143. People v.

Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 645 (1991)

G.R. No. 84079 May 6, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NESTOR KALUBIRAN, accused-appellant.
Facts: Nestor Kalubiran was arrested as result of a “buy-bust” operation in which Pat. Leon Quindo acted as the buyer while the other team
members lay in wait to arrest Kalubiran at the pre-arranged signal. After the successful transaction to Kalubiran, Quindo give the signal. Arresting
officer approached and frisked Kalubiran and recovered the marked money and found 17 more sticks of marijuana on appellant’s person. After
trial, the Regional Trial Court found Kalubiran guilty as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a P20,000 fine. Kalubiran appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest and search violated appellant’s constitutional right.
Held. No. The accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto as a result of the entrapment and so came under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court authorizing a warrantless arrest of any person actually committing a crime. The search was made as an incident of a lawful arrest and so
was also lawful under Section 12 of Rule 116. However, Kalubiran was accused only of selling the two sticks of marijuana and cannot be held to
answer the 17 other sticks found on his person at the time of his arrest. Thus the decision of the court to the appealed judgment is affirmed in toto.

144. People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991)

G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
Facts: Due to persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, a temporary
checkpoint was set up for the checking of all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. During their inspection of a bus, one of the NARCOM
officers notices a bulge, suspected to be a gun, on Malmstedt’s waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and found therein hashish, a
derivative of marijuana. Mikael Malmstedt was carrying two travelling bags, each containing a teddy bear with bulges inside which did not feel like
foam stuffing. The accused was arrested, tried in RTC La Trinidad and convicted for violation of RA 6425, as amended. Then Malmstedt filed a
petition to the SC for the reversal of the decision arguing that the search and the arrest made was illegal because there was no search warrant.
Issue: Whether or not the search and arrest of the accused illegal for lack of warrant.
Held: The RTC decision is affirmed. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed
by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. The constitution states that a peace officer or private person may arrest a person without a
warrant when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

145. Espano v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558 (1998)

G.R. No. 137612 September 25, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO ANTINERO BERIARMENTE, accused-appellant.
FACTS: Espano was caught in flagrante by Pat. Pagilagan together with police officers selling Marijuana near Zamora and Pandacan Streets, where
they are conducting an investigation in the area reported being rampant of drug pushing. The agents frisked the accused after he completed his
transaction to a buyer and there found with him 2 tea bags of Marijuana. Accused was asked by the police officers whether he has some more of
the marijuana and told them he got more at his house. They went to the accused house and found 10 more teabags of Marijuana. During the trial,
accused denied all the allegations against him and made an appeal but the trial court did not believe his alibi and found him guilty of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Accused appealed that the arrest was illegally done and the search of his house is deemed a violation of his constitutional right.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule (Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court). He
was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to
an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two pieces of cellophane of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful
and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana found at petitioner’s residence, however, the same are inadmissible in evidence since no search warrant was served to him.

146. People v. Che Chun Ting, 328 SCRA 592 (2000)

G.R. Nos. 130568-69 March 21, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHE CHUN TING alias "DICK," accused-appellant.
Facts: Accused-appellant, Che Chung Ting alias Dick, was charged and convicted for delivering, distributing and dispatching in transit and having in
his possession large amounts of shabu. Mabel Cheung Mei Po received a call from Dick to deliver the stuff and after she delivered a transparent
plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance to an informant, in full view of NARCOM agents. The accused together with the evidence was
then brought to Camp Crame. Che Chung Ting contends that the shabu is inadmissible in evidence as it was seized without a valid search warrant.
As a consequence of the illegal search, the things seized on the occasion thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule.
Issues: Whether or not this case falls within the exception of the constitutional rights of the accused.
Held: No. The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the exception, the same must be limited to
and circumscribed by the subject, time and place of the arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person
of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited to “dangerous weapons” or “anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense.” The search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place
where the suspect was arrested, or the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. As a consequence of the illegal search, the things
seized on the occasion thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. They are regarded as having been obtained from a
polluted source, the “fruit of a poisonous tree.” The shabu seized by the NARCOM operatives, which cannot legally be possessed by the accused
under the law, can and must be retained by the government to be disposed of in accordance with law. Hence, the appealed judgment of conviction
by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

147. People v. Estrella, G.R. Nos. 138539-40, January 21, 2003

G.R. Nos. 138539-40 January 21, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO C. ESTELLA, appellant.
FACTS: Estella was sitting on a rocking chair located about two (2) meters away from a hut when police officers showed the search warrant and
explained the contents to him. The team searched the hut and found a plastic container under the kitchen dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber
revolver. The team seized the prohibited drug, the revolver and ammunitions and arrested the appellant. He was held guilty of illegal possession of
the illegal drug found therein. Appellant contended that the hut was not his, hence the search and seizure was illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.
HELD: The appealed Decision is SET ASIDE. Antonio C. Estella is ACQUITTED. With the failure of the prosecution to establish the propriety of the
search undertaken — during which the incriminating evidence was allegedly recovered – it is held that the search was illegal. Without the badge of
legality, any evidence obtained therein becomes ipso facto inadmissible.

148. People v. Libnao, et al., G.R. No. 136860, January 20, 2003
G.R. No. 136860 January 20, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused.
AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN, accused-appellant.
FACTS: The intelligence operatives of the PNP began conducting surveillance operation on a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac suspected as drug
dealers in the area transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks. They flagged down a passing tricycle ride in by Libnao and Nunga with a
suspicious black bag with them. The officers invited them to Kabayan Center No.2. Upon reaching the center, with the Brgy, Captain, the black bag
was opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside were eight bricks of marijuana sealed in
plastic bags and covered with newspaper. Libnao argued that her arrest was unlawful, capitalizes on the absence of a warrant for her arrest, was
not assisted by a lawyer during interrogation and not duly informed of her right to remain silent. Hence, she argues that the confession or
admission obtained therein should be considered inadmissible in evidence against her.
ISSUE: Whether or not both the accused can be convicted based on the prosecution’s evidence.
HELD: YES. The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been
conducting surveillance operation for 3 months in the area. It is also clear that at the time Libnao was apprehended, she was committing offense in
making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs. Under the ROC, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless
arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto. The instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the trial
court finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to R.A. No.
7659, and sentencing her to an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos is hereby AFFIRMED.

Plain view doctrine

149. People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993)
G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant.
Fact: A day after elements of the NARCOM team had conducted a surveillance and successful test buy on Mari Musa pursuant to an information
received that he is engaged in the sale of marijuana, a buy-bust operation was planned which resulted in appellant’s arrest. The team found a
plastic bag containing dried marijuana.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure was lawful.
Held: Yes. The NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then searched the
entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.
Objects in the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. Appeal is Dismissed and the judgment of the trial court affirmed.

150. Padilla v. CA, 269 SCRA 402 (1997)

G.R. No. 121917 July 31, 1996
ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA, accused-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees.
Facts: Maranarag and his companion witnessed a hit-and-run accident involving the Mitsubishi Pajero of Robin Padilla (D), who was the unknown
driver at the time. As a member of a civic group, Maranarag decided to report the incident to the police via VHF radio. Mobile patrols responded
and chased the fleeing Pajero to the north. They finally caught up with the Padilla (D) and found several firearms in the vehicle and in his person.
Issues: Whether or not the warrantless arrest and search valid?
Ruling: Yes. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable"
suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity after the hit-and-run incident was reported to them. Thus, the
warrantless arrest was proper as Padilla was caught in flagrante delicto with possession of unlicensed firearms and ammunition. The decision of the
Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is
AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED. As the law say that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. Objects whose possessions are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a
warrant.

151. People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000

G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHlLIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The accused was allegedly caught
in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp,
approximately 25 meters away from the his nipa hut. Appellant was arraigned and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Valdez testified for himself that at that time of event he was weeding his vegetable farm 100 meters away from where the marijuana plants were
found and was called by a person whose identity he does not know. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the
hemp plants. He was then asked about the marijuana growing there and when he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him
and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search, for the law enforcers had ample time to secure
a search warrant and that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Trial on the merits then ensued.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is lawful and the seized evidence admissible.
HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the RTC promulgated decision and set aside for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant is acquitted and ordered
released immediately. In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of probable
cause given the fact that police had ample time to obtain said warrant. The protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally
mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The confiscated marijuana plants were evidently obtained
during an illegal search and seizure and as by product it is inadmissible against appellant. It was a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to
have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant. The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must
adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Absent the required degree of proof of an
accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.

152. People v. Compacion, G.R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001

G.R. No. 124442 July 20, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO COMPACION y SURPOSA, accused-appellant.
Fact: Armando Compacion, without any authority of law, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally plant, cultivate or culture two (2)
full grown "Marijuana plants", more or less eleven (11) feet tall, in gross violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. The prosecution contends that the
accused-appellant opened the gate and permitted them to come in. The accused admitted the he planted and cultivated the same knowing it as a
medicinal plant, and not marijuana, for the purpose of his wife suffering from migraine. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued. The trial court convicted the accused of the crime charged guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The accused
appealed the decision that during the search, agents and police officer had not secure warrant to arrest and search the house despite the fact that
they have enough time to such.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure is valid.
Held: The decision of the RTC is hereby reversed and set aside. Armando Compacion is hereby acquitted. The subject marijuana is ordered disposed
of in accordance with law. Here, the warrantless arrest is not valid for the reason that they forced their way into Compacion premises without the
latter's consent. It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of Compacion on the suspicion that he was
growing and cultivating marijuana when they allegedly came in "plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises their
intention was to seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one to be
issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the marijuana plants inadvertently when they conducted surveillance and barged into
accused-appellant's residence. As a general rule: objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.

