Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition

A Journal on Normal and Dysfunctional Development

ISSN: 1382-5585 (Print) 1744-4128 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/nanc20

Study of the theory of mind in normal aging: focus

on the deception detection and its links with other
cognitive functions

Cristina Calso, Jérémy Besnard & Philippe Allain

To cite this article: Cristina Calso, Jérémy Besnard & Philippe Allain (2019): Study of the theory of
mind in normal aging: focus on the deception detection and its links with other cognitive functions,
Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition, DOI: 10.1080/13825585.2019.1628176

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13825585.2019.1628176

Published online: 12 Jun 2019.

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AGING, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND COGNITION
https://doi.org/10.1080/13825585.2019.1628176

Study of the theory of mind in normal aging: focus on the

deception detection and its links with other cognitive
functions
Cristina Calsoa,b, Jérémy Besnarda and Philippe Allaina,c
a
Laboratoire de Psychologie des Pays de la Loire (EA 4638), Université d’Angers, Maison de la recherche
Germaine-Tillion, Angers cedex 01, France; bUnité Transversale de Recherche Psychogenèse et Psychopathologie.
Cliniques, psychopathologie et psychanalyse (EA 4403), Université Paris 13-Sorbonne Paris Cité, Villetaneuse,
France; cUnité de neuropsychologie, Département de neurologie, CHU d’Angers, Angers cedex 01, France

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Detection of deception is crucial to avoid negative circumstances Received 7 July 2018
(financial frauds, social tricks) in daily living. Considering that this Accepted 29 May 2019
cognitive function is especially supported by the prefrontal cortex KEYWORDS
of the human brain and that these cerebral regions change with Older adults; theory of mind;
advanced age, deception detection may also change with aging. deception; cooperation;
Our purpose is to study this complex ability and its potential links executive functions
with other cognitive functions, such as the executive control, in
normal aging. Thirty-five young adults (YA) aged from 20 to 40,
thirty-five old adults (OA) aged from 65 to 79 and thirty very old
adults (VOA) aged from 80 to 95 were involved in this study. We
propose a novel neuropsychological test (inspired by Theory of
Mind Picture Story task) assessing the ability to understand decep-
tive and cooperative interactions, and tasks involving executive
processes (monitoring, task setting, flexibility) to all participants.
Between-group analyses show that older participants performed
worse than YA on deceptive, cooperative and mixed situations
(involving deception and reciprocity) of our task. Significant corre-
lations exist between the deception-cooperation detection and
the executive functions. Our results show that these frontal abil-
ities decline after 65 years, even more after 80 years, and they are
involved on the deceptive-cooperative situations. The verbal IQ is
also linked with the deception-cooperation detection. This sug-
gests that mixed cognitive trainings would allow older adults to
detect more easily bad intentions of others, to adjust their beha-
vior to context and to achieve their goals with less risk.

Introduction
The study of normal cognitive aging is very widespread (Harada, Natelson Love, &
Triebel, 2013; Harrington et al., 2017; Samson & Barnes, 2013). Nevertheless, structural,
functional and cognitive aging-related changes (Anderson & Craik, 2000; Lindberg, 2012;
Nissim et al., 2016; Tisserand, van Boxtel, Gronenschild, & Jolles, 2001) encourage
researchers to assess cognitive processes especially supported by the frontal regions

CONTACT Cristina Calso cricalso@gmail.com

© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 C. CALSO ET AL.

of human brain (e.g., Cox et al., 2014; Kennedy & Raz, 2009). In fact, cortical thickness
(Thambisetty et al., 2010; Yuan & Raz, 2014) and volume changes have been reported for
these cerebral regions more than for other areas, such as temporal, parietal and occipital
regions (Farokhian, Yang, Beheshti, Matsuda, & Wu, 2017; Haug & Eggers, 1991; Raz,
2000; Tisserand et al., 2002). If frontal lobes change with advanced age, the cognitive
processes they support could deteriorate earlier than other abilities supported by non-
frontal regions (“frontal hypothesis of cognitive aging”; West, 1996).
A large number of abilities depend on the integrity of frontal lobes, including the
motor and premotor cortex (essential to prepare, execute and control movements), and
the prefrontal cortex characterized by lateral, medial and ventral regions (Kolb &
Whishaw, 2008). The prefrontal cortex supports very complex cognitive functions, such
as attention, working memory, planning (MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002) and
understanding of others’ perspectives and emotional/affective states (known as cogni-
tive and affective theory of mind; Duval, Piolino, Bejanin, Eustache, & Desgranges, 2011).
These abilities are necessary to make different activities of daily living (e.g., to run some
errands, to plan holidays) and to adapt the behavior to a novel task or context (e.g., to
evaluate rewards/risks, to have good social interactions) (Stuss, 2008).
In the last thirty years, a differential (not global) deterioration of frontal lobe functions
was observed with advanced age (Denburg & Hedgcock, 2015; Lamar & Resnick, 2004;
MacPherson et al., 2002), but few studies (Calso, 2017; Calso, Besnard, & Allain, 2016) focused
on the four categories of abilities described by Stuss and Levine (2002; see also Stuss &
Knight, 2013). These authors described four categories of frontal lobe functions, each one
supported by a specific frontal region and interconnected (Stuss, 2011; Stuss & Alexander,
2007): 1. cognitive executive functions (monitoring and task setting), 2. energization or
psychological activation (involved on tasks that require speeded responses), 3. behavioral/
emotional self-regulation and decision-making (motivational, reward/risk aspects of beha-
vior), 4. metacognitive functions (self-consciousness, theory of mind, detection of deception)
(Stuss, 2008).

Deception detection
In the present study, we focus in particular on one of these frontal processes: the
deception detection, which is essential to understand other people’s intentions and
to avoid frauds and tricks (acting to deceive or outwit someone) in daily living. The
need to distinguish between real cooperation and deception can be considered as
a crucial element in the evolution of primate and human cognition and as the source
of complex social interactions between individuals (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006).
Deception has been used across a wide range of areas such as social psychology,
economy and marketing since 1921 (Nicks, Korn, & Mainieri, 1997), and the percen-
tage of deception studies peaked in the 1970s (Gross & Fleming, 1982). As suggested
by Ortmann and Hertwig (2002), fluctuations of this percentage may reflect different
definitions of deception proposed over time. Deception was defined as “the provision
of information that actively misled subjects regarding some aspect of the study” (Adair,
Dushenko, & Lindsay, 1985), as “an explicit misstatement of fact” (Nicks et al., 1997), as
“telling subjects the wrong things” (in other words, lying; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2008).
Nevertheless, “not telling subjects things” (Hey, 1998), or “withholding information
 AGING, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND COGNITION 3

