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NEW APPROACHES TO THE GOVERNANCE OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Insights from Africa

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New Approaches to the
Governance of Natural
Resources
Insights from Africa

Edited by

J. Andrew Grant
Associate Professor, Queen’s University, Canada

W.R. Nadège Compaoré

Researcher, Queen’s University, Canada

Matthew I. Mitchell
Assistant Professor, Saint Paul University, Canada
Editorial matter and selection © J. Andrew Grant, W.R. Nadège Compaoré,
and Matthew I. Mitchell 2015
Foreword © Kathryn Sturman 2015
Individual chapters © Respective authors 2015
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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Grant, J. Andrew, 1974–
New approaches to the governance of natural resources : insights from
Africa / J. Andrew Grant, Associate Professor, Queen’s University,
Canada ; W.R. Nadège Compaoré, Researcher, Queen’s University,
Canada ; Matthew I. Mitchell, Assistant Professor, Saint Paul University,
Canada.
pages cm. — (International political economy series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Natural resources—Africa—Management. 2. Conservation
of natural resources—Africa. I. Nadège Compaoré, W. R.
II. Mitchell, Matthew I. III. Title.
HC800.Z65G73 2015
333.7096—dc23 2014029181
 For
Elizabeth and Audrey
Awa and Henri
Marika and Zachary
This page intentionally left blank
Contents

List of Tables, Figures, and Boxes ix

Foreword xi

Acknowledgements xiv

Notes on Contributors xv

List of Acronyms xxv

Part I Introduction: Theoretical Approaches and

Policy Implications
1 ‘New’ Approaches to the Governance of Africa’s Natural
Resources 3
J. Andrew Grant, W.R. Nadège Compaoré, Matthew I. Mitchell,
and Mats Ingulstad

2 Interrogating the ‘Good’ in ‘Good Governance’:

Rethinking Natural Resource Governance Theory and
Practice in Africa 25
Mari-Lise du Preez

Part II Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil

Sectors
3 The Rise and Fall of Oil-Rentier States in Africa 45
Douglas A. Yates

4 Access to Information and Transparency Provisions in

Petroleum Laws in Africa: A Comparative Analysis 65
Peter G. Veit and Carole Excell

5 Micro-Level Effects of Oil Resources: Insights from a

Survey of Angolan Microcredit Clients 96
Allan Cain, Ivar Kolstad, and Arne Wiig

6 Bridging the Governance Gap in South Sudan:

Connecting Policy-Makers to Populations in Africa’s
Newest Oil-Producing Country 113
Conrad Winn, Melissa Jennings, and Matthew I. Mitchell
vii
viii Contents

Part III Governance Challenges in Africa’s

Non-Petroleum Natural Resource Sectors
7 Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships in Mining: From
Engagement to Development in Ghana 131
Hevina S. Dashwood and Bill Buenar Puplampu

8 Network Governance and the African Timber

Organization: Prospects for Regional Forestry Governance
in Africa 154
J. Andrew Grant, Dianne Balraj, Jeremy Davison, and
Georgia Mavropoulos-Vagelis

9 Refocusing Governance from the ‘Bottom-Up’:

Understanding the Gendered Dynamics of Land Deals for
Biofuel Development in Kenya and Tanzania 181
Andrea Collins

10 Casting the Net Widely: Effective Governance and the

Contribution of Fisheries to the Development of African
Countries 200
Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Dawit Tesfamichael

11 Hydropolitics and Transboundary River Basin

Management Nuances in the Southern African
Development Community 224
Anthony Turton

Part IV Concluding Remarks: New Challenges and

Opportunities
12 Global and Local Challenges and Opportunities:
Reflections on China and the Governance of African
Natural Resources 247
Christopher Alden and Ana Cristina Alves

13 Prospects and Trends in the Governance of Africa’s Natural

Resources: Reflections on the Role of External and Internal
Actors 267
J. Andrew Grant, W.R. Nadège Compaoré, Matthew I. Mitchell,
and Timothy M. Shaw

Index 285
Tables, Figures, and Boxes

Tables

2.1 Comparison between formal and informal institutions 33

3.1 African oil-export dependency as percentage of gross
domestic product 48
3.2 Income inequality in African oil states 50
3.3 Oil-export dependency as percentage of government
revenue (2008) 51
3.4 Rentier mentality and corruption 55
3.5 Domestic oil consumption in African rentier states
(2009) 57
3.6 GDP composition by sector in African oil-rentier states 58
4.1 Information provisions in petroleum laws and bills in
five African countries 71
5.1 Descriptive statistics 101
6.1 Public opinion polling results in South Sudan: general
environment 118
6.2 Public opinion polling results in South Sudan: daily life
for households 118
10.1 Prevalence of undernourishment, potential catch loss as
% of actual tonnes of fish caught and level of seafood in
dietary protein in 22 coastal African countries 207
11.1 Transboundary river basins to which one or more SADC
member state is a riparian 227
11.2 Physical description of the major transboundary rivers
in the SADC region 230
11.3 Population trends and dynamics in the SADC region 232
11.4 Population dynamics and water security in the SADC
region 234
11.5 Sectoral water efficiency in the SADC region 237

Figures

3.1 Chain of causality in a rentier state 56

5.1 Gini coefficients of selected resource-rich countries
(2005) 97

ix
x List of Tables, Figures, and Boxes

10.1a Time-series of reported catch from 1950 to 2004,

globally 203
10.1b Time-series of reported catch from 1950 to 2004, from
the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of African
countries 203
10.2 Percentage of exploited stocks in the five status
categories: under-developed, developing, fully
exploited, over-exploited, and collapsed (a) globally
and (b) within the EEZs of African countries 205
10.3 Percentage of stocks that are classified as over-exploited
or collapsed in each EEZ: (a) in the 1960s and (b) in the
2000s 206
10.4a Distant water fleet access to West African waters
(Agreement Years, 1960–1969) 209
10.4b Distant water fleet access to West African waters
(Agreement Years, 1990–1999) 210
10.5 Exported marine product as a percentage of the total
landing (broken line) and its value (full line) 211
10.6 Exporters and importers of demersal fish 212
10.7 Exporters and importers of small pelagic fish 212
10.8 Change in the catch rate for Sudanese artisanal
fisheries, error bars are 95% confidence intervals 213
10.9 The estimated catch, annual average of five years, and
data submitted to FAO for the Eritrean trawl fishery in
the Red Sea 216
10.10 Catch data for Sudanese artisanal fisheries from data
recorded in the market (broken line) and total estimate
including unreported catch (full line) 216
10.11 The concept of value addition throughout the food
chain 219
11.1 Mean annual precipitation across the SADC region 226
11.2 The conversion ratios of MAP to MAR in the SADC
region 228

Boxes

1 Petroleum laws and bills reviewed 67

2 Constitutions and access to information laws and bills
reviewed 68
3 The legislature and access to information 74
Foreword

Africa’s natural resource endowment has shaped its history and interac-
tions with global trade and economic systems for centuries. In the 21st
century, the commodities price boom and sustainability concerns about
human impacts on the environment have increased the value placed
upon the continent’s renewable and non-renewable resources. Mineral
and energy resources are being discovered and extracted at an unprece-
dented pace, with governance regimes scrambling to keep up with the
competition to do business in the extractive industries. Depleting land,
water, forests, fish, and other resources needed to sustain life have been
elevated from matters of local conservation to an international human
security issue.
More than a decade into the mining, oil and gas boom driven by ris-
ing demand from the industrialization of China and India, this is an
apt time to reflect on what has changed in recent years in approaches
to governing the extractive industries. In Africa, the early years of rec-
ognizing the trend in growing demand for minerals, oil, and gas were
characterized by alarm. Layered over the pessimism prevalent to exter-
nal views of ‘the hopeless continent’ (Economist, 2000) at the turn of the
millennium was a warning of a ‘new scramble’ for Africa’s resources.
This discourse evoked images of rapacious multinational oil and min-
ing companies backed up by their powerful governments – both the
former colonial powers of Europe and the emerging powers of China
and India (and to a lesser extent, Brazil and Russia). Experienced mining
countries, such as South Africa, Australia, and Canada, were expected to
pursue their own economic interests by extension into African regions
less experienced in mining. African governments were anticipated to be
either powerless or complicit in the plunder of their countries’ assets at
the expense of their peoples.
It soon became clear that this was an overly negative view and that
opportunities for growth and development existed alongside the haz-
ards of the ‘resource curse’. The obvious difference between the ‘old’ and
‘new’ scrambles for African resources is the revenues that now accrue to
sovereign African states when they decide to exploit natural assets on
their own terms. There is a realization of the pivotal role these govern-
ments play in deriving and sharing the benefits of resource extraction in
the national, sub-national, and local interests.

xi
xii Foreword

Regional and international policy instruments have gained traction

in supporting this role, such as the African Mining Vision, the African
Peer Review Mechanism of the New Partnership for Africa’s Develop-
ment, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and the Natural
Resource Charter. Certification schemes and policy initiatives have
arisen to help govern forests, fisheries, water, and land – with a partic-
ular emphasis on transboundary management of shared resources. The
REDD+ initiative stands out in recent years as a substantial opportunity
for African countries to guard and attach greater value to their forests,
now that the threat of climate change has elevated areas like the Congo
Basin rainforest to global significance.
The positive effects of the commodities boom on economic growth in
Africa have been noted in recent years, for example, in the report of the
McKinsey Global Institute (2010) titled Lions on the Move: The Progress
and Potential of African Economies. The African Economic Outlook (2013)
tracks positive trends in economic and human development, related to
Africa’s comparative advantage in natural resources. However, these and
other sources caution against exaggerating extant positive changes and
underestimating the intractability of poverty and conflict.
This book’s focus on new approaches to governance matches this shift
to cautiously optimistic and constructive analyses of Africa’s resource
challenges and opportunities. The emphasis on norms as well as a
wide variety of actors requiring attendant levels of analysis (i.e., at the
local, national, regional, and global) offers a welcome multidimensional
framework for understanding governance.
The resource-specific, country-specific, and country-comparative
chapters provide a nuanced and disaggregated picture of resource gov-
ernance in Africa. There is surprisingly little contrast between different
commodities in the earlier literature on natural resource governance.
For example, major African oil-producing countries should not be
pooled with other resource-rich countries in analysing the challenges of
resource-led development, because their dependence on resource rents
far exceeds that of other resource-rich countries. The global geostrategic
importance of oil exposes them to unusually strong international pres-
sures (for better and for worse). Regions can have disparate responses
to similar external forces. For instance, Zambia and its neighbours
Botswana and Tanzania experienced the global financial crisis differ-
ently due to their respective dependence on copper, diamonds, and gold
(African Development Bank, 2009).
The most interesting aspect of country comparison is not the average
effect of natural resources on economic development, but its variation.
 Foreword xiii

Resource-abundant countries constitute some of the richest and some of

the poorest countries in Africa. Some countries emerging from decades
of violent warfare are achieving rapid economic growth from miner-
als extraction, such as Mozambique and Liberia, while new state South
Sudan has yet to achieve enough stability to realize its potential. Oth-
ers, like Zambia and Ghana, hope to achieve greater reduction of poverty
than they have had in the past, by governing their extractive resource
sectors differently.
Finally, I would like to congratulate the editors of and contributors
to this book, several of whom Timothy Hughes and I had the plea-
sure to work with in the early stages of the project. It is gratifying to
see how the book evolved from earlier drafts of several chapters com-
missioned by the South African Institute of International Affairs into a
broader appraisal of resource governance in Africa supported by a net-
work of highly regarded academics and policy practitioners in this field.
It is hoped that this network will continue to strengthen and contribute
innovative, multidisciplinary approaches to ensure that Africa benefits
profoundly from its natural resources.

Kathryn Sturman
University of Queensland, Australia
Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Christina Brian and Timothy Shaw for their
enthusiasm and support throughout the various phases of the edited
book project and Ambra Finotello for her patience and assistance in
shepherding the manuscript through the production process. Kathryn
Sturman and Timothy Hughes offered welcome encouragement and
suggestions during the preliminary planning stages of the project.
We would also like to thank the following institutions for providing
stimulating scholarly environments for the editors while the manuscript
neared completion: University of the Witwatersrand (Andrew Grant);
South African Institute of International Affairs (Nadège Compaoré);
and University of Wisconsin-Madison (Matthew Mitchell). Last, but
not least, we would like to thank the contributors for their time and
collegiality during the course of the book project.

xiv
Contributors

Christopher Alden is Full Professor in International Relations at the

London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and the Acting-
Head of the Global Powers in Africa Programme at the South African
Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). Alden has published widely on
China–Africa issues, including the monograph China in Africa (2007)
and the co-edited volume China Returns to Africa (2008), as well as
numerous scholarly journal articles and reports. He also co-founded
Africa’s first centre devoted to East Asian studies at the University of
the Witwatersrand in 1992.

Ana Cristina Alves is Assistant Professor at Nanyang Technological Uni-

versity, School of Human and Social Sciences, Singapore. She holds a
PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics.
Her doctoral dissertation was a comparative study of China’s engage-
ment in the oil industry in Angola and Brazil. She has published widely
on China–Africa relations and China’s relations with Portuguese speak-
ing countries, including a co-edited book titled China and Angola: A
Marriage of Convenience? (with M. Power, 2012). Previously, Alves served
as a Senior Researcher at the South African Institute of International
Affairs (SAIIA) in Johannesburg.

Dianne Balraj is the Environmental Policy Coordinator at Conservation

International Guyana. Her work entails contributing to the strength-
ening of national and regional environmental policies, strategies, and
programmes, notably in priority areas such as biodiversity and ecosys-
tem services, sustainable development of natural capital, and climate
change and REDD+ in Guyana. Balraj holds an MA in Political Studies
from Queen’s University, Canada. Her research interests include water
policy in the Guiana Shield eco-region, REDD+, biodiversity offsets, and
governance issues in forestry and mineral resource sectors. Her most
recent scholarly work was published in Natural Resources Forum.

Allan Cain is the Executive Director of Development Workshop, an

architect, and a specialist in project planning, urbanization, and the
upgrading of squatter settlements. He has over 35 years of profes-
sional experience in developing countries, 28 of those in conflict and

xv
xvi Notes on Contributors

post-conflict Angola implementing projects for community water sup-

ply, school building and planning, environmental sanitation, land
rights, and public participation. Cain has also developed programmes
with local civil society and non-governmental partners in Angola on
peacebuilding. In recent years, he has participated in several programme
evaluations and missions for the United Nations, European Union, and
the World Bank. He has worked in Canada, Egypt, Oman, Iran, United
States, Niger, Angola, and Mozambique. Cain is the director of Devel-
opment Workshop (Canada, France, and Angola), Canadian Honorary
Consul to Angola and an Officer of the Order of Canada, and a member
of the boards of several development institutions. Cain has lectured at
universities in Canada, Angola, Norway, United States, South Africa, and
United Kingdom. He has an undergraduate degree in Environmental
Studies (Waterloo, Canada), did his graduate studies at the Architectural
Association (London, United Kingdom) and further specialist studies
at Harvard and Boulder, Colorado (in Microfinance). His articles and
papers have been published widely in international journals. Along
with his co-founders of Development Workshop, Cain is working on
a forthcoming book titled Planning with Vulnerable People in Turbulent
Times.

Andrea Collins is a Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate

Scholar (CGS – Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada) and doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Stud-
ies at Queen’s University, Canada. She was previously a Balsillie Fellow
at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) based in
Waterloo, Canada. Her research focuses on the gendered dynamics of
the multi-level governance of large-scale agricultural investment and
land deals. Drawing on critical feminist political economy and global
governance perspectives as well as recently conducted field research, her
PhD dissertation combines analyses of the local gender dynamics of land
deals in East Africa with analyses of global codes of conduct on agricul-
tural investment. This work assesses the extent to which these codes
of conduct will be able to meaningfully address gender inequalities in
the governance of land. Collins has been awarded a Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada Postdoctoral Fellowship, which
will begin in 2015.

W.R. Nadège Compaoré is originally from Burkina Faso and is a Joseph-

Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholar (CGS – Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada) and doctoral candidate in
 Notes on Contributors xvii

the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University, Canada. Her

doctoral research investigates the political economy of transparency in
oil sectors and draws upon extensive field research conducted in Gabon,
Ghana, and South Africa, which was funded by an African Initiative
Graduate Research Grant (in conjunction with the Centre for Inter-
national Governance Innovation), a Student in International Develop-
ment Grant (CIDA), and a Michael Smith for Foreign Study Supplement
Grant (SSHRC), respectively. From January to March 2013, Compaoré
was a Research Fellow with the Governance of Africa’s Resources Pro-
gramme at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).
She was also a Visiting Graduate Student with the Faculty of Law and
Economics at Omar Bongo University in Libreville, Gabon, from June to
August 2013.

Hevina S. Dashwood is Professor and Chair of the Department of Polit-

ical Science at Brock University, Canada. The author of The Rise of Global
Corporate Social Responsibility: Mining and the Spread of Global Norms
(2012), she has conducted field research on Canadian mining compa-
nies and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Africa. Her work on
CSR in mining sectors has been published in the form of scholarly book
chapters as well as journal articles in International Journal, Canadian Jour-
nal of Political Science, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Business
and Society, and Corporate Governance.

Jeremy Davison recently served as the Prefectural Advisor of the Japan

Exchange and Teaching Program in Yamanashi Prefecture for the Gov-
ernment of Japan. Davison holds a BA (Honours) in Political Studies
from Queen’s University, Canada, and is currently completing his MA at
the University of Toronto, Canada. His research interests focus on the
evolution and application of democratization and liberal theory to
governance and public policy challenges in the Global South.

Mari-Lise du Preez is an Independent Researcher and development

consultant. She is a former Programme Manager at the South African
Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), where her research as part
of the Governance of Africa’s Resources Programme focused primar-
ily on the forestry sector. She has conducted field research through-
out Africa and her work on the forestry sector is anchored in the
context of natural resource governance debates more generally and
the African continent’s role in global trends and developments more
specifically.
xviii Notes on Contributors

Carole Excell is Senior Associate at the World Resources Institute work-

ing on Access to Information, Public Participation, and Access to Justice
issues around the world. Previously she was the Coordinator for the
Freedom of Information Unit of the Cayman Islands Government, in
charge of ensuring the development and effective implementation of
the Cayman Islands Freedom of Information Law. She was in charge of
developing an implementation plan for the Cayman Islands, creation
of an information manager’s network, and development of appropri-
ate IT systems and appropriate administrative regulations. She also
worked with The Carter Center as Field Representative in Jamaica,
working on their Access to Information Project. As part of the Carter
Center Access to Information project she was involved in the devel-
opment of materials, conduct of research and analysis on legal and
policy issues associated with the right to information, and acted as the
Secretariat to the Volunteer Attorneys Panel, a panel of lawyers who
provide pro bono services to civil society organizations and indigent
persons. Excell is also an attorney-at-law with an LLB from the Uni-
versity of the West Indies and Certificate of Legal Education from the
Norman Manley Law School, Mona. She has an MA in Environmental
Law from the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. She has seven years’
experience working for the Government of Jamaica on environmental
and planning issues at the Natural Resources Conservation Author-
ity and then at its successor, the National Environment and Planning
Agency.

J. Andrew Grant is Associate Professor in the Department of Politi-

cal Studies at Queen’s University, Canada. He is the recipient of an
Early Researcher Award from the Government of Ontario’s Ministry
of Research and Innovation for work on governance issues in mineral
resource sectors. Grant is a Faculty Associate with the Queen’s Southern
African Research Centre, a Senior Fellow with the Queen’s Centre for
International and Defence Policy, and a Research Fellow with the Centre
for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University. He has been a Visiting
Scholar/Researcher at Northwestern University, USA, and University of
the Witwatersrand, South Africa. During his doctoral studies, he served
as an intern at the Campaign for Good Governance in Freetown, Sierra
Leone. Grant is editor of Darfur: Reflections on the Crisis and the Responses
(2009) and co-editor of The New Regionalism in Africa (with F. Söderbaum
2003) and The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms (with T.M.
Shaw and S. Cornelissen, 2011). He conducts research on governance
and regional security issues as they relate to the extraction and trade
 Notes on Contributors xix

of natural resources. These research interests have led to field research

projects in Sierra Leone, Ghana, Guinea, Botswana, Namibia, and South
Africa, and his findings have appeared in scholarly journals such as
Natural Resources Forum, Journal of Cleaner Production, Commonwealth &
Comparative Politics, Resources Policy, and Extractive Industries and Society.
Grant serves on the Editorial Board of the Journal of Regional Security and
has advised Canadian, American, British, and German policy-makers on
topics ranging from the Kimberley Process and conflict diamonds to
humanitarian responses and international engagement in fragile states
to the politics of identity formation among non-state armed groups in
Africa.

Mats Ingulstad is Postdoctoral Fellow at the Norwegian University of

Science and Technology. He holds a PhD from the European Univer-
sity Institute in Florence, awarded for his thesis titled ‘Winning the
Hearths and Mines: Strategic Materials and US Foreign Policy, 1933–58’.
Ingulstad has edited three books on the global political economy of
raw materials and published numerous scholarly articles, including a
recent piece in the International History Review. He has received several
grants, fellowships, and awards, including a Baruch/Marshall Fellowship
from the George Marshall Foundation. He is a co-founder of the His-
tory and Strategic Raw Materials Initiative (HSRMI), a scholarly network
dedicated to advancing scholarship on raw materials issues.

Melissa Jennings is an Independent Researcher and development con-

sultant. She served as the Field Work Coordinator for the P3/IRI national
poll of South Sudan from August 2011 to November 2011. She also
served as the Project Consultant for a qualitative/quantitative polling
project in South Sudan from May to June 2010 for World Vision Sudan.
She has conducted field work and resided in Ethiopia, Northern Sudan,
and Uganda for extensive periods. She holds a BA from Dalhousie
University, Canada, and an MA from the Royal Military College of
Canada.

Ivar Kolstad is the Research Director for the Natural Resources Group
at the Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI). He is an economist and
his current research focuses on poverty dynamics, natural resources
and development, and corporate social responsibility. He has also con-
ducted research on corruption, entrepreneurship, inequality, FDI, trade,
aid, and public financial management. He teaches business ethics at
the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration and
xx Notes on Contributors

headed the CMI Human Rights Programme from 2005 to 2009. He has
a PhD in game theory from the Norwegian School of Economics and
Business Administration.

Georgia Mavropoulos-Vagelis is Assistant Manager with Ernst & Young

in Johannesburg, South Africa, where she works in the Customs and
International Trade Department. She holds an LLM in international
trade law and investment in Africa from the Faculty of Law at the
University of Pretoria. In 2012, she served as a Researcher at the
South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). Her most recent
scholarly work was published in Natural Resources Forum.

Matthew I. Mitchell is Assistant Professor of Conflict Studies at Saint

Paul University, Canada. After completing his PhD in the Department
of Political Studies at Queen’s University, he was a Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada Postdoctoral Fellow at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison during the 2013–2014 academic year.
His research on governance, migration, and violent conflict in natural
resource sectors in West Africa has been published in several schol-
arly venues, such as African Studies Review, Canadian Journal of African
Studies, Conflict, Security, & Development, and Journal of Contemporary
African Studies. Mitchell is the recipient of the APCG-Lynne Rienner Best
Dissertation in African Politics 2013 Award.

Bill Buenar Puplampu is Associate Professor at the University of Ghana

Business School and a Chartered Psychologist with over 20 years of expe-
rience in management development, business education, organizational
consulting, university teaching, and research. His area of specializa-
tion is Organizational Psychology. He began his academic career in the
United Kingdom where he taught at the University of Westminster, part
time at the Universities of East London and London Metropolitan. He
is currently the Dean of the Central Business School of Central Univer-
sity College, Ghana. He has delivered a wide range of consulting services
covering institutional renewal, strategy, human resource management,
organizational structuring, organizational culture, and corporate gover-
nance to various arms of the Ghanaian government, United Nations
Mission in Liberia as well as many INGOs, multinational corporations,
and Ghanaian firms. Since August 2009, he has served as an Indepen-
dent Director on the Board of Merchant Bank Ghana. He is a member
of the British Psychological Society and the Academy of Management
and is the founding Director of PsyconHR, a Ghanaian organizational
 Notes on Contributors xxi

advisory services firm. He has research interests in employee motiva-

tion, leadership, work values, and organizational culture and struc-
ture. His work has appeared in Acta Commercii, Business and Society
Review, Consulting Psychology Journal, European Business Review, and Ife
Psychologia.

Timothy M. Shaw is Visiting Professor at the University of

Massachusetts Boston following four years as Director of the Insti-
tute of International Relations at the University of the West Indies
in Trinidad and five years at the Institute of Commonwealth Stud-
ies at the University of London. Shaw previously taught for three
decades at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Canada. He has been a
visiting faculty member at universities in Denmark, Japan, Nigeria,
South Africa, United Kingdom, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and he con-
tinues to serve as Visiting Professor at Mbarara University of Science
and Technology and Mbarara University Business School in Uganda
and Stellenbosch University in South Africa. His recent publications
include Commonwealth: Inter- and Non-State Contributions to Global Gov-
ernance (2008) and co-authored articles in Global Society and Interna-
tional Studies Review. He is the co-editor of The Diplomacies of Small
States (with A.F. Cooper, 2009), The Ashgate Research Companion to
Regionalisms (with J.A. Grant and S. Cornelissen, 2011), Africa and
International Relations in the 21st Century (with S. Cornelissen and
F. Cheru, 2011), and Rethinking Development Challenges for Public Pol-
icy: Insights from Contemporary Africa (with K. Hanson and G. Kararach,
2012).

Kathryn Sturman is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Social

Responsibility in Mining (CSRM) and an Adjunct Lecturer in the School
of Politics and International Studies at the University of Queensland,
Australia. Her research focuses on international governance initiatives
in extractive industries, with regional expertise in Africa and South-
east Asia, and particular emphasis on global governance norms (such
as transparency and anti-corruption initiatives in extractive industries);
mining and development; resource nationalism; and subnational con-
flict dynamics arising from resource extraction. Prior to joining the
CSRM, Sturman was Head of the Governance of Africa’s Resources Pro-
gramme at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)
where she also conducted field research and policy development in
the minerals, oil and gas, and logging sectors in several African coun-
tries. She holds a doctorate in International Relations from Macquarie
xxii Notes on Contributors

University, Australia, and an MA degree in Political Studies with distinc-

tion from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. Sturman’s findings
have been published in the form of reports, book chapters, and articles
in scholarly journals such as African Security Studies. She is also co-editor
of Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts (with J. Lind,
2002).

Ussif Rashid Sumaila is Professor and Director of the Fisheries Centre

and the Fisheries Economics Research Unit, University of British
Columbia, Canada. He is deeply interested in how economics, through
integration with ecology and other disciplines, can be used to help
ensure that environmental resources are sustainably managed for the
benefit of all generations. He has authored several articles and won
awards including the Leopold Leadership Fellowship, the Pew Fellow-
ship for Marine Conservation, and the Peter Wall Institute Senior Early
Career Scholar Award. He has given talks at the United Nations, the
White House, the United States Congress, the Canadian Parliament, and
the World Trade Organization. His work is cited in articles published by
The Economist, Boston Globe, International Herald Tribune, Maine Sunday
Telegram, Financial Times, Globe and Mail, Voice of America, CBC News,
and Vancouver Sun.

Dawit Tesfamichael is Researcher in Environment and Social Sys-

tems. He is originally from Eritrea and has completed his PhD in
the Department of Resource Management and Environmental Stud-
ies at the University of British Columbia, Canada. He is interested in
the interaction of the environment and society, and how they impact
each other. His research focuses on methods of assessment, evalua-
tion, and management of resources in terms of ecological, social, and
livelihood sustainability. He has conducted extensive research in Africa
and the resultant publications have employed ecosystem modelling,
rapid evaluation, in-person interviews, and long-time series analyses.
His findings have appeared in scholarly journals such as Ecology and
Society.

Anthony Turton has a DPhil from the University of Pretoria on the

topic of transboundary river basin management in Southern Africa. He
is a Professor at the Centre for Environmental Management at the Uni-
versity of the Free State in South Africa and serves within a number of
international bodies in leadership positions. He is a professional speaker,
consultant, and thought leader for government and large corporations
 Notes on Contributors xxiii

grappling with the emerging issue of water constraints to economic

growth and development.

Peter G. Veit is Project Manager for the Equity, Poverty, and Envi-
ronment initiative in the Institutions and Governance Program at
the World Resources Institute. His recent work has focused on a
range of environmental governance matters, particularly environ-
ment/democracy and environment/human rights links. For more than
15 years, he has conducted research and written on community-based
natural resource management, environmental decentralization, envi-
ronmental advocacy, and other environmental accountability matters.
He has undertaken long-term field research in a number of African
countries, including in Sierra Leone as a Fulbright Scholar, where he con-
ducted research on household variability in agricultural strategies and
practices and in Rwanda as Director of the Karisoke Mountain Gorilla
Research Center, where in the 1970s he studied the reproductive prac-
tices of mountain gorillas. He has held a range of research and teaching
positions at the University of California campuses at Santa Cruz and
Davis.

Arne Wiig is the Research Director for the Poverty Reduction Group at
the Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI). He has a PhD in Economics
and has more than 20 years’ experience working as an economist in
research, consultancies, and policy analysis. His research focuses on
international trade and foreign direct investments, poverty analysis,
microcredit, resource economics, and corporate social responsibility. His
current research collaboration initiatives include projects on ‘regional
trade and poverty in SADC’ and ‘entrepreneurship and human capital’.
He has published extensively on policies for beating the resource curse,
corporate social responsibility, barriers for exports of agricultural prod-
ucts, and the impact of trade preferences for least developing countries.
He has undertaken long-term fieldwork projects in Angola, Botswana,
Namibia, and Bangladesh.

Conrad Winn is Professor of Political Science and has been at Carleton

University, Canada, since 1974. He currently specializes in public opin-
ion, mass communications, and public affairs. His books include Political
Parties in Canada (with J. McMenemy, 1976), Broadcasting Policy and
Copyright Law (with R. Babe, 1981), Hate on Trial: The Zundel Affair, the
Media and Public Opinion in Canada (with G. Weimann, 1986), House
of Commons Reform (with M. Gunther, 1991), and Theater of Terror:
xxiv Notes on Contributors

Mass Media and International Terrorism (with G. Weimann, 1994). His

journal articles have appeared in Canadian Journal of Political Science,
Canadian Public Administration, Canadian Journal of Marketing Research,
and Policy Options. Winn has lectured widely, holding appointments at
York University (Environmental Studies), Université du Québec (Com-
munications), and Wilfrid Laurier University (Political Science), as well
as abroad. He has held executive or directorship positions with the
Canadian Political Science Association, Parliamentary Internship Pro-
gram, Canadian Survey Research Council, Canadian Association of
Marketing Research Organizations, B’nai Brith Canada, and Ashbury
College. He founded COMPAS Inc., one of Canada’s leading national
public opinion research firms, which is research partner to the National
Post, Ottawa Citizen, and other media. Winn’s media polls are accessible
at www.compas.ca/.

Douglas A. Yates is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the

American University of Paris and also teaches Anglo-American law
at Université de Cergy-Pontoise and International Relations at the
American Graduate School in Paris. For the past 20 years, he has been
researching, writing, publishing, and doing activism on the question
of oil-dependency on the African continent. His research has been
supported by a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental
organizations including the US Department of State, US Department
of Defense, Catholic Relief Services, South African Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs (SAIIA), German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, South African
Governance of African Resources Project, and the British Chatham
House. Yates, a recognized authority on Gabon, has travelled through-
out the African continent and has been regularly invited to consult
on oil-related subjects. His work on African oil and related issues have
appeared in the form of a dozen edited chapters and five books: The
Rentier State in Africa: Oil-Rent Dependency and Neo-Colonialism in the
Republic of Gabon (1996), Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and
Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development (with R. Traub-Merz, 2004),
The Historical Dictionary of Gabon (3rd edition 2006), The French Oil Indus-
try and the Corps des Mines in Africa (2009), and The Scramble for African
Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of Africa’s Natural Resources
(2012). He has frequently appeared on CNBC, Al Jazeera, France24, as
well as a dozen African television and radio stations.
Acronyms

AAGI Ahafo Agribusiness Growth Initiative

AFD Agency for Development
AfDB African Development Bank
AMV Africa Mining Vision
ASM artisanal and small-scale mining
ATI Access to Information
ATO African Timber Organization
AU African Union
BAB Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai
BABDA Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai District Assembly
BINGO Big international non-governmental organization
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, and China
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CAEMC Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CAR Central African Republic
CBFP Congo Basin Forest Partnership
CDB China Development Bank
CDD Centre for Democracy Development
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CIFOR Center for International Forestry Research
CMEC China National Machinery and Equipment
Corporation
CMI Christian Michelsen Institute
CNMC China Nonferrous Metals Corporation
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC China’s National Petroleum Corporation
COC chain-of-custody
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPI Corruption Perception Index
CREC China Railway Engineering Corporation
CSR corporate social responsibility
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DW Development Workshop

xxv
xxvi List of Acronyms

EAC East African Community

ECA Economic Cooperation Administration
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zones
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
ENSO El Nino Southern Oscillation
ERP European Recovery Program
ET evapotranspiration
EU European Union
EwE Ecopath with Ecosim
FAA Fisheries Access Agreement
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FLEGT Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade
FMU forest management unit
FOCAC Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
FOCCISA Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa
FSC Forest Stewardship Council
GBC Ghana Bauxite Company
GDP gross domestic product
GEITI Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
GNP gross national product
GNPOC Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
GOSS Government of South Sudan
GPRS Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
GSOPP Golden Star Oil Palm Project
GSR Golden Star Resources
HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Country
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome
ICGLR-RCM International Conference on the Great Lakes
Region-Regional Certification Mechanism
ICRAF International Centre for Research in Agro-Forestry
IDP internally displaced person
IDRC International Development Research Centre
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFC International Financial Corporation
IFI international financial institution
IFIA Inter-African Forest Industries Association
ILC International Land Coalition
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPE International Political Economy
 List of Acronyms xxvii

IR International Relations
IRAD Institute for Agricultural Research for Development
ITTA International Tropical Timber Association
ITTO International Tropical Timber Organization
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
IUU illegal, unreported and unregulated
KPCS Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
LEITI Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army
MAP mean annual precipitation
MAR mean annual runoff
MCS monitoring, control, and surveillance
MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan
MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MNC multinational corporation
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFCA Non-Ferrous China Africa
NGGL Newmont Ghana Gold Limited
NGO non-governmental organization
NOC National Oil Company
NOCAL National Oil Company of Liberia
NPA National Petroleum Authority
NRC Natural Resource Charter
NRG Natural Resource Governance
NRM Natural Resource Management
NWG national working group
OASL Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands
ODAC Open Democracy Advice Centre
ODI Outward Direct Investment
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
OHADA Organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afrique du
droit des affaires (Organisation for the Harmonization
of Business Law in Africa)
OLS ordinary least squares
PAFC Gabon Pan-African Forestry Certification Gabon
PCBF Partnership on Congo Basin Forests
PCI principles, criteria, and indicators
PEFC Programme for the Endorsement of Forest
Certification
PFE permanent forest estate
PIAC Public Interest and Accountability Committee
PMMC Precious Minerals Marketing Company
xxviii List of Acronyms

PSA production-sharing agreement

PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers
PWYP Publish What You Pay
REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation plus Conservation
ROC Republic of Congo
ROSS Republic of South Sudan
SADC Southern African Development Community
SAIIA South African Institute of International Affairs
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SEPA State Environmental Protection Administration
SFM sustainable forestry management
SOE State-Owned Enterprise
SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SSACC South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission
SSC South–South Cooperation
SSCCSE Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and
Evaluation
SSI Social Sustainability Initiative
SSR security sector reform
SWE Sectoral Water Efficiency
TNC transnational corporation
UN United Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission on Africa
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
UNIPEC China International United Petroleum & Chemicals
Company
US United States
VPA voluntary partnership agreement
WCI water crowding index
WGA World Governance Assessment
WTO World Trade Organization
WUSC World University Service of Canada
WWF World Wildlife Fund
Part I
Introduction: Theoretical
Approaches and Policy
Implications
1
‘New’ Approaches to the
Governance of Africa’s Natural
Resources
J. Andrew Grant, W.R. Nadège Compaoré, Matthew I. Mitchell,
and Mats Ingulstad

Introduction

Extant work on natural resources in Africa has made significant

contributions towards our understanding of key challenges and
prospects facing the sector, especially with regard to governance-related
matters. Discussions on the multifaceted nature of relevant stakeholders
in the resource sector have particularly been fruitful in yielding renewed
engagement with previously neglected dynamics such as the role of cor-
porate actors and the significance of global standards in the regulation
of natural resources on the continent. In this context, the scholarship on
natural resource governance in Africa has arguably evolved from a pre-
dominant view that held state actors as the primary actors of resource
governance to one that acknowledges the powerful role of non-state
actors such as multinational corporations and civil society organizations
in the governance process. Yet, with a great number of analyses study-
ing the significance of various state and non-state actors’ impacts on
African natural resource governance, much remains to be deciphered
with regard to the local and global norms and structures through, and
within, which these various stakeholders operate. This book is innova-
tive in its approach in that it aims to advance our understanding of
such norms and structures, by presenting recent scholarship from vari-
ous disciplinary perspectives, thus illustrating throughout the chapters
an extensive coverage of a different number of natural resource sectors
and resource-rich African countries.

3
4 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

The objective of this chapter is to invite readers to consider new

approaches to resource governance – that is, various avenues for more
innovative governance theorizing as well as more creative forms of pol-
icy and practice – that are being applied to natural resource sectors in
Africa. To this end, the chapter begins by elucidating the volume’s core
analytical perspectives and concepts, so as to better situate its theoreti-
cal framework. The next section argues that dominant approaches to the
governance of natural resources in Africa are largely characterized by an
actor-focused research. The section subsequently discusses the lacunae
that result from this kind of focus, particularly through an assessment
of the complex relationships between global governance initiatives and
national governance strategies involved in the extraction and trade of
natural resources. In the third section of the chapter, we engage the
concepts and perspectives that support the characterization of our ana-
lytical framework as ‘new’ and provide a contrasting account of ‘old’
approaches to the governance of natural resources in Africa. The section
also elaborates on the global–local dynamics that currently characterize
the governance of natural resources in Africa – not as a clear dichotomy,
but rather as a complex apparatus involving sub-national, national, and
regional mechanisms. The fourth section of the chapter presents an
outline of the structure of the book and a summary of the individual
chapters. The final section provides a set of conclusions and reflections
on some of the themes presented in the introduction to the volume.

Beyond a focus on actors: Making sense of governance

as rules

Africa is a rich continent, because of the abundance of natural resources

that it contains; Africa is a poor continent, because the vast number
of its population remains in poverty. The simple juxtaposition of these
two statements reflects a profound paradox that intuitively suggests a
fundamental problem in the ways in which natural resources on the
African continent are managed and the ways in which income from
those natural resources are redistributed. As accurate as it is however,
this acknowledgement is as far as intuition can take us. In an attempt
to make sense of this problem and its root causes, scholars of Africa’s
natural resources have advanced different approaches, frameworks, and
theories to provide analysts, practitioners, and policy-makers with the
tools necessary to understand the issues that perpetuate poverty in an
otherwise wealthy continent. Using the concept of ‘governance’ as a
starting point, researchers concerned with this problem have offered
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 5

various explanations for the above paradox. This volume borrows its
understanding of the term ‘governance’ from International Relations
(IR) scholarship and understands it to be ‘concerned with the regime
which constitutes the set of fundamental rules for the organization of
the public realm, and not with government’ (Bøås, 1998: 120). This con-
ceptualization does not deny the fact that governments remain a sine
qua non component to the governance process. Rather, we posit the
governance of natural resources as concerned with the fundamental rules
that guide the management of natural resources, rather than merely
concerned with actors (state and non-state) involved in the process. This
is a critical distinction as the existing literature on the governance of
natural resources in Africa tends to centre on actors, resulting in policy
prescriptions that target a change in actor behaviour as a central means
towards improving resource governance across the continent.
The focus on actors, particularly state actors, may be explained by
the fact that influential literature on governance in Africa has typi-
cally placed the onus on African states, thus describing African modes
of governance, for instance, as personalized rule that is largely accom-
modating of elite interests, whereas others described some resource-rich
post-colonial African states as neo-patrimonial states (Bøås, 2003: 32).
While the approaches within these various works have been largely
successful in advancing existing knowledge of governance issues on
the continent, they have also tended to overshadow key aspects to
explain the contemporary behaviour of these states. Take, for instance,
discussions on neo-patrimonialism in Africa. Neo-patrimonialism can
be defined as a system in which, in theory, the public and private
spheres are two separate realms, while in practice, the line between
the two is blurred, with rulers depending on patron–client relationships
to maintain power (Taylor, 2010). This is indeed a very useful concept
that not only explains the nature of some African states in the post-
colonial era, but also underlines key structures and norms underpinning
and enabling the characteristics of these states. This conceptualization
suggests that there are specific structural conditions that allow the blur-
ring of the public and private spheres; though, such dynamics are not
systematically addressed when examining scholarship on the subject,
where concerns remain primarily focused on African states. To be sure,
such structural conditions are not confined to the continent, as they
do not exist in isolation from interactions with external powers outside
Africa, such as China and its leading position within the growing geopo-
litical and economic grouping known as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa).
6 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

Yet, despite these complicated structures-actors-norms mechanisms,

characteristics of resource governance that tend to be emphasized
in the literature are those that depict many African states as neo-
patrimonial, as illustrated through the continued denunciation of cor-
rupt political elites who enjoy personalized rule. This explains why
state actors are often viewed as barriers that restrict efforts to pro-
mote effective governance on the continent. Less emphasized, however,
are the circumstances under which these states came to be neo-
patrimonial. In other words, addressing predominant issues such as
neo-patrimonialism will require more than transforming the behaviour
of political elites. We argue that analysts should carefully and system-
atically unpack the conditions through which states may emerge as
neo-patrimonial in Africa, by locating the local, national, regional, and
global dynamics that impact those states and are impacted by such
forces.
Indeed, existing literature on natural resource governance – be it
focused on Africa or more general in nature – illustrates the need to
acknowledge the structural forces at local, national, regional, and global
levels. This leads to the following questions: how does an uneven
focus on actors play out in the relevant scholarship, and what does
this mean insofar as policy implications in the resource sector? A sur-
vey of the literature on natural resources governance in Africa shows
that the foci on the role of actors is illustrated through the com-
mon use of concepts such as the ‘resource curse’ and corporate social
responsibility (CSR). To a large extent, the former highlights the role
of state actors and the latter that of multinationals. To date, how-
ever, the concept of the resource curse is perhaps the most popularized
one in work dealing with resource governance on the continent. The
resource curse argument posits it as a paradox found in resource-rich
countries in the Global South, whereby resource-abundant countries
experience lower economic growth. Scholars who embrace the resource
curse argument acknowledge the structural basis of this curse, by point-
ing to the fact that poor countries often lack the institutional capacities
that would make their governments accountable to their populations.
In the African context specifically, where many governments can access
resource wealth without checks from their citizenry, resource abundance
tends to increase opaque governance networks; this enables a plunder-
ing of natural resources by political elites and a worsening of the welfare
of local populations.1 In sum, the more profitable the resources, and the
weaker the government institutions, the more likelihood there is that
elites will appropriate national resources for personal gain. This explains
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 7

why a highly profitable resource such as oil has been seen as the most
susceptible to suffer the curse, which has led to the parallel conceptual-
ization of the ‘oil curse’ (Yates, 1996; 2006; 2012; Shaxson, 2007; Ross,
2012).
As discussed in the above paragraph, weak institutions that lack the
necessary means to hold governments accountable for their actions are
acknowledged in the resource curse argument. So why do we main-
tain that such arguments focus on actors unevenly? Reconsidering
the notable resource curse argument, for instance, its most commonly
associated concept is corruption. We suggest that the heavy focus on
corruption may silence much of what enables corruption to emerge and
proliferate. Specifically, if one reviews the literature on natural resources
exploitation in Africa, the common facts and figures that are easily
found are those involving corrupt actors. For instance, using telling
figures from oil-rich African countries, Magrin and van Vliet (2008)
advance the argument that the resource curse is largely a product of cor-
ruption rather than the result of other pervasive issues such as violent
conflicts. For example:

In Nigeria, despite $300 billion in oil revenues over 25 years, aver-

age per capita income is less than $1 a day; in real terms, it is
now lower than it was in 1960 (Gary and Karl, 2003). In Angola,
from 2000 to 2004, 2 million people survived thanks only to help
from the World Food Program (WFP) (Gary and Karl, 2003). The two
largest sub-Saharan African oil producers certainly have a long his-
tory of conflicts, more or less tied to black gold, but this only partially
explains their persistent poverty.
(Magrin and van Vliet, 2008: 105)

Unfortunately, after such alarming data are acknowledged, one is often

left wanting of the precise mechanisms within the global political eco-
nomic structures that enable the misappropriation of funds in resource-
rich African countries. What legislation (or lack thereof) exists in home
countries that in turn enables transnational firms to behave the way
they do when exploiting resources in African host countries? What pol-
icy measures from existing financial structures – ranging from national
to global arenas – encourage or facilitate the illicit use of natural resource
revenues? The chapters in this volume pay particular attention to the
structural conditions in local, national, regional, and global political
economies and serve to explore the various facets of the questions posed
above.
8 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

‘Old’ versus ‘new’ approaches to the governance of natural

resources in Africa

Given the above analysis, we propose an exploration of ‘new’

approaches that are comprehensive in nature. To be sure, this compre-
hensive approach engages a wide-variety of actors – state and non-state,
at the macro and micro levels, be they sub-national, national, regional,
or global actors (e.g., the BRICS). In this respect, our approach is not
fundamentally new in the sense that it aligns with global governance lit-
erature within the discipline of International Relations (IR), which calls
for a move away from state-centric views held by traditional paradigms
such as realism and liberalism. Unlike realist and liberalist paradigms,
which posit a hierarchical world dominated by unitary rational actors
such as states, global governance literature conceptualizes the world as a
complexity of networks, which comprises state and non-state actors, for-
mal and informal, licit and illicit, at the global and local levels (Rosenau
and Czempiel, 1992; Weiss, 2000; Rosenau, 2002; Söderbaum, 2004).
Before elaborating on the ‘newness’ of our approach, it will be useful
to provide a contrasting example that is evocative of the type of ‘old’
approaches that once dominated natural resource governance in Africa.

The governance of natural resources in Africa in historical context:

Reassessing rhetoric and realities
Studies of the history or international political economy of Africa’s
natural resources often make a cursory reference to the ills of the so-
called Scramble for Africa that occurred in the late-19th century and
reached an apex during the Berlin Conference that began in late 1884
and ended in early 1885. The Berlin Conference is not only associated
with the seemingly arbitrary partitioning of the African continent into
what would become state boundaries, but it is also associated with the
plunder of its natural resources by Europe’s colonial powers – principally
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Portugal, and Belgium – among
others. Any reference to the United States notes merely that the country
was little more than a passive observer during the Berlin Conference
proceedings. While this is a rather superficial characterization of the
American delegation present at the Berlin Conference, the United States
took note of the importance that the European countries attached to the
natural resources of their respective colonies in Africa. Before proceeding
to a discussion of the impact of the Economic Cooperation Administra-
tion (ECA) on Africa, the present section provides the historical context
to the ‘old’ approaches to natural resource governance.
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 9

The traditionalist and state-centric orientation underlying much of

the literature on African resource governance does in many ways resem-
ble a caricature of the ‘Berlin Conference-form’ of colonialism, in which
the rulers of the ‘metropolitan’ states wielded their own straight-rulers
to damaging – and as a glance at a map of the continent will reveal –
permanent effect. But as the present section reveals, such approaches
are not only outmoded, but also ahistorical, and obfuscate the complex
modes of governance determining management of these resources by
the colonial governments and their successors. As the European pow-
ers ventured from their coastal strongholds and into the vast interior of
the African continent, the very fact that there was a need for an inter-
national conference to lay down the rules of the ‘Scramble’ attests to
the international convention that no state could operate in a lawless
vacuum within the boundaries patrolled by its tirailleurs or its gun-
boats. There were structures, norms, and institutions that existed at
multiple levels, some of which were hammered out around the con-
ference table in Berlin. In the General Act of the Berlin Conference
the ‘Great Powers’ agreed to abide by a set of rules that applied both
at the local, global, and trans-imperial level. These countries pledged
not only to encourage trans-African commerce under the supervision
of an international commission of navigation of the waterways of the
Congo and abide by a legal framework for the pursuit of land owner-
ship by the European powers, but also to ‘watch over the conservation
of the indigenous populations and the amelioration of their moral and
material conditions’.2
The conquest and division of the African interior seemed an unstop-
pable force to contemporary observers, which Charles Arthur Conant
(1898) called a function of ‘a natural law of economic and race devel-
opment’. Few were impressed by the dedication to ameliorating the
conditions of the local populations, however, and the question of access
to the raw materials was loudly proclaimed to be the basic – and base –
motive for the expansion and consolidation of the colonial empires.
Critics of imperialism like John A. Hobson, and famously the Russian
revolutionary Vladimir Lenin, analysed the subjugation of Africa as a
consequence of the economic requirements of the metropolitan states.
According to Lenin (2008: 82), ‘The more capitalism is developed, the
more the need for raw materials is felt, the more bitter the competition
becomes, and the more feverishly the hunt for raw materials proceeds
throughout the whole world, the more desperate becomes the struggle
for the acquisition of colonies.’ Historians of empire have laboured hard
to dispel such reductionist notions about the nature and functioning
10 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

of imperialism. There were strategic, geopolitical, and prestige consid-

erations, as well as religious, missionary, ethical, cultural, and sexual
influences on the choice made by the colonial powers, in addition to
the fact that as often as not, further expansion was not so much the
result of a contemplated push into the interior while searching for new
resources, but the reaction to local events.3
While the driving forces of the ‘Scramble for Africa’ are more complex
than either neo-Marxist or realist inclinations may want to consider, so
was the actual exploitation of the resources within the colonies an intri-
cate and varied affair. The terrible excesses of King Leopold’s ‘private
territory’ in the Congo were reminiscent of the ancient slaveholding
empires of antiquity, as separate modes co-existed within the colo-
nial territories themselves. The French writer Louis Ferdinand Céline
recalled from his own ventures into Francophone Africa that while
what he termed a ‘Roman mode’ of resource extraction had its adher-
ents, the whip had a tendency to wear out the hand holding it. Céline
(1932) found a competing approach to be much more successful, the
establishment of lasting asymmetrical power relationships that allowed
colonialists to engage segments of indigenous populations as trading
partners and agents of their own oppression, based on what he described
as the hallmarks of an advancing civilization: militarism, consumerism,
and hypocrisy. And certainly the colonial authorities altered the exist-
ing societies through the commercialization of the agricultural sector,
the exaction of taxes, provisions, and labour. The colonial powers also
introduced new divisions between public and private which often con-
flicted with the more communal understanding by local communities
of how resources are to be managed and distributed (Berry, 1992; van
den Bersselaar and Decker, 2011).
During the First World War, the German colonies were seized over the
course of the hostilities and they were subsequently passed on to the
victors under the auspices of the League of Nations. This created new
entanglements of norms and rules affecting governance, as administra-
tion was based upon certain conditions, such as opening the territory
to commerce and protecting the inhabitants. These new administra-
tions also had to report annually to the League of Nations and their
performance was monitored by an international ‘mandates’ commis-
sion. While the most vocal anti-colonialists like Lenin and the most
avid pro-colonialists were united in their view that the mandates sys-
tem was simply imperial annexation in disguise, there was a widely
held belief that the system heralded a new era in colonial manage-
ment in which the resources of these territories were to be mobilized
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 11

and developed for the benefit of local populations. Aside from this
modicum of oversight, the League of Nations was unable to do much
about transforming colonial governance through the mandatory sys-
tem. Nonetheless, it managed to generate an international discourse of
the rights and duties of the colonial powers to prepare the subjugated
peoples for eventual independence, and which limited the range of per-
missible policy options (Pedersen, 2006). Put differently, the subjection
of colonial rule to an increasingly penetrating international scrutiny was
a symptom that the outright exploitation of the natural resources of
other peoples was becoming less tenable.
The Second World War gravely weakened both the will and the
capacity of the European powers to maintain their rule (Fraser, 2003).
Yet, at the same time, the massive resource mobilization that had
been required to defeat the Axis powers demonstrated the contin-
ued importance of accessing natural resources in Africa. Furthermore,
the post-war reconstruction of Europe hinged on continued access to
African resources. In order to reassert themselves, the ‘metropolitan’
states adopted rhetoric about furthering the development of their colo-
nial possessions to prepare them for eventual independence, despite
their true aims to keep the ‘Europeans in’, the ‘Africans down’, and the
‘Americans out’ of their colonial empires. The United States, while com-
mitted (in its own eyes and rhetoric) to decolonization, also prioritized
the fortification of Europe against the growing power of Soviet Commu-
nism, and colluded to a significant extent in mapping and tapping the
natural resources of the African continent.