153. People v. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. 139301, September 29, 2004
[G.R. NO. 139301 : September 29, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. HUANG ZHEN HUA and JOGY LEE, Appellants.
Facts: Police operatives received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao, and appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen
Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen also learned that appellant Lee was handling the payments and accounting of the
proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking activities of Lao and Chan. The policemen then proceeded to Paranaque to enforce Search Warrant No. 96-
802. As they get in the room the officers found the things belong to Lao, kilos of shabu and other paraphernalia’s in the master’s bedroom together
with other documents, passports and bank passbook. All of it served as future reference and evidence, thus confiscated. RTC and CA decision found
Hua and Lee guilty of the crime. The accused raise an appeal to Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the intrusion into the premises is permissible even with an authorized warrant under the plain view doctrine..
Held: Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when; (a) a party whose premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses,
upon demand, to open it; (b) when such person in the premises already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority and persons;
(c) when the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and (d) when those in the premises, aware of
the presence of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the
officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted. Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy evidence or
dispose of evidence. However, the exceptions above are not exclusive or conclusive. Although a search and seizure of a dwelling might be
constitutionally defective, if the police officers entry was without prior announcement, law enforcement interest may also establish the
reasonableness of an unannounced entry. Hence, the appeal of appellant Huang Zhen Hua is granted reversing the RTC’s decision convicting her of
the crime, thus acquitted. The appeal of appellant Jogy Lee is DENIED. The decision of the RTC, convicting guilty is AFFIRMED.

154. Veronia School District. 47 J v. ACTON, June 26, 1995

515 U.S. 646 (1995) No. 94-590
Vernonia School District 47J, petitioner v. James Acton, respondent
Facts: An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. School
officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted the
Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied
participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing. They then filed this suit, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the Policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Oregon Constitution. The
District Court denied the claims, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Policy violated both the Federal and State Constitutions.
Issue: Whether or not random drug testing of high school athletes violate the reasonable search (collection of urine) and seizure clause of the
Fourth Amendment?
Held: No. The reasonableness of a search (collection of urine) is judged by "balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." In the case of high school athletes who are under State supervision during school
hours, they are subject to greater control than over free adults. The privacy interests compromised by urine samples are negligible since the
conditions of collection are similar to public restrooms, and the results are viewed only by limited authorities. Furthermore, the governmental
concern over the safety of minors under their supervision overrides the minimal, if any, intrusion in student-athletes' privacy.

155. People v. Huang, 439 SCRA 350

G.R. NO. 139301 : September 29, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. HUANG ZHEN HUA and JOGY LEE, Appellants.
Facts: Police operatives received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao, and appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen
Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen also learned that appellant Lee was handling the payments and accounting of the
proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking activities of Lao and Chan. Base on the conducted surveillance operations, it is verified that Lao and appellant
Lee were lover, they always went out to dine with Chan and other people, and Lao has two rented apartments in Makati and Paranaque..
With two search warrants supervised by S/PINSP Margallo, they went to the apartment rented in Makati and no persons were found inside.
Thereafter, the group received a word and headed a follow-up operation. As the two men alighted, one of the men approached them and
introduced himself, but Chan and Lao fired shots. Thus, a shoot-out ensued between the members of the raiding team and the two suspects. Chan
and Lao were shot to death during the encounter. The policemen then proceeded to Paranaque to enforce Search Warrant No. 96-802. As they get
in the room the officers found the things belong to Lao, kilos of shabu and other paraphernalia’s in the master’s bedroom together with other
documents, passports and bank passbook. All of it served as future reference and evidence, thus confiscated. RTC and CA decision found Hua and
Lee guilty of the crime. The accused raise an appeal to Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the document, passport and bank books are admissible as evidence in an authorized seizure were valid under the plain view
doctrine.
Held: Police officers in implementing an authorized search warrant to the residence of the accused of drugs, can also seized credit cards, a
passbook, a passport, photographs and other documents and papers. On the contention of the accused that the seizure of such item was illegal,
the SC ruled that the seizure was legal because the articles were in PLAIN VIEW. Their seizure was authorized because of their CLOSE CONNECTION
to the crime charged. The passport would show WHEN and HOW OFTEN the accused had been in and out if the country; her credit cards and
passbook would show how much money she had amassed and how she acquired them; the pictures would show her relationship to the co-
accused. Hence, the appeal of appellant Huang Zhen Hua is granted reversing the RTC’s decision convicting her of the crime, thus acquitted. The
appeal of appellant Jogy Lee is DENIED. The decision of the RTC, convicting guilty is AFFIRMED.

156. Unilab v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574

G.R. No. 163858 June 28, 2005

UNITED LABORATORIES, INC., petitioner, vs. RNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES and/or OCCUPANTS, Shalimar Building, No. 1571,
Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, respondents.
Facts: UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate and took evidence to a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products,
especially Revicon multivitamins. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant.
After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly
REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of
Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the seized items be turned over to the custody
of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search
warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, which the petitioners opposed
alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view
doctrine.
Held: It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the
warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view.
It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present
when the warrant was enforced to prove that the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were
incriminating and immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were
opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items. Petition denied.

Enforcement of fishing, customs and immigration laws

157. Roldan v. Area, 65 SCRA 320 (1975)
G.R. No. L-25434 July 25, 1975
HONORABLE ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., in his capacity as Acting Commissioner, Philippine Fisheries Commission, and THE PHILIPPINE NAVY,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE FRANCISCO ARCA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch 1) and MORABE, DE GUZMAN
& COMPANY, respondents.
Facts: Petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy seized and impounded two fishing vessels owned by respondent company for
illegal fishing with dynamite. Respondent company filed a complaint with application for preliminary mandatory injunction, against herein
petitioners. It was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the
coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer of compromise by respondent company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
numerous violations of the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were settled granting the issuance of writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to respondent. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the enforcement of fishing and customs law in search and seizure of the fishing vessels without warrant were unlawful.
Held: No. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception
to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws.
They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippines navy or Cost Guard. Writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction set aside as null and void.

158. People v. Gatward, 267 SCRA 785 (1997)

[G.R. Nos. 119772-73. February 7, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NIGEL RICHARD GATWARD, and U AUNG WIN, accused, NIGEL RICHARD GATWARD, Accused-
Appellant.
Facts: Nigel Richard Gatward and U Aung Win, in the vicinity of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport After having inspected the luggages of the
other incoming passengers did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport heroin (2605.70 grams and 2632.0 grams) contained in
separate carton envelopes with a total weight of 5237.70 grams which is legally considered as a prohibited drug. Accused Gatward pleaded not
guilty of the charge when arraigned, while U Aung Win pleaded guilty of the crime charged upon his arraignment. The Trial Court found both guilty
of the crime charged
Issue: Whether or not Gatward’s and U Aung Win’s suitcase may be searched without warrant.
Held: When Gatward checked in his bag as his personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight 806 he thereby agreed to the inspection thereof in
accordance with customs rules and regulations, an international practice of strict observance, and waived any objection to a warrantless search. His
subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag,
or in flagrante delicto. The conviction of U Aung Win is likewise unassailable. His culpability was not based only upon his plea of guilty but also upon
the evidence of the prosecution, the presentation of which was requires by the lower court despite said plea. The evidence of the prosecution
convincingly proved his having imported into this country the heroin found in his luggage which he presented for customs examination upon his
arrival at the international airport. There was, of course, no showing that he was not authorized by law to import such dangerous drug, nor did he
claim or present any authority to do so.

159. People v. Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000

[G.R. No. 138881. December 18, 2000.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEILA JOHNSON Y REYES, Accused-Appellant.
Facts: At the time of the incident, Leila Reyes Johnson arrived in the Philippines to visit her son’s family. At her departure bound to America,
Johnson did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess three plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride. That the accused
does not have the corresponding license or prescription to possess or use said regulated drug. According to Olivia Ramirez the on duty lady frisker,
when she frisked Leila Johnson she felt something hard on the latter’s abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear
two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Ramirez not satisfied with the explanation reported
the matter to her superior and inspected the accused to the rest room and turned out that Mrs. Johnson carrying dangerous drug.
Issue: Whether or not a search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property without being violative of her constitutional
rights.
Held: Yes.Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and (c) Used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense. Accordingly, the above items seized from accused-appellant should be returned to her. Second. Accused-appellant argues
that the prosecution failed to fully ascertain the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride to justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The decision of the RTC finding Johnson guilty hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION. The passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle and
other personal effects not yet returned to Johnson are hereby ordered returned to her.

