C 06 7 0 3 0 4 971ED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-13804 Doc No.

C06703049 Date: 09/26/2019

TUE VAY 06 08:06:20 1997 [USNATO 1501] WO COPY Page 1 of 3

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FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0654

C NFIDENTIALUSNATO 001501

'D STAFF FOR EXECUTIVE1SSISTANT EDELMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/07

TAGS: AMGT ,'
SUBJECT: OFFfCIAL- 'INFORMAL‘40.

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT E. HUNTER. REASON

1.5 (D).

2. (C) FOLLOWING, FOR YOUR CLEARANCE, IS A DRAFT FRONT-

CHANNEL REPORT ON DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT'S MEETING WITH
GERMAN MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR ISCHINGER AT USNATO ON MAY
2:

(BEGIN TEXT' OF DRAFT CABLE)

PROG 05/02/97
AMB:REHUNTER
POLEC:BCOWELL T:/COWELL/DEPSEC52.DOC
XO:RQ DCM:WRP POLEC:DM/CS ODA:CJ
POL

USMISSION USNATO "

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEgBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USLO SACLANT NORFOLK VA
USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF/SPASAC//
ZEN USDELMC BRUSSELS BE

STATE FOR EUR, S/NIS

STATE PASS NSC FOR VERSHBOW & PIFER; OVP FOR FUERTH
SECDEF FOR USDP, ASD (ISP) MILLER,
DASD (ISP/RUE) KELLEHER, DASD (ISA/EUR)
OSTERTHALER, AND ISA/EUR/NATO '
JOINT STAFF FOR ACJCS(LTG MYERS) AND J5(VADM REDD)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/07

TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, RS
SUBJECT: NATO-RUSSIA - DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH
GERMAN POLDIR ISCHINGER, MAY 2

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-13804 Doc No. C06703049 Date: 09/26/2019
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1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT E. HUNTER. REASON

1.5 (D).

2. - tv.11-- THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND GERMAN POLITICAL

DIRECTOR ISCHINGER, MAY 2 AT THE MISSION, EXCHANGED VIEWS
ON THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER.
OTHER PARTICIPATANTS INCLUDED, ON THE GERMAN SIDE: .KLAUS
SCHARIOTH, HEAD OF THE MFA OFFICE FOR
NATO/SECURITY/DEFENSE AFFAIRS, AND NATO PERMREP VON
RICHTHOFEN; ON THE U.S. SIDE: NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR
EUROPE SANDY VERSHBOW, AMBASSADOR HUNTER, D SPECIAL
ASSISTANT ERIC EDELMAN, AND MISSION NOTETAKER.

3. 4G.}- POLITICAL DIRECTOR ISCHINGER CHARACTERIZED THE

LATEST RUSSIAN DRAFT OF A JOINT NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENT AS
"VERY INTERESTING AND EXTREMELY PROMISING." ISCHINGER
SAID HE WAS "SURPRISED -- IT LOOKS GOOD." SCHARIOTH AND
VON RICHTHOFEN SHARED THAT VIEW.

4. -K4— ISCHINGER SAID GERMANY INCREASINGLY HAS A

DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEM AND MUST BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL
THAT CERTAIN RED LINES ARE NOT CROSSED:

-- NATO SHALL NOT AGREE ANY STEPS WITH RUSSIA THAT COULD
INFRINGE IN ANY WAY ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE
IDENTITY (ESDI).

(VERSHBOW ASKED IF THAT MEANT, FOR EXAMPLE, POLISH

PARTICIPATION IN EUROCORPS, AND ISCHINGER SAID YES, IS
NATO PROMISING RUSSIA SOMETHING THAT WOULD PROHIBIT SUCH
PARTICIPATION?)

-- NATO SHALL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH RUSSIA ON SENSITIVE

POINTS REGARDING WHETHER NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS IN CENTRAL
AND EAST EUROPEAN STATES WOULD BE RULED OUT.

(ISCHINGER EXPLAINED THAT GERMAN POLITICIANS WERE ALREADY

COMPLAINING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT A FOURTH "NO"
COULD BE ADDED TO THE "THREE NO'S." IF THERE WAS TO BE
ANYTHING ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTION BEYOND THE EXISTING
DRAFT CHARTER, GERMANY WOULD PREFER SAYING SOMETHING
OUTSIDE THE CHARTER RATHER THAN INSIDE IT -- FOR EXAMPLE,
IN A LETTER FROM SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA TO FOREIGN
MINISTER.PRIMAKOV OR A SPEAKING NOTE TO BE HANDED OVER.
THIS WOULD BE POLITICALLY PREFERABLE TO ADDITIONAL
LANGUAGE IN THE CHARTER, WHICH WOULD BE THE SECOND OR
THIRD BEST SOLUTION. SIDE LETTERS WOULD ALSO BE BETTER.)

