John Leandro Reyes

2015-0591
Modern Africa – HIST 160

ETHNIC-RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: A

CONFLICT RESOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
The Central African Republic (CAR) has seen many conflicts since its independence
from France in 1960. According to a 2007 report by the International Crisis Group, “The Central
African Republic if anything worse than a failed state: it has become virtually a phantom state,
lacking any meaningful institutional capacity at least since the fall of Emperor Bokassa in 1979.”
Since its independence, the country has seen five coups.1
The volatile nature of CAR’s post-colonial political system has caused the establishment
of basic civil liberties and political rights to be very underdeveloped. Freedom House, the global
watchdog monitoring political freedom, categorizes CAR as “not free” with a score of seven
(lowest score possible) for both civil liberties and political rights in its 2015 index. In addition to
recurrent military takeovers of power, CAR has also been afflicted with chronic instability as a
result of various rebel groups taking up arms against the central government. Most of these
rebels turn to insurgency as a result of alleged sectarian exclusion and marginalization.2
Since gaining independence in 1960, CAR has experienced decades of violence and
instability. An insurgency led by the Seleka (or “alliance” in Sango)—a coalition of armed,
primarily Muslim groups—has resulted in the severe deterioration of the country’s security
infrastructure and heightened ethnic tensions. Seleka fighters launched an offensive against the
CAR government in December 2012, and both seized the capital city of Bangui and staged a
coup in March 2013. In response to brutality by Seleka forces, “anti-balaka”
(meaning “invincible” in Sango) coalitions of Christian fighters formed to carry out reprisal
violence against Seleka fighters, adding an element of religious animosity to the violence that
had previously been absent.3
From then on, though there were compromises and conflict resolutions that have been
made, despite the optimism, the crisis only intensified. Even up to the present context the Central
African Republic has witnessed a resurgent bloodbath between armed groups, including the
Muslim Seleka and the Christian anti-Balaka. To be potent, solutions, must not only stop the
fighting but also bridge the underlying intercommunal divisions.
1
Religious Freedom Institute. “Central African Republic: Religious Persecution and Political Conflict.”
Religiousfreedominstitute.org. https://www.religiousfreedominstitute.org/cornerstone/2016/7/14/central-african-
republic-religious-persecution-and-political-conflict (accessed on December 10, 2018).
2
Ibid.
3
Council on Foreign Relations. “Violence in the Central African Republic.” Cfr.org.
https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/violence-in-the-central-african-republic
(accessed on December 10, 2018.)
DISCUSSION
The former French colony descended into violence in 2013 when Seleka rebels toppled
the country’s president, François Bozizé, a Christian from the south, and installed in his place
their leader, Michel Djotodia, a Muslim from the north. This development overturned the long-
standing political setup of the CAR, as for the first time since independence in 1960, a force
from the predominantly Muslim north held sway in the country. The rebels’ rule was marked by
a campaign of executions, indiscriminate killings, rape, looting, and torching of villages
belonging to the majority Christians.4
Within a few months, a backlash ensued from the Christian south, which formed a group
called anti-Balaka that started as a vigilante group to wrest back power and contain Seleka’s
violence. In next to no time, the crisis took on ethno-religious and intercommunal dimensions.
The Seleka posed as the defenders of the CAR’s Muslim 15 per cent, while the anti-Balaka
presented themselves as the protectors of the Christian and animist 85 per cent. Anti-Balaka,
which associated every Muslim with the Seleka, attacked Muslims, looted their properties, and
razed their homes. The Seleka responded by maiming non-Muslims and pillaging their
properties.5
By December 2013, French and African Union (AU) forces had neutralised the Muslim
insurgents in the capital, Bangui. Djotodia was forced to resign as president and went into exile.
This gave the anti-Balaka, whose initial efforts to take over the capital failed, the upper
hand. The anti-Balaka’s self-defence quickly evolved into deliberate targeting of
civilians. Human Rights Watch reported in February 2014 that the militia had slaughtered
Muslim civilians, publicly lynched them, mutilated them, and set their bodies on fire. A UN
inquiry revealed in December 2014 that estimates of those killed in the carnage ranged from
3,000 to 6,000 but noted that “such estimates fail to capture the full magnitude of the killings that
occurred.” The report also found that by March 2014, over 99 per cent of the Muslims in Bangui
had been either killed or forced to flee, while the total Muslim population of the country had
dropped to less than 20 per cent of the total. The UN described the situation as “ethnic
cleansing.”6
The UN Security Council established a 12,000 peacekeeping forces named Minusca,
which the African Union and French Forces and was mandated to protect civilians and support
transition processes. There action plan was marked by commendable efforts by the Transitional
Government, with the support of the international community, to implement the Brazzavile peace
agreement. Transitional Government led preparations, national consultations and sensitization
activities for successful Bangui Forum, held last May of 2015 from 4 to 11. They also took
decisive step to ensure accountability for human rights violations and abuses by adopting the law

