in the
performance of any work under the contract with such Bureau.

(d) LIMITED EXEMPTION FOR ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS—Subject to sections 2007

and 2009 of this title, this chapter shall not prohibit an employer from requesting an
employee to submit to a polygraph test if—
(1) the test is administered in connection with an ongoing investigation involving

economic loss or injury to the employer’s business, such as theft, embezzlement,
misappropriation, or an act of unlawful industrial espionage or sabotage;
(2) the employee had access to the property that is the subject of the investigation;
(3) the employer has a reasonable suspicion that the employee was involved in the
incident or activity under investigation; and
(4) the employer executes a statement, provided to the examinee before the test, that—
(A) sets forth with particularity the specific incident or activity being investigated
and the basis for testing particular employees,
(B) is signed by a person (other than a polygraph examiner) authorized to legally

bind the employer,
(C) is retained by the employer for at least 3 years, and
(D) contains at a minimum—
(i) an identification of the specific economic loss or injury to the business

of the employer,
(ii) a statement indicating that the employee had access to the property that
is the subject of the investigation, and
(iii) a statement describing the basis of the employer’s reasonable suspicion

that the employee was involved in the incident or activity under investiga-
tion.
(e) EXEMPTION FOR SECURITY SERVICES—
(1) IN GENERAL—Subject to paragraph (2) and sections 2007 and 2009 of this title,
this chapter shall not prohibit the use of polygraph tests on prospective employees
by any private employer whose primary business purpose consists of providing
armored car personnel, personnel engaged in the design, installation, and mainte-
nance of security alarm systems, or other uniformed or plainclothes security person-
nel and whose function includes protection of—
(A) facilities, materials, or operations having a significant impact on the health or

safety of any State or political subdivision thereof, or the national security of
the United States, as determined under rules and regulations issued by the
Secretary within 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, including—

(i) facilities engaged in the production, transmission, or distribution of elec-

tric or nuclear power,
(ii) public water supply facilities,
(iii) shipments or storage of radioactive or other toxic waste materials, and
(iv) public transportation, or
(B) currency, negotiable securities, precious commodities or instruments, or pro-

prietary information.
(2) ACCESS—The exemption, provided under this subsection shall not apply if the
test is administered to a prospective employee who would not be employed to
protect facilities, materials, operations, or assets referred to in paragraph (1).
(f) EXEMPTION FOR DRUG SECURITY, DRUG THEFT, OR DRUG DIVERSION INVESTIGA-
TIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL—Subject to paragraph (2) and sections 2007 and 2009 of this title,
this chapter shall not prohibit the use of a polygraph test by any employer authorized
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance listed in schedule
I, II, III, or IV of section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812).
(2) ACCESS.—The exemption provided under this subsection shall apply—
(A) if the test is administered to a prospective employee who would have direct
access to the manufacture, storage, distribution, or sale of any such controlled
substance; or
(B) in the case of a test administered to a current employee, if—
(i) the test is administered in connection with an ongoing investigation of

criminal or other misconduct involving, or potentially involving, loss or
injury to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of any such controlled
substance by such employer, and
(ii) the employee had access to the person or property that is the subject of
the investigation.
SECTION 2007. RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF EXEMPTIONS

(a) TEST AS BASIS FOR ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION—
(1) UNDER ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS EXEMPTION—Except as provided in para-

graph (2), the exemption under subsection (d) of section 72006 of this title shall
not apply if an employee is discharged, disciplined, denied employment or promo-
tion, or otherwise discriminated against in any manner on the basis of the analysis

of a polygraph test chart or the refusal to take a polygraph test, without additional
supporting evidence. The evidence required by such subsection may serve as addi-
tional supporting evidence.
(2) UNDER OTHER EXEMPTIONS—In the case of an exemption described in subsec-

tion (e) or (f) of such section, the exemption shall not apply if the results of an
analysis of a polygraph test chart are used, or the refusal to take a polygraph test
is used, as the sole basis upon which an adverse employment action described in
paragraph (1) is taken against an employee or prospective employee.
(b) RIGHTS OF EXAMINEE—The exemptions provided under subsections (d), (e), and (f)
of section 2006 of this title shall not apply unless the requirements described in the
following paragraphs are met:
(1) ALL PHASES—Throughout all phases of the test—
(A) the examinee shall be permitted to terminate the test at any time;
(B) the examinee is not asked questions in a manner designed to degrade, or

