1
CA S E DI G E S T: T E C S ON V S. C O M E L E C "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal"  in connection with Section 4,
12:41 AM
G.R. No. 161434             March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER,  Citizen.
G.R. No. 161634             March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ
G. R. No. 161824             March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the
presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented
material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming
that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being
foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was
a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the
Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve
the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.)   The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of
a candidate” for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are
held.
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.)   Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on
respondent’s birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are
"those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." 
Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced
by the latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His
citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at
the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any
other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954 was
presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to
his son, Allan---respondent’s father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an
American citizen,  was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as
evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on
citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that
respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on
respondent’s citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced
by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs.
COMELEC,et al.
GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700
March 8,2016
Perez, J.:
FACTS:
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections,
Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and that her residence up to day before
May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted
from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn
infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS
SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She
immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to
Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US.
Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen
in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due
to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who
2
then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then
quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother
and finally went home for good to the Philippines
on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition
declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter
and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes
Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225
requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino
Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or
cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among
others, that she cannot be considered a natural born
Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that
her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos.
The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the
ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements and that she committed
misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME
COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6
that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a
natural- born Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency
requirement.
HELD:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born
Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the
constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may
run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are
Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which
are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was
found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality
wherein there is 99% probability that residents there
are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that
Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability
3
and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule
128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a
class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention,
wherein though its enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to
definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born
citizens.
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with
the natural-born citizenship as to the country where
they are being found, as covered and supported by the
UN Convention Law.
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the
10-year residency because she satisfied the
requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to
remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON
REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in
acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting
May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace
Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual
stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile
in the US, coupled with her eventual application to
reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence,
her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.

Case Digest: CLU vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, respondent
G.R. No. 83815             February 22, 1991
FACTS:
 The two petitions in this case sought to declare
unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued by then
President Corazon C. Aquino.
 The petitioners alleged that Section 1, 2 and 3 of EO 284
contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution
 The assailed provisions of EO 284 are as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary
or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in
addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions
in the government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required
in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the
subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any
official hold more than two positions other than his primary
position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such
corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or
assistant secretary.
4
 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, meanwhile, states
that:
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise,
or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
 PETITIONERS CONTENTION: EO 284 adds exceptions
to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the
constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in government
are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice
President (may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet
under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII: “The Vice-President may
be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment
requires no confirmation.”) and the secretary of justice (as
an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII: “A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,
the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
 5

Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the

Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.”)

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional

HELD: Yes. EO 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The court said, by allowing Cabinet members, undersecretaries or

assistant secretaries to hold at least two positions in the government
and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment which is a direct contravention of
the express mandate of Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

The explained that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this

constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to
those particular instances cited in the constitution itself which are
Section 3 of Article VII (for VP) and Section 8 of Article VIII (for
Secretary of Justice).

Thus, the PETITION is GRANTED.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has
arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section
9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
6
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010,
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically
considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most
senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato
C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales;
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18,
2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint
the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any
vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days
from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they
could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII
(Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII
(Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated
in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the
President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court
to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its
“insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC,
the specified period within which the President shall appoint a
Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether
the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an
insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the
JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is,
after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the
JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in
view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the
short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the
Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to
other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department),
provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department),
states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of
7
a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained
in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4
(1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s
or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of
the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained
in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4
(1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the
 8

next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s

or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of
the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the

same character, in that they affect the power of the President
to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only
to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the
framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14
and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments. If that was their intention in
respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only
to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1)
thereof.
 9

refused to be placed under CA's review. She then filed a petition for
certiorari with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a TRO before
the SC, to declare "as unlawful and unconstitutional and without any
legal force and effect any action of the CA on her lawfully extended
appointment on the ground that they have no lawful and
Bautista Vs. Salonga constitutional authority to confirm and to review her appointment.

Meanwhile,
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission onthe CA wrote a letter
Appointments, to Executive
appoint Secretary
the heads of theMacaraig
executive
informing him that the CA disapproved Bautista's
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel "ad interim
or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him inappointment"
this Constitution.asHe shall
Chairperson
also appoint of theofficers
all other CHR.
of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lowerPending thetheresolution
in rank in Presidentofalone,
Bautista's
in the case,
courts,President
or in the Aquino
heads of
departments, agencies, designated Mallillin as "Acting orChairman of the CHR".
commissions, boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the Bautista filed
recess of thea supplemental urgent voluntary
Congress, whether ex-parte motion seeking tobut
or compulsory,
restrain
such appointments shall be effective only until after disapproval by the Mallillin on
Commission from continuing to
Appointments exercise
or until the adjournment
the next functions of of
the Congress. (Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)  chairman. The SC issued a TRO.

