Cases: Constitutional 2 Church vs.

State

Aglipay v. Ruiz

• Religious postage stamps sold by Director of Posts

• It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an event of a religious
character, was not designed as a propaganda for the Catholic Church. Aglipay's prohibition suit
was dismissed.

Garces v. Estenzo

A petty dispute on who should have custody of the statue of San Vicente Ferrer should not have taken
up the time of the Supreme Court. There can be no doubt that the statue was bought with private funds
raised by the barangay council which also decided who should have custody of it. How the cura parroco
got it into his head that he should have custody of the statue defies logic. lt is not, therefore, suprising
to hear statements that religion has no relevance to current problems. Let there be affirmation action
by the churches and less concern for inconsequential matters.

Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon Test)

• The framers of the United States Constitution specifically and purposefully prohibited the
establishment of a state church because of the inherent problems. The Establishment Clause
was designed to avoid state “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity.”
• There exists a three-part test in determining whether the state statutes in question violate the
First Amendment:
o Government’s action must have a secular purpose.
o Government’s action must neither advance nor prohibit religion.
o Government’s action must not result in the excessive government involvement with
religion.

Board of Education v. Allen

• The New York law in question ordered public school officials to lend textbooks, without charge,
to all students in grades 7 through 12, including those in parochial schools.
• The court first addressed the establishment clause, which generally prohibits the government
from establishing, advancing, or giving favour to any religion. The justices held that the primary
purpose of the statute was the improvement of education for all children.

County of Allegheny v. ACLU

• The County’s crèche display contains no other object or figures to detract from its religious
message. Without more, this display is unconstitutional as an improper state endorsement of
the religion represented by the crèche. In contrast, the menorah display is surrounded by a
Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty. Thus, while the menorah is an inherently religious
symbol, the combined effect of placing it in a display with other holiday objects is to downplay
its religious message. The overall setting of the menorah makes it a permissible state-sponsored
 display depicting images of the winter holiday season. Thus, the crèche display violates the
Establishment Clause, while the menorah display does not. The decision of the court of appeals
is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
• Ultimately, in evaluating the effect of government conduct under the Establishment Clause, the
judiciary must ascertain whether “the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be
perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the non-
adherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices.” Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373 (1985).

Lynch v. Donnely

• The Establishment Clause does not require an absolutist approach to any religious symbol.
Rather, the determination requires a fact-sensitive inquiry involving whether the symbol (i) has
a secular purpose, (ii) is principally used to advance religion, or (iii) entangles government with
religion.
• Finally, it would be ironic to prohibit the creche when there are myriad religious symbols and
songs in public places during the holidays, and when Congress and state legislatures still open
public sessions with prayer.
• More than anything else, the case shows that there is flexibility in the Court’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.

Epperson v. Arkansas

Susan Epperson a relatively new teacher in the Little Rock school system was told to use a new textbook
for her 10th grade biology class in the 1965-66 school year. The textbook had a chapter on Darwin’s
theory of evolution. She feared that she may lose her job and be criminally prosecuted for teaching that
chapter. So, she sought a declaratory judgment, stating that the 1928 law was void, and that the State
could not dismiss her for violation of the statute. Parents of two school children joined in Epperson’s
suit.

School District v. Schempp

• The State of Pennsylvania required that ten verses from the Holy Bible be read at the opening of
each day in public school. Children may excuse themselves from the Bible reading with a
parent’s note. A family of the Unitarian faith, the Schempp family, sued to enjoin enforcement
of the Pennsylvania law. The suit alleged that the law violates the First Amendment.
• Therefore, the notion of government’s neutrality towards religion is violated when a majority
imposes one religion in public schools. The Free Exercise Clause does not mean that a majority
could use State government to practice its beliefs. Government should remain out of the
business of religion entirely because that is what the First Amendment demands.
• Abington Tp. v. Schempp is an important decision because it put to rest the question of prayer in
public schools. That did not, however, stop controversy from surrounding the Court’s decision
for many years to follow.

Engel v. Vitale
 • Vitale was the head of the Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 9 in New York.
He directed each teacher to start off each school day with a prayer. As a response, Engel filed
suit in state court claiming the prayer requirement violated the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause.
• Engel v. Vitale as a landmark case prohibits a school from requiring prayer, even though non-
denominational, as it violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Free Exercise Clause

American Bible Society v. City of Manila

• In the course of its ministry, ABS has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospels
throughout Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 1953,
the acting City Treasurer of Manila informed ABS that it was conducting the business of general
merchandise since November 1945 without providing the city with Mayor's permit and
municipal license in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended and Ordinances Nos. 2529,
3028, 3364 and required plaintiff to secure within three days the permit and license fees,
together with compromise covering the period from fourth quarter of 1945 to second quarter of
1952 in P5, 281.45. ABS protested about the requirement but paid to the defendant the said
permit and license fees in the said amount.
• Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:
• (7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights. The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right
to disseminate religious information.
• It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious
pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this
cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila
Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair
its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs.
• With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any
charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of
religious practices.
• It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional,
however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No.
2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to
license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.
Gerona v. Secretary of Education

• Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from their schools
when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag
ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of
conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight
and requested to reinstate their children. This was denied.
• The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an
emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty
which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of
church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.
• The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the
Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity;
that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance
and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the
legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order
No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute
provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about
freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and
reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag
ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to
participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the
public school they were attending.

Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent

• All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory
in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and
Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions.
• Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion
akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional
limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents
relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the
explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and
state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious
ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the
flag ceremony.
• YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.
 • Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among
human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious
profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on
one’s belief. The first is absolute if the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second
is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to
public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent.
• Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
engage in “external acts” or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

INC v CA

• Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly
“offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by
law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against
contrary religious belief.
• [The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that
reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of
religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present
danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment
to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire
policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the
Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in
our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the
free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to
the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroy, the State should not
stand still.