about research hypotheses, the range of experimental manipulations” (Hertwig &

Ortmann, 2008) are not considered as deception. In this way, deception would be
constituted by an intentional misrepresentation of the purpose of an experiment.
Starting from these definitions, we aimed to study the detection of deception as the
ability to observe and understand social situations (without any information about
the purpose of our experiment), which involve tricks. This metacognitive function is
involved in common interpersonal interactions (Stuss, 2008) and could impact
elderly’s autonomy, confidence, assurance and quality of life.
From a morphological and functional point of view, detection of deception seems to
be supported by the medial frontal regions of human brain, particularly by the right
ventral regions (32 patients with different focal frontal lesions in Stuss, Gallup, &
Alexander, 2001; see also Asp et al., 2012; Lissek et al., 2008). Stuss et al. (2001) also
showed that right frontal lesions impaired visual perspective taking, the ability to
understand others’ perspectives. In particular, their results suggest that the subjects
needed “affective connections” (among ventromedial frontal regions/amygdala and
other limbic regions) on deception tasks, and that they needed cognitive processes,
supported by the superior medial frontal regions, on attribution of intention tasks.
Patients with right frontal lesions were impaired in a variety of tasks involving theory
of mind, especially appreciation of second order mental states (e.g., A thinks that
B thinks . . .), distinguishing jokes from lies or recognizing deception (Brüne & Brüne-
Cohrs, 2006; Rinaldi, Marangolo, & Baldassarri, 2002; Siegal, Carrington, & Radel, 1996;
Winner, Brownell, Happé, Blum, & Pincus, 1998).
In the study realized by Asp et al. (2012), patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex
damage (mean age 60.4 years; n = 18) were more credulous to misleading ads and
showed the highest intention to purchase the products in the misleading advertise-
ments than patients with brain damage outside of the prefrontal cortex (mean age
50.2 years; n = 21) and healthy participants (mean age 60.7 years; n = 10). These results
support the False Tagging Theory, which posits that the prefrontal cortex is critical in
mediating doubt, and they could explain poor financial decision-making when persons
with ventromedial prefrontal dysfunctions (e.g., caused by neurological injury or aging)
were exposed to persuasive information (Asp et al., 2012). A recent study by Spreng
et al. (2017) showed that financial exploitation was associated with brain differences in
regions involved in socio-emotional functioning.
Langleben et al. (2002) measured the brain activity during simulated deception task, the
Guilty Knowledge Test. The increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex, the superior
frontal gyrus, and the left premotor, motor, and anterior parietal cortex was specifically
associated with deceptive responses. Langleben et al. (2002) suggested that the inhibition
of the truthful response may be a basic component of intentional deception.
Lissek et al. (2008) proposed a functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm to
13 young healthy volunteers (mean age 26.46 years) in order to determine the brain
areas of the theory of mind network involved in reasoning about cooperative and
deceptive interactions. They used cartoons depicting cooperation, deception or
a combination of both, where two characters cooperated to deceive a third (Theory of
Mind Picture Story task; Brüne, 2003). Their results showed that both deception and
cooperation activated the bilateral temporoparietal junction, the parietal and cingulate
4 C. CALSO ET AL.

regions, while deception alone additionally involved the orbitofrontal and medial pre-
frontal regions (Lissek et al., 2008).
Brain areas such as the prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortices, that are
associated with both social understanding and executive function, activate when one
engages in deception (Ruffman, Murray, Halberstadt, & Vater, 2012).

Deception detection in normal aging

Many researchers assessed theory of mind (for review, see Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, &
Bailey, 2013; Kemp, Després, Sellal, & Dufour, 2012; Moran, 2013) and decision-making
(e.g., Beitz, Salthouse, & Davis, 2014; Han et al., 2016; Zamarian, Sinz, Bonatti, Gamboz, &
Delazer, 2008) in normal aging, but only few studies focused on the detection of
deception (e.g., James, Boyle, & Bennett, 2014; Judges, Gallant, Yang, & Lee, 2017),
despite the frequent financial frauds and social tricks reported by older adults (e.g.,
theft, mugging, deceit, people took advantage of them). For example, James et al. (2014)
and Judges et al. (2017) analyzed the susceptibility to scams and the experience with
fraud respectively, showing a greater older adults’ vulnerability. As older people increas-
ingly surf the Internet and use different software in their daily lives, a common form of
deception is conducted online (Perrin & Duggan, 2015; cited by Ebner et al., 2018). The
results described by Ebner et al. (2018) showed that a greater susceptibility awareness in
middle-old age (mean age 80 years; n = 16) was associated with better positive affect,
short-term memory and verbal fluency.
Stanley and Blanchard-Fields (2008) presented 20 interviews (crime and opinion
topics) to 171 young adults and 193 older adults and asked them to decide whether
each interview subject was lying or telling the truth. The participants were divided
among three presentation conditions (visual, audio, or audiovisual) so that there were
approximately 55 young adults (mean age 20.60 years) and 55 older adults (mean age
70.72 years) in each condition. Findings showed some age-related differences in deceit
detection accuracy. In older adults, reduced emotion recognition (facial expressions) was
related to poor deceit detection in the visual condition for crime interviews only.
Slessor et al. (2012) assessed adult age-related differences in both the association
between averted gaze and judgments of deception and the strength of the “deceiver
stereotype”. This study involved 46 young adults (mean age 21.1 years) and 44 older
adults (mean age 72.7 years). The results showed that, when the participants had to
decide whether individuals were lying, older adults were less likely to associate direct gaze
with honesty and averted gaze with deception than young adults. This effect was not due
to age-related differences in the strength of the deceiver stereotype, both young and
older participants associated averted gaze with lying (Slessor et al., 2012).
In the study realized by Ruffman et al. (2012), older adults (mean age 71.03 years;
n = 30) were worse than young adults (mean age 20.96 years; n = 30) at telling when
speakers were telling the truth versus lying in the lie detection task using videos. In this
task, the participants judged the veracity of young and older speakers’ opinions about
topical issues. Older adults were relatively transparent in that both young and older
participants found it easier to differentiate the truths and lies of older adults compared
to young adults. All participants were not advantaged when judging a speaker from the
 AGING, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND COGNITION 5