160. People v. Canton, GR 148825, Dec. 27, 2002

G.R. No. 148825 December 27, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SUSAN CANTON, appellant.
Facts: Canton was charged for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. She was caught in possession of metamphetamine hydrochloride (Shabu)
without prescription or license. Susan was bound to Saigon, Vietnam. Prior to her flight, she passed through the metal detector and beeped. A
civilian inspector of the airport searched her upon frisking; she felt something that is bulging in the abdomen of Susan. They were able to recover
packets that were wrapped with packing tape.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of Susan were violative of her
constitutional rights.
Held: No, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235, “ Every
ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: “Holder
hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched
shall not be allowed to board the aircraft,” which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier and hereof. The
judgment of the RTC finding appellant Susan Canton guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) and the costs is hereby AFFIRMED. The
appellant’s passport, plane tickets, and girdles are hereby ordered to be returned to her.
 161. People vs. Suzuki, G.R. No. 120670, October 23, 2003
[G.R. No. 120670. October 23, 2003.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. HEDISHI SUZUKI, Appellant.
Facts: Zuzuki was in the airport for his flight to Manila. PASCOM and NARCOM agents were in the airport to follow on reports on drug trafficking.
When he walked through the metal detector, the alarm sounded. He was bodily frisked and nothing was found on his person so they proceeded to
check his luggage but appellant refused then consented eventually and opened it. There they found packs of aluminum foil and when opened, it
was found to be marijuana.
Issue: Whether or not the search was conducted was incidental to a lawful arrest therefore not violative of his constitutional rights.
Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the RTC’’s decision with modification. Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy. Whenever the right against
unreasonable search and seizure is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by
giving consent to the search or seizure. Here, Zuzuki voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted. Thus the search conducted is reasonable
and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights. The search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is deemed
to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under and the packs of marijuana obtained in the course of
such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against appellant. Neither was the search incidental to a lawful arrest since appellant was not yet
arrested at the time of the search. To be considered a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there must be a lawful arrest before
the search can be made.

“Stop and frisk”

162. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
392 US 1 (1968)
Terry, petitioner-defendant v Ohio, respondent
Facts: Terry and two other men , Chilton and Katz, were observed by a plain clothes police officer McFadden in what the officer believed to be
"casing a job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. Police officer basing his experience ,
had reasonable cause to believe that the defendants were conducting themselves suspiciously, and some interrogation should be made of their
action." Purely for his own protection, the court held, the officer had the right to pat down the outer clothing of these men, who he had reasonable
cause to believe might be armed. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure of Terry and the other men in violation of the Fourth Amendment following a search incident to a
lawful arrest.
Held: the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be
introduced into evidence against Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on
more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat
to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and
designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation.

163. People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)

G.R. No. 119220 September 20, 1996
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NILO SOLAYAO, accused-appellant.
Facts: While conducting an intelligence patrol, the arresting officers met appellant who was drunk and wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle
suit. After introducing himself as PC, the police officer seized the dried coconut leaves which appellant was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-
inch long homemade firearm locally known as “latong.” The latter had no permission to possess the same. The firearm was confiscated and he was
turned over to the custody of the Caibiran police who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm which is a product of an unlawful warrantless search.

Held: No. Solayao and his companion’s drunken actuations as well as the fact that Solayao was attired in camouflage uniform or a jungle suit and
the flight of his companions aroused the suspicion of the police officer’s group. There was no error on the part of the trial court when it admitted
the homemade firearm as neither evidence nor violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the
prosecution failed to produce evidence that Solayo has no license to carry the firearm by merely relying on the lone witness’ (SPO3 Nio) testimony
that Solayo admitted to them during the time he was apprehended that he has no license to carry such weapon. The prosecution should have
presented a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm. Hence, Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence.

164. Manalili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447, October 7, 1997

G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts: The policemen conducted surveillance because of information that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City
Cemetery. The policemen chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to
have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and
introduced themselves as police officers. They then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist but
later showed his wallet where a crushed marijuana residue was found inside.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence inadmissible as evidence.
Held: The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure is
unconstitional and subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any
proceeding. IN these case, the search and seizure may be made only in with probable cause at best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion.
The policemen had sufficient reason to stop Manilili to determine if he was actually high on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the
fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug addicts. Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception
to the general rule against a search without a warrant. Hence, the assailed decision and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of Six years to twelve years and a fine of 6,000.00.

165. Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 (1997)

G.R. No. 123595 December 12, 1997
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts: Four police officers were conducting a patrol in Quiapo due to bomb threats that been occurring in the area for the last seven days. They
found two groups of Muslim-looking men standing on opposite sides of the Quezon Boulevard corner who were acting suspiciously and their eyes
were moving very fast. After thirty minutes of observing the two groups, they decided to approach one of the groups. Upon seeing the policemen,
the groups fled in all directions. Fortunately, one of the men later identified as Malacat, was apprehended. Without a warrant, the police officer
searched him and found a grenade tucked inside his front waist line. Malacat was arrested and charged with illegal possession of explosives.
Issue: Whether or not the search on Malacat is valid, pursuat to the exception of “stop-and-frisk” rule.
Held: There could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the
part of the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed. Since the arrest of petitioner is invalid, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one
incidental to a lawful arrest. There was also no justifiable reason to apply the “stop-and-frisk” rule. In this case, harbouring doubts upon the
petitioner as a member of the group attempted to bomb the plaza has no support, there was nothing in petitioners behaviour or conduct and there
was at all no ground to believe that petitioner was armed. Hence, I vote to SET ASIDE the assailed decision and to ACQUIT petitioner.

Search of moving vehicles

166. Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968)
G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968
HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as Commissioner of Customs; PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila; and MARTIN ALAGAO, as Patrolman of the Manila Police Department, petitioners,
vs. REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Facts: Martin Alagao head of the counter-intelligence unit of Manila Police Department Acting upon reliable information that a certain shipment of
personal effects, allegedly wrongly declared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port and loaded
on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs,
conducted surveillance Police officers intercepted and seized the said trucks. Hence, private respondent Mago filed with CFI for mandamus with
restraining order that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a competent court.
Issue: Whether or not a police officer could seize imported goods without search warrant.
Held: Yes. Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the Customs Law may effect search and
seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and
also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary
to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. Writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for is granted and ordering the
private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.

167. People v. CFI of Rizal, 101 SCRA 86 (1980)

G.R. No. L-41686 November 17, 1980
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH IX, QUEZON CITY, presided by HON. ULPIANO
SARMIENTO, JESSIE HOPE and MONINA MEDINA, respondents
Facts: The Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was informed by an undisclosed Informer that a shipment of highly dutiable goods would
be transported to Manila from Angeles City on a blue Dodge car. As the suspected car arrived, and sped away after giving the toll receipt. On
pursuit, the agents succeeded to block the car drien by Sgt Hope and Monina Medina. The Agents saw 4 boxes on the back seat of the Dodge and
upon inquiry they were bringing the boxes to the Tropical Hut at Epifanio de los Santos. Col. Abad joined the party at Tropical Hut, where a man
who was supposedly going to receive the boxes. Said man did not appear. An inspection of Hope’s car revealed that it contained a total of 11 boxes.
The boxes were opened and photographed. The boxed contained more or less 4,441 wrist watch and more or less 1, 075 watch bracelets (with
assorted brands) which were all untaxed. A warrant of Seizure and Detention was issued against the items and the Dodge car, however, that at the
time Hope and Medina were apprehended, RASAC Agents were not armed with warrant of arrest and seizure. Seizure proceedings ensued. The
Collector of Customs declared the seized items and the car nor subject to forfeiture and were to be released to Del Rosario , original owner, with
the taxes to be paid. CFI Rizal ruled that the allegedly smuggled articled as well as the pictures of such articled were inadmissible as evidence
because of a warrantless search and seizure.
Issue: Whether or not the items seized in the blue Dodge car without warrant of seizure are inadmissible for evidence.
Held: No. The court ruled that even though Hope and Medina were exonerated from administrative liability (when the Collector of Customs
declared the items seizes as not subject to forfeiture) cannot deprive the State’s right to prosecute. In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector
of Customs, as in other seizure proceedings, concern the res rather the persona. The proceeding is a probe on contraband illegally imported goods.
These merchandise violated the revenue law of the country, and as such, have been prevented from being assimilated. In lawful commerce until
corresponding duties are paid thereon and the penalties imposed and satisfied either in the form of fines or of forfeiture in favor of the
government who will dispose of them in accordance with law. Hence, the Order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is ordered
remanded for further trial and reception of evidence without excluding the articles subject of the seizure or for such action as the prosecution may
take after the re-assessment and re-evaluation of its evidence as hereinabove directed.
168. People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991
[G.R. No. 88017. January 21, 1991.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LO HO WING alias PETER LO, LIM CHENG HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO TIA y
SANTIAGO, Defendants. LO HO WING alias PETER LO, Defendant-Appellant.
Facts: Lo with Tia (government’s agent) went to China where ther secured the shabu to be brought to the Philippines. Upon their arrival in the
Philippined, Lim met them. The authorities relying on the intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate
apprehended them in a taxicab and thereafter were searched. The authorities found shabu inside the tin cans which are supposed to contain tea.
They were charged with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Trial court then convicted them based on the factual findings.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure made against the accused was illegal.
Held: Yes, since they had been informed of the date and time of arrival of the accused at the NAIA well ahead of time, specifically two (2) days in
advance. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid
warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto is that the seizure of evidence in plain view. Hence, the rule having been
violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle
Hence, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is thereby DISMISSED

169. Salvador v. People, G.R. No. 146706, July 15, 2005

[G.R. NO. 146706. July 15, 2005]
TOMAS SALVADOR, Petitioners, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Facts: Tomas Salvador, PAL ground crew employees were allegedly caught with dutiable goods (branded watches, etc) after PAF officers were
observing their conduct and found it to be suspicious during a special mission given to them to make a routine surveillance to check on reports of
alleged trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by PAL employees. Petitioners were convicted. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not the seized items are admissible in evidence.
Held: Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance
operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search made
by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected the search and seizure
without a search warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs law. It clearly recognizes the power of the State to foil any
fraudulent schemes resorted to by importers who evade payment of customs duties. The Government’s policy to combat the serious malady of
smuggling cannot be reduced to futility and impotence on the ground that dutiable articles on which the duty has not been paid are entitled to the
same Constitutional protection as an individual’s private papers and effects. Here, we see no reason not to apply this State policy which we have
continued to affirm. Petition denied.