needlessly intrude on, such examinee;
(C) the examinee is not asked any question concerning—
(i) religious beliefs or affiliations.
(ii) beliefs or opinions regarding racial matters,
(iii) political beliefs or affiliations,
(iv) any matter relating to sexual behavior; and
(v) beliefs, affiliations, opinions, or lawful activities regarding unions or labor

organizations; and
(D) the examiner does not conduct the test if there is sufficient written evidence
by a physician that the examinee is suffering from a medical or psychological
condition or undergoing treatment that might cause abnormal responses dur-
ing the actual testing phase.
(2) PRETEST PHASE—During the pretest phase, the prospective examinee—
(A) is provided with reasonable written notice of the date, time, and location of
the test, and of such examinee’s right to obtain and consult with legal counsel
or an employee representative before each phase of the test;
(B) is informed in writing of the nature and characteristics of the tests and of the
instruments involved;
(C) is informed, in writing—

(i) whether the testing area contains a two-way mirror, a camera, or any
other device through which the test can be observed,
(ii) whether any other device, including any device for recording or monitoring
the test, will be used, or
(iii) that the employer or the examinee may (with mutual knowledge) make a
recording of the test;
(D) is read and signs a written notice informing such examinee—
(i) that the examinee cannot be required to take the test as a condition of
employment,
(ii) that any statement made during the test may constitute additional support-
ing evidence for the purposes of an adverse employment action described
in subsection (a)
(iii) of the limitations imposed under this section,
(iv) of the legal rights and remedies available to the examinee if the polygraph
test is not conducted in accordance with this Act, and
(v) of the legal rights and remedies of the employer under this chapter (includ-
ing the rights of the employer under section 2008(c)(2) of this title, and
(E) is provided an opportunity to review all questions to be asked during the test
and is informed of the right to terminate the test at any time.
(3) ACTUAL TESTING PHASE—During the actual testing phase, the examiner does
not ask such examinee any question relevant during the test that was not presented
in writing for review to such examinee before the test.
(4) POST-TEST PHASE—Before any adverse employment action, the employer shall—
(A) further interview the examinee on the basis of the results of the test; and
(B) provide the examinee with—
(i) a written copy of any opinion or conclusion rendered as a result of the

test, and
(ii) a copy of the questions asked during the test along with the corresponding
charted responses.
(5) MAXIMUM NUMBER AND MINIMUM DURATION OF TESTS—The examiner shall

not conduct and complete more than five polygraph tests on a calender day on
which the test is given, and shall not conduct any such test for less than a 90-
minute duration.

(c) QUALIFICATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF EXAMINERS—The exemptions provided

under subsections (d), (e), and (f) of section 206 of this title shall not apply unless
the individual who conducts the polygraph test satisfies the requirements under the
following paragraphs:
(1) QUALIFICATIONS
The examiner—
(A) has a valid and current license granted by licensing and regulatory authorities
in the state in which the test is to be conducted, if so required by the state; and
(B) maintains a minimum of a $50,000 bond or an equivalent amount of profes-

sional liability coverage.
(2) REQUIREMENTS
The examiner—
(A) renders any opinion or conclusion regarding the test—
(i) in writing and solely on the basis of an analysis of polygraph test charts,
(ii) that does not contain information other than admissions, information,
case facts, and interpretation of the charts relevant to the purpose and
stated objectives of the test, and
(iii) that does not include any recommendation concerning the employment
of the examinee; and
(B) maintains all opinions, reports, charts, written questions, lists, and other
records relating to the test for a minimum period of 3 years after administration
of the test.
SECTION 2008. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

(a) IN GENERAL—A person, other than the examinee, may not disclose information
obtained during a polygraph test, except as provided in this section.
(b) PERMITTED DISCLOSURES—A polygraph examiner may disclose information acquired

from a polygraph test only to—
(1) the examinee or any other person specifically designated in writing by the examinee;
(2) the employer that requested the test; or
(3) any court, government agency, arbitrator, or mediator, in accordance with due
process of law, pursuant to an order from a court of competent jurisdiction.