same age group. Older adults were worse at detecting lies. Age differences in lie
detection were mediated by age differences in emotion recognition.
Slessor, Phillips, Ruffman, Bailey, and Insch (2014) explored own-age biases in decep-
tion detection using videos of younger and older speakers. Older participants (mean age
72.04 years; n = 47) showed an own-age bias: they were more likely to think that
deceptive speakers of their own age, relative to younger speakers (mean age
19.73 years; n = 40), were telling the truth. Older participants were also more confident
in their judgments of own-age, relative to other-age, speakers. Nevertheless, both age
groups of participants trusted younger speakers who had previously told the truth more
compared to those who had lied.
Sweeney and Ceci (2014) created and used spontaneous (e.g., unrehearsed) pro-social
lies in an ecological setting. This study involved 84 college students (mean age
19.58 years) and 77 older adults (mean age 73.77 years). They had to detect lies in
three modalities: audio, visual, and audiovisual. Both age groups were best at detecting
lies in the audiovisual and worst in the visual modalities. Older adults had worst ability
to detect deception in comparison with college students. Furthermore, older adult males
were the hardest to detect. There was an age-matching effect for college students but
not for older adults (Sweeney & Ceci, 2014).
El Haj and Antoine (2018) assessed the young (mean age 21.71 years; n = 45) and older
(mean age 67.64 years; n = 42) adults’ tendency to deceive. The results showed that older
adults had a low tendency to deceive in the deception scale (including items such as “I
sometimes tell lies if I have to” or “I never take things that don’t belong to me”) and they
also had a low performance in the inhibition task administered than young participants.
The low tendency to deceive in the older adults was significantly correlated with their
diminished inhibitory ability. Older adults’ performances were probably related to their
difficulty in inhibiting an honest response (El Haj & Antoine, 2018).

Links between deception detection and other cognitive functions

Some studies showed significant relationships between theory of mind and other
cognitive functions, showing an involvement of memory (Naito, 2003) and executive
processes, essential to adapt the behavior to novel contexts and to achieve complex
tasks (Aboulafia-Brakha, Christe, Martory, & Annoni, 2011; Bailey & Henry, 2008; Bottiroli,
Cavallini, Ceccato, Vecchi, & Lecce, 2016; Bull, Phillips, & Conway, 2008; Charlton, Barrick,
Markus, & Morris, 2009; German & Hehman, 2006; Moran, 2013; Phillips et al., 2011;
Rakoczy, Harder-Kasten, & Sturm, 2012), on metacognitive tasks (see also Calso, Besnard,
& Allain, 2019). There seems also to exist significant links between detection of decep-
tion and executive functions, such as working memory (Christ, Van Essen, Watson,
Brubaker, & McDermott, 2009). Furthermore, deception-related regions in the dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior
insula and anterior cingulate cortex were also associated with executive control (Christ
et al., 2009). A recent study (El Haj, Antoine, & Nandrino, 2017) showed the involvement
of deception and theory of mind in destination memory (41 participants had to remem-
ber to whom a piece of information had previously been told; mean age 27 years). El Haj
et al. (2017) explained that deception requires monitoring and inferring what subjects
know, suspect and believe.
6 C. CALSO ET AL.

Calso et al. (2019) showed that old (mean age 68.9 years; n = 30) and very old (mean
age 83.3 years; n = 20) adults’ performances on the Modified Picture Stories-Theory of
Mind Questionnaire (MPS-TOMQ; a task measuring the ability to infer others’ mental
states across visual information) correlated with other metacognitive measures, such as
the performances observed on classical theory of mind tasks (false belief and reading
the mind in the eyes).

Objectives of the present study

In this way, our first goal was to assess the ability to understand deceptive and
cooperative (working/acting together to the same end) situations with advanced age.
Our second purpose was to study the potential correlations existing between deception-
cooperation detection and other cognitive functions, such as the executive functions, in
normal aging. Starting from the literature, we hypothesized that older adults perform
worse than young adults on deception detection tasks involving cognitive processes
supported by the ventromedial regions (Asp et al., 2012; Lissek et al., 2008; Stuss et al.,
2001), which seem to change largely in normal aging (Lindberg, 2012). Considering the
nature and the complexity of deception tasks, we also aimed at testing the hypothesis
that the detection of deception correlates with executive functions, such as reasoning,
verbal fluency and working memory, including updating, inhibition and flexibility
(Miyake et al., 2000).

Method
Participants
One hundred healthy subjects (35 young [YA], 35 old [OA] and 30 very old adults [VOA])
were involved in this study. YA (17 men and 18 women) were aged from 20 to 40 (mean
[M] = 25.43, standard deviation [SD] = 4.32), OA (11 men and 24 women) were aged from 65
to 79 (M = 68.40, SD = 3.45) and VOA (5 men and 25 women) were aged from 80 to 95
(M = 83.37, SD = 3.47). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
hearing, and no previous record of neurological, medical, or psychiatric disorders (healthy
questionnaire). They provided written informed consent to participate to the experiment,
and the study was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
We observed that YA had a mean of years of education (M = 16.23 years, SD = 2.81)
higher than that of OA (M = 14.20 years, SD = 2.58) and VOA (M = 9.10 years, SD = 4.26)
(see Table 1). Older participants’ global cognitive functioning was normal (for a normal
range ≥ 26/30, OA’s Mini Mental State Examination [MMSE] scores: M = 28.40, SD = 1.61;
VOA’s MMSE scores: M = 27.23, SD = 1.91).

Materials and procedure

Global and frontal cognitive functions
Global and frontal cognitive functioning was studied. The MMSE (M. F. Folstein, Folstein,
& McHugh, 1975) assessed global abilities, such as temporal and spatial orientation,
memory, attention, written and oral comprehension, visuoconstruction. We proposed to
 AGING, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND COGNITION 7

Table 1. Participants’ general characteristics (sex and education, level of depression), cognitive
functions (MMSE, NART, FAB) and behavior (DEX). The mean scores, standard deviations (SD),
p-values concerning the one-way ANOVA and the ANCOVA are indicated.
Test-Group Yong Adults Old Adults Very old Adults P-value
Mean (SD) n = 35 n = 35 n = 30 P-value ANCOVA
a
Sex (Men/Women) 17/18 11/24 5/25 _
Age 25.43 (4.32) 68.40 (3.45) 83.37 (3.47) < .001 b _
Education (years) 16.23 (2.81) 14.20 (2.58) 9.10 (4.26) < .001 b _
GDS _ 1.43 (1.72) 2.83 (1.70) .002 c _
MMSE _ 28.40 (1.61) 27.23 (1.91) .01 c _
NART 25.31 (4.60) 27.60 (4.49) 24.93 (5.26) .05 b .004
FAB 17.54 (0.78) 15.94 (1.76) 13.60 (2.06) < .001 b < .001
DEX (global score) 22.37 (11.70) 17.43 (9.32) 20.23 (9.33) N.S. b .003
DEX EF 4.40 (2.83) 3.09 (1.99) 3.50 (2.49) N.S. b .003
DEX AR 7.71 (4.87) 5.80 (4.02) 6.93 (4.47) N.S. b .04
DEX MC 6.97 (3.60) 5.94 (3.32) 7.10 (3.23) N.S. b .02
GDS: Geriatric Depression Scale, MMSE: Mini Mental State Examination, NART: National Adult Reading Test, FAB: Frontal
Assessment Battery, DEX: Dysexecutive Questionnaire, EF: Executive Functions, AR: Auto-regulation, MC:
Metacognitive functions, N.S.: Non-significant. a χ2 test (analysis of the sex ratio), b One-way ANOVA (young adults/
old adults/very old adults), c Student’s t-test (old adults/very old adults).

all participants (young, old and very old) the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson,
1982) in order to assess the verbal IQ across previous word knowledge for correct
pronunciations. The Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB; French version, Dubois,
Slachevsky, Litvan, & Pillon, 2000) provided a global measure of frontal functions, and
included similitudes, prehension, Luria’s sequence, conflicting instructions, go-no go,
60 seconds verbal fluency (VF) task.