Strategic natural resources: The Economic Cooperation

Administration (ECA) in Africa4
The importance of Africa’s natural resources came back into focus for
the United States during – and in the aftermath of – the Second World
War. Access to external sources of natural resources was increasingly rec-
ognized as strategically important. This recognition became actualized
during the early years of the United States’ Marshall Plan,5 which sought
to rebuild the European economies that had been severely disrupted
by the Second World War. A key component of the Marshall Plan was
the ECA, which was the agency tasked with overseeing the exchange
of excess raw materials (e.g., natural resources ranging from minerals
to agricultural products) from recipients of American financial aid (i.e.,
European countries) to the United States. The magnitude of the recon-
struction process in Europe meant that many countries would have to
rely on the natural resources produced by their colonies in Africa (and,
12 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

to a lesser extent, Asia) in order to maintain the inflow of American

funds under the Marshall Plan. Put differently, tapping the natural
resources of what was then referred to as the ‘Third World’ was con-
sidered by the United States as an absolutely essential part of its effort
to overcome the economic malaise in Europe following the war (Wood,
1986; 2005).
The attendant influx of external sources of natural resources was
appreciated by the United States government in economic and strate-
gic terms. Regarding the former, the growing American economy was
placing a significant strain on domestic supplies during the late 1940s
and early 1950s. The United States Army Staff insisted that American
minerals processing plants and manufacturers relied upon a wide variety
of raw materials from Africa, without which domestic industries would
grind almost to a halt. In the case of the latter, most of the ECA’s efforts
to promote the development of strategic materials targeted Africa – a
fact that many Cold War historians tend to overlook. Westad (2005:
121), for instance, sees Africa’s rise on the American list of priorities
occurring only by the late 1950s, when Washington became worried
about the need to protect the flow of strategic materials and checking
Soviet influence in the region. However, the American concern for Africa
preceded the rise of Soviet influence and owed much to the experience
with African sources of strategic materials during the Second World War.
The strategic materials programme under the ECA made it profoundly
clear how Africa’s natural resources were brought into the American sup-
ply chains beginning in the late 1940s, which quickly evolved into a
vital national interest for the United States – even after the Marshall
Plan concluded. Moreover, the Soviet Union soon became aware of
how the Marshall Plan diverted natural resources to the United States,
which led the country to seek similar arrangements with its allies. Thus,
access to varied sources of natural resources quickly became cast as an
important strategic pillar of the Cold War competition between the two
superpowers.
Economic development considerations for Europe’s colonies in Africa
came to the fore under the ECA, but such interests only arose in accor-
dance with the need to keep the Marshall Plan funded in the face of the
growing cost of the United States’ military involvement in the Korean
peninsula. As the conflict deepened in Korea at the beginning of the
1950s, the United States Congress became ever more truculent about
appropriations for foreign aid. The ECA hoped that by asking for funds
for strategic materials in Africa and subsequently linking such funds
to development, enough persuasion could be mounted to loosen the
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 13

Congressional ‘purse-strings’.6 Even prior to having to present a com-

pelling case to the United States Congress, Africa had been recognized
by the ECA as the continental region with the greatest potential to
enable European economies to bear the burden imposed on them by
rearmament (Orchard, 1951).7
Hubbard (2011: 201) contends that both the Truman and Eisenhower
administrations were unwilling to invest American funds in African
development. However, this assessment fails to acknowledge that the
Truman administration did provide substantial funds through the
Marshall Plan, which enabled the colonial governments to portray
themselves in the role of promoters of development. Hubbard’s over-
sight is understandable, as these monies are hard to discern because they
do not appear in the official statistical record owing to the way in which
they were distributed in conjunction with funds for European recipients.
Nwaubani (2001) suggests that the Truman administration saw no con-
tradiction between its commitments to build up the colonies in Africa
as a prop for the European economies and for its own ‘Open Door’ poli-
cies designed to give American capital access to the raw materials of the
continent. This assessment lacks a degree of nuance and is therefore not
entirely correct. Since these African economies were already very ‘thin’
and often relied on one or two main exports, the ECA feared that exces-
sive investment in extractive mineral sectors would create disturbances,
and possibly upset the precarious relationship between the European
colonialists and local populations. Labour and food supply problems
were a vexing challenge. Moving farmers into mines meant that less
manpower was available to produce foodstuffs (Orchard, 1951).8
The track record of the ECA is mixed. According to one estimate,
American aid under the ECA arrangement may have directed as much as
USD 1 billion towards development-related extractive resource projects
in Africa (Wood, 2005: 246). Yet, there was very little discussion of how
these aid monies were actually used and how the ECA arrangement
might benefit Africans, aside from vague and undefined references that
the extraction of natural resources would somehow result in develop-
ment gains in the colonies. Furthermore, over the span of the Marshall
Plan, American support for agricultural development was also increas-
ingly limited to those sources that could provide food for miners and
workers engaged in strategic materials development in isolated areas of
Africa (United States Department of State, 1951: 1233). Yet, despite the
aforementioned fears and challenges, the shift to development projects
enabled the ECA to support some degree of sustained development in
Africa and to ameliorate some of the worst effects of the rearmament
14 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

programme in Europe. This was a conscious strategy that benefitted the

United States the most, as it was not merely a reflection of the fact that
as the markets tightened it became more difficult to find raw materials
that could be purchased with either dollars or counterpart funds. The
ECA did not waver in its position that the strategic materials develop-
ment projects had to be firmly embedded in a larger socio-economic
context, even as the orientation changed towards development projects
that would facilitate strategic materials production. The ECA held as a
matter of principle that the maximum contribution to American secu-
rity could not be achieved unless a broader view was taken. Moreover,
the development focus of the ECA provided certain tactical advan-
tages that enabled it to make deals that would have otherwise been
impossible.9
Yet, as the above discussion suggests, little attention was allocated by
a small circle of policy-makers to the governance of natural resource
extraction in Africa. Actors such as civil society representatives were
excluded from the governance equation and firms were acquiescent
beneficiaries with very little influence on policy. Rather, utmost con-
sideration was placed on principles associated with realism in IR, such
as a zero-sum competition for access to natural resources, counting
and comparing production numbers, and devising ways to facilitate the
transformation of natural resources into products (e.g., ranging from
consumer goods to weaponry) that could be employed for boosting the
economic and military security (of the superpowers and their allies, not
the colonies). The ECA also enabled America’s allies to gain a better
understanding of what resources could be tapped in their territories
through sponsoring an extensive survey programme, and employing
some of the best geologists and surveyors that the United States could
provide. Such projects were undertaken both in the British and the
French colonial empires, and the ECA even managed to cut its way
through the wall of red tape that surrounded the Portuguese colonial
empire.10
The proliferation of international organizations and the institutional-
ization of international law in the post-Second World War era suggest
that today the governance of natural resources is even far less a mat-
ter for coherent and self-contained states than in the past. Yet, the
emergence of new governance initiatives (e.g., the Extractive Indus-
tries Transparency Initiative [EITI]) does not mean that the legacy
of the ‘old’ governance structures has faded away completely. The
institutionalization of a global ‘open door’ policy through the World
Trade Organization (WTO) has facilitated the entry of China into the
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 15

African resource sector, which is evocative of the way in which real-

ist objectives can be achieved through liberal institutionalist bodies.
While the chief objective embodied in the United Nations-sanctioned
regime for sovereignty over natural resources has been to ensure the
fullest use of the existing raw materials, new concerns, such as envi-
ronmental dimensions have come into play (Schrijver, 1997) – though
sometimes in unanticipated ways. For example, China has sought to
use environmental concerns as a justification in its dispute with the
European Union, United States, and Japan over its desire to restrict
the export of Chinese rare earth minerals (Wagner, 2014). This serves
as a reminder that the ‘new’ approaches to natural resource gover-
nance have not completely displaced the ‘old’ variants. Thus, the
dispersal of governance along multiple levels gives additional weight
to our claim that a close analysis of how these global regimes func-
tion is warranted because they embody contradictory impulses, which
make it difficult to predict their effects, whether in Africa or else-
where.

Spatiality in natural resources: A global governance perspective

In contrast with the above example of an ‘old’ approach – infused by tra-
ditional paradigms such as realism – this volume aligns with Dingwerth
and Pattberg’s (2006: 191–192) conception of global governance as a
perspective that emphasizes the importance of spatiality, the dynamic
interactions of a multi-level system of political processes with a multi-
actor approach to world politics. As such, we build from the extant
global governance literature as a means of constructing a more effective
perspective for analysing the complex process of natural resource gov-
ernance on the continent. Still, we advance our framework as new, in
the sense that in addition to considering the significant role of a diverse
number of actors, we are systematically applying a multi-level system per-
spective to resource governance in Africa. Specifically, we understand a
multi-level system to not only be about geographical spaces such as the
national, sub-national, regional, and global levels, but to also include
other governance spaces, such as the governance of finance, labour,
education, and social justice. This perspective is informed by a politi-
cal economy perspective, whereby the political, economic, and social
spaces and structures are all intricately linked.
The extant literature on natural resource governance underscores the
need to make visible the structural forces at play locally, regionally, and
globally. For instance, Frynas and Manuel (2007) address the claim that
Africa is witnessing a ‘New Scramble’ for its oil sector, by examining
16 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

arguments that external actors such as the United States and China are
now entering an increasingly stiff competition for the continent’s prized
resources. The authors caution against jumping on the alarmist band-
wagon that posits oil-rich African countries as effectively experiencing
a so-called oil rush and implicitly presenting the governance of oil as
plagued by a helpless response from African states, in the face of preda-
tory extractive companies. Instead, the authors present a nuanced view
of the current competition for oil resources in Africa, by showing that:
(1) given their oil-wealth, African governments hold significant bargain-
ing power over oil companies, be they based in the countries of bilateral
and other external actors and therefore are able to resist demands for
reform from multilateral donors such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF); and (2) newcomers to the oil sector in African countries
(namely China, but also others such as Brazil and India) do not yet have
sufficient financial and technological capacities to seriously compete
against institutionally well-established participants such as the United
States (Frynas and Manuel, 2007: 240). Frynas and Manuel’s critique
applies to many contemporary studies on Africa’s natural resources,
especially literature that invokes the resource curse argument.11 What is
critiqued in this type of scholarship is the use of a simplified dichotomy
involving local versus global actors, where the exploitation of Africa’s
natural resources is presented as a doomed crisis; and in which local
African state actors are often portrayed as active looters who cooperate
with predatory multinational corporations, with little in-depth analysis
of the dynamics of the spaces within (and between) which these various
actors operate.
While we support Frynas and Manuel’s (2007) interdisciplinary
approach, which is based on three different perspectives including inter-
national relations, history, and business, we aim to go further in our
agenda by systematically examining the structural powers at play at the
sub-national, national, regional, and global levels of governance. For
instance, African countries offer extremely low operating costs relative
to other resource-rich countries, with policy mechanisms such as min-
ing codes or fiscal regimes offering huge tax cuts to companies operating
on the continent.12 While existing studies acknowledge these dynam-
ics as an enabling factor, they do not carefully investigate and position
the how and why factors through which current fiscal conditions in
Africa are developed. In this light, our volume seeks to highlight key
aspects of the global political economy – that includes political, eco-
nomic, legal, social, and environmental dimensions – that may explain,
for instance, how and why financial institutions such as the IMF or the
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 17

World Bank may push for certain mining codes in African countries that
are appealing to extractive companies but disadvantageous for the host
countries.
Rudra and Jensen (2011: 639) recently addressed these questions –
though from a global rather than an African perspective – by pointing
to regional and global factors such as ‘trade, migration, foreign invest-
ment, and other global forces’ as necessary dimensions that analysts of
natural resource governance everywhere must take into consideration
as complementary variables when examining the domestic factors of
natural resource governance. Only in doing so can one begin to dis-
cuss the politics of natural resources, and not just the management of
natural resources. The distinction between politics and management is
parallel to that between governance and management. Here, the dis-
tinction reflects an analysis by Bartley and colleagues (2008) on the
decentralization of natural resource governance, which contrasts eco-
nomic and rational choice theories against institutional theories. This
contrast highlights the importance of politics as rules of the game and
enables a shift from a rational and economic management of natu-
ral resources (concerned with maximizing profit and efficiency) to a
governance of natural resources that will account for how power rela-
tions shape the strategies of actors.13 Our volume echoes this analytical
approach by contextualizing it to the African region. Thus, it is against
this backdrop that the volume presents its new approaches, whereby
each chapter systematically applies the above theoretical concerns to
a comprehensive range of empirical issues that impact Africa’s natural
resource governance.
The new approaches that we present through this book exhibit a dual-
istic nature. First, a renewed perspective from existing global governance
and political economy literatures; second, an innovative approach to the
analysis of resource governance in Africa which, given its roots in a
critical multi-level perspective, seeks to render visible the connections
between the resource sector and other sectors that impact and/or are
impacted by resource governance and seeks new ways to extend its foci.
For instance, the volume stresses the significance of exposing the mutual
impacts between the exploitation and trade of Africa’s natural resources
and issues of energy security, food security, environmental security,
gender inequality, economic development, and violent conflict. These
concerns and characteristics constitute the new approaches that we seek
to illustrate throughout the coming chapters and explain the multidis-
ciplinary nature of the volume. Thus, though the chapters reflect the
presence of political scientists and development analysts, they also echo
18 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

voices from other disciplinary perspectives such as environmental, legal,

and business studies.

Structure of the book

Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter picks up on

the volume’s critical approach to dominant theoretical views on nat-
ural resource governance in Africa. Du Preez’s chapter problematizes
the concept of ‘good governance’ and critiques the proliferation of
homogenized policy prescriptions concerning natural resource sectors.
Largely using the Angolan model of oil governance, and the case of
resource governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), du
Preez illustrates the pertinence of network governance as a helpful concept
for unpacking the challenges of natural resource governance in Africa.
Understood as a hybrid form of governance, which involves public and
private actors, the author shows that network governance only becomes
a useful concept when context is taken into consideration and that this
may not be the case for all African countries. In other words, one cannot
talk of resource governance in Africa in a homogenized and general-
ized sense, without acknowledging particularities in the types of states
involved, as well as the different characteristics therein. In this respect,
the second chapter supports the theoretical message discussed in the
introduction, which is that considerations of actors’ roles are not suffi-
cient. Rather, it is the contextual mode of governance in each country,
determined by the latter’s predominant structures and norms, which
will decide whether the rhetoric of ‘good governance’ may be fitting
as a policy outcome. The first and second chapters together constitute
the volume’s first part, which introduces the reader to the theoretical
approaches and policy implications of the study.
Part II is dedicated to the governance challenges in Africa’s various
petroleum sectors. In this part, Chapter 3 provides an expert analysis by
Douglas Yates, who revisits rentier theory and its potential significance
in the contemporary study of oil states in Africa. The chapter is particu-
larly compelling in the analysis of the distinction between oil rents and
oil profits, as well as the resulting implications in the political economy
of African petro-states. In Chapter 4, Peter Veit and Carole Excell present
an excellent background for situating the evolution of Access to Infor-
mation (ATI) laws in the petroleum sector throughout Africa and the
challenges facing the development and implementation of those laws.
Given the privileged position given to transparency in resource gover-
nance, this chapter is central to furthering the debate on the prospects of
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 19

oil governance in Africa. Chapter 5 is a collaborative work authored by

Allan Cain, Ivar Kolstad, and Arne Wiig, which presents original empir-
ical insights from a survey of Angolan microcredit clients. This survey
serves as the analytical centrepiece through which the authors assess
the micro-level effects of oil resources on the poor. This is a much wel-
come complement to the volume, given that many analyses tend to
focus on the macro-level effects of petroleum resources. The focus on
microcredit is especially compelling, in light of the major place given
to microcredit financing in many development initiatives on the con-
tinent. The sixth chapter is a much-needed study of Africa’s newest
country, South Sudan. Conrad Winn, Melissa Jennings, and Matthew
Mitchell make an important contribution to current debates on resource
governance by examining the challenges of South Sudan. Despite the
country being formed amidst complex regional, national, and local pol-
itics, which further complicates governance dynamics, insights garnered
from public opinion polls revealed early signs of optimism. And yet as
the renewed political violence in 2013–2014 highlights, South Sudan
continues to face innumerable governance challenges that undermine
the development of its oil sector and threaten the stability of the entire
country.
The third part of the book deals with governance challenges in
non-petroleum resource sectors in Africa. In the opening chapter of
this part – Chapter 7 – Hevina Dashwood and Bill Buenar Puplampu
discuss the challenges and prospects of achieving community-level
development through multi-stakeholder partnerships in mining with
reference to Ghana’s mining sector. This is indeed a timely contribu-
tion, given Ghana’s relatively recent experience with various multi-
stakeholder initiatives. Using network governance as an analytical
framework, Chapter 8 tackles the important subject of forestry gover-
nance in Africa, with a focus on the African Timber Organization (ATO).
In this chapter, J. Andrew Grant, Dianne Balraj, Jeremy Davison, and
Georgia Mavropoulos-Vagelis advance the idea of network governance
as a useful concept through which to make sense of the complex public–
private social dynamics involved in forestry governance. The chapter
thus echoes theoretical discussions elaborated in the first part of this
volume, and its analytical implications speak to the appeal of ‘gov-
ernance with some government’ in the context of natural resources
in Africa. Chapter 9 by Andrea Collins takes a bottom-up governance
approach to analysing the gendered dynamics of land deals for biofuel
development in Kenya and Tanzania. The chapter adds significantly
to the literature on land deals, through a critical analysis of extant
20 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

literature that emphasizes the importance of a gendered framework in

the African context. Chapter 10, authored by Ussif Rashid Sumaila and
Dawit Tesfamichael, highlights the potential of fisheries to contribute
to the development of African countries through effective governance.
The chapter makes a solid case against illegal, unreported, and unregu-
lated (IUU) fishing in African waters; it calls for an amelioration of key
institutional and human resources through regional efforts. The chapter
is largely policy oriented and will be an excellent tool for policy-makers
at all levels involved in Africa’s fisheries. In Chapter 11, Anthony Turton
discusses transboundary river basin management nuances in the South-
ern African Development Community (SADC). The author suggests the
use of transboundary river basins as the hydrological foundation of the
regional political economy of the SADC. As such, he argues in favour of
the need to privilege regional cooperation over single national strategies
when it comes to the region’s water resources.
The fourth and final part offers an overview of new challenges and
opportunities in the governance of natural resources in contemporary
Africa and closes with a series of concluding reflections and remarks.
In Chapter 12, Christopher Alden and Ana Cristina Alves demonstrate
that China’s growing demand for natural resources from the African
continent cannot be separated from existing dynamics at the global
level. Alden and Alves situate China–Africa relations within existing
challenges and trends in the global political economy. Timothy Shaw
joins the volume’s editors in the concluding chapter, which empha-
sizes the role of both external and internal actors in governing Africa’s
resources. Chapter 13 also serves to reinforce the previous chapter’s argu-
ments on the importance of integrating and applying governance issues
in Africa’s natural resource sectors to a wider global context.

Conclusions and reflections

In the policy world, our framework translates into a call for dynamic
policy conversations between different actors and spaces – an endeav-
our that extends beyond the natural resource sector. We propose this
framework as a means to caution against isolated policy prescriptions
that do not take into account the wider societal issues related to natural
resources, whether inside or outside the continent. Indeed, while one
may analytically conceptualize global versus local dynamics, it is diffi-
cult in practice to determine where the local sphere stops and where
the global begins. Thus, for example, the EITI is a global governance
initiative that undoubtedly owes its emergence to the demands of key
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 21

global civil society organizations such as Save the Children, Global Wit-
ness, and Transparency International (Hilson and Maconachie, 2009:
55). In this case, one can locate the creation of the EITI in multiple
global spheres. However, one wonders whether without the financial
and organizational support of the Norwegian government for the EITI,
with the EITI Secretariat tellingly hosted in Oslo, and financially sup-
ported by the governments of many countries from the Global North,
the longevity of the initiative at the global level would have been jeopar-
dized. Finally, while the EITI represents a global standard, each national
chapter has so far developed their own agenda, which sometimes holds
key differences from the global standard.
In other words, politics at the sub-national and regional levels often
complicate national-level governance in ways not easily addressed by
global governance literature, particularly where ‘local’ and ‘global’ struc-
tures and norms already interact in complex dynamics. In sum, without
seriously engaging with relevant actors inside, outside, and in-between
the reified ‘local’ and ‘global’ spheres and norms, and across different
sectors of governance, current analyses cannot effectively acknowledge
the profound changes affecting natural resource governance in Africa.

Acknowledgements

A preliminary version of this chapter was presented at the 54th Annual

Meeting of the International Studies Association in San Francisco,
California, in April 2013. The authors thank Steen Fryba Christensen,
Timothy Shaw, and the external reviewers for their insightful comments
and suggestions that improved the chapter.

Notes
1. The resource curse argument has been most notably argued through the
work of Sachs and Warner (1995; 1997), with their latter work focusing on
sub-Saharan Africa.
2. See ‘General Act of the Conference of Berlin Concerning the Congo’ (1909).
3. Two forceful advocates of this view are Cain and Hopkins (2001). For a
rebuttal, see Hyam (2010: 137).
4. Parts of this section draw upon Ingulstad (2014).
5. Otherwise known as the European Recovery Program (ERP).
6. Per the correspondence from C. Tyler Woods to James Hendrick,
22 January 1951, HSTL\James Hendrick Papers\Box 3\ECA – Overseas
territories.
7. See also: Advisory Committee on Underdeveloped Areas, Minutes, 16 Febru-
ary 1951, HSTL\James Hendrick Papers\Box 5\Strategic Materials, Folder 2;
22 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

and correspondence from Allan Hugh Smith to Harry Fite, 13 December

1950, HSTL\James Hendrick Papers\Box 3\ECA – Overseas territories.
8. See also: Advisory Committee on Underdeveloped Areas, Minutes, 16 Febru-
ary 1951, HSTL\James Hendrick Papers\Box 5\Strategic Materials, Folder 2;
and correspondence from Allan Hugh Smith to Harry Fite, 13 December
1950, HSTL\James Hendrick Papers\Box 3\ECA – Overseas territories.
9. Per the correspondence: from James Cooley to Ty Wood, 25 October 1951,
HSTL\James Hendrick Papers\Box 4\ECA – Strategic Materials, Folder 1;
and from James Hendrick to Stott, Clampitt, and Curtin, 20 July 1951,
HSTL\James Hendrick Papers\Box 3\ECA – OSR, Paris 1950–1951. See
also: Memorandum of Telephone conversation between Dean Acheson and
Lawton, 3 April 1951, HSTL\Dean Acheson Papers\Box 68\April 1951.
10. Based on the following correspondence: Stanton Keith to Alan Bateman,
19 April 1951; and Charles Stott to Alan Bateman, 6 November 1950,
which may be accessed via the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale Univer-
sity, under the heading ‘Alan Bateman Papers\Box 8\Economic Cooperation
Administration, 1950, 51’.
11. The relevance of the resource curse literature in studies examining the gov-
ernance of natural resources in Africa is discussed in an earlier section of this
chapter.
12. For further in-depth discussion of this issue in the context of mining codes,
see Campbell (2003).
13. Note, however, that although Bartley and colleagues (2008: 165) focus on
political actors, we examine political, economic, social, and environmental
actors, and hold these actors to be intricately connected.

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2
Interrogating the ‘Good’ in ‘Good
Governance’: Rethinking Natural
Resource Governance Theory and
Practice in Africa
Mari-Lise du Preez

Introduction

The concept of ‘governance’ risks becoming an empty catch-all phrase.

This is even truer for a concept such as ‘good governance’, which is often
prescribed as a panacea for any number of Africa’s woes. Although the
concept seems intuitive, intuition will suffice neither for academic nor
policy research, and cannot serve as the foundation for policy recom-
mendations. This chapter aims to conceptualize governance and then
to problematize the ideal of ‘good governance’. Throughout, and in
order to ground the discussion in real-world cases, arguments are illus-
trated with examples from the Democratic Republic of Congo and other
resource-rich countries in Africa.
That Africa is rich in natural resources is not news. Its soil contains
abundant minerals. The continent is home to the world’s second largest
rainforest, and its rivers and seas contain fish that feed the people of
the continent and beyond. More recently, the discovery of new and
substantial oil and gas reserves in countries like Ghana, Uganda, and
Mozambique have served to amplify both challenges and opportuni-
ties of resource-rich African countries. This chapter attempts to move
beyond the now hackneyed phrase ‘the paradox of plenty’ to inter-
rogate the role for governance in ensuring that the continent derives
equitable and sustained benefit from her resources. It ends with some
recommendations for policy advisors.

25
26 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

From government to governance

The word ‘governance’ is derived from the Latin word gubernare, which
means to steer (for instance steering a ship) (Schneider and Bayer,
2007: 10). In the past the term ‘governance’ was often used sim-
ply to refer to government as a process (Mayntz, 2003: 1). This is
changing. Jabeen (2007) traces a scholarly shift in focus from ‘gov-
ernment’ to ‘governance’ to a paradigmatic shift in political thinking
on the role of the state. Whereas the so-called old paradigm of gov-
ernance saw it as the sole responsibility of government, the ‘new
paradigm’ sees government as but one (albeit arguably the most sig-
nificant) of the actors in the process of governance, alongside civil
society1 and the private sector. With this change comes a shift in the
role of government from that of commanding and controlling to that
of steering, supporting, and guiding (Jabeen, 2007). In the same vein,
Schneider and Bauer (2007: 10) describe the novelty of governance
theory as decomposing and deconstructing the institutional and self-
organization of modern societies into constellations of actors and rule
regimes.
While most scholars agree that, at its core, the governance discourse
is concerned with the relationship between state intervention (public
authority) and societal autonomy (or self-regulation), there are those
who rightly reject a simple ‘old’ versus ‘new’ dichotomy, arguing instead
for a continuum of types of governance (Treib et al., 2005). On oppo-
site ends of this continuum lie the ideal types ‘hierarchy’ and ‘market’
(Mayntz, 2003). While some scholars use different terms for these ideal
types (Bradach and Eccles, 1989: 97–118), in essence the ends of the
spectrum most often refer respectively to orders which co-ordinate social
action by using command and control mechanisms (hierarchies), and
to orders that emerge spontaneously from the self-co-ordination of
autonomous actors (markets) (EU New Modes of Governance Project).
In between these ideal types, there are different ‘hybrid forms’. These
so-called hybrids function by non-hierarchical co-ordination based on
the exchange of resources and/or trust (EU New Modes of Governance
Project). The type of hybrid governance form that is most often referred
to is the ‘network’. The most popular triad of governance types is thus
hierarchies, markets and networks, the three of which exist on a con-
tinuum with ‘hierarchy’ and ‘market’ on either end, and ‘network’
(together with other hybrid forms) in between. While a discernible shift
in focus away from the hierarchical end of the governance spectrum has
been identified, scholars also make the point that the most fitting type
 Mari-Lise du Preez 27

of governance required for any scenario remains context-specific (see,

for instance, Laking, 2005: 2–3).

Matching content with context

When it comes to natural resource governance, the most obvious con-

textual factor relates to the nature of the resource itself. Sub-Saharan
Africa is rich in natural resources. Some of these natural resources are
renewable (the fish in the sea or the Congo rainforest) and others non-
renewable (gold or oil). Some resources only have value once extracted
and processed (cobalt, gold), while others have intrinsic value (like a tree
that provides environmental services). Other distinctions include those
between point resources (those that are highly geographically concen-
trated and often represented on maps as points, like gold ore) and diffuse
resources (those that are geographically more dispersed, like forests or
alluvial diamonds) (see, for instance, Lujala, 2003), or between ‘lootable’
(alluvial gems or timber) and ‘un-lootable’ (oil, gas and deep-shaft min-
erals) (Ross, 2002) resources. Scholars have also considered the demand
or price elasticity of different resources. These characteristics all have
different governance implications.
The second contextual factor relates to where such resources are
found. Natural resources are located in areas with specific geographic,
socio-economic, political, and historical contexts. For the past few hun-
dred years, states have been considered the primary unit of analysis
on the international stage. Although the role of the state has changed
and is changing, natural resources are still found within the bound-
aries of states. Internationally recognized states have legal sovereignty
over their territories. This de jure sovereignty accords them certain
rights and responsibilities. However, despite the fact that all states are
considered equal before international law, the way interactions play
out in reality is much more complex. One would be hard-pressed
to find a case that illustrates this complexity better than the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC). For a start, the DRC is a de jure
sovereign state whose real (de facto) sovereignty over much of its ter-
ritory can at best be described as very weak. In addition, the fact
that the DRC is dependent on outside (donor) funding for more than
half its budget, raises new and difficult-to-answer questions around
the issues of sovereign rights and responsibilities. These questions
are compounded even further when accounting also for other actors
in the governance landscape, including the private sector and civil
society.
28 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

The challenges do not end where state boundaries end. Again the
DRC provides an evocative example. The number of actors and states
involved in the Congo Wars has led it to being described as ‘Africa’s
First World War’. Natural resources (land, minerals, forestry, fisheries,
and now also oil and gas) are central to the ongoing tensions in the
Great Lakes region. Efforts to address these issues stretch from the local
to the national, regional, and international, including such things as a
mineral certification in the context of the International Conference on
the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the introduction of United States
laws on conflict minerals from the Great Lakes through the Dodd-Frank
Act (Ayogu, 2011).
The DRC and its region might illustrate many natural resource-related
challenges well. In terms of governance-related indices, African states
range from 32nd (Botswana) to 182nd (Somalia) out of 182 in the Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index rankings (Transparency International, 2011)
and from 23rd (Mauritius) to 183rd (Chad) out of 183 in the World
Bank Ease of Doing Business rankings (World Bank, 2012a; see also
World Bank, 2012b). While most of the countries ranked in the UNDP’s
category ‘low human development’ are African, there are also several
African countries in the ‘medium human development’ category and
even some in the ‘high human development’ one (Libya, Seychelles,
Mauritius) (UNDP, 2011). Then again, 8 out of the 12 states (or really
9 out of 13, as the index does not yet reflect the split between Sudan
and South Sudan) are regarded as ‘critical’ according to the Foreign
Policy Failed States Index for 2011. This includes resource-rich states
like Chad, the DRC, Zimbabwe, and South Sudan (Foreign Policy,
2011).
Of course there are many more indicators and factors to be considered.
Even the single fact that Angola’s oil money makes it less dependent
on donor funding than the DRC leads to two entirely different sets
of governance challenges. In countries that rely on significant donor
funding the role of development partners is central. In these countries,
important questions need to be asked about such things as ownership
of development initiatives and development partner co-ordination. The
same development partners face a challenging environment of a differ-
ent kind in Angola: a country much more wary of outside assistance.
Some states see their resource riches as a way to decrease donor depen-
dence.2 As countries become less reliant on donor funding, so too the
influence of these external partners diminish. This was recently illus-
trated in Uganda: soon after the country’s oil discovery, the purchase of
fighter jets pushed Uganda’s defence budget over the 2 per cent of Gross
 Mari-Lise du Preez 29

Domestic Product (GDP) threshold earlier agreed to between the ruling

party and external donors (De Kock and Sturman, 2012: 48).
The less visible presence of so-called traditional development part-
ners in a country like Angola does not, however, mean lack of outside
influence or assistance. The emergence of resource-hungry powerhouses
changes the dynamics of natural resource exploitation in Africa, which
was for many years dominated by the United States and the EU. The for-
mer colonial powers are increasingly seeing their influence challenged
by so-called emerging powers. Consulting company Maplecroft’s Emerg-
ing Powers Integration Index measured 150 economies’ integration with
those of the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) (Aris,
2009). Out of the 150 countries measured, the index found Angola’s
economy to be the most integrated with that of the large emerging pow-
ers. Four of the top ten economies on this index are African (Angola, the
Republic of Congo (ROC), the DRC and Liberia) and at least one (South
Africa) is often considered as part of emerging power groupings. South
Africa formally joined the BRIC grouping (now the BRICS) in 2011. Sign-
ing a resources-for-infrastructure deal with China implies very different
dynamics to signing an IMF loan agreement. These kinds of new deals
are exemplified in Angola to the extent that the World Bank has dubbed
the model the ‘Angola mode’ (Alden and Alves, 2009: 9–10). Many of
the implications of these new relations are yet to be explored.
Moving from the public to the private sector, it is important to
note that one cannot do any natural resource governance work with-
out asking pointed questions about the roles and responsibilities of
some of the largest multinational extractive companies in the world.
This is where natural resources governance meets corporate governance.
An initiative like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
deals with the issue of revenue transparency in the extractive indus-
tries (mainly mining and oil, but in the case of Liberia also timber, with
some talk of expanding it also to other sectors like fisheries). EITI is a
multi-stakeholder governance initiative that involves governments and
companies as well as civil society. In the case of large companies, a host
of governance-related measures exist, ranging from voluntary to legal
requirements.3
In addition to the large players, there are also smaller ones, and the
governance dynamics surrounding the different-sized companies dif-
fer. Whereas large listed companies are visible and ready targets for
such things as disinvestment campaigns, smaller companies can some-
times more easily fly ‘under the radar’. By way of example, Patey (2006)
describes the complex dynamics underlying corporate behaviour in a
30 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

country like Sudan (before its split into Sudan and South Sudan). He
demonstrated how, when some companies considered the risks of oper-
ating in a conflict environment too high and opt to leave, others would
move in to take their place.
On the opposite end of the private sector spectrum – in contrast to
sizable transnational corporations (TNCs) – are those actors that are
active, but operate outside of the formal economy. A large and vibrant
informal sector is one of the few things that is relatively common
across Africa and much of the developing world. Artisanal and small-
scale mining (ASM) happens largely in the informal sector and most,
but not all, of artisanal logging and fishing occurs in the informal sec-
tor. This poses particular governance challenges. One step up from the
informal sector one finds micro-enterprises, and then one step up from
micro-enterprises are small and medium enterprises, and so forth.
Even more so than the public or private sectors, civil society consists
of a vast range of actors. In Africa, this range is often obscured by a
narrow conceptualization of civil society that equates it with NGOs.
Critical scholars find such a conceptualization problematic on several
levels. In Africa, most local NGOs are funded by donors or by ‘big
brother’ BINGOs (big international NGOs). A narrow understanding of
civil society also often links it inextricably to the normative ideals of
liberal democracy (more on this in the next section). Such a limited def-
inition may also obscure other, possibly vibrant forms of civil society.
A broader definition of civil society, such as, ‘the totality of voluntary
civic and social organisations and institutions that form the basis of a
functioning society as [distinct from] the force-backed structures of a
state (regardless of that state’s political system) [and commercial insti-
tutions of the market]’ (Wang, 2010: 207)4 allows for the inclusion of
actors such as trade unions, religious organizations, community-based
media, and social movements.
Interestingly, scholars like Kelsall (2008: 13) argue that one often finds
that some of the only self-sustaining civil society organizations in Africa
are religious ones. In a country such as the DRC, the church plays a
large and important role and has even published policy recommenda-
tions on issues related to natural resource governance. However, even a
broader definition of civil society can serve to obscure the power dynam-
ics at play both within civil society and between civil society and other
public policy actors. For instance, Putzel and colleagues (2008) describe
the power of the Roman Catholic Church in the DRC, as well as its
complex relations with political power. Such nuanced analyses move us
away from a narrow – and some would argue idealistic – conception of
 Mari-Lise du Preez 31

civil society as beyond reproach. Even the more critical scholars would,
however, not deny the role played by actors outside of the formal public
and private sectors in Africa; a role that increasingly reaches beyond
state boundaries. In 2011 and 2012, for instance, the Economic Jus-
tice Network of the Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa
(FOCCISA) organized an Alternative Mining Indaba on the fringes of the
Mining Indaba, held annually in Cape Town, South Africa. As its name
suggests, this event provides a platform for alternative perspectives on a
sector (and event) often dominated by big business and government.
The fact that the state is no longer considered the sole governance
actor has been emphasized throughout this chapter. The increasing role
for other actors is the flip side of the changing role of the state. Together,
the two factors mentioned above are central to the formation of net-
works and other multi-stakeholder forms of governance, such as the
EITI mentioned above. These exist at different scales, ranging from those
within a single state to international ones, and in different sectors.
In the forestry sector for instance, multi-stakeholder networks include
the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP), the Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC) (Grant et al., 2013), and the African Timber Organization
(ATO) (Grant et al., see Chapter 8).

On ‘good governance’ and other normative notions

Challenges faced by African countries are often blamed on bad gov-

ernance. The antidote for bad governance would seem to be ‘good
governance’. According to the World Governance Assessment Project
(WGA) good governance is based on six core principles derived from
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). These principles are
participation, fairness, decency, accountability, transparency, and effi-
ciency (ODI, 1999). Despite the claims to universality of these principles,
the way in which they are given meaning is specific and necessarily
informed by underlying sets of values. These values are in turn reflected
in institutions.
In recommendations for improved governance, the principles men-
tioned above are often translated into the institutions of competitive
party systems with institutionally guaranteed and protected civil lib-
erties. These are essential elements of what are usually called ‘liberal
democracies’ (Heywood, 2002: 32–33). Underlying the institutions of
liberal democracies (or what Heywood calls ‘Western polyarchies’) is a
general perception that choice and competition are healthy, that indi-
vidual rights are a good that needs to be protected and – as mentioned
32 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

earlier – often also that (narrowly conceived) civil society organiza-

tions are inherently good and provide a necessary balance against the
state. These perceptions should not simply be presumed to be univer-
sal. Consider, for instance, the premise that competition is healthy. The
universality of this perception is challenged in societies that place a
higher value on co-operation and consensus. Also, whereas some soci-
eties believe in the primacy of individual rights, others function with
the community (and not the individual) as point of reference.
Value differences have important implications for governance initia-
tives, some of which will be discussed in the following section. For now,
it is important to note that the idea of ‘good governance’ is aspirational.
It wants to change the governance system in a certain direction and is
therefore value laden.

It is an institution

Jabeen (2007) explains that the values of formal institutions are of two
kinds: espoused values, and values in action. Whereas espoused values
are values that are manifested in formal rules, policies, and structure of
formal institutions and organizations, values in action are values that
are actually reflected in behaviour at institutional, organizational, and
individual levels. Jabeen continues to explain that ‘incongruity between
formal and informal institutions may lead to a divergence in espoused
values and values in action, resulting in a gap between structure and
behaviour, rules and implementation, promises and results, form and
substance, and goals and results’. She concludes that good governance,
as it has often been used, is ‘a concept based on norms and values
well-grounded in democratic and bureaucratic traditions of Western and
developed societies where there is less or no incongruity between formal
and informal institutions’.
In societies where there is such a convergence between formal and
informal institutions, policy-makers need not pay a great deal of atten-
tion to the informal. This is often true to the extent that some (Meisel
and Ould, 2008) have defined good governance as ‘the highly formal
system of social regulation that prevails in developed countries’. This is
not the case in much of Africa, where several scholars (see, for instance:
Hyden, 2005; UN Economic Commission for Africa, 2007; Kelsall, 2008)
have noted the salience and influence of informal institutions; institu-
tions which are sometimes influential to the extent that a scholar like
Tim Kelsall (2008: 12) refers to the informal world of politics as the ‘real’
world. In such a context, it would make more sense to define governance
 Mari-Lise du Preez 33

as ‘the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that
regulate the public realm, the arena in which government as well as
economic and societal actors interact to make decisions’ (Van Bodegom
et al., 2008: 15).
In the same vein, North (1997) defines institutions as the humanly
devised constraints that structure human interaction, or the ‘rules of
the game’. He continues to explain that institutions consist of both the
formal rules (laws and regulations) and informal constraints (conven-
tions, norms of behaviour, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and the
enforcement characteristics of both. Formal and informal institutions
differ both in terms of their functions and structures (see Table 2.1).
So, for instance, whereas formal institutions are potentially open to
scrutiny, informal ones are most often closed and confidential. In addi-
tion, in Africa, as in other parts of the developing world, formal and
informal institutions often differ also in their underlying values. The
incongruity described above could in large part be traced to the fact that
many of the formal institutions in Africa were introduced during the
colonial period, from outside. Even today, the role of outside actors in
Africa cannot be overemphasized.
Whereas it is relatively easy to change the espoused values of a
society by changing the rules, it is much more difficult to trans-
late such changed espoused values into changed values in action.
As Jabeen (2007) argues, ‘[while] using good governance as a frame-
work for administrative reforms in countries with incongruity between

Table 2.1 Comparison between formal and informal institutions

Variable Formal institutions Informal institutions

Type of exchange Impersonal Face-to-face

Approach to rules Rule of law Rules in use
Character of rules Written Unwritten
Nature of exchange Contractual Non-contractual
Time schedule Specified Non-specified
Actor premise Organizational goal Shared expectations
adherence
Implications of Precise compliance Ambiguous execution
agreement
Transparency Potentially open to Closed and confidential
scrutiny
Conflict resolution Third party body Self-enforcement

Source: Based on Hyden (2005: 12).

34 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

formal institutions and informal institutions, [externally imposed] val-

ues . . . may easily be made part of espoused values by changing the rules
but it will be difficult to translate these values into action’. Fairhead
(2005: 202) explains how, in the DRC, past efforts at reform served
merely to change the (formal) rules of the game and its beneficiaries, but
not the game itself. This illustrates that while countries like the DRC are
often described as ‘weak’ or ‘fragile’ or even ‘failed’ as in the Foreign
Policy Index mentioned earlier, the resilience of existing governance
systems should not be underestimated.

Elusive political will

A lack of change is often blamed on a lack of political will. More

often than not, this is attributed to such things as patronage or neo-
patrimonial forms of governance that serve to protect entrenched elite
interests. This familiar argument suggests that those who benefit from
the current system will be resistant to change. The countless results
yielded by a simple online academic database search for the phrase
‘patronage in Africa’ gives an indication of the substantial work done
on related subject matter. Nevertheless, scholars still disagree about the
roots of the current system and also about what remains to be done.
A recent volume edited by Bach and Gazibo (2012) argues that neo-
patrimonialism is not a uniquely African phenomenon. It even goes
as far as calling into question the oft-accepted tenet that the neo-
patrimonial state is necessarily anti-developmental. This chapter will
not add significantly to that debate. Instead, it wishes to point out that
in addition to entrenched interests, a lack of political will can also be
attributed to a bad fit between suggested reforms and local context.
Some recognition of the need to ensure better institutional fit can be
seen in the heated debate about whether, and how, traditional insti-
tutions are relevant for the transformation of African economies and
governance systems (see, for instance: UN Economic Commission for
Africa, 2007; Logan, 2008). A paper published by the UN Economic
Commission for Africa (2007) speaks of a fragmentation of politi-
cal institutions on the continent. The paper describes an incongruity
between what it labels a ‘post-colonial State’ that emulates Western insti-
tutions of governance and ‘traditional institutions’ that are particularly
salient in rural Africa and in areas where people feel alienated from the
state. Some would venture to use stronger words than ‘incongruity’ and
‘alienation’ to describe this relationship, arguing that Africa faces today
an institutionally enforced tension between urban and rural (Mamdani,
 Mari-Lise du Preez 35

1996; UN Economic Commission for Africa, 2007). The UN Economic

Commission for Africa (2007) paper is of the opinion that successful
development is unlikely to occur under the existing duality of insti-
tutions, and argues instead for their integration. The abovementioned
recommendation is by no means universally supported. In Ghana, tra-
ditional chiefs play an important role as part of the formal political
system, whereas Tanzania did away with formal traditional leadership
soon after independence.
Whatever the decision regarding traditional institutions, and even if
it is to design wholly new institutions, scholars like Skjøslvold (2008:
1–19) argue that the design of robust systems often requires the bringing
of elements from the past system into the new system. So, for instance,
Botswana adapted its institutions of parliament, councils, and village
committees to include elements of a tribal traditional meeting called a
‘kgotla’. A kgotla is in essence a democratic process with historical roots
in which the village chief would consult with local villagers, who in turn
have a right to express their views and concerns (Weber, 2008).
The point remains that, as international organizations and donor
agencies increasingly realize, one-size-fits-all prescriptive templates do
not work. Should policy advisors wish to design initiatives that stand
any chance of being successfully implemented, they have to design ones
that ‘fit’ in the local context, and emerge from that context. A bad ‘fit’
will manifest itself in a lack of political will for change. In addition to
oft-cited entrenched interests, one of the challenges faced in design-
ing African governance solutions is the issue of ‘fit’. Another relates to
capacity.

Enough of good governance?

In addition to the abovementioned challenge of ‘fit’, it should be noted

that the good governance agenda is overwhelming. As scholars iden-
tify links between particular types of policies or institutions and poverty
reduction, growth or development, more and more variables are added
to the good governance to-do list (Grindle, 2004: 527). This has led to a
good governance agenda that is additive rather than analytical (Grindle,
2007: 571). Following such an agenda leads to the development of gov-
ernance scorecards that call for improvements touching virtually all
aspects of the public sector. It follows that countries with the longest
to-do lists also have the smallest capacity.
The good governance agenda is therefore particularly problematic
in fragile states where high expectations and low capacity are often
36 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

coupled with low motivation and sometimes with questionable legiti-

macy. Moreover, in states that are heavily dependent on aid, the good
governance agenda has led to a multitude of governance reforms, all
undertaken at the same time, differentially supported by a plethora
of donors, and as Grindle (2004: 529–530) notes, ‘often with little
thought to their sequencing, their interdependence, or their relative
contributions to the overall goal’. In summary, then, critics of the good
governance agenda note that it provides little guidance on what is essen-
tial and what is not, on what should come first and what should follow,
on what can be done in the short term and what over the longer term,
and on what is feasible and what not (Grindle, 2004: 529–530).
For instance, a study by the French Development Agency has shown
that factors such as ‘co-ordination capacity’ and ‘strategic vision’ appear
to be more important predictors of economic performance in develop-
ing countries than most of those on the good governance agenda (Meisel
and Ould, 2008). When building from a low base, co-ordination capac-
ity and strategic vision have been shown to be more important than a
formalization of rules, which could follow later. The same critics men-
tioned in the previous paragraph suggest ‘good enough governance’ as a
possible alternative to good governance. The idea of good enough gov-
ernance is still a concept in formulation (Grindle, 2007; Jabeen, 2007;
Meisel and Ould, 2008; Van Bodegom et al., 2008) and therefore not yet
one that can serve as a fully developed theoretical framework. What
it does bring to the debate, however, is the following: like the idea
of ‘fit’ described above, it too aims to link the content of governance
interventions to the context.
The idea of ‘good enough governance’ also challenges policy advi-
sors to rethink the main aim of governance reforms, asking ‘govern
for what purposes or to what end?’ This assists in seeing good gover-
nance not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end, whether that
end is poverty alleviation, development, or sustainable development.
This encourages a pragmatic governance agenda. The way in which the
‘good governance agenda’ has often translated into recommendations
for a neo-liberal democratic state was discussed earlier. However, the
jury is still out on the oft-assumed causal links between democracy and
development. At the 2011 Oslo Governance Forum, for instance, one
of the prominent speakers argued that although democracy has gained
moral victory, it has not yet been able to prove that it can deliver better
or more efficiently than alternative systems. Other speakers made ref-
erence to examples of ‘non-democratic’ good governance in countries
like Singapore. Another speaker argued that if the story of the 20th cen-
tury was that of democracy and its adversaries, the challenge of the 21st
 Mari-Lise du Preez 37

century will be the way in which democracy deals with its own internal
challenges.
In the light of these challenges, this chapter considers getting rid of
the ‘good’ in ‘good governance’ altogether. In most of the developing
world, a more useful question than whether governance is ‘good’ (in a
blanket, one-size-fits-all sense), might well be the more pragmatic one
of how and where governance can assist in achieving identified goals.
Instead of ‘good governance’, this chapter therefore suggests speaking of
‘context-specific governance solutions’.

Implications for policy advisors

This section will give some overarching suggestions and also provide
some questions meant as food for thought for those who give policy
advice. This is done in the belief that asking good questions is at least as
important as giving good answers.
An overall question to guide policy advisors is, ‘What kind of gover-
nance makes sense in this context?’ In the DRC, for instance, challenges
of governing a complex giant relate in part to issues of capacity and in
part to issues of political will. In addition to an overall weariness when
faced with the momentous size of the challenge, a lack of political will
can, in turn, be separated into issues of entrenched interest and ‘bad
fit’. All of this should encourage those who provide policy input to be
analytical rather than additive in their advice. As Grindle (2004: 536)
argues,

While it is important to ask what’s missing in a country’s governance

profile, questions about improvements that are occurring and the
conditions under which they are doing so can provide important
insights into how change occurs, the dynamics of reform, and the
kinds of interventions that produce changes that are good enough
for improved performance.

In cases where a lack of political will for meaningful change exists

due to entrenched interests, governance reform should aim to deter
such actors. At the same time, it should reward actions that contribute
to the achievement of agreed-upon goals. In sum, constructive solu-
tions are those that incentivize behaviours that work towards the vision
and discourage/sanction those that do not. Useful questions to think
about include: ‘For what purpose or to what end are we governing
here?’; ‘What role for incentives (carrots) and what for deterrence
(sticks)?’; ‘What role for mandatory enforceable regulation, and what
38 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

for voluntary?’ and ‘What role for demand-side measures and what for
supply-side measures?’
As mentioned, however, a lack of political will can also exist due to a
bad ‘fit’ between a governance initiative and the local context. In such a
case, the challenge becomes to relate the content of reforms to the con-
text. In terms of context, history matters and so do values. Obviously,
being cognisant of the local context requires more deliberate effort from
external actors than it does from those ‘on the inside’. This is a par-
ticularly important consideration in those states dependent on outside
assistance. In addition, the governance agenda more than many others,
is often one driven from the outside. Useful questions to ask include,
‘How did this country/region’s history influence where it is today?’;
‘What values underlie existing institutions, formal or informal?’ and
‘What are my own underlying values and how might that differ with
those in this context?’ A useful starting point is political context map-
ping tools used by international organizations (like the World Bank) and
donor agencies (see Nash et al., 2006).
An example is useful here, such as an issue that relates to a reform of
a particular regulatory framework. Here a somewhat philosophical ques-
tion remains whether a regulatory framework should aim to reflect the
commonly agreed values in a society (‘law as codified values’) or whether
it should serve as an ideal to strive towards. Depending on one’s answer
to this question, some related, but different suggestions could be offered.
While one side would argue for a framework that goes ‘with the grain’
(Kelsall, 2008) in Africa, the other would speak of identifying and build-
ing on so-called drivers of change (see, for instance, Putzel et al., 2008).
Either way, this chapter suggests that, as far as possible, new institutions
should build on existing ones. The obvious questions here would be,
‘What institutions exist here, both formal and informal?’ and ‘Is there
any way in which new institutions could build on the existing ones?’
Building on existing institutions would also go some way in dealing
with another context-related challenge, namely that of capacity. When
building from a low base with limited resources, it is crucial to prioritize
and sequence reforms. Questions that could guide where efforts are to be
concentrated include, ‘What is the most urgent need?’ and ‘In what area
is limited inputs most likely to have a significant impact?’ If, in addi-
tion, interventions yield some relatively quick and visible results, they
could serve to create momentum for positive change. Again, building
on ‘drivers of change’ is one way to do this.
Of course, development partner assistance can go some way in filling
the capacity gap. This also means that, while co-ordination is important
 Mari-Lise du Preez 39

in any country, it is even more so in countries where a plethora of

diverse actors are involved. Some provision needs to be made for the
co-ordination of stakeholders in pursuit of the strategic vision. In the
world of development, partner co-ordination is sometimes referred to as
the ‘division of labour’. The form that such co-ordination should take
is – like everything else – context specific. Finally, as with all the sug-
gestions above, there are many questions that could be asked about co-
ordination, some of which include, ‘Who are the stakeholders?’; ‘What
are their interests in the process?’, ‘From where do they derive their legit-
imacy?’; ‘Who do they/should they account to?’, ‘What are their possi-
ble contributions?’, and ‘Who should drive the process or set the terms?’
Finally, advisors would do well to remember that the state – and this
includes both African states and international partner states – is no
longer the sole actor on the governance landscape. This often requires
a conceptual and analytical shift in units of analysis from that of states
and the inter-state system, to the study of networks at different scales.
On a theoretical level, certain International Relations (IR) and Interna-
tional Political Economy (IPE) theories could prove helpful. On a more
analytical level, advisors are pointed to systems thinking and related
analytical approaches.

Conclusions

Clearly, good questions do not necessarily mean there are easy answers,
and often it means the opposite. This chapter has cautioned against
prescribing good governance as a panacea for ‘any-and-all’ of the chal-
lenges faced by Africa. At the same time, it did not deny the important
role for governance in ensuring that the continent’s population benefit
optimally and sustainably from its abundant resources. It urged pol-
icy advisors to be analytical rather than additive in their advice and
to be wary of grand ‘one-size-fits-all’ plans. It suggested replacing the
idea of blanket ‘good governance’ with that of ‘context-specific gover-
nance solutions’. If designed well, such solutions could contribute to
ensuring that Africa’s abundant natural resources are harnessed for the
development of the current generation, and subsequent generations.

Notes
1. Whereas Marx saw civil society as the collection of relations embedded in the
market, Gramsci saw a triple differentiation of actors: between the state, the
economy, and society. It is the latter Gramscian distinction that will be used
in this chapter. See, for example, Mamdani (1996: 14–15).
40 Theoretical Approaches and Policy Implications

2. This was the topic of a seminar hosted at the Clingendael Institute entitled,
‘Resource Governance: The Ticket Out of Aid for Resource Rich Countries?’ on
28–29 March 2012.
3. For a summary, see for example, Utting (2005).
4. The last section was added to conform with the earlier differentiation made
between state, economy, and society (see note 1).

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Part II
Governance Challenges
in Africa’s Oil Sectors
3
The Rise and Fall of Oil-Rentier
States in Africa
Douglas A. Yates

Introduction

This chapter is concerned with African ‘rentier states’, a category first

coined by an Iranian economist Hossein Mahdavy (1970), writing
about the problems of oil dependency in Iran. His theory was suc-
cessfully applied by other scholars working on Arab countries (e.g.,
Beblawi and Luciani, 1987), Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Yates, 1996;
Omeje, 2008; Watts, 2008), and then Latin America (e.g., Buxton, 2008;
Campodócino, 2008). More than a simple pejorative, this classification
refers to a complex of associated ideas concerning negative developmen-
tal patterns in economies dominated by external rent, particularly oil
rent, in the developing world. The rise and fall of these states is more
than just another boom-and-bust cycle of resource dependency. Instead
of cultivating an ethic of hard work, oil rentiers follow an easy path to
quick riches, spending money which they have not earned. The more
eagerly they spend their unearned oil revenues striving to reach devel-
opment, the farther they recede from it. Like those men described by
Seneca who desire to live happily, but whose minds are blinded to a clear
vision of just what it is that makes life happy: ‘The more eagerly a man
strives to reach it, the farther he recedes from it if he has made a mis-
take in the road; for when it leads in the opposite direction, his very
speed will increase the distance that separates him’ (Seneca, 2006: 99).
So too the African oil-rich states, after billions of dollars of oil revenues
expended, have remained among the poorest and least developed coun-
tries in the world. Blinded by sudden wealth provided by oil, their elites
lack a clear vision of what development is really all about, and so they
hasten their economies along the primrose path to perdition.