Emergency circumstances
170. People v. De Gracia 233 SCRA 716 (1994)
G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO DE GRACIA, CHITO HENSON and JOHN DOES, accused. ROLANDO DE GRACIA,
accused-appellant.
Facts: Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) staged coup d’état in December 1989 against the
Government. A team from the NCR Defense Command conducted a surveillance on Eurocar building pursuant to an intelligence report that
elements of the RAM-SFP was occupying the said establishment as their communication command post. After they were fired at by a group of five
men, a searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office, finding and confiscating ammunition, dynamites, Mshells and “Molotov” bombs inside one
of the rooms and arresting appellant who was holding a C-4. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, there
was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing
within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed. Appellant was convicted for illegal possession
of firearms in furtherance of rebellion but was acquitted of attempted homicide.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure.
Held: Yes, there was a valid search and seizure in this case. Under circumstances, SC considered that the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives had reasonable ground to believe that a crime
was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Under the situation then prevailing, the
raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. Impugned judgment of the trial court is affirmed, but
the recommended executive clemency is deleted.

Checkpoints
171. Gen. De Villa v. Valmonte G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners, vs. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND, respondents.
FACTS: Valmonte and ULAP Assocation filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration
of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to
direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people. According to Petitioners,
they filed the petition because they were subjected to searches and seizures without the benefit of a warrant. The petitioners averred that there’s
a recent incident happened, where a certain Benjamin Parpoon, was allegedly killed in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to
speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
ISSUE: Whether or not the installations of the checkpoints violated their constitutional right against illegal search and seizures.
HELD: NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures. Not all searches and
seizures are prohibited. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
In the case at bar, the setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing an effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit
of the public. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so
clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted. Hence, petition
dismissed.

172. Aniag v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424 (1994)

G.R. No. 104961 October 7, 1994
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE,
respondents.
Facts: In preparation for the scheduled synchronized elections, COMELEC issued a Gun Ban resolution and Resolution No. 2327. Pursuant to the
“Gun Ban,” Ceding to the request of the House of Representatives Sergeant-at-Arms to return the firearms issued to him, petitioner, Francisco
Aniag, instructed his driver to pick up the firearms from his house and to bring the same Congress. The driver was then apprehended at a
checkpoint and was detained after the policemen found the firearms in a bag in the truck of the car.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s driver the warrantless search is valid. The police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for
an inquest but ordered released.
Held: No. In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation, driver Arellano being alone and a mere employee of petitioner
could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the
“implied acquiescence.” If there was any, could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano’s part to the search, and “consent” given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. Hence, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The warrantless search conducted by the Philippine National Police is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the warrantless
search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against petitioner.

173. People v. Usana, 323 SCRA 754 (2000)

G.R. Nos. 129756-58 January 28, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIAN DEEN ESCAÑO, VIRGILIO TOME USANA and JERRY CASABAAN LOPEZ, accused,
VIRGILIO TOME USANA and JERRY CASABAAN LOPEZ, accused-appellants.
Facts: Accused-appellants were convicted of violation of PD 1866 and violation of the COMELEC gun ban due to a checkpoint search conducted by
the police which search was subsequently questioned by Usana and Lopez.
Issue: Whether or not the checkpoint search conducted valid?
Held: This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a
way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists' right to "free
passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle's
occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right
against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as the accused have invoked. Not only would it be impractical, it would also forewarn those who
intend to violate the ban. Usana and Lopez also question the validity of the search. The trial court, in convicting the three accused for violation of
R.A. No. 6425.

174. People v. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004

G.R. No. 141137 January 20, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO; ARNOLD ROBLE and GERLYN WATES, Appellants.
Facts: Fifteen police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC gun ban, a motorcycle with three men on board
namely appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), Arnold Roble (Roble) Gerlyn Wates (Wates) sped past of the police officers. When they were ordered
to return to the checkpoint, a police officer asked what the backpack contains which the appellants answered that it was only a mat. The police
officers opened the bag and it turns out that its contents were marijuana. The Regional Trial Court rendered them guilty for transporting,
possessing and delivering prohibited drugs and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search upon the appellants and the seizure of the alleged 1,700 grams of marijuana violated their constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
HELD: Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a
routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable that either the
motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Warrantless search of the personal effects
of an accused has been declared by the Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused and attempted to flee. In light then of Vinecario et al.‘s speeding away after noticing the checkpoint even after
having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack, and the
reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army,
apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable
belief on the part of the law enforcers. Hence, the decision of the RTC that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegally transporting
marijuana is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION

G.Valid Warrantless arrests

Rebellion as Continuing Offense
175. Umil v. Ramos, G. R. 81567, July 9, 1990
G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL,
and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners, vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
Facts: the Regional Intelligence Operation Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU – CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of
the NPA Sparrow Unit being treated for a gunshot wound at a hospital. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person who was listed in
the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon is actually petitioner Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad responsible for the killing of two
CAPCOM soldiers the day before. He was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile
patrol car and fired at the two CAPCOM soldiers seated inside. n this 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by
the military on the petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest
without warrant.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s arrest was lawful.
Held: Yes. Petitioner Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion
being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crime. Petitions are dismissed.

Committed in the Presence of Police Officers

176. People v. dela Cruz, 184 SCRA 416 (1990)
G.R. No. 83260 April 18, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN DE LA CRUZ y GONZALES and REYNALDO BELTRAN y ANIBAN, accused-appellants.
Facts: After receiving a confidential report from their informant, a but-bust operation was conducted by a team from the 13 th Narcotics Regional
Unit to catch the pusher/s. At the scene, it was the accused-appellant, De La Cruz and Beltran, who first negotiated with the poseur-buyer.
Appellant instructed his co-accused to give one aluminium foil of marijuana which the latter got from his pants’ pocket and delivered it to the
buyer. After ascertaining the authenticity of the marijuana, the agent gave signal. The two accused were arrested.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest was valid.
Held: Yes. While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from one’s person without a search warrant, needless to
state a search warrant is not necessary, the search being incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when,
in his presence, he person to be arrested was committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is a matter of judicial
experience that in the arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were invariably caught red-handed.
Hence, the judgment of the lower court that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt is affirmed.

177. People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 (1991)

G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDISON SUCRO, accused-appellant.
Facts: During the surveillance operation of Sucro’s activities, police operatives, Roy Fulgencio, saw appellant sell Marijuana to a group of persons
identified as Ronnied Macabante. The police team was able to overtake and arrest Sucro and recover from him 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana
from the cart inside the chapel. Accused appealed that the marijuana teabags were seized without serving upon him a search warrant. These were
offered in evidence during his trial where he was found guilty.
Issue: Whether or not Sucro’s arrest without warrant is lawful consequently the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
Held: Yes. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where an arrest without warrant is considered lawful.
An offense committed in the presence or witin the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without warrant, when
the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. It would
suffice if the overt act were to be seen by a police officer, although from a distance of, for example, 2 meters. Since the arrest was considered valid,
the evidence presented is admissible in evidence. Hence, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Edison Sucro had indeed
committed the offense charged. The trial court's decision must be upheld.

178. People v. Mengote, G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992

G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.
Facts: A surveillance team was dispatched after the police were informed of the presence of three suspicious-looking persons. At the place, the
officers saw two men “looking from side to side,” one of whom was holding his abdomen. The police approached and identified themselves, after
which the suspects were searched. Rogelio Mengote was found to be in possession of a .38 caliber Smith and Weeson revolver with six bullets in
the chamber. During the investigation, one witness alleged that the revolver was among the articles stolen from him during a robbery in his house.
The gun, live bullets and holster were offered during the trial. Accused-appellant was subsequently convicted of illegal possession of firearms.
Issue: Whether or not the search and arrest were valid. Whether or not the revolver was admissible in evidence.
Held: No. At the time of the arrest, Mengote was merely “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen.” There was apparently no offense
that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence. There was nothing to
support the arresting officers’ suspicion other than Mengote’s darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. They also did not know what offense had
been committed and neither were they aware of Mengote’s participation at the police headquarters that they learned of the robbery in his house
and of Mengote’s supposed involvement therein. Thus, the arrest and search being unlawful, evidence is inadmissible being a fruit of the poisonous
tree. Hence, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered released.

179. People v. Luisito Go, G.R. No. 116001, March 14, 2001
G.R. No. L-116001 March 14, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUISITO GO y KO alias "KING LOUIE", accused-appellant.
Facts: Members of the Intelligence went to the police outpost at Crossing, Calamba, Laguna, to follow up an intelligence report that
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, a regulated drug, was being supplied there. Police agent report that he saw Luisito Go enter the
Flamingo Disco House with a gun tucked in Go's waist. Together, the three policemen proceeded to the Flamingo, informed the owner that they
were conducting an "Operation Bakal," to search for illegally possessed firearms. The owner allowed them and told a waiter to accompany them.
Police officers identified themselves and asked Go to stand up and saw the gun tucked in his waist with no license and confiscated the gun. On the
way to his car, the police officers noticed a PNP identification card hanging from the rearview mirror even Go is not a member of the PNP, no
driver’s license and registration of the vehicle. Inside the car they saw pieces of glass tooters and tin foils. Go took out an attaché case with 2 clutch
bag inside. The first bag contained granules of suspected shabu and the other is P 120,000.00. Also inside the attaché case the police officers found
that it also contained three glass tooters, tin foils, an improvised burner, magazines and newspapers. Consequently, two Informations were filed
against Go before the RTC for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act and violation of PD 1866. After a joint trial, the lower court rendered judgment
convicting Go in the two criminal cases. Go appealed his conviction and judgment of the case before the Court of Appeals. In an Amended Decision,
the Court of Appeals affirmed Go's conviction but modified the penalty. Go filed the petition for review.