Executive functions and memory

Even if the phonemic VF (“S”) is included in the FAB, we chose to propose 2 minutes
phonemic and semantic VF task (Cardebat et al., 1996) to allow the study of executive
processes, such as spontaneous flexibility, inhibition and updating abilities during
a longer duration (Shao, Janse, Visser, & Meyer, 2014). The participants had to generate
as many words as possible starting with the letter “S” for the phonemic VF task, or in the
“animals” category for the semantic one. Monitoring and task setting seem to be
particularly involved in the first 15 seconds of the VF task, energization in the last 45/
60 seconds of the same task (“F, A, S”; Stuss, 2011).
The Modified Card Sorting Test (MCST; Godefroy & Grefex, 2008; Nelson, 1976) was
used to study a number of frontal (e.g., cognitive flexibility, inhibition, monitoring) and
non frontal lobe functions (e.g., memory). We chose this task because it is a brief version
of the original one (Milner, 1963), using 48 cards (24 cards shown 2 times) rather than
128 cards (Milner, 1963) or 64 cards (Stuss et al., 2000). In the MCST, the experimenter
shows to the participant one card (among 24), that the participant has to associate to
another card (among 4), according to one of 3 unknown/implicit criteria (form, color,
number). After 6 correct responses, the subject has to change the association, choosing
another criterion. The order of criteria chosen by participants is accepted, provided they
respect this order during the task (e.g., color, form, number, color, form, number). With
MCST, we assessed the participants’ ability to categorize and to benefit from the
experimenter’s feedbacks (“yes” or “no”) following each association.
8 C. CALSO ET AL.

The learning of 16 words (immediate recall), their free and cued recall (Van der Linden
et al., 2004) assessed short- and long-term memory abilities, as well as working memory.

Behavior
The participants’ everyday behavior was studied with the Dysexecutive Questionnaire
(DEX; French self-report version, Allain et al., 2004), including 20 items scored on
a 5-points Likert scale. We chose this questionnaire because its items are particularly
correlated with the frontal lobe functions (executive cognitive functions [DEX EF],
behavioral and emotional auto-regulation [DEX AR], metacognitive functions [DEX MC];
Simblett & Bateman, 2011).

Deception and cooperation detection

The nature of the psychological experiment is essential because the experimenter
could deceive participants (Ortmann & Hertwig, 2002), be truthful about the
setting and purpose of the experiment through first-hand experiences with decep-
tion (e.g., Prisoner’s Dilemma Game), or choose to assess individual ability to
detect deception across indirect experiences. In this second case, each participant
would observe some scenes, videos or pictures involving deceptive situations (e.g.,
Theory of Mind Picture Story task; Brüne, 2003). We highlight that the effects
(affective and cognitive responses) of direct experiences with deception are not
clear yet. Some studies focused on moral costs and benefits of deception (e.g.,
Bortolotti & Mameli, 2006), on people’s ability to detect deception in legal settings
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2008), but their goals were different than ours. Thus, we
chose indirect experience of deception.
Considering that social situation experiments had a complicated structure (as a multilevel
game) and that a number of participants reacted adversely to non-cooperative behavior in
some situations (e.g., in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game; Ortmann & Hertwig, 2002), for
this study, the detection of deceptive and cooperative interactions was studied with a novel
French task, the MPS-TOMQ, inspired by the Theory of Mind Picture Story task (Brüne, 2003).
We drew 6 picture stories adapting characters’ age and situations to elderly (e.g., to ask for
help, to be deceived): 2 stories involving deception, 2 stories involving cooperation and 2
mixed stories, involving both types of interaction. Our task includes the reproduction of 2
picture stories of the Brüne’s task (Over the wall, Bike accident) and 4 original picture stories
representing social interaction between young and older adults (see Figure 1). Each story
has 4 pictures, which have to be arranged into a logical/chronological sequence (MPS;
highest possible score was 36). For that, subjects were timed. Then, starting from the correct
sequence, the participants answered to a series of questions concerning each picture story
(TOMQ; highest possible score was 33). Below, some examples of questions included in the
TOMQ: what does the person wearing a blue t-shirt think is in the bag?/what does the
person wearing a blue t-shirt believe the person wearing an orange t-shirt intends to do?
(first-/second-order belief), what do you think the person wearing an orange t-shirt intends
to do? (deception detection), what does the bald person expect from the other person?
(cooperation detection). The TOMQ included one control question for each story in order to
assess the detection of reality, relatively to the picture stories (e.g., what is in the bag?). We
thus obtained 2 global scores for each participant for the sequences and questionnaires
respectively, and a time score only for the MPS. An alternative analysis of the participants’
 AGING, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND COGNITION 9

(a) (b)

(c)

Figure 1. Examples of picture stories of the MPS-TOMQ task, involving (a) deceptive or (b)
cooperative interactions, and (c) both situations (deception and reciprocity).

performances on the MPS-TOMQ task was realized to obtain an individual score for each
story category (deceptive, cooperative, mixed interactions), including sequences and ques-
tionnaires scores concerning 2 stories at a time.

Statistical analyses
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and ANCOVA (with level of education as covariate)
allowed between-groups analysis when statistical comparisons were made among 3 groups of
data (YA/OA/VOA). Bonferroni’s method was used for multiple comparisons (α = .05 for 3
comparisons and α’ = .0167 for each comparison: YA/OA, YA/VOA, OA/VOA). Student’s t-test
was used when the comparisons were made between 2 groups of data (OA/VOA). Links
between quantitative variables were calculated with the Pearson’s correlation coefficients ρ
for each group of participants (all correlation tests are carried out between 2 variables at a time;
α < .05). Linear regression allowed better understanding of the role of studied variables on the
detection of deception.
10 C. CALSO ET AL.