CA contends that, granting that Bautista's appointment as Chairman

of the Commission on Human Rights is one that, under Sec. 16, Art.
Facts:  VII of the Constitution, as interpreted in the Mison case, is solely for
the President to make, yet, it is within the president's prerogative to
In August 1987, President Cory Aquino designated petitioner Mary voluntarily submit such appointment to the CA for confirmation.
Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights. In December 1987, she extended to Bautista a Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure of the
permanent appointment as Chairman of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR shall be at the
Commission. Bautista took her oath of office and immediately pleasure of the President.
discharged her functions and duties.

In January 1989, President Aquino extended an "ad interim Issues:

appointment" to Bautista.
In February 1989, the Commission on Appointments, requested
Bautista's presence along with documents as required by its rules in
connection with the confirmation of her appointment. Bautista
1. Does the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR
require the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments?
2. After Bautista took an oath and discharged the functions of the

office, could the President extend an "ad interim appointment" or
any other kind of appointment that called for confirmation by the
CA?
3. Was the appointment or re-appointment of Bautista on January
14, 1989 an ad interim appointment? Does an ad interim
appointments apply to appointments solely for the President to
make, i.e., without the participation of the CA?
4. Can the tenure in office of said Chairman (and Members) be
made dependent on the pleasure of the President?
5. Can Bautista be removed from office?
Held:
1. No. Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, it follows that the
appointment by the President of the Chairman of the (CHR), is to be
made without the review or participation of the Commission on
Appointments.
To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not specifically
provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and
Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are
expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments.
2. Neither the Executive nor the Legislative (Commission on
Appointments) can create power where the Constitution confers
10
none. The evident constitutional intent is to strike a careful and
delicate balance, in the matter of appointments to public office,
between the President and Congress (the latter acting through the
Commission on Appointments). To tilt one side or the other of the
scale is to disrupt or alter such balance of power. In other words, to
the extent that the Constitution has blocked off certain
appointments for the President to make with the participation of the
Commission on Appointments, so also has the Constitution
mandated that the President can confer no power of participation in
the Commission on Appointments over other appointments
exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution. The exercise of
political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be
sustained.
Nor can the Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of
its constitutionally delimited power to review presidential
appointments, create power to confirm appointments that the
Constitution has reserved to the President alone. Stated differently,
when the appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for
the President to make without the participation of the Commission
on Appointments, the executive's voluntary act of submitting such
appointment to the Commission on Appointments and the
latter's act of confirming or rejecting the same, are done without or
in excess of jurisdiction.
Even if the president may voluntarily submit to the commission on
appointments an appointment that under the constitution solely
belongs to her, still, there was no vacancy to which an appointment
could be made on 14 January 1989. When Her Excellency, the
President converted Bautista's designation as Acting Chairman to a
permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights, significantly she advised Bautista (in the same appointment
letter) that, by virtue of such appointment, she could qualify and
enter upon the performance of the duties of the office of Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights. All that remained
 11

for Bautista to do was to reject or accept the appointment. President."

Obviously, she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of
office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo Tenure in office should not be confused with term of office. As Mr.
B. Fernan and assuming immediately thereafter the functions and Justice (later, Chief Justice) Concepcion in his concurring opinion in
duties of the Chairman of the CHR. Bautista's appointment Alba vs. Evangelista, stated:
therefore on 17 December 1988 as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights was a completed act on the part of the President. The distinction between "term" and "tenure" is important, for,
pursuant to the Constitution, "no officer or employee in the Civil
Service may be removed or suspended except for cause, as
3. No. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do provided by law" (Art. XII, section 4), and this fundamental principle
not apply to appointments solely for the President to make, i.e., would be defeated if Congress could legally make the tenure of
without the participation of the Commission on Appointments. Ad some officials dependent upon the pleasure of the President, by
interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 clothing the latter with blanket authority to replace a public officer
Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the before the expiration of his term.
Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim
appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the When Executive Order No. 163 was issued, the evident purpose
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of was to comply with the constitutional provision that "the term of
Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the
make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Commission (on Human Rights) shall be provided by law" (Sec.
Appointments, can not be ad interim appointments. 17(2), Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