45
46 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

Oil rent and the rentier

What is rent? In classical economic theory, it was understood to mean

any surplus that was left over after all the costs of production had been
met. It was paid to the owner of the land. You can think of it as an
income paid to a landlord for the value of his real property, and to com-
pensate him for interference with the possession of his land. An old
English term of Norman French origins, feudal ‘rente’ survived long
enough to enter into the lexicon of 19th-century political economy.
Rent is one of four factors of this type of income. The other three are
‘wages’, ‘interest’, and ‘profit’. Malthus (1815) defined rent as ‘that por-
tion of the value of the whole produce which remains to the owner of
the land’. Ricardo (1821) defined it as a ‘gift of nature’ paid to the owner
for the ‘scarcity’ of land, and its ‘difference in quality’. Farmers pay rent
to a landlord from what they get in price on the market and what it cost
them to get it there in the first place (e.g., cost of seeds, tools, wages,
interest, profits, merchants, etc.). If all these costs equalled the sale price,
as might happen on marginally fertile land, the crop produced no rent.
Cultivation of higher-quality land, on the contrary, could result in rent.
Ricardo called this kind of income ‘differential rent’ because it reflected
the difference in the land’s fertility, and so was a gift of nature.
Mineral rents also derive from the difference between the mineral
price and the costs of production. ‘Mines, as well as land, generally pay
rent to their owners’, he wrote, ‘and this rent is the effect and never the
cause of the high value of their produce’ (Ricardo, 1821: 590). Mineral
rents reflect both the quality of land and the market price for the ore.
Rent is paid to the owner of land for use of the land and removal of its
resources. Since some lands are better in quality, their mineral deposits
are richer or are better located than others, these lands tend to produce
rent. According to Pierce (1986: 99), ‘The general rule is that deposits
where rents are greatest are the ones most profitable to exploit now, and
are determined by the price of the mineral on the present and projected
future markets’.
‘Oil rent’ can be defined as the difference between the price of a given
quantity of oil sold to consumers in the form of petroleum products and
the total cost incurred in discovering, producing, transporting, refining,
and marketing that oil. The term as it is used here is not familiar to most
people. Newspapers write about ‘oil windfall profits’. That blurs a very
real distinction between profits and rents. Even economists use the term
in a way that divorces it from the larger social context. Treating rent as a
microeconomic category, something to be paid in a particular place and
time, they tell us very little about the ‘rentier’ as a larger social actor, as
 Douglas A. Yates 47

a member of a group or class who does not participate in the productive

process, but still receives an income.
A rentier is unlike any other social actor in the production process.
The labourer receives wages for his work, the creditor receives interest
for scarcity of capital, and the entrepreneur only receives profits when
he successfully manages risk (each income derives from some element
of sacrifice or risk). But the rentier receives his income ‘unearned’1 as an
entitlement of land ownership.
The concept ‘rentier state’ was first used by Mahdavy (1970: 428)
to designate any country that receives on a regular basis substantial
amounts of external economic rent. The quantitative threshold was not
specified, but Mahdavy was talking about cases where the effects of the
oil sector on that country were ‘significant’ (essentially oil-dependent
states). When he first coined the term, oil prices were around USD 3 a
barrel, and so the oil rents he was talking about were still relatively small,
by current standards. Mahdavy cited Kuwait and Qatar as extreme exam-
ples, with limited capabilities for industrialization and few alternative
sources of revenue.
Mahdavy was far ahead of his time, and his idea assumed greater rel-
evance in the 1970s. The OPEC oil cartel, the Arab oil embargo, and the
fall of the Shah of Iran combined to push the price of oil (thus rents)
to historic highs: Oil prices rose ten-fold, from around USD 3 a bar-
rel (in the 1970s) to around USD 35 a barrel (in the 1980s), and all of
this with no additional costs in production. Much of the oil price con-
sisted of rent paid by companies (and ultimately by oil consumers) to
the exporting state. ‘Typically’, reported Luciani a decade later, ‘rents
comprise 95 to 97 per cent of gross receipts of low-cost oil’ (Beblawi and
Luciani, 1987: 26).
A ‘rentier economy’ has four preconditions that are identified by
Beblawi (1987): (1) The economy must be one where rent situations pre-
dominate, where more than 40 per cent of national income is derived
from oil revenue; (2) The origin of rent must be ‘external’ to the econ-
omy, that is, from foreign sources. Domestic rents, even rents substantial
enough to predominate, are not sufficient to characterize an economy
as rentier because they result from domestic factors of production. If an
economy is producing rent domestically, then it must also be produc-
ing domestic wages, interest, and profit; (3) Only the few receive rent
in a rentier economy. An open economy with high levels of foreign
trade is not rentier, even if it predominantly depends on rent, because
domestic society is actively involved in the accumulation of wealth;
(4) Government must be the principal recipient of the rent. This last
characteristic is closely related to the concentration of rent in the hands
48 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

of the few. ‘The state or the government, being the principal rentier
in the economy, plays the crucial role of the prime mover of eco-
nomic activity’ (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987: 53). The bureaucracy in
such an economy has a tendency to turn into a ‘rentier class’ (Mahdavy,
1970: 467).
Using these four characteristics systematically, it is possible to draw
a sample of oil-producing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that qualify
as rentier states. First, the economy must be one where the rent sit-
uation predominates. Looking at International Monetary Fund (IMF)
data concerning oil-export dependency on Table 3.1 it appears that
seven countries – Gabon (85%), South Sudan (71%), Congo-Brazzaville
(69%), Equatorial Guinea (65%), Angola (63%), Chad (38%), and Nigeria
(34%) – qualify as having oil-rentier economies. Beblawi’s 40 per cent
threshold, however, must not be taken too strictly but interpretively, or
it would not be possible to include Nigeria within the category. Given
that Nigeria is the largest oil exporter in the subcontinent, and without

Table 3.1 African oil-export dependency as percentage of gross domestic

product

Oil exports USD GDP USD Oil-export

billions (2012) billions (2012) dependency (%)

Angola 68.637 108.960 63

Benin 0.000 8.017 0
Cameroon 2.254 27.618 8
Chad 3.694 9.723 38
Congo-Brazzaville 10.984 15.870 69
Congo-Kinshasa 0.912 16.491 6
Côte d’Ivoire 3.371 26.659 13
Equatorial Guinea 13.187 20.271 65
Gabon 8.375 17.031 85
Ghana 3.817 45.124 8
Mauritania 0.225 4.532 5
Niger 0.314 7.408 4
Nigeria 89.322 263.225 34
South Africa 0.010 443.288 0
South Sudan 9.391 13.227 71
Sudan 5.498 59.286 9
Uganda 0.000 16.959 0

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (2012) for all data except South Sudan,
accessed at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata. For data from the
Republic of South Sudan, see National Bureau of Statistics, www.ssnbs.org (both
accessed 1 June 2012).
 Douglas A. Yates 49

a doubt the most important regional producer, it would make little sense
to exclude it from this discussion.
Second, the origin of this oil rent must be external, that is, foreign rev-
enue. All of the African oil-exporting countries sell their oil to foreign
corporations who transport and refine that crude for ultimate distribu-
tion and use by foreign consumers overseas. Oil exports are the ultimate
source of economic rent in African oil states. This distinguishes rentiers
from other more developed states whose companies produce oil for
domestic use.
Third, only a few receive rent in the African oil states. Although it
is extremely difficult to procure reliable data on the distribution of
income, the World Bank publishes country reports for many countries
that include calculations of the Gini coefficient. Data on their income
distributions are compiled by the World Bank’s Development Research
Group using primary household survey data obtained from government
statistical agencies and World Bank country departments. Some coun-
tries are lacking this data. A diligent effort has been made to gather
information missing from the World Bank report on Table 3.2, which
provides a quantitative measure of income inequality using the Gini
coefficient which measures inequality on a scale of 0-to-1 (0 meaning
perfect equality, and 1 perfect inequality) and a qualitative description
typical of what one reads in the published literature. The World Bank
publishes no Gini coefficient for Angola, a hopelessly corrupt regime.
Nor has it published a Gini coefficient for South Sudan, which has just
become an independent state, and has only joined the Bretton Woods
institutions this year. But the Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statis-
tics and Evaluation (SSCCSE) National Baseline Household Survey report
published in 2010 provides a sufficient estimate to confirm what quali-
tative descriptions have with regularity described in this poor, war-torn
landlocked country.
Fourth, the government must be the principal recipient of the rent.
Mahdavy (1970: 467) suggested that since oil rents are paid directly to
the government, ‘the temptations for a government bureaucracy to turn
into a rentier class with its own independent sources of income are con-
siderable’. African rentier states are particularly dependent on oil-export
revenues for their government budgets (see Table 3.3).
As can be clearly seen from Table 3.3, the level of governments’
oil-revenue dependency is extremely high, reflecting the generally low
level of African economic development, as well as weak post-colonial
state institutions. Tax-gathering capacities of African oil-rentier states
tend to be low and viable alternatives to oil revenues difficult to find.
50

Table 3.2 Income inequality in African oil states

Gini coefficient Qualitative description

Angola 0.55 ‘Most of the benefits of the resource boom

have gone to a fairly small elite that lives
in an African version of St Tropez, with
ritzy beach clubs inside walled enclaves’
(Economist, 2011).
Chad 0.39 ‘Poverty is primarily a rural problem:
87 per cent of the poor live in rural areas.
[However] in N’Djamena, the inequalities
are significant: the poorest fifth of the
population accounts for less than 1 per
cent of total consumption’ (IMF, 2010: 18).
Congo-Brazzaville 0.47 ‘According to our inquiries the incidence
of poverty (proportion of poor people)
is situated at around 50.1% of the
Congolese’. Author’s translation (UNDP,
2007).
Equatorial Guinea 0.65 ‘About 75% of the population live below
the poverty threshold and get no benefit
from the oil economy’ (African Economic
Outlook, 2012).
Gabon 0.41 ‘The UN’s IRIN news service notes that
30 per cent of the population lives under
the official poverty line, and that
according to the IMF, Gabon’s social
indicators are more in line with those of
low-income countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa’ (United States Export Assistance
Center, 2012).
Nigeria 0.44 ‘Nigeria ranks among the most unequal
countries in the world. The poverty
problem in the country is partly a feature
of high inequality which manifests in
highly unequal income distribution and
differential access to basic infrastructure,
education, training and job opportunities’
(UNDP, 2009).
South Sudan 0.46 ‘51% of the population is below the
poverty line. This varies greatly depending
on place of residence, with 55% of the
population in rural areas classified as poor,
compared to 24% in urban areas’ (SSCCSE,
2010).

Source: Angola (Economist, 2011) Chad (IMF, 2010) Congo (UNDP, 2007) Equatorial Guinea
(GPI, 2010) Gabon (US Export Assistance Center, 2012) Nigeria (World Bank, 2003) South
Sudan (SSCCSE, 2010).
 Douglas A. Yates 51

Table 3.3 Oil-export dependency as percentage of government revenue (2008)

Revenue watch index Oil exports/State

(RWI) revenue (%)

Angola 34.7 83.6

Chad N/A 78.9
Congo-Brazzaville N/A 86.0
Equatorial Guinea 11.6 93.5
Gabon 41.8 65.7
Nigeria 46.5 81.0
South Sudan N/A 98.0

Source: RWI (Transparency International, 2010), Oil Exports/State Revenue (IMF, 2009) South
Sudan, Sudan Tribune (20 January 2012) www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-shuts-down
-its-oil,41353.

Furthermore, the lack of government transparency – as measured by

Transparency International’s Revenue Watch Index – means that the
real contribution of oil rent to government lifestyles is probably much
greater than the official figures reported. A great amount of money is
simply never recorded on the official government ledgers; but govern-
ment oil dependency is no less for this crooked accounting. On the
contrary, valuable goods tempt men to do wrong. Finally, South Sudan
has only recently achieved its independence, and therefore its data has
yet to be reported separately from that of Sudan. Estimates are not how-
ever difficult to procure. All major news sources have reported 98% oil
dependency in South Sudan.
Therefore if we look at the four criteria for oil-rentier states set
forth by the literature, we see that seven African countries – Angola,
Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and South
Sudan – could qualify as ‘rentier states’. The next step of this analysis
is to examine the social, economic, and political effects of such oil-rent
dependency.

Rentier mentality, allocation state

For Giacomo Luciani (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987) the key feature of a
rentier state is that it is liberated from the need to extract revenues from
its own domestic economy. This sounds like a blessing. But necessity is
the mother of invention. Mahdavy (1970) had observed that the Iranian
oil industry’s most significant contribution is that it enabled the Shah
to embark on large public expenditure programmes. Massive spending,
without having to resort to domestic taxation or burdensome public
52 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

debt, should have given Iran a short-cut to development. For Mahdavy

(1970: 432–434) the question was why this had not occurred: ‘Perhaps
one of the more crucial problems that needs to be studied is to explain
why the oil-exporting countries, in spite of the extraordinary resources
that are available to them, have not been among the fastest growing
countries in the world.’ Taking the state’s financial autonomy as his
point of departure, Luciani classified all states according to their fiscal
policies. He then called a ‘production state’ one that relies on taxation of
the domestic economy for its income. In this kind of state, domestic eco-
nomic growth is an imperative, and the government’s economic policies
are developmental. The rest he called ‘allocation states’, in which the
government does not depend on domestic sources for its revenue, but
rather is by itself the primary source of revenue in the domestic econ-
omy. Since domestic economic development is not directly related to
the government budget, an allocation state ‘fails to formulate anything
deserving the appellation of economic policy’ (Beblawi and Luciani,
1987: 70).
The idea of a ‘rentier mentality’ suggests that an oil-rentier econ-
omy is premised on and eventually creates within the larger society
a specific kind of mentality. Economic behaviour in a rentier state is
distinguished from conventional economic behaviour by a rentier men-
tality that ‘embodies a break in the work-reward causation’ (Beblawi
and Luciani, 1987: 52). Rewards of income and wealth do not come
to the rentier as the result of work, sacrifice, or investment, but are the
result of chance or situation. Mahdavy (1970: 437) lamented this fact
when he contrasted the somewhat lacklustre attitude prevalent in the
rentier class with the sense of alarm and urgency prevalent among most
other state leaders in underdeveloped countries to alleviate the poverty
of their people:

Whereas in most underdeveloped countries, this kind of relative

regression will normally lead to public alarm and some kind of polit-
ical explosion aimed at changing the status quo, in a rentier state,
the welfare and prosperity imported from abroad pre-empts some
of the urgency for change and rapid growth and coincides with
socio-political stagnation and inertia.

Satisfied with their material conditions, ‘[i]nstead of attending to

the task of expediting the basic socio-economic transformations, they
devote the greater part of their resources to jealously guarding the status
quo’ (Mahdavy, 1970: 443).
 Douglas A. Yates 53

This ‘rentier mentality’ has profound consequences on a country’s

economic productivity. Its break in the work–reward causation means
that for the rentier ‘reward becomes a windfall gain, an isolated fact’
(Beblawi and Luciani, 1987: 52, emphasis in original). Income and
wealth are seen as situational or accidental, rather than as the end
result of a long process of systematic and organized production. Jobs
and contracts and licenses are given as an expression of patronage and
clientelism rather than as a reflection of sound economic rationale.
While rent-seeking behaviour is not unusual in modern African states,
the monumental sums of economic rent coming from a booming oil
sector make the lotus-eating symptoms of oil rent pathological. Only
aid-dependent regimes have anything similar. But aid is given in mil-
lions of dollars. Oil generates billions. While their people live in desperate
poverty, the elites stand aloof, relax their efforts, and spend vast fortunes
on luxury goods and overseas vacations. They are passively unoccupied
with the ‘great transformation’ of their societies. One joke laments sar-
donically that big oil money has been so corrupting in Africa that it
makes the leaders too lazy to steal. Civil servants see their principal duty
as being available in their offices during working hours. Businessmen
abandon industrial manufacturing and enter into real estate specula-
tion or other special service sector activities associated with a booming
oil economy. The best and brightest seek out lucrative high-paying gov-
ernment posts. Everybody knows getting access to oil rent is how to get
rich. Beblawi (1987: 8) concludes that such psychological side-effects of
the oil-rent dependency complex represent ‘a serious blow to the ethics
of work’.
After more than two decades of researching and writing about
African oil-rentier states, this author is overwhelmed with the mass
of qualitative evidence supporting the hypothesis that oil-rent depen-
dency encourages the corruption of the ethics of work. You can
see for yourself. A simple search of any literature on these seven
countries will quickly reveal studies, reports, books, scholarly studies,
official statements, and mass media articles on this dysfunction.
Although there is no measure of the concept of ‘rentier mental-
ity’, the larger phenomenon of ‘corruption’ has been measured, and
such measurement has been increasing in its scope and sources over
the past decade. Perhaps the most famous is Transparency Interna-
tional’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), but there are also World
Bank Governance Indicators as well as a plethora of other non-
governmental organization (NGO) indicators available for scholars to
consult.
54 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

There exists a strong correlation between oil-rent dependency and cor-

ruption. As a recent IMF working paper by Arezki and Brückner (2009: 1)
concluded:

an increase in oil rents significantly increases corruption, signifi-

cantly deteriorates political rights while at the same time leading
to a significant improvement in civil liberties. We argue that these
findings can be explained by the political elite having an incentive
to extend civil liberties but reduce political rights in the presence
of oil windfalls to evade redistribution and conflict. We support our
argument documenting that there is a significant effect of oil rents
on corruption in countries with a high share of state participation
in oil production while no such link exists in countries where state
participation in oil production is low.

First-generation rentier state theorists, like Mahdavy and Beblawi found

problems in oil-rent dependent states in the Middle East that may
seem genteel when compared to the much more savage ‘rent-seeking’
(Krueger, 1974) by elites in African rentier states. Some of these countries
suffered decades of civil war (Angola, Chad, South Sudan) or military
rule (Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville) or kleptocratic police states (Equato-
rial Guinea). Such catastrophically bad governance turns the problem of
effective revenue management into something of a side issue.
In order to give an idea of the corrupting effects of oil-rent
dependency on African rentier states, Table 3.4 provides a quantita-
tive measure of corruption by Transparency International (the famous
CPI) followed by a sampling of qualitative descriptions found in the
literature. The volume of qualitative data on corruption in African
oil-exporting regimes is so vast that it would be quite impossible to
summarize in passing.2
The following anecdotes are meant to be illustrative, not synthetic,
and accusations made in one country could easily be found in other
sources made against other countries listed in this table. Once again,
the sheer volume of corruption charges could fill an encyclopaedia. The
purpose of providing these qualitative descriptions is to emphasize the
empirical reality of oil-rent dependency being associated with a corrupt,
‘rentier mentality’.
Another frequently cited problem with oil-dependent economies is
that they are highly vulnerable to external price shocks. All oil-rentier
states have been wounded at one time or another by this ‘Achilles ten-
don’, even if their exposure to price fluctuations has been a shared, and
Table 3.4 Rentier mentality and corruption

Corruption perception Qualitative description

index

Angola 2.0 (168/183) ‘One of the central elements of Angola’s governance problems is what the World Bank has called its
dual financing system, where part of the state budget is managed through conventional mechanisms
involving the Treasury, the Ministry of Finance, and the Central Bank, whereas another part,
involving oil sales outside normal budgetary processes, is managed by other bodies – notably by
Sonangol. This has also been referred to as the ‘Bermuda Triangle’ (where money disappears without a
trace)’ (Shaxson, 2009: 71).
Chad 2.0 (168/183) ‘Chad’s minister for morality and good governance has been sacked and charged with corruption,
accused of stealing hundreds of thousands of dollars in funds meant for cracking down on graft’
(Reuters, 2012).
Congo-Brazzaville 2.2 (154/183) ‘In April 2010, Sassou N’Guesso ordered 91 suits from Pape for 276,000. A month earlier, in March
2010, he had bought 48 shirts for 24,000. In one year, in the 12 months from November 2009,
Sassou N’Guesso spent more than 652,000 on clothes there. The Sassou N’Guesso clan have 24
properties in France in their own name, 112 bank accounts and various sports cars’ (Chrisafis, 2012).
Equatorial Guinea 1.9 (172/183) ‘The president and his close circle . . . divert to their own private benefit the overwhelming
preponderance of revenue from Equatorial Guinea’s natural resources, including its land and
hydrocarbon resources. This gross mis-appropriation of the nation’s resources has continued for well
over two decades, enriching members of the Nguema group and making Equatorial Guinea an almost
perfect kleptocracy’ (Open Society, 2010: 3).
Gabon 3.0 (100/183) ‘Jack Blum, a United Nations consultant and expert on offshore banking, estimates that in years past
the Bongo family and its cronies have “siphon[ed] off 25 per cent of the gross domestic product of the
country. And it’s made them incredibly rich” ’ (Ross, 2011).
Nigeria 2.4 (143/183) ‘During years of authoritarian rule, the ruling elite captured the oil income for personal enrichment
and power purposes. Nigerian military power-holders were economically and politically independent
of their subjects, and could obstruct and dismantle the rule of law and the state institutions in order
to extract the rents and use them for private purposes’ (Amundsen, 2010:13).
South Sudan N/A N/A
55
56 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

not a uniform, experience. Economic diversification varies considerably

from one oil economy to the next. But all states in which oil-rent pre-
dominates have shared an education in the uncertainty of world oil
markets. Thus, many oil-rentier states have taken measures to protect
themselves against future trauma. For example, oil stabilization funds
have been set aside using surplus windfall revenues to pay government
expenses when prices collapse. Still, looking at the experience of most
oil-rentier states, one has a sense that the learning curve has been too
short and steep. It is not clear that they have really been able to learn
from their own recent past. If the lesson is diversification (that rentier
states should become something else) this suggests that the real solu-
tion is to not to be dependent on oil rent in the first place. This is not
so much a solution to the problem as an admission of it.
How can an oil-rentier state diversify its economy? And into what
activity can it diversify? This has been where the learning curve flat-
tens out. Assuming that it can simply purchase development with its
oil revenues mistakenly assumes that development is a commodity,
rather than a process. Examine the chain of causality in a rentier state
(Figure 3.1) and see how the inflow of massive oil revenues patterns the
problems of economic, social, and political development. One major

Significant
inflow of
external oil rent

Financial Relax foreign Decline in

autonomy
of the state exchange rates non-oil sectors

No taxation Capital- Reduced

Rentier Import
(Extractive intensive economic
capacity) mentality projects dependency
diversification

Relief from Technological Decline in rural

Inefficiency and Vulnerability to
political standard
accountability corruption dependency of living oil price shocks

Limited Reduced role Rural-urban

democratic for domestic dualism
participation labour

Decline in Enclave
state legitimacy industrialization

Figure 3.1 Chain of causality in a rentier state

Source: Yates (2012: 87).
 Douglas A. Yates 57

Table 3.5 Domestic oil consumption in African rentier states (2009)

Production (bbl/day) Consumption (bbl/day)

Angola 1, 906, 000 74, 000

Chad 115, 000 2, 000
Congo-Brazzaville 267, 860 10, 000
Equatorial Guinea 321, 980 1, 090
Gabon 242, 130 18, 000
Nigeria 2, 208, 310 272, 000
South Sudan∗ 350, 000 10, 000

∗ South Sudan, media source estimates.

Source: Energy Information Agency (2012).

problem observed by Mahdavy (1970: 429) was that, ‘however one looks
at them, the oil revenues received by the governments of the oil export-
ing countries have very little to do with the production processes of
their domestic economies’. Often the population is too small for local
refinement and consumption to make economic sense, but domestic use
of oil is limited in any case by the state’s rent-seeking export promotion
of its crude. Since most oil is produced for export, little is left behind for
local refinement or consumption (see Table 3.5). So petroleum indus-
tries in the oil-rentier states tend to be enclave industries that generate
few backward or forward linkages. Backward linkages are the purchase of
local inputs. Forward linkages are the domestic use of output in further
productive operations (Frank, 1980: 89). Sometimes the states require
progressive increases in the local value-added content through subcon-
tracting to local firms. Other times they decree an indigenization of
personnel to increase local participation. But a general lack of inter-
industry linkages between the oil sector and the local economy prevents
the oil enclaves from becoming launch pads for industrial development.
The mechanism of a rentier economy is premised on the inflow of
massive amounts of external rent. This rent comes in a concrete form
of foreign exchange (oil is sold for dollars). Access to foreign exchange
is important for all developing countries because it allows them to
purchase not only consumable goods (food, fuel, medicine, etc.) but
also the technology of advanced industrial capitalism (machines, tools,
parts) and high-skill services. Many other developing countries must suf-
fer costly balance-of-payment crises or inflation to acquire these goods
and services. This should not be the case with a rentier state, an econ-
omy saturated in hard foreign currency. But unexpectedly the inflow
of external rent on unprecedented scales has time and again tended
58 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

to throw the input–output matrix of rentier economies into chronic

imbalance, as both the state and the society become increasingly depen-
dent on the continual input of this foreign revenue. One consequence
is that the state tends to relax constraints on foreign exchange, with
imported manufactures replacing domestic manufactures lacking a suf-
ficiently large enough economy of scale to compete. If the rentier state
uses its oil revenues to purchase imported foodstuffs, these too will com-
pete with domestically produced food on the local markets. Combined
with the attraction of rural workers to the urban areas where the oil
revenues are concentrated, oil rents cause a decline in both agricultural
production and rural living standards.
The CIA World Factbook reports the percentage contribution of agri-
culture, industry, and services to total GDP on a country-by-country
basis. The agency explains in its notes and definitions that, ‘Agricul-
ture includes farming, fishing, and forestry. Industry includes mining,
manufacturing, energy production, and construction. Services cover
government activities, communications, transportation, finance, and all
other private economic activities that do not produce material goods.’
Looking at the data arrayed on Table 3.6, it is clear that the agricul-
tural sector (A-sector) in these states represents a very small percentage
of the national income, which is striking because this is the economic
sector which usually employs the greatest number of people. The indus-
trial sector (I-sector) may look impressive in these countries, on the
surface, until one removes the oil industry from these figures, and real-
izes that very little is left. Besides mining, there is little manufacturing
in these countries, which are essentially dependent on extractive indus-
tries. Finally, the service sector (S-sector) has become quite substantial
in those states which have been producing oil for a substantial period

Table 3.6 GDP composition by sector in African oil-rentier states

S-sector (%) I-sector (%) A-sector (%)

Angola 24.6 65.8 9.6

Chad 40.6 6.7 52.7
Congo-Brazzaville 27.2 68.7 4.1
Equatorial Guinea 4.9 91.7 3.4
Gabon 41.0 53.9 5.1
Nigeria 31.0 33.6 35.4
South Sudan N/A N/A N/A

Source: CIA, World Factbook (2012) www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

fields/2012.html (Accessed 2 June 2012).
 Douglas A. Yates 59

of time, and reflect the need for servicing the oil industry and para-
petroleum firms, as well as the need for financial services to manage the
inflow of economic rent.
Another consequence of the availability of large amounts of external
rent is that government can embark on big capital-intensive develop-
ment projects. Possessing the foreign exchange required to purchase
foreign technology, the rentier state has a capacity to embark on large-
scale infrastructural campaigns and state-run industrial complexes. The
short-term benefits of such programmes are attractive because infras-
tructural development can employ domestic labour and also because
modern industrial complexes endow the state with prestige. The long-
term consequences, however, are less impressive. Rather than enlarging
the goods-producing capacity of the economy, inter-sector linkages tend
to be negligible because of the high import intensity of infrastructural
construction activities. The state-owned industries are often worse in
that they cannot employ a significant percentage of the population and
often demonstrate little commercial viability. They may even drive out
small-scale local capital from similar productive activities. These state-
owned industries also tend to be enclaves, relying on constant imports
for their upkeep and maintenance. They also tend to provide expensive
advantages for their personnel like recreational facilities and round-trip
voyages on company aircraft for family visits to keep them from getting
too homesick.
So long as oil rent continues to flow from the petroleum sector
into state coffers, unprofitable but prestigious development projects
may continue to enjoy allocations. Conversely, successful projects may
lose government investments when state revenues decrease – unrelated
to the success of the projects themselves. Since the oil sector is an
industry, deceptive figures showing an absolute increase in ‘industrial’
production may therefore exist parallel with a relative decline in the
manufacturing sector. Rentiers can conspicuously consume imported
manufactured goods, moreover, without domestic substitution being
pursued at all. Spending unearned income, with a rentier mentality, they
prefer to purchase imported goods. When they fail to substitute these
with locally manufactured goods, this causes a decline in local domestic
manufacturing.
Why does their demand for domestically manufactured goods not
keep pace with their demand for imports? There are several expla-
nations. The first is ‘conspicuous consumption’ (Weblen, 1899), that
is, consumption of goods for purposes of creating invidious compari-
son. The status conferred by foreign imports often makes them more
60 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

desirable. The second is that imports often possess inherent qualities

resulting from advanced process engineering by foreign manufacturers.
The third is that there is a temptation for government to maintain arti-
ficially high exchange rates for their national currencies to facilitate
the purchasing power of their money. The relative price of imported
goods becomes low enough to disadvantage domestic manufacturers not
only in the local economy but in the external markets. Export-oriented
industry loses its comparative advantage and import-substitution indus-
try loses its economic rationale (real profitability). The fourth is that
domestically manufactured goods are often produced in the absence of
viable markets. Industries are targeted for development by state policies
that have non-market considerations in mind (e.g., jobs, prestige, sym-
bolism, kickbacks, electoral patronage, or foreign pressures). Prestige-
oriented industrialization of this kind is pursued for perceived benefits
associated with modernization, rather than a real market demand for the
goods. When diversification is pursued for its own sake and the supply
of diversified goods is not met with effective demand, domestic indus-
tries become net consumers, rather than net producers, of the national
income.
The comparative advantage of a rentier is the abundance of cheap
oil, for which the world markets demonstrate relentless demand. But
increased dependency on imports and declines in the non-booming
tradable sectors, the ‘Dutch disease’, is a pathology that has been
observed in the oil-rentier economies afflicted by price shocks. The
Dutch disease afflicts countries with booming oil sectors by distorting
the patterns of growth in the agricultural and other tradable produc-
tive sectors of the economy (Gelb, 1988). It takes its name from the
situation in the 1970s when booming North Sea gas exports pumped
massive oil rents into the Dutch economy, which appreciated the Dutch
guilder and, in so doing, exposed Dutch manufacturers to more intense
foreign competition and higher unemployment. In a country with the
Dutch disease, the booming oil sector attracts rural workers away from
agricultural production while at the same time contributing to a relative
devaluation of local foodstuffs. The same happens in the manufacturing
sector. Capital is reallocated to the oil sector, where returns are higher
than in either farming or manufacturing. Since the government is the
principal recipient of oil rents, there is a tendency for its bureaucracies
to expand. Financial services also increase to meet the needs of incom-
ing foreign exchange. Oil service industries also experience distorted
growth: pipeline maintenance, storage tanks, port facilities, helicopters
and other transport businesses, and merchants supplying oil company
 Douglas A. Yates 61

employees in the enclaves with tertiary services and basic supplies (e.g.,
restaurants, shops, and hotels).
The paradoxical negative impact of sudden oil wealth on an economy
can be described as follows: An economy experiencing an export boom
can be divided into three sectors which are: (1) the booming export
sector, such as oil; (2) the lagging export sector of traditional exports;
and, (3) the non-traded goods sector. In the presence of Dutch disease,
the traditional export sector gets crowded out by the other two sec-
tors. Oil windfalls lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate by
shifting production inputs (capital and labour) to the booming mineral
sector and non-tradable sector (retail trade, services, and construction),
thereby reducing the competitiveness of the non-booming sectors of
agriculture and manufacturing, hence causing their collapse. Conse-
quently, rural and urban living standards decline. The Dutch disease is
a matter of one sector benefiting at the expense of others.

Conclusion

There has been a great deal of discussion and published literature on

the ‘resource curse’, and for better or worse, that category has become
the dominant conceptual framework for discussing the dysfunctions of
oil-dependent states. While this author finds himself subsumed under
the category, it is not without some disappointment, for a much better
theoretical framework was already in place decades before the current
resource curse fad, and as many critics have pointed out, using the term
‘curse’ suggests a deterministic process directly linking complex histori-
cal phenomenon to an ‘inert’ mineral resource. Put differently: oil curses
nothing; oil money corrupts.
What this chapter has attempted to show is the chain of causality in
an oil-rentier state, and to demonstrate with a series of commonly avail-
able indicators that the major predictions of rentier theory are supported
by empirical data drawn from Sub-Saharan Africa. The long-term effects
of oil-rent dependency are political authoritarianism, economic under-
development, and social corruption. While it is possible to act on each
of these symptoms separately, through democracy promotion, foreign
investment, development aid, and transparency initiatives, the ultimate
solution resides in ending the cause of these disorders; that is, oil-rent
dependency itself. If the chain of causality postulated by rentier theory is
true, then even the rising successful rentier states are doomed to fall. But
this fall will not be premised, as some believe, on the ultimate decline
of their oil reserves (‘peak oil’) nor even the substitution of oil by other
62 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

less expensive minerals (‘price collapse’); rather, the decline and fall of
oil-rentier states will be the unintended consequence of their regimes
living off unearned oil revenues, instead of attending to the genuine
developmental needs of their domestic populations.

Notes
1. In Ricardo’s era, most land was inherited; hence the basis for the argument
that income from such inherited land was ‘unearned’.
2. For a series of synthetic reports on the problem, see for example, Global
Witness (1999; 2004; 2009).

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4
Access to Information and
Transparency Provisions in
Petroleum Laws in Africa:
A Comparative Analysis
Peter G. Veit and Carole Excell

Introduction

Petroleum laws are being developed or reformed in many countries in

Sub-Saharan Africa. Recent discoveries of oil and natural gas in Ghana,
Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Kenya, and other countries have led to
the development of more comprehensive petroleum regulatory regimes
(BBC, 2012; Guardian, 2012). Established producers, such as Nigeria,
have also taken steps to reform their laws to address new contexts and
challenges, including national and international demands for increased
scrutiny and transparency in the extractive industry sector. For exam-
ple, several governments and corporations have endorsed the voluntary
disclosure standards of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive (EITI).1 In Africa, Nigeria (2007) and Liberia (2009) have passed
EITI legislation (EITI, 2009; NEITI, 2012).
Inclusion of information provisions in petroleum laws that promote
disclosure and transparency are consistent with most African constitu-
tions which provide for the right of access to information (ATI). South
Africa’s Constitution (1996), for example, provides that ‘Everyone has
the right of access to – (a) any information held by the state; and (b) any
information that is held by another person and that is required for the
exercise or protection of any Rights’ (GOSA,2 1996).3 There is growing

The views expressed in this chapter belong to the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, the World Resources
Institute.

65
66 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

momentum in Africa to develop comprehensive ATI laws to allow for

the administration of the right of information by the state. Currently,
nine African countries have passed ATI laws – South Africa, Uganda,
Zimbabwe, Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Guinea, and Niger. Several
other countries are debating ATI bills, including Sierra Leone, Rwanda
and Kenya (Freedominfo, 2011; Article19, 2012; Human Rights Watch,
2012).
Public ATI is also recognized in international law, including the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 19), the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Article 9),4 and the Protocol on Democracy
and Good Governance (ECOWAS, 2001). The Declaration of Principles
on Freedom of Expression in Africa (Article IV[1]) provides that ‘Pub-
lic bodies hold information not for themselves but as custodians of the
public good and everyone has a right to access this information, subject
only to clearly defined rules established by law’ (APAI, 2012).
With many African countries yet to pass a comprehensive ATI law
and with implementation challenges in those with ATI laws, advocates
have used the constitution as well as information provisions in pro-
curement, judicial, natural resource, and other sectoral laws to access
needed information. Information provisions in petroleum and other
sectoral laws have limitations, but they can play a role in supporting
an incremental approach to the development of a comprehensive infras-
tructure for ATI. In Ghana, an ATI bill was introduced into parliament in
2002, but has yet to be passed (Carter, 2009). In 2010, however, Ghana
became EITI compliant in the petroleum and mineral sectors and, in
2011, enacted the Petroleum Revenue Management Act which exceeds
EITI standards (EITI, 2010).
There is a growing academic literature on ATI, although little research
has focused on the law and practice of ATI in Africa (Ross, 2010; Relly,
2011). There is also a large academic literature on the ‘resource curse’
including in Africa, but again little is focused specifically on ATI legis-
lation or information provisions in petroleum laws (McMillan, 2005;
Mehlum et al., 2006; Luong and Weinthal, 2006; Robinson et al.,
2006; Rosser, 2006). There is a large non-academic (e.g., development,
advocacy) literature on transparency and accountability in Africa’s
extractive industries, including on information provisions in specific
national (e.g., South Sudan and Uganda) petroleum laws (Cossé, 2006;
Langenkamp, 2010; Lay and Minio-Paluello, 2010; Global Witness,
2011; Veit et al., 2011). This chapter seeks to bridge the ATI-resource
curse gap in the academic literature by providing a legal review and
 Peter G. Veit and Carole Excell 67

comparative analysis of information provisions in petroleum laws in five

African countries – Uganda, Ghana, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Liberia.
It discusses the implications for public ATI and concludes with some
policy options and recommendations.

Methodology

The research5 for this report was designed to collect data and informa-
tion to answer two principle questions:

• Do petroleum laws in Africa include provisions that govern informa-

tion and, if so, what ATI issues do they address?
• Do the information provisions in Africa’s petroleum laws provide for
transparency and support the right of ATI?

The research involved legal reviews of the upstream and downstream6

petroleum laws – or advanced petroleum bills – in Ethiopia, Liberia,
Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Ghana (see Box 1).7

Box 1. Petroleum laws and bills reviewed

Ethiopia

• Proclamation to Regulate Petroleum Operations, 1986

Ghana

• National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005

• Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Bill, 2010
• Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011
• Petroleum Commission Act, 2011

Liberia

• Act Adopting the New Petroleum Law of the Republic of

Liberia, 2002
• Act Establishing the Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, 2009
68 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

Box 1. (Continued)

Uganda

• Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill,

2012
• Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing, Conversion, Transporta-
tion and Storage) Bill, 2012

Zimbabwe

• Petroleum Act, 2006

For Ghana and Uganda, the petroleum bills were reviewed, not the exist-
ing laws. The work also involved reviewing the constitutions, ATI laws
(and Ghana’s ATI bill), and other information-related laws in the five
research countries (see Box 2). Data collection also involved literature
reviews, internet research, and interviews of ATI scholars, advocates,
government officials, and lawmakers in Ghana and Uganda.8

Box 2. Constitutions and access to information laws and bills

reviewed

Ethiopia

• Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,

1994 (in force 1995)
• Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation, 2008

Ghana

• Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992

• Right to Information Bill, 2002

Liberia

• Constitution of the Republic of Liberia, 1986

• Freedom of Information Act, 2010
 Peter G. Veit and Carole Excell 69

Uganda

• Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 (amended 2005)

• Access to Information Act, 2005
• Access to Information Regulations, 2011

Zimbabwe

• Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1979 (amended 2005)

• Access to Information and Privacy Act, 2002

Not all laws that govern the petroleum sector were reviewed. For exam-
ple, Uganda’s Public Finance Bill (2011), which will govern public
revenues, was not reviewed. Nor were Ethiopia’s Petroleum Operations
Income Tax Proclamation (1986) and Petroleum Operations Income
Tax (Amendment) Proclamation (2000). Similarly, not all laws that
govern information were reviewed. For example, the research did not
involve legal reviews of official secrecy or national security acts. Finally,
the research did not examine ATI implementation, including court
rulings. As a result, care must be exercised in interpreting the find-
ings for the research countries as well as other nations around the
world.

Africa’s petroleum laws in comparative context

The petroleum laws in the five research countries establish unique

legal regimes and institutional infrastructures for governing the sector.
In Ghana and Uganda, commercially viable petroleum reserves were
recently found and the laws are being reformed. The new petroleum
laws are more comprehensive than the old laws, addressing a broader set
of petroleum matters and providing more specific directions. They are
also broader in scope than the laws in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe where
significant petroleum reserves have not been found.9 Petroleum has
recently been found off the coast of Liberia. Further tests are needed
to determine if the finds are commercially viable, but the govern-
ment has already started to reform its Petroleum Law of 2002 (BBC,
2012).
All petroleum laws reviewed for this research have provisions that gov-
ern information (hereafter ‘information provisions’). These provisions
commonly address a narrow set of ATI issues, including: government
70 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

duties to collect, store and share information (including with the pub-
lic through proactive release and citizen requests); and licensee (e.g.,
contractors, concession holders, and other holders of petroleum rights)
obligations to keep records and share information with the government.
Some petroleum laws also have confidentiality clauses that criminalize
and establish sanctions for the disclosure of confidential information
(see Table 4.1).
No petroleum law provides for the range of issues needed to effectively
govern information and ensure public ATI. ATI scholars and advo-
cates argue that a comprehensive ATI law should address: implementa-
tion and enforcement, proactive release of information, citizen request
procedures and internal review, oversight mechanisms and investiga-
tions, administrative appeal of refusal and judicial review, protection of
whistle-blowers, private body information, and other issues (Neuman,
2002). Few petroleum laws provide for enforcement of the right of
ATI by citizens or appeal of refusal outside the court of laws.10 As a
result, petroleum laws do not govern information in a comprehensive
or complete manner.
Finally, the petroleum law information provisions do not provide suf-
ficient directions or clear instructions for effective implementation. For
example, all laws require licensees to provide information to govern-
ment, but are silent on how licensees must share information or what
the government must do with it. Further, most laws require government
to make certain information available to the public, but provide lit-
tle guidance on requesting procedures and administrative requirements
for requesters (e.g., designated officers, procedures, timelines, fees, and
administrative decision-making processes). As a result, implementation
requires interpretation by responsible government bodies (in practice,
guidelines or regulations) or orders from the courts (in decisions, rulings,
or judgements).

Main findings

The chapter now proceeds to examine six principal findings that stem
from the research. Each finding is addressed in detail below.

Government duty to collect information

The petroleum laws in the research countries provide government with
the responsibility to generate and collect many types of information,
including information generated and held by licensees. The laws also
authorize government to proactively access and acquire licensee-held
information and, under certain circumstances, seize their information
 71

Table 4.1 Information provisions in petroleum laws and bills in five African
countries

ATI Issue: Legislation

Does the law have language that provides for . . . ?
E1 G1 G2 G3 G4 L1 L2 U1 U2 Z1
Government duty to collect information
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government duty to keep records (e.g., registers, other devices)
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Government duty to make information available to public
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Licensee obligation to keep records
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Licensee obligation to provide information to government
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Licensee obligation to make information public
No No No No No No Yes No No Yes
Confidentiality clauses
No Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes No
Criminalizes and sanctions for releasing confidential information
No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Criminalizes and sanctions government for not releasing public
information
No No No Yes No No Yes No No No
E1. Proclamation to Regulate Petroleum Operations, 1986
G1. National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005
G2. Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Bill, 2010
G3. Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011
G4. Petroleum Commission Act, 2011
L1. Act Adopting the New Petroleum Law of the Republic of Liberia, 2002
L2. Act Establishing the Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, 2009
U1. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012
U2. Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing, Conversion, Transportation
and Storage) Bill, 2012
Z1. Petroleum Act, 2006
72 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

for specific purposes, such as to verify licensee data or investigate

criminal activities. These authorities are critical for government to effec-
tively monitor petroleum operations, verify licensee reports and ensure
compliance with the law.
Zimbabwe’s petroleum law requires the Petroleum Regulatory Author-
ity to keep minutes of Board meetings11 and accounts of its finances;12
conduct annual financial audits;13 and provide the minister with reports
on its operations and performance.14 Further,

The Authority shall maintain or cause to be maintained a register of

licences in which shall be recorded, in relation to each licence – (a)
the name of the licensee; and (b) the nature of the licence; and (c)
any terms and conditions subject to which the licence was issued;
and (d) any renewal, amendment, suspension or cancellation of the
licence.
(GOZ, 2006)15

The law also empowers government to access and seize information held
by licensees. For example, it provides that ‘all books, records, accounts
and documents required to be kept by a licensee in terms of this Act
shall be open to inspection at all reasonable times by an inspector or by
a police officer’16 and that the inspector may seize any licensee ‘book,
record or document which he or she has reasonable cause to suspect will
afford evidence of the commission of an offence against this Act’.17
While the petroleum laws ensure that government has access to
many types of information, with the exception of Uganda’s upstream
petroleum bill, they place duties on government petroleum agencies to
establish and maintain records of only a few types of information. (e.g.,
register of licenses, minutes of meetings, and books of accounts and
finances). Effective storage of information and management of records
are critical if information is to be made available to the public, especially
for government to respond to citizen requests in a timely manner.
Uganda’s upstream Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Pro-
duction) Bill provides that ‘The Minister shall establish a National Oil
and Gas Resource Data Bank for the storage of petroleum data gener-
ated under this Act’ (GOU, 2012a).18 This is the only petroleum law
reviewed that requires government to store and maintain all types of
petroleum information. However, the phrase ‘under this Act’ is impor-
tant since considerable information generated and held by licensees is
not required to be passed to government (see below). The downstream
Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing, Conversion, Transportation and
Storage) Bill does not call for such storage of information (GOU, 2012b).
 Peter G. Veit and Carole Excell 73

Licensee obligation to keep records and provide information

to the government
The petroleum laws reviewed require licensees to keep books, ledgers,
records or registers of some types of information, especially information
on petroleum operations and finances, and to pass much of their
information to government. The laws also require licensees to make
their information and records available to government for on-site
inspections. Further, many laws require licensees to immediately notify
government of certain events, such as the discovery of petroleum
reserves, oil spills, workplace accidents, and archaeological finds (e.g.,
Ethiopia’s petroleum law19 ). Some petroleum laws explicitly provide that
information collected by licensees is government property.
Ethiopia’s petroleum law provides that the ‘contractor shall keep
records of his Petroleum Operations, including drilling, geophysical and
geological data and shall submit such data reports and notice to the
Minister in accordance with regulations issued by the Minister or, in the
absence of such regulations, in accordance with the Petroleum Agree-
ment’ (GOE, 1986).20 Contractors must also ‘Annually submit to the
Minister and other appropriate authorities financial statements, includ-
ing balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, audited by a recognized
independent auditor acceptable to the Minister’21 and ‘make regular
reports to the national Bank of Ethiopia regarding all currency received
imported, remitted and maintained abroad. The manner of report-
ing shall be specified in the applicable Petroleum Agreement’ (GOE,
1986).22
Liberia’s petroleum law provides that ‘The holder of a petroleum
contract is required to furnish and submit to the National Petroleum
Company of Liberia copies of all information, data, documents, and
samples generated from the petroleum operations in addition to the
periodic reports required by the regulation and petroleum contract’
(GOL, 2002).23 This includes information on production, income and
expenses (GOL, 2002).24 The law further provides that: all seismic and
other technical data and information is the property of the National Oil
Company of Liberia (NOCAL);25 contractors must give NOCAL access to
their installations and information;26 and at the expiration or surrender
of a hydrocarbon exploration permit, the ‘holder must likewise furnish
NOCAL with all the information and petroleum data in the holder’s
possessions concerning the affected area’ (GOL, 2002).27
Similar provisions are found in the petroleum laws in Zimbabwe,
Ghana and Uganda. Uganda’s Petroleum (Exploration, Development
and Production) Bill provides that ‘All petroleum data generated under
74 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

this Act shall be owned by the State’ (GOU, 2012a).28 The down-
stream Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing, Conversion, Transportation
and Storage) Bill does not have such a provision (GOU, 2012b).29 The
upstream bill also provides that licensees periodically submit summaries
of their information to government,30 but not detailed (GOU, 2012a).
Indeed, the bill includes an extensive section requiring licensees to keep
records of a wide range of information at an offsite address, includ-
ing on quantities and qualities of crude, drilling and operation, and
discovery of minerals (GOU, 2012a).31 This information is only trans-
ferred to the government upon revocation or expiry of the license
(GOU, 2012a).32 Similar language is found in the downstream petroleum
bill (GOU, 2012b).33 These provisions are problematic for public access
because Uganda’s ATI Act of 2005 is restricted to information held by
the executive branch of government.

Information available to the public

The petroleum laws in the research countries require government to
make one or more types of information available to the public, either by
proactively releasing the information (e.g., official Gazette) or by citizen
request. No law calls for all or even most types of petroleum informa-
tion generated and collected by government to be disclosed. Some laws
establish committees or other bodies with roles and authorities to over-
see certain aspects of the petroleum sector, a number of which include
members from outside government. Many also specifically mandate the
executive branch of government to report to and share information with
the legislature (see Box 3).

Box 3. The legislature and access to information

The research country constitutions provide the legislature with

fundamental law making, and oversight roles, and empower it
with authorities to meet its functions. The petroleum laws in some
research countries include provisions that specifically mandate
the executive branch of government to report to and share infor-
mation with the legislature. For example, the petroleum law in
Zimbabwe provides that ‘The Minister shall, within six months of
the end of the Authority’s financial year, lay before Parliament a
report submitted to him or her by the Authority . . . together with
the statement of accounts and auditor’s report for the preced-
ing financial year of the Authority’ (Petroleum Act, 2006, Section
26[2]). The petroleum laws in other countries, such as Liberia,
 Peter G. Veit and Carole Excell 75

are silent on government sharing information with the legislature

(or even on any specific roles of the legislature in governing the
petroleum sector, such as approving licenses).
The legislature is the ‘people’s house’ and lawmakers are rep-
resentatives of their constituents, but petroleum information
acquired or held by the legislature is not necessarily available to
the public. No petroleum law reviewed mandates the legislature
to release petroleum information to the public and most ATI laws
only govern information held by the executive branch of gov-
ernment. Some ATI advocates have argued that comprehensive
ATI laws should govern information held by all branches and
levels of government, but legislature-held information is often
governed only by the legislature’s standing orders or rules of pro-
cedure. Many legislatures in Africa operate in secret and do not
proactively release their information or make it available to the
public upon request. Few African legislatures even record the indi-
vidual votes of their members on motions and bills (Veit et al.,
2008).

Zimbabwe’s petroleum law requires only that the government register

of licenses (see Box 3), which ‘shall be open for inspection by members
of the public at all reasonable times at the offices of the (Petroleum Regu-
latory) Authority on payment of a fee, if any, specified by the Authority’
(GOZ, 2006)34 The law further provides that ‘Within 30 days after the
issue of a licence . . . the licensee shall, at its own expense, cause the
licence to be published in the Government Gazette and in a newspaper
circulating in the area in which it intends to operate’ (GOZ, 2006).35
Liberia’s petroleum law explicitly provides for only one type of infor-
mation to be made available to the public: ‘The Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) should be conducted for all energy project, activity
or regulation that is likely to have significant impact on the environ-
ment. The information and impact so acquired should be interpreted
and communicated to the proper authorities and stakeholders’ (GOL,
2002).36 In contrast, the Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Ini-
tiative (LEITI) Act provides for disclosure of licenses, licensee payments,
and government receipts and revenues from petroleum – as well as
minerals, forests and other natural resources (LEITI, 2012). The LEITI
government agency functions include: ‘To require all extractive compa-
nies and covered agencies and levels of government to disclose, at least
once every year, the data of all payments made and revenues received in
76 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

respect of the extraction of Liberia’s forest and mineral resources’;37 and

‘To submit annual reports to the President and the Liberian Legislature
as well as the public on its operational activities, including utilization of
funds received in connection therewith’ (GOL, 2009).38
Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue Management Act provides for the dis-
closure of licenses and revenue information. It requires government to
publish quarterly information on receipts from licensees, and the Min-
ister of Finance to provide parliament and the public with quarterly
reports that reconcile receipts and expenditures (Gary, 2011). The law
is similar to the LEITI but is restricted to the petroleum sector. Ghana’s
National Petroleum Authority Act provides that the NPA’s ‘Board may
disclose to the public information obtained by it in the performance of
its functions under this Act’ (GOG, 2005).39 The use of ‘may’, rather
than ‘shall’, means that the release of information is at the Board’s
discretion.
Uganda’s upstream and downstream petroleum bills have similar
proactive disclosure provisions. The upstream bill provides for gov-
ernment to publish in the official gazette and ‘at least one national
newspaper of wide circulation in Uganda’ notices of license applica-
tions including a brief summary of proposed activities (GOU, 2012a).40
Further, ‘the application may, within the limits of the commercial con-
fidentiality, be inspected at the offices of the Minister.’ (GOU, 2012a)41
Similar provisions are included in the downstream bill (GOU, 2012b).42
Uganda’s upstream bill also calls for the government to publish in
the Gazette: directives to the Petroleum Authority,43 announcement of
areas for petroleum exploration licensing,44 notices of applications,45
and announcements of areas for petroleum production licensing46
(GOU, 2012a). The downstream bill provides ‘Upon granting a licence
the Minister shall, as soon as possible, cause a notice to be pub-
lished in the Gazette, stating the name of the licensee, the general
nature of the licence and the location of the licensed facility’ (GOU,
2012b).47 Finally, the upstream bill provides that the minister may
make regulations regarding ‘the licensee’s obligation to make informa-
tion on the activities under this Act available to the public’ (GOU,
2012a).48 A similar provision is found in downstream bill (GOU,
2012b).49
Regarding confidentiality, Uganda’s upstream petroleum bill provides
that

The Minister may, subject to confidentiality of the data and com-

mercial interests, and in accordance with the Access to Information
 Peter G. Veit and Carole Excell 77

Act, 2005, make available to the public details of all agreements and
licenses, details of exemptions from conditions of license, approved
field development plants, and approved arrangements subject to
prescribed fees.
(GOU, 2012a)50

It is unclear what is meant by ‘subject to confidentiality of the data

and commercial interests’, but this provision may exempt a wider
scope of information than provided under the ATI law (see below). The
downstream bill has similar provisions regarding

(a) details of all agreements, licences and any amendments to the

licences or agreements whether or not terminated or valid; (b) details
of exemptions from, or variations or suspensions of, the conditions
of a licence; (c) licences; and (d) all assignments and other approved
arrangements in respect of the licence.
(GOU, 2012b)51

Some petroleum laws establish oversight committees or bodies which

may include citizens or representatives of civil society, providing mem-
bers access to certain types of information and opportunities to share
citizen interests and concerns. For example, Ghana’s Petroleum Rev-
enue Management Act establishes a 13-member Public Interest and
Accountability Committee (PIAC) to monitor and evaluate how govern-
ment manages and uses petroleum revenues for public benefit. Formally
unveiled in December 2011, PIAC includes members from civil soci-
ety (Daily Graphic, 2011). Since passage in 2011, the government has
released the Production-Sharing Agreements (PSAs), audited statements
of its petroleum accounts, and other information (Ghana EITI, 2012).
The petroleum laws in Zimbabwe52 and Liberia53 provide opportu-
nities for appointment of members or representatives of communities
affected by the petroleum sector to be part of the regulatory authority
and technical committee respectively (GOZ, 2006; GOL, 2002). Also in
Liberia, the Multi-stakeholders Steering Group, LEITI’s governing body,
is comprised of at least 15 members from government, civil society and
the private sector. Civil society members ‘include (1) Publish What You
Pay-Liberia or a successor organization; and (2) a representative of a
recognized association or union of workers in the extractive sectors as
permanent members’ (GOL, 2009).54
While the petroleum laws in the research countries provide for cer-
tain type of government-held information to be made available to the
78 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

public, they do not call for the release of all information needed by cit-
izens to effectively monitor the sector. No law explicitly provides for
the disclosure of the range of information that is commonly provided
by an ATI law and, therefore, should not be viewed as a substitute for
a comprehensive ATI law. Further, when a petroleum law provides for
the release of information, it is primarily by publishing it in the official
government Gazette. ATI advocates argue that other means are needed
to ensure information is available to the majority of citizens, such as via
popular media and in local languages (Foti and de Silva, 2010).

Confidentiality clauses
Liberia’s petroleum law, Ghana’s National Petroleum Act and Uganda’s
two petroleum bills have confidentiality clauses.55 While Uganda’s
bills provide some detail on when confidential information may be
released, the bills and Liberia’s and Ghana’s laws are silent on critical
matters such as how confidentiality is justified, who may access con-
fidential information and, how long the information is to be held as
confidential.
Liberia’s petroleum law provides that ‘All such reports submitted to
the National Petroleum Company of Liberia are considered confidential
and may not be made public except as provided for in the petroleum
contract, consistent with the applicable provisions of the administrative
regulations and the present law’ (GOL, 2002).56 It is not clear which
reports the law is referring to, but they may include ‘all information,
data, documents, and samples’57 and other periodic reports noted in
previous provisions (GOL, 2002).
Uganda’s upstream petroleum bill provides ‘Except as provided under
this Act and the Access to Information Act, 2005, all data submitted to
the Minister by a licensee shall be kept confidential and shall not be
reproduced or disclosed to third parties by any party under this Act’
(GOU, 2012a).58 The information cannot be disclosed by government or
licensee without written consent of the other (GOU, 2012a).59 A simi-
lar provision is included in Uganda’s downstream bill (GOU, 2012b).60
It also provides that information submitted by a licensee to the minister
concerning the operations ‘shall be treated as confidential for a period
as may be specified in the licence or the agreement’ (GOU, 2012b).61
The upstream bill does not include such a provision, but, in practice,
licenses are known to include confidentiality clauses.
Ghana’s National Petroleum Authority Act provides that the NPA
‘Board shall not disclose to a person (a) a trade secret, and (b) privi-
leged commercial or financial information, without the prior written
 Peter G. Veit and Carole Excell 79

undertaking of that person to keep the secret, information or matter in

strict confidence and to use it for the purpose for which it was sought’.62
The Petroleum Revenue Management Act provides for information to
be confidential, but limits the authority of the minister: ‘Information or
data, the disclosure of which could in particular prejudice significantly
the performance of the Ghana Petroleum Funds may be declared by the
Minister as confidential, subject to the approval of Parliament’ (GOG,
2011).63 The government must provide reasons for declaring the infor-
mation confidential64 and this justification must be made available to
the public upon request three years after the information is no longer
confidential (GOG, 2011).65
These confidentiality clauses are not sufficiently clear to establish pre-
cisely which types of information are confidential. For example, it is
unclear whether information regarding production levels, revenue gen-
erated by the licensee, licensee payments to government, and other
petroleum information is considered confidential. This information is
available to the public in many other countries (EITI, 2012). By not
clearly delineating the scope of what is considered confidential, govern-
ment officials have discretion to interpret the provisions and prevent
disclosure.
Liberia’s petroleum law, Ghana’s National Petroleum Act and
Uganda’s bills create a presumption of confidentiality (confidentiality
by default) that places the burden of showing why requested informa-
tion should be disclosed to the public on the requestor (consistent with
the oath of secrecy administered to all civil servants and official secrets
laws)66 . Experience shows that once information is identified as confi-
dential, it is difficult to argue for it to be released as non-confidential
(Roberts, 2006).
In contrast, a presumption in favour of disclosure assumes that the
benefit of releasing information to the public outweighs the costs to
government (and licensees), and places the burden on the state to justify
why withholding is warranted. Uganda’s and Liberia’s ATI laws place the
burden on the government to show why information should be exempt
from disclosure. In both ATI laws, the confidentiality provisions focus
on the harm that disclosure would have on a third party’s interest (such
as that of a commercial business) and balances that interest against the
public interest in disclosure (see below). ATI advocates argue that com-
prehensive ATI laws should include all exemptions that can be asserted
by government to limit disclosure. Additional confidentiality provisions
appearing as disclosure exemptions in petroleum or other laws may
be inconsistent with or undermine disclosure provisions in ATI laws,
80 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

making for complex and unwieldy interpretation and implementation

processes.