5. -(C--)- THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ASKED WHY THIS WOULD BE

LESS PROBLEMATIC FOR THE GERMANS. ISCHINGER ACKNOWLEDGED
IT WOULD BE "NOT MUCH LESS PROBLEMATIC," BUT THAT NATO
WOULD ONLY HAVE CONFIRMED ITS PREVIOUS UNILATERAL
STATEMENTS. THE SIDE DOCUMENTS WOULD ONLY INTERPRET WHAT
WAS IN THE CHARTER. TALBOTT SAID THAT THE ISSUE CAME UP '
WITH RUSSIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV. MAMEDOV HAD
SAID THERE WAS SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE FORMAT, BUT BOTH

HE AND FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SAID THAT SOMETHING MORE ON

NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE WAS ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL. EDELMAN
SAID THE RUSSIANS HAD WANTED THIS ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE IN
SECTION 5 OF THE CHARTER.

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-13804 Doc No. C06703049 Date: 09/26/2019
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6. -(-H- VERSHBOW NOTED THAT FRENCH MFA POLITICAL

DIRECTOR BLOT HAD SUGGESTED A UNILATERAL DECLARATION,
WITHOUT NEGOTIATION, OF THE "THREE NO'S" AND A "NO" ON
ASSOCIATED INFRASTRUCTURE. THIS WOULD ESSENTIALLY
RESTATE WHAT THE ALLIANCE HAD SAID ALL ALONG. ISCHINGER
SAID THIS WAS EXACTLY WHAT GERMANY WANTED TO DO --
INTERPRET THE EXISTING ALLIANCE POSITION. HE SUGGESTED
MAKING COSMETIC CHANGES TO THE DRAFT CHARTER -- E.G.,
"MEMBERS OF NATO HAVE REAFFIRMED" INSTEAD OF "MEMBERS OF
NATO HAVE STATED." THIS WOULD BE A SMALL CHANGE, WITH NO
CHANGE IN MEANING, MAKING THE TEXT MORE FORMAL.

7. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, REFERRING TO HIS APRIL 30-

MAY 2 VISIT TO MOSCOW ACCOMPANYING THE SECRETARY,
COMMENTED ON HIS STRONG IMPRESSIONS OF THE PERSONALITIES
OF RUSSIAN LEADERS. TALBOTT WAS SURE THAT PRESIDENT'
YELTSIN HAD DECIDED MONTHS AGO THAT HE WOULD GO TO A
SIGNING CEREMONY IN PARIS, REGARDLESS OF THE DETAILS OF
THE FINAL DOCUMENT, AND MEET WITH "HIS FRIENDS HELMUT,
JACQUES, AND BILL." IN A PHONE CALL BETWEEN PRESIDENT
YELTSIN AND SECRETARY ALBRIGHT, YELTSIN HAD SAID THE
PROBLEM WAS SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA. IF IT WAS UP TO
THE SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE OTHER ALLIED HEADS
OF GOVERNMENT, THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM, YELTSIN HAD
ASSERTED.

8. THE IMPLICATION, SAID TALBOTT, WAS THE ALLIANCE

NEEDED TO MAKE SURE THAT SOLANA HAD FULL AUTHORITY IN HIS
FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS. IT ALSO CAST
DOUBT ON THE BELIEF IN SOME QUARTERS THAT, IF THE ALLIES
"HUNKER DOWN, RUSSIA WILL CAVE" ON REMAINING ISSUES. IT
WAS EVIDENT TO TALBOTT THAT A DEAL WITH NATO WOULD BE
VERY HARD FOR THE RUSSIANS TO SWALLOW AS A POLITICAL
MATTER. HE SAID WE NEED TO DO EVERYTHING WE PRUDENTLY
CAN TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NATO-RUSSIA TALKS ARE
A REAL NEGOTIATION. SINCE THE RUSSIANS HAVE RECENTLY
"CAVED" ON SO MANY ISSUES, FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV MUST
BE ABLE TO TELL YELTSIN THERE HAS BEEN SOME MOVEMENT ON
THE NATO SIDE.

9. --te'}---THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THAT, AT SOME POINT,

KEY HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT NEED TO CALL YELTSIN, TO
PUSH THE RUSSIANS OVER THE LINE AND MAKE THEM FEEL BETTER
ABOUT CROSSING IT. ISCHINGER NOTED THAT SOLANA WOULD
MEET WITH TOP RUSSIAN OFFICIALS ON MAY 6, AND THAT
ISCHINGER WOULD SEE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER AFANASSIEVSKY
ON MAY 7.

10. 115}- TALBOTT NOTED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD SHOWN

INTEREST IN WHAT NAME THE NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENT WOULD
HAVE. THE U.S. PREFERRED "CHARTER," BUT COULD LIVE WITH
"ACT." TALBOTT ASKED FOR ISCHINGER'S REACTION TO
"FOUNDING ACT." THE GERMANS SAID IT WOULD BE BETTER TO
AVOID LABELS THAT HAD CONSTIT[JTIONAL CONNOTATIONS.

(END TEXT OF DRAFT CABLE)

HUNTER

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2017-13804 Doc No. C06703049 Date: 09/26/2019