(c) DISCLOSURE BY EMPLOYER—An employer (other than an employer described in

subsection (a), (b), or (c) of section 2006 of this title) for whom a polygraph test is
conducted may disclose information from the test only to—
(1) a person in accordance with subsection (b); or
(2) a governmental agency, but only insofar as the disclosed information is an admis-
sion of criminal conduct.
SECTION 2009. EFFECT ON OTHER LAW AND AGREEMENTS

Except as provided in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 2006 of this title, this chapter
shall not preempt any provision of any state or local law or of any negotiated collective
bargaining agreement that prohibits lie detector tests or is more restrictive with respect to
lie detector tests than any provision of this act.

APPENDIX B
STATES PROHIBITING OR LIMITING THE POLYGRAPH AS OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1994
STATE AND STATUTE No Employer May ‘‘—’’ PENALTY EXEMPTED

ALASKA ‘‘Request or Suggest’’ $1,000 Fine a/o 1 year jail Police
23 AK Stat. 23.10.037
ARIZONA No questions re labor License rev- Gov’t.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. ocation (Examiner)
32-2701
CALIFORNIA ‘‘Demand or Require’’ None stated Gov’t agency.
CA. Labor Code 432.2
CONNECTICUT ‘‘Request or Require’’ $250-$1,000 Police
31 CT Stat. 51g
DELAWARE ‘‘Require, Request or $500 fine a/o 90 days Police (crimes only)
19 DE Code Ann. 704 Suggest’’
DIST. OF COLUMBIA ‘‘Administer, use or $500 fine a/o 30 days Police, Fire,
36 DC Code 801 accept results’’ Corrections
HAWAII ‘‘Require’’ $1,000 fine a/o 1 year Police
21 HI Rev. Stat. Ch 378
IDAHO ‘‘Require’’ Misdemeanor Law enforcement
44 ID Code 903,904
IOWA ‘‘Request or require’’ Serious Misdemeanor & Peace or corrections
IA Code Ann. 730.4 civil enforcement officer
MAINE ‘‘Require, Request or None stated Law Enforcement
32 ME Rev. Stat. 7151 Suggest’’
MARYLAND ‘‘Demand or Require’’ Misdemeanor Fine to Law Enforcement,
MD Ann. Code, Lab. & $100 Corrections
Empl., Section 3-702
MASSACHUSETTS ‘‘Subject or Request’’ Fine $300-$1,000; Fine Criminal cases
MA Ann. Laws Ch 19B to $1,500 a/o 90 days,
2d offense
MICHIGAN ‘‘Request, Require or Misdemeanor $1,000 a/o Applicant requested
MI Comp. Laws Ann. administer’’ 90 days
37.201
MINNESOTA ‘‘Solicit or Require’’ Misdemeanor None stated
MN Stat. Ann. 181.75
MONTANA ‘‘Require’’ Misdemeanor Gov’t
MT Code Ann., 39-2-304
NEBRASKA ‘‘Require’’ Class II Misdemeanor Law Enforcement
NE Rev. Stat. 81-1901
NEW JERSEY ‘‘Influence, Request or Disorderly Person Fine Controlled Substance
NJ Stat. Ann. 2C: 40A Require’’ to $1,000 Mfrs.
Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-IV-B1