Issue: Whether Go was legally arrested without warrant for illegal possession of firearms and illegal drugs.
Held: The Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an arrest may be effected without a warrant. Among these are
when, in the presence of a peace officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or
when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it. Herein, the police saw the gun tucked in Go's waist when he stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as
none was necessary. Go could not show any license for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect
committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. As a consequence of Go's valid warrantless arrest. This is a valid search incidental to the
lawful arrest. The subsequent discovery in his car of drug paraphernalia and the crystalline substance, which was later identified as shabu, though
in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearm was committed, cannot be said to have been made during an illegal search. As such,
the seized items do not fall within the exclusionary clause, which states that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against warrantless
arrest cannot be used for any purposes in any proceeding. Hence, not being fruits of the poisonous tree, so to speak, the objects found at the scene
of the crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and the drug paraphernalia, can be used as evidence against appellant. Besides, it has been held that
drugs discovered as a result of a consented search is admissible in evidence.

180. Larranaga v. CA, 281 SCRA 254

G.R. No. 130644 October 27, 1997
THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, represented in this suit by his mother MARGARITA G. LARRANAGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts: Petitioner Larranga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention before RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and
was detained without the filing of the necessary information and warrant of arrest. The petitioner alleged that he must be released and be sunject
to a preliminary investigation. However, pending the resolution of the Court for the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction filed by the petitioner, RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest directed to the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation.

Held: Yes. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at
arraignment. Petitioner, in this case, has been actively and consistently demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before he was charged
in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during the arraignment because there was a pending case in this Court regarding his right to avail
of a regular preliminary investigation. Clearly, the acts of the petitioner and his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary investigation is
part of procedural due process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed. Hence. the inquest investigation of
petitioner is reversed, annul the Order for Detention During The Pendency of the Case and order the immediate release of petitioner. Also, order to
cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of petitioner.

181. People v. Bongalon, 374 SCRA 289 (consent, in flagrante, waiver)

G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013
GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts: George was charged with child abuse, by striking Jayson Dela Cruz (12 year old) with his palm hitting the latter at his back and his left cheek,
and uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s family, which acts of the accused are prejudicial to the child’s development and which demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a human being. Petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that
he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after his minor daughters, Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing
stones at them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he
only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters. RTC and CA found and declared petitioner guilty of child abuse.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling: NO. Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back and on
the face with his hand, we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview. The records did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity” of Jayson as a human being, or
that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of
the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who
had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. The crime the petitioner was
liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the decision of the CA is set aside; and ENTER a new
judgment finding Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the
Revised Penal Code.

182. People v. Recepcion, GR 141923, Nov. 13, 2002 (hot pursuit, waiver of illegality)
G.R. No. 141943-45. November 13 ,2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. DIOSDADO RECEPCION Y PALASO (deceased), FELIPE DELA CRUZ Y REYES, AUDIE DONA Y BINAN,
ALFREDO BARACAS Y CONCEPCION, EDUARDO PALACPAC Y ROSALES, BERNARDO RANARA Y MORATALLA (at large), JOEMARI DELOS REYES Y
CONCEPCION, DOMINADOR RECEPCION Y PALASO and ROBERT ALFONSO Y MARTIZANO, appellants.
Facts: Eight persons allegedly conspired to kill and actually killed 5 customers of Sabungan Fastfood and Videoke. A waitress in said bar testified as
to the incident and identified the accused as the persons responsible. Another witness who worked as a waitress in a restaurant across the scene of
the crime testified and identified the same offenders. After the shooting, the accused boarded a jeepney owned by Ruben Labjata and made him
drive to Tarlac where they freed the driver and boarded a tricycle driven by Conrado Marquez. After the police invited the jeepney driver and the
tricycle driver for questioning, the area was cordoned off. The group along with FO1 Felipe Dela Cruz, surrendered after several calls by the police.
The accused were taken into custody was intercepted at the national highway of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija on board a tricycle. The accused were
charged with multiple murder, violation of PD No 1866, and robbery in band in three separate accusatory informations. The indictees, whene
arraigned, pled not guilty to the entire charged and interposed alibi as a defense.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest made was valid.
Held: Yes. The arrest of appellants has been made in hot pursuit, an exception from the rule that warrantless arrests are illegal. In any event,
appellants can no longer assail the illegality of their arrest since such a claim has not been brought up before or during the arraignment. The failure
to timely move for the quashal of the Information on this basis operates as a waiver of the right to question the supposed irregularity of the arrest.
the assailed judgment of the court a quo convicting appellants is AFFIRMED subject to the following MODIFICATIONS hereby found guilty of
homicide. Appellant Felipe dela Cruz, as an accessory, is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

Personal Knowledge of the Offense

183. People v. Bagista, G.R. no. 86218, September 18, 1992
[G.R. No. 86218. September 18, 1992.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELSIE BAGISTA y BANGCO, Accused-Appellant.
Facts: Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Detachment Office received information from one of its regular informants that a certain woman, 23 years of
age, with naturally curly hair, and with a height of 5’2″ or 5’3″, would be transporting marijuana from up north. Acting upon they established a
checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles, both private and public, coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying marijuana
leaves on board. After hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus which came from Lepanto, Benguet. Sgt. Parajas announced to
that they were going to search their baggages. At the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the right side with a travelling
bag with black and orange stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and discovered three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by
assorted clothing. The bag and the contents were confiscated and the woman arrested.
Issue: Whether or not probable cause is present in the conduct of the warrantless search. Whether or not the warrantless search is valid.
Held: A warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view. This in no way, however, gives
the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. In the case at bar, the
NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential
information they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing
marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to search accused-appellant’s belongings since she fits the description given by the
NARCOM informant. Hence, the decision of the lower court was AFFIRMED in toto.

184. People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 (1993)

G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accused-appellant.
Facts: The Valenzuela Police Station received a report about a mauling incident. Upon learning at the hospital that the victim died on arrival and
being informed of the cause of death, the policemen proceeded to the crime scene where they found piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow
block and two roaches of marijuana. After being told by the eyewitness the identity of one of the three assailants, the policemen went to
appellant’s house where they introduced themselves, and apprehended him and confiscated dried marijuana leaves.

Issue: Whether or not the search of appellant’s person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid.
Held: Yes. The policemen arrested appellate only some three (3) hours after he and his companions had killed the victim. They saw the victim deaf
in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death. The eyewitness reported the happening to
the policemen and pinpointed her neighbour, the appellant, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of the facts indicating that appellant and two other had killed him, they could lawfully arrest him
without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. The
search conducted on appellant’s person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. Appealed decision is affirmed with
modification.
 185. Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997.
G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997
ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts: At 8:00pm, Maranarag and his companion witnessed a hit-and-run accident involving the Mitsubishi Pajero of Robin Padilla (D), who was the
unknown driver at the time. As a member of a civic group, Maranarag decided to report the incident to the police via VHF radio. Mobile patrols
responded and chased the fleeing Pajero to the north. They finally caught up with the Padilla (D) and found several firearms in the vehicle and in his
person.
Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid? Is the warrantless search valid?
Ruling: Yes. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable"
suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity after the hit-and-run incident was reported to them. Thus, the
warrantless arrest was proper as Padilla (D) was caught in flagrante delicto with possession of unlicensed firearms and ammunition. A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view
are subject to seizure even without a warrant. Hence, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of
the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED

186. People v. Sinoc, 275 SCRA 357 (1997)

G.R. Nos. 113511-12 July 11, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO SINOC y SUMAYLO, accused-appellant.
Facts: A company pajero was carnapped. Isidoro Viacrusis, together with the driver, Guijapon, were shot causes the driver to die and the other is on
verge of death. The following day, a secret informant named Boyet reported to the police Station at Monkayo, Davao del Norte that the carnapped
"Pajero" was parked behind the apartment of a certain Paulino Overa. On instructions a police team went to the place and saw the "Pajero." With
their initial inquiries having yielded that the man who had brought it there would return that morning. Hours later, they saw a man approach the
"Pajero" who, on seeing them, tried to run away. They found out that the man, identified as Danilo Sinoc of Surigao del Norte, had the key of the
"Pajero," and was acting under instructions of certain companions who were waiting for him at the Star Lodge at Tagum, Davao del Norte. They
went to the Star Lodge only to discover that his companions were no longer there. Only Sinoc and Vicente Salon were arraigned and the other
accused being then at large. Both entered pleas of not guilty and were thereafter jointly tried. RTC found Sinoc guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
two cases jointly tried: one, of the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder and the other, of the complex crime of kidnapping with
frustrated murder. Salon, on the other hand was acquitted inasmuch as conspiracy was not proven. Sinoc appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the police officer had personal knowledge of the crime Sinoc committed to allow them to arrest the latter without a warrant
of arrest.
Held: The law provides that an arrest without warrant may be licitly effected by a peace officer, inter alia. "When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it." There is no question that the police
officers in this case were aware that an offense had just been committed;a "Pajero" belonging to a private company had been “carnapped" and its
driver and passenger shot, the former having died and the latter being on the verge of death. Nor is there any doubt that an informer had reported
that the stolen "Pajero" was at the Bliss Housing Project at Monkayo. It was precisely to recover the "Pajero" that a team authorities went to that
place and, on taking custody of the "Pajero. Sinoc's link to the stolen vehicle (and hence to the kidnapping and killing accompanying its asportation)
was thus palpable. The foregoing circumstances left the police officers no alternative save to arrest Sinoc and take possession of the "Pajero." His
arrest without warrant was justified; indeed, it was in the premises the officers' clear duty to apprehend him; their omission to do so would have
been inexcusable.