Results
Between-group analyses
General characteristics of the participants
Table 1 shows the means (SD) and p-values of the one-way ANOVA and the ANCOVA
obtained from the 3 groups of data regarding the general characteristics of population.
A χ2 (chi-squared) test was carried out in order to exclude the possible dependence
between the variables “sex” and “group”. The results show that these 2 variables were
independent (χ2 test is non significant; α < .05). The results of ANOVA and post-hoc test
show that the participants’ level of education was significantly different (F(2, 97) = 40.73;
p < .001; η2 = .46): YA/OA (Bonferroni’s method: c = 2.03; p = .03), YA/VOA (c = 7.13;
p < .001), OA/VOA (c = 5.10; p < .001).

Global and frontal cognitive functions

Between-group analysis on the global cognitive functioning indicates that OA per-
formed better than VOA at the MMSE (Student’s t(64) = 2.67; p = .01; Cohen’s d = .66).
NART scores were not significantly different, even if OA’s scores were higher than those
of the other participants at this task (F(2, 97) = 3.08; p = .05; η2 = .06). OA generally
performed better than VOA (c = 2.67; p = .08). The results of the ANCOVA show
a significant difference between our 3 groups of participants for the NART (effect of
group: F(2, 94) = 5.87; p = .004; η2 = .09; effect of education: F(1, 94) = 18.65; p < .001;
η2 = .14). Nevertheless, this difference has not been confirmed by the post-hoc test.
Concerning the global frontal lobe functioning, the participants’ performances at the
FAB were significantly different (F(2, 97) = 48.98; p < .001; η2 = .50). In particular, YA had
higher scores than OA (c = 1.60; p < .001) and VOA (c = 3.94; p < .001), and OA
performed better than VOA (c = 2.34; p < .001).

Behavior
The measure on participants’ everyday behavior (DEX) doesn’t show any significant
differences between data groups. The results show a great heterogeneity in the parti-
cipants’ responses (see Table 1). Only DEX scores concerning questions related with
executive functions were slightly different (F(2, 97) = 2.60; p = .08; η2 = .05): YA generally
obtained higher scores relative to OA (c = 1.31; p = .08). The ANCOVA allows to show
some significant differences concerning the scores obtained at the DEX (see Table 1). An
effect of group (F(2, 94) = 6.02; p = .003; η2 = .10) and an effect of education (F(1,
94) = 12.72; p < .001; η2 = .10) on the DEX scores have been shown, differences not
confirmed by the post-hoc test. No group x education interaction has been shown.

Executive functions and memory

Significant differences were found for the 2 minutes phonemic VF task (F(2, 97) = 14.43;
p < .001; η2 = .23). YA produced a higher number of words beginning by “S” in 120 seconds
than OA (c = 4.03; p = .04) and VOA (c = 8.96; p < .001). OA performed better than VOA on
this task (c = 4.93; p = .01). Taking into account the first 15 seconds of the phonemic VF task,
some differences appeared (F(2, 97) = 6.14; p = .003; η2 = .11), with VOA performing worse
than YA (c = 1.33; p = .002). During the last 45/60 seconds of the phonemic VF task, we
 AGING, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND COGNITION 11

Table 2. Mean scores and response times for our sample. Standard deviations (SD) are within
parentheses. The p-values for the one-way ANOVA and the ANCOVA are also reported (between-
groups analysis for the measures of the cognitive functions, especially executive and memory
processes).
Test-Group Yong Adults Old Adults Very old Adults P-value P-value
Mean (SD) n = 35 n = 35 n = 30 ANOVA ANCOVA
Phonemic VF 15/60s 5.43 (1.56) 4.86 (1.50) 4.10 (1.52) .003 N.S.
Phonemic VF 45/60s 9.31 (3.80) 7.83 (3.74) 5.20 (2.50) < .001 N.S.
Phonemic VF 120s 23.26 (7.54) 19.23 (6.46) 14.30 (5.90) < .001 N.S.
Phonemic VF Err 0.03 (0.17) 0.09 (0.28) 0.13 (0.43) N.S. N.S.
Semantic VF 15/60s 9.23 (2.12) 9.43 (2.34) 8.53 (2.13) N.S. N.S.
Semantic VF 45/60s 15.94 (4.01) 13.34 (3.89) 11.10 (4.67) < .001 .02
Semantic VF 120s 39.31 (9.19) 33.57 (9.24) 28.50 (7.63) < .001 .01
Semantic VF Err 0 (0) 0.03 (0.17) 0.07 (0.25) N.S. .04
Learning (16 words) 15.86 (0.35) 15.43 (0.85) 15.43 (1.01) .04 N.S.
Free + cued recall 15.71 (0.41) 15.24 (0.80) 13.92 (1.95) < .001 .002
Long-term recall 16 (0) 15.86 (0.49) 14.63 (1.43) < .001 < .001
Recognition 16 (0) 15.80 (0.47) 15.37 (1.03) < .001 .01
Memory task Err 0.26 (0.66) 1.14 (1.52) 2.07 (2.05) < .001 .02
MCST Category 5.86 (0.35) 5.23 (1.03) 4.27 (1.11) < .001 < .001
MCST Err 4.26 (3.99) 9.31 (6.72) 13.80 (5.27) < .001 < .001
MCST Nelson’s Err 1.40 (1.80) 4.20 (4.66) 6.27 (3.64) < .001 .008
MCST Milner’s Err 2.63 (2.25) 4.74 (2.96) 6.73 (2.49) < .001 .001
MCST Time (s) 187.43 (55.49) 277.17 (106.77) 363.43 (81.84) < .001 < .001
VF: Verbal fluency, s: seconds, Err: Errors, MCST: Modified Card Sorting Test, N.S.: Non-significant.

obtained similar results (F(2, 97) = 11.70; p < .001; η2 = .19) but, in this case, YA (c = 4.11;
p < .001) and OA (c = 2.63; p = .008) performed better than VOA. There were no differences
between the number of errors made by the participants on this task (see Table 2). The
ANCOVA doesn’t show any significant differences between our participants’ performances
in the phonemic VF task (see Table 2). There is a small effect of education for the words
pronounced in the first 15 seconds (F(1, 94) = 4.27; p = .04; η2 = .02) and during 120 seconds
of this VF task (F(1, 94) = 10.1; p = .002; η2 = .04).
The participants’ performances were significantly different on the 2 minutes semantic
VF task (category of “animals”) (F(2, 97) = 12.36; p < .001; η2 = .20). YA performed better
than OA (c = 5.74; p = .02) and VOA (c = 10.81; p < .001), and OA generally produced
a higher number of words than VOA (c = 5.07; p = .06) on the semantic VF task. During
the last 45/60 seconds of this task, we obtained similar results (F(2, 97) = 10.93; p < .001;
η2 = .18). YA performed better than OA (c = 2.60; p = .03) and VOA (c = 4.84; p < .001). No
significant difference was shown among YA’s, OA’s and VOA’s performances during the
first 15 seconds of the semantic VF task and between the number of errors made by the
participants on this task (see Table 2). The results of ANCOVA show a group effect for the
number of words pronounced during the last 45/60 seconds (F(2, 94) = 3.89; p = .02;
η2 = .07), the 120 seconds (F(2, 94) = 4.86; p = .01; η2 = .09), and for the number of errors
made in this VF task (F(2, 94) = 3.25; p = .04; η2 = .06).
The ANOVA reveals a significant difference between groups for time (F(2, 97) = 35.47;
p < .001; η2 = .42), number of correct categories (F(2, 97) = 26.13; p < .001; η2 = .35) and
number of errors (F(2, 97) = 24.93; p < .001; η2 = .34) on MCST. Concerning the time
necessary to realize this task, YA were faster than OA (c = −89.74; p < .001) and VOA
(c = −176.00; p < .001). VOA were also slower than OA (c = −86.26; p < .001). YA chose
a higher number of correct categories with respect to OA (c = .63; p = .01) and VOA
12 C. CALSO ET AL.