Criminalizing the release of confidential information

All research countries have laws providing government with regula-
tory and enforcement powers to govern the petroleum sector. The
petroleum laws provide government (or designated individuals or insti-
tutions) with the authorities needed to monitor licensees to ensure
compliance with the law and contract, sanction non-compliance,
and terminate agreements.67 Many laws call for implementing reg-
ulations that establish specific sanctions, including presumably for
not meeting information provisions. Zimbabwe’s petroleum law and
Uganda’s two bills include provisions that specifically criminalize the
release of confidential information. In contrast, Ghana’s Petroleum Rev-
enue Management Act criminalizes the withholding by government
of information that is required by law to be released to the public.
In Liberia, the LEITI government agency has the authority to sanc-
tion licensees and government agencies for not disclosing required
information. Many petroleum laws also address the provision of false
or misleading information by licensees or government misuse of
information.
Zimbabwe’s petroleum law does not have a confidentiality clause for
the release of specific types of information, although it refers to the
release of commercial secrets. Specifically, ‘If an inspector or member
or employee of the (Petroleum Regulatory) Authority in the course of
his or her duties as such acquires information relating to the financial
affairs of any person, or to any commercial secret, he or she shall not for
personal gain make use of such information, nor disclose it to any other
person’ (GOZ, 2006).68 This holds ‘for a period of five years after the
date on which he or she ceased to be an inspector, member or employee’
(GOZ, 2006).69 Any person who contravenes this ‘shall be guilty of an
offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level nine or to imprison-
ment for a period not exceeding five years or to both such fine and such
imprisonment’ (GOZ, 2006).70
Uganda’s upstream petroleum bill provides that any person who
contravenes the law and releases confidential information ‘commits
an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding five
hundred currency points or imprisonment not exceeding five years
or both’ (GOU, 2012a).71 A similar provision is found in the down-
stream bill (GOU, 2012b).72 The upstream bill also provides sanctions
for persons who cease to be members of the board or staff of the
 Peter G. Veit and Carole Excell 81

Petroleum Authority for disclosing information obtained in the course

of employment (GOU, 2012a).73
Liberia’s petroleum law provides that ‘Each license shall provide ade-
quate sanctions for the failure of the licensee to fulfil the obligations
undertaken by the holder. The regulation promulgated by the National
Oil Company of Liberia, shall determine and establish the sanction to
be thus imposed’ (GOL, 2002).74 Under the LEITI Act, the responsible
government agency must bring to the attention of government ‘all insti-
tutional and procedural deficiencies as well as lapses, understatements,
misrepresentations, and violations of law’75 and ‘perform and undertake
any and all actions as may be necessary to achieve its statutory objec-
tives’ (GOL, 2009).76 LEITI’s governing body, the Multi-stakeholders
Steering Group, has authority: to conduct audits and investigations;
‘To determine the sanctions to be applied against any company and/or
agency government failing to submit a report required by the EITI, or
otherwise comply with requirements of the LEITI’;77 and ‘[t]o take any
and all other actions necessary for achieving the objectives of LEITI’
(GOL, 2009).78
Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue Management Act is similar to the
LEITI but goes further by criminalizing non-compliance with an obli-
gation to publicize information. Specifically, ‘Any person who fails to
comply with any obligation to publish information provided for in this
Act’ commits an offence and must pay a fine (GOG, 2011).79 The crim-
inalization of and harsh sanctions for releasing confidential petroleum
information coupled with the ambiguity of which information is con-
fidential creates a powerful incentive for government officials to err
on the side of withholding information from the public. In contrast,
Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue Management Act and Liberia’s LEITI Act
provide sanctions for not disclosing information that should by law be
made available to the public. This is consistent with Ghana’s ATI bill
and is similar to ‘failure to release information’ provisions in many
ATI laws, including Liberia’s ATI law.80 Sanctions for not releasing
information as required by law encourage government officials to proac-
tively release information and to carefully review all citizen requests for
information.

Hierarchy of laws
Most petroleum laws provide that licensees must comply with all laws,
and that the petroleum law supersedes other laws when they are in con-
flict.81 The governments of Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Liberia enacted an
ATI law after passing their petroleum law and the ATI law provides that
82 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

it trumps other laws when they are in conflict.82 While the ATI laws
in these three countries vary in approach and support of public ATI,
they are – with the possible exception of Zimbabwe’s ATI law83 – more
supportive of the right of ATI than the information provisions in the
petroleum laws. Uganda’s two petroleum bills recognize the country’s
ATI law, but create hurdles to accessing information that may not be
consistent with the ATI law or the constitutional right of ATI. Ghana
has yet to enact an ATI law (Ghanaian Times, 2011).
Ethiopia’s petroleum law (1986) states that ‘all Petroleum agreements
and Petroleum Operations shall be governed by the laws of Ethiopia’84
but that ‘No laws or rules, whether written or customary, shall apply
to matters expressly provided for in this proclamation’ (GOE, 1986).85
Ethiopia’s Constitution (1994) includes a right of ATI and the ATI law
(2008) provides ‘The right of access provided in Art. 12 of this Proclama-
tion applies to the exclusion of any provision or other legislation that
prohibits or restricts the disclosure of information, provided that this
right takes effect subject to the exceptions provided in this Part’ (GOE,
2008).86
Zimbabwe’s petroleum law (2006) stipulates that

This Act supersedes any and all Acts, Decrees, or Regulations; or pro-
visions contained in any such other Decree, Act or Regulations found
to be inconsistent with this Law or provisions hereof. Accordingly,
other than the Act establishing the National Petroleum Company
of Liberia (NOCAL), all Regulations, Decrees, Acts or Laws that are
inconsistent with this Law, are hereby repealed and declared null and
void, to the extent of such inconsistency.
(GOZ, 2006)87

Zimbabwe’s ATI law (2002) states: ‘If any other law relating to access to
information, protection of privacy and the mass media is in conflict or
inconsistent with this Act, this Act shall prevail’ (GOZ, 2002).88
Liberia’s petroleum law (2002) does not explicitly state that licensees
must abide by the laws of the country, but provide that ‘All holders of
petroleum contracts or reconnaissance licenses shall abide by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Laws of Liberia’ (GOL, 2002).89 It also provides for
EIAs and other actions which are consistent with Liberia’s environmen-
tal laws.90 The LEITI Act (2009)91 provides that ‘any law to the contrary
notwithstanding’ meaning that the law stands regardless of what any
contrary law may provide (GOL, 2009).
 Peter G. Veit and Carole Excell 83

Liberia’s ATI law (2010) states,

Save for the Constitution, this Act is and shall be the primary law gov-
erning the right of access to information, including all matters related
to request for and provision of information in Liberia. No adminis-
trative action, order or regulation contrary to, inconsistent with, or
in derogation of this Act shall issue or be effective in Liberia, and this
Act shall prevail over any and all subsequent inconsistent statutes,
except a subsequent statute that specifically amends or repeals it.
(GOL, 2010)92

The ATI law also has comprehensive public interest tests that could be
effectively used to push for disclosure of information that may oth-
erwise be held secret in petroleum and other laws. These provisions
are among the strongest such provisions in any ATI law in Africa and
are particularly important given the confidentiality clause in Liberia’s
petroleum law.
Uganda’s two petroleum bills (2011) recognize the national ATI law
(2005). In the upstream petroleum bill, ‘The Minister may, subject to
confidentiality of the data and commercial interests, and in accordance
with the Access to Information Act, 2005, make available to the pub-
lic’ (GOU, 2012a).93 A similar provision is found in the downstream
bill (GOU, 2012b).94 Uganda’s Constitution (1995) provides two exemp-
tions: ‘Every citizen has a right of access to information in the possession
of the State or any other organ or agency of the State except where
the release of the information is likely to prejudice the security or
sovereignty of the State or interfere with the right to the privacy of any
other person’ (GOU, 1995).95 The ATI law and ATI regulations have more
exemptions and some advocates argue that many are inconsistent with
the constitutional exemptions (GOU, 2011; GOU, 2005).
Public access of the petroleum PSAs is currently before Uganda’s
courts. In 2010, a lower court declared the PSAs confidential using the
ATI law, although the plaintiffs (two local journalists) are appealing. Also
in 2010, Greenwatch, a Ugandan environmental law non-governmental
organization (NGO), filed a petition with the High Court requesting the
PSAs using the Constitution. This matter has yet to be heard. Following
mounting pressure from lawmakers, government recently released the
PSAs to parliament but it has refused to make them available to the pub-
lic. Other types of petroleum information, such as licensee payments
and government revenues which are disclosed to the public in Ghana
84 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

and Liberia, are not released in Uganda. The information provisions in

Uganda’s petroleum bills may create even more hurdles for citizens to
realize their right of ATI.

Conclusions

This analysis supports the findings of other research that information

provisions in petroleum laws often vary within (and across) countries,
and are in conflict with other national laws, including ATI law. A dis-
jointed, patchwork approach to governing information is inefficient
and confusing to government agencies and citizens. ATI best practice
calls for a consistent approach to governing all government-held infor-
mation, ensuring there are no conflicts across statutes (Mendel, 2008).
Little research has been conducted on linking framework ATI laws with
information provisions in sectoral laws, but based on this research the
best approach for governing information will depend in large measure
on the presence or absence of a comprehensive ATI law.
ATI scholars and advocates argue that a comprehensive ATI law is
central to realizing constitutional provisions on the right of ATI and
to making governments more accountable and responsive (Neuman,
2002). An ATI law – coupled with enabling regulations and capable
implementing agencies – provides for the administration of the right
to information, expresses limits of the right, and establishes appeal
procedures. An ATI law also ensures consistency in the governance of
information within and across sectors. Research shows that govern-
ments with an ATI law more often respect the right to information,
proactively provide information to the public, invest in record man-
agement procedures, and standardize processes to respond to requests,
than governments without an ATI law (Hazell et al., 2010). Countries
without ATI laws should consider developing a comprehensive law.
In countries with an ATI law, information provisions in petroleum
and other natural resource laws must be harmonized. The sectoral laws
should specifically reference the ATI law as the predominant law regard-
ing ATI and they should include the same language in each law or
reference information provisions in existing laws (‘incorporation by
reference’). Petroleum and other sectoral laws should not prohibit or
restrict the disclosure of information that is allowed to be released under
the ATI law, or they should not introduce exemptions that are materi-
ally inconsistent with the objectives of the ATI Act. The sectoral laws
should provide a clear duty for government to collect and store various
types of information within government offices to ensure that records
 Peter G. Veit and Carole Excell 85

fall within the scope of the ATI law. Sectoral laws can allow for the
release of information beyond the requirements of the ATI law, such as
requiring licensees to release information to the public (e.g., Zimbabwe
petroleum law).
In the absence of a comprehensive ATI law (including many coun-
tries in Africa and the Middle East), information provisions in petroleum
and other natural resource laws provide important opportunities for the
public to access sectoral information. This is especially important in
countries with a restrictive official secrets or national security law. The
information provisions in sectoral laws do not substitute for an ATI law,
but the findings of the present study suggest that petroleum (and other
natural resource) laws should address a minimum set of issues to ensure
effective information governance. This includes:

• Information Storage: Petroleum laws should provide for government to

maintain full and accurate public records of the petroleum sector and
the affairs of responsible government agencies (unless already pro-
vided by other statutes governing records management). The infor-
mation should be managed and maintained in accordance with inter-
national record management principles. The laws should criminalize
and provide sanctions for the destruction of public information.
• Proactive Release: Petroleum laws should provide for government to
proactively release a minimum set of standardized information in
ways that make the information available to the majority of citizens
(e.g., websites and popular media, not just the Gazette). This mini-
mum set should be outlined in a schedule or regulations within the
law. The petroleum laws should criminalize and provide sanctions for
the non-disclosure of public information.
• Citizen Requests: Petroleum laws or enabling regulations should
establish simple, straightforward procedures for citizens to request
government-held information. They should provide opportunities
for citizens to appeal to the ministry and to independent authori-
ties, including courts. The laws should establish clear procedures for
citizens to challenge or appeal regulatory decisions when they are
refused information. The appeal procedures should require the min-
ister or independent authority to provide the requestor with written
reasons for refusal. If fees are required to process requests or appeals,
they should not be prohibitive for the average citizen.

Confidentiality clauses in petroleum and other sectoral laws are prob-

lematic – coupled with official secrets laws, secrecy oaths for civil
86 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

servants, and other measures, they create a presumption of secrecy. Any

confidentiality provisions in petroleum (and other sectoral) laws should
be clearly and narrowly drawn and subject to strict ‘harm’ tests (e.g., sub-
stantial harm to commercial confidentiality and ‘public interest’ tests).
The standards for commercial confidentiality for state-owned petroleum
companies and private companies may differ. Commercial confidential-
ity in the petroleum sector has traditionally restricted ATI, although this
may be changing (e.g., Liberia’s LEITI Act and Ghana’s Petroleum Rev-
enue Management Act). The petroleum laws should also protect public
officials who release information in good faith.
Public ATI alone will not deliver accountable and responsive govern-
ment. Without information, however, citizens and civil society have
difficulties effectively monitoring government and companies with
rights over petroleum and other valuable natural resources. Given the
importance of petroleum to the economies of a growing number of Sub-
Saharan African countries – and more broadly, the importance of natural
capital to low-income economies – ATI in natural resources is central to
deconstructing authoritarian regimes and building democratic institu-
tions. ATI in natural resources can help open up all branches and levels
of government; leverage transparency reforms in other sectors, such
as health and education; and usher in systemic governance reforms,
including a comprehensive ATI law and other forms of transparency
infrastructure.

Notes
1. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was launched in 2002
‘to increase transparency of payments by companies to host country govern-
ments for the extraction of oil, gas and mineral resources, and of government
receipts of this income’ (Parham, 2005).
2. In-text citations referencing ‘Government of X’ have been abbreviated to
GOX. For example, GOSA stands for Government of South Africa.
3. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Article 32(1).
4. Recognizes that ‘Every individual shall have the right to receive informa-
tion’.
5. This work is part of a broader WRI-led project on ATI in Africa funded by
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and other funders being
implemented principally in Uganda, Ghana, and South Africa. In each coun-
try, a local partner organization is partnering with WRI and leading the field
work – Greenwatch in Uganda, Centre for Democracy Development (CDD)
in Ghana, and Open Democracy Advice4 Centre (ODAC) in South Africa.
WRI has conducted desk studies on four other countries – Ethiopia, Nigeria,
Liberia, and Zimbabwe.
 Peter G. Veit and Carole Excell 87

6. Upstream petroleum laws generally address exploration, development, and

production. Downstream petroleum laws address refining, processing, trans-
portation and storage.
7. These countries were selected because they represent the major regions of
Sub-Saharan Africa. All five countries have the right of ATI enshrined in their
constitutions. Ethiopia, Liberia, Zimbabwe, and Uganda have a comprehen-
sive ATI law while Ghana’s parliament is debating an ATI bill. Liberia also
has the LEITI Act which provides for transparency of contracts, payments,
and revenues from petroleum, minerals, forestry, and agriculture.
8. The research also reviewed Nigeria’s laws, including the Petroleum Industry
Draft Bill, 2009, Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Act, Freedom of
Information Law, and the Constitution. The findings are not included in
this report principally because the Petroleum Industry Draft Bill is stalled.
9. Ethiopia’s petroleum law which addresses upstream and downstream matters
is only 18 pages long while just the downstream petroleum law in Uganda is
more than 160 pages in length.
10. Some petroleum laws address the issue of government–licensee dispute reso-
lution, although most refer to the arrangements established in the particular
contract. For example, Liberia’s law states, ‘The appropriate provisions in
the respective contracts, licenses or permits shall govern the procedure for
the settlement or resolution of disputes. A choice of forum for such dispute
resolution shall be as provided in the applicable provision of the contract’
(Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 11.2). Ethiopia’s law states,

1. Any dispute, controversy or claim between the Government and the

contractor arising out of or relating to the petroleum Agreement or the
interpretation, breach or termination thereof shall to the extent possible
be resolved through negotiations. 2. In the event that agreement cannot
be reached through negotiations, the case shall be settled by arbitration
in accordance with the procedures specified in the petroleum Agreement.

(Proclamation to Regulate Petroleum Operations,

1986, Section 25)

11. The Authority’s Board ‘shall cause minutes of all proceedings of and deci-
sions taken at every meeting of the Board or of a committee of the Board
to be entered in books kept for the purpose’ (Petroleum Act, 2006, Section
18[1]).
12. (1) The Board shall ensure that proper accounts and other records relat-
ing to such accounts are kept in respect of all the Authority’s activities,
funds and property, including such particular accounts and records as the
Minister may direct. (2) Not later than three months after the end of each
financial year of the Authority, the Authority shall prepare and submit to
the Minister a statement of accounts in respect of that financial year or
such other period as the Minister may direct.
(Petroleum Act, 2006, Section 22)
13. Petroleum Act, 2006, Section 23.
14. Petroleum Act, 2006, Section 26.
15. Petroleum Act, 2006, Section 42(1).
88 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

16. Petroleum Act, 2006, Section 55(7).

17. Petroleum Act, 2006, Section 55(9)(c).
18. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012, Section
145(4).
19. Liberia’s petroleum law provides that, ‘The exploration permit holder
must immediately report any discovery of hydrocarbons to the National
Petroleum Company of Liberia’ (Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 6.6) and
‘All accidents shall be immediately reported to the competent authorities’
(Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 2.5.10). Ethiopia’s law states that the con-
tractor shall ‘Notify the Minister, as soon as practicable, in the event of
discovery of anthropological, archaeological or historical objects or sites
or other minerals’ (Proclamation to Regulate Petroleum Operations, 1986,
Section 17[2]).
20. Proclamation to Regulate Petroleum Operations, 1986, Section 2(A). Similar
obligations are provided elsewhere in the law – the contractor shall, ‘Keep in
Ethiopia complete and accurate books of accounts on Petroleum Operations’
(Proclamation to Regulate Petroleum Operations, 1986, Section 18(1)[a]).
21. Proclamation to Regulate Petroleum Operations, 1986, Section 18(1)(b).
22. Proclamation to Regulate Petroleum Operations, 1986, Section 24(2).
23. Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 2.5.4.
24. ‘Holder of a petroleum contact shall maintain a separate accounting of its
petroleum operations in Liberia for each fiscal year to include the account-
ing of productions and showing both the results, the amount of income,
and expenses which are therein recorded or directly related’ (Petroleum Law,
2002, Section 10.5.1).
25. Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 5.1.8.
26. ‘The holders of petroleum contract shall, give the personnel of the National
Petroleum Company of Liberia access to the work sites, installations, infor-
mation and records for the implementation and administrations of the
petroleum operation’ (Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 4.6.4).
27. Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 6.10.
28. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012,
Section 145(1).
29. Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing, Conversion, Transportation and Stor-
age) Bill, 2012.
30. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012, Section
145(6).
31. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012,
Section 146.
32. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012,
Section 147.
33. Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing, Conversion, Transportation and Stor-
age) Bill, 2012, Sections 74 and 75.
34. Petroleum Act, 2006, Section 42(2).
35. Petroleum Act, 2006, Section 35(4).
36. Petroleum Law, 2002, Section12.3.8.
37. Liberia Extractive Transparency Initiative Act, 2009, Section 4.1(b).
38. Liberia Extractive Transparency Initiative Act, 2009, Section 4.1(i).
 Peter G. Veit and Carole Excell 89

39. National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005, Section 38(1) provides ‘Subject to
the provisions of this Act and any other enactment, the Board may disclose
to the public information obtained by it in the performance of its functions
under this Act’.
40. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012,
Section 55(1).
41. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012, Section
55(2)(c).
42. Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing, Conversion, Transportation and Stor-
age) Bill, 2012, Section 12(1) and 12(2)(c).
43. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012,
Section 14(2).
44. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012,
Section 53(2).
45. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012,
Section 55(1).
46. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012,
Section 70(2).
47. Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing, Conversion, Transportation and Stor-
age) Bill, 2012, Section 16(3).
48. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012, Section
180 (2[c]).
49. Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing, Conversion, Transportation and Stor-
age) Bill, 2012, Section 98(2)(d).
50. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012,
Section 148(1).
51. Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing, Conversion, Transportation and Stor-
age) Bill, 2012, Section 76.
52. ‘In appointing the members of the Board (of the Petroleum Regulatory
Authority) the Minister shall endeavour to secure that members are repre-
sentative of groups or sectors of the community concerned with or affected
by the petroleum industry’ (Petroleum Act, 2006, Section 6[2]).
53. Liberia’s petroleum law provides that, ‘The President of Liberia may, from
time to time, designate, not more than three (3) such other persons, who
shall not be officials of Government, to serve as member of the Hydrocarbon
Technical Committee’ (Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 4.4.9). The law does
not specify whether these ‘other persons’ can or must be citizens affected by
petroleum sector or members of NGOs.
54. Liberia Extractive Transparency Initiative Act, 2009, Section 6.4.b.
55. Nigeria’s petroleum law states ‘Any information supplied by the licensee
or lessee shall . . . be treated by all public officers and other authori-
ties entitled to the information as confidential’ (Petroleum Act, 1990,
Section 58).
56. Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 2.5.5.
57. Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 2.5.4.
58. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012,
Section 149(1).
59. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012, Section
149(1)(a) and (b).
90 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

60. Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing, Conversion, Transportation and Stor-

age) Bill, 2012, Section 77.
61. Without prejudice to any other condition upon which a licence may
be granted under section 19, it shall be a condition in each licence for
the licensee to provide the Minister, at such times and in such manner
as the Minister may require, full information concerning the licensee’s
operations and for the inspection of the facility, records and accounts of
the licensee by persons authorised by the Minister. (2) The information
submitted to the Minister under subsection (1), shall be treated as confi-
dential for a period as may be specified in the licence or the agreement.
(Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing, Conversion, Transportation
and Storage) Bill, 2012, Section 20[1])

62. National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005, Section 38(2).

63. Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011, Section 49(3).
64. ‘The declaration of confidentiality shall provide a clear explanation of the
reason for treating the information or data as classified, taking into account
the principles of transparency and the right of the public to information’
(Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011, Section 49[4]).
65. Any information that is classified at the time when it could have been
published, as well as the reason for it being treated as classified, shall be
made available to the public upon request three years after the date on
which it could been published unless the reason for it being classified is
still valid.
(Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011, Section 49[6])

66. Several research countries still have official secrets or national security laws.
67. For example, Liberia’s petroleum law provides that
Each license shall provide for adequate sanctions for failure by the
licensee to fulfil the obligations undertaken by him. The regulation to
be promulgated and issued by the National Petroleum Company in keep-
ing with the relevant laws of Liberia, shall provide for penalties in the
event or a breach of certain provisions and conditions laid down in
the license. When such breach occurs, a fine commensurate with the
nature of the breach shall be imposed and payable to the Ministry of
Finance, which shall not be less than (US)$500,000. In the event of a
continuing breach, the fine, not less than (US)$1000 per day, shall be
imposed.
(Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 2.4.18)

Further, ‘A hydrocarbon exploration permit may be withdrawn or termi-

nated in the event the holder fails to adhere to the provisions of this law’
(Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 6.11.1); ‘Each license shall provide adequate
sanctions for the failure of the licensee to fulfill the obligations under-
taken by the holder. The regulation promulgated by the National Petroleum
Company of Liberia, shall determine and establish the sanction to be thus
imposed’ (Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 11.4); and ‘The holder’s failure to
remedy any serious violation, or breach of contract after being duly noti-
fied, shall be grounds for the National Petroleum Company of Liberia or
the appropriate agency of Government to terminate or cancel the contract
 Peter G. Veit and Carole Excell 91

or relevant permits and rights granted to the holder’ (Petroleum Law, 2002,
Section 11.5).
68. Petroleum Act, 2006, Section 59(1).
69. Petroleum Act, 2006, Section 59(2).
70. Petroleum Act, 2006, Section 59(3).
71. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012, Section
150(4).
72. Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing, Conversion, Transportation and Stor-
age) Bill, 2012, Section 78(3).
73. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012, Section 33.
74. Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 11.4, A similar provision is found in
Section 2.4.18.
75. To bring to the attention of the Government, as part of its EITI Report
and for appropriate actions, all institutional and procedural deficien-
cies as well as lapses, understatements, misrepresentations, and viola-
tions of law, including tax delinquencies observed during the audits,
investigations, or reconciliations of payments and revenues data sub-
mitted by all companies and the relevant agencies and levels of
Government.
(LEITI, 2009, 4.1.h)

76. Liberia Extractive Transparency Initiative Act, 2009, Section 4.1.j.

77. Liberia Extractive Transparency Initiative Act, 2009, Section 6.3.h.
78. Liberia Extractive Transparency Initiative Act, 2009, Section 6.3.j.
79. Any person who fails to comply with any obligation to publish informa-
tion provided for in this Act, or causes another person to fail to comply
with information, or in any manner hinders or causes another person to
hinder the compliance with these obligations, commits an offence and is
liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding two hundred and
fifty penalty units.
(Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011, Section 50)

80. Liberia’s Freedom of Information Act, 2010, Section 7 (subsections 1 and

2) states that the following sanctions will take effect in the event of wrong-
ful denial of access to information: 1st offence, monetary fine of LRD 5,000
to LRD 10,000; 2nd offence, 2mth suspension (w/o pay); and 3rd offence,
dismissal. Ghana’s Right to Information Bill, 2002, Section 61(1) provides
‘A failure or neglect by an information officer or other public officer to per-
form a function authorised by this Act where the occasion arises to perform
that function constitutes a gross misconduct’ (the sanctions for gross mis-
conduct are not defined in this act). Nigeria’s Freedom of Information Law,
2011, Section 6(5) provides ‘Where a case of wrongful denial of access is
established, the defaulting officer or institution shall on conviction be liable
to a fine of N500,000’.
81. In the absence of a statement, convention provides that newer laws super-
sede older ones.
82. Nigeria’s ATI law states that the right to information is established ‘notwith-
standing anything contained in any other Act, Law or Regulation’ (Freedom
of Information Law, 2011, Section 2[1]).
92 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

83. Zimbabwe’s ATI law has been criticized by many advocates for various weak-
nesses, including the existence of numerous disclosure-limiting exemptions
and, as a result, may not make any more information available to the public
than the information provisions in the petroleum law.
84. Proclamation to Regulate Petroleum Operations, 1986, Section 26.
85. ‘No laws or rules, whether written or customary, shall apply to matters
expressly provided for in this proclamation. In particular, the following
laws are inapplicable to Petroleum Operations: a. Mining proclamation No.
282/1971: b. Mining regulations No. 396/1971; and c. Joint Venture Estab-
lishment Proclamation No. 235/1983’ (Proclamation to Regulate Petroleum
Operations, 1986, Section 27).
86. Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation, 2008, Section 15(1).
87. Petroleum Act, 2006, Section 11.6.
88. Access to Information and Privacy Act, 2002, Section 3(2).
89. ‘All holders of petroleum contracts or reconnaissance licenses shall abide by
the Environmental Protection Laws of Liberia. Such holders shall avail their
sites, installation to the agent(s) of the National Environmental Protection
Agency of the Republic of Liberia’ (Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 2.5.2).
90. ‘The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) should be conducted for all
energy project, activity or regulation that is likely to have significant impact
on the environment. The information and impact so acquired should be
interpreted and communicated to be proper authorities and stakeholders’
(Petroleum Law, 2002, Section 12.3.8).
91. The LEITI Act is only the second dedicated piece of EITI legislation (follow-
ing the NEITI Act in Nigeria) passed thus far, though many implementing
countries have issued presidential or ministerial decrees or have amended
existing legislation to establish a legal framework for the initiative.
92. Freedom of Information Act, 2010, Section 1.7.
93. Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill, 2012, Section
148(1).
94. Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing, Conversion, Transportation and Stor-
age) Bill, 2012, Section 76(1).
95. Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, Section 41(1).

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5
Micro-Level Effects of Oil
Resources: Insights from a Survey
of Angolan Microcredit Clients
Allan Cain, Ivar Kolstad, and Arne Wiig

Introduction

Walking the streets of central Luanda, the capital of oil- and diamond-
rich Angola, you cannot help but notice the stark disparities. The tall
office buildings of the oil and diamond companies present a marked
contrast to the poverty of the children selling small items to passing
cars in the streets. If you venture a little further from the city centre,
there are large slum areas where people live with limited access to basic
necessities such as clean water or medical facilities. It is not that inequal-
ity and poverty cannot be found in other countries. However, research
shows that these problems are greater in natural resource-rich countries
such as Angola than they are in other countries. This phenomenon is
often called the ‘resource curse’ or the ‘paradox of plenty’ (Auty, 1993;
Karl, 1997). Based on available data, Angola has one of the world’s high-
est Gini coefficients,1 even when compared to other oil-rich states, as
illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Cross-country empirical studies document a negative effect of
resource dependence on economic growth, poverty and inequality,
and human development (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Gylfason, 2001a;
Gylfason, 2001b; Bulte et al., 2005).2 While early studies referred to the
‘Dutch disease’ as a main source of the problems, recent studies have
come to emphasize political mechanisms as a key cause of the resource
curse (Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Kolstad and Wiig,
2009). High resource rents facilitate patronage, where the political elite
in a country use resource revenues to secure their hold on power (and

96
 Allan Cain et al. 97

Norway 0.26

Egypt 0.35

Algeria 0.37

Cameroon 0.43

Nigeria 0.51

Angola 0.62

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7

Figure 5.1 Gini coefficients of selected resource-rich countries (2005)
Source: Development Workshop (2010).

continued access to resource rents). The rents also provide an incen-

tive for rent seeking, where skilled individuals use their skills in the
pursuit of a share of the resource rents rather than in the creation of
alternative productive enterprises (Yates, see Chapter 3). The implica-
tion is that to avoid a resource curse, a country needs good institutions.
For instance, institutions of democratic accountability make the use of
resource rents for narrow political purposes more difficult, and the rule
of law makes productive activities relatively more attractive to potential
rent seekers. The problem is that those who hold the power to change
institutions are often the same people who benefit from current insti-
tutional dysfunctions, thereby making reform unlikely.3 Angola is an
illustrative case.
That reforms are difficult to attain in resource-rich countries is likely
reflected in the low priority of human capital expansion in public expen-
diture. While it is well known that human capital plays an important
role for economic growth through increasing productivity, resource-
rich countries invest less in education (Birdsall et al., 2001; Gylfason,
2001b).4 While access to resources reduce the budget constraints for
providing public goods, governments of resource-rich countries appear
to lack the willingness or incentives to finance education. Part of the
explanation for this contradiction may be that it can be difficult for
the ruling elite to acquire rents from the education sector (compared to
other sectors such as resource extraction or construction). Furthermore,
education plays an important role for voice and accountability – both
of which may challenge the power basis of the elite.
98 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

While we know a great deal about the situation of natural resource-

rich economies at an aggregate country level, we know much less about
the situation at a more disaggregate level. What is the situation of the
poor, how do they live and survive in a resource-rich context? What
are the more immediate, micro-level constraints they face in making
a living for themselves and their families, and in escaping poverty?
Does the resource curse affect the poor disproportionally, and what
about the living standards of particular socio-economic groups among
the poor? We have chosen to focus on microcredit entrepreneurs as
entrepreneurship plays an important role for private sector develop-
ment. Private sector development in turn increases the opportunity
costs of rent seeking, thus reducing resource curse challenges (Mehlum
et al., 2006).
While cross-country empirical studies of resources are plentiful, quan-
titative analysis at the micro level in resource-rich countries has been
much scarcer. An important reason for this is a lack of data. For example,
a significant number of resource-rich countries in the world lack good
household survey data. In the case of Angola, the latest numbers on
poverty and inequality in the World Development Indicators database
for instance, date from 2000. The country has not even conducted a
basic census since 1970. The lack of a tradition of independent social
science research is one reason; consequently, the country has invested
relatively little in learning about the situation of its citizens.5 The legacy
of conflict can be another reason, but this is linked to the competition
for natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Whatever the reason,
the lack of such basic data creates problems in analysing the situation of
the poor. For instance, what sampling frame would one use in a country
where no recent census is available?
This chapter presents results from a survey jointly conducted in 2010
by Development Workshop (DW) and the Chr. Michelsen Institute
(CMI). The survey covered 539 microcredit clients, randomly selected
among the clients of two urban branches of the largest non-commercial
microcredit institutions in Angola, KixiCrédito. Since no census data is
available, we have relied on the client lists of the microcredit institutions
as a sampling frame. The results are therefore not nationally represen-
tative, but we can be fairly confident that they are representative of the
urban entrepreneurs targeted by the institutions in question. This per-
mits us to provide a window into the existence of these individuals and
their families inhabiting two urban slum areas in Luanda, with potential
applicability also to other poor urban dwellers. We study urban dwellers
as they are living close to where the decisions on oil production and the
 Allan Cain et al. 99

distribution of oil revenue are taken (i.e., they face greater rent proxim-
ity). Our data is consistent with the high cost of living faced by poor
urban entrepreneurs in Angola. A high price level is not uncommon in
oil-rich economies, where the profitability of the oil sector drives up
prices of scarce resources. It nevertheless indicates the struggle that poor
people face in making a living, and thus underscores the importance
of providing an analysis of the constraints they experience on a regular
basis.
Our econometric results suggest that the profitability of entrepreneur-
ship among the poor is constrained by a lack of education and by
chronic illness. Our results at the micro level therefore reflect results
at the macro level on human capital scarcity in resource-rich countries
(Gylfason, 2001b). The results also indicate that entrepreneurial suc-
cess is related to local institutional arrangements, adding to results at
the macro level on the importance of institutions for the economy as
a whole. Notably, further experimental tests produce some ambiguities
related to the effect of education in a resource-rich context. We find that
education tends to make people favour their own social group over out-
siders, that is, creates greater in-group favouritism. On the one hand,
this may make microcredit groups work better; on the other, it may pro-
duce biases that create difficulties in the transition to a society with
more impartial institutions. Macro level studies indicate that impar-
tial institutions are of particular importance to address patronage and
the resource curse (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). If education promotes in-
group favouritism, it is not obvious that education improves chances for
institutional reform.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section
presents the details of the DW-CMI survey and provides a summary
overview of the data. The results from econometric analyses of prof-
its among the microcredit clients surveyed are then presented in the
third section. The fourth section of the chapter discusses findings from
the experimental data on the link between education and in-group
favouritism. The final section provides some concluding remarks related
to the findings.

The DW-CMI survey

The DW-CMI survey of microcredit clients in Luanda was piloted in

December 2009, and the full survey was conducted over a period of six
weeks from February to March 2010. In the absence of census or other
population data, we used the client pool of the Angolan microcredit
100 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

institution KixiCrédito as our sampling frame. Established in 1999,

KixiCrédito is the largest non-commercial microcredit institution in
Angola. It has a total of 8600 active clients in 12 branches across the
country (African Development Bank, 2010). The survey covered clients
from two branches of the KixiCrédito institution, Sâo Paulo and Hoje ya
Henda. Both branches are close to the centre of Luanda – a pragmatic
choice as costs of doing fieldwork in Angola are huge, due to a gener-
ally high price level and logistical difficulties created by extreme traffic
congestion.
KixiCrédito clients are organized in solidarity groups consisting of
10–30 clients. 51 solidarity groups were randomly selected from the two
branches, and interviews conducted with all group members present
at the bi-weekly group meeting, totalling 539 respondents in all. The
groups surveyed constitute about 60 per cent of all groups in the two
areas. Interviews were conducted in Portuguese by local enumerators.
The survey elicited data on personal and household characteristics,
business characteristics and profitability, socio-economic data includ-
ing education and health, data on social capital, and on redistributive
preferences.
Selected descriptive data for the full sample are presented in
Table 5.1.6 The median microcredit client interviewed was 42 years old,
female, unmarried, and the head of a six-person household. A little more
than one-third of our sample participants are men, consistent with the
female–male ratio in the KixiCrédito client base. Most respondents have
only been clients of KixiCrédito for a few years, while the median client
took his/her first loan in 2008. Average current outstanding loan size
of the clients are about 100,000 Angolan Kwanza (a little more than
USD 1,000 at the time of the survey), which is also the average in the
KixiCrédito system. The median and mean clients have 10 and 12 years
of business experience, respectively. Only about one-quarter of the busi-
nesses are officially registered, the median business has no employees
outside the household, and the mean number of employees is 0.33.
In other words, our sample consists of small enterprises, often termed
micro-enterprises. Almost 95 per cent of entrepreneurs are involved in
various kinds of retail sales, some in combination with simple manu-
facturing or service provision, the rest are involved in manufacturing
(of clothes, food, furniture, and more) or services (hairdressing, beauty
salons, transport, and more).
At a simple descriptive level, the most interesting statistics appear
at the bottom of the table. The weekly profit of the median firm is
about USD 100, and the mean about USD 250. This is substantially
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics

Observations Median Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum

Individual/household characteristics
Age 536 42 42.75 9.03 19 76
Male 537 0 0.37 0.48 0 1
Married 537 0 0.42 0.49 0 1
Household head 537 1 0.69 0.46 0 1
Household size 537 6 6.50 2.86 0 18
Loan/business data
Year of first loan 533 2, 008 2, 007.24 2.28 1, 988 2, 010
Current loan size (1,000 Angolan 532 93 91.56 74.69 0 744
Kwanza)
Years of business 537 10 12.10 8.32 1 45
Business registered 536 0 0.27 0.45 0 1
No of employees 535 0 0.33 2.32 0 48
Sales (Angolan Kwanza/week) 536 30, 000 111, 998.80 958, 616.00 0 20, 500, 000
Profits (Angolan Kwanza/week) 536 10, 000 24, 990.89 87, 363.33 −25, 000 1, 395, 000
Socio-economic data
Household income (Angolan 532 20, 000 77, 963.15 735, 431.50 0 16, 600, 000
Kwanza/week)
Years of education 537 7 6.82 3.89 0 17
Chronically ill 537 0 0.08 0.28 0 1
101
102 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

higher than in similar surveys from other developing countries, but

consistent with the fact that Angola is an oil economy with a very
high price level. For a six-person household the median profits translate
into USD 2.40 per person per day, which is above standard inter-
national poverty rates. However, without a meaningful purchasing
power parity adjustment of these numbers, which is unavailable for
a central Luandan context, it is hard to relate these numbers to any
absolute poverty line. The table also presents numbers for total house-
hold income of the respondents, in which the median is about USD
200 per week. Once again, this is difficult to compare to interna-
tionally accepted poverty definitions. In addition, household incomes
reported in surveys are typically believed to be biased. Of course, as
the respondents of our survey are not representative of the popu-
lation of Angola in general, these numbers tell us little about the
poverty situation in the country more generally. However, they do
offer some insight into the situation of KixiCrédito clients in central
Luanda.
The high price level faced by inhabitants of Luanda raises the ques-
tion of how people make a living in this context: what are the major
challenges they face? Clearly, the above data suggests that there is
variation in how well different entrepreneurs run their business. The
most profitable enterprises earn a few thousand dollars per week, while
the least profitable operate at a loss. One should of course be care-
ful in taking reported profits in a developing context too literally, and
there are some indications that the maximum profits reported may be
excessive, as there are some inconsistencies in the numbers reported
by the respondents in question. If we exclude the respondents who
report higher profits than sales, as we do in our econometric anal-
ysis, the maximum profits reported are about USD 2,800. However,
the point about variation in profits remains, highlighting the impor-
tance of understanding why some entrepreneurs do better than others.
In examining this, we have paid particular attention to the effects of
education and health on entrepreneurial profits. As seen in Table 5.1,
the average and median respondent in our sample has about seven
years of education. This may be higher than the country average, as
it may be the case that more educated individuals are more likely to be
entrepreneurs or use microcredit services. About eight per cent of our
sample report suffers from some form of chronic illness. In the next
section we report results on the effect of education on entrepreneurial
profits using the DW-CMI survey data, and also the relation between
health and profits.
 Allan Cain et al. 103

Constraints to generating profitable enterprises among

the poor7

The effect of education on profits

A number of empirical studies have been conducted on the effect of
education on entrepreneurial success, most of which use years of for-
mal schooling as the main explanatory variable. A meta-analysis of
such studies from developing economies by van der Sluis and colleagues
(2005) finds that an added year of schooling increases profits by 5.5%
across studies. This compares to 6.1 per cent return to formal educa-
tion for entrepreneurs in developed economies (ibid.), and 6.5 per cent
return in wage work (Harmon et al., 2003). In the entrepreneurship liter-
ature, most studies use the classic Mincer (1974) equation in estimating
the returns to education, which also includes age (and age squared)
as proxies for experience. Typically, the returns are estimated using
ordinary least squares (OLS).
The problem with most previous empirical studies is that they do not
address the challenge of endogeneity. Education and entrepreneurial
success likely depend on unobserved variables such as ability, making
OLS estimates of returns biased. In other words, there may be selec-
tion on unobservables into both education and entrepreneurship. While
the literature on the impact of education on wages has addressed this
problem (e.g., Angrist and Krueger, 1991), far less emphasis has been
placed on this challenge in the entrepreneurship literature. A few recent
exceptions are van der Sluis and colleagues (2007) and Kolstad and
Wiig (2010), whose results suggest that returns to education may be
substantially higher than in OLS estimations when the endogeneity of
education is addressed.
In obtaining results from the DW-CMI survey data on the effect of
education on profits, we used instrument variable estimation to address
the problem of endogeneity. A good instrument for education needs
to be highly correlated with education, but should not affect profits.
We used four instruments to identify a causal effect: the number of lan-
guages spoken by the father of an entrepreneur, the educational level of
his/her eldest sibling, access to newspapers at home during childhood,
and a dummy for whether the father of the entrepreneur was a farmer.
The first three are indicators of a parental preference for education, while
the fourth is related to the opportunity cost of going to school. All our
instruments have the expected correlation with education, passing stan-
dard tests of instrument strength. In addition to standard covariates, we
add further control variables to take out possible counter-arguments to
104 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

our exclusion restriction. An over-identification test does not reject the

validity of our instruments.
Our results suggest that education is an important constraint to the
success of Luandan entrepreneurs. We find a significantly positive effect
of education on profits, with point estimates that suggest a return to an
added year of education of between 7.1 to 9.4 per cent. This is higher
than OLS estimates using the same specification in the DW-CMI sur-
vey data, and also higher than point estimates from previous studies
using OLS in other countries (van der Sluis et al., 2005), though the
differences are not statistically significant. Our results are also consis-
tent with the larger size of IV estimates compared to OLS estimates
in the literature on effects of education on wages. In sum, the effect
of education on entrepreneurial profits is substantial. In further anal-
yses, we also tested separately the effect of education for female and
male entrepreneurs. While the point estimates suggest that the returns
to education for females may be higher than for males, the difference
is not statistically significant, and we therefore cannot conclude that
education has a greater effect for female entrepreneurs than for males.

The relation between health and other variables and profits

The effect of health on entrepreneurial success has received far
less attention than the effect of education in previous studies of
entrepreneurship. In a model of entrepreneurial success, illness can be
thought to decrease the productivity of an entrepreneur in a similar way
that education increases it. Of course, in estimating the effect of health
on profits, the question of endogeneity arises again. Unobserved charac-
teristics such as attitudes to risk could affect both health and profits, and
there is a distinct possibility of reverse causality between the two vari-
ables. The data do not include instruments for health. Consequently,
in this case our estimates capture correlations rather than causal effects.
The results are nevertheless sufficiently interesting to provide a basis for
further studies.
The results from the DW-CMI survey data suggest that chronic ill-
ness has a significantly negative relation to entrepreneurial success. The
magnitude of the correlation is substantial, as entrepreneurs who report
being chronically ill had almost 30 per cent lower profits. Moreover, we
also have more detailed data on the types of illnesses (not only chronic)
the respondents report suffering from, the most common of which are
stomach disorders. Interestingly, people who suffer from these disorders
have on average 34 per cent lower profits. Malaria is the second most
common, and respondents afflicted by malaria on average have their
 Allan Cain et al. 105

profits almost halved. For other illnesses, there are too few observations
to obtain useful results. If these results are confirmed in studies that
address endogeneity, there is cause to start thinking about substantial
returns to health interventions aimed at entrepreneurs.
As noted, we also have some indicators of social capital in our data set.
Social capital is commonly divided into trust and networks, for which
we have different measures of both dimensions. As for health, we do
not have instruments for social capital, so results must be interpreted as
correlations rather than causal effects. The trust variables are variants on
the World Value Survey trust question – ‘Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in
dealing with people?’ – where the term ‘people’ was replaced with other,
more narrow group designations. None of the trust variables had a sig-
nificant relation to entrepreneurial profits. For our networks variables,
we asked respondents about membership in various organizations and
associations, and about whether they knew a person’s specified range of
occupations (teachers, politicians, lawyers, etc). We found no relation
between the extent of an entrepreneur’s network and profits, nor did
most specific memberships or networks appear to be related to profits.
The only network variable robustly associated with profits was know-
ing a police officer. For entrepreneurs who stated knowing a member
of the local police, profits were up to 30 per cent higher. It is possi-
ble that knowing a police officer helps entrepreneurs run their business
more profitably, by for instance providing access to information. How-
ever, a more likely explanation for the uncovered correlation is reverse
causality. Profitable businesses may be more attractive targets for police
officers seeking bribes, consistent with findings by Svensson (2003) in
Uganda. More informal interviews we conducted suggest that police
corruption is an important constraint to entrepreneurs in Angola. Our
results therefore suggest that looking at local institutional arrangements
may be important to understand the situation of micro-entrepreneurs
in this context.

The ambiguous role of education8

As part of the DW-CMI survey, we also conducted an economic exper-

iment on in-group favouritism among our respondents. As mentioned,
KixiCrédito clients are organized in credit groups, called solidarity
groups, with joint liability for loans. The idea behind this experiment
was to explore the solidarity of microcredit clients towards their fel-
low solidarity group versus outsiders. This provides insights regarding
106 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

how closely knit these solidarity groups are, and what characterizes
individuals who are more likely to favour their own social group more
generally.
The experiment took the form of a dictator game. In this game, each
participant (or dictator) was given 500 Angolan Kwanza (a little more
than USD 5 at the time of the experiment), and told that he/she could
keep the money or give some or all of it to a recipient. The decision was
anonymous in the sense that the recipient would not know the identity
of the dictator, nor would the dictator know the identity of the recipient.
The game was played in two versions. In the first version, the recipient
was a fellow credit group member of the dictator. In the second version,
the recipient was not a member of the dictator’s credit group. The fact
that real money is used in the experiment means that participants face
a real decision that affects them personally, as opposed to hypothetical
survey questions. The fact that the decision was anonymous means that
decisions are not influenced by strategic considerations, such as fear of
being punished by the recipient in future interactions.
What do the choices of the participants in this game tell us? Com-
pletely rational, self-interested participants would keep all the money,
giving nothing to recipients in either version of the game. If a positive
amount is given, we can take this as an indication of altruistic or egali-
tarian preferences. The participant cares not only about his own payoff
but also that of the recipient. If a participant gives more to a fellow
credit group member than to an outsider, we can take this as an indi-
cation of in-group favouritism or solidarity. In other words, it suggests
that a participant places greater emphasis on the situation of a fellow
group member compared to a stranger.
Analysis of data on how much was given in the two versions of the
game tells us two things. First, a large proportion of participants gave
away none of the money in either version of the game. Keeping all
the money was in fact the most common decision, taken by 28 per
cent of participants in the first version of the game and 41 per cent in
the second. A substantial share of the participants can hence be char-
acterized as self-interested. The rest, however, gave away some or all
of the money, exhibiting altruism or egalitarianism. The second most
common decision was to give half the money to the recipient, a not
uncommon pattern in these types of games. Second, participants gave
away more money to fellow credit group members than to outsiders.
The average amount given to a fellow group member was 131 Angolan
Kwanza, whereas the average amount given to an outsider was 107.5
Angolan Kwanza. The difference is statistically significant. This suggests
 Allan Cain et al. 107

that participants have an in-group bias, as they tend to treat members

of their credit group more favourably than non-members.
There is considerable variation in the degree of in-group favouritism
exhibited by different individuals, however. To see what characterizes
individuals exhibiting greater in-group favouritism, we ran regressions
using the difference between the amounts given in the two versions
of the game as the dependent variable. Our main explanatory vari-
able, education, was instrumented by the same instruments as in the
analysis of entrepreneurial success. We also controlled for credit group
differences using group dummies, and a number of other covariates.
The results show that more highly educated participants favoured in-
group members to a greater extent. The more years of education a client
has, the greater was the amount given to a fellow group member com-
pared to the amount given to an outsider. The point estimate indicates
that an added year of education increases the relative amount given to a
fellow credit group member by almost 20 Angolan Kwanza, representing
a sizeable four per cent of the endowment. The IV estimate is also signif-
icantly different from the OLS estimate, underscoring the importance of
correcting for the endogeneity of education.
The uncovered effect of education on in-group favouritism has wider
implications. In microfinance, a key idea is that joint liability for loans
creates incentives for repayment through social pressure from other
credit group members, which reduces the need for collateral and reduces
the risk to the lending institution. Our results suggest that more edu-
cated people are more willing to give priority to demands from fellow
group members compared to outsiders. In combination with results
presented in the previous section, more years of schooling not only
increases the success of entrepreneurs, but can also make microcredit
interventions more sustainable since more educated clients are more
tightly integrated in their credit group.
However, it is also possible to view the positive effect of education
on in-group favouritism in less favourable terms. Modernization the-
ory suggests that the increase in education that comes with increases in
income will lead to a better chance of democracy, since ‘[e]ducation pre-
sumably broadens men’s outlooks’ (Lipset, 1959: 79). Education is often
seen more generally as making individuals focus on the greater good
rather than the special interests of a more limited social group.9 This is
a particularly relevant argument to explore in a resource-rich context,
as it suggests that education may reduce the problem of elite capture of
rents integral to the resource curse. One possible interpretation of our
results is, however, that education promotes particularism rather than
108 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

universalism, and a more educated population therefore does not neces-

sarily press for more impartial institutions. In the Angolan context, there
is an ambiguity about education, as it seems to promote success at the
micro level, but may in the end also have effects that slow or prevent
transition to a better institutional order. Whether our results general-
ize beyond Angola is an open question. It is possible that the large
economic and social inequalities in Angola have produced a schooling
system that highlights in-group considerations. But this question needs
further study.

Concluding remarks

While a number of studies document macro level effects of natural

resources, much less is known about how resources such as oil affect
development prospects at the micro level of local economies in African
countries. This may in part reflect lack of micro data in resource-rich
countries. Angola is a case in point, where no comprehensive house-
hold survey is available, and the last census dates back to 1970. This
chapter has applied data from a recent survey of 539 microcredit clients
in Luanda to shed light on challenges the poor face in a resource-rich
country, and how resource wealth and economic exclusion can frame
their existence.
The DW-CMI survey data provides a unique perspective on the sit-
uation of a segment of the poor population in a heavily extractive
resource-dependent country. Our results indicate that a lack of schooling
is a significant constraint on the ability of microcredit clients in Luanda
to run a successful business. A lack of education therefore represents a
limitation to the chance entrepreneurs and their families have of escap-
ing poverty, and possibly also on the employment-generating potential
of small businesses in poor communities. On the other hand, how-
ever, we find that education may also impede institutional development
through in-group favouritism. It is therefore not clear that education
promotes voice and accountability in the productive way claimed in the
modernization literature.
We also find some more tentative evidence that health status and
corruption may be important factors influencing the profitability of
micro-enterprises in Luanda. However, more research is needed to
uncover any causal effects of these variables. Since our sample is lim-
ited to entrepreneurs operating close to the centre of Luanda, more
research is also needed to determine the extent to which our results
generalize beyond the Luandan or Angolan context. Our results on the
 Allan Cain et al. 109

importance of schooling for entrepreneurial success are consistent with

general findings in most developing countries. However, the scarcity of
education in resource-rich developing countries and the importance of
private sector development in addressing rent-seeking problems related
to resources, make these results particularly relevant in a resource-
rich context. Whether the link we uncover between education and
in-group favouritism is related to specific features of the resource-rich
context under study is unclear. However, the results of Friedman and
colleagues (2011) from Kenya suggest that this may be a more general
phenomenon.
While a survey of this kind is important in identifying the immediate
constraints that poor individuals and households face in a resource-
rich context, it is essential to consider these constraints in light of
the underlying reasons for the exclusion of poor families from the
economic benefits of development in resource-rich countries. Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Development Workshop,
and microfinance institutions like KixiCrédito, can and do play an
important role in improving the access to capital and training for poor
entrepreneurs. However, a general improvement in equitable access and
quality of education or health facilities depends on political accountabil-
ity of the government. The incentive for the government to address the
situation should come from the demands of poor communities them-
selves. The lack of available data on the situation of the population in
a country can result in low awareness on the part of government and
weak political accountability. This is a characteristic Angola shares with
several other natural resource-rich countries. The lack of comprehensive,
accessible data may therefore be one aspect of the resource curse.

Notes
1. The Gini coefficient is a commonly applied measure of inequality and varies
between 0 and 1. The higher the Gini coefficient, the more unequal the
economy.
2. It should be noted that some studies use resource abundance rather than
dependence as their explanatory variable, finding no evidence of a resource
curse (see Stijns, 2005; Lederman and Maloney, 2008; Brunnschweiler and
Bulte, 2008; Alexeev and Conrad, 2009).
3. For an analysis of government incentives, see Kolstad and Wiig (2009); for
an analysis of the role of multinational corporations, see Wiig and Kolstad
(2010).
4. Based on a different set of indicators of resources and human capital, Stijns
(2006) concludes the opposite.
110 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

5. See Cain (2007; 2010; 2013; 2014), Cain and Mulenga (2009), and Develop-
ment Workshop (2006).
6. Two observations were dropped due to mistakes in the entry of age and loan
size.
7. This section presents analysis and results from Kolstad and Wiig (2012a).
8. This section presents analysis and results from Kolstad and Wiig (2012b).
9. Friedman and colleagues (2011) provide an overview of the literature and
present evidence that education may strengthen stated attitudes of ethnic
identification while having no effect on democratic attitudes – a result that
is in accordance with our findings.

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6
Bridging the Governance Gap in
South Sudan: Connecting
Policy-Makers to Populations in
Africa’s Newest Oil-Producing
Country
Conrad Winn, Melissa Jennings, and Matthew I. Mitchell

Introduction

On 9 July 2011, South Sudan became the newest country in Africa

after it won a war of independence from the Sudanese government in
Khartoum – a war that was largely fought over its right to govern its
own natural resources. Notwithstanding this victory, a wide range of
critically important governance policies have yet to be developed and
implemented. While the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) may have
defeated its rival in a recent referendum for independence, a formidable
amount of work remains to be done. Despite the innumerable chal-
lenges facing the country, notable progress was made in the early
stages of the post-independence period. During this time, the GOSS and
international organizations had a crucial window during which funda-
mental improvements to health, nutrition, and food security were made
possible. In addition, anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that house-
hold livelihoods had improved since the signing of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) between the belligerent parties and during the
post-independence period. For example, resettlement activities returned
many people previously displaced from their homes, allowing these
households to resume their livelihoods. Moreover, improved infrastruc-
ture and flow of goods and services had a significantly positive effect
on both the economy and the morale of the South Sudanese popu-
lation. And yet despite these notable improvements, overall access to

113
114 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

basic services remains poor and insecurity and lawlessness in many

regions continues to increase while food shortages remain daily reali-
ties – despite the generation of significant oil revenues – outside of Juba,
South Sudan’s capital. What is more, the renewal of violent conflict that
began in mid-December 2013 has plunged the country into a new cycle
of insecurity and violence that has killed thousands and displaced over
a million people (International Crisis Group, 2014).
The above discussion briefly captures the important strides yet innu-
merable challenges facing contemporary policy-makers and the South
Sudanese people. In light of the enduring governance challenges and
protracted conflict in South Sudan, this chapter aims to explore the
strategic partnerships in terms of resource development in the region.
More specifically, it examines how these partnerships in the realm of
resource development relate to goals of competent governance within
South Sudan and for international donors. This is indeed an important
theme in contemporary South Sudan since one of the main justifications
for seceding from Sudan was the goal of promoting improved gover-
nance of natural resources, notably oil. In investigating the recent efforts
to promote good governance in natural resource sectors, the chapter
argues that there have been minimal concrete improvements since
South Sudan gained independence. This conclusion is largely drawn
from the use of quantitative research findings that were collected from
the first public opinion poll conducted with the International Repub-
lican Institute in 2011. In short, the data suggests that the absence of
a coherent strategy by the Republic of South Sudan (ROSS) to govern
its own natural resources, the salience of widespread corruption, and
the protracted nature of existing regional conflicts serve to undermine
efforts to improve the governance of the country’s natural resource sec-
tor. These concerns have been exacerbated by the renewed political crisis
which has further undermined prospects for economic development
based on South Sudan’s oil sector (Shankleman, 2014).