4
Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. “Ethno-Religious Violence in the Central African Republic.”
Instititute.global. https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/ethno-religious-violence-central-african-republic
(accessed on December 10,2018).
5
Ibid.
6
Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2014: Central African Republic.” Hrw.org.
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/central-african-republic (accessed on December 10,
2018).
creating Special Criminal Court on June 3, 2015.7 Over two years, the mission made
considerable progress in returning peace to the capital and major cities. However, there has been
a spectacular increase in violence since the last quarter of 2016. In May 2017, the anti-balaka
militia killed more than 140 people in the remote town of Bangassou. More than 300 people have
been killed and 100,000 have been displaced since May. The UN expressed worry over what it
described as “early warning signs of genocide” in the country.
RECOMMENDATION
Consequently, the UN should review, renew, and revamp MINUSCA’s mandate and (1)
increase the troop ceiling for MINUSCA to enable a substantial deterrent capacity; (2) Support
the extension of state authority and rule of law to establish a durable solution in CAR; and (3) the
UN mission needs to become more intimately involved in mediation processes.
First, increasing the troop ceiling for MINUSCA is essential to enable a substantial
deterrent capacity. With the end of the French Sangaris operation in 2016, the departure of
Ugandan troops of the African Union task force and of their US special forces support from the
east, as well as the withdrawal of the Congolese battalion for conduct and discipline issues, the
UN mission has a critical need for reinforcement to uphold its responsibilities and strengthen its
ability to protect civilians and reduce the presence of armed groups.
In addition, strengthening MINUSCA’s police mandate with more units, to secure IDP
camps and ensure their civilian character, facilitate interaction with communities, and
complement the action of military contingents, is essential to ensure continued security provision
in line with the evolution of threats on the ground.
Second, the extension of state authority and rule of law is crucial to establishing a durable
solution in CAR. The UN first needs to address the difficult question of what “restoration and
extension of state authority” means in a context like CAR. MINUSCA should go beyond the
administrative and technical aspects of state authority (including training of public officials and
logistical support for their deployment), as well as simple “support” to the policies of host states.
The UN can better contribute to the definition of such policies in order to ensure they encourage
the peace process and oppose exclusionary and sectarian ideologies, and that the national
political strategy is relevant for sustaining peace. Notably, MINUSCA should adopt a strong
stance against cases of local authorities encouraging violence and exclusion and contributing to
the escalation of tensions. It should support the government in identifying and arresting spoilers
of the peace process, removing state officials with radical viewpoints from public office, shutting
down media conveying hate speech, and promoting an inclusive dialogue to prevent further
radicalization.
Third, the UN mission needs to become more intimately involved in mediation processes.
Mediation is the biggest weakness of MINUSCA, particularly as momentum was lost after the
elections when the newly elected Touadera decided not to negotiate with armed groups before
they disarm. The UN failed to sell a political vision for the peace process to the new
administration, and to encourage a more compromising stance to safeguard the peace dividends
of the Bangui Forum. Since then, and while armed groups have run out of patience and readopted
a confrontational approach, MINUSCA has proven to be too little involved, or effective, in the
7
MINUSCA. “Report on the situation of human rights in the Central African Republic.” Ohchr.org.
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CF/MINUSCA_9Dec2015.pdf (accessed on December 17, 2018). P.4.
mediation attempts.
The UN mission is in a unique position to explore all the relevant tracks of diplomacy
and mediation, from negotiations with government officials and armed groups leaders, to
community dialogue at all levels. The Security Council will, however, need to give MINUSCA
the authority and means to defend a solid political position. From a robust military posture to a
frank dialogue with government, and a deeper connection between community engagement and
political negotiation, MINUSCA will need to define a thorough, multilayered, and sustainable
strategy to step up its action to restore peace, protect civilians, and reverse violent trends that
have the potential to spark genocidal acts.
REFERENCES:
Religious Freedom Institute. “Central African Republic: Religious Persecution and
Political
Conflict.”Religiousfreedominstitute.org.https://www.religiousfreedominstitute.org/cornerstone
/2016/7/14/central-african-republic-religious-persecution-and-political-conflict (accessed on
December 10, 2018).

Council on Foreign Relations. “Violence in the Central African Republic.” Cfr.org.

https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/violence-in-the-central-
african-republic (accessed on December 10, 2018.)

Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. “Ethno-Religious Violence in the Central African
Republic.” Instititute.global. https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/ethno-religious-
violence-central-african-republic (accessed on December 10,2018).

Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2014: Central African Republic.” Hrw.org.
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/central-african-republic (accessed
on December 10, 2018).
MINUSCA. “Report on the situation of human rights in the Central African Republic.”
Ohchr.org. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CF/MINUSCA_9Dec2015.pdf
(accessed on December 17, 2018).