(c = 1.59; p < .001). VOA performed also more poorly than OA (c = .96; p < .001) on this
task. If we take into account all types of errors made by the participants on the MCST
(repeat of previous category, also named Milner’s errors; repeat of previous response, or
Nelson’s errors; unattended response; Godefroy & Grefex, 2008), YA made a lower
number of errors than OA (c = −5.06; p < .001) and VOA (c = −9.54; p < .001). OA
made a lower number of errors than VOA (c = −4.48; p = .004). Considering that we
assessed 2 types of perseverative errors for this task, the ANOVA reveals a significant
difference among YA, OA and VOA for the number of Milner’s errors (F(2, 97) = 20.37;
p < .001; η2 = .30) and for the Nelson’s errors (F(2, 97) = 15.34; p < .001; η2 = .24). OA
(c = −2.11; p = .003) and VOA (c = −4.10; p < .001) repeated the previous category more
frequently than YA, and VOA made a higher number of Milner’s errors than OA
(c = −1.99; p = .008). YA made a lower number of Nelson’s errors than OA (c = −2.80;
p = .004) and VOA (c = −4.87; p < .001). OA generally made a lower number of Nelson’s
errors than VOA (c = −2.07; p = .06).
The ANOVA reveals a significant difference between the participants’ performances
on the memory task (16 words list) (F(2, 97) = 3.44; p = .04; η2 = .07), which is not
confirmed by post-hoc test. YA generally performed better than OA on this task (c = .43;
p = .07). The ANCOVA shows no significant differences between our groups of partici-
pants in this first memory task. The 3 age groups differed substantially in free and cued
recall of the learned words (F(2, 97) = 19.04; p < .001; η2 = .28). In particular, YA (c = 1.78;
p < .001) and OA (c = 1.32; p < .001) performed better than VOA. Concerning the
recognition of 16 words included in a new list with distractors, the participants’ perfor-
mances were also different (F(2, 97) = 8.39; p < .001; η2 = .15). YA (c = .63; p < .001) and
OA (c = .43; p = .02) recognized a larger number of words than VOA. A significant
difference is also revealed among the 3 groups of participants for the free and cued
recall realized after an interval of 20 minutes (F(2, 97) = 25.66; p < .001; η2 = .35). YA
(c = 1.37; p < .001) and OA (c = 1.22; p < .001) performed better than VOA on this task.
No significant difference was shown between YA’s and OA’s performances. Participants
made a different number of errors on memory task (F(2, 97) = 11.95; p < .001; η2 = .20).
YA made fewer errors than OA (c = −.88; p = .04) and VOA (c = −1.81; p < .001). VOA
made also a higher number of errors than OA (c = −.92; p = .04).

Deception and cooperation detection

Our statistical analysis shows significant differences for the deception task (MPS-TOMQ; see
Table 3) on time (F(2, 97) = 48.43; p < .001; η2 = .50), global score of sequence (MPS) (F(2,
97) = 57.17; p < .001; η2 = .54) and global score of questionnaire (TOMQ) (F(2, 97) = 24.11;
p < .001; η2 = .33). YA were quicker than OA (c = −132.11; p < .001) and VOA (c = −296.68;
p < .001), and OA were quicker than VOA (c = −164.57; p < .001) on this task. YA obtained
higher scores of sequence than OA (c = 8.11; p < .001) and VOA (c = 11.42; p < .001). VOA also
performed worse than OA (c = 3.30; p = .01). YA performed better than OA (c = 1.57; p < .001)
and VOA (c = 2.95; p < .001) on TOMQ, and OA performed better than VOA (c = 1.38; p = .005)
on this task. The ANCOVA shows similar results for the time necessary to realize this task (YA
> OA > VOA; group effect: F(2, 94) = 25.11; p < .001; η2 = .34). No education effect or group
x education interaction has been shown. Concerning the MPS and the TOMQ, a group effect
has been shown (MPS: F(2, 94) = 31.43; p < .001; η2 = .40; TOMQ: F(2, 94) = 7.68; p < .001;
 AGING, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND COGNITION 13

Table 3. Between-groups analysis (one-way ANOVA and ANCOVA) for the deception-cooperation
detection (MPS-TOMQ). The mean scores and response times (in seconds) are also indicated for our
sample. Standard deviations (SD) are within parentheses.
Test-Group Yong Adults Old Adults Very old Adults P-value P-value
Mean (SD) n = 35 n = 35 n = 30 ANOVA ANCOVA
MPS 30.89.43 (4.23) 22.77 (5.09) 19.47 (3.95) < .001 < .001
TOMQ 22.11 (1.02) 20.54 (1.94) 19.17 (2.04) < .001 < .001
MPS-TOMQ T 178.09 (72.73) 310.20 (121.74) 474.77 (159.82) < .001 < .001
MPS-Dec S + Q 18 (3.69) 13.29 (3.58) 10.90 (3.41) < .001 < .001
MPS-Dec T 73 (40.33) 105.54 (53.78) 190 (81.47) < .001 < .001
MPS-Coop S + Q 15.14 (1.46) 13.20 (1.81) 12.13 (2.24) < .001 < .001
MPS-Coop T 41.51 (14.25) 77.43 (49.35) 118.47 (57.83) < .001 < .001
MPS-Mix S + Q 19.86 (1.46) 17.11 (3.31) 15.77 (2.67) < .001 < .001
MPS-Mix T 63.57 (37.88) 127.23 (60.64) 172.63 (62.69) < .001 < .001
MPS: Modified Picture Stories (global score of Sequences), TOMQ: Theory Of Mind Questionnaire (global score of
Questionnaires), S: score of Sequences, Q: score of Questionnaire, T: Time, Dec: Deception, Coop: Cooperation, Mix:
Mixed stories.