187. People v. Baula, G.R. No. 132671, November 15, 2000

G.R. No. 132671 November 15, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRISANTO BAULA, RUBEN BAULA, ROBERT BAULA and DANILO DACUCOS, accused-
appellants.
Facts: Jupiter Caburao, son of Patrocina Caburao, who saw the commission of the crime killing his mother by the Baula’s and Dacucos on 13
December 1995, at around 8:00 P.M. Before the accused fled from the crime, they threatened Jupiter with death if he were to divulge the incident
to anyone. For fear of reprisal from the accused, only believing that the police would be able to solve the gory killing on their own, Jupiter did not
reveal the damage to either his relatives or the police. The next day, the police authorities, went to the locus criminis. The investigation revealed
that before the victim was killed, she had been to Brigida Tumamang's store; that the Baulas, et. al. were also at the store having a drinking spree;
that the victim left the store and that, 15 minutes later, the Baulas, et. al. also left. SPO4 Mirande, with several policemen, repaired to the
respective houses of accused-appellants. With the positive result of the blood-stained from the pair of short pants, polo shirt and bolo of the
accused, together with the victim's dried blood samples, the accused were charged with murder. The accused plea of not guilty but the RTC
rendered its judgment convicting Baula, et. al. of the crime of murder. Baula, et. al. appealed.

Issue: Whether the Baulas can be arrested without warrant for the killing of Petrocinia Caburao, and whether or not seizures can be effected
pursuant to such arrests.
Held: The situation here in question is the purview of any of the established exceptions. In a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest to be
effected under the circumstances enumerated by law an offense has in fact just been committed, and the peace officer has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. The Accused were not being arrested at the time that the bloodstained bolo, polo
shirt and short pants were allegedly taken from them but were just being questioned by about the death of Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating
officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed the crime. Being in no position to effect a warrantless
arrest, the police officers were thus likewise barred from effecting a warrantless search and seizure. The police officers acted on a mere suspicion
that Baula, et. al. committed the crime. Mere suspicion cannot satisfy the requirement of probable cause which signifies a reasonable ground
sufficiently strong in them to warrant a person accused is guilty. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength
of the evidence yielded by that search. The Court finds it less than credible the stance of the prosecution that the polo shirt and short pants have
been voluntarily given. An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty. This presumption by itself, cannot prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual. Hence, the assailed
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and all the accused-appellants are hereby ACQUITTED

188. People v. Cubcubin, G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001

G.R. No. 136267. July 10, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FIDEL ABRENICA CUBCUBIN, JR., Accused-Appellant.
Facts: Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. was being sought in connection with the shooting near the cemetery of a Henry Piamonte. Cubcubin. He denied
involvement in the incident. PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked permission to enter and look around the house of the accused. SPO1
Malinao, Jr. noticed a white t-shirt placed over a divider near the kitchen. Upon close examination, he said that he found it to be "bloodied." When
he picked up the t-shirt, two spent .38 caliber shells fell from it. Cubcubin was charged for the crime of murder. RTC found Cubcubin guilty of
murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether or not there was "probable cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to believe that Cubcubin committed
the crime, to allow them to conduct the latter's warrantless arrest.

Held: Under Rule 113, Sec 5(b) of the ROC, two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just committed an
offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it. Herein, the arrest of Cubcubin was effected shortly after the victim was killed. There was no "probable cause” the arresting officers,
to believe that Cubcubin committed the crime. The two did not have "personal knowledge of facts" indicating that Cubcubin had committed the
crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that Cubcubin was probably guilty was based entirely on what they
had been told by others. On the other hand, the search of Cubcubin's house was illegal and, consequently, the things obtained as a result of the
illegal search are inadmissible in evidence against him. Also, Cubcubin refused to answer of where he hid the gun. Thus, the gun was purposely
sought by the police officers and they did not merely stumble upon it. Nor were the police officers justified in seizing the white t-shirt placed on top
of the divider "in plain view". The actual t-shirt merely had some small specks of blood at its lower portion. Furthermore, there is no evidence to
link Cubcubin directly to the crime. Hence, Cucubin is acquitted.

Time of Arrest
189. People vs. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791 (1992)
G.R. No. 95902 February 4, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DON RODRIGUEZA, accused-appellant.
Facts: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas,
Albay. The participating agents were given money treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a certain Don.
Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and “a certain object wrapped in a plastic” later identified as marijuana was given in exchange
for P200. The agent went back to headquarters and made a report, based on which, a team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted
in the house of the father of the accused. During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe
among others. There was no authorization by any search warrant. The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court,
considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest was in consonance to his constitutional right
Held: NO. The arrest and seizure were illegally conducted. In the case at bar, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant and the situation mentioned in the case. Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable
search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act because the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then
they should have first secured a search warrant during that time. Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction of the
accused, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. As clearly shown by the evidence,
the prosecution has failed to establish its cause. It has not overcome the presumption of innocence accorded to appellant. Hence, the accused is
acquitted.

190. Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 586 (1992)

G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial
Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts: Rolito Go, in a case of road rage, shot the victim, Eldon Maguan, and fled the scene. After establishing that Rolito Go was probably the
assailant, the police launched a manhunt. Six days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself before the police to verify news reports that he
was being hunted by the police. He was immediately detained. Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without a warrant because he
went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just
committed” at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of
Maguan and accordingly, none had the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful
warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to a preliminary investigation, could
not apply in respect of petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s warrantless arrest was valid.
Held: No. Rolito Go’s arrest took place six days after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers obviously were not present, within the meaning
of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effect six days after the shootong be reasonably
regarded as effected “when the shooting has in fact just been committed” within the meaning od Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the “arresting”
officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. Petitioner Go is ordered released
upon posting of a cash bail bond without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the Provincial Prosecutor move for
cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

191. People v. Calimlim, G.R. No. 123980, August 30, 2001

G.R. No. 123980 August 30, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL CALIMLIM y MUYANO, accused-appellant.
Facts: Lanie S. Limin was 14 years old and had been living with Manny Ferrer and Cresencia Ferrer for the past 3 years. On the night she left alone in
one of the two houses of the Ferrers since her usual companions, the sons of Manny Ferrer, were out for night disco. The accused Manuel Calimlim
enter her room, poked a knife at her neck and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. After the fourth intercourse, Calimlim threatened that he
would kill her if she reported the incidents. Despite the threat, she told her cousin, Manicris Ferrer, who then reported the matter to Dr. Nancy
Quinto who lived nearby. The rapes were reported to the station. Dr. Ricardo Ferrer conducted the physical examination on Lanie, and found that
there was minimal vaginal bleeding and there were lacerations in the hymen and a vaginal discharge positive for spermatozoa. Manuel Calimlim
denied the accusations. The RTC found Calimlim guilty of 4 counts of rape and sentenced him to death and to pay for damages. Hence, the
automatic review.
Issue: Whether or not Calimlim may raise the illegality of the warrantless arrest conducted against him, especially as the arrest was made a day
after the crime was committed.
Held: No. Even Calimlim avers that his arrest violated his constitutional rights since his arrest was made without judicial warrant although the police
had ample time to get one. But here it will be noted that Calimlim entered a plea of not guilty to each of the informations charging him of rape.
Thus, he had effectively waived his right to question any irregularity which might have accompanied his arrest and the unlawful restraint of his
liberty. Given the circumstances of his case, the exceptions do not apply here and the Court is constrained to rule that Calimlim is estopped from
raising the issue of the legality of his arrest. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Hence, the decision of the trial court finding the accused guilty is affirmed.

192. People v. Vinalon, GR 135542, July 28, 2002

G.R. No. 135542 July 18, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REYNALDO VIÑALON Y SAN AGUSTIN and ARNOLD DEVERA Y MOCALEN, accused-appellants.
Facts: Riding in a bus, appellants with the intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation announce a hold up and thereafter robbed and
divested the passenger personal property. Further, in pursuance of their conspiracy, with the intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior
strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one PO1 Joseph Llave by then and there shooting him on different parts of
his body that inflicting serious and fatal wounds which immediate cause of his death. During the shoot-out, stray bullets hit Norman Mapa, bud
conductor, and Antonio Hernandez, passenger, thereby causing them serious physical injuries. Viñalon was also wounded and after the incident,
preceded to a Hospital. After being ascertain with the identities, policemen frisked Viñalon and found in his pockets all the belongings they rob.
Trial court found the appellants guilty of robbery with homicide and sentencing each to suffer the penalty of death. Appellants interposed an
appeal seeking reversal of the judgment.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest and the search and seizure incident is valid.
Held: A warrantless arrest may be made by police officers based on their personal knowledge culled from the victim herself who pointed to the
suspect as the assailant at the time of the arrest. In our view, the arrest of appellants done immediately after the incident was valid for it was made
by the arresting officers after the victims of the robbery pointed to appellants as the malefactors. Accordingly, the search and seizure that ensued
are valid as incidental to a lawful arrest. Hence, the appealed decision of the RTC is hereby affirmed with modification.