‘Learning from the best’

South Sudan won independence from one of the most corrupt countries
in the world. The Republic of Sudan has been internationally sanctioned
for corrupt practices and for openly financing its president’s personal
wars with state funds. Prior to independence Sudan was listed as one
of the world’s most corrupt countries in Transparency International’s
2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, and was ranked 172 out of 178
countries studied. While there is little information yet on South Sudan
 Conrad Winn et al. 115

or its ranking – as the country is too new to be included (TrustLaw,

2011) – the institutionalized corruption that has characterized political
and economic life in Sudan has travelled south where many of today’s
ministers in the new GOSS had long-standing professional histories of
working in Khartoum. As is the case in Sudan, corruption is indeed
openly acknowledged as a way to do business in contemporary South
Sudan, where baksheesh (i.e., bribes) are commonly used to ‘grease the
wheels’ in daily life.
Many of today’s corruption problems may be tied to the pedigree of
the current government in South Sudan. As a rebel movement turned
political party, turned ruling majority government, the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement (SPLM) has been stunted as it has little gover-
nance capacity compared to its more robust military wing, the Sudan
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) (Young, 2008). In essence, the SPLM
suffers from a lack of transparency and weak administrative capacity.
As one scholar noted, these weaknesses are tied to previous practices
by political leaders, such as Salva Kiir and the late John Garang, who
appointed experienced politicians from outside the SPLM to leading
positions in the GOSS (Young, 2008: 172). For example, many army
officers are now performing civilian roles. Moreover, SPLM members
have reportedly attended sessions of the National Assembly with armed
guards or with their own weapons, not being able to fully grasp the
changing environment from that of combat to civil service (Young,
2008).
Since the implementation of the CPA, the SPLM-led GOSS has had
an accountability problem over donor funds, oil revenues and the dubi-
ous expenditure related to these funds. This is best illustrated in recent
research conducted among returned and displaced populations in and
around Juba. As Leonardi (2011: 229) notes: ‘Human life appears to have
been commoditized on a vast scale by the economy of the recent war,
from which the top military officers are commonly believed to have
profited.’ Leonardi (2011: 229) adds that ‘this evokes a longer history of
the apparent capacity of government to extract and consume productive
resources, or, in the bluntest formulation, to turn blood into money’. For
example, between 2006 and 2009, as much as USD 212 billion was pro-
vided to South Sudanese authorities as part of the CPA; however, there
has been little by way of progress as these funds do not appear to have
improved government capacity and institution building (Multi Donor
Trust Fund for South Sudan, 2009). In addition, the Multi Donor Trust
Fund for South Sudan (MDTF) does not account for any of the bilateral
aid, the United Nations missions, or other multilateral funding. Aside
116 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

from some highly polished presidential and parliamentary infrastruc-

ture in Juba, the GOSS and the SPLM brass are well known for funnelling
a substantial amount off the top. Despite one-party rule in a very clear
majority with 93 per cent of the votes in the 2010 election, the SPLM
holds a very tenuous position through a balance of tribal loyalties and
veterans guarantees. The tenuous nature of the SPLM was tragically
revealed by the renewal of hostilities between the organization’s mem-
bers in mid-December 2013 (International Crisis Group, 2014). Clearly,
nothing can be taken for granted by a government who owes so much to
so many. As a result, corruption has been endemic to the SPLM and the
SPLA which has subsequently been carried over to newly independent
South Sudan via the GOSS.
More recently, however, President Salva Kiir has taken on an anti-
corruption campaign as a personal mandate, as the issue draws greater
attention both at home and abroad. This has included a 2010 annual
report to the National Assembly, a four-year strategic anti-corruption
action plan, and a declaration of public servants income, assets, and
liabilities (Birungi, 2011). Despite having bold targets and objectives, the
annual report was anonymous in that it did not even reveal any corrupt
officials’ names. Despite the fact that the South Sudan Anti-Corruption
Commission (SSACC) is autonomous and independent, it does not have
the resources, the legal power or the capacity to combat the national
scourge of corruption single-handedly.

How South Sudanese see South Sudan

Foreign donors appear to be increasingly aware of the scale of the
problem of corruption in South Sudan and its resulting impact on gover-
nance, notably in its oil sector (Shankleman, 2014) Consequently, many
donors have made ‘good governance’ a focal point of programming
which includes security sector reform and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion, along with longer-term development goals and a sustainability
approach. Notwithstanding the increased donor pressure that has been
placed on the GOSS and the SPLM in particular, there is much reason
to believe that this pressure is unlikely to ‘alter the structure and orien-
tation of the SPLM’ (Young, 2008: 174). There is therefore compelling
evidence to suggest that if the SPLM is to change its institutionalized
corrupt practices, public opinion needs to play a leading role since
the SPLM as a popular movement has historically relied on the mass
mobilization and support of millions of pastoralists.
Given the putative importance of public opinion in potentially alter-
ing political behaviour, we now turn our attention to the question of
 Conrad Winn et al. 117

how South Sudanese view the state of their country/government and

the methodology employed to gain such insights. The most basic find-
ing reveals that while most South Sudanese feel that South Sudan is
‘headed in the right direction’ (57.1 per cent) there are still close to
half (40.9 per cent) who feel that it is ‘headed in the wrong direction’.
Upon closer examination, some important regional distinctions exist as
both Unity (71.3 per cent) and Western Equatoria (57.8 per cent) were
the only states to have a majority of respondents who believe that the
country is ‘headed in the wrong direction’.
As outlined in the introduction, these findings are based on pub-
lic opinion polling that was conducted in 2011. In order to collect
as broad range of opinions as possible across the country, the sample
was initialized prior to arrival in South Sudan and finalized upon team
selection and collaborative planning sessions with polling supervisors
in Juba. The survey tool included 44 quantitative questions and was
administered in multiple languages including Dinka, Nuer, Juba Arabic,
Classical Arabic, and English. Face-to-face interviews were conducted by
Pechter Polls in conjunction with Samahe Incorporated (a local polling
company) in the language of the respondent’s choice. In terms of the
regional scope, the survey covered both urban and rural areas, and
10 states and 62 counties including Juba. The sample included 2,225
individuals that were randomly selected from the county lists generated
with the probability proportionate to its size in the overall population
as represented in the 2010 Statistical Yearbook for South Sudan.1 This
approach ensures that every eligible adult had an equal and known
chance of being selected. The corresponding households were then ran-
domly selected within each county, and a respondent 18 years of age
or older was randomly selected from each household. A gender quota
ensured that every other interview must be with a female. A sample
of this size is sufficient to yield an overall margin of error of +/−
2.1 per cent. While local language translations were done for specific
words, interviews employed scripted, translated questionnaires as much
as possible. Respondents were asked to list three reasons for the ‘general
environment’, whether positive or negative. These open-ended answers
were then coded in order to determine which were the most common
among the respondents. As outlined below, the top three responses
nationally for the first, second, and third responses were as follows
(see Table 6.1).
At the individual or household level these indicators show a more
detailed picture of daily life for households across South Sudan. Again,
respondents answered in an open ended format. Meanwhile, the data
118 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

Table 6.1 Public opinion polling results in South Sudan: general environment

Ranking of importance Coded responses Percentage

First response Independence/freedom/separation 11.7

Crime and security 8.6
Education 8.3
Second response Education 10.9
Health 10.4
Crime and security 7.4
Third response Health 13.5
Education 10.5
Food shortage/famine 6.7

Table 6.2 Public opinion polling results in South Sudan: daily life for
households

Ranking of importance Coded responses Percentage

First response Food shortage/famine 18.7

Health 10.6
Unemployment 10.1
Second response Food shortage/famine 14.3
Health 12.5
Unemployment 6.9
Third response Health 11.6
Education 8.6
Food shortage/famine 8.3

was pre-coded to find the most common responses pre-coded. This

generated the following results (see Table 6.2).
When cross-tabulated with gender, issues including food shortages
and unemployment concerned women slightly more than men. On the
other hand, issues including health, education and security concerned
men slightly more than women. For the section on national priorities,
a number of priority issues were named and respondents were asked to
rank each in terms of whether these were a ‘Very High’, ‘High’, ‘Low’,
or ‘Very Low’ priority for the government. All of these issues came back
as being very high priority issues, with healthcare receiving the highest
percentage.
With respect to the issue of the redistribution of natural resource rev-
enues, the poll results show that respondents favour a split of resource
 Conrad Winn et al. 119

revenue between states and the federal government. This calls for local
populations to receive the maximum peace dividend guaranteed by the
CPA in terms of basic service delivery, something very few in the country
have experienced thus far. In terms of priorities, although respondents
said everything was a ‘high priority’ in the priority section, respon-
dents repeatedly stated that service delivery was a priority including
healthcare and education. Moreover, ‘security’ is also deemed to be
a priority but needs to be nuanced as it includes food security and
crime as well as cattle raiding. Regions and states reflect the differences
in service delivery and security particularly in their responses. In fact,
there is currently little clarity among the population over the roles and
responsibilities for service delivery in their communities. The section
on provision of services was formulated for the purpose of gauging
which individuals were considered to be the responsible stakeholders for
various community/nation-building tasks. Governments (national and
state) were seen as the primary stakeholders for infrastructure projects
and security; community members and local governments were selected
for keeping the community clean; traditional leaders were attributed
with a large share of solving local disputes and a smaller share of col-
lecting taxes and allocating land; local governments were primarily
responsible for collecting taxes; national, state, and local governments
were all seen as being responsible for managing schools and natural
resources.
Meanwhile, the section on land ownership addresses another criti-
cally important governance challenge in contemporary South Sudan
and the multiplicity of actors involved in governing land tenure
arrangements. In order to ensure that the emphasis was not shifted
to family relations or community matters, a two-part question was
asked regarding both land at household level and farm or grazing land,
as these are understood differently in terms of ownership and rights.
The results were very much in favour of individual ownership at the
household level, however split between government and individuals for
ownership of grazing/farm land. The results of the poll confirm the need
for the GOSS and State Legislatures to implement policies to protect and
establish land tenure. In Deng’s words:

Legislative assemblies at either the GOSS or state level could

hold hearings on land allocations above a certain size, adding
another layer of transparency to investment decision-making.
Parliamentarians are also better positioned to represent the views of
120 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

their constituencies, which could help avoid the allocation of land

without the knowledge of affected communities.
(Deng, 2011: 37)

In sum, these findings from the public opinion polling illustrate how
local populations view a variety of governance challenges in contempo-
rary South Sudan. In so doing, they shed light on a number of issue areas
that warrant serious attention from policy-makers at the international,
national, and local levels.

Regional concerns at independence

Despite the relatively optimistic outlook outlined above by many
respondents, South Sudan continues to be plagued by a range of regional
concerns. With the memory of a common enemy to the north start-
ing to fade and the constant return of internally displaced persons
(IDPs), many of these concerns revolve around questions related to the
governance of natural resources, land redistribution, and the manage-
ment of IDPs in the post-CPA period. These dynamics are illustrated
by Leonardi who discusses the discourse across regions, tribal identi-
ties and languages that centre around the commoditization of human
life in exchange for the right to citizenship, and land through the
use of patriotic sacrifice (i.e., participation in the civil war) as popu-
lations shift around resources, into urban centres and as a result of
conflict in South Sudan. According to Leonardi (2011: 225), ‘Just as
the buckets of blood imply the commodification of human life, so
the sale of land essentially involves the conversion of blood relation
into money, something which has been resisted or regulated in the
past.’
In addition, the unresolved border disputes over minerals and oil with
Sudan in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states present yet another poten-
tially explosive issue. There is currently only one pipeline from the
disputed oil fields on the border and from the territory in the south,
which means that oil must be piped to the Red Sea Port in Sudan. This
could, however, soon change as media outlets have recently reported
that South Sudan is much closer to developing a pipeline in the south
(BBC, 2013). Nonetheless, the scope of this problem is dramatically
highlighted when one considers that at the time of independence oil
accounted for 98 per cent of the GOSS’s revenues (Sudan Tribune, 2012).
As de Waal (among others) have noted, since independence, the GOSS
has stopped paying the National Unity government any oil revenues
including transit fees as outlined in the CPA. A complete shutdown was
announced on 23 January 2012 by President Salva Kiir to completely
 Conrad Winn et al. 121

halt all oil production to stop the government in Khartoum from con-
fiscating oil on its way to the port, claiming three million barrels had
already been looted (Sudan Tribune, 2012). As de Waal states, Khartoum’s
delegates to talks in Addis Ababa complain bitterly as they ask why they
should ‘allow Southern oil to go free to market, when the money from
its sales is used to arm rebels who want to destroy us’ (de Waal, 2012).
In terms of the actual players involved in the extraction of the oil, much
of this resource is in the hands of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating
Company (GNPOC), which is a consortia made up of the China National
Petroleum Corporation (40 per cent stake), Malaysia’s Petronas Carigali
Overseas (30 per cent), and ONGC Videsh of India (25 per cent). Mean-
while, the remaining 5 per cent is held by the government of Sudan
(Sudapet). And yet South Sudan continues to have a firm grip on the
oil industry, as illustrated by the events in December 2011 when the
GOSS warned international oil companies and pipeline operators not to
co-operate with Sudan on crude oil-related matters, unless authorized.
These companies have been pressured by both governments, with South
Sudan enforcing the stoppage, while Sudan in turn pressures them to
continue to supply oil (Boylan, 2012).2
These regional concerns ultimately illustrate the numerous challenges
that serve to create regional instability and the obstacles this poses to
developing strategic partnerships. The central role of the oil industry
and the governance challenges associated with this economy clearly
represents a leading issue among these concerns. Despite the potential
revenues from the oil sector,3 natural resource extraction is known to
exacerbate corruption as it has yet to create an environment of good
governance practices. Since the GOSS has enacted very few policies on
resource extraction, contracts are given based on backroom deals and at
the state and ‘payam’ level. For example, the first independent oil sale in
South Sudan represented one million barrels of crude and involved the
Chinese buyer Chinaoil, a subsidiary of Petrochina. According to some
calculations, this sale was worth around USD 110 million (TrustLaw,
2011).
As previously alluded to, the proposed development of a South Sudan-
Kenya pipeline could represent a crucial development in shifting the
regional dynamics related to the governance of the oil sector. As Boylan
(2012) notes, the construction of such a pipeline has emerged at a con-
venient moment for both countries as the pipeline would allow Kenya to
show Uganda that it has other options for the importation of African oil,
while arming Juba with a powerful negotiating tool in leveraging talks
with Khartoum (Boylan, 2012). And yet despite the promise that such a
development could bring, Boylan further adds that it is indeed possible
122 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

that neither country is fully committed to such a project as the pipeline

would require significant foreign direct investment. Furthermore, as
South Sudan appears to be ‘playing politics’ with the pipeline project,
this could serve to alienate future business partners. The sobering truth
is that there has been no example of a nation that has escaped conflict
and instability when it begins from a point of widespread corruption
despite efforts to profit from resource exploration and the exportation
of oil (among other resources). One must only think of countries such as
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Sudan, Angola, Columbia, and Guatemala, where poor governance of
their respective natural resources has brought about both conflict and
instability. If the SPLM believes for a moment that their oil supply will
benefit everyone, they are gravely mistaken since its track record in
governing the oil sector leaves much to be desired.

Prescriptions on ways forward

In this penultimate section of the chapter, we propose to address a num-
ber of ways forward that may serve to improve the governance capacity
of state actors in managing the challenges addressed in this chapter.
In so doing, we focus on three themes that are directly tied to the above
challenges: land tenure reform, security sector reform (SSR), and the
use of regional frameworks for improving the governance of security.
Fundamentally, we argue that these initiatives can serve to bridge the
governance gap by connecting policy-makers with local populations, in
turn improving capacity-building around a range of governance issues.
With respect to the issue of land tenure reform and land ownership,
the diversification of investment and resources and graduated land ceil-
ings, where authorization from successively higher levels of government
is required as the size of land allocations increases, can help to ensure
that the higher levels of government are informed when large terri-
tories are transferred to private interests. In fact, some scholars have
commented on elements of the Investment Promotion Act, notably
with respect to where the existing Land Act calls for actual regulations
to be put in place that ‘prescribe a ceiling on land allocations’ (see
Ch. V, 15[6]). Under such a system, county commissioners and tradi-
tional authorities could only unilaterally allocate land up to a certain
size (e.g., 100 ha). State authorities would have to authorize anything
above that size. The state government too would have a ceiling above
which the allocation would have to be authorized by the GOSS (e.g.,
1000 ha) (Deng, 2011). Given the enduring problems related to land
ownership in South Sudan, these issues warrant much more attention.
 Conrad Winn et al. 123

Meanwhile, sustained SSR following the principles laid out by the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) will
also have to be adhered to in order to resolve the current conflict that
plagues South Sudan. This includes building national and state capacity
as well as clearly defining the roles of each level of government. The
urgent need to address the issue of SSR is captured in the following
quote which highlights the explosive conditions that pose formidable
security-related governance challenges:

According to census data, 72% of the population is under 30 years

of age and 50% is under 17. Leaders fret that this population bloc
is increasingly unconnected to traditional authority structures and
yet these cohorts are Southern Sudan’s future. They lack education,
jobs and may see future prospects as dim. They have grown up in a
violent world where conflict is managed at gunpoint, and many are
armed. The security issue is critical and leaders must bear in mind the
demographics that can contribute to instability.
(Management Systems International, 2009: 8)

This is but one indicator that illustrates the looming factors that could
spell out future challenges in post-independent South Sudan. Currently,
the GOSS is still being run on a system of patronage for bush fighting
and rank in the SPLM. In terms of the security sector, there has been
harsh criticism of the military, police and judicial system. Moreover,
there have been allegations of irregular pay for soldiers, lack of promo-
tion and discriminatory practices. In addition, the SPLA also accuses the
Special Branch, which has received little attention in national and inter-
national reform programmes, of being a source of insecurity (Saferworld,
2011). The deteriorating state of institutionalized security monopolized
by the GOSS is also manifesting at the ‘payam’ level in the form of vig-
ilante groups and other community-led militias including the ‘arrow
boys’ in Western Equatoria and the home guard system (Willems and
Rouw, 2011). These challenges necessitate a rapid shift from a primar-
ily centralized Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
programme aimed at equipping the GOSS and SPLA with a programme
that helps to remove the weaker elements and modernize its army
against its own people (Willems and Rouw, 2011), towards a more
holistic approach that includes every community at the boma4 (village
administrative) level. This should be done systematically and holistically
among all donors by drawing upon lessons learned from places such
as Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Liberia and laid out in the OECD-DAC
124 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

handbook, DfID’s Stabilization Unit as well as USAID’s strategy (Ball,

2005). In short, with an economy highly dependent on foreign aid due
to oil pipeline shutdowns, SSR and post-referendum peacebuilding is
now more than ever in the hands of international donors and thus
warrants immediate action.
Finally, the use of regional frameworks could also prove instrumen-
tal in changing the current situation (International Crisis Group, 2014).
South Sudan is currently a member of the United Nations, as well as
a member of political forums including the African Union, the Inter-
Governmental Agency on Drought and the Nile Basin Initiative, and
the Regional Centre on Small Arms. South Sudan has also joined (or
is in the midst of joining) several key regional economic partnership
forums including the Common Market for East and Southern Africa
(COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC). The country should
work with regional frameworks to address previously taboo subjects
including human security issues such as state-sponsored violence, which
are now commonly addressed as preconditions to attaining sustainable
development targets (Bach, 2005). Sincere initiatives to incorporate
representatives from civil society, academia, non-governmental organi-
zations, and corporations through track two and three diplomacy5 have
proven successful in negotiating non-proliferation treaties, cessation of
hostilities, and memoranda of understanding on human security issues
and should be encouraged. For example, the Nairobi Declaration, signed
in 2000 by ten countries within the region has been heralded as a success
in regionalism. This declaration envisages a broad partnership between
governments, multilateral agencies, and representatives of civil society
groups to stop the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW)
throughout the region. The Nairobi Declaration also aims to provide
a ‘comprehensive and multi-faceted strategy’, including ‘improvement
of national laws and regulations governing the manufacture, trade,
acquisition, possession and use of arms; weapons collection and destruc-
tion programmes; capacity building for law enforcement officers, such
as the police, border control officers and customs officials’. Finally,
the Nairobi Declaration outlines provisions for ‘monitoring of arms
transfers through the establishment of national databases and com-
munication systems’ as well as the exchange of information between
‘regional law enforcement officers and public awareness programmes’
(Thusi, 2003: 18). Although the declaration is neither comprehensive
nor particularly well-co-ordinated, it is seen as a step in the right direc-
tion in terms of inclusion of various actors in the regional security
dialogue.
 Conrad Winn et al. 125

One of the biggest successes in East African regional security has been
IGAD’s ‘frontline states’ strategy, delegating responsibility for mediation
to the states that have the greatest vested interest in a particular conflict
and its resolution. An example of IGAD’s mediation efforts is the sign-
ing of the CPA in which Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea played
a significant role in fostering negotiations between the Khartoum Gov-
ernment and the SPLM in 2005. The CPA, which included provisions
for political power sharing, a Joint Integrated Defence Force, univer-
sal and minority rights for all Sudanese and the implementation of
DDR projects, was a hard-fought achievement for regional reconciliation
and co-operation efforts and an example of the value of using regional
frameworks as a governance strategy. As outlined in a recent report by
International Crisis Group (2014), regional actors must play a critical
role in the ongoing efforts to halt the renewed violence in South Sudan
and in the consolidation of national peacebuilding.

Conclusions

Notwithstanding the potential contributions with respect to the use of

regional frameworks for bridging governance gaps, a number of chal-
lenges remain. For example, there is a serious problem of resource
deficiencies and a legacy of historical mistrust among member states.
There is indeed a long history of inter-state conflict in East Africa
between countries such as Tanzania and Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea,
Sudan and Ethiopia, and Somalia and its neighbours. And yet the
greater issue for all states has been the suppression of internal conflict
and direct challenges to regime legitimacy. These include Somali sep-
aratists in Puntland and Somaliland; Ethiopian rebellions in Ogaden
and Afar; the Ugandan civil war in Acholiland; Sudanese disenfran-
chisement in the south, Darfur and the east; Djibouti’s Afar population
seeking greater central government control; Eritrean Islamic funda-
mentalist movements; the ‘implosion’ of the DRC; Tanzania’s political
struggle and appeasement with Zanzibari separatists; Kenya’s ‘ethnically’
charged political climate, and the battle between Hutus and Tutsis in
Rwanda and Burundi. These security threats have been exacerbated by
the uncontrolled flow of SALW into and around the region, a phe-
nomenon made easier owing to weak governance structures in many
of these countries.
In conclusion, while at the present juncture the ROSS may have
resolved one of its most contentious governance challenges with the
development of a new pipeline that could redirect the flow of South
126 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Oil Sectors

Sudanese oil away from Sudan, the country faces a number of endur-
ing and formidable problems. While this chapter has outlined some
long-term policies that need to be implemented to rectify the existing
inequalities, South Sudan has a long way to go. In drawing upon recent
public opinion polling this chapter has clearly identified many of the
challenges that are highlighted by South Sudanese themselves. Along-
side the need to address these complex problems and to resolve the
current political crisis is an urgent imperative for more research on the
governance challenges in this newly independent country. This is par-
ticularly the case with respect to the sustainability of current resource
extraction and land ownership policies and the direct/indirect benefits
for citizens. In essence, we argue that the adoption of such a research
agenda may better equip policy-makers and academics to help improve
the governance gaps that continue to affect local populations.

Notes
1. Southern Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation, Statistical Yearbook for
Southern Sudan 2010, Juba, South Sudan 2010 (www.ssccse.org).
2. In 2012, Juba indicated that it will not sign an oil deal at any price and rejected
Sudan’s proposal of transit fees totalling USD 36 a barrel, while South Sudan
offered to pay around USD 1 a barrel (Laessing, 2012: 3). A more recent agree-
ment with Sudan related to the access and fees for use of export pipelines
has been undermined by the new outbreak of violent conflict in South Sudan
(Shankleman, 2014).
3. According to de Waal (2012), the current level of extraction of 350,000 barrels
of oil per day is estimated to provide the GOSS with USD 1,000 per year, per
person (based on an estimated population of roughly 8 million citizens).
4. Administrative structure is as follows. Village or settlement: depending on the
size of a clan, the clan can sometimes occupy the entire village. In some
cases where friendly relations exist between or among neighbouring clans,
and depending on their size and resources available (water, grazing land, or
fertile soil), clans can live together in one village. These are ‘homogeneous’, in
that unless there are inter-marriages between tribes, more than one tribe will
not live in the same village. Boma: cattle camp, 20 clans. Bomas are always
headed by village elders and sub-chiefs appointed to assist the executive chief
who executes law and order. Payam: each payam is administered by a hered-
itary Executive Chief who administers 2–5 bomas. County: approximately 6
payams. State: 6–10 counties (this is based on field notes taken during various
research visits in South Sudan by the author).
5. Mbabazi and colleagues (2002) stress the importance of recognizing the role
of Track-2 and Track-3 diplomacy which they define as diplomacy involving
a range of actors including NGOs, civil society, think tanks and universities,
engaging in field-based peace-building initiatives. This has been the major suc-
cess of regional security in the case of East Africa, the ability to meaningfully
include increasing numbers of non-state actors, stakeholders, and civilians in
 Conrad Winn et al. 127

the security dialogue, regionally, at the African Union and internationally (see
for example African Union Peace and Security Council, 2012a; 2012b). This is
a success not replicated at the international level or in Africa more broadly.

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Part III
Governance Challenges in
Africa’s Non-Petroleum Natural
Resource Sectors
7
Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships in
Mining: From Engagement to
Development in Ghana
Hevina S. Dashwood and Bill Buenar Puplampu

Introduction

This chapter will assess the potential for multi-stakeholder partnerships

between mining companies, NGOs, local communities, and local gov-
ernment to foster community-level development in Ghana. Although
such partnerships have been attempted in other resource-rich African
countries such as South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), only recently has Ghana seen initiatives of this nature. Mining
companies are often ill-equipped internally to promote development,
and local governance structures often lack the capacity to develop cohe-
sive socio-economic development strategies in areas affected by mining.
The chapter will assess the possibilities and challenges of realizing
community-level development through multi-stakeholder partnerships
in Ghana. Multi-stakeholder partnerships have the potential to address
institutional weaknesses, governance gaps and the high poverty levels
typical of rural Ghana where mining takes place. We argue that, for
multi-stakeholder partnerships to realize their full potential, backward
and forward supply and value chain linkages within the economy, as
well as a forward consideration of economic legacies that would sur-
vive mineral extraction, must be fostered. As has been widely noted in
the literature, the extractive sector has a troubling legacy in developing
countries, including many African states.1
In order for multi-stakeholder partnerships to address institutional
weaknesses and governance gaps, this chapter calls for a national
development strategy that interconnects with policies at the local com-
munity level to produce lasting economic value. The chapter will argue
that to achieve maximum value from multi-stakeholder partnerships,

131
132 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

a multi-stage approach should be adopted. First, government policy

on mining is needed that works from a blueprint for localized eco-
nomic development. Second, mining operations need to be integrated
with infrastructural development. Third ‘synergization’ of local and in-
country economic activity with mining is needed. Fourth, explication is
needed of exit modalities for firms seeking constructive disengagement
after the extractive phase has concluded.
The chapter begins by situating the notion of multi-stakeholder part-
nerships within the broader literature on corporate social responsibility
(CSR) and sustainable development. The conditions in Ghana that give
rise to the need for multi-stakeholder partnerships are considered. The
third section will develop a four-stage framework that should inform
multi-stakeholder partnerships, while the next section will assess the
degree to which various existing initiatives in Ghana meet the crite-
ria set forth in the framework. The chapter will then conclude with
an assessment of existing arrangements in Ghana, gaps that need to
be addressed, and the posing of questions to inform a research agenda
on multi-stakeholder partnerships. In considering mining, we are inter-
ested in the extractive sector broadly. Thus in parts of our discourse,
we include issues that arise from not only hard-rock mining but also
the extraction of oil as a mineral resource. Key to all our arguments is
the idea that these partnerships offer more to the development agenda
than traditional approaches. We argue that with the discovery and
commercial production of oil, Ghana stands at the crossroads of deter-
mining for itself whether to go the traditional route of additive incomes
derived from royalties, taxes, and carried interest shares or choose the
multiplicative approach of creating partnerships and policy frameworks
that provide growth based on synergy of extractive sector economic
activities. Synergies are derived from taking advantage of the opportu-
nities offered by mining to build capacity, expand economic activity,
and generally offer business and government the chance to use the
mining activity to draw in other related activities, innovations, and
partnerships.

Corporate social responsibility, sustainable development,

and multi-stakeholder partnerships

Corporate social responsibility

At both a conceptual and practical level, global companies operating
in developing African countries in the extractive sector have had to
re-think the nature of their responsibilities towards local communities
 Hevina S. Dashwood and Bill Buenar Puplampu 133

affected by their operations. Whereas CSR is still often conceptual-

ized as discretionary, or ‘voluntary’ in the business literature (Carroll,
1999; Carroll and Buchholtz, 2006), in the developing-country con-
text companies’ economic, social, and environmental responsibilities
have come to be recognized as entailing a degree of ongoing obligation
towards local communities (Idemudia, 2008; Dashwood and Puplampu,
2010a). This shift in understanding the nature of their responsibilities is
driven to a large extent by the fact that extractive companies are vulner-
able to local community opposition to their operations. Given the need
to secure a ‘social licence to operate’ (Gunningham et al., 2003), gain-
ing community acceptance is a key strategic consideration for extractive
companies seeking to mitigate risks, while also assuming legitimacy as a
normative understanding of appropriate activities of mining companies
(Flohr et al., 2010; Dashwood, 2011).
In recognizing and acting upon their obligations, extractive compa-
nies have had varying degrees of success in addressing their responsi-
bilities, but a number of pressing challenges have limited the impact
of their efforts. In the developing-country context, extractive compa-
nies’ operations are typically located in impoverished, often neglected,
rural communities where farming (usually subsistence) is the princi-
pal economic activity. In exchange for the disruption arising from
large-scale surface mining, companies are expected to deliver socio-
economic development, through the provision of jobs, schools, clinics,
local contracting, and the development of linkages in the supply chain.
While laudable, these efforts, when conceptualized as CSR, have taxed
the traditional competencies of companies set up as profit-maximizing
firms. Consistent with stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), where firms
are understood to engage in strategic management of ‘stakeholders’
affected by their operations, CSR has tended to reflect firm-centric
understandings of what is needed in local communities, and corre-
sponding initiatives that often fail to meet the development needs of
local communities in any tangible sense because of the lack of consulta-
tion (Hilson, 2007; Hilson and Banchirigah, 2009; Ofori, 2007; Sagebien
and Lindsay, 2011). In addressing these challenges, extractive compa-
nies over the past decade have come to recognize that they are but
one part of a larger whole in seeking to play a positive role in the
promotion of socio-economic development, (Dashwood, 2012). Consis-
tent with this thinking, extractive companies now often partner with
other actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local
community leaders, in the delivery of initiatives for the benefit of local
communities.
134 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

CSR and sustainable development

In keeping with this understanding of the nature of their responsibil-
ities, most mining companies frame their CSR initiatives according to
the global norm of sustainable development (Dashwood, 2011; 2012).
Global mining companies understand that, consistent with sustainable
development, they need to be responsive to the socio-economic devel-
opment needs of the local communities and countries where they
operate, while also respecting the need to preserve the environment.
Firm-centric initiatives under the traditional stakeholder model give way
to ones where local communities are consulted and where firms link
up with other partners to develop appropriate development-oriented
initiatives. In this respect, the framing of mining companies’ corpo-
rate responsibilities in terms of sustainable development is broadly
consistent with the logic of multi-stakeholder partnerships.
Sustainable development is, in the view of some, a mantra that has
now assumed centre stage for development policy-makers and analysts,
economists, environmentalists, NGOs, pressure groups, and business
executives in various sectors including the extractive. There are incon-
sistencies in the definitions and applications of the term ‘sustainability’.
Whichever way it is defined or used, a number of commonalities
appear evident: sustainability and the related term ‘sustainable devel-
opment’ refer to some form of social, economic development and
environmental management and/or resource use which has a longer-
term view/approach with the concomitant agenda of providing for
subsequent generations by avoiding exploitative sacrifice of resources
through current production (e.g., extractive, manufacturing, waste dis-
charge) practices (Bird, 2004). Related to sustainable development is
the growing concern also, for corporate sustainability. Van Marrewijk
(2003), bridging the CSR debates with the corporate sustainability
debates, suggests that corporations need to recognize that there can-
not be a ‘one-size-fits-all’ definition and approach to CSR in its bid
to respond to both sustainability challenges and corporate continu-
ity. So can organizations contribute to sustainable development as well
as sustain their own operations using CSR? Although the contribu-
tion (or not) of mining to sustainable development is the subject of
heated debate, for the purposes of this chapter, we take the start-
ing assumption that mining, if conducted in a manner consistent
with environmental protection and socio-economic advancement, and
with appropriate institutional supports, can contribute to sustainable
development.
 Hevina S. Dashwood and Bill Buenar Puplampu 135

Multi-stakeholder partnerships
Multi-stakeholder partnerships are referred to as tripartite partnerships,
public–private partnerships, community development agreements, and
so forth. Not all conceptualizations include a role for the private sector,
but what is essential for this analysis is that the private sector is con-
sidered to have a vital role in multi-stakeholder partnerships in devel-
oping countries. ‘Governance gaps’ in developing countries, or ‘areas of
limited statehood’ (Borzel and Risse, 2010), have led analysts and prac-
titioners alike to look to the private sector as a ‘functional equivalent’ to
the state. Given the dominant role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in
the extractive sector in Africa, mining and oil and gas companies have
become key (if controversial) players in multi-stakeholder partnerships.
Recognizing the importance of local communities in multi-
stakeholder partnerships, Ralph Hamann (2008) has developed a
schematic model that nicely captures the array of potential actors at
the local level in Africa. These include traditional institutions (encom-
passing tribal leadership, religious/spiritual customs and authorities,
land tenure systems and resource allocations, mechanisms for dispute
resolution); local government; corporations (impacts on local commu-
nities); and other civil society groups (e.g., NGOs, trade unions, media,
and other interest groups). Interacting with these actors are external
groups or factors – encompassing national government, international
NGOs, multilateral organizations, and business associations (national
and global). Mediating these various actors are the specific challenges
and opportunities for promoting sustainable development at the local
level (Hamann, 2008: 16). While this broad schema needs to be modi-
fied to fit the Ghanaian context, it provides a conceptual starting point
for thinking about what is involved in multi-stakeholder partnerships
in the African context.
A key consideration that influences the role of various actors in multi-
stakeholder partnerships is the local development context, and in the
case of mining companies, the specific impacts of their core business
activity as well as their community development initiatives (Hamann
et al., 2011: 261–262). For this reason, partnerships involving min-
ing companies in mining communities typically involve sustainable
livelihood projects. A second key consideration is that, as much as min-
ing companies respond to failures of central government in delivering
public goods (and in extreme cases, in enforcing collectively binding
rules), they play a role in directly influencing the governance context
in which they operate (Hamann et al., 2011: 263). Mining companies
136 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

can – wittingly or unwittingly – stir up tensions between various local

community actors, often involving traditional leadership structures,
local governance structures set up by central government, and village
elders or thought leaders. As such, mining companies’ influence on gov-
ernance can be either supportive or damaging. Furthermore, weak local
governance structures hinder their ability to advocate effectively for
positive, development-enhancing engagement with mining companies.

Conditions in Ghana limiting the potential benefits

of mining

Negative impacts of mining

Drawing on our earlier research, the environmental and social concerns
generally associated with mining in Ghana range from environmental
destruction (e.g., tailings spills) to negative health effects (e.g., exposure
to particulate matter and noise) to severe social dislocation (e.g., loss
of livelihoods). The problems and possibilities associated with mining
can be organized around three themes: the distribution of the benefits
of mining; representation and voice; and responsibility (Dashwood and
Puplampu, 2010a; 2010b).
A major challenge posed by the mining sector is the realization of
the equitable distribution of the benefits of mining. There is little tangi-
ble evidence in the communities immediately affected by mining of the
royalties paid to government by mining companies. The lack of basic
services is reflected in the poor state of public roads, crumbling infras-
tructure, inadequate healthcare facilities, and so on, which are ordinar-
ily a government responsibility. In general, the quality of life of people
who live and work in mining communities continues to be characterized
by high levels of poverty, unemployment, and subsistence farming.
It is around the lack of tangible benefits from mining that much
conflict is generated, as communities often feel the immediate tangi-
ble effects of harm. These harms result from involuntary resettlement,
inadequate compensation, pollution, and the resort to state security per-
sonnel when galamsey operators encroach on mining concessions – on
which they might earlier have engaged in artisanal mining (Dashwood
and Puplampu, 2010a; 2010b; Grant et al., 2011; 2013; Nyame and
Grant, 2012; 2014).
The lack of representation and voice is reflected in the inadequate
consideration given by local and national government in Ghana to the
rights and needs of local communities affected by mining, as well as by
international financial institutions, which encouraged FDI in mining
 Hevina S. Dashwood and Bill Buenar Puplampu 137

and focused on guaranteeing the rights of investors at the expense of

local communities. In a context of general neglect in rural areas where
mining takes place, the question of responsibility for the provision of
public goods arises. An expansive notion of CSR as contributing to
sustainable development poses tensions in terms of the role of state
institutions or public sector organizations, and what is expected of pri-
vate, profit-oriented organizations (Merali, 2006). In as much as the line
between state and company responsibilities with respect to sustainable
development is blurred, attempts to delineate clearly the boundaries
with respect to responsibilities are problematic. Lack of state capacity,
and limited resources, are a factor in explaining why local communities
turn to mining companies for delivery of socio-economic development.
The truth, however, is that firms also often lack the capacity to deliver
broad-based socio-economic development, since this is not their pri-
mary goal. These realities go to the heart of the friction that often
arises when mining companies are operating in impoverished local
communities.
When mining companies practice CSR, the state loses its obligation
to meet the needs of people in local communities. Local communities
tend to see companies as a ‘cash cow’, which absolves government of the
need to take responsibility. Mining companies see their responsibilities
to be towards those communities directly affected by their operations.
This can create resentment, when a community does not get a paved
road while a neighbouring community does. In such a context, the
line between whether the company or the government is responsible
becomes easily blurred. Multi-stakeholder partnerships have the poten-
tial to overcome these difficulties, by allowing development initiatives
to focus on entire districts, rather than just the immediate catchment
area of a mine.

Lack of national-level institutional capacity and synergies

Mining is an economic activity that presents enormous simultaneous or
concurrent possibilities and challenges to those countries that need or
depend on it. First, one must consider the various possibilities. The value
of precious metals and that of most other commodities accessible only
through mining has been known to grow over time. Significant prof-
its accrue to both companies and nations. In Africa, gold and diamond
mining built the South African economy. Oil is crucial for Nigeria and
copper is vital for Zambia. For many African countries, mining provides
over 65 per cent of export earnings. By 2005, Africa produced 46 per cent
of the world’s diamonds, 21 per cent for gold, 16 per cent for uranium,
138 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

and 62 per cent of platinum. These statistics do not include the sig-
nificant employment opportunities, direct and indirect supply chain
opportunities for local businesses in the provision of various direct as
well as support services to mining concerns.
However, the challenges are legion. First, the extractive sector by
its nature is non-renewable. Once the resource is exploited, the coun-
try no longer has the benefit of it. This places a significant respon-
sibility on policy-makers and economic policy managers to design
appropriate strategies through which the most returns may be real-
ized from the resource-extraction phase. Second, the environmental
damage requires appropriate mitigation strategies. Third, the impact
of mining on local communities, while it is ongoing with the boom
created by the attendant demand for nearby land, housing, transporta-
tion services, and so forth, tend to create an inflationary effect. Often,
this disadvantages local people, given their lower purchasing and eco-
nomic power. Fourth, the potential for ghost towns after mines have
run the course of their useful life presents a veritable challenge for local
government.
The four challenges noted above require that African countries build
national and local institutional capacity for addressing each of these
problems and combinations of the same. However, as various writers
(Hilson, 2007; Ofori, 2007; Dashwood and Puplampu, 2010a; Puplampu
and Dashwood, 2011) have noted, Africa lacks institutional capacity to
manage both the policy and practical issues that arise from mining. Let
us use Ghana as an example. Dashwood and Puplampu (2010a) iden-
tify the state-level institutions that have a direct and indirect bearing on
mining. These include government ministries for mines, science, and
local government, the Minerals Commission, Environmental Protection
Agency, and Geological Survey Department. The difficulties confronting
these state agencies in the administration and management of mining
issues in such a way as to address the problems noted above are three-
fold: internal weaknesses; legislative inadequacies; and weak or poor
attempts at synergizing the efforts of the various agencies.

Internal weaknesses
State agencies in Ghana, such as the Inspectorate Division of the Miner-
als Commission, have complained for a long time about poor resources.
These include their inability to attract, train, and retain high-calibre pro-
fessionals and a lack of equipment and machinery with which to carry
out some of the checks within their repertoire of normal inspections of
mining activity.
 Hevina S. Dashwood and Bill Buenar Puplampu 139

Legislative inadequacies
Most public sector institutions in Ghana are set up by constitutional
provision or by Acts of Parliament. Often these institutions are unable
to generate their own incomes and have to live by the budgetary alloca-
tions from the centre. The legal strictures also tend to place a limit on
the autonomy with which these institutions may engage in advocacy,
direct discourse with investors or potential partners and collabora-
tors. Similar legislative limitations seem to hamper the Inspectorate
Division of the Minerals Commission of Ghana, as institutionally, it
performs two roles that potentially come in conflict with each other –
that of a promoter of mining and that of acting as regulator. The
Inspectorate Division is the agency set up by law (Minerals and Min-
ing Act 703) to conduct mine inspections and ensure all mining activity
is compliant in areas such as safety and requisite competence of rel-
evant personnel. The Inspectorate Division’s challenges of reporting to
and operating under the Minerals Commission of Ghana can be readily
imagined.

Weaknesses in synergization of efforts

Apart from the main institutions in the mining sector in Ghana (GSD,
MinCom, ID, MLRN, Precious Minerals Marketing Company [PMMC]),
there are no less than six other agencies/bodies or organizations which
have a bearing or interest in mining and related issues. These include
Chamber of Mines, Forestry Commission, Ghana Immigration Service,
Environmental Protection Agency, National Development Planning
Commission, and Ghana Investment Promotion Centre. However, the
level and extent to which these agencies discuss mining and other
extractive activities, prepare comprehensive policy positions that tackle
all the areas and issues, interconnect their activities sufficiently to ensure
end-to-end delivery of value from the extractive sector to and for Ghana
as a country, is in doubt. For example, mining in Ghana, broadly
defined, would include extraction of oil, mining of various precious met-
als, quarrying of stone, winning of sand and winning of salt. All these
activities take place at different locations within the country and differ-
ent levels of sophistication. There seems no clear answer to the spate of
arrests of Chinese operators in galamsey activities; there seem no clear
policy position on the potential for developing the salt industry – given
the new oil economy that is emerging.
In a 2012 newspaper notice (Daily Graphic, 29 May 2012),
Ghana’s Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) published
140 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

mineral royalty payments made to Metropolitan/Municipal and District

Assemblies. These were royalties accruing from the operations of var-
ious mining companies in 2010 and 2011. The total amounts stood at
approximately 3,651,000 Ghana cedi or USD 1,921,578 (shared between
18 District Assemblies). The point is, for too long developing countries
have focused on the potential income streams as a measure of the value
of natural resource extraction, instead of the multiplicative possibilities
that arise from the activities themselves. This view is akin to the argu-
ments Porter (1990) makes in his thesis in the Competitive Advantage of
Nations; that is, the possession of a natural resource and direct exploita-
tion of same – of itself – would not necessarily lead to the development
aspirations of a country.

Lack of local-level governance capacity

One of the key barriers to effective harnessing of the potential socio-
economic benefits of mining is that local level governance capacity
is very weak. Furthermore, there are complex layers of authority in
rural Ghana where mining typically takes place. Governmental author-
ity and representation at the local level is vested in District Assemblies,
while traditional authority is vested in the ‘Stool’ or tribal chiefs, which
remains very strong in Ghana. In addition to the problem of capac-
ity, it is not clear that local government has effectively represented its
constituents in local communities. According to Ayine (2001: 96–99),
central and local government authorities are/were complicit in failing
to respect the rights of local communities because they see local com-
munities as obstacles, rather than rights-bearers, to mining operations.
The failure of local elected officials to represent the interests of com-
munities has created much mistrust between them. Our earlier research
revealed that NGOs feel that mining companies are able to co-opt the
District Assemblies, as well as other government agencies, including the
EPA, police and military. The traditional authorities, who might also
speak on behalf of their people, are, in the view of NGOs, bought by
mining companies with material benefits of various kinds (Dashwood
and Puplampu, 2010a; 2010b).
Reports reviewing implementation of the Extractive Industries Trans-
parency Initiative (EITI), in which Ghana participates, highlight a
number of problems hindering the effective realization of benefits from
mining. Although the immediate mandate of GEITI (Ghana EITI) is to
report on transparency and accountability in the receipt and disburse-
ment of mining royalties and taxes, the problems identified also point to
 Hevina S. Dashwood and Bill Buenar Puplampu 141

long-term deficiencies in capacity to manage funds, and by extension,

utilize them in support of local socio-economic development.
Although GEITI has found good transparency and accountability at
the national level, significant deficiencies and weaknesses have been
identified at the sub-national level. Specifically, several shortcomings
came to light in the disbursements of mining benefits to local com-
munities (Nguyen-Thanh and Schnell, 2008). In Ghana, 10 per cent
of mineral royalties are dedicated to the Minerals Development Fund,
of which 1 per cent goes to the Administrator of Stool Lands, and the
remaining 9 per cent goes to the local districts that provide the minerals,
namely the District Assemblies, traditional authorities, and stools. The
scope of GEITI does not cover the Minerals Development Fund, mean-
ing that neither the revenues flowing into the Fund, nor the manner in
which the funds are used, are accounted for.
As it currently stands, the GEITI reporting template does not cover
stools or traditional authorities, which receive 45 per cent of revenues
earmarked for local communities. The audit reports only cover funds
that go to the District Assemblies, and of these, only two reported in
2005 (Obuasi Municipal Assembly and Wassa West District Assembly)
even though there are eight major mining sites in the country. The rea-
son for this under-reporting was that most District Assemblies do not
possess bank accounts or budgets and the fact that the regional OASL
offices responsible for disbursing the funds did not provide accurate
information on the sources of the revenues (Nguyen-Thanh and Schnell,
2008).
Aside from the non-publication to their constituencies of amounts
paid to the local institutions, the lack of procedures for reporting by
the traditional authorities, the non-existence of mechanisms for audit-
ing the use made of funds by traditional institutions and the limited
participation in decision-making as to the use of funds by members
of local communities (Tsikata, 2008), these deficiencies point to major
weaknesses in the potential of local government to act as ‘agents of
development’. Furthermore, the Mineral Development Fund lacks legal
backing, which weakens the capacity of local government institutions to
assert and enforce a right to receive funding (GHEITI Newsletter, 2010:
10). One of the reasons the revenues have not translated into visible
results for the local communities is that the government uses the dis-
tribution to replace central government support and not in addition to
established levels of support.
Given the shortcomings noted above, it is not surprising that Dis-
trict Assemblies face challenges with the planning and delivery of
142 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

development projects. The National Development Planning Commis-

sion is vested with the responsibility to support District Assemblies in
incepting development projects by providing planning guidelines to
facilitate bottom-up planning. However, District Assemblies lack basic
socio-economic data that would inform development projects, so that
the needs assessment process is flawed. The combination of weak capac-
ity for planning and budgeting, fragile linkages to the local communities
being represented, resource and time constraints, present overwhelming
obstacles against local government’s ability on its own to formulate and
implement socio-economic development strategies that would harness
mineral resources (Institute of Local Government Studies, 2010).

Can mining firms and other extractive operators be the

catalyst for development?

Given our discourses above, one may ask: can mining actors directly
facilitate economic development? This is a question that has been
debated by many scholars (see Bird, 2004; Bird and Herman, 2004).
To expect unbridled CSR compliance from businesses is to suggest a
transformation of the primary objectives of firms to something else.
Nonetheless, we tend to see the merits of this point. By extension, in the
area of developing countries, to expect mining firms (or others engaged
in the extractive sector) to take on the development agenda by them-
selves or as a consequence of their own values is to expect them to take
on the role of government. Our earlier work shows that firms often lack
the internal engagement levers with which to make dedicated commu-
nity relevant choices that would support local development (Dashwood
and Puplampu, 2010b; Puplampu and Dashwood, 2011).
Based on the obvious limitations of the state, local government,
extractive firms as well as civil society organizations, we argue that
the answer lies in multi-stakeholder partnerships, which could poten-
tially promote socio-economic development in mining communities
beyond the immediate catchment area of the mines. Some compa-
nies are already doing this (Newmont, for example), and the Minerals
Commission wants to encourage this idea by formalizing partnerships
(Minerals Commission, 2010). As such, the government supports the
implementation of some variation of multi-stakeholder partnerships.

Five prior conditions and a four-stage framework for effective

multi-stakeholder partnerships in Ghana
The principle of multi-stakeholder partnerships holds that all parties rec-
ognize the value and contribution that each brings to the partnership.
 Hevina S. Dashwood and Bill Buenar Puplampu 143

This suggests that five prior conditions are necessary for such arrange-
ments to work. These include:

1. Commitment to open democratic governance at both the national

and local level. What we mean here is that the discursive dialogues
which are likely to characterize multi-stakeholder partnerships can-
not take place in an atmosphere of restrictive or repressive politics,
restrictive media or where citizens, community and citizens’ voices
are insufficiently provided for.
2. Recognition by all commercial players in the extractive sector of the
business case for responsive practices. We recognize that not all play-
ers will be at the same level of appreciation of the issues at stake at
the same time. For example, while a lot of attention is focused on
the environmental damage large mining firms can cause, it is fully
evident that the galamsey operators often leave reckless damage in
the wake of their artisanal mining activities. In multi-stakeholder
arrangements, we argue that all players must be persuaded that
responsive practices are not reserved for only one or two categories
of players.
3. Recognition of right of stakeholders and interest groups to con-
tribute to the development dialogue at all points within the dialogue
space (from conceptualization to implementation). In Ghana and
other developing countries, governments often structure their pol-
icy discourses with scant regard for the views of marginalized and
dispossessed rural communities. This must change.
4. Commitment to the principle of value adding/asset developing –
rather than asset stripping – by businesses. Bird has collaborated
with several colleagues to produce a three-volume series2 (compris-
ing a community of more than 30 scholars from 15 countries)
that calls on international businesses to work in such a way as to
enhance and add to the stock of capital in developing areas. By this
statement, this group of scholars are positing that firms can work
to build up human, natural, productive, financial, and social cap-
ital in such a way that the countries and communities in which
they operate ultimately experience uplift in their socio-economic
levels.
5. Recognition of the rights of local people to the economic benefits
and potentialities that should accrue to them from exploitation of
sub-surface resources – especially given that for many developing
countries, right of ownership vests more in custodial trusteeship,
traditional presence, ancestral worship/lands rather than private
purchase and the exchange of contract.
144 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

Multi-stakeholder partnerships are effectively what Dashwood and

Puplampu (2010b) have called a ‘round table’ or ‘symposium’ of interest
groups and stakeholders. The aim of these partnerships is to take all the
issues around extractive industry into discussion and work out appropri-
ate strategies for the achievement of inclusive business and sustainable
development. We argue that working with and within these condi-
tions, Ghana and other developing countries (and indeed depressed
areas in developed countries) should be able to create and operate
development policy that interconnects extraction with backward and
forward supply and value chain linkages within the economy as well
as a forward consideration of economic legacies that would survive
mining/extraction.
The absence of mechanisms for co-ordinated, ongoing dialogue in the
context of mining has also been noted by Hamann and colleagues (2011:
274) in their research on multi-stakeholder partnerships in Africa:

There continues to be a significant disjuncture – especially in many

African countries – between national development policy processes
and extractive company activities. There are surprisingly few forums
for multi-stakeholder collaboration between key role-players at the
national level, and similarly there is often a dearth of coordination
of policy processes, focused on mining or trade and industry, on the
one hand, and community development, on the other.

Based on the above we now set out the four-point staged approach
for achieving balance between business, national development and
community growth in the extractive sector in Ghana and elsewhere.
First, government policy on mining is needed that works from a
blueprint for localized economic development. From our work so far,
we find that often, government policy on mining seems to be driven
by a number of legitimate concerns and aims. These include the
need to exploit natural resources for economic development; provi-
sion of employment; and generation of government revenues through
royalties, taxes, and carried interest dividends.
Legitimate though these are, we argue that they do not recognize the
value of localized economic development. By ‘blueprint for localised
economic development’ we mean that each district or region where
mining takes place or is to take place must have a comprehensively
thought through and discussed plan for how the mining activity will
be used purposively and in a targeted manner to impact and uplift the
local economy. In the Western Region of Ghana, following the discovery
 Hevina S. Dashwood and Bill Buenar Puplampu 145

and commercial production of oil, the twin cities of Sekondi-Takoradi

have seen significant growth in the expatriate population, hikes in rent,
hotel rates, cost of land as well as a whole range of services that are
now being provided. For example, for the first time, the global account-
ing firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) opened an office in Takoradi in
2010. We have however not sighted any document that suggests that the
government has considered the range of economic possibilities for the
Western Region in general and the Sekondi-Takoradi area in particular.
Second, mining operations should be integrated with infrastruc-
ture development. Compared with several African countries, Ghana
perhaps is reasonably well endowed with over 9,000 kms of paved
roads and over 60 per cent mobile telephony penetration and other
favourable indicators. However, aerial views of any of its cities shows
how underdeveloped the road infrastructure still is even in mining
areas such as Tarkwa and Obuasi. We argue that the second stage of
multi-stakeholder partnership engagement should involve such agen-
cies as Community Water and Sanitation, Urban Roads, Feeder Roads
and Highways Authority in a concerted plan that links mining revenue
to direct infrastructure projects. Such projects should be tied in to the
local economic plan discussed immediately above. The aim for such
efforts should be that mining areas should benefit from a consistent
attention to infrastructure growth over the entire lifespan of extraction
activity.
Third, there needs to be synergization of local and within-country
economic activity with mining such that mining activity ultimately acts
as a catalyst for other economic value chain possibilities. This is a point
drawn directly from some of the arguments Porter (1990) makes. Essen-
tial to this are two commitments: firstly to a long-term development
and growth agenda and secondly to an integrated policy framework
for development. He shows that single policies may on their own seem
proper, but when set within the context of ‘a more complete and inte-
grated framework’ (Porter, 1990: 618) may become questionable. Porter
shows also that factor inputs and endowments have become less able
to lift the fortunes of nations, that distinctions between social and eco-
nomic policy only serve to undermine both since they are inextricably
linked. We draw on all these and suggest that for Ghana to achieve
maximum returns from its mining activities, multi-stakeholder partner-
ships must consider the entire supply and value chain possibilities that
emerge from any particular mining effort.
Questions must be asked as to the upstream and downstream
industry opportunities; questions must be asked about the potential
146 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

technological skills and services that may be generated by mining; ques-

tions need to be asked about linkages within the economy that may
be catalysed by the operationalization of a particular mining initiative.
Mining is extractive, and therefore it requires the type of thinking that
Porter (1990: xvii) refers to as ‘clusters’, which ‘focuses thinking on
productivity and cross-company linkages. Clusters bring government
entities, companies, suppliers, and local institutions together around
a common agenda which is constructive and actionable’. This is what
we mean by ‘from engagement to development’. Parties have to engage
each other in discussion leading to viable plans, concepts and locally rel-
evant agendas. In a relevant paper, Gadzekpo (2012) shows the vast clay
deposits in various communities in Ghana and the potential economic
value of such a resource – if policy integrates clay with other economic
activities.
Fourth, explication of exit modalities for firms seeking constructive
disengagement is required. Given that large firms in extraction operate
where the ore can be found (Dashwood and Puplampu, 2010a), they
are by nature unlikely to remain in the area in perpetuity. Our final
point therefore relates to mutually discussed exit modalities for firms
disengaging from extraction in any particular community. The tradi-
tional approach for disengagement may simply involve sale, relocation,
or abandoning of assets. We suggest that the multi-stakeholder partner-
ship model will offer the platform for discussion of just how a company
seeking to leave an area may do so in a responsible manner.