Figure 2. Young (YA), old (OA) and very old (VOA) adults’ performances on the deception,
cooperation and mixed stories (MPS-TOMQ). Between-groups analyses were realized by one-way
ANOVA and the Bonferroni’s method. In this graph, each group mean is represented by a symbol
(central point), and a line extending out from this symbol represents the interval. Two group means
are significantly different whenever their intervals are disjoint (indicated by light grey vertical lines).
They are not significantly different whenever their intervals overlap.

η2 = .13). A small effect of education exists for the TOMQ (F(1, 94) = 6.18; p = .01; η2 = .05). No
group x education interaction has been shown.
Starting by the participants’ performances on the MPS-TOM task, we assessed the
detection of deception and the detection of cooperation-reciprocity individually and at
the same time by mixed stories (see Figure 2).
The two-way ANOVA shows a large effect of group (young, old, very old adults; F
(2) = 75.31; p < .001; η2 = .25) and a large effect of condition (deception, cooperation,
mixed stories; F(2) = 64; p < .001; η2 = .22) on the participants’ performances in the MPS,
and a small group x condition interaction (F(4) = 5.07; p < .001; η2 = .03).
The one-way ANOVA reveals a significant difference among the 3 groups of partici-
pants for the detection of deception (F(2, 97) = 33.80; p < .001; η2 = .41). YA’s scores
were higher than those obtained by OA (c = 4.71; p < .001) and VOA (c = 7.10; p < .001).
OA performed better than VOA (c = 2.38; p = .02) on this task involving deceptive
interactions. A significant difference was shown on the time spent to complete this task
14 C. CALSO ET AL.

(F(2, 97) = 32.45; p < .001; η2 = .40): VOA were slower than YA (c = −117.00; p < .001) and
OA (c = −84.46; p < .001).
The 3 age groups differed also substantially in the task involving cooperation (F(2,
97) = 22.57; p < .001; η2 = .32). YA performed better than OA (c = 1.94; p < .001) and VOA
(c = 3.01; p < .001), and OA generally obtained higher scores than VOA (c = 1.07; p = .06)
on this task. A significant difference appeared among our groups of participants on the
time necessary to realize this task (F(2, 97) = 24.85; p < .001; η2 = .34). YA spent less time
than OA (c = −35.91; p = .003) and VOA (c = −76.95; p < .001) on this task involving
reciprocity and cooperative interactions. VOA were slower than OA (c = −41.04; p < .001).
The results also show significant differences among YA’s, OA’s and VOA’s perfor-
mances on the mixed stories (F(2, 97) = 21.37; p < .001; η2 = .31). YA performed better
than OA (c = 2.74; p < .001) and VOA (c = 4.09; p < .001) on this task involving deception
and cooperation. The 3 age groups differed substantially in the time spent to realize this
task (F(2, 97) = 33.06; p < .001; η2 = .40). VOA were slower than YA (c = −109.06; p < .001)
and OA (c = −45.40; p = .003), and OA were slower than YA (c = −63.66; p < .001) on the
same task. We highlight that the results of the ANCOVA are similar for each condition of
the MPS-TOMQ (deception, cooperation, mixed stories; see Table 3).

Correlation analysis
Some significant correlations (moderate and large effects, r < .50 and r > .50 respectively)
were found for YA between the level of education and the age (r = .72; p < .001), 2 minutes
phonemic VF (r = .39; p = .02), DEX (r = −.42; p = .01) and DEX MC scores (r = −.44; p = .008).
YA’s DEX MC scores were also negatively correlated with YA’s age (r = −.48; p = .004). The
level of education correlates with the NART (r = .43; p = .03), MMSE (r = .36; p = .03), DEX
(r = −.38; p = .02) and DEX MC scores (r = −.43; p = .009) for the group of OA, with the NART
scores (r = .63; p < .001), 2 minutes phonemic VF (r = .48; p = .007) and semantic VF (first
15 seconds; r = .41; p = .02) for the group of VOA (see Figures 3 and 4). OA’s DEX EF scores
were correlated with OA’s NART scores (r = −.39; p = .02) and age (r = −.37; p = .03). Our
results don’t show any significant correlations (p < .05) between measures of deception/
cooperation detection and YA’/OA’/VOA’s level of education or DEX scores. An exception
exists for the DEX MC scores, which correlated with VOA’s MPS scores (r = −.38; p = .04).
Our correlation analysis allows also to study the detection of deception-cooperation
in relation to other variables: previous knowledge (education, NART), frontal functions
(FAB, DEX) and some executive processes (monitoring, task setting, flexibility). YA’s
ability to answer at the TOMQ was positively correlated with FAB scores (r = .44;
p = .009). MPS scores concerning cooperation-reciprocity detection were significantly
associated with the number of errors made on the MCST (r = −.34; p = .04). In Figures 3
and 4, we show the significant correlations (Pearson’s ρ coefficients; p < .05) observed
for the OA and the VOA.

Regression analysis
Based on the significant correlations previously presented in Figures 3 and 4, we realized
a regression analysis. A number of linear regression models were relevant for our study.
In these models, the dependent variable was the individual composite score
Figure 3. Significant correlations exist between the different variables concerning OA’s performances. The Pearson’s ρ coefficients are written in bold whenever
p < .05, in italic bold whenever p < .01, in italic whenever p < .001.
AGING, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND COGNITION
15
 16
C. CALSO ET AL.

Figure 4. Significant correlations exist between the different variables concerning VOA’s performances. The Pearson’s ρ coefficients are written in bold whenever
p < .05, in italic bold whenever p < .01, in italic whenever p < .001.
 AGING, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND COGNITION 17

corresponding to the mean of the z-scores of OA’s and VOA’s performances at the MPS-
TOMQ task, or to the mean of the z-scores of OA’s and VOA’s performances at one of the
3 types of stories involving deceptive and/or cooperative interactions. In all models, the
estimate coefficient associated to the independent variable was significantly different
from 0 (p < .05) and positive (if the score relative to this variable increased, the
deception-cooperation composite score also increased). The results obtained through
these analyses are summarized in the Table 4.