193. People v. Mendez, GR 147671, Nov. 21, 2002

G.R. No. 147671. November 21, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. RENANTE MENDEZ and BABY CABAGTONG, accused-appellant.
Facts: In the rape case of Candy Dolim, 13 years old, who according to his father, Rico Dolim, left the house to collect bet on the PBA endings on
December 8, 1996, and after four days found in Sitio Tinotogasan dead and was raped . Aurea Cabagtong pointed to the accused-appellants, Baby
Cabagtong and Renante Mendez as the perpetrators of the crime. According to Ronnie, he was about three meters away when he later saw
accused-appellants. Renante Mendez was on top of Candy, having sexual intercourse with her, while Baby Cabagtong was holding the victim’s
hands. Ronnie was warned by the accused not to tell to anyone about what he saw or else they would kill him and his family. The Renante Mendez
was arrested by SPO2 Cernio without warrant basing only on their knowledge of his guilt. Baby Cabagtong was arrested by Mejica, a member of the
Citizens’ Crime Watch. The trial court found the evidence for the prosecutions, particularly the testimonies of Ronnie Cabagtog and his mother,
credible and rendered them guilty.

Issue: Whether or Not the warrantless arrest of accused Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong justified.
Held: No. Nor can we close our eyes to the palpable violations of the rights of accused-appellants during the period of their detention. The facts of
the case show that accused-appellants were arrested without any warrants from the courts. SPO2 Cernio did not have personal knowledge of the
commission of the crime so as to justify the warrantless arrest of Renante Mendez. Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant under
law must be based upon "probable cause," which means "an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion" based on actual facts. Baby
Cabagtong, on the other hand, was arrested by Zosimo Mejica, a member of the Citizens' Crime Watch, on the basis of the citizens' arrest law.
Mejica was neither a police officer nor a witness to the incident, and not a member of investigative team. This does not constitute personal
knowledge to warrant a citizens' arrest. Finally, the records do not show that accused-appellants were assisted by counsel in the course of the
investigation and were appraised of their rights under the Constitution. Accused-appellants also insist that they did not receive a copy of the order
requiring them to submit counter-affidavits. The fact that these irregularities were never raise before arraignment, and were therefore considered
waived when accused appellants entered their pleas, does not justify the short cuts. These procedural lapses clearly indicate that the police had
shut its mind off to the possibility that other parties might have committed the crime. Hence, the decision of the lower court was reversed and the
accused-appellants were acquitted.

Marked Money
194. People vs. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586 (1993)
G.R. No. 74189 May 26, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO ENRILE Y VILLAROMAN and ROGELIO ABUGATAL Y MARQUEZ, accused-appellants.
Facts: A buy-bust team was dispatched to entrap appellant Rogelio Abugatal, a plan made on the strength of a tip given by a police informer. After
witnessing the exchange, two policemen approached appellant and placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the wrapped object he
gave the poseur- buyer. Upon prodding, appellant Abugatal led the police to the house of his co-accused Enrile where he identified the latter as the
source of the marijuana. Appellant Enrile was frisked and the marked money was found inside his front pocket.

Issue: Whether or not appellant Enrile’s warrantless arrest and search was justified.
Held: No. The policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal knowledge that he was the source of the marijuana. The discovery
of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the act of selling marijuana. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it
were, that facet alone would not retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure. Hence, the conviction of Antonio Enrile in the
challenged decision is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and shall be released immediately

Lack of Urgency
195. People v. Pasudag, G.R. No. 128822, May 4, 2001
G.R. No. 128822 May 4, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO PASUDAG y BOKANG @ "BERTING, accused-appellant.
Facts: Alberto Pasudag was accused on the basis of inference that he planted, cultivated and cultured the seven (7) plants of marijuana found in his
garden 5 meters away from his home. When SPO2 Pepito Calip saw the garden and reported to Chief of Police after receiving the information, the
latter dispatched team to conduct investigation to the house of the accused. Upon seeing the marijuana plants took pictures of accused Pasudag
standing beside one of the marijuana plants then uprooted the plant. The team brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the police
station. Pasudag admitted offense. The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as charged and, taking into consideration his
educational attainment (he reached only grade IV), hence, this appeal saying Accused-appellant erred that the confiscation report was not an
extrajudicial admission which required the intervention of his counsel.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest of the accused requires urgency or necessity for the warrantless search
Held: No, the Court ruled that search and seizure conducted without the requisite judicial warrant is illegal and void ab initio. The prosecution’s
evidence clearly established that the police conducted a search of accused’s backyard garden without a warrant; they had sufficient time to obtain
a search warrant; they failed to secure one. There was no showing of urgency or necessity for the warrantless search, or the immediate seizure of
the marijuana plants. The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs.
However, quick solutions of crimes and apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights.”“The mantle of
protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high handedness of law enforcers, regardless of
the praise worthiness of their intentions.” With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellant. Hence, the decision of the trial court was reversed and set aside. Accused was acquitted.

196. People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988)

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Having earlier received a tip from an informer identifying the accused, Idel Aminnudin, who was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and
was carrying marijuana, the PC officers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked like marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect’s articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed agains him and he
was eventually convicted. However, and it is Aminnudin’s claim that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana
allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights.

Issue: Whether or not Aminnudin’s arrest and search, caught in flagrante delicto, justifies the warrantless arrest.
Held: No. It is clear that the PC had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was
coming to Iloilo n the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrical was certain. And from the information
they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the
arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a “search warrant was not necessary.” Thus, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED
and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.

IV.PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

Art. III, Sec. 3(1)
197. Gaanan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA 113 (1986)
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts: Complainant Atty. Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon have a settlement proposal to the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assult
against to Laconico. When Atty. Pintor called, Laconico requested Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone
extension to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Laconico agreed to the proposal that he will give 8,000 for settlement.
When Atty. Pintor receive the money, Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, arrested the
complainant. When Gaanan executed an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct
assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion. Since appellant listened to the telephone
conversation without complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. The lower
court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC
affirmed with modification hence the present petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under Rep. Act No. 4200
Held: No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting,
or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire
or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office
use. The petition is GRANTED. Hence, petitioner is herby acquitted.

198. Ramirez vs. CA, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
FACTS: Ramirez made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that
the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s
dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”. Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private
respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration by the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to
the conversation.
HELD: NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner. Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute. The unambiguity
of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly
supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the
law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity.

199. Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005

G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES)
CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO
ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO, Petitioners, vs. GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO
GOLEZ, Respondents.
FACTS: A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in
the Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which required respondents to make a
return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the CA. CA dismissed the petition because the detainees are
already charged of coup d’etat. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitutional rights of the petitioners were violated in connection with the right to privacy of communication.
HELD: The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. The remedy of habeas
corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being
illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the
detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error.
Neither can it substitute for an appeal.

Exclusionary Rule
Art. III, Sec. 3(2)
200. In Re Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987)
G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."
FACTS: Eva Maravilla Ilustre, in her fourth case before the Supreme Court, has been held in contempt due to the threatening letters she sent to
individual Justices, her efforts to disparage the SC in the media, and her complaint against them with the Tanodbayan that completely disregarded
facts, circumstances, and legal considerations; instigated the circulation of a false headline implying graft and corruption charges against Justices.
The involvement of Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, her counsel, is judged to have committed acts unbecoming of an officer of the Court, and has been
suspended indefinitely.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ilustre and Laureta should be held in contempt for their remarks on the Supreme Court.
Held: Ilustre has lost three times in court, and by virtue of res judicata, which bar her from acquiring Maravilla’s properties, serve as final judgment
of the case. Supreme Court gave ample time and consideration to her petitions, but ultimately held that they had no merit. In their persistence to
overturn detrimental decisions, their threats of “exposing” the supposed corruption of the Supreme Court to the media, and their unfounded
complaint to the Tanodbayan, Ilustre and Laureta attempted to subject the judiciary to the executive, which is unjustifiable under separation of
powers. Independence of the judiciary is the indispensable means for enforcing the supremacy of the Constitution. A letter individually addressed
to some justices of the Supreme Court is not covered by the constitutional right to “privacy of communication” when the same pertain to their
exercise of judicial functions. Hence, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G. Laureta for the setting aside of the order
suspending him from the practice of law, and of Eva Maravilla Ilustre for the lifting of the penalty for contempt are DENIED, and this denial is FINAL.

201. Gutang v. People, GR 135406, July 11, 2000

[G.R. No. 135406. July 11, 2000.]
DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS: David Gutang, together with Noel Regala, Alex Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, Jr. was arrested by policemen with the enforcement of a
search warrant. Several drug paraphernalia, which later tested positive for marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride, were seized along
with a small quantity of marijuana fruiting tops. The four were brought to Camp Crame and were subjected to a drug-dependency test and were
asked to give a sample of their urine to which they complied. Their urine samples all tested positive for shabu. De Venecia, Jr. voluntarily submitted
himself for treatment, rehabilitation and confinement. Gutang, Regala and Jimenez pleaded not guilty. They were found guilty of possession and
use of prohibited drugs. Gutang argued that the urine sample is inadmissible in evidence because he had no counsel during the custodial
investigation when it was taken. In effect, it is an uncounselled extra-judicial confession and a violation of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the urine samples taken were admissible in evidence.
RULING: The Court ruled that it was admissible and the petition is denied. The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody
and placed under investigation for the commission of crime. Such right is guaranteed by the Constitution, however, what the Constitution prohibits
is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be
material to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation and not to unearth undisclosed facts. An accused may validly be
compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to
be done without going against the proscription against testimonial compulsion.

202. KMU v. Dir. - Gen. of NEDA, 487 SCRA 623

G.R. No. 167798 April 19, 2006
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, EMILIA P.
DAPULANG, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
Facts: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order (EO) No. 420 on April 13, 2005, directing all government agencies and
government-owned and - controlled corporations to adopt uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems.