As the term of office of the Chairman (and Members) of the

4. No. Previous to Executive Order No. 163-A, or on 5 May 1987,
Executive Order No. 163 was issued by the President, Sec. 2(c) of
which provides:
Sec. 2(c). The Chairman and the Members of the Commission
on Human Rights shall be appointed by the President for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Appointments to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
It is to be noted that, while the earlier executive order (No. 163)
speaks of a term of office of the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights — which is seven (7) years without
reappointment — the later executive order (163-A) speaks of
the tenure in office of the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights, which is "at the pleasure of the
Commission on Human Rights, is seven (7) years, without
reappointment, as provided by Executive Order No. 163, and
consistent with the constitutional design to give the Commission the
needed independence to perform and accomplish its functions and
duties, the tenure in office of said Chairman (and Members) cannot
be later made dependent on the pleasure of the President.
Executive Order No. 163 was declared unconstitutional.
5. Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, as
such, by the President on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance
 12

thereof, is not to say that she cannot be removed from office before
the expiration of her seven (7) year term. She certainly can be
removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to
due process properly safeguarded. (Bautista vs. Salonga, G.R. No.
86439, April 13, 1989)
Issue: Whether or not the new president has the power to
cancel all ad interim appointments made by the previous
president after they have all qualified?

Dominador Aytona vs. Andres Castillo Held: To quote “We are informed, it is Malacañan's practice
— which we find to be logical — to submit ad
interim appointments only when the Commission on
January 19, 1962 4SCRA 1 Appointments is in session. One good reason for the
Ponente: CJ Bengzon practice is that only those who have accepted the
appointment and qualified are submitted for confirmation.
Nevertheless, this time, Malacañan submitted its
appointments on the same day they were issued; and the
Facts: December 19, 1961, Aytona was appointed as ad
Commission was not then in session; obviously because it
interim Governor of Central Bank and took oath and office
foresaw the possibility that the incoming President would
on the same date. Noon of December 30, 1961 President
refuse to submit later the appointees of his predecessor. As
elect D. Macapagal assumed office and subsequently on
a result, as already adverted to, some persons whose
December 31, 1961 issued Order No. 2, cancelling all ad
names were submitted for confirmation had not qualified
interim appointments made by the previous Chief of State.
nor accepted their appointments.” 
On the 1st day of January 1962, Castillo was appointed by
the incumbent president as Governor of Central Bank
therefor replacing the ad interim appointee Aytona, and the
former qualified immediately. Aytona instituted a qou
warranto proceeding challenging the right of Castillo to
exercise his right to the said post.

AYTONA VS CASTILLO
Posted by kaye lee on 11:22 PM
4 SCRA 1 G.R. No. L-19313 January 19 1962 [Midnight Appointment]
FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed
petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank.
Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-
elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued
administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad
interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in
all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the former
President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres
Castillo  as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a
case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly
appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new
President, should be considered void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia
were valid.
13
RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal,
previous President Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker
administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he
ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. 
It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the
political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential
prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in
important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of
deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment
and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the
issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost
all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may,
with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential
prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill
all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and
thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the
corresponding appointments.
Categories: 4 SCRA 1, Constitutional Law 1, G.R. No. L-19313

MONSANTO V. FACTORAN
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.
Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of
the crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify
the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC
affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she
was extended by then President Marcos absolute
pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was
that clemency could be given even before conviction).
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the
Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred
to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be
reinstated to her position without the necessity of a
new appointment not earlier than the date she was
extended the absolute pardon. 
Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full
pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which
implies that her service in the government has never
14
been interrupted and therefore the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her
preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay
for the entire period of her suspension; and that she
should not be required to pay the proportionate share
of the amount of P4,892.50
The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the
President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran
denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto
must first seek appointment and that the pardon does
not reinstate her former position. 
Issues:
1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?
2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a
new appointment?
3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?
Held: 
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding
from the power entrusted with the execution of the
 15

laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is

bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a 2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
crime he has committed. It is the private, though official removing her disqualification from holding public
act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-
communicated officially to the Court. apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a
new appointment.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as
blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of 3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the
the law the offender is as innocent as though he never Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding
committed the offense, it does not operate for all service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is
purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of
or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be
erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the extinguished by the same causes recognized in the
conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due,
It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness. remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor
and debtor, compensation and novation. (Monsanto vs.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989)
makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for
what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the
offense has been established by judicial proceedings,
that which has been done or suffered while they were
in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and
justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be
required.” This would explain why petitioner, though
pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for
lost earnings and benefits. 