Existing multi-stakeholder arrangements in Ghana: Strengths

and weaknesses
Major mining companies operating in Ghana have employed a range of
partnership strategies. Most of these initiatives can be considered to be
partial, rather than comprehensive partnerships, because they generally
do not involve the full range of major players in local communities,
namely local government, traditional authorities, mining companies,
and NGOs. Generally, as will be briefly described below, these initiatives
meet only some, but not all, of the four-stage framework outlined in the
previous section of the chapter.
Golden Star Resources’ Golden Star Oil Palm Project (GSOPP) initia-
tive is a noteworthy example of a multi-stakeholder partnership, because
it has the potential to provide sustainable livelihoods to people well
after the mines have closed. The GSOPP project is an important CSR
initiative because it involved extensive consultation from the local com-
munity, devolved decision-making to the chiefs in terms of which land
 Hevina S. Dashwood and Bill Buenar Puplampu 147

would be farmed and who would farm it, and reflects learning about
appropriate farming initiatives. The project has the potential to be self-
sustaining and economically viable with a real prospect of improving
the standard of living of the participating communities because there is
a market for oil palm fruits and there is indigenous knowledge about oil
palm farming.
The benefits that GSR can claim from GSOPP reside largely within its
immediate catchment area, however. The tendency for mining compa-
nies to devote their CSR resources to their immediate catchment areas
limits their potential impact, and is one reason why multi-stakeholder
partnerships that includes local government is warranted.
In an effort to address current deficiencies, Newmont has sought
to shore up the capacity of the District Assemblies, by working with
them to identify and negotiate what is needed in the communities.
Specifically, through the Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation,
Newmont Gold Ghana Limited has worked with the Asutifi District
Assembly, to identify specific development projects. These projects have
focused on infrastructure development in the region, largely involv-
ing the construction of schools, teachers’ quarters, toilets, and libraries
(Newmont Ahafo Development Foundation, 2012). It is immediately
obvious that these initiatives are what would normally be the respon-
sibility of government.
More promising is Newmont’s partnership with development-
oriented NGOs to promote sustainable livelihood projects in the areas
of its operations. For example, it has worked with African Connec-
tions, a Ghanaian NGO that provides expertise on sustainable economic
development programmes. Newmont Ghana Gold Limited (NGGL) part-
nered with African Connections to design and implement the Ahafo
Agribusiness Growth Initiative (AAGI). AAGI is a market/demand driven
approach to sustainable development which builds the capacities of par-
ticipating groups to create ‘economies of scale’ that allows small-holders
to maximize economic benefits (African Connections, 2010).
To the extent the AAGI can help local farmers transition from subsis-
tence to farming as a viable business with direct economic linkages to
credit sources and markets, and can provide benefits to the district as a
whole, it meets a number of the criteria for successful partnership. As the
local government with responsibility for implementing the GPRS, the
District Assemblies in mining areas are the weak link in the overall
strategy. Based on available information, it is not clear to what extent
Newmont and African Connections engaged the District Assemblies in
the AAGI initiative.
148 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

A multi-stakeholder partnership that perhaps comes closest to what

is commonly understood is that between Rio Tinto Alcan, the Bibiani-
Anhwiaso-Bekwai (BAB) District Assembly in Western Ghana, and the
World University Service of Canada (WUSC). WUSC is collaborat-
ing with local government in Ghana to reduce poverty and improve
livelihoods in local communities, in support of the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (WUSC, 2012). The partnership started with a pilot
project from 2008 to 2010 at the Kanaso School, to improve school
facilities and the teaching and learning environment available to stu-
dents. Rio Tinto Alcan, which has operated the Ghana Bauxite Company
(GBC) since 1974 in a joint venture with the Government of Ghana,
provided CAD 300,000 in funding for the project, as part of its own
Social Sustainability Initiative (SSI). In light of the success of the part-
nership and pilot project, starting in 2011 the initiative was extended
to the entire BAB district for a further three-year period to 2014, encom-
passing 12 communities. Rio Tinto Alcan committed an additional CAD
300,000 for the project over three years, despite the fact that it sold its
80 per cent share of GBC to Bosai Minerals Group Company Limited in
2010.
Rio Tinto Alcan’s decision to support the extended and expanded
partnership reflects an understanding, shared by WUSC, of the need
to help communities in the entire district, not just its catchment area
in support of the BAB development goals in the areas of education,
health, and diversification of livelihoods (Rio Tinto Alcan, 2012). WUSC
claims the 12 communities participating in this project have become
active advocates of their development needs (WUSC, 2012). The project
aims to strengthen governance and service delivery, improve the qual-
ity of education and school services, and support economic growth and
job creation for youth, a key priority in all rural communities across
Ghana (WUSC, 2012). In 2011, the Canadian International Develop-
ment Agency (CIDA) allocated CAD 500 million towards the project, as
part of its larger (and controversial) initiative to support Canadian min-
ing companies in their efforts to promote sustainable development in
the communities in which they operate.
The advantages of this multi-stakeholder approach undertaken by Rio
Tinto Alcan, WUSC, and BABDA are that it is aligned with the govern-
ment’s development strategies; it avoids duplication of efforts; and it
leverages other resources. Furthermore, WUSC claims that the partner-
ship explicitly seeks to strengthen the capacity of the BAB, and involve
the community directly in decisions around development. The initia-
tive seems lacking, however, in the extent to which it fosters economic
linkages and synergies around the activities of the mining company.
 Hevina S. Dashwood and Bill Buenar Puplampu 149

Although Rio Tinto Alcan’s decision to extend its partnership after it

sold its share in the mine is commendable, the question as to how
sustainable this partnership will be under the new ownership beyond
2014 is inescapable, and speaks to larger dilemmas surrounding the
durability of multi-stakeholder partnerships.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to make a conceptual contribution to the

nascent literature on multi-stakeholder partnerships in resource-rich
African countries. It has also sought to contribute to the research agenda
on how the extractive sector might potentially contribute to value-
adding activities in the communities in which companies operate. This
chapter examined the various forms of multi-stakeholder partnerships
that have emerged in the extractive sector in Ghana. To further this
research agenda in the case of Ghana, more analysis is needed of existing
and prospective partnership initiatives currently under development, to
determine whether they meet the conditions for harnessing the benefits
of extraction to Ghana’s broader strategies, as outlined in the four-stage
framework above.
Multi-stakeholder partnerships in Ghana are a relatively new phe-
nomenon, most having been launched within the past five years.
The four-stage framework provides a conceptual basis upon which
empirical research and analysis of the (potential) effectiveness of the
multi-stakeholder initiatives outlined above can proceed. In arguing
for the potential of multi-stakeholder partnerships to harness the ben-
efits of mining in a sustainable manner while mitigating the costs,
there are several cautionary notes and questions that can inform future
research.
First, and most obvious, there is the potential that power asymmetries
between mining companies and local communities/District Assemblies,
as well as NGOs/local communities/District Assemblies, can lead to
intimidation in a context of extreme wealth differentials. Power asym-
metries also arise from superior access to information and negotiation
skills, that can affect how both mining companies and NGOs (both
national and international) interact with local communities/District
Assemblies. Rather than assuming from the outset that such dynam-
ics undermine genuine multi-stakeholder partnerships, we argue that
the impact of power asymmetries needs to be empirically observed.
There could be, for example, off-setting considerations, such as the need
for mining companies to have a social license that affords local com-
munities greater authority than might normally be the case. Lack of
150 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

understanding about the proper role of the District Assemblies that leads
to inadequate engagement can be addressed through education, and a
clearer specification of roles. This is admittedly challenging in a con-
text where companies are often expected to perform the function of
government.
A second issue with multi-stakeholder partnerships is that it is often
assumed, rather than empirically examined, who the most appropriate
players ought to be. For example, NGOs are considered to be natu-
ral allies of local communities, but NGOs engaged in advocacy may
not necessarily be best partners. Our earlier research revealed that it is
not always clear whether or not the priorities of NGOs are the same
as those of the communities, which themselves have interests which
are usually not harmonious (Dashwood and Puplampu, 2010a; 2010b).
It may be that NGOs engaged in advocacy are most effective at the
regional level: to promote investments that have economies of scale and
that can promote backward and forward linkages. NGOs can also advo-
cate for improved legislative framework at the national level, and seek
to influence national policy in the interests of mining communities.
Preliminary evidence points to a preference for development-oriented
NGOs that can effectively support socio-economic development at the
local level. The precise nature of tension and conflict between min-
ing companies and anti-mining NGOs, as well as between traditional
authority and local government in communities, needs to be examined
in specific contexts in order to better understand how those dynamics
affect multi-stakeholder partnerships.
Third, there is a significant degree of responsibility placed on min-
ing companies through multi-stakeholder partnerships, which as noted
above, may be missing in terms of both internal competence and
genuine commitment to sustainable development. Although for the
purpose of this study, it was assumed that mining company commu-
nity initiatives are driven by, and can be consistent with, a commitment
to sustainable development, this is a matter that needs to be empir-
ically examined. Mining companies may lack the competency and
expertise around socio-economic development, but they must neverthe-
less demonstrate that they are attempting to build such competency.
As much as government should not devolve responsibility to com-
panies for public goods normally delivered by government, neither
should companies devolve responsibility for a district’s development to
development-oriented NGOs. How these dynamics play out is a final
important question that should drive further research on the effec-
tiveness and sustainability of multi-stakeholder partnerships in Ghana.
 Hevina S. Dashwood and Bill Buenar Puplampu 151

Multi-stakeholder partnerships require that mining companies be gen-

uinely committed, so that even after the mine closes or they sell their
share in the company (e.g., Rio Tinto Alcan), there is a self-sustaining
character to initiatives undertaken.

Notes
1. See, for example, the journal special issues under the guest editorships of Bird
(2009) and Hilson (2012).
2. Bird and Herman (2004), Bird and colleagues (2005), and Bird and Velasquez
(2006).

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8
Network Governance and the
African Timber Organization:
Prospects for Regional Forestry
Governance in Africa
J. Andrew Grant, Dianne Balraj, Jeremy Davison, and
Georgia Mavropoulos-Vagelis

Introduction

Forests, covering over 30 per cent of our planet’s surface, come in many
shapes and sizes – from the snow-covered evergreen woods of colder
climes to the tropical rainforests sweltering along the equator. These
wooded ecosystems, often holding little more in common than a dense
concentration of trees, are very important to their respective regions’
ecological balance. Forests are vital ‘carbon sinks’ that absorb carbon
dioxide and produce the oxygen necessary for life to exist on our planet.
Forests are a source of shelter, food, fuel, heat, and wide variety of man-
ufactured goods for human populations. Their importance cannot be
overstressed. Accordingly, the governments of most countries endowed
with these precious resources, and a host of other organizations, have
taken great pains to ensure that forests are utilized in a sustainable way
that will not damage this natural resource beyond regeneration.
The African Timber Organization (ATO), founded in 1976 by 14 coun-
tries,1 seeks to ensure that forests under its jurisdiction, which account
for a total of 86 per cent of Central and West Africa’s forests and 15 per
cent of the world’s tropical forests (as of 2004), are protected and man-
aged in a sustainable fashion (ATO & ITTO, 2003; ATO, 2004). The ATO’s
primary objective is the promotion of the sustainable production and
trade of African timber. In other words, the ATO seeks to maximize the
human and economic gains that member countries’ forests can provide,

154
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 155

while ensuring that such activities harm neither the environment nor
the forests’ long-term capacity to continue producing timber. In recent
years, the ATO has taken formal steps to increase its effectiveness by
strengthening its co-operation with member states’ governments and
other organizations concerned with the sustainable harvest of African
forests such as the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO),
the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), the European
Union, and the French government (FAO, 2001). These organizations
met in Libreville, Gabon, in January 1993 to develop a set of regional
principles, criteria, and indicators (PCIs) for the ATO’s member coun-
tries. In 2000, the African Timber Organization’s PCIs were harmonized
with those of the ITTO.2 The ATO/ITTO PCIs are described by Rayner
and colleagues (2010: 83) in the following manner:

The ATO/ITTO PCI for the Sustainable Management of African Natu-

ral Tropical Forests consists of four principles. Principle 1 provides a
framework for evaluating and monitoring the forest policy adopted
by each ATO/ITTO member state. It focuses on measures taken by
governments within their legal and institutional mandates to favour
SFM [sustainable forestry management]. Principles 2–4 allow for the
monitoring, evaluation and planning of forest management at the
forest management unit (FMU) level. They address the sustainable
supply of required goods and services (Principle 2), the maintenance
of the main ecological forest functions (Principle 3), and the contri-
bution of forest management to the economic and social well-being
of concession workers and local populations (Principle 4).

This chapter contends that while the ATO has achieved considerable
success in formulating, implementing, and regulating the sustainable
management of its member countries’ forests, it still has a number of
weaknesses. Accordingly, there are a number of actions that could be
undertaken by particular stakeholders, member states, and both the
ATO and the ITTO that would improve the sustainability of the produc-
tion of and trade in member countries’ timber. The chapter is divided
into three sections. The first section outlines a theory of network gov-
ernance and discusses its applicability to the ATO and then uses this
analytical framework to examine the institutional configuration of the
ATO and assess its accomplishments – particularly the work it has done
in collaboration with the ITTO. The second section identifies the impor-
tant lessons to be learned from the ATO’s accomplishments and suggest
that the organization still has a number of weaknesses, namely: a lack
156 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

of sufficient finances, training, and technology; insufficient reporting

on the implementation of the PCIs in certain member countries; and,
as of yet, an incomplete understanding of the differences in member
countries’ capacities to implement and monitor policies produced by
the ATO and ITTO coupled with an overly uniform application of these
policies across member countries. The chapter will conclude with some
suggestions to improve the above problems.

Network governance

Two widespread schools of thought on the phenomenon of gover-

nance are state-centric governance and network governance. Theories
of state-centric governance present governance as a centralized, top-
down phenomenon that occurs at the state level. State governments
are responsible for making and arbitrating the rules. Network gover-
nance, in comparison, frames governance primarily as a product of the
relations between NGOs, local industry associations, and international
organizations. These actors, in their dealings and negotiations with one
another, produce formal and informal rules that act to constrain their
actions in some spheres and enable them in others (Hafner-Burton et al.,
2009: 560). While both approaches have their respective strengths and
weaknesses, this chapter contends that theories of network governance
provide a superior framework for analysing institutions that manage
natural resources, like the ATO, as a multiplicity of not only state but
also regional and international organizations play a major role in their
management. Accordingly, network governance will serve as the analyt-
ical framework for this piece. An analysis through the lens of network
governance allows one to see the positive ways in which non-state
actors contribute to the exchange of knowledge, awareness, capacity-
building, resource sharing, and co-ordination of the management of
natural resources. There are a number of scholars of network gover-
nance in particular whose works are of special relevance to an analysis
of the ATO. Their arguments and insights will be briefly expounded and
analysed before the ATO itself is examined.
Natural resource management by nature requires multidisciplinary
networks of multi-level institutions (e.g., sub-national, national,
regional, etc.) with regional insights to address the cross-border ele-
ments of natural resources, which create interdependencies. Teye (2013)
echoes this premise and argues that sustained mutual dependency pro-
duces networks. However, he moves beyond resource dependency in
order to emphasize the importance of interpersonal dependency. Teye
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 157

(2013) maintains that the interpersonal resources of various actors rep-

resent a key element of their access to networks and also give agency to
informal social networks. Teye’s argument allows analyses of the ways
in which power and informal exchange of diverse resources can impact
upon the configuration of networks, illustrating the ways in which some
actors may be constrained and others enabled based on the resources
available to them to participate in networks and to influence outomes.
In the case of actors with limited resources, such as the ATO, access to
broader networks may be limited and policy outcomes may be imposed
rather than independently driven. The likely result of this dynamic is
the imposition of uniform policies with limited contextualization and,
consequently, limited efficacy.
Carlsson and Sandstrom (2008) similarly surmise that network het-
erogeneity may be linked to a network’s ability to access and exchange
resources and that networks that are connected centrally (i.e., presence
of a co-ordinating body) and densely may perform better than forms
of network governance without these qualities. Carlsson and Sandstrom
integrate the concept of ‘social capital’ with network governance, and
argue that network properties can determine the performance of net-
works. This emphasis reflects a focus that has been scarce in the study
of natural resource governance and allows for an analysis of the ATO’s
place in its network in relation to the co-ordinating body of the ITTO,
the consequences for its power within that network, and the ability to
influence decision-making.
As Ohanyan (2012: 376) suggests, non-governmental organizations
can be especially important components of networks when they serve
as organizations for ‘bridging’, whereby networks and partnerships are
fostered. Ohanyan proposes a theory of ‘network institutionalism’ that
grants NGOs greater agency in their participation in networks. In partic-
ular, she argues that NGOs have used and influenced the development
of networks to increase funding, broaden the scope of agendas, and
enhance their own position within networks (Ohanyan, 2012: 377–378).
This focus on the role of NGOs within networks is particularly crucial
when analysing institutions like the ATO3 and others with relatively
weak capacity and power within their respective networks, for it per-
mits an emphasis on the ways in which institutions can collaboratively
buttress their position within a network through shared resources.
Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) acknowledge that partnerships repre-
sent a governmental shift away from bureaucratic management towards
collaborative relationships with non-state actors.4 From this basis,
the authors contend that a set of ‘partnerships’ is an ‘organizational
158 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

structure’, whereas a ‘network’ is a ‘mode of governance’ through which

co-ordination is achieved. Other modes of governance include mar-
kets and hierarchies, both of which contribute to co-ordination (Börzel,
1998).5 The authors argue that multiple modes of governance may be
seen in various phases in the life cycle and associated tasks of partner-
ships and that each mode of governance may introduce competitive
or co-operative dynamics based on understandings of the power rela-
tionships between the members of any given partnership. Thus, it is
completely feasible for network governance to operate in conjunction
with other modes of governance, creating simultaneous competition
and collaboration. This conceptualization is important in helping to
highlight the ways in which partnerships can be characterized by both
the collaborative benefits of network governance as well as the competi-
tive aspects associated with market governance and other organizational
structures. It allows the ATO to be considered as a partnership that
engages in multiple modes of governance, including network gov-
ernance, the implications of which are related to the simultaneous
presence of both enabling and constraining dynamics. Understanding
these dynamics allows the ATO to be analysed in light of its strengths
and opportunities to access resources through enabling conditions as
well as in light of the constraints that may place it in competition with
other actors within its network.
The definition espoused by Jones and colleagues (1997: 914) frames
network governance as ‘a select, persistent, and structured set of
autonomous firms (as well as nonprofit agencies) engaged in creat-
ing products or services based on implicit and open-ended contracts
to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safe-
guard exchanges. These contracts are social – not legally – binding’.
The authors propose a ‘general’ theory of network governance based
on the private sector’s use of networks to address ‘uncertain and com-
petitive environments’ in economic activities. Their definition does
not address state actors in relation to governance, but instead focuses
on firms and non-profit agencies in business-related activities. How-
ever, it can provide insights to enrich the network governance theory
as it addresses state actors in non-business exchanges. For instance,
Jones and colleagues (1997: 914) introduce transaction cost economics
to the theory of network governance. This framework allows insights
into the ways in which networks can reduce transaction costs by the
exchange of competencies and resources through co-ordination and
co-operation. Although Jones and colleagues are seeking to understand
actor behaviour in commercial activities, their insights into the bene-
fits of co-ordination and co-operation apply to NGOs because the latter
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 159

often operate with limited resources and must reduce transaction costs
so that they might provide their intended public goods.
A crucial element that may be underrepresented in definitions of
network governance is the extent to which networks may be used to
build credibility and power through strategic networking with reputable
institutions (e.g., international NGOs, government and intergovern-
mental institutions of developed countries). Carlarne and Carlarne
(2006) examine the ways in which institutions from developing coun-
tries may pursue enhancement of political legitimacy and influence
under the guise of democracy and development and similarly, how insti-
tutions from developed countries can also enhance their own credibility
by providing their support to popular causes. The authors explore the
idea that key actors within a network may be more driven by inter-
nal interests than the declared collective interests of the network. Such
scenarios can result in ineffective network governance, as internal inter-
ests of powerful institutions may compromise the implementation of
projects based on the collective agenda (Carlarne and Carlarne, 2006:
354–355). Illustrative examples are cases where governments and other
large entities use their resource superiority and legitimacy to with-
hold financing for critical projects in order to achieve their political
and/or economic interests (Carlarne and Carlarne, 2006: 358). Although
Carlarne and Carlarne concentrate on the relationship between high-
level donors like governments and intergovernmental institutions and
NGOs, it may occur between any types of institutions where power and
legitimacy asymmetries exist. These situations are more likely to occur
when there is a marked difference in strength/power of the institutions
involved. Within the context of network governance, the power asym-
metries of institutions will become an important factor in determining
the integrity of governance processes. Ohanyan (2012: 372) similarly
highlights the imbalances that exist within networks as a result of
resources and structural positions within a network. Mutually beneficial
relationships based solely on building credibility can have undesirable
consequences if networks rely too heavily upon one another, become
insulated within their exclusive network, and disengage from connectiv-
ity and dialogue with a broader network of key governance appendages
(e.g., NGOs), thus losing sight of the initial objective of the network.

Analysing and assessing the ATO

The ATO’s main priority since its initiation has been to promote
the implementation of sustainable forestry management (SFM) in its
member countries in accordance with recommendations made at the
160 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

international level, specifically those made by the Intergovernmental

Panel of Forests. As an organization, the ATO is governed by four prin-
ciples, two sub-principles, 26 criteria, and 60 indicators at regional and
national levels. These principles and indicators seek to govern the pro-
motion of sustainable forestry management in its member countries.
However, these principles were not significantly different from those of
the larger and more influential International Tropical Timber Associa-
tion (ITTA), established by the United Nations in 1983 in the context of
a growing global concern for the need for better management of trop-
ical forests. Accordingly, the ATO and another influential organization
tasked with ensuring the sustainable management of the world’s forests,
the ITTO, decided to create a combined set of principles, criteria, and
indicators (PCIs) for the ATO’s member countries. It can be said that
forestry management in Africa is, for the most part, governed by this
core set of PCIs.
The ATO and ITTO’s harmonized set of PCIs, finalized in 2000 and
then published in 2003, has benefited both organizations greatly (Atyi
and Johnson, 2005). The potency and reach of the ITTO has been
increased, as its co-operation with the ATO has fostered closer con-
nections with local and regional actors associated with the ATO, and
provided the ATO with access to the ITTO’s international donors.
By virtue of the close co-operation between these two organizations,
it would be impossible to understand the ATO in isolation. Instead,
the organization will be analysed in the context of the ATO/ITTO joint
framework, which refers to the process of co-operation between the two
organizations.
In order to assess the ATO and determine its accomplishments
and drawbacks, the organization must be analysed in the context of
the interrelations between international certification schemes and the
development of a specifically African framework for forest manage-
ment. At the World Summit on Sustainable Development on 30 August
2002, Henri Djombo, the ATO’s President-in-Office, spoke with great
clarity about the purpose of the ATO as he conceived of it and some
of the challenges facing the organization. African states endowed with
forests consider them to be one of their most important economic
resources because of the benefits they provide to rural communities (e.g.,
livelihoods, shelter, food, fuel), the fact that they store and transform
carbon dioxide into oxygen, the immense biodiversity that they pos-
sess, and, of course, their potential for economic development. Pressures
on forest management are growing with population growth and short-
ages of arable land. The challenge is to balance the need for economic
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 161

growth that reduces endemic poverty in many parts of Africa and the
need to preserve natural resources and protect the environment for
the good of both current and future generations. Djombo noted that
forest preservation initiatives needed to be incorporated into broader
plans for development, such as providing for decentralized forest man-
agement with a focus on local and regional resource development and
control. An example provided was that of a tax reform which had been
implemented so as to create incentives for local processing of timber.
Although the ATO is defined as an intergovernmental organization
by its membership structure, its collaboration and activities are such
that it interacts extensively with non-state institutions, including indus-
try, NGOs, local forest communities, and international institutions.
While its membership is composed solely of governments, these non-
governmental interactions provided through its network present greater
opportunities for engaging with local- and sub-national level issues
related to SFM. Aligned with Ohanyan’s analysis of the buttressing role
of NGOs by virtue of their added and complementary resources, the
ATO’s extra-governmental relationships are particularly relevant given
the relatively weak governance capacity of many member states. That
is, without the support and participation of various non-state institu-
tions, such as NGOs, research institutions, and industry associations, the
task of sustainable forest management (for the bulk of Africa’s forests,
for which member states are responsible), would be a nearly impossible
undertaking.
The subject of stakeholder involvement is an important one. The
inclusion of civil society organizations and NGOs representing indige-
nous and forest-dependent peoples is key to developing representative
sustainable forest management criteria that are unique to national and
sub-national contexts.6 Ohanyan accords NGOs with greater agency, by
highlighting their importance in support of key actors within a given
network. And, necessarily, NGOs will join networks with their own
values and goals for decision-making influence and their decisions to
support network actors will be shaped in part by the approaches of these
support-seeking actors. The extent to which the ATO has taken mea-
sures to accommodate the active participation of such groups is largely
uncertain due to the limited availability of information. However, this
issue becomes salient as the livelihoods and cultures of such peoples
are impacted by the SFM criteria and indicators that are adopted. Fur-
thermore, the nature of biodiversity and ecosystems of tropical forests
is such that regions governed by the ATO/ITTO framework often differ
substantially in terms of the temperature, climate, geography, culture
162 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

of indigenous persons inhabiting the land, and so forth, and thus nec-
essarily requires more nuanced, context-specific criteria and indicators.
Accordingly, researchers like Quinn (2007) endorse bottom-up creation
processes, whereby indigenous communities are meaningfully involved
in the creation of local and national level PCIs, which leads to local own-
ership and empowerment, and, therefore, an opportunity for greater
sustainability. Ohanyan corroborates the importance of NGOs within
networks as actors that can complement the state-centrism of existing
regional and global orders, effectively opening a window for the analy-
sis of network impacts on NGOs’ efficiency and influence and vice versa,
the ways in which NGOs may impact upon the functioning of a network
or individual actors within a network.
Were we to consider network governance on a spectrum, then the
frequency and depth of the ATO’s interactions may help determine
the extent to which the organization governs effectively through net-
works. The lack of information about the specific interactions between
the ATO and local actors involved in Africa’s forest industry makes
it difficult to ascertain the depth and extent to which network gov-
ernance can explain these interactions. The closeness of the ATO to
the ITTO may actually constrain its ability to access the benefits of
a larger governance network. If the ITTO maintains responsibility for
interacting with nodes in its own larger network and simply funnels
the benefits of these interactions directly to the ATO, the latter may
miss out on opportunities to interact more directly with the ITTO’s net-
work institutions. In this sense, it is participating in an indirect network
through the ITTO. The implications of indirect access to the broader
environmental governance network are that the ATO may be delayed
in learning about and adapting to emerging norms and utilizing novel
technologies and mechanisms that enhance SFM in a way that is con-
sistent and reinforcing, thereby augmenting its regional capacity and
reputation.
Jones and colleagues (1997: 927) contend that strategic restrictions on
the number of exchange partners within a network is necessary to dis-
criminate against less useful partners and to reduce transaction costs.
Accordingly, the ATO’s strategy for network expansion must strike a
strategic balance between the benefits of close ties with the ITTO as
a stronger institution with access to financing and resources and the
potential costs7 of being limited to a smaller direct network, potentially
with fewer opportunities to interact with broader thematic networks,
limited autonomy, and limited exposure to innovative/novel policies.
Jones and colleagues (1997) also note that stronger connectivity may
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 163

create greater dependency. For the ATO, this may mean greater pressures
to concede and limited influence to promote policies that may be more
contextually sound or congruent to national interests.
We may also understand the relationship between the ATO and
ITTO in terms of relations of power. Hafner-Burton and colleagues
(2009: 562–563) state that the power of a particular node in a network
is based on that node’s position in the network, which is defined by
continuous interactions with other nodes and serves as a gate-keeper
of access to a broader network. In the ATO/ITTO framework, the ITTO
wields more power relative to the ATO by virtue of its more extensive
direct and persistent interactions with other network institutions and
its role in disseminating and disbursing information and resources to
the ATO (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 570–572). This centrality not only
enables access to information from other nodes, but also to access ben-
efits from other nodes, and influencing of the flow of information and
the norms and understandings within a given network. By extension,
the ATO’s capacity to capitalize on these benefits is dwarfed by the pri-
macy of the ITTO. In line with Jones and colleagues (1997), Lowndes
and Skelcher (1998: 321) also make the observation that network gov-
ernance can result in the marginalization of some institutions due to
relative resource capacities. This applies to the present analysis given
that it accurately portrays the imbalance between the ATO and ITTO.
The ATO has been able to pursue SFM and achieve a measure of
success to date through its linkage to the ITTO, which afforded it
access to a broader network of environmental institutions, access to
financing and capacity-building, and allowed it to significantly reduce
its own transaction costs in the process. Since the harmonization of
the ATO/ITTO PCIs, the ATO received support from the ITTO on SFM
projects and certification initiatives in member countries. The ITTO’s
expansion into a broader environmental network – for example via
the programme known as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation plus Conservation (REDD+) – has also positioned the ATO
to benefit from payments for the SFM efforts of its members. This
financial mechanism provides incentives for countries to protect and
sustainable use their forests by attaching financial value to the carbon-
storage capacity of standing trees. In line with Carlsson and Sandstrom
(2008), the ITTO thus assumes a degree of centrality within this gover-
nance network and also a notable degree of primacy. This dynamic can
be either constraining or enabling for the ATO. It has certainly enabled
its activities through funding and provision of knowledge-exchange and
capacity-building. At the same time, the centrality of the ITTO may
164 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

allow it a place at the top of the network hierarchy and facilitate a

monopoly of network connections, potentially constraining the ATO’s
direct access to these connections. The limited independence of the
ATO is reflective in its inescapable association with the ITTO. Indeed,
there is no official website for the ATO and its major online presence is
in relation to its connection to the ITTO via the ATO/ITTO PCI.
In 2003, after the publishing of the ATO/ITTO PCI, collaboration
between the institutions resulted in the planned six-year regional
ITTO project – PD 124/01 Rev.2 (M) – to promote SFM based on the
PCI and notably, with the inclusion and participation of stakeholders
(Atyi and Johnson, 2005: 12–14). The key objectives of the project were
to enhance ITTO member countries’ capacity to implement the PCI
and to enhance the capacity for regional co-operation through the
ATO in order to support its member countries’ implementation of the
PCI (via strong mechanisms for consultations, awareness building, mon-
itoring and auditing, stakeholder capacity-building, etc.). Preliminary
results of Phase I (of three Phases) of the project were released in 2005.
The project was successful in facilitating the creation of participatory
and representative mechanisms for consultation on SFM policy as well
as implementation in Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), and Togo. The project also supported existing
fora in Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, and the Republic of Congo (ROC) by
broadening stakeholder representation.
The project also supported the development of national PCI through a
participatory stakeholder engagement process (Atyi and Johnson, 2005).
Cameroon, Ghana, and Gabon had initiated their own PCI development
process with the assistance of the ITTO, EU, Worldwide Fund for Nature,
and the Center for International Forestry Research. National working
groups (NWGs) on SFM within each country were assisted in finalizing
their national PCI. In the ROC and Côte d’Ivoire, the project established
NWGs, with broad stakeholder participation (roughly 20 members in
each country) and supported the development of national PCI drafts.
Information dissemination was facilitated by the creation of national
reporting on SFM progress in each country and Cameroon, Gabon, and
Ghana all drafted reports based on ATO PCI.
In recognition of the need for greater co-operation and knowledge-
sharing between countries, the 2003 ATO/ITTO project also saw success
in the creation of a regional-level consultative forum for progress on
SFM (Atyi and Johnson, 2005). A regional workshop was convened in
the ROC with representatives from government, NGOs, development
agencies, and civil society, where participants were able to share their
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 165

insights on ways that regional consultative processes can be contin-

ued. The creation of an auditing framework for the ATO/ITTO PCI was
developed to inform on the requirements for the PCI, implementation,
and monitoring in forest management. The level of participation shown
by stakeholders’ attendance in workshops and meetings was notable,
with participation from concession managers, government administra-
tors, forest communities, NGOs, development agencies, and regional
institutions.
Phase II of the project involved national capacity-building in ITTO
member countries and Phase III (2011–2014) focuses on capacity-
building for beneficiary groups within ITTO member countries (ITTO,
n.d.a). The project ultimately resulted in the training of various
stakeholders, including forestry staff and specialists, the development
of training manuals (ITTO, n.d.a), enhancing stakeholder capacity to
both implement SFM as well as engage more meaningfully in broader
national and regional dialogue on SFM within the governance network
institutions. This ATO/ITTO project successfully created a set of com-
mon network governance mechanisms for planning, implementation,
and national and regional engagement for promoting SFM. Of note, the
establishment and support of consultative fora and NWGs to achieve
national PCIs was a key success. Such mechanisms are critical for cre-
ating channels for information dissemination on SFM implementation
and monitoring among stakeholders and building cohesion and a mea-
sure of national and regional consensus. It is important to note that the
ITTO was the provider of most of the funding for each phase, with the
ATO contributing very minimally in Phase I and only providing office
space in Phase II. This showcases the power asymmetry based on the rel-
ative resources of the two institutions and may mean that the ITTO gets
to define the parameters of projects such as these.
The ITTO’s ‘Status of Tropical Management 2011’ provides evidence
of the progress made in its member countries. Between 2005 and 2010,
the forest area certified in ITTO member states jumped from 10.5 mil-
lion to 17 million hectares and the area certified in Africa almost tripled
to 4.63 million hectares (Blaser et al., 2011: 3). The natural tropical
permanent forest estate (PFE)8 is estimated to be 761 million hectares,
comprised of 403 million hectares of production forest and 358 mil-
lion hectares of protection forest. The area of PFE considered under
sustainable management climbed from 36.4 million hectares in 2005 to
53.3 million hectares. Of the five countries singled out for considerable
progress towards SFM, Gabon was the only Africa state (others included
Brazil, Guyana, Malaysia, and Peru). The total area of natural forest
166 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

production PFE under management plans rose from 4.3 million hectares
from 2005 to 6.56 million hectares in 2010 (Blaser et al., 2011: 29).
Despite the overall growth in land under sustainable management,
there are some countries of concern. In the DRC, Liberia, and Nigeria
no forest concession was verified as under sustainable management as
of 2011 (Blaser et al., 2011: 85, 119, 128). Cameroon went from having
no certified forests in 2005 to having five under the Forest Stewardship
Council (FSC) in 2010, but the CAR received no certifications by the
2011 ITTO report, and Côte d’Ivoire had no certification scheme nor
certified forest (Blaser et al., 2011: 50, 59–60, 76).
For its own part, the ATO has served as a platform to facilitate dialogue
between various stakeholders involved in SFM in the region. The cre-
ation of dialogue between governments, NGOs, and international actors
within the framework of SFM contributes to improved communication,
knowledge-exchange, and reinforced and consolidated commitment to
sustainability in member countries. In this sense, the ATO’s functioning
occurs within a context of pluricentric governance, whereby a number
of state and non-actors collaborate within networks to achieve various
outcomes that contribute to improved SFM. This is a marked shift from
governance strictly by national governments.
A testament of the effectiveness of the ATO/ITTO joint framework is
the adoption of ATO/ITTO PCIs as a set of guidelines for other major
organizations dedicated to the promotion of sustainable forest man-
agement in Africa. One such organization, the FSC, has used ATO/
ITTO standards in the creation of certification schemes for African tim-
ber. Similarly, the Central African Regional Programme of the World
Wildlife Fund (WWF) has been using the ATO/ITTO PCIs to examine
the progress of sustainable forest management of its partners in the for-
est industry. Further, a WWF and ATO agreement to promote the PCI has
resulted in the financing of projects in the ROC, CAR, and DRC. These
are promising examples of stakeholder participation in and interaction
with forest governance and illustrates the impact of the ATO in coun-
tries of Central Africa such as Gabon, Cameroon, the CAR, DRC, and
ROC.9 In the same vein, the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest
Certification (PEFC) recently validated the Gabonese Forest Certifica-
tion Scheme (PAFC-Gabon),10 an initiative based entirely on ATO/ITTO
PCIs.11
Further evidence of the efficacy of the ATO/ITTO joint framework is
its role in accelerating the implementation of the regulations stipulated
by the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) Action
Plan, a timber purchasing framework set up by the EU with the aim of
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 167

ensuring that EU member countries import only timber that has been
harvested from forests that are managed sustainably. The project also
provides support to member countries that are setting up regulatory
frameworks for the use of ATO/ITTO PCIs. This will certainly increase
the use of this sustainable forest management standard.12
In addition, the ATO collaborates with other intergovernmental orga-
nizations such as the Central African Economic and Monetary Commu-
nity (CAEMC) and Economic Community of Africa States (ECOWAS).13
In practice, the ATO has become more than an intergovernmental orga-
nization by virtue of its collaboration with international organizations
and NGOs. Certainly, the ATO on its own does not have the means
to achieve its bold targets for the implementation of SFM. In 2009,
the ATO/ITTO engaged in the project ‘Promotion of Sustainable Man-
agement of African Forests’ in collaboration with the WWF’s Regional
Office in Central Africa for a series of regional training workshops (ITTO,
2013: 13).14 At that time, some of the countries in the region were
also involved in developing certification schemes with the FSC Regional
Office of Africa and Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certifica-
tion (PEFC).15 Certification schemes can be seen as network governance
tools, as the ATO/ITTO works closely with certifiers like the FSC and
PEFC towards the shared goal of SFM, thus expanding the network of the
ATO. The ATO/ITTO continues to facilitate FSC certification for forest
concessionaires. The project has also prepared countries for negotiating
Voluntary Partnership Agreements under the EU’s FLEGT. The ATO has
also participated in COMIFAC’s Partnership on Congo Basin Forests
(PCBF) regional meetings (PEFC, 2012: 15; ITTO, 2013: 14). Through
these collaborations, knowledge is transferred and governance capaci-
ties are enhanced, thus further extending and deepening the governance
networks associated with SFM in Africa.
In order to evaluate the progress made towards establishing a
sustainable forestry sector in central African states, the regional WWF
used the ATO/ITTO principles to assess partners in the forest industry
on their progress. Whereas governments may not have the financial
or technical capacity to conduct such assessments, network governance
invites and enables non-state actors to collaborate and share the costs
of monitoring the progress of sustainable forest management as a pub-
lic good for all the states involved. This network governance framework
has also been used by the French government’s Agency for Develop-
ment (AFD) to evaluate progress among concessionaires financed under
their SFM projects in Gabon. The International Union for Conserva-
tion of Nature (IUCN) also worked with the industry and NGOs to
168 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

create an independent monitoring system for concessions based on the

ATO/ITTO PCI framework. In addition, as part of the ATO/ITTO project
124/01 Rev.2 (M), the ATO/ITTO framework functions to improve the
dissemination of information by encouraging member countries to pro-
duce periodic national reports outlining their progress in meeting, or
not meeting, their goals with regard to sustainable forest management
(Atyi and Johnson, 2005). Cameroon, Ghana and Gabon have cre-
ated the first national-level periodic reports based on the principles of
the ATO/ITTO PCI in accordance with the ITTO principles and guide-
lines at a national level. The ROC, Côte d’Ivoire, and the CAR were
next, and their respective reports were followed by national validation
workshops and a regional meeting in Libreville with representatives
from ITTO member countries to share insights on the reports (Atyi
and Johnson, 2005). Reports were commenced for Cameroon, Congo,
Gabon, Liberia, and the CAR from 2009 to 2010 and the ITTO has
recommended that areas for greater synergy be encouraged through
increased reporting on progress towards SFM.16
Bosni and colleagues (2008) explain some of the challenges to forest
development and resource management using a self-described ‘African’
lens. The authors examined eco-labelling, which has a particularly
Western ethos, but which could possibly benefit African countries by
increasing exports. The authors highlight certain problems with eco-
certification (and the variety of regimes that carry out such certifica-
tions). Chain of custody certification can be very expensive because in
order to be certified as ‘eco’ at retail, every portion of the chain must be
independently certified and verified which is very costly. The product
must also be tracked through the entire process. All of this can come
into conflict with the desire to promote local, small- and medium-scale
production with a view to benefitting otherwise impoverished commu-
nities. Large transnational corporations (TNCs) are much more likely to
have the infrastructure to implement such procedures, take on height-
ened cost structures, and have the institutional and managerial capacity
to comply with such certification regimes due to the relative disparity of
business sophistication. Bosni and colleagues (2008: 417) conclude that
‘[f]orest certification is a costly and complicated process and most of the
certification done so far in the tropics or developing countries has been
very small and only possible through public funding’.
Recently, the ITTO and ATO’s co-operation was strengthened by a
joint regional project, ‘ITTO PROJECT PD 124/01’.17 One outcome of
this project, according to a 2005 ITTO report, was the establishment of
a consultative forum comprised of participating countries with the two
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 169

goals of aiding in the monitoring of progress towards sustainable devel-

opment and offering a participatory and representative platform for
consultation on policy issues (Atyi and Johnson, 2005). The project sup-
ported national working groups in the ROC and Côte d’Ivoire to develop
national PCIs, with inclusive representatives from all stakeholder groups
(estimated at 20 members in each country). The project also resulted in
a regional consultative workshop in the ROC with the objective to boost
SFM initiatives. It was attended by government institutions, NGOs,
regional development agencies, and civil society organizations. Various
stakeholders were involved in the project activities themselves, includ-
ing concession owners, government administrators, forest communities,
NGOs, and development agencies. Shortly after, small national forums
and even regional forums, with the same goals and a similar structure as
the larger ATO forum, were developed within member countries.
The ATO’s network also extends to the Inter-African Forest Indus-
tries Association (IFIA), a body comprised of over 300 timber industry
and trade associations that ‘contributes to the strengthening of pro-
fessional structures within the timber industry in West Africa and the
Congo Basin’.18 The IFIA has provisions for the pursuit of SFM in its
mission statement and seeks to ‘promote African timber with a focus
on sustainable management of forests based on forest management
planning, legal forest exploitation, certification and carbon emissions
reduction throughout the chain of supply’.19 The IFIA collaborates with
the ATO on forest certification with respect to the FSC and the ATO also
participates in consultations for PAFC certification and implementation
in the Congo Basin.20
Granted, early efforts at forest certification for SFM were unimpres-
sive Rametsteiner and Simula (2003). However, there are benefits that
are packaged with certification that may help to offset the high costs
within developing countries. For instance, certification requires coun-
tries to enhance data collection and quality for monitoring purposes.
This data can be useful not only for commercial SFM but also for col-
lecting national data for the mapping of national natural resources. Such
databases can be used for other sustainability projects and conservation
activities required by governments such as ranging from biodiversity
priority-setting, planning, tracking, and monitoring of conservation and
protected areas to tracking of deforestation and degradation to ini-
tiatives relating to REDD+ financing. Moreover, it builds institutional
capacity, which can be transferred to other sustainability and conserva-
tion projects. Whether these additional benefits justify the costs is yet
to be determined. With increasing efforts to attach economic value to
170 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

biodiversity and ecosystem services (TEEB, n.d.), the benefits may soon
be accorded greater weight for their ability to support biodiversity and
ecosystem conservation. Indeed, as Atyi and Johnson (2005) and Grant
and colleagues (2013) emphasize, there has been attention allocated to
greater integration of biodiversity conservation into SFM, which had led
to calls at the national and international levels for greater biodiversity
initiatives in countries within the Congo Basin.
The ATO benefits from its relationship with the ITTO in many ways,
though this may be better balanced with more direct involvement by
the ATO in interactions with institutions and nodes in the broader
environmental governance network. The ITTO’s international presence
provides it with access to financial resources and technical capacity that
can be funnelled to the ATO, a relatively smaller node with weaker
overall capacity, international presence, and reputation. Furthermore,
greater network connections can open the ATO to greater scrutiny and
criticism (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 571), and introduce more stringent
standards before it has a chance to build its capacity to meet interna-
tionally recognized ones. Thus, it may be compelling for the ATO to sit
back and reap the benefits of its close relationship with the ITTO while
insulating against scrutiny from a broader network. Nevertheless, after
more than a decade of existence, the ATO should be ready to open up
to a wider network that places the organization under greater scrutiny,
which in turn will bring about institutional transformation.
Another task of the joint ATO/ITTO framework has been the devel-
opment of national PCIs through a broad-based participatory process
within a framework of the ATO/ITTO core principles at the national and
regional levels, as well as other relevant forest-related initiatives (Atyi
and Johnson, 2005). In fact, the ATO has granted three member coun-
tries in Africa – Cameroon, Ghana, and Gabon – the independence to
have the final say in which ATO/ITTO PCIs will be adopted, improv-
ing the flexibility of the organization’s international scope towards
countries’ particular contexts.

Policy recommendations

Given the above evidence, it seems that the ATO/ITTO joint frame-
work has been successful in advancing the sustainable management
agenda of its member states’ forests.21 In this regard, the ATO/ITTO has
created a network governance framework for the sustainable manage-
ment of tropical forests in the region that can be used as the standard
for management, verification, and certification. Without these guiding
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 171

principles, the SFM agenda would not have likely been pushed by
national governments in line with the stringent PCIs of the joint
ATO/ITTO variety. Governments were provided with the technical assis-
tance to develop country- and region-specific PCIs as well as assisted
in planning for certification schemes, which can be quite costly. Pérez
and colleagues (2006) found that policies, infrastructure, markets and
technology were the main drivers of change in forest concessions’ envi-
ronmental practices, based on a questionnaire conducted in the Congo
Basin. They found that regional and international forestry institutions
were seen as having the least influence in changing practices. However,
the authors did find that groups pushing for certification and lobbying
were perceived as having an impact. This is good news for the ATO,
as an organization that is actively involved in pushing the certifica-
tion agenda in member countries. Thus, it is reasonable to say that
altogether, the ATO has engendered some measure of success on the
issue of sustainable forest management. However, there are a number of
actions that the ATO itself and various stakeholders associated with it
could undertake to improve the sustainable harvest of timber in Africa.
We suggest five policy-oriented improvements, which are elaborated
upon below.
First, numerous differences in country capacities must be recog-
nized and taken into account. To begin, stakeholders need to prioritize
the promotion of member states’ own sustainable management crite-
ria within the ATO/ITTO’s larger framework of PCIs. Moreover (and
simultaneously), the ATO/ITTO joint framework and member states’
governments need to ensure that the quality of the tools used to formu-
late, implement, and manage the progress of sustainable development
policies is consistent from country to country and region to region. For
instance, to the extent that decentralization can encourage SFM at a
localized level in member countries, the ATO/ITTO’s policies ought to
be formulated based on the capacity of local governments, NGOs, and
indigenous and forest communities to formulate strategies to enhance
local competencies. Shared local efforts to meet criteria for SFM ini-
tiatives may see more success than top-down efforts, as they would
capitalize on the localized knowledge and sense of greater inclusion and
‘ownership’ by local communities.
Second, the ATO/ITTO must increase the amount of technical and
financial support it provides to member states if the organization’s
PCIs are to be implemented and utilized effectively. In particular,
improved technology is needed to facilitate effective communication
and evaluation at the regional level. The ATO/ITTO members must
172 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

create national policies that are conducive to strong investment cli-

mates in order to convince financers that SFM projects will be successful.
This means building strong domestic institutions for the monitoring
and enforcement of ATO/ITTO PCIs, with consideration of the role of
decentralization in achieving more informed and efficient planning,
enforcement, and monitoring by local governments.22 It also necessi-
tates having the ATO/ITTO develop a transparent regional monitoring
system that can function to report on the verification of SFM progress.
The ATO/ITTO network can be expanded to include institutions that
have demonstrated innovation in monitoring and reporting (e.g., satel-
lite mapping for baseline assessments and systems for monitoring
forest change demonstrated success in community based monitoring)
and engage more frequently in technical capacity-building and tech-
nology transfers. Given that the ITTO operates in Latin America as
well, the organization should determine whether certain technologies
or innovative practices used successfully in that continent might be
fruitfully transferred to the African context. There is also a space for
the ATO/ITTO to highlight more explicitly the links between its work
and the global climate change agenda to open up new networks and
access to financing. Facilitating these exchanges may be worthwhile.
Additionally, the ATO/ITTO must take steps to ensure complete and
standardized reporting from member countries. Although there were
notable improvements in data collection since the 2005 ITTO report, the
2011 edition of the report on the Status of Tropical Forest Management
suffered from a range of incomplete data on many measures.
Third, technology will also be important to efforts towards certifi-
cation, as eco-labelling schemes require stringent standards that may
necessitate improved production facilities and equipment that may
be costly. The introduction of chain-of-custody (COC) technology,
like ‘smart tags’, can reduce the long-term costs of such measures
(Bonsi et al., 2008: 424), but will require up-front financing. The
ATO/ITTO must incorporate these cumulative costs into their project
budgets and engage more extensively with various financial mecha-
nisms for funding and a wider scope of funders, including the private
sector. Financing by itself, however, is not enough. It must be specifically
targeted in order to enhance institutions as well as scientific and techni-
cal capacities to meet the complex needs of SFM. Sustainably managing
tropical forests with unique and complex ecosystems will require financ-
ing for education and training. Some members of the ATO/ITTO have
existing ties to non-state research and development institutions that
can be tapped into. For instance, forest research is conducted by the
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 173

Institute for Agricultural Research for Development – IRAD, the World

Agroforestry Centre – ICRAF, CIFOR, and the International Institute of
Tropical Agriculture in Cameroon (Blaser et al., 2011: 49). Among mem-
ber states, the DRC also has a vast network of NGOs, research and
development institutions related to forestry and environment (Blaser
et al., 2011: 84). Resources must be leveraged to take advantage of the
existing institutions in more equipped countries like Cameroon and to
target countries like the CAR23 that seem to be lagging behind in terms
of research, certifications, and SFM designations, yet have a moderately
vibrant NGO sector.
Fourth, once individual member states’ PCIs are finalized, it will be
necessary to create a regulatory framework for internal audits of forest
concessions in each country based upon that country’s specific PCIs.
Incentives must be provided for national governments to pursue cer-
tification for SFM and there is evidence that independent audits may
encourage improved governance (Rametsteiner and Simula, 2003). How-
ever, certification schemes have received criticism for various reasons,
in addition to those proffered earlier, some of which are related to
perceived protectionism on the part of importing states that demand
eco-labelling as well as high costs and complexity (e.g., chain of custody
certification) and low returns for producing states that become certified
(Bosni et al., 2008). Given the low success rate of such intense certifica-
tion schemes, very few tropical timber producing countries have been
able to become certified and those that do often rely on outside funding
(Bosni et al., 2008: 417). The creation of a national certification scheme
based on PCIs and endorsed by third parties may be a viable alterna-
tive that can streamline the process for producers in tropical developing
counties and create a process that is more applicable to the socio-
political context of African states as well as the financial constraints of
tropical producers. Such national certification systems exist in several
Latin American countries. It should be noted, though, that the prolifera-
tion of various standards of certification can create unfair trade practices
(Tissari, 2001). The need for certification audits may create a space for
the ATO/ITTO to work with individual states to develop minimum stan-
dards and guidelines to enable thorough and transparent monitoring
and reporting for audits. Indeed, there was collaboration between the
ATO and CIFOR on a Pan African Certification (PAFC) scheme in 2002,
based on the PCIs of the ATO/ITTO joint framework, which would be
implemented by the ATO (Richards, 2004: 20).
In addition to such schemes, newer financial mechanisms – such as
REDD+ – can provide a means for governments to receive payments
174 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

for employing sustainable forest practices. The ATO/ITTO can take mea-
sures to work more closely with REDD+ to carry out projects in its
members states, which will require strict monitoring, reporting, and ver-
ification systems for audits in order to secure payments. The potential
for REDD+ financing in Africa is great if the unique context of the
continent and its regions are clearly understood. For investors to be
convinced, transparency will be crucial and will entail close collabora-
tion with state and non-state groups (reputable NGOs, civil society, and
so forth) that can facilitate or undertake implementation. This means
that the ATO/ITTO has a role to play in providing a platform for its
members to realize an Action Plan for preparing for REDD+ financ-
ing, which will necessitate ramping up monitoring, evaluation, and
reporting systems as well as refining implementation and enforcement
institutions. The presence of a network of robust domestic and inter-
national NGOs and civil society organizations will be important in this
effort. For instance, the DRC has both the Wildlife Conservation Soci-
ety and World Resources Institute, international institutions that may be
able to engage in the exchange of capacity and technology with regional
offices in order to contribute to preparations for incorporating REDD+.
Fifth, member states’ NWGs, which are key actors in the sustainable
forest management process at the national level, must be revised and
supported. Their specific task should be to encourage their respec-
tive national governments to promote pan-African certification (ITTO,
2007). FSC certifications may be too expensive, as markets do not pay
the premium required to make certification financially viable for tropi-
cal producers who practice SFM. The ATO/ITTO efforts to promote the
SFM process therefore, cannot be expected to make leaps and bounds
if markets do not get on board. The ATO and ITTO have prominent
roles to play in convincing importing countries to place a premium on
sustainable timber and to create the incentives required for producing
countries to become certified. The DRC participated in an ATO working
group on an African certification scheme (Blaser et al., 2011: 85), and
Ghana is also interested in developing a national certification scheme
since FSC-certification bodies have been unable to certify vast areas in
the country (Blaser et al., 2011: 106). The ATO’s support of the PAFC
system led to pilots in Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Cameroon, the CAR, and
Gabon (Timber Design and Technology, 2012). Gabon created a national
PAFC system, which may be able to serve as the regional standard
and create market-friendly harmonization. The ATO’s role, thus, should
be to support any other member state that is committed to develop-
ing their national PAFC system. On 26 March 2013, Gabon officially
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 175

declared its plans to revise its certification system and opened the Forest
Management Standard to public consultation as required by the PEFC.24
The ATO/ITTO’s goal of spreading its forest management schemes to
all of Africa is commendable and, if realized, would surely improve the
sustainability of the timber industry across the continent. Improving
the ATO/ITTO joint framework along the lines of the suggestions made
above, in particular by acquiring more finances, improving the technol-
ogy used by the organization, and increasing its manpower, will help to
ensure that this goal does not remain unfulfilled as an overly optimistic
‘pipedream’.