STATE AND STATUTE No Employer May ‘‘—’’ PENALTY EXEMPTED

NEVADA ‘‘Request, suggest, Misdemeanor State safety & health,
NV Rev Stat. 613.440 require security employees,
currency or controlled
substance handlers.
OREGON ‘‘Require’’ $500 Fine a/o one year Criminal cases only.
Or. Rev. Stat. 659.225
PENNSYLVANIA ‘‘Require’’ Misdemeanor, 2d degree Police or drug access
18 PA Cons. Stat. Ann. employees
7321
RHODE ISLAND ‘‘Request, require or Fine $200 Law enforcement
28 RI Laws 28-6.1-1 Subject’’
TENNESSEE Specified questions Class C misdemeanor None
TN Code Ann. 62-27-128 prohibited (for examiner)
UTAH ‘‘Require’’ Misdemeanor None
VERMONT ‘‘Request, Require or Fine $500-$1,000 a/o Law enforcement;
21 VT Stat. Ann. 494 administer’’ 6 months, (not precious metals,
suspendable) jewelry or drug mfr
or sale
VIRGINIA No inquiries re sexual Class 1 misdemeanor Incumbent employees
VA Code 40.1-5.4: 3 activities
WASHINGTON ‘‘Require’’ Misdemeanor Law enforcement, drug
WA Rev. Code 49.44.120 dispensers, national
security.
WEST VIRGINIA ‘‘Require or $500 Fine Law enforcement; drug
WV Code, Section Request’’ mfrs or dispensers.
21-5-5a
WISCONSIN ‘‘Require’’ Administrative None penalties.
WI Stat. Ann. 111-37
NOTE: In addition to the foregoing, the following states also prohibit the Voice Stress Analyzer, either by statute or
opinion of the state attorney general: California, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Tennessee and
Wisconsin. (The Federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 also includes the Voice Stress Analyzer and
Psychological Stress Analyzer in its definition of lie detector.)
31-IV-B2 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International

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CHAPTER 31

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-I-1

In 1921 Larson devised an instrument capable of simultaneously recording blood pressure,

31-I-2 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International

THE OPERATION OF THE INSTRUMENT

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-I-3

As a response to these hearings and further expressions of congressional concern, federal

31-I-4 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International

CONDUCTING THE TEST

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-I-5

● First, an examiner can be protected against the possibility of accusations of misconduct,

If the test is to be heard or witnessed by an observer, written consent should be obtained

31-I-6 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International

● ‘‘Have you ever taken anything from your place of employment?’’

● ‘‘Do you drink alcoholic beverages to excess?’’

● ‘‘Have you answered all my questions truthfully?’’

VOICE STRESS ANALYZER

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-I-7

31-I-8 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-I-9

POLYGRAPH vs. VOICE STRESS

1. To date, no credible evidence in information furnished by the manufacturers, the scien-

31-I-10 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International

DOS AND DON’TS

● When the prospective examinee declines to submit to examination voluntarily;

● When the prospective examinee is known to be mentally incompetent, has serious

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-I-11

● Do interrogate and, if possible, use a neutral approach. Obtain an electronically recorded

● Do point out the effectiveness of the polygraph technique.

● Don’t describe it as infallible.

● Do withhold detailed information about the incident from the examinee.

● Do recognize the value of a polygraph test, as it might affect your case.

● Do tell the non-deceptive—truthful—examinee that he or she will be informed of the

● Do ask the examiner any questions which may be bothering you.

31-I-12 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International

● Do work with your examiner as a team member.

● Don’t assume that the examiner prefers to go it alone.

● Do confine your request to specific issues which must be resolved.

● Don’t expect the examiner to conduct a witch hunt for you.

● Do confine your examination to one specific offense.

● Do level with your examiners.

● Don’t conceal investigative techniques or other means you’ve utilized in developing

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-I-13

BEHAVIOR OF UNTRUTHFUL AND TRUTHFUL INDIVIDUALS

31-I-14 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International

QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING OF EXAMINERS

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-I-15

Although adequate training is essential, authorities claim:14

An examiner must be an intelligent person, with a reasonably good educational background—

An earlier Congressional study which demonstrated variances among government agencies

31-I-16 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International

1. Be at least 25 years of age;

2. Be a college graduate from an accredited school;

3. Have at least five years of investigative experience;

4. Undergo a complete background investigation, satisfactory completion of psychological

5. Be of a high moral character and sound emotional temperament.

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-I-17

APPLICATIONS LIMITED BY LEGISLATION

31-I-18 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International

BROAD INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EPPA

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-I-19

ADMISSIBILITY OF THE LIE DETECTOR

31-I-20 Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International

Protection of Assets • Copyright © 2004 by ASIS International 31-I-21