Discussion
We aimed at assessing the ability to understand and detect deceptive and cooperative
situations in normal aging, with a comparison between young, old and very old healthy
adults’ performances. In line with our expectation and previous studies (James et al.,
2014; Judges et al., 2017; MacPherson et al., 2002), OA’s and VOA’s performances were
significantly worse than those of YA on tasks involving executive and metacognitive
functions. OA performed better than VOA on the phonemic verbal fluency tasks, the
sorting card test, the long-term memory task and when they had to understand decep-
tion stories (if the participants’ level of education is not controlled). Our results confirm
previous studies showing some age-related differences between young and old adults’
deception detection ability (Stanley & Blanchard-Fields, 2008; Sweeney & Ceci, 2014).
Concerning the distinction between old and very old adults, these participants had
similar performances on stories involving cooperation-reciprocity, on mixed stories and
on all the other cognitive tests proposed. Although we found that older adults were
generally worse than young adults at detecting deceptive-cooperative situations, there
was no evidence of an own-age advantage (characters’ age in the picture stories) as also
observed by Ruffman et al. (2012).
Older participants’ ability to identify deceptive-cooperative situations could be
explained by an expected difficulty to inhibit the non-pertinent response (El Haj &
Antoine, 2018; Langleben et al., 2002), to recognize facial emotions (Calso et al., 2019;
Ruffman et al., 2012; Stanley & Blanchard-Fields, 2008), or to detect negative informa-
tion, which they had to infer from picture stories (concerning a theft and a bad joke).
The literature in this domain shows that older adults’ attention is more biased towards
positive than negative information (Ebner et al., 2018). During our deception task, older

Table 4. Regression analysis results for old and very old adults.
MPS-TOMQ Deception Cooperation Mixed stories
Tests R2 Adj R2 R2 Adj R2 R2 Adj R2 R2 Adj R2
OA MMSE .26 .23 .19 .17 _ .22 .20
FAB .31 .29 .21 .18 _ .16 .13
Semantic + phonemic VF _ _ _ .12 .09
Semantic VF _ .12 .10 _ _
Phonemic VF _ _ _ .18 .15
MCST _ _ _ .11 .09
VOA FAB .13 .10 _ _ _
NART .31 .28 _ .14 .11 .28 .25
MPS-TOMQ: Modified Picture Stories-Theory of Mind Questionnaire, R2: R-squared, Adj R2: Adjusted R-squared, OA: Old
adults, VOA: Very old adults, MMSE: Mini mental state examination, FAB: Frontal assessment battery, VF: Verbal
fluency, MCST: Modified card sorting test, NART: National adult reading test.
18 C. CALSO ET AL.

participants sometimes said: “It is not possible that he deceives his friend, they are
acting together/He offers a gift”, even when a deceptive interaction was depicted. As the
negative and positive affects seem to be linked with deception detection, we could
introduce in future research a measure of this aspect using self-report questionnaires.
Furthermore, literature studies indicate that older people face more difficulties with
decision-making tasks involving some losses (Beitz et al., 2014; Zamarian et al., 2008). As
the decision-making ability, supported by the ventromedial regions of the brain, could
be associated with the deception detection ability, future research could further explore
this relationship. Probably, positive affects, positive bias and an impairment of the
decision-making ability in normal aging could influence social information processing
with effects on deception detection. Some studies cited by Ebner et al. (2018) showed
also a significant link between older adults’ depressive mood and fraud susceptibility. On
this point, we highlight that old participants in our study were not depressed (we
assessed this aspect using a geriatric depression scale during the pre-test phase).
As Sweeney and Ceci (2014) showed that older adult males were the hardest to
detect lies and that the findings about sex differences in ability to detect deception are
sometimes contradictory (Sweeney & Ceci, 2014), in future research, it would be inter-
esting to study gender differences in normal aging. Similarly, it would be pertinent to
use an audiovisual deception-cooperation detection task in addition to our visual task in
order to examine any potential modality differences in normal aging (Stanley &
Blanchard-Fields, 2008; Sweeney & Ceci, 2014).
Our second purpose was to study the expected associations between the theory of
mind, in particular the detection of deception, and the executive functions. The results
confirm our hypothesis and the precedent findings by Christ et al. (2009), who observed
significant links between deception detection and working memory. Furthermore, El Haj
and Antoine (2018) showed a significant correlation between the low tendency to
deceive in the older adults and their diminished inhibitory ability. Our findings show
significant moderate relations between deception/cooperation detection and some
frontal processes, such as flexibility (verbal fluency and sorting card test) and other
frontal and non-frontal processes assessed with the FAB, MMSE and NART tests.
According to our correlation analysis results, the regression analysis shows positive
relationships between the ability to detect deceptive and cooperative interactions, the
frontal-executive processes and the verbal IQ after 65 years old. The association between
deception detection and verbal fluency was also shown by Ebner et al. (2018) in middle-
old age. They suggested that verbal fluency could be associated with older adults’
susceptibility awareness, increasing negative consequences of their choices and beha-
viors. According to other researches, these results may contribute to the resilience
against multiple forms of deception, such as social tricks, fraud risk or online spear-
phishing attacks.
If the parietal, cingulate and ventromedial prefrontal regions play a crucial role in the
reasoning about deceptive and cooperative interactions (Lissek et al., 2008; Stuss et al.,
2001), on a neuroanatomical and functional level these areas of human brain could
change in normal aging. For this reason, future research should identify potential links
existing between structural, functional and cognitive changes (extending the study
realized with young adults; Lissek et al., 2008) and clarify which metacognitive processes
 AGING, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY, AND COGNITION 19

are particularly impaired in normal aging. In this study, it seems also relevant to
distinguish old and very old adults’ performances.

Limitations and conclusion

We highlight that the different approaches and methodological choices between the
studies (social, economic or psychological interests, direct versus indirect deception
experiences, pencil-and-paper tasks versus real situations, different sample size and
age) prevent us from doing a fair comparison between results.
Concerning our theory of mind task, we could have used a larger print size of the
picture stories in order to allow to identify more easily the details and to adapt even
better the material to older people (we used a standard A4 paper size divided into 4
sequences for each story).
Participants’ level of education and older participants’ physical state in our study
were probably better than those of the general population, as observed in many
other researches (e.g., Ebner et al., 2018). That could limit the generalization of our
findings. Nevertheless, our study highlights the importance of analyzing specific
cognitive processes (metacognitive and executive abilities), which could change in
young/middle-old age and might be mediated by a common neuroanatomical basis.
Our results could allow to adapt many activities and daily tasks to older adults’
difficulties and proposing individual mixed cognitive trainings. This type of interven-
tion includes physical, cognitive or social activities that may maintain or improve
elderly’s cognitive functioning, interpersonal relationships and well-being (McDermott
et al., 2019). Starting from the preserved cognitive processes (e.g., verbal IQ, immedi-
ate/short-term memory), we could help older people to acquire awareness about the
fact that people can act to deceive others, to detect more easily the real intentions of
others (focusing on positive and negative information), to adjust their behavior to
context as appropriate, to make decisions and to achieve their goals with less risk and
better rewards.

Acknowledgments
We are grateful to the staff of Centre d’action sociale de la Ville de Paris for the interest shown in
our study and for allowing us to recruit and meet a large number of old and very old adults. None
of the authors has any conflict of interest to declare.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding
This work was supported by the Université d’Angers in France.
20 C. CALSO ET AL.

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