Conclusions

The famous environmentalist James Lovelock once noted with melan-

choly that it is far easier to create deserts than forests. Managing
these enormous and diverse ecosystem is, indeed, no easy task. How-
ever, despite some room for improvement, the ATO, in co-operation
with the ITTO, has demonstrated much promise in terms of ensuring
the sustainable harvest of African timber. Moreover, the accomplish-
ments and drawbacks of the ATO/ITTO joint framework are instructive
to other forestry governance schemes that are influenced by network
governance in Africa. Noteworthy accomplishments include the con-
siderable increase in the total area of forest within the jurisdiction of
the ATO/ITTO; the facilitation of dialogue between various actors in
the region with stakes in sustainable forest governance; the adoption of
ATO/ITTO PCIs by a number of other influential organizations involved
in the forestry sector, both local and international; the utilization of
the broad network of the ATO and ITTO to promote external moni-
toring of the progress towards achieving the sustainable management
of member countries’ forests; and the implementation of certification
schemes that have, at the very least, improved data collection in the
countries that have adopted them. The chapter also outlined five actions
that the ATO and ITTO could take to improve the effectiveness of their
operations, namely the need to be more sensitive to member countries’
local conditions when formulating and implementing PCIs; the need
to increase the technical and financial support it provides to member
countries, especially with regard to monitoring and data collection; the
need to create a regulatory framework in each member state for inter-
nal audits of forest concessions; build closer linkages with REDD+ in
order to gain additional financial and logistical means carry out projects
within members states; and, lastly, enhance NWGs so that more local
176 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

communities are involved in consultations, which, in turn, increases

levels of participatory governance.
The ATO/ITTO’s performance is instructive particularly for those for-
est governance organizations that operate within limited budgets and
are largely dependent on network connectivity for covering resource
gaps and accessing decision-makers. Such organizations can benefit
from actively pursuing connections with more powerful, reputable orga-
nizations, diversifying the interests within a network (heterogeneity)
and benefitting from exposure to new norms (e.g., interdependence, col-
laboration), and practices (e.g., innovative modes of governance) related
to forest management as well as access to resources previously diffi-
cult to secure. Related, the ATO’s large success in facilitating dialogue
on forest governance is instrumental in getting a wide cross-section of
stakeholders to participate in open dialogue on policy, planning, and
implementation of forest governance. The opportunities provided for
interactive knowledge exchange and learning has made concepts like
decentralization and cross-sectoral co-ordination more mainstreamed
and closely linked to success in forest governance initiatives. Thus, it is
important to take stock of these early efforts at capacity-building, which
essentially set the stage for the internalization of norms and sensitiza-
tion to innovative policy instruments and implementation practices.
Importantly, the ATO’s capacity has been complemented and
enhanced through not only other governance institutions, but also
through its connections with civil society organizations. Partnering
with well-resourced international NGOs, powerful industry associations,
research institutes, and others strengthens the capacity of the organiza-
tion to participate more effectively within its networks. Concomitantly,
participating civil society organizations also benefit from increased
inclusion and mobilization at national and sub-national levels, building
their own capacities and reputations. Such mutually beneficial part-
nerships can thus go a long way in enhancing the power required
to influence policy and programming within networks and can be an
important route for African states and forest governance institutions
to become empowered to take ownership of their forest governance
policies and create a long-term strategy for self-regulation. Civil society
organizations can also be empowered through the use of certification
schemes, in which the ATO/ITTO has been intensely involved. Certifi-
cation systems using the PCI have provided market-based incentives for
forest producers to implement SFM.
While networks can contribute positively to forest governance, it
is important to note that the obligations committed to by multiple
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 177

actors through networks can dilute accountability, whereby it is diffi-

cult to hold the collective responsible for shared commitments. Thus,
efficacy and efficiency depend greatly on the will and resources of rel-
evant actors, on their understanding of the need to build consensus,
and their need to devolve some degree of autonomy to the gover-
nance network. While the role of the state as the sole decision-maker
is tempered, there remain key roles that state governments must fill
in order to meet SFM goals. These role consist of the need to serve as
interlocutors of consensus-building, building capacity and expertise in
governing institutions through the provision of resources, and ensur-
ing transparency and accountability. This rearrangement of government
functions is necessary in network governance and efforts must be taken
to build the awareness, will, and capacity of governments to perform
these functions.
Regarding the devolution of a degree of power, it is important to
note that states are generally reluctant to do so – especially in the
case of networks that are highly centralized. Meaningful participation
in such networks can be threatened by suspicious states that are less
open to negotiating consensus and more inclined to seeking resources
and building personal reputations of government officials. Thus, net-
works should be well structured and take into account the importance
of balancing centralization with greater equality of access and influence
so that forestry governance is more appealing to current and potential
state participants.

Notes
1. Guinea has since withdrawn from the ATO. The remaining 13 members
are Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria,
Republic of Congo, Sao Tome e Principe, and Tanzania.
2. See ITTO (2003) and Nkoulou (2007).
3. See, for example, Grant and colleagues (2013).
4. See also Lowndes and Skelcher (1998).
5. Börzel (1998) similarly conceptualizes networks as an alternative to
hierarchy- and market-based forms of governance.
6. See, for example, Quinn (2007: 24–27).
7. Potential costs may be restricted to ‘macro-culture’, which refers to shared
assumptions and values that evolve from frequent interactions within
relationships (Jones et al., 1997: 929–930).
8. Under ITTO policy, countries must establish a PFE that is legally secured and
remain under forest cover (Blaser et al., 2011: 19).
9. http://wwf.panda.org/who_we_are/wwf_offices/cameroon/ (Accessed 13
October 2012).
178 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

10. The Gabonese Forest Certification Scheme (PAFC-Gabon) is the first African
scheme to meet PEFC’s sustainability benchmark requirements.
11. The Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC) is an
international non-profit, non-governmental organization dedicated to pro-
moting sustainable forest management through independent third-party
certification. PEFC is the world’s largest certification organization.
12. www.rinya.maff.go.jp/j/kaigai/pdf/steven.pdf (Accessed 12 October 2012).
13. See ITTO (2004).
14. In 2010, the DRC was supported by the WWF and ITTO to develop its PCI for
SFM (Blaser et al., 2011). See also ITTO (2011b, 2011a).
15. See ITTO (2012: 14) and PEFC (2012).
16. Seven countries have produced these national-level reports, including
Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, the ROC, the CAR, Cote d’Ivoire, and Liberia
(ITTO, n.d.b). However, analyses of these specific countries are limited by a
lack of public access to these elusive reports.
17. www.itto.int/portfolio12/ (Accessed 8 October 2012).
18. www.atibt.org/en/ifia-en/presentation-en/mission-en/.
19. www.atibt.org/en/ifia-en/presentation-en/mission-en/.
20. www.atibt.org/en/ifia-en/ifia-partenaires-en/institionnels-en/.
21. www.rinya.maff.go.jp/j/kaigai/pdf/steven.pdf (Accessed 12 October 2012).
22. For example, Pacheco (2005) explores the ways in which decentralization
can contribute to more effective forest management.
23. No area under the production PFE in the CAR is under SFM as of ITTO’s 2011
report (Blaser et al., 2011: 62). In 2012, a low-intensity civil war erupted
in the CAR and the rebels eventually ousted the president. Conditions in
CAR continue to witness sporadic fighting, SFM work in the CAR will be
moribund until a fully functioning government is restored in Bangui.
24. See PEFC (2013).

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9
Refocusing Governance from the
‘Bottom-Up’: Understanding the
Gendered Dynamics of Land Deals
for Biofuel Development in Kenya
and Tanzania
Andrea Collins

Introduction

Ongoing global and regional food crises since the global financial
downturn of 2008 have catalysed much analysis regarding agricultural
production and the development of agricultural land. The result is a
renewed interest in large-scale foreign agricultural investment in regions
with large swaths of ‘unused’ arable land, often formally unclaimed or
state-owned land that has not been developed for large-scale agricultural
production. In 2012, the International Land Coalition (ILC) estimated
that land deals reported as approved or under negotiation between 2000
and 2010 totalled 203 million hectares worldwide, 134 million hectares
of which is African land (Anseeuw et al., 2012: 4). Consequently, such
investments have been critically labelled ‘land grabs’, echoing colo-
nial quests for land and leading to speculation about a new ‘scramble’
for African land (Southall and Melber, 2009). For international orga-
nizations such as the World Bank, ‘governance’ has emerged as a key
focus. Many researchers argue that weak governance structures in several
African countries have made them ideally suited to investment interests
seeking to avoid legal and political complications (Deininger et al., 2010;
FAO et al., 2010; Anseeuw et al., 2012). In response, efforts to establish
global standards for ‘responsible investment’ have already been under-
taken, touting the benefits of agricultural investment and claiming the

181
182 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

detrimental impacts are largely the result of ‘weak governance’ at the

state level (FAO et al., 2010).
This chapter looks to address a key gap in these efforts to govern agri-
cultural investment by examining land deals and governance with a
gender lens. Despite coverage of the social disruption that land deals
create, most research acknowledges but fails to detail the particularly
detrimental impact of land deals along gender lines, as well as the spe-
cific ways in which local gender dynamics shape the prospects for better
governance (Cotula et al., 2009; Deininger et al., 2010; Vermeulen and
Cotula, 2010). Thus, while a number of reports stress the need for com-
munity consultation as well as local and global monitoring, there is a
fundamental lack of understanding regarding how local gender dynam-
ics inform land governance. In order to effectively understand and
address issues of governance, one must consider the gender dynamics
of local governance as part of the broader framework of the governance
of land deals.
This chapter seeks to improve understandings of governance, land
grabs, and gender, through a re-examination of the gender and global
governance literature. This chapter will elaborate on the gendered
dynamics of land deals, specifically as an extension of gender inequal-
ities in the distribution of land rights in East Africa, and refocus
governance scholarship such that it examines land deals from the bot-
tom up. In doing so, the chapter develops a gendered framework for
analysing various levels of governance – from the local to the global – in
order to comprehend the unequal social and economic impacts of large-
scale land deals. Methodologically speaking, this framework challenges
the ‘gender-neutral’ biases that exist in the practices of contemporary
governance by studying the social relations in which individuals are
embedded, and which are constituted by unequal political, economic
and social structures. This chapter will look specifically at the processes
governing land in Kenya and Tanzania, to highlight how these forms
of governance operate in practice. If policy-makers are truly commit-
ted to improving the governance of land deals, it is essential that both
global and local governance initiatives consider the diverse forms of
governance that affect the dynamics of agricultural investment itself.

Governance and land deals

As described above, cases of ‘land grabbing’ have garnered international

media attention since the food crises of 2007–2008 and the global finan-
cial crisis of 2008. ‘Land grab’ has been the politically charged term
 Andrea Collins 183

employed by activists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to

describe how foreign and local investors have laid claim to land previ-
ously considered ‘unused’, often depriving local communities of access
to land, disrupting access to local resources, or drastically changing
the landscape through irrigation, deforestation, or the introduction
of foreign crop species. States and foreign investors are frequently
accused of failing to recognize and appreciate existing customary land
usage, creating vulnerabilities where local peoples do not have formal
legal land claims. Yet, as a recent International Land Coalition (ILC)
report explains, ‘land grabs’ – understood as land acquisitions that vio-
late human rights, lack transparency, and fail to meet standards of
consent – are only part of a much broader phenomenon of commercial
agricultural investment (Anseeuw et al., 2012).1
In contrast, many transnational investors, national governments, and
international institutions view ‘large-scale agricultural investment’ as a
key component of stimulating economic growth and stability for devel-
oping countries. It holds the potential to develop ‘unused’ land, create
jobs, stimulate local economies, and improve terms of trade. The 2010
World Bank report ‘Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can it Yield
Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?’ (Deininger et al., 2010) surveyed
‘large-scale agricultural investments’ for their viability, likelihood to
increase farm yields, and potential for increasing employment. Yet the
report is at times also critical of large-scale developments. The report
observes that consultations are not comprehensive and do not include
gender considerations or marginalized groups, such as disadvantaged
ethnic communities or pastoral farmers. Media coverage of the report
suggested that the report itself was reflective of divisions within the
World Bank about the desirability of land deals (Nierenberg and Ridberg,
2010; Rastello, 2010). Thus, while the World Bank report looks for ways
in which these investments might be viable, it also clearly lays out
issues of legitimacy and concern for the social and economic realities of
those on the ground. The report ultimately calls for improved land gov-
ernance to ensure transparency and accountability in land acquisition
(Deininger et al., 2010).
Efforts to respond to these and other criticisms of land deals as
well as establish preferred international governance standards have
thus emerged. In particular, 2010 marked an important point in the
development of a global institutional discourse surrounding land deals.
In January 2010, the FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD, and the World Bank released
their collective ‘Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that
respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources’. This joins a report by the
184 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, ‘Large-scale land acquisi-

tions and leases: a set of Minimum Principles and Measures to Address
the Human Rights Challenge’ published in 2009 and an effort to develop
‘Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land
and Other Natural Resources’, by the secretariat of the FAO, IFAD, the
World Bank, and others, a process which concluded in 2012. The pro-
liferation of these governance proposals reflect what has fast become
an international consensus among international financial institutions:
that agricultural investment needs only to be improved to resolve these
social externalities, and that global norms of ‘good governance’ provide
the best course of action to address social and economic inequalities
that have been both created and exacerbated by the increased interest in
land ownership. These efforts to establish global standards for ‘respon-
sible investment’ tout the benefits of agricultural investment and claim
that the detrimental impacts are largely the result of ‘weak governance’
at the state level (FAO et al., 2010). The resilience of a discourse about
improved investment climates and the ongoing institutional supports
afforded to these principles by international bodies suggest that this dis-
course may well remain the dominant trope in the governance of land
deals.
However, presuming that ‘improved governance’ or ‘good gover-
nance’ alone will remedy the ill effects of large-scale agricultural invest-
ments suggests a lack of understanding of how land is governed and
who is negatively affected by new commercial land pressures. More-
over, it suggests a narrow definition of ‘governance’ itself, one that
focuses on the operation of local land markets and facilitates invest-
ment flows through the development and regulation of clear individual
and private land rights. As Borras and Franco (2010) acknowledge, these
notions might be perceived as relevant or, ‘at the very least, harmless’
(2010: 515). Yet the emerging research on land deals details the ways
in which large-scale agricultural projects transform local economies and
displace local populations and producers, including those with private
land rights (Borras and Franco, 2010).
The governance of land deals thus needs to be analysed across multi-
ple levels and forums far more cautiously. The term ‘governance’ itself
needs to be more carefully applied and defined in academic and policy
analysis of land rights and access. From a local governance angle that
defines the stakeholders, the conditions of consultations, and the legal
rights of land users, to the efforts to establish global level standards of
investment, the governance of land deals is itself complex. A gender-
sensitive analysis ultimately allows us to ground our analysis in specific,
 Andrea Collins 185

local governance contexts and highlight inequalities in how land is

governed. Global attempts to generalize standards of governance risks
obscuring how gender relations are manifested within various forms of
economic, social, and political governance in national and local com-
munities. While global sites of governance could provide fertile ground
for the mainstreaming of gender considerations, such an approach is
inherently limited as it fails to address institutional, discursive, and
structural gender biases within global and local structures and processes
(Rai and Waylen, 2008). It is thus unlikely that global governance ini-
tiatives can resolve gender inequalities in a meaningful way. One must
further interrogate the specific sites of governance themselves in order
to fully address institutional gender inequality.

Gender, land deals, and governance

Incorporating a gender perspective into academic and policy considera-

tions of land deals is essential for a more comprehensive understanding
of their impacts, and for understanding the differential impacts of vari-
ous policy prescriptions. Attention to the gendered differences in access
to land, land tenure, or customary land rights; access to necessary
inputs; and the repercussions of agricultural shifts in household dynam-
ics, income generation, and property are all relevant for anticipating
how land deals will affect local communities (Behrman et al., 2012).
An understanding of structural gender inequalities as well as the role of
gender dynamics in households and communities is essential for under-
standing how local structures potentially impact both the outcomes of
land deals themselves, and the ripple effects of such shifts in agricultural
production.
These gendered social dynamics exist alongside, and inevitably
interact with, land tenure frameworks, ongoing titling processes, con-
sultation processes, compensation and contract negotiations, and mon-
itoring. Because most land is acquired legally, existing legal frameworks
surrounding land tenure are essential for understanding the negotia-
tion and consultation process (Cotula, 2011). Where land remains under
customary tenure, the state may claim ownership or claim to be the cus-
todian of land for a particular group. In the case of Tanzania, where
the state holds the ‘radical’ title of all land, Village Councils are vested
with control of village land, which is managed locally and subject not
only to local customs, but often influenced by kinship relations as well
(Tsikata 2003). In the case of family or chieftaincy ownership of land
titles, it is typically the male head or chief that is understood to be the
186 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

landholder. Across these various structures, women typically access land

through their relations to men, whether as mothers, daughters, or wives
(Behrman et al., 2012).
Statutory land rights are increasingly being established in many coun-
tries, and formal titling and the privatization of land have placed
ownership largely into the hands of men. While some scholars are con-
cerned with the alienation created in the production of titling markets,
in many cases, women are excluded from land titling altogether, even in
communities with existing matrilineal land regimes (De Schutter, 2011;
Peters, 2010). This exclusion from land markets suggests that women
who own land are likely in a weaker position to participate in nego-
tiations, and those women without land ownership may be excluded
from consultation altogether (Behrman et al., 2012). Further, the atti-
tudes of investors may also influence who participates in negotiations:
‘investors who think of men as farmers and women as dependents may
not take into account the role of women in agriculture or make efforts to
involve them in negotiations or subsequent contracts and employment’
(Behrman et al., 2012: 55). Finally, the presence of formal land rights
should not imply an absence of customary land rights or informal gov-
ernance of land access. Rather, a system of legal pluralism is often at
work in terms of land rights (Mackenzie, 1990). Thus, local gender roles,
rights, and expectations are essential for understanding how structural
gender inequalities have the potential to affect the negotiation process.
The proposed benefits or compensation also need to be explored.
One of the oft-touted potential benefits of land deals, despite evidence
to the contrary, is the increase in local employment, including the
employment of women (Deininger et al., 2010; Cotula et al., 2009; Li,
2011). However, Behrman and colleagues point to a number of cases in
which new positions were expected to be exclusively or largely for men.
Beyond such hiring disparities, possible gendered divisions of labour,
skill levels wage rates, and hours also need to be taken into account
(Behrman et al., 2012). Proposed benefits such as investments in pub-
lic goods must also be examined for gender-differentiated access and
benefits (Behrman et al., 2012).
The implementation of land deals also yields several sites for further
investigation, including the displacement of local peoples – one of the
primary concerns of activist organizations – and the history of gen-
der inequalities in agrarian change suggests that there may be distinct
gendered impacts here as well. Finally, potential enforcement and mon-
itoring suggest several modes by which women may be excluded from
these processes, whether through gaps in data collection or merely by
 Andrea Collins 187

the existing power asymmetries between investors and local populations

(Behrman et al., 2012).

Gender and governance

In addition to the broader social, economic, and political concerns
surrounding land deals, there are also points at which legal, social, eco-
nomic, and political gender inequalities intersect to create obstacles to
meaningful participation to vulnerable populations. These are inequal-
ities that are rooted in existing conventional governance structures,
yet are clearly affected by informal social structures and attitudes that
also govern legal, social, economic, and political behaviour and orga-
nization. Yet these additional structures are rarely considered within
mainstream discussions of governance, despite the potential of global
governance perspectives to do so (Overbeek, 2005).
In order to capture the myriad governance dynamics at work in a
given context, Rai (2008) proposes a new form of analysis that studies
governance along two different axes. The first is the governance of poli-
ties, which includes the regulation of economic and political life at local,
national, and international levels and roles of different actors, including
state and non-state actors, market actors, epistemic communities, and
social movements at all levels (Rai, 2008). This axis falls very much in
line with existing governance analyses, the global level initiatives cur-
rently being undertaken, and even national level policy. In this sense,
this framework builds on the formidable existing body of literature on
global governance.
The second axis provides an innovative approach for feminist scholars
of governance: the governance of communities. This axis is concerned with
the role of traditions alongside ‘languages of hatred’ (Rai, 2008: 38) that
prevent the expression of alternative visions of the community; the role
of formal and informal institutions, systems and discourse; the policing
of boundaries through public spectacles; and, finally, the struggles of
individuals and groups that cross the boundaries of race, caste, religion,
sexuality, and class and shape governance (Rai, 2008: 39). Thus, under-
standing the governance of communities requires more than a technical
analysis of policy frameworks and economic policy, but an understand-
ing of cultural control and division. It demands that scholars consider
these modes of governance alongside the conventional study of polities
to fully capture the dynamics of global governance and the disciplining
of local economic, political, and social relations.
The intersection of these two axes provides new ground for a fem-
inist analysis of governance. The governance of polities must be seen
188 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

to intersect with the governance of communities, especially where the

two axes complement each other and restrict alternative conceptions
of community and economic organization. We can thus anticipate how
gender inequalities might be manifested in the local governance of land
deals given the appreciation of how communities are governed in addi-
tion to how polities are governed. This framework thus expands upon
conventional modes of thinking regarding the relationship of gender
and global governance, which has a tendency to focus on the integra-
tion of ‘women’ or ‘gender’ into policy in a relatively narrow fashion
(Rai and Waylen, 2008). In contrast, this framework invites scholars to
rethink governance itself by not only seriously considering governance
from the local to the global but regarding governance as the product of
intersecting forms of authority, both political and social.
Given existing studies of the gendered dynamics of land tenure sys-
tems, land redistribution, and responses to commercial pressures on
land as well as the analysis of gender and land deals done to date
(Razavi, 2009; Wandia, 2009; Daley, 2011; Behrman et al., 2012), gender-
sensitive research anticipates many manifestations of gender inequality
in the dynamics and outcomes of land deals. They include, but are
not limited to exclusion from tenure rights/formal land titles; exclusion
from consultation processes with firms, local government, community
councils; loss of land access; lack of access to new employment opportu-
nities or material, loans, and investments; shifts in gender roles, within
households and communities; and violent, including sexual, attacks on
women holding or living on land intended for possession.
With Rai’s framework in mind, each of these issues can be examined
as an intersection between the governance of polities and communi-
ties. Both men and women of various racial, ethnic, and socio-economic
backgrounds experience the effects of land deals as a result of the social
positions that determine how they experience formal and informal gov-
ernance. In the sections that follow, I employ this framework to consider
how land governance operates in practice in Kenya and Tanzania, where
political and community governance intersect to create multilayered
land regulations that have distinct gender-based impacts.

Examining land deals and gender in Kenya and Tanzania

The new waves of agricultural investment in East Africa thus encounter

and interact with the existing gender politics of land rights and access
embedded in complex land governance frameworks. Disciplinary local
authorities, such as familial, ethnic, or religious customs, as well as
 Andrea Collins 189

formal community structures, such as village assemblies and councils,

are capable of producing and reproducing multilayered governance.
Thus, a bottom-up consideration of how land governance processes and
negotiations operate must be imbued with a consideration of these spe-
cific contexts, as well as socio-economic structures, within which land
rights and agricultural practice are negotiated. In the case studies that
follow, I examine the ways in which the governance structures of land
are embedded in gendered socio-political relations and highlight the
intersection of political and community governance.
Given the growing interest in agricultural investment in both Kenya
and Tanzania, and their divergent histories with respect to land gov-
ernance in their respective post-colonial periods, these case studies
provide a unique opportunity to consider distinct modes of national
and local governance with reference to their gendered impacts. After
independence, Kenya continued the individualization, titling, and reg-
istration of land while the Tanzanian government retained the ‘radical’
title over land mentioned above. As Kenya liberalized, Tanzania pur-
sued African socialist (ujamma) policies, undergoing ‘villagization’2 in
the 1970s, and resettling thousands of peasants (Tsikata, 2003). Despite
undergoing structural adjustment in the 1980s and land reform in
the 1990s, Tanzanian land policies remain distinct from those of its
northern neighbour. In contrast, Kenya’s liberalized land policies have
remained largely intact for decades, but exist alongside customary
practices.
Each country faces distinct debates over land, underpinned by com-
plex gendered social relations and inequalities. Together, these countries
provide illustrations of the embeddedness of gender relations in political
and community governance and what this might mean for broader con-
siderations of the governance of agricultural investments. The cases of
Kenya and Tanzania are relevant for understanding the broader trends
in the relationship between local governance and agricultural invest-
ments across Africa. As academic and policy debates continue about
the desirability of more liberalized land markets versus protections of
community and/or customary land rights, these cases demonstrate the
potential benefits and drawbacks of each model and the implications
for meaningful participation and governance (Manji, 1998; Whitehead
and Tsikata, 2003). Importantly, in undertaking a bottom-up approach
to governance, these cases highlight the various forms of governance at
work in terms of land rights and investment.
Below, within the respective political contexts of Tanzania and Kenya,
I consider four intersecting sets of vulnerabilities experienced by women
190 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

affected by commercial land deals: systemic discrimination related to

the access to, ownership of, and control of land; systemic discrimina-
tion in socio-cultural and political relations; relative income inequality;
and physical vulnerability (Daley, 2011). Although in general terms
these vulnerabilities are similar, the specific local and national gover-
nance structures and contexts shape how gender-based vulnerabilities
are experienced and what means communities and individuals have for
opposition or resistance. In this way, these vulnerabilities illustrate the
ways in which the governance of polities and communities intersect,
as anticipated by the framework discussed above. Finally, despite the
very clear differences in the organization and governance of land for
over half a century, both cases exhibit deficiencies in terms of gender
equality in terms of land rights and signal key points of examination for
policy-makers and scholars alike.

Land grabs and gender in Tanzania

The debates over the desirability of more democratic, local control
versus the desirability of individualized land rights from the national
government remain at the heart of feminist conversations over land in
Tanzania and across the continent.3 Both national land policies and cus-
tomary practices have shaped gender inequalities in land access over
the last century. Scholars have detailed how these various forms of gov-
ernance have interacted over time and, alongside profound shifts in
economic organization, have combined to limit women’s access to land
rights, whether formal or customary (Tsikata, 2003). Tsikata (2003) cites
anthropological studies demonstrating how Tanzanian women histori-
cally had significant customary rights of land access, which were eroded
by both colonial and post-colonial land policies, including the formal-
ization of customary law. Importantly, recent land policy reforms in
Tanzania continue to be marked by tensions between customary and
statutory law, and women’s rights activists have protested the sidelin-
ing of gender issues in national discourses on land reform (Manji, 1998;
Tsikata, 2003; Mbilinyi and Shechambo, 2009). The long absence of gen-
der considerations in these debates and the continued marginalization
of gender in land debates suggest an investment climate in which gen-
der concerns are unlikely to be a priority for decision-makers at various
levels.
The 1990s witnessed increased land litigation and tenure insecurity
as a result of ambiguities in the land governance frameworks and a
failure to recognize customary landholdings (Yngstrom, 2002; Kitunga,
2003). The findings of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land
 Andrea Collins 191

Matters in 1992 launched contentious debates regarding the democratic

value of systems of local land governance versus national control of
the radical title of land. The Land Commission’s findings recommended
that the control of the radical title be devolved to the Village Assem-
blies, with adjudication of land disputes falling to an elected Council
of Elders (Tsikata, 2003). The draft National Land Policy released in
1995 largely rejected the Commission’s recommendation for devolution
of the radical title to the villages. Instead, the National Land Policy,
and the subsequent Land and Village Land Acts, maintained that the
State held the radical title to land and encouraged further liberaliza-
tion (Shivji, 2002; Tsikata, 2003). Tanzanian women’s groups mobilized
on the land issue in response to the Shivji Commission and expressed
their disappointment with the lack of attention to gender inequality
in land access in the Commission’s research and final report (Manji,
1998). The National Land Policy ultimately received support from some
Tanzanian women’s advocacy groups, though it too proved to be divi-
sive among Tanzanian women’s groups. Though feminist activists were
disappointed in the Commission’s lack of attention to gender in the
proposed devolution of land governance, some were also suspect of a
National Land Policy that relied heavily on the individualization of legal
land rights and the creation of a system that could exclude low-income
and uneducated women (Tsikata, 2003; Mbilinyi and Shechambo,
2009).
The current relationship between Village Councils, the national gov-
ernment, and foreign investors as a result of the Land Act and Village
Land Act of 1999 highlight the difficult realities of governing foreign
investment in land. Asymmetries of power and information disad-
vantage local communities as villages have signed over land without
adequate understanding of its impacts or without appropriate compen-
sation (ActionAid, 2010). Moreover, as the leasing of lands to foreign
companies requires villages to transfer land rights to the national gov-
ernment, the suspension of agricultural operations by a number of
land developers has potentially negative ramifications for local peo-
ples promised employment, new infrastructure, and compensation in
exchange for the transfer of land (Carrington, 2011).
Socio-cultural restrictions on women’s local political participation
effectively limit gendered considerations in local forums, including the
Village Council that decides whether or not to lease local land to
private developers. As noted throughout the literature on land deals,
the so-called marginal lands sometimes targeted for development are
those lands used by women for food, fuel, water, medicinal purposes
192 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

and the like (Behrman et al., 2012; Daley, 2011). The lack of atten-
tion to the resource and labour needs of household sustainability and
reproduction may fail to serve local needs or may exacerbate existing
problems. For instance, in both Shingyanga and Hanang, large-scale
development projects have created pipeline and irrigation systems that
redirect water from kilometres away, but to which local populations do
not have immediate access. As a result, women and girls continue to
retrieve water on foot from sources now tapped by corporate agricultural
developments (Kinoti, 2012). Thus, the exclusion of women’s voices in
decision-making forums – whether in the Village Councils or in consul-
tation with developers – does not bode well for gender equality at the
local level or for familial and community well-being in both the short
and the long term. According to Mbilinyi (2003), such exclusion has
long been a hallmark of economic planning in Tanzania.
Further, resistance to land grabbing in Tanzania has recently been
met with violent responses, highlighting the physical vulnerabilities of
women and targeted communities. FemAct (2009) report that Maasai
communities in Loliondo division, Arusha region were violently evicted
by the Tanzania police Field Force unit on land leased to the United Arab
Emirates-based Ortello Business Corporation. The eviction involved the
burning of homes, torture, and the rape of Maasai women (FemAct,
2009). Beyond violence exercised by state authorities or private security
forces, analysis should consider the role of spousal ‘discipline’ and the
spread of disease that may be facilitated through the in- or out-migration
of labourers (Daley, 2011).
While vesting greater control in local Village Councils and Assemblies
has the potential to protect local interests in land against foreign and
state interests, at the same time, local politics are overlaid with custom-
ary practices that restrict women’s land access and political participation
(Tsikata, 2003). In contrast, national efforts to individualize land tenure
hold the promise of legally protecting and enforcing women’s individual
rights to land. However, legal protections for land tenure do not ensure
women’s access to resources or markets, nor do they remedy existing
customary practices and beliefs that frown upon women’s independent
land ownership. As such, the persistence of customary practices, as well
as broader social expectations about the appropriateness of participation
in public life, intersect with formal legal processes to constrict women’s
access to recourse in terms of land. Considered alongside the possi-
ble detrimental effects of land deals in terms of violent displacement
or market exclusion, these intersections of political and community
governance need to be more closely considered.
 Andrea Collins 193

Kenya
Klopp (2000: 15) suggests that ‘[o]ne might say that Kenya was founded
by successive land grabbing, and hence, land grabbing is as old as Kenya
itself, if not older’. Klopp is making reference to the establishment of
Kenya as a political entity under British colonial rule and the subsequent
tools of land appropriation and allocation as exercised by both colonial
and post-independence governments. As noted above, the Kenyan gov-
ernment has pursued individualization, titling, and registration of land
rights since independence in 1963, yet it has neither fully replaced the
practice of customary law across the country nor has it protected citi-
zens from the land grabbing by Kenya’s political elites (Mackenzie, 1990;
Klopp, 2000). From the outset, titling and registration of land largely
benefited men as heads of households, and customary law continued
to govern women’s access to land through kinship relations (Davison,
1988; Mackenzie, 1990; Nzioki 2002). As such, land remains a con-
tentious issue in Kenyan politics, creating tension across ethnic, class,
and gender lines.
Despite these ongoing political challenges, efforts to remedy gender
inequality in land rights continue to be made. In 2010, Kenyans voted to
alter the constitution to include a number of new provisions regarding
gender equality, including land rights. The new constitution promises
the right to own property to ‘every person’ and equitable access to
land and security of land rights. While these provisions do not explic-
itly mention women or other groups as historically disadvantaged, the
constitution does commit to eliminating gender discrimination in the
law, customs and practices related to land and property (Republic of
Kenya, Sec. 60.1f). These changes have been heralded as a significant
step forward in terms of women’s rights in Kenya, especially given the
socio-cultural and economic importance of land.
Yet it remains to be seen whether or not these constitutional changes
will translate into long-term social change and whether women’s claims
to land will be protected, especially where corporate or elite interests tar-
get land for investment. Moreover, changes in statutory law coexist with
customary law in many parts of the country. According to Mackenzie
(1990), ‘two spheres of land rights coexist, and battles over land are
fought within and across both’ (Mackenzie, 1990: 629). Further, new
legal protections may not effectively counter women’s economic, social,
and physical vulnerabilities, nor may legal protections be sufficient or
even effectively enforced. Independent economic wealth is often a key
factor in determining who will be able to launch legal challenges where
unconstitutional practices occur.
194 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

Land grabs and gender in Kenya

As in Tanzania, many Kenyan women face systemic discrimination
with regard to access to and ownership of land, in spite of legal pro-
tections and guarantees. Changes to legislation can be a resource for
women and other marginalized groups, but this legislation exists along-
side other power relations and dispute settlement forums. Thus, despite
these recent changes, whether women’s rights to land will be effectively
implemented and enforced remains to be seen, especially in light of the
greater value of land. In Kenya, chronicles of ‘property grabbing’ – a
phenomenon distinct from land deals, wherein victims, largely female
widows, are forcibly evicted from their homes by family members, tra-
ditional leaders, or neighbours – highlights the continued importance
of kinship ties to women’s claims to land access (Izumi, 2007). Thus,
in spite of legal protections, systemic discrimination in land access
continues to be shaped by social expectations and local governance
structures.
This discrimination also further perpetuates Kenyan women’s eco-
nomic inequality in its shaping of gendered expectations and the
shaping of productive and reproductive roles. While liberalized land
policies have long undermined women’s relative economic stability,
ongoing shifts in agricultural production and the limits to women’s off-
farm activity and income have prevented women from accumulating
the capital required to purchase land in a number of rural communi-
ties (Davison, 1988; Mackenzie, 1990). Women’s lack of independent
land ownership in Kenya increases their vulnerability in the face of
land deals and the land markets that further titling and registration
create. Moreover, the promise of investors to develop labour markets
frequently appears to overlook the realities of women’s productive and
reproductive roles. This economic inequality, which is closely connected
to social exclusion, is not likely to be remedied by economic governance
initiatives alone.
In addition, systemic gender discrimination in socio-political repre-
sentation is a pressing concern that needs to be addressed by interested
parties conducting consultations or assessments. Daley (2011: 7) notes
how Maasai women in Kenya have been traditionally excluded from
discussions on land distribution, and even where they were permitted
to attend – as executors of their husbands’ estates, they were still not
permitted to speak. Thus:

As a result, and ‘lacking a forum to articulate their preferences’,

women as a group ‘disengaged from the process. Rules created to
 Andrea Collins 195

exclude women had a cultural basis, which they were neither ready
nor equipped to challenge’.
(Daley, 2011: 37)

Pervasive socio-political exclusion based on gender suggests that Kenyan

women of various community backgrounds may be excluded not only
from local decision-making, but decision-making at multiple levels. The
exclusion of women from community discussions often results in a lack
of attention to women’s land usage or the potential impacts of land
projects on women’s productive and reproductive activities. Considered
alongside the complexity of the negotiation of large-scale land deals
detailed above, limited participation of women in local decision-making
perpetuates gender blindness in economic, social, and environmental
planning.
Finally, Kenyan women experience systemic gender-based violence,
with up to half of all Kenyan women having experienced abuse since
adolescence, and in some regions, spousal ‘discipline’ might be inter-
preted as an ‘elemental component of local culture’ (Daley, 2011:
8). Women may also experience sexual and violent abuse from male
officials in trying to protect their access to land, and influxes of single,
male migrant workers as a result of changes in production may encour-
age disease transmission. Hence, as noted above, analysis of land deals
must consider where employment is generated and who will be filling
these positions (Daley, 2011).

Conclusions

As economic pressures on agricultural land grow, communities will

continue to grapple with the issues surrounding the purchase and devel-
opment of land. Land deals themselves vary in form and substance,
requiring close attention to the ways in which corporate firms or local
elites secure land from governments, councils, communities, and indi-
viduals, and who stands to benefit. As such, conceptions of ‘governance’
need to be expanded upon in order to more completely understand the
complex legal, political, social, and economic contexts within which
land deals are conceived and struck. In Tanzania and Kenya, understand-
ing the various structures of land governance entails an appreciation
of legal and political pluralism alongside an understanding the role of
gendered social expectations in shaping the ways in which individu-
als participate, or do not participate, in the public sphere. Formal legal
governance and customary land tenure each enable individuals and
196 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

communities to make claims over land, but which nonetheless remain

tied to social positions based on gender and class. As such, potential
critics to the deals remain silenced and potential pitfalls unspoken. Even
more seriously, the governance of land and behaviour can and has taken
violent forms.
This chapter has demonstrated that gender-sensitive consideration
of land deals broadens the scope of what is typically considered ‘gov-
ernance’. While international efforts to mitigate the negative impacts
of land deals consider often ill-defined problems of ‘weak governance’,
advancing voluntary principles and guidelines for transnational actors,
a gendered analysis of land deals enables another focus. Gender-
sensitive analysis considers the immediate local level impacts that land
deals have on existing vulnerable communities, especially women. This
includes understanding various structures of governance as sites of gen-
der inequality and how they intersect to create social exclusion. Based
on these insights, state and local policy-makers should undertake more
thorough gender-sensitive social impact assessments of proposed land
deals, paying attention to how vulnerable groups are excluded through-
out the land deal process, from the initial consultations through to the
lasting social and economic impacts. Ideally, such assessments would
empower decision-makers not only to reject exploitative deals, but
also encourage (re-)examination of the complexities of local land gov-
ernance schemes. In the short term, advocacy and support for such
critical and thorough assessments seem more likely emerge from local
and international civil society organizations, given the lure of agricul-
tural investments for elites and governments in uncertain economic
times.
Attention to formal and informal local forms of governance reveals
the complexity of governing land deals. Rooting governance analysis in
the ‘local’ and working from the ‘bottom-up’ should lead to a recon-
sideration of initiatives intended to mitigate the negative impacts of
commercial land investment. Especially where global level initiatives
have struggled to incorporate considerations of gender inequality, a
closer examination of local governance and the deeply unequal impacts
of land deals should provide the impetus to delineate between various
forms of governance and closely examine their impacts.

Notes
1. For the purposes of this chapter, ‘land deals’ will be the preferred term to
describe the general phenomenon of international commercial investment in
 Andrea Collins 197

or purchases of land. See the 2011 Tirana Declaration (www.landcoalition.org/

fr/node/1109) for a detailed and widely accepted definition of ‘land grab’.
2. Villagization involved the resettlement of nine million peasants without con-
sultation or consent and without considering existing customary laws. This
resettlement was justified by the State’s ownership of land (Tsikata, 2003).
3. For detailed discussions of Tanzania’s land debates and the role of feminist
activism therein see Tsikata (2003), Shivji (2002), and Mbilinyi (2009).

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10
Casting the Net Widely: Effective
Governance and the Contribution
of Fisheries to the Development of
African Countries
Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Dawit Tesfamichael

Introduction

Africa’s marine fisheries and oceans have contributed significantly to

the livelihood of the continent’s coastal communities for centuries. The
shell middens found off the coast of Eritrea in the Red Sea are the oldest
record of human consumption of sea food (Walter et al., 2000; Mayer
and Beyin, 2009). The Fantis of Ghana have been fishing along the
West African coast since the 18th century (Alder and Sumaila, 2004;
Atta-Mills et al., 2004). Marine resources could continue to serve as a
sustainable source of economic development. That is, social and cultural
values for coastal African countries if marine resources are managed and
governed effectively with regard to the environment. In this chapter, we
explore the opportunities and challenges facing African fisheries, with
the objective of providing insights for policy-makers and the public, to
help them develop policies for the sustainable development of African
fisheries, both for current and future generations. By sustainability we
here mean the ability to maintain the regeneration potential of fisheries
resources indefinitely into the future so that they can support the social
and economic needs of the society for many generations to come.
Specifically, this chapter begins with a discussion of the current state
of African fisheries and sets this in the context of global fisheries.
It addresses the following question: how are fish stocks within the Exclu-
sive Economic Zones (EEZs)1 of African countries doing? Put differently,
are fish stocks under-fished, fully fished, or over-fished? The answers

200
 Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Dawit Tesfamichael 201

to these questions will help us identify how Africa’s fisheries/marine

resources should be governed into the future to support developments
in the continent. Next, it identifies key governance issues and problems
facing marine fisheries in the continent, such as illegal, unreported,
and unregulated (IUU) fishing, the lack of adequate knowledge of the
resources in Africa’s marine ecosystems, and promotion of continental
and regional co-operation. The chapter then presents the key challenges
to broadening and enhancing successful marine governance initiatives
around Africa. In the penultimate section, the chapter provides exam-
ples of successful fisheries across the continent and explains why these
fisheries are successful. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
possible solutions for the problems identified above.

The governance of fisheries

The governance of fisheries has many facets which include biological

and socio-economic (Chuenpagdee and Sumaila, 2010). Knowledge of
the resources and the ecosystem that supports them is the base for
any fishery and its management. Consequently, fishery assessment tools
have been developed to address these ecosystems. The variety of surplus
yield models are the most common models used in assessing many fish-
eries in developing countries (Garcia et al., 1989), in the rare instance
where some form of management is put in place. The models estimate
the maximum sustainable yields of fisheries, which acts as a quan-
titative management target (Beverton and Holt, 1957). Bio-economic
models add the economic aspect of fisheries explicitly to the biologi-
cal models in order to have a wider scope of fishery assessment and give
comprehensive guidelines to policy-makers (Clark, 1973).
Naturally, developing countries, including those in Africa, are inter-
ested in how they can use their fisheries resources to support the
development of their countries. Until now, fisheries development sim-
ply meant more boats and more people fishing. Instead of this, it is
clear from the literature and data analysis presented herein that mod-
ern fisheries development should be seen in terms of maintaining and
rebuilding overfished stocks such that they can continue to produce
benefits to both current and future generations in a sustainable manner.
Modern fisheries management should seek to optimize the net benefits
from each unit of fish taken from the ocean; that is, we should focus
on quality rather than the current emphasis on the quantity of fish
caught. A dataset for the entire African continent is not readily available.
We have searched databases to obtain a long time series data, starting
202 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

from 1950 up until the present, which clearly shows changes overtime.
We present here the best dataset we managed to acquire.

The current state of Africa’s fishery resources

Fish resources are increasingly being over-exploited throughout the
planet, and this includes resources in the EEZs of African countries.
Excessive fishing efforts have led to the depletion of marine popu-
lations and changes in ecosystem structure (e.g., Pauly et al., 2002;
Myers and Worm, 2003). Large-bodied, predatory fish are particularly
vulnerable. Thus, fish catch has become increasingly dominated by
species lower in the food chain, a phenomenon known as ‘fishing down
marine foodweb’ (Pauly et al., 1998). Over-exploitation results in sub-
stantial socio-economic losses to the fishing industries and communities
(Sumaila and Suatoni, 2005; World Bank and FAO, 2008) by threaten-
ing the long-term survival of marine species (Hutchings and Reynolds,
2004).

Sustainability of exploited fish stocks globally and in

African waters

Using catch data from the Sea Around Us project, we present in

Figure 10.1 an evaluation of the trends in reported global fish catch. The
Sea Around Us project developed an algorithm that disaggregated
reported catch data into a 30 degrees latitude by 30 degrees longitude
grid of the world’s oceans.2 The main source of catch data is fisheries
statistics from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), which is modified where appropriate with more reli-
able data. Thus, the Sea Around Us project catch data allows the analysis
of both the temporal trends and spatial patterns of change in global
catch. To put the current state of African marine fisheries in the con-
text of global fisheries, we used the same dataset to study catches
extracted from the EEZs of African countries over the past six decades
(see Figures 10.1a and 10.1b).
The global reported fish catch increased from less than 20 million
tonnes in 1950 and peaked at around 80 million tonnes in the mid-
1980s (Watson and Pauly, 2001) (Figure 10.1a). It is worth noting that
up to 10 per cent of the global catch is from the highly productive
Peruvian anchovy (Engraulis ringens). When Watson and Pauly (2001)
subtracted the Peruvian anchovy from the global catch, a steeper decline
in global catch since the 1980s was demonstrated. Subdividing the catch
into groups of species, catches of invertebrates and small pelagic fishes
 Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Dawit Tesfamichael 203

Catch (million tonnes) 90

80
Peruvian anchovy
70
60
Demersal & other fishes
50
40
30 Pelagic fishes (>30 cm)
20
10 Pelagic fishes (<30 cm)
0 Invertebrates
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Figure 10.1a Time-series of reported catch from 1950 to 2004, globally

7
Catch (million tonnes)

6
5
Demersal & other fishes
4
3
Pelagic fishes (>30 cm)
2
1 Pelagic fishes (<30 cm)
0 Invertebrates
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Figure 10.1b Time-series of reported catch from 1950 to 2004, from the Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZ) of African countries

(<30 cm in total length) were relatively stable in the last two decades.
However, catches of large pelagic (living in surface or mid-water depth)
and demersal (living on or near the seafloor) fishes declined consistently.
Catches from Africa’s EEZs were below one million tonnes in 1950 and
they currently stand at about five million tonnes. The highest catch
taken was about six million tonnes in the late 1970s.
The global catch trend provides a general picture of the exploitation
level of the world’s fisheries resources. Since the 1980s, fishing efforts
in many regions, including Africa, continued to increase. Thus, the
overall reduction in catch indicates that the majority of the world’s
fisheries resources have already reached their maximum sustainable lev-
els. Specifically, large predatory and demersal fish show declining trends
204 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

since the mid-1980s. This suggests that these groups are already over-
exploited. Catch extracted from the EEZs of African countries fluctuates
more than global catches because of the dominance of the highly vari-
able pelagic species in the EEZs of Africa (Figure 10.1). Adjusting the
statistics with potential IUU catches may show an even steeper declin-
ing trend in global and African fish catches in recent decades (Watson
and Pauly, 2001; Agnew et al., 2009).
Using the same catch time-series data compiled by the Sea Around Us
project and the categorization schemes similar to those adopted by FAO
(2006), Figure 10.2 shows the exploitation status of exploited fish stocks.
The maximum catch of each commercially exploited stock in the time
series was determined.

Various stages of exploitation of fish populations

Next, we define various stages of exploitation of fish populations accord-
ing to the FAO (2006). These stages include ‘under-developed’ (low
level of fishing effort, producing much lower catches of fish than the
potential maximum level), ‘developing’ (rapid increase in fishing effort
and catch), ‘fully developed’ (reached maximum annual catch), ‘over-
exploited’ (fish abundance is too low to maintain maximum level of
catch), and collapsed (reduction of fish abundance by fishing to lev-
els at which the catch is negligible compared to historical levels). For
years before the maximum catch of a stock had been reached and the
catch was below 10 per cent and 50 per cent of the maximum catch,
a stock was considered ‘under-developed’ and ‘developing’, respectively.
When annual catch exceeded 50 per cent of the maximum catch, a stock
was considered ‘fully exploited’. For years after the maximum catch had
been reached and annual catch was below 50 per cent of the maximum
catch, the stock was considered ‘over-exploited’. Finally, when catch
declined to less than 10 per cent of the maximum catch, it was con-
sidered ‘collapsed’. The overall status of the exploited fish stocks was
evaluated globally, by country EEZs and, specifically for coastal African
countries, from 1950 to 2004.
Classifying exploited stocks (by country and taxon) into the above
five exploitation ranks, we see from Figure 10.2 that the number of
over-exploited and collapsed stocks in the world increased rapidly from
less than 5 per cent in the late 1950s to over 50 per cent in the 2000s
(Figure 10.2a). This means that catch from over half of the fish stocks
decreased by over 50 per cent from their maximum level. There is vir-
tually no exploited stock that is currently in the under-developed or
 Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Dawit Tesfamichael 205

(a) Global
100

Percent of exploited stocks

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year

(b) Within the EEZs of African countries

100
Percent of exploited stocks

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year

Collapsed Over-exploited Fully-exploited

Developing Under-developed

Figure 10.2 Percentage of exploited stocks in the five status categories: under-
developed, developing, fully exploited, over-exploited, and collapsed (a) globally
and (b) within the EEZs of African countries

developing stage. The pattern in African countries is similar to the global

pattern, with a little time lag.
We plot in Figure 10.3, the proportion of over-exploited and collapsed
stocks in each country. In the 1960s, the number of over-exploited or
collapsed stocks in most parts of the world was small, representing less
than 10 per cent of their exploited fish stocks. However, by the 2000s,
206 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

(a) 1960s

(b) 2000s

Percent of stocks
over-exploited or collapsed
0–10
11–20
21–30
31–40
41–50
>50

Figure 10.3 Percentage of stocks that are classified as over-exploited or collapsed

in each EEZ: (a) in the 1960s and (b) in the 2000s

most EEZs, including those in Africa have a high proportion of over-

exploited or collapsed stocks.
We have demonstrated in this section, using catch data from 1950
to the recent available data, that the state of African fisheries, just like
those of fisheries around the world, is not strong. The data analysis
shows that there are issues with the sustainability and long-term sur-
vival of African fish stocks and therefore the livelihoods of the people
who depend on them. The data shows that the best days of fish stocks
are probably over, with huge economic, nutritional, and social costs to
the continent. Reversing the declining trends described in this section
is urgently needed.

The cost of the current poor state of fisheries to Africa

The state of African fisheries depicted in the preceding section is not

just about data – it is also about people and their sustenance. To make
this clear, we provide in Table 10.1 (see below) information taken from
Srinivasan and colleagues (2010) on the potential loss in catch and catch
 Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Dawit Tesfamichael 207

Table 10.1 Prevalence of undernourishment, potential catch loss as % of actual

tonnes of fish caught and level of seafood in dietary protein in 22 coastal African
countries

Country Prevalence of Potential catch Percentage (%)

undernourish- loss (tonnes) as of dietary
ment in total % of actual protein derived
population (%), tonnes caught, from sea food,
2003–2005 2000 2003–2005

Liberia 40 200 −
Guinea-Bissau 32 200 2
Namibia 19 83 6
Democratic 76 320 7
Rep. of
Congo
Benin 19 22 5
Angola 46 120 9
Côte d’Ivoire 14 8.7 9
Guinea 17 24 7
Rep. of the 22 12 12
Congo
Tanzania 35 16 −
Djibouti 32 200 −
Mauritania 8 6 7
Kenya 32 7.9 −
Sierra Leone 47 9 16
Mozambique 38 9.9 −
Togo 37 12 −
Gambia 30 15 14
Senegal 26 5.9 15
Ghana 9 − −
Nigeria 9 − −
Sao Tome 5 − −
Principe
Seychelles 9 − −

value for some coastal African countries and the prevalence of under-
nourishment in these countries. This table demonstrates that many
African countries, some with large proportions of their population fac-
ing undernourishment, could gain significant amounts of fish protein
by instituting effective governance of their marine fisheries resources.

Key issues and problems facing marine fisheries in Africa

Using a number of indicators, the preceding section demonstrates that
fisheries resources around the world, including those in Africa, are not
208 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

in a strong state. The key issue facing the continent is clearly the need to
halt the current decline of its fisheries and put in place governance struc-
tures that would help rebuild the continent’s fish resources to their full
potential. These resources will in turn contribute to livelihoods, poverty
reduction, and the general well-being of the people. The current poor
state of global fisheries has resulted in the following, many of which
have direct implications for African fisheries:

• a rise in distant water fishing over time (Alder and Sumaila, 2004);
• an increase in fishing access agreements with developing countries
(Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002; Atta Mills et al., 2004);
• an increase in global trade of fish products (Anderson, 2003);
• increasing use of fisheries subsidies (Milazzo, 1998; Sumaila and
Pauly, 2006);
• rise in illegal; unreported and unregulated fishing (OECD, 2004; High
Seas Task Force, 2006; Sumaila et al., 2006);
• drive to extend fishing to the deep and high seas (Morato et al., 2006);
and
• increasing faith in aquaculture as the solution to dwindling wild fish
stocks (FAO, 2006; Liu and Sumaila, 2008).

Each of these developments has implications for African countries, with

many of them impacting the ability of Africa to manage its resources
sustainably for the benefits of both current and future generations of
Africans.

Distant water fishing and fishing access agreements

There were two concurrent events that caused the expansion of fish-
ing efforts from European (also Asian) countries to Western Africa. First,
fish stocks were increasingly depleted in different parts of the world,
most notably in Europe in the 1970s. As a result of these depletions,
new fishing grounds were needed. Second, the desire for newly inde-
pendent African countries to develop economically and socially led
to the granting of fishing rights by some African countries to foreign
fleets. Conversely, the European vessels had been forced out of their
own regions, after decades of over-fishing had significantly decreased
the quality and quantity of fish stocks there, while the demand was still
growing (Gaag et al., 2005).
Even though the marine resources of West Africa have been systemat-
ically exploited for several decades by foreign fleets, heavy exploitation
commenced in the early 1960s, mainly to meet the increasing demand
 Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Dawit Tesfamichael 209

for fish and other marine products in European countries (notably,

France, Spain, Portugal, and the former Soviet Union) and China (Alder
and Sumaila, 2004). However, it was not until 1979 that the EU negoti-
ated and signed bilateral Fisheries Access Agreements (FAAs) on behalf
of its fishing sector. These agreements are usually negotiated by policy-
makers with little or no participation by scientists or fishing commu-
nities of developing nations. Figures 10.4a and 10.4b taken from Alder
and Sumaila (2004), demonstrate the change in ‘agreement years’; that
is, the number of years countries in West Africa have entered into access
agreements with countries outside the region, to fish within their EEZs.
These figures clearly show that there has been a significant increase
in access agreements between West African countries and countries in
Europe and Asia from 1960 to 1999. Access agreements between the EU
and some West African countries have continued to date.
Mauritania is an example of an African country that has signed fish-
ing access agreements with EU countries for many years. For example,

31

Annual Landings
(million tonnes)
2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
Asia Soviet EU
Bloc

Figure 10.4a Distant water fleet access to West African waters (Agreement Years,
1960–1969)
Source: Alder and Sumaila (2004).
210 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

41

185

35

Annual Landings
(million tonnes)
2.0 45

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
Asia Former EU Africa
Soviet
Bloc

Figure 10.4b Distant water fleet access to West African waters (Agreement Years,
1990–1999)
Source: Alder and Sumaila (2004).

the country signed a six-year, 86 million euro per year, fisheries agree-
ment with the EU in 2006, with a clause allowing for re-negotiating after
two years. In addition, license fees from European fishermen may add
22 million euros a year for Mauritania. The current agreement allows
200 European vessels to fish for shrimps, hake, tuna, and other species
in the waters off the Mauritanian coast. It is worth noting that the EU
signed its first fishing agreement with Mauritania in 1987. The income
from the EU’s fisheries agreement with Mauritania is estimated to con-
stitute 30 per cent of Gross Domestic Product. The Minister of Fisheries
in Mauritania estimates that European fishermen catch as much as 600
million euros worth of fish each year from Mauritania’s waters. More-
over, a recent EU study estimated that each euro worth of fish caught
by European vessels leads to a total economic impact in Europe of three
euros, implying an overall economic impact of 1.8 billion euros for the
90–110 million euros per year that the Europeans pay for the fish.

Global trade of fish products

Global trade in fish and fish products has been increasing in recent
years (Alder and Watson, 2007; see Figure 10.5). This happened partly
 Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Dawit Tesfamichael 211

60 20

Export as % of landing
Export value (106 USD)

15
40

10

20
5

0 0
1976 1982 1988 1994 2000
Year

Figure 10.5 Exported marine product as a percentage of the total landing

(broken line) and its value (full line)

because many fish stocks in the north of the Atlantic were overfished,
and partly because of the creation of the Exclusive Economic Zone in
the late 1980s, which meant that distant water fishing nations could
not fish as far away from home as in the past.
We see from the figure that as the percentage of landings of exported
marine products has increased steadily since 1975, so too has the value
of fish and fish products. However, from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s
there was a rapid increase in value of fish exports compared to the vol-
ume exported. It is worth noting that the increasing value of exports is
also in contrast to other protein sources such as chicken and beef, where
prices have remained stable or have declined.
Figures 10.6 and 10.7 provide an overview of the global importers
and exporters of demersal fish and small pelagic species, respectively.
In the 1970s, cod was the dominant traded fish, but this shifted to Alaska
pollock in the 1980s and then in the 1990s. We now find that there is a
mix of species. While pollock remains prominent, other fish such as cod,
plaice, haddock, and saithe are becoming increasingly important. What
is clear in the above two figures is that, in general, fish move from the
developing south to the developed north of the world through trade.