Issue: Whether EO 420 infringed on the citizen’s right to privacy

Held: All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their
governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that these ID cards violate their right to privacy. Neither have there been
complaints of abuse by government entities in the collection and recording of personal identification data. In fact, petitioners in the present cases
did not claim that the ID systems of government entities prior to EO 420 violated their right to privacy. Thus, they had even less basis for
complaining against a unified ID system under the executive order in question. The data collected and stored under EO 420 were to be limited to
only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself would show only 8 of these which is considered not just strictly confidential but also personal matters.
They are, in fact, routine for ID systems, therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the constitutionality of EO 420 as non-violative of the
right to privacy. Supreme Court upheld in Whalen, those required under EO 420 are far more benign. Hence, they cannot constitute any violation of
the right to privacy or be used to embarrass or humiliate anyone. EO 420 applies only to government entities that, pursuant to their regular
functions under existing laws, already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards. It does not grant these entities any power that they do not already
possess under existing laws. Hence, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is declared VALID.

V.Freedom of Speech and Assembly

Art. III, Sec. 4
Prior Restraint
203. Near v. Minnesota, 238 US 697
Jay Near, Appellant v. Minnesota Ex Rel. Olson, appellee, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
Facts: In a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday Press, Jay Near and Howard Guilford accused local officials of being implicated with
gangsters. Minnesota officials sought a permanent injunction against The Saturday Press on the grounds that it violated the Public Nuisance Law
because it was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory. The law provided that any person "engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or
circulating an "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and
could be enjoined from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. The state supreme court upheld both the temporary injunction and the
permanent injunction that eventually issued from the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not prior restraints on speech are generally unconstitutional, such as when they forbid the publication of malicious, scandalous,
and defamatory content of the Minnesota "gag law".
Held: In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Charles Hughes, the Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was facially
unconstitutional, meaning the decision was based on an analysis of the law's general applications, not the specific context of this case. The Court
held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. (The majority used the
incorporation doctrine to apply the rights granted under the Bill of Rights to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.) The Court established
as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication
in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding. In some situations, such as
when speech is obscene, incites violence, or reveals military secrets, the government might be able to justify a prior restraint.

204. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 US 51

Freedman, appellant v Maryland, appellee 380 U.S. 51 (1965)
Facts: Maryland required that all films be submitted to a board of censors before being exhibited. The board could disapprove films that were
obscene, debased or corrupted morals, or tended to incite crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman
challenged the law as unconstitutional due to the procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that prior approval itself was unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether or not Maryland law violate the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment?
Held: The Court found the Maryland law to be invalid. The Court decision reflected a concern that the statute provides the danger of "unduly
suppressing protected expression." The board was allowed overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of statutory provisions for judicial
participation in the procedure to prohibit a film. The Court established three guidelines as adequate safeguards to protect against the "undue
inhibition of protected expression." These guidelines are to: (1) place the burden of proving the film is unprotected expression on the censors, (2)
require judicial determination to impose a valid determination, and (3) require prompt determination "within a specified time period."

205. New York Times Co. v. US, 403 US 713

New York Times Company, petitioner v United States, respondent , 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
Facts: In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington
Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The
President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington
Post Co.
Issue: Whether or not that the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of what it termed "classified information" violate the First
Amendment.
Held: Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the
press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law
embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event
imperilling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified.

206. Alexander v. US - 113 S. Ct. 2766, 125 L. Ed. 2d. 441

509 U.S. 544 (113 S.Ct. 2766, 125 L.Ed.2d 441) No. 91-1526.
Ferris J. ALEXANDER, Sr., Petitioner v. UNITED STATES.respondent
Facts. The Petitioner owned 13 adult bookstores throughout Minnesota. He was convicted on 17 obscenity counts and 3 RICO violations. The
obscenity convictions were based on the sale of 4 magazines and 3 videotapes. He was sentence to 6 years in prison, fined $100,000 and ordered to
pay the cost of trial and incarceration for the obscenity counts. In addition, he was ordered to forfeit his businesses and nearly $9 million in profits.
Issue. Is the court order to shut down the adult bookstores an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech?
Held. No. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) rejected the argument that the sentence violated Petitioner’s First Amendment
constitutional rights, but remanded for reconsideration under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).
The items were seized as punishment not a prior restraint. This is an authorization to suppress disfavored speech. The majority emphasizes the
definition of a prior restraint to distinguish it from a subsequent judgment. The stores were shut down because they were related to past
wrongdoings. The Petitioner is free to start another adult bookstore chain once he serves his sentence. So, this action is not a content-based
restraint.

207. INC v. CA, GR 119673 July 26, 1996

G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND TELEVISION
and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDOZA, respondents
Facts: The petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series. The
Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law. Petitioner INC questioned the actions of respondent Board. The RTC grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its
TV programs. CA reversed the RTC. Saying that the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,”
and the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the on the ground that the materials constitute an
attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.” Thus, petitioner
INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue : Whether or not respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program
Held : No. In the case at bar that the videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were
considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section
3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. But the ground
"attack against another religion" was merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the
respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. Board submits that a "system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by
judges and not left to administrative agencies. The fact that the case at bar involves videotapes that are pre-taped. Given the specific content of the
speech, it is not unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can determine whether its sulphur will bring about the
substantive evil feared by the law. Thus, the decision of the CA is affirmed.

208. David v. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160

G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S.
MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL
GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, Respondents
Facts: As the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the
20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal
of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor and newspaper columnist, together with
his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. The next day operatives of the CIDG of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN
MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those
petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers
of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional impeding the right to assembly. Consequently
Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies
were valid?

Held: The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power to issue decrees which is a Legislative power, to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all
laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President and To impose standards on media or any form of
prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional. The warrantless arrest
of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in
the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880

Subsequent punishment
209. People v. Perez, 45 Phil. 599
G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: Isaac Perez, he municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the
morning of April 1, 1992, in the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood,
which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: “The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood’s head for having
recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence.” Because of such utterances, he was charged in the CFI of Sorsogon
with violation of Article 256 of the RPC which has something to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority. He was
convicted. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Perez’s remarks is protected by the constitutional protection on freedom of speech.
Held: No, it is not. Agreed with the lower court in its findings of facts but convicted the accused for violation of Act No. 292 (Section 8) with
modification. The sentence of the lower court, the defendant and appellant shall suffer 2 months and 1 day's imprisonment and pay the costs. It is
of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless
the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech
and press and assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of
the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.

210. Dennis v. US, 341 US 494

341 U.S. 494 (1951) June 4, 1951
Eugene Dennis, John B. Williamson, Jacob Stachel, et al., petitioner v United States, respondent
Facts: In 1948, eleven Communist Party leaders were convicted of advocating the violent overthrow of the US government and for the violation of
several points of the Smith Act. The Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow or destruction of the United
States government. The party members who had been petitioning for socialist reforms claimed that the Act violated their First Amendment rights.
Party leaders were found guilty and lower courts upheld the conviction.
Issue: Whether or not the Smith Act, a non-speech related offense based on speech, violate the First Amendment
Held: The convictions based on the Smith Act did not violate the First Amendment despite the fact that the defendants advocated violent
overthrow of the government. The Court upheld the convictions of the Communist Party leaders and found that the Smith Act did not "inherently"
violate the First Amendment. In the plurality opinion, the Court held that there was a distinction between the mere teaching of communist
philosophies and active advocacy of those ideas. Such advocacy created a "clear and present danger" that threatened the government. Given the
gravity of the consequences, the Court held that success or probability of success was not necessary to justify restrictions on the freedom of
speech. The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later date. “No matter how it is worded, this is a
virulent form of prior censorship of speech and press, which I believe the First Amendment forbids.”

211. Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835

G.R. No. L-27833 April 18, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF RE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT 4880. ARSENIO GONZALES and FELICISIMO R.
CABIGAO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Petition for declaratory relief re constitutionality of RA 4880
Facts: The revised Election Code under RA 4880 was amended to include two new sections which prohibits the too early nomination of candidates
and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity. Petitioners alleges that RA 4880 is unconstitutional because its
enforcement would prejudice basic rights, such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly and the right to form associations or societies
for purposes not contrary to law, guaranteed under the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the freedom of expression may be limited.
Held: Yes. Freedom of expression is no absolute. Two tests may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction. These are the “clear and
present danger” rule and the “dangerous tendency” rule. The scope of the curtailment to which freedom of expression may be subjected is not
foreclosed by the recognition of the existence of a clear and present danger of substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral process. The
prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for
public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether
directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a
constitutional command.

212. Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, Jr., 137 SCRA 628

G.R. No. L-59329 July 19, 1985
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) petitioner, vs. THE HON. JOSE P. DANS, JR., MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION &
COMMUNICATIONS, THE HON. CEFERINO S. CARREON, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL TELECOM., COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.
Facts: The radio station DYRE as summarily closed on grounds of national security allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE
contends that they were denied due process and the closure violates freedom of expression. There was no hearing to establish factual evidence for
the closure. Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a
motion to withdraw the petition. But the rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing
the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a “RESOLUTION” for the guidance
of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in matters as this case.
Issue: Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.
Held: Yes. The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its
operations curtailed. It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable
standard to which government action must conform in order that may deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be
valid. The closure of the radio station is likewise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and expression. Although the
government still has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of
freedom of expression is the “clear and present danger” rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this danger
that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a
representative democracy. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and
freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. Petition granted.