LAGMAN VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
August 28, 2018Gracezyl Blancoissue on
justiciability, justiciability, lagman vs executive secretary, lagman vs
medialdea, martial law duterte, political law case
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C.
ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR.
VS. HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN
N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEF’ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO
ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR
G.R. NO. 231658
JULY 4, 2017
FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the whole island of
Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
therein. On May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress
on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required by the
Constitution).
The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist
group in Marawi City. According to the report, the Maute group is an
affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in
Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other parts of
16
Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that
has plagued Mindanao for decades.
Proclamation 216 is now assailed by several petitioners:
LAGMAN PETITION
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano,
Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed this petition
to assail the President’s declaration of Martial Law.
Its main contention is that, the president’s declaration has no sufficient and
factual basis – arguing that acts of terrorism are not equated with rebellion
or invasion. Lagman also contends that the seeming affiliation with ISIS is
only mere propaganda, designed to create an appearance of capability for
the Maute group.
The petition also cited several facts in the president’s report which was
refuted by several media networks and news articles because they turned
out to be false or untrue. Among these was the report about the attack on
Amai Pakpak Hospital, the ransack of the Landbank of the Philippines,
and the burning of several schools.
CULLAMAT PETITION
The Cullamat Petition on the other hand avers that the president fails to
show any acts of rebellion and invasion outside Marawi City. Hence, the
declaration of Martial Law for the whole island of Mindanao has no
sufficient basis. Cullamat also reiterated the false facts in the president’s
report, as pointed out in the Lagman petition.
MOHAMAD PETITION
The Mohamad Petition also avers that the power to declare Martial Law is
a remedy of last resort. It contends that the extraordinary powers of the
President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out

the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial law.
OSG’S CONSOLIDATED COMMENT
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the court should
only review Proclamation 216 under the lens of grave abuse of discretion,
and not on the correctness of facts.
The OSG also further argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should
be examined based on the facts/information that were available to the
president at the time he made the determination. Doing otherwise will
impose an impossible standard on the president’s exercise of discretion.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petition is reviewable by the court under Section 18,
Article VII.
2. WON the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the
actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or
separately.
3. WON the power of judicial review by this Court involves the
calibration of graduated powers granted the President as
Commander-in-Chief, namely (1) calling out powers, (2)
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (3)
declaration of martial law.
4. WON there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
HELD:
17
1.) YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and declaration of martial law is
that the petitioner should be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer.
2.) YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it
specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This is completely independent
from Congress’ duty to review.
It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by the
President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual
basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or
suspension, such a revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand, Congress may take into
consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events
supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court, Congress could probe
deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented
before it.
The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing
of a petition “in an appropriate proceeding” by a citizen. On the other
hand, Congress’ review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be
activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or
suspension was made.
The court held that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review
with, and independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary,
 18

any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels
or deny the Court of its power to review. of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other
independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion
3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the exists.
President’s decision pertaining to which extraordinary power should he
use to avail in a given set of facts or conditions. To do so would be
tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and
an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with
the President.
The sequence of “graduated powers” does not refer to a sequence,
arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This
so-called “graduation of powers” does not dictate or restrict the manner by
which the President decides which power to choose.

4.) YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the

proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information and
data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration.
The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be
limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and
Proclamation.

The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The
President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration
of Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified

news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources
shown to have affirmed the contents thereof.

As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence,
twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered
for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.

Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec
Facts:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President
Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction
during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On
October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
President. None of the disqualification cases against him prospered but
he only placed second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a
Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of
the Mayor of the City of Manila.
19
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada
before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public
office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification.
Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in
relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). 
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that
President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively
restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M.
Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim,
who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to
disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal
and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
Issue:
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having
been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?

Held:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his
civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the
pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous,
and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.  xxxx
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and
accepted by former President Estrada does not actually specify which
political right is restored, it could be inferred that former President
Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s
rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was
the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative
action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5
of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses
20
the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency,
to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in
this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for
violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the
President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only
instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in:
(1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final
conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming
from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress
by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and
its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which
states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,”
expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon
that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the
LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance
of the absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC
is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal
escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other
words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted
plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any
public office, whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional.
21
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the
pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed
to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the
pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former
President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office
have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a
condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil
and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a
preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or
preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually
introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of
a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an
integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself
alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity
contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor
to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an
introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of
rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation
much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on
Respondent’s promise never to seek a public office again, the former
 22

ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself.
Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the
decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd
preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
extended to former President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
206666, January 21, 2015)
 23

Sarmiento v Mison (Constitutional Law) (2) There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
Sarmiento III v Mison

GR No. 79974 December 17, 1987

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Constitution;

Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces otherwise provided for by law;
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest in the President alone.
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.cralaw

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of
contention.

PADILLA, J:

ISSUE:

FACTS: Whether or not the President can appoint Mison without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments
(1) Petitioners contend that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the
constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments.
 24

HELD:
Petition dismissed. President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional
authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority
and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments
pertaining thereto.
(2) It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a
bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the
consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as
already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus"
among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded
the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

In sum: (3) In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and
expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices
presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII,
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII. Consequently, there
including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the
was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone"
Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and
after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the
members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or
2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the
officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those president) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President,
officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second
Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or
provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are
considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law.

RATIO:

(1) By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction

that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it
would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the
first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.