Fisheries subsidies
Fishery subsidies are financial transfers, whether direct or indirect, from
public entities to the fishing sector. These transfers usually help the
212

Cod, saithe, plaice, redfish, haddock

EEZ fished
Importing
country
cod flatfish
pollock
flounder

hake
hake hake

Grenadier,
snoek, seabream

Figure 10.6 Exporters and importers of demersal fish

Source: Alder and Walters (2007).

Capelin, herring, mackerel

clupeoids
herring mackerel
capelin
menhaden pilchard

anchoveta,
sardine
Horse & jack
mackerel
(33% of
global
exports)

EEZ fished
Importing
country

Figure 10.7 Exporters and importers of small pelagic fish

Source: Alder and Walters (2007).
 Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Dawit Tesfamichael 213

sector make more profits than they would otherwise make, resulting in
overcapacity and overfishing. Fisheries subsidies are a concern because
(i) they have been estimated to be large (Sumaila and Pauly, 2006) and
are paid by the tax payer. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether this
is the best use of public funds, especially in African countries where
the demand for public funds to deal with huge issues of public inter-
est are unlimited; (ii) subsidies have socio-economic, distributional,
and trade impacts on fishing communities, regions, and countries. The
group which does not receive subsidies is disadvantaged in the market
place; (iii) fisheries subsidies are recognized worldwide as contributing
to overfishing. As described earlier, many fish stocks in African EEZs
are already depleted. Consequently, providing subsidies that lead to
overcapacity and overfishing is detrimental.
We provide an example of the potential negative effects of fisheries
subsidies. Based on interviews with fishermen of different ages, we illus-
trate in Figure 10.8 the decline in catch rate in Sudanese artisanal
fisheries after the introduction of subsidies for motors by the British
overseas development project starting in the late 1970s.

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing

IUU incidence in Africa is known to be high (Sumaila et al., 2006; Agnew

et al., 2009), an activity that is carried out by many fishing fleets active

120
Catch (kg/day/crew)

80

40

0
<1980 1980s 1990s 2000s
Decades

Figure 10.8 Change in the catch rate for Sudanese artisanal fisheries, error bars
are 95% confidence intervals
Source: Tesfamichael and colleagues (in preparation).
214 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

in West African waters, both domestic and foreign. It is known that for-
eign fleets discard a lot of their by-catch and that they also catch beyond
their agreed amount (Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002). This is because rel-
ative to fish stocks in waters elsewhere, the waters of Africa offer the
potential for high, valuable catches. In addition to this attraction, the
likelihood of being detected while fishing illegally is low because of weak
monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) systems in many coastal
African countries (Sumaila, 2012). Even when IUU fishers are caught,
the fines imposed on them are usually so low that they are unable to
serve as effective deterrence. On the other hand, the domestic fleets are
so numerous that it is difficult to put in place an effective monitoring
system. These vessels land their catches not only in areas where proper
MCS is carried out but also in areas that are outside the MCS monitor-
ing system. Even for those vessels that land their catches in monitored
landing sites, not all their catches are reported because some of it is
consumed by crew members. Moreover, catch is given to family and
friends and therefore will not usually be reflected in the records as those
portions are taken before the official weighing. These amounts can be
significant, representing up to half of the reported catch in some cases
(Tesfamichael and Pauly, 2011).
The high incidence of IUU fishing inflicts ecological, economic, and
social impacts. Ecologically, IUU fishing undermines the already lim-
ited stock assessments in many coastal African countries by making it
impossible to estimate the total fish stock removals from the marine
ecosystems of the continent. Economically, IUU fishing imposes huge
impacts on the continent. According to Agnew and colleagues (2009),
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries alone
suffer annual revenue losses totalling up to USD 1 billion. Finally, social
impacts appear in the form of conflicts between domestic small-scale
fleets and IUU fishing fleets. IUU fishing contributes to the food security
issues facing many African countries by undermining the resource base
and therefore the potential for higher catches.
The following actions can be taken to begin to deal with the IUU prob-
lems facing coastal countries in the continent. In the first place, joint
efforts by groups of African countries to put in place MCS systems will
help immensely. The lack of adequate MCS in Africa stems mostly from
the lack of resources, both human and financial. By pooling resources,
groups of countries would be in a position to monitor their waters more
effectively and thus increase the detection probability of IUU fishing.
The SADC countries are considering a joint effort as described herein.
Also, the 16 countries adjacent to the Gulf of Guinea’s large marine
 Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Dawit Tesfamichael 215

ecosystem in West Africa will benefit immensely by working together

to set up a joint MCS system. Other measures that can be taken to
address IUU fishing in African waters include: (i) improving the legal
system – making judges appreciate the negative impacts of IUU fishing;
(ii) implementing training and port inspection and regional collabora-
tion; (iii) implementing joint technological solutions at the regional
and ecosystem levels; (iv) using social and cultural pressure to deal
with domestic IUU fishing; and (v) bringing education and economic
development to coastal fishing communities.
The lack of the collection of basic fishery statistics such as catch and
effort, exacerbated by IUU fishing, is a major problem to assess the sta-
tus of fishery resources in many African countries. The traditional stock
assessment surveys developed mainly in developed temperate countries
may not be easily applicable to the tropical developing countries for two
major reasons: the ecological and technical fisheries differences between
the two regions; and because fishery surveys cost a lot of financial and
human resources, which most developing countries do not have at their
disposal. What is reported in terms of catch and effort for developing
countries is intermittent and is not comprehensive even for the years in
which there are reports. There is a clear problem of a stable and contin-
ued institutional structure mandated to do data collection. The meagre
data that is reported for developing countries does not include IUU,
which underestimates the actual extraction and encourages the notion
that more is still available to be fished. This, in turn, may result in severe
depletion or even extinction of species. The magnitude of the reported
catch can be significant compared to the reported catch. Alverson and
colleagues (1994) estimated the global unreported discards to be 17.9 to
39.5 million tonnes every year, while the maximum global catch given
by the FAO was around 85 million tonnes in the mid-1990s.
Efforts should be made to get a better understanding of fishery catches
(Tesfamichael and Pitcher, 2007). Pauly (1995) recommended that even
anecdotal information should be used to understand what is happen-
ing to resources. The alternative usually is to report zero when there is
no data, which is clearly problematic. We provide here examples of esti-
mated total catch, including unreported catch, and the official reported
catch from the Red Sea. Figure 10.9 shows catch data reported to FAO,
and the estimated annual total catch, average over five years, including
unreported catch for the Eritrean Red Sea trawl fishery. The differences
between the two values are significant and this could easily lead to a mis-
management of the resources. Figure 10.10 below shows catch estimates
for Sudanese artisanal fisheries. The fisheries administration in Sudan
216 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

Catch '000 tonnes

40

20

0
4

4
–5

–5

–6

–6

–7

–7

–8

–8

–9

–9

–0
50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

00
Year (period)

Total estimated catch FAO data

Figure 10.9 The estimated catch, annual average of five years, and data submit-
ted to FAO for the Eritrean trawl fishery in the Red Sea
Source: Tesfamichael and Pitcher (2007).

12
Catch (t × 103)

0
1950–54

1955–59

1960–64

1965–69

1970–74

1975–79

1980–84

1985–89

1990–94

1995–99

2000–04

Figure 10.10 Catch data for Sudanese artisanal fisheries from data recorded in
the market (broken line) and total estimate including unreported catch (full line)
Source: Tesfamichael and Pauly (2011).

depends on market data records for its annual catch reports. However,
surveys have shown that half of total fish catch in Sudan does not go
through the formal market channels.
FAO collects annual fish catch globally; however, the accuracy of
the data is debatable (see Figure 10.9 below). Because of the unstable
 Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Dawit Tesfamichael 217

institutional structure in many developing countries, development

projects, which are mainly sponsored by international donors, depend
heavily on FAO data for their planning. Such actions through interna-
tional projects may increase the total catch at the beginning. But if the
effect is monitored over a longer period, it may decrease drastically the
resource base and the catch of the fishers (see Figure 10.8 above).

Aquaculture as the solution?

Many African countries, including those that are non-coastal, see
aquaculture as a potential avenue for meeting the animal protein needs
of their population. We agree that fish farming has potential in Africa,
but that it needs to be pursued carefully. In particular, there are two
aspects that need to be considered carefully. First, Africa needs to avoid
the farming of fish that needs fish meal and oil because such farming
does not add to the physical quantity of fish available for human con-
sumption and therefore is unlikely to contribute to the supply of fish
protein (Pauly et al., 2002; Naylor et al., 2003). Second, farms need to
be regulated tightly to ensure that they do not cause environmental
damage, which will saddle the continent with much higher costs than
overall benefits (Sumaila et al., 2007).

Tackling the problems

To identify possible solutions, we need to understand the fundamental

reasons for the problems of the current state of African fisheries men-
tioned above. In our view, there are three key reasons for the problems
we face: (i) The lack of adequate knowledge on the state of fish stocks
and the ecosystems to support them; (ii) The lack of understanding of
the immense value (in a broad sense) of Africa’s fishery resources; and
(iii) The inadequacy of fisheries management, especially, monitoring,
control, and surveillance. Other challenges include: (i) The prevalence
of poverty in many fishing communities in Africa, which makes it dif-
ficult to put in place policies for the long-term sustainability of the
resources (Sumaila, 2005); (ii) Many fish stocks are shared by many
African countries. For example, 16 countries share the fish stocks in the
Gulf of Guinea Large Marine Ecosystem. This calls for a high degree
of co-operation among these countries in order to bring about effec-
tive governance (Munro, 1979; Sumaila, 1995); and (iii) The lack of
understanding of the connection between what we do today and what
fishing opportunities there will be in the future for our children and
grandchildren.
218 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

The current notion of fisheries development as synonymous with

more boats and more people in the fishery hoping for more catches and
jobs, needs to change to what we call ‘modern fisheries development’.
The modern fisheries development concept argues that effective gover-
nance of African fisheries requires a shift from fisheries as a drain on
society’s resources to fisheries as a net contributor of wealth and com-
munity development. To achieve this, we need to move away from the
notion of fisheries development as having more boats and more fishers
active in the fishery, to one that views fisheries development as main-
taining and rebuilding fish stocks so they can be in a better position
to deliver benefits sustainably over time. Effective governance needs to
move beyond the current emphasis on catching as much fish as possible,
so that the resource rent from fisheries is not dissipated and makes sure
that costal countries, and especially fishing communities, add value to
their fish catch. In effect, effective fisheries governance needs to focus on
the generation and equitable distribution of resource rent within each
fishery, from the outset of management to the final consumption of fish
products. Without dealing adequately with these foundational prob-
lems, African countries cannot engage in global fish trade, sign access
agreements and/or provide subsidies that are ecologically sustainable,
or economically and socially beneficial to their coastal communities.
Drawing from the work of the Global Ocean Economics project at the
Fisheries Centre of the University of British Columbia, Canada, the
schematic diagram (see Figure 10.11) captures the concept of value addi-
tion throughout the food chain. It includes all the components of net
benefits from the fishery, from when fish is caught through to final
consumption.3
Coastal African countries need to think of the effective manage-
ment of the complete fish chain, to ensure that maximum benefits are
retained in the local fishing communities. Furthermore, to achieve effec-
tive governance of the fisheries in Africa, managers need to broaden
their current focus from what they receive from trading raw fish, for
example, through access agreements, to include the total added value to
the economies of fishing nations’ right throughout the fish chain.

Examples of effective local management successes

It is worth briefly mentioning that some local initiatives (or
co-management arrangements) are having positive impacts in the
management of fishery resources. Co-management has been advo-
cated strongly as an effective and integrated management scheme in
many societies that have strong traditional connections with resources
 Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Dawit Tesfamichael 219

EwE Foreign Import Import

(foreign) fisheries (landings) (products)

Landings Fish
Retail
(domestic) products
Final
EwE Domestic Wholesale/ consump.
(domestic) fisheries processing

Food
service
Export Export
(landings) (products)

Figure 10.11 The concept of value addition throughout the food chain

(Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). Many coastal communities in Africa have

developed traditional management schemes as their socio-economic
and cultural values evolved with the coastal resources and they have
been effective for a long time. For example, many coastal communi-
ties in East Africa (e.g., Sudan and Eritrea) prohibit fishing boats to
operate in the shallow coastal waters near the villages. Those easy to
access resources are left for those who do not have the means to go to
deeper waters such as widows. This traditional governance reduces the
pressure on the resources around settlements, which is usually the first
to be depleted. A collaborative management in Tanzania to stop dyna-
mite fishing provides yet another illustration of a sound local initiative
(Verheij et al., 2004).

Concluding remarks

People have been using marine resources for millennia and will do so
in the future, as long as there are still resources to extract. However, the
available evidence indicates quite clearly that global fisheries in general
are not currently sustainable. This conclusion is also true for fisheries
in Africa. The pressure on fishery resources from increased populations
and global trade has been growing disproportionally to the regeneration
capability of the resource base. To supply the ever-increasing demand of
220 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

fishery resources, we have witnessed heavy investments (at least in the

industrialized countries) in the fishing industry and technology, which
is now capable of catching large amounts of fish in a short time and can
go to the furthest possible areas.
In Africa, fishery resources are generally highly exploited. To continue
exploiting them at the rate that has been done so far is not viable. The
management of African fisheries is weakened by lack of data collection
mechanisms, assessment of the status of the resources, and the absence
of clear policy and management guidelines. These issues are not only in
fisheries, but they are part of the bigger issues of governance and lack of
institutions in the overall socio-political structures of African countries.
These weaknesses have resulted in IUU fishing, and in African coun-
tries entering into agreements with foreign fleets through deals that do
not benefit their societies and have severe consequences for the resource
base. On the other hand, there are pockets of good examples of manage-
ment schemes that are usually carried out through the co-management
of resources by a strong participation of local communities. They can be
used as effective models for practical governance.
To conclude, we provide a number of key elements of modern fisheries
development, which if pursued by African countries, have the poten-
tial to put Africa’s fisheries on a sustainable path for the benefits of
the continent’s population. First, proper assessment and monitoring of
the resource base needs to be done. This will act as the foundation for
any decision-making in the fisheries, both for domestic fishery and for-
eign fleets. The small-scale inshore fisheries benefit local communities
extensively both by providing food, economic means and employ-
ment. Consequently, their ‘smart’ development will have a long lasting
impact and arguably requires the following measures: where feasible,
assign catch rights or dedicated access privileges to fishing communities;
involve the coastal communities in the planning and implementation
of resource management schemes, that is, co-management; and improve
access to capital for the local fisheries through microcredit. If countries
have resources that local fleets are not able to fish and thus need to allow
foreign fleets to do, it is advisable that they only allow mutually ben-
eficial global trade/access agreements that are ecologically sustainable
and bring benefits to the local communities. Strengthening enforcement
against both local and foreign illegal activities could benefit African
countries significantly. As far as subsidies are concerned, they should
be used rarely, and only be used if they do no harm to the resource base.
Aquaculture can be a good alternative to fishing when countries engage
only in sustainable aquaculture that contributes to fish protein supply
 Ussif Rashid Sumaila and Dawit Tesfamichael 221

and increases food security. Even with the best management tools, there
are always unforeseen challenges. Thus the use of marine protected areas
as insurance against uncertainty and management failures is highly
advised.

Notes
1. An EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, which can stretch
for 200 nautical miles, prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), over which a state has the right to exploit marine
resources.
2. For more details, see Watson and colleagues (2004) and www.seaaroundus.org.
3. Ecopath with Ecosim (EwE) denotes an ecosystem model that is used to track
how catches impact the sustainability of all the different fish species in a given
ecosystem.

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11
Hydropolitics and Transboundary
River Basin Management Nuances
in the Southern African
Development Community
Anthony Turton

Introduction

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) region cov-

ers 14 sovereign states (Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC],
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), two of which are islands
(Mauritius and Madagascar). The 12 mainland African states are linked
by 21 river basins that cross international political borders, 15 of
which are considered to be the most important in terms of socio-
economic development. The SADC region is characterized by a specific
hydrological regime, arising from the fact that the majority of the area
lies between the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone and the Southern
Ocean, both of which drive different patterns of weather and precipita-
tion. To further complicate matters, the two dominant weather systems
are also mediated by the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which
introduces a further element of unpredictability into the equation. This
biophysical characteristic is superimposed onto a set of countries, each
with different developmental trajectories, different political histories,
differing legal systems that reflect previous colonial legacies and diverse
natural resource endowments. The ending of the Cold War has resulted
in an attenuation of localized theatres of political instability, which in
turn has meant that the SADC region is now set to grow economically
into a more integrated regional grouping, possibly along similar lines
to that of the European Union (EU). This chapter is distilled from a

224
 Anthony Turton 225

study conducted by Turton and colleagues (2008) for the United Nations
Economic Commission on Africa (UNECA) and Turton (2009) for the
South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), but goes beyond
those studies insofar as it explores ramifications for a future in which
national food security is placed at risk due to climate change. This
chapter explores what a future SADC region might look like in the wake
of climate change half a century from now by extrapolating current
empirical data into a plausible scenario. It is argued that the most appro-
priate response would be to re-negotiate food security at a regional level,
consistent with the core ideals of the Hydropolitical Complex already in
existence and it highlights some policy issues.
The chapter starts with an overview of regional precipitation, followed
by a description of the transboundary rivers (rivers that cross interna-
tional political borders) in the region. A detailed population analysis is
presented in order to distil drivers for a future scenario in which climate
change could become relevant. The Southern African Hydropolitical
Complex is presented as a concept and climate change is assessed in
terms of its possible role as a driver of regional integration within this
probable scenario. The chapter is wrapped up with a conclusion in
which some key policy implications are raised.

Regional precipitation

The economic development potential of the SADC region is defined by

the availability of water. The primary source of water is precipitation,
which is highly skewed across the region, as shown on Figure 11.1.
The precipitation patterns are characterized by steep gradients from
north to south and from east to west, with the most currently eco-
nomically diverse countries being on the ‘wrong side’ of the global
average of 860 mm/yr−1 . The data presented in Figure 11.1 show these
precipitation-related facts in a dramatic way, with the red line represent-
ing the global average isohyet of 860 mm/yr−1 and the number stated
in brackets beneath each country name representing the annual average
precipitation for that country.
Arising from these precipitation patterns, the SADC region has a very
specific drainage system. As a result of the colonial legacy, international
political borders seldom reflect hydrological management units, which
in terms of ‘21st-century thinking’ are the river basin, defined as the
area within the physical boundary delineating the surface drainage area.
At the continental level, Africa has 64 river basins that cross interna-
tional political borders – the 63 noted by Ashton and Turton (2008) plus
226 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

D. R. C.
(1,534) TANZANIA
(937)

ANGOLA
ZAMBIA MOZAMBIQUE
(1,050)
(1,011) (969)

MALAWI
(1,014)
ZIMBABWE Mean Annual
(652) Rainfall (mm)
NAMIBIA 2500
(254) BOTSWANA 2000
(400) 1500
1250
1000
900
800
700
600
SWAZILAND 500
SOUTH AFRICA
(788)
N (497) 400
300
500 km 200
LESOTHO
(760) 100
© P.J. Ashton

Figure 11.1 Mean annual precipitation across the SADC region

Source: Figure courtesy of Peter Ashton.

Lake Chilwa (see Turton et al., 2008). Of these, 21 are found in the SADC
region (as shown in Table 11.1).
Given this highly skewed nature of the regional precipitation the
SADC region also has a very specific hydrology. This is driven by the con-
version of mean annual precipitation (MAP) (rainfall) to mean annual
runoff (MAR) (water in a river and thus available for economic devel-
opment). Figure 11.2 shows the MAP:MAR conversion ratio for the 21
transboundary river basins in the SADC region. The conversion ratios of
 227

Table 11.1 Transboundary river basins to which one or more SADC member
state is a riparian

Basin name Agreement Type Riparian states

Buzi No Perennial Mozambique,

Zimbabwe
Chiloango No Perennial Angola, DRC
Congo Yes Perennial Angola, Tanzania,
Zambia
Cunene Yes Perennial Angola, Namibia
Cuvelai Yes – no RBO Endorheic Angola, Namibia
Incomati Yes Perennial Mozambique, South
Africa, Swaziland
Lake Chilwa No Endorheic Malawi,
Mozambique
Lake Natron No Endorheic Kenya, Tanzania
Limpopo Yes Perennial Botswana,
Mozambique, South
Africa, Zimbabwe
Maputo Yes Perennial Mozambique, South
Africa, Swaziland
Nile Yes Perennial DRC, Kenya,
Tanzania
Okavango/Makgadikgadi Yes Endorheic Angola, Botswana,
Namibia
Orange/Senqu Yes Perennial Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia, South
Africa
Pagani No Perennial Kenya, Tanzania
Pungué No Perennial Mozambique,
Zimbabwe
Rovuma Yes – no RBO Perennial Mozambique,
Tanzania
Savé/Runde No Perennial Mozambique,
Zimbabwe
Thukela No Perennial Lesotho, South
Africa
Umba No Perennial Kenya, Tanzania
Umbeluzi Yes Perennial Mozambique, South
Africa, Swaziland
Zambezi Yes Perennial Angola, Botswana,
Malawi,
Mozambique,
Namibia, Zambia,
Zimbabwe

Source: Based on Turton and colleagues (2008).

228 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

800

100%
700
Austria
75%
Mean annual runoff (mm)

600 Italy

500 50%
United Kingdom
400
Sweden
West Germany
300 Canada
25%
United States
200 Spain
Romania
10%
100
Australia
South Africa
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
Mean annual precipitation (mm)

Figure 11.2 The conversion ratios of MAP to MAR in the SADC region
Source: Redrawn from O’Keeffe and colleagues (1992).

MAP to MAR in the SADC region are mostly clustered around the tenth
percentile.
The horizontal axis represents MAP with the vertical axis showing
MAR. The small dots on the graph represent individual river basins in
the SADC region, with the larger dots representing specific countries by
way of comparison. Thus, for example, South Africa receives a similar
amount of precipitation to Canada (horizontal axis) but the conversion
of that rainfall to stream flow is vastly different (vertical axis). It is imme-
diately evident that while the river basins in the SADC region differ
in terms of volumetric flow, they are mostly clustered along or below
the tenth percentile (O’Keeffe et al., 1992). This means that while the
continental average MAP:MAR conversion is 20 per cent (Shiklomanov,
1993), the SADC conversion ratio is considerably less, being in most
cases half of that (10%), often from a low precipitation base. It is this
set of factors – a combination of climatic and hydrological – that is a
fundamental developmental constraint in the SADC region.

Transboundary rivers in the SADC region

The SADC region has 21 transboundary river basins to which one or

more SADC member states are riparian. These are shown in Table 11.1,
which also indicates the existence of an inter-state agreement, the
 Anthony Turton 229

names of the respective riparian states and the classification in terms

of being either perennial (a river that flows permanently) or endorheic
(a river that flows into an inland terminus other than the ocean,
often driven by specific episodic events giving such systems a unique
hydrology and risk profile).
These transboundary basins can be divided into three distinct cate-
gories. Category 1 consists of those transboundary rivers where not all
of the riparian states are members of SADC. This means that the SADC
Protocol is not necessarily applicable to the management of that spe-
cific river basin, but it could become the foundation for management
in the future. Included in this category are the: Chiloango, Congo, Lake
Natron, Nile, Pagani, and Umba basins. Category 2 consists of those
transboundary rivers where all riparians are members of SADC, so the
management of those systems is subject to the SADC Protocol (Ramoeli,
2002). This consists of two distinct subsets. Category 2a consists of rivers
that have significant portions of their basin in each riparian state so
joint management is vital; this subset consists of the Cunene, Incomati,
Limpopo, Maputo, Okavango/Makgadikgadi, Orange/Senqu, Rovuma,
Savé-Runde, Umbeluzi, and the Zambezi basins. Category 2b consists
of rivers that are fully within SADC territory and thus under the juris-
diction of the SADC Protocol, but are characterized by basins where
the largest proportion of the resource lies in one country. As a result,
joint management is not critical and might even be impractical. This
subset includes the Buzi, Pungué, and the Thukela basins. Category 3
consists of rivers that have specific hydrological regimes, which are not
conducive to the construction of large dams, mostly being endorheic
in nature, but sometimes also ephemeral and thus linked closely to
groundwater. This means that a disproportionately large number of
livelihoods are dependent on a water supply that is often highly irreg-
ular and erratic, and where the management of these systems is very
complex, often linked to endemic poverty, and mostly under-funded.
Included in this category are the Cuvelai and Lake Chilwa basins.
Of these transboundary river basins, a number are closed out, mean-
ing that more rights have been allocated to these systems than actual
water available at a high assurance of supply. Basin closure thus poses
a unique set of management challenges, so it is important that these
specific systems be distinguished from the rest. These include the
Orange/Senqu, Limpopo, and Incomati, all of which are of strategic
importance to South Africa (Ashton et al., 2008).
The hydrological data for the major transboundary river basins in the
SADC area is shown in Table 11.2, which is the best available public
domain data.
 230

Table 11.2 Physical description of the major transboundary rivers in the SADC region

Basin Total basin area (km2 ) River length (km) Mean annual runoff (Mm3 /yr−1 )

Pallett UNEP Wolf

Buzi 31,000 – – 250 2,500

Congo/Zaire 3,800,00 3,669,100 3,669,100 4,700 1,260,000
Cunene 106,500 110,000 – 1,050 5,500
Cuvelai 100,000 – – 430 Ephemeral
Incomati 50,000 46,000 46,000 480 3,500
Limpopo 415,000 414,800 414,800 1,750 5,500
Maputo 32,000 30,700 30,700 380 2,500
Nile 2,800,000 3,038,100 3,038,100 6,700 86,000
Okavango/Makgadikgadi 570,000 706,900 706,900 1,100 11,000
Orange/Senqu 850,000 945,500 945,500 2,300 11,500
Pungué 32,500 – – 300 3,000
Rovuma 155,500 151,700 151,700 800 15,000
Savé – Runde 92,500 – – 740 7,000
Umbeluzi 5,500 10,900 10,900 200 600
Zambezi 1,400,000 1,385,300 1,385,300 2,650 94,000

Columns 2, 5, and 6 – Pallett and colleagues (1997); Column 3 – UNEP (2002); Column 4 – Wolf (2006).
 Anthony Turton 231

Population as an element of hydropolitical risk

Population growth and dynamics are important drivers of three ele-

ments closely associated with water resource management and thus
hydropolitical risk. The first is planning for infrastructure development
in anticipation of how large the population will be in the future, but
more importantly, where it will be located (urban/rural) and where it
will be employed (agriculture, industry, mining, services sector). The
second is related to food security, with the recent spike in food price
inflation at a global level being somewhat of a forewarning of things
to come at the SADC regional level. The third is related to economic
development, or specifically how a unit of water is translated into a unit
of livelihood and a unit of economic activity. Table 11.3 depicts the
population trends across the SADC region.
From these data it is evident that five countries have a population
growth rate exceeding 2 per cent – Angola (2.136%), DRC (3.236%),
Madagascar (3.005%), Malawi (2.395%), and Tanzania (2.072%), as indi-
cated in Column 3 of Table 11.3. Six countries have a low population
growth rate of less than 1 per cent, some even being negative, largely
as the result of HIV-AIDS (but other factors are also relevant) – Lesotho
(0.129%), Mauritius (0.8%), Namibia (0.947%), South Africa (0.828%),
Swaziland (–0.41%), and Zimbabwe (–0.787%). Three of these coun-
tries are highly urbanized (>50% of the total population living in urban
areas) – Angola (53.3%), Botswana (57.4%), and South Africa (59.3%),
as indicated in Column 5. The significance of this fact is that it is eas-
ier to provide services to people living in urban areas, but those people
are also most likely to be cut off from a livelihood base if there is not
enough economic diversity in the country to support an urban popula-
tion. Five of these countries have a low urban population (<30% of the
total population living in urban areas) – Lesotho (18.7%), Madagascar
(26.8%), Malawi (17.2%), Swaziland (24.1%), and Tanzania (24.2%).
Four countries have a large portion of their total population (>50%)
working in the agricultural sector – Lesotho (57%), Madagascar (78%),
Tanzania (82%), and Zambia (70%), as indicated in Column 7. These
countries have high levels of poverty and are prone to drought impacts
given the dependence on the agricultural sector, mostly being small-
scale subsistence farming, but some also represent future agricultural
capacity in a different regional food security configuration (most
notably Zambia).
Three countries have a significant portion of their population
employed in the industrial sector (>20%), usually in mining-related
 232

Table 11.3 Population trends and dynamics in the SADC region

Country Current Population Life % Urban % Rural % Labour % Labour % Labour

population growth % expectancy (2005) (2005) force in force in force in
(July 2008 (2008 est.) (2008 est.) agricultural industrial service
est.) in years sector sector sector
(1996–2005) (1996–2005) (1996–2005)

Angola 12, 531, 357 2.136 37.92 53.3 46.7 NA NA NA

Botswana 1, 842, 323 1.434 50.16 57.4 42.6 23 22 50
DRC 66, 514, 504 3.236 53.98 32.1 67.9 NA NA NA
Lesotho 2, 128, 180 0.129 40.17 18.7 81.3 57 15 23
Madagascar 20, 042, 552 3.005 62.52 26.8 73.2 78 7 15
Malawi 13, 931, 831 2.39 43.45 17.2 82.8 NA NA NA
Mauritius 1, 274, 189 0.8 73.75 42.4 57.6 10 32 57
Mozambique 21, 284, 700 1.792 41.04 34.5 65.5 NA NA NA
Namibia 2, 088, 669 0.947 49.89 35.1 64.9 31 12 56
South Africa 48, 782, 756 0.828 48.89 59.3 40.7 10 25 65
Swaziland 1, 128, 814 −0.41 31.99 24.1 75.9 NA NA NA
Tanzania 40, 213, 160 2.072 51.45 24.2 75.8 82 3 15
Zambia 11, 669, 534 1.654 38.59 35.0 65.0 70 7 23
Zimbabwe 11, 350, 111 −0.787 44.28 35.9 64.1 NA NA NA

Columns 1–3: CIA World Factbook.

Columns 4–5: UN (United Nations). 2006. World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision. Database. Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
Population Division. New York.
Columns 6–8: ILO (International Labour Organization). 2005. Key Indicators of the Labour Market. Fourth edition. CD-ROM. Geneva [www.ilo.org/
kilm].
Source: Based on Turton and colleagues (2008).
 Anthony Turton 233

activities – Botswana (22%), Mauritius (32%), and South Africa (25%),

as indicated in Column 8. These countries also have some degree of eco-
nomic diversification, making them less liable to direct impacts from
droughts.
Four countries have a significant portion of their population
employed in the services sector (≥50%) – Botswana (50%), Mauritius
(57%), Namibia (56%), and South Africa (65%), as indicated in Column
9. These countries are on a trajectory where they can optimize their
water availability by means of the improved sectoral water efficiency
inherent to the services sector. In this regard the value generated per
unit of water is known to be much greater in the services sector, than in
the agricultural sector, both in terms of pecuniary returns and number
of livelihoods generated (Allan, 2000; 2002). This is an important factor
in a future scenario where food security becomes a regional rather than
a national priority.
The analysis from Table 11.3 gives a broad indication of the capac-
ity to manage hydrological vulnerability, also known as water inse-
curity and thus an element of hydropolitical risk. Water insecurity
can be thought of as a situation where there is insufficient assur-
ance of supply to sustain future demands for economic growth and
social cohesion. When one combines these datasets, we can see that
there are two countries that have a high level of urbanization com-
bined with a diversified economy (Botswana and South Africa), and
one country with a less urbanized but diversified economy (Mauritius).
The former countries can be considered to be water scarce but adap-
tively secure while the latter can be considered to be water abun-
dant but adaptively secure. More importantly, the regional hegemonic
power – South Africa – is in a position to renegotiate food secu-
rity at a regional level, thereby benefitting from the sectoral water
efficiency embedded in a diversified economy. In this regard hege-
mony can be thought of as a combination of political, military,
and economic power that could be deployed to support the national
interest.
This analysis becomes more nuanced when one examines the water
availability in each of these countries as shown in Table 11.4. Column
2 indicates the current population with Column 3 showing the total
water resource available to a given country. Column 4 shows the por-
tion of the total resource that has been developed, which enables the
calculation to be made of the total developed resource per capita pre-
sented in Column 5. From this we can derive the population pressure
on water availability by calculating the number of people dependent on
 234

Table 11.4 Population dynamics and water security in the SADC region

Country Current population Total Developed Developed Population pressure

(July 2008 est.) water resource water resource water/capita (2000) on water availability
(2000) (people/M m3 /year)
(2000)

Angola 12,531,357 184 km3 (1987) 0.35 km3 /yr 22 m3 /p/yr 72

Botswana 1,842,323 14.7 km3 (2001) 0.19 km3 /yr 107 m3 /p/yr 112
DRC 66,514,504 1,283 km3 (2001) 0.36 km3 /yr 6 m3 /p/yr 50
Lesotho 2,128,180 5.2 km3 (1987) 0.05 km3 /yr 28 m3 /p/yr 412
Madagascar 20,042,552 337 km3 (1984) 14.96 km3 /yr 804 m3 /p/yr NA
Malawi 13,931,831 17.3 km3 (2001) 1.01 km3 /yr 78 m3 /p/yr 553
Mauritius 1,274,189 2.2 km3 (2001) 0.61 km3 /yr 488 m3 /p/yr 548
Mozambique 21,284,700 216 km3 (1992) 0.63 km3 /yr 32 m3 /p/yr 80
Namibia 2,088,669 45.5 km3 (1991) 0.3 km3 /yr 148 m3 /p/yr 40
South Africa 48,782,756 50 km3 (1990) 12.5 km3 /yr 264 m3 /p/yr 880
Swaziland 1,128,814 4.5 km3 (1987) 1.04 km3 /yr 1010 m3 /p/yr 232
Tanzania 40,213,160 91 km3 (2001) 5.18 km3 /yr 135 m3 /p/yr 364
Zambia 11,669,534 105.2 km3 (2001) 1.74 km3 /yr 149 m3 /p/yr 93
Zimbabwe 11,350,111 20 km3 (1987) 4.21 km3 /yr (2002) 324 m3 /p/yr (2002) 674

Columns 1–4: CIA World Factbook.

Source: Based on Turton and colleagues (2008).
 Anthony Turton 235

a given volume of water (1 × 106 m3 yr1 ), which gives an indication of

water crowding as shown in Column 6.
When assessing developed water per capita (Column 5), three dis-
tinct categories are evident. Those countries with a low level of
developed water per capita (<200 m3 /p/yr) are shown as red in
Column 5. These include nine countries – Angola (22 m3 /p/yr),
Botswana (107 m3 /p/yr), DRC (6 m3 /p/yr), Lesotho (28 m3 /p/yr),
Malawi (78 m3 /p/yr), Mozambique (32 m3 /p/yr), Namibia (148 m3 /
p/yr), Tanzania (135 m3 /p/yr), and Zambia (149 m3 /p/yr). Countries
with a medium level of developed water per capita (200–400 m3 /
p/yr) are shown in Column 5 and include South Africa (264 m3 /p/yr)
and Zimbabwe (324 m3 /p/yr). Countries with a high level of devel-
oped water (>400 m3 /p/yr) include Madagascar (804 m3 /p/yr), Mauritius
(488 m3 /p/yr), and Swaziland (1,010 m3 /p/yr). South Africa and
Zimbabwe stand out in terms of water constraints to future economic
development, making them key players in a future regional food security
configuration. The data shown in Column 6 is the water crowding index
(WCI) for each country. Water crowding reflects the population pressure
on water by expressing the number of persons per standardized unit of
water (1 × 106 m3 yr) as originally conceptualized by Falkenmark (1989).
Again South Africa and Zimbabwe stand out as being significantly water
constrained in the future.
Arising from the ratio of developed water per capita, a new pat-
tern emerges in terms of water crowding. This is a useful indi-
cator of the number of people that depend on a given unit of
water, as shown in Column 6. There are five countries with a
high population pressure on water (>400 people/Mm3 /yr): Lesotho
(412 people/Mm3 /yr), Malawi (553 people/Mm3 /yr), Mauritius (548
people/Mm3 /yr), South Africa (880 people/Mm3 /yr), and Zimbabwe
(674 people/Mm3 /yr). There are two countries with a medium pop-
ulation pressure on water (200–400 people/Mm3 /yr) that include
Swaziland (232 people/Mm3 /yr) and Tanzania (364 people/Mm3 /yr).
There are six countries with a low population pressure on water
(<200 people/Mm3 /yr) that include Angola (72 people/Mm3 /yr),
Botswana (112 people/Mm3 /yr), DRC (50 people/Mm3 /yr), Mozambique
(80 people/Mm3 /yr), Namibia (40 people/Mm3 /yr), and Zambia (93
people/Mm3 /yr). The countries with low population pressure that also
possess good soils and adequate rainfall – Angola, DRC, Mozambique,
and Zambia – thus become candidates for a new role as regional food
baskets.
From this assessment the prognosis for future water security can be
estimated. There are six countries with a low level of developed water
236 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

resource per capita and low population pressure on water – Angola,

Botswana, DRC, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zambia. These countries
have considerable scope for improving their water security, which is also
likely to improve their standard of living and economic output at the
national level. There is one country with a low level of developed water
resource per capita and high population pressure on water – Malawi.
This suggests that water constraints will be a severe limitation to future
economic development. There are two countries with a medium level
of developed water resource per capita and high population pressure on
water – South Africa and Zimbabwe. These countries have specific water-
related constraints to future economic development and will need to
rely on the gearing inherent to inter-sectoral water allocation in order
to leverage more jobs and more value per unit of water, by shifting agri-
cultural water to the industrial and services sector, while sourcing food
from elsewhere in the SADC region. There is one country with a high
level of developed water resource per capita and low population pres-
sure on water – Mauritius. There is one country with a high level of
developed water resource per capita and medium population pressure
on water – Swaziland.
Emerging from this assessment it becomes instructive to analyse the
sectoral water efficiency in the various SADC countries. Table 11.5 shows
the total water resource per country (Column 2) alongside the per-
centage allocation of that national resource to the agricultural sector
(Column 3), the industrial sector (including mining) (Column 4), and
the services sector (including domestic consumption) (Column 5). This
enables a rough sectoral water efficiency to be calculated for the agri-
cultural sector (Column 6) and the industrial sector (Column 7). This
is expressed as a ratio of the percentage water consumed by the given
sector in relation to the percentage contribution of that sector to the
overall GDP of the country. This gives an overall indication of relative
water efficiency, which has specific ramifications for hydropolitical risk
by unlocking the value of water for economic development by leverag-
ing the known improved sectoral water efficiency that occurs when the
economy diversifies from a purely agricultural base to an industrial and
services base.
From this assessment it is evident that two broad categories of case
exist. There are four countries with a high agricultural sectoral water
use (>70%), that also have a significant economic contribution from
the agricultural sector to the overall economy (>20%), indicated in Col-
umn 6. This includes Madagascar with an Agricultural SWE Ratio of
96:27, Malawi with an Agricultural SWE Ratio of 80:38, Mozambique
Table 11.5 Sectoral water efficiency in the SADC region

Country Total water Agricultural water Industrial water Services water Agricultural Industrial
resource use (%) 2000 use (%) 2000 use (%) 2000 SWE SWE

Angola 184 km3 (1987) 60 17 23 60 : 10 17 : 66

Botswana 14.7 km3 (2001) 41 18 41 41 : 2 18 : 52
DRC 1,283 km3 (2001) 31 17 53 31 : 55 17 : 11
Lesotho 5.2 km3 (1987) 20 40 40 20 : 15 40 : 45
Madagascar 337 km3 (1984) 96 2 3 96 : 27 2 : 16
Malawi 17.3 km3 (2001) 80 5 15 80 : 38 5 : 18
Mauritius 2.2 km3 (2001) 60 14 25 60 : 5 14 : 25
Mozambique 216 km3 (1992) 87 2 11 87 : 23 2 : 30
Namibia 45.5 km3 (1991) 71 5 24 71 : 11 5 : 35
South Africa 50 km3 (1990) 63 6 31 63 : 3 6 : 31
Swaziland 4.5 km3 (1987) 97 1 2 97 : 12 1 : 46
Tanzania 91 km3 (2001) 89 0 10 89 : 43 0 : 19
Zambia 105.2 km3 (2001) 76 7 17 76 : 17 7 : 26
Zimbabwe 20 km3 (1987) 79 7 14 79 : 18 7 : 23

Columns 1–4: CIA World Factbook.

Source: Based on Turton and colleagues (2008).
237
238 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

with an Agricultural SWE Ratio of 87:23, and Tanzania with an Agricul-

tural SWE Ratio of 89:43. These countries are predominantly agricultural
in nature and are not yet in a position to reap the benefits of becoming
industrialized. This means that water security is also a livelihood issue
that can translate into the movement of environmental refugees in the
context of climate change as mooted by Homer-Dixon (1994). There
are ten countries with an industrial sector that also have a relatively
high economic contribution from that sector to the overall economy
(>20%), indicated in Column 7. This includes Angola with an Industrial
SWE Ratio of 17:66, Botswana with an Industrial SWE Ratio of 18:52,
Lesotho with an Industrial SWE Ratio of 40:45, Mauritius with an Indus-
trial SWE Ratio of 14:25, Mozambique with an Industrial SWE Ratio of
2:30, Namibia with an Industrial SWE Ratio of 5:35, Swaziland with an
Industrial SWE Ratio of 1:46, Zambia with an Industrial SWE Ratio of
7:26, and Zimbabwe with an Industrial SWE Ratio of 7:23. These coun-
tries are all showing different degrees of benefit arising from the gearing
inherent to Industrial SWE where more livelihoods and economic devel-
opment is generated per unit of water than in agriculture. This is
an important component in the logic of a future based on regional
food security for the water-constrained but more diversified political
economies – most notably South Africa – with Angola, Mozambique,
and Zambia becoming the most probable future bread baskets for the
SADC regional economy.

Southern African Hydropolitical Complex

Does water scarcity drive conflict or co-operation? If it drives conflict,

then a Security Complex can emerge as we see in the Tigris/Euphrates;
but if it drives co-operation instead, then a Hydropolitical Complex
can emerge. A Hydropolitical Complex exists when patterns of inter-
state amity (co-operation) and enmity (conflict) converge around the
co-dependence on a specific shared water resource, with the overall
pattern of convergence tending towards co-operation rather than con-
flict (Ashton and Turton, 2008; Turton, 2008a; Turton and Ashton,
2008; Maupin, 2010). This is the pattern in the SADC region, so it is
prudent to call the SADC region the Southern African Hydropolitical
Complex when referring to inter-state relations over water, specif-
ically because of the convergence around co-operation rather than
conflict. This differs fundamentally from a Hydropolitical Security Com-
plex, which is focussed more on the management of enmity between
riparian states on a contested transboundary river (Schulz, 1995). It is
 Anthony Turton 239

significant to note that the four most water constrained countries that
are on the ‘wrong side’ of the global average isohyet of 860 mm/yr−1
(see Figure 11.1) – Botswana (400 mm/yr−1 ), Namibia (254 mm/yr−1 ),
South Africa (497 mm/yr−1 ), and Zimbabwe (652 mm/yr−1 ); are also
countries that share the largest number of transboundary aquifers
(Turton et al., 2006) – Botswana (8), Namibia (6), South Africa (9), and
Zimbabwe (4). These four countries are called Pivotal States, and the
three transboundary surface water basins that they depend on for strate-
gic supplies of water, and which have already been fully – or almost
fully – allocated (Incomati, Limpopo, Orange/Senqu), are called Pivotal
Basins. This unique pattern of distribution has a number of ramifica-
tions in the context of implications arising from global climate change,
which are absent from the current literature, thereby making this an
important issue for consideration in the context of any serious study on
the governance of transboundary water resources.
More importantly, it is within this Hydropolitical Complex – a level of
management and analysis above the sovereign state – that national food
security limitations will be solved at a regional level. This will have sig-
nificant implications for governance processes and structures across the
board, with national interests being harmonized through supranational
institutions such as SADC, and sectoral interests being harmonized by
means of focussed technical bilateral commissions created for specific
purposes (Turton, 2008b).

Climate change as a future driver of regional integration

Having noted the hydrological realities and unpacked the many nuances
relating to economic development in the SADC region, it now becomes
instructive to build a scenario for a future in which climate change plays
a significant role. In this regard it is anticipated that the hinterland of
the SADC region will become both hotter and dryer as a direct result
of climate change (Schulze, 1990; Gash et al., 2001; Cavé et al., 2003;
Scholes and Biggs, 2004; de Wit and Stankiewicz, 2006). Convergence
is now taking place among the Southern African scientific community
that an annual average increase of 4◦ C in ambient air temperature is
probable, with certain river basins potentially having an even greater
increase.1 This suggests that four significant elements in the overall
hydrological cycle across the SADC region will change:

• The annual average rainfall will decrease to levels below those

recorded on Figure 11.1.
240 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

• The MAP:MAR conversion will change dramatically, with the most

probable outcome being a reduction in MAR and thus a reduction in
the yield of dams.
• The evapotranspiration (ET) losses will increase, resulting in an over-
all desiccation of the terrestrial vegetation but accompanied by an
increased loss of water from dams at a rate that has not yet been
reliably calculated.
• The higher ambient air temperature will raise the temperature of the
water column in dams, increasing the trophic status of many of the
large dams currently infested with blue-green algae (cyanobacteria)
(Harding and Paxton, 2001; Oberholster et al., 2005; van Ginkel,
2004).

This has many ramifications for the SADC region, the most signifi-
cant of which will be the migration of the annual average isohyet of
860 mm/yr−1 shown on Figure 11.1 both northwards and eastwards.
The most dramatic impact that this northwards migration will have is
to cut off the source of the various transboundary rivers that currently
arise on the Bié Plateau in southern Angola. This includes the Cunene,
Cuvelai, Okavango, and tributaries of the Zambezi, all of which are likely
to show a marked decline in streamflow. The eastward migration of the
860 mm/yr−1 isohyet will include the desiccation of the Limpopo River
basin and the encroachment of the Kalahari into areas of central and
southern Mozambique.
The implications of this will be felt most notably by South Africa,
functioning at the very limit of its economic development and already
experiencing both water and energy constraints to job creation. The
Limpopo River basin will be particularly hard hit in this scenario, with
very specific implications for South Africa. If one considers the WCI as
being a benchmark of sustainability with 2000 persons per flow unit of
water (1 × 106 m3 yr1 ) as representing the so-called water barrier beyond
which development is possible only with massive technological injec-
tion (Falkenmark, 1989), then it is alarming to note that this was already
sitting at 4219 in the South African portion of the Limpopo in 2000 and
will be a staggering 4974 by 2025 all things remaining equal (Ashton
et al., 2008). While it is dangerous to draw conclusions from this single
indicator, it is instructive to note that xenophobic violence is already
a problem in South Africa (Turton, 2009). Hence, it is not a giant leap
of logic to ask whether a WCI of 2.5 times the accepted global stan-
dard might be a challenge in the context of the known out-migration of
technical skills (SAICE, 2008).
 Anthony Turton 241

Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe will also be severely impacted by

the northward and eastward migration of the annual average isohyet of
860 mm/yr−1 . The former two countries, already largely desert nations,
will probably witness greater desert coverage as the Namib, a true desert,
expands into the Kalahari, a semi-desert. Zimbabwe, already devastated
by hyperinflation and mismanagement caused by the land-grab policies
of Robert Mugabe, will become more Kalahari-like with the one small
area around Mazoe – which currently receives more than the global
annual average of 860 mm/yr−1 – shrinking. The combined implication
for these three countries will be the loss of national food security.
The above discussion leads to one to ponder what the SADC region
might then look like half a century from now. Given the dynamics
sketched out in the scenario above, it is highly likely that the two most
economically developed countries in the SADC region – South Africa
and Zimbabwe – will lose their ability to feed their own citizens, with the
other two national economies that are reasonably diversified – Botswana
and Namibia – being saved from this fate only because of a relatively low
population level. Namibia is a nuanced case however, as even though it
has a low population, most of it is located in the north, making it depen-
dent on water security from rivers arising on the Bié Plateau in southern
Angola, and thus likely to be at risk. Mozambique, currently poor but
growing rapidly as a result of the post-war peace dividend, will become
split between an arid south and a well-watered north.
The most logical solution to the loss of national food security by the
Pivotal States in the South African Hydropolitical Complex would thus
be to cascade the problem upwards to the SADC level and re-negotiate
a regional food security protocol. The most likely location of this new
regional bread basket would be Angola and Zambia, both blessed with
good soils, abundant rainfall and low population pressure, making them
ideal candidates for their probable future role. Northern Mozambique is
also likely to play a role in this regard. The DRC is a special case, with
tropical factors limiting its potential as a future cereal producer. This
means that infrastructure will need to be extended into these countries,
all poorly connected into the transport network sustaining the south at
present.
Angola is likely to reap massive benefits from this arrangement, by
virtue of the fact that water scarcity across the SADC region also has
implications for energy security. The Grand Inga Scheme has signifi-
cant potential, and if developed, would see the creation of an energy
grid along the west coast of SADC, from the mouth of the Congo
River, through Angola and Namibia, into South Africa. This would make
242 Governance Challenges in Africa’s Non-Petroleum Sectors

Angola doubly significant, as both a food and energy security player

with emerging power at the regional level. Angola is currently outward-
looking by virtue of its historic linkages to Europe and its current status
as an exporter of energy to the United States, but this new role would
enable it to reinvent itself as a potential regional superpower and thus
more inward looking.

Conclusions

The SADC region is characterized by the existence of a large number of

transboundary rivers that connect the various national economies, all of
which currently function independently of each other. However, climate
change is likely to drive new patterns of political and economic integra-
tion. If one accepts that there is already a Hydropolitical Complex in
place, reflecting the inherent value of co-operation over competition
for shared water resources, then it is not a great leap of logic to con-
sider a future in which food, energy and even water security is dealt
with at the regional rather than national level. The factual basis of this
probable evolution has been presented to show the nuanced nature of
the regional political economy. The climate change scenario has been
offered as a speculative proposition about how the future might evolve,
so it is not intended to be a statement of empirical fact. The governance
challenges at the regional level will probably be dealt with via a series of
innovative mechanisms that sees the harmonization of national inter-
ests though organs of SADC, while sectoral harmonization will most
probably occur through a series of bilateral organs, purpose designed
and arising from specific bilateral regimes between food importing states
and food producing states.
The management of water insecurity, specifically as this impacts food
security, has major policy implications. The most notable of these is
finding ways to harmonize national policy-making processes at the
regional level, but also across sectoral boundaries. This will require
a process to be embedded in a new architecture of governance, in
which policy-making can be facilitated across international borders
and sectoral boundaries. If correctly managed, then climate change is
likely to become a major driver of regional integration as systems are
optimized at a level above the sovereign state and river basin.

Note
1. Personal communication with Roland Schulze.
 Anthony Turton 243

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Part IV
Concluding Remarks: New
Challenges and Opportunities
12
Global and Local Challenges and
Opportunities: Reflections on
China and the Governance of
African Natural Resources
Christopher Alden and Ana Cristina Alves

Introduction

China’s three decades of unbroken growth, transforming it from an eco-

nomic backwater to the world’s second largest economy, has fuelled an
ever-expanding demand for energy, strategic minerals, and new markets
(Downs, 2004: 21–41; Oliveira, 2008: 83–109). The promulgation of the
government’s ‘going out’ strategy, whereby over a hundred restructured
state-owned enterprises have been given the legal and administrative
means, preferential access to finance, and diplomatic support neces-
sary to break into markets outside of China, has been the main policy
response to this need. Given the financial resources of what by 2006 had
become the world’s largest holder of foreign reserves (over USD 3 tril-
lion as of mid-2012) and applying these to the problem of carving out a
position in the energy and strategic minerals markets was, in retrospect,
a fairly straightforward solution to this dilemma in a capital-starved
African environment.
Concurrently, the willingness of the Chinese government to provide
a whole package of inducements alongside any leasing or supply agree-
ments, aimed at elite-defined needs ranging from presidential palaces to
large-scale infrastructure projects, has proved to be crucial to securing
deals in Africa throughout most of the past decade (Alden, 2007: 11–36;
Alves, 2012). Underlying this approach is a highly publicized provision
whereby the Chinese government forswears any interest in the domestic
affairs of African governments, in direct contrast to the European Union

247
248 New Challenges and Opportunities

(EU) or the United States (US), both of whom have selectively applied
conditions to their development assistance programmes and even some
investments. The success of Chinese resource diplomacy in Africa can be
measured in terms of its presence across the continent in most of all the
major resource economies there: it has gone from a status of no posi-
tion in the resource market in 1995 to a standing as a significant player
today with oil exploration licenses from Sudan and Uganda to Angola,
and mining concessions from Guinea and Sierra Leone to Zambia and
South Africa.
This chapter discusses three broad key questions that cut across most
literature on China’s engagement in Africa produced since the turn of
the century. These questions are: (a) To what extent do natural resources
drive China’s relationship with Africa? (b) Does China engage African
natural resources in a fundamentally distinct way? and (c) How have
China’s engagement strategies impacted the development and gover-
nance of African natural resources? While not aspiring to provide a final
answer to each of these questions, the present study aims at inform-
ing the debate by providing a concise analysis pertaining to the above.
In this framework, the chapter starts by discussing China’s search for
resource security as a key driver of its foray into Africa; the next section
analyses the specificities of China’s ways of engagement in resources
sectors in the continent followed by an assessment of the impact these
have had in the industry in terms of development and governance.
Before concluding, the authors briefly discuss how growing exposure
to African risks and international scrutiny is also prompting noticeable
policy shifts in China’s ways of engagement in resources sectors in the
continent. This study is based on primary (e.g., in-person interviews,
fieldtrips, and primary documents) and secondary sources compiled and
digested over several years (2007–2013).

China’s search for resource security in Africa

Even though China’s search for new markets undoubtedly plays an

important role in its foray into Africa, one cannot stop noticing that
the bilateral trade structure over the past decade illustrates the increas-
ing weight of resources quest in its interaction with the continent. One
of the most notable changing traits in China’s foreign trade over the past
decade has been the increasing share of minerals in its global imports.
In 2010 mineral commodities accounted for 64 per cent of China’s
imports totalling USD 375 billion up from USD 40 billion a decade ago
(WTO, 2012). In order to minimize its increasing vulnerability Beijing
 Christopher Alden and Ana Cristina Alves 249

has pursued a strategy of diversifying its supply sources. While Asia and
the Middle East still account for a significant share of China’s mineral
commodities supply, its imports from other resource rich regions such
as Oceania, Latin America and, particularly Africa have expanded a lot
faster in recent years. Africa’s share in China’s minerals imports presents
one of the fastest growth rates having increased 14 times over the past
decade (WTO, 2000–2011).
Although China is the leading producer of a wide range of minerals
(e.g., aluminium, cement, coal, copper, gold, iron and steel, lead, man-
ganese, silver, tin, tungsten, zinc, and rare earths) and ranks among the
world’s top producers of many other mineral commodities, including
oil (fifth-largest producer), its demand of a number of strategic min-
eral commodities (e.g., chromium, cobalt, copper, iron ore, manganese,
nickel, petroleum, platinum group metals, and potash) largely outstrips
domestic supply. As a result Beijing is increasingly reliant on imports
to meet its domestic demand (Tse, 2012). China’s reliance on imports
is growing – even in commodities sectors where the country itself is a
leading global producer – namely tin.
Oil security is the foremost Chinese concern since it represents its
largest external reliance. From leading Asian oil exporter up until the
early 1990s, China became in the following decade the second largest
world consumer and importer by virtue of its fast growing domestic
demand. At present, and despite being among the top five world’s largest
oil producers, China only provides for less than half of its domestic oil
needs (BP, 2011). China’s oil consumption has doubled in the last decade
and according to OPEC it will double again by 2030 when it is expected
to consume over 15 million barrels per day (OPEC, 2008: 46). As Downs
points out, if the question in the 1990s was whether Beijing would have
the financial means to secure the necessary oil supply, in the 2000s the
issue became if there would be enough oil available in the international
market to supply China (Downs, 2006: 15).
Chinese imports from Africa, which in 2011 accounted for nearly
60 per cent of total bilateral trade (USD 166 billion) are largely com-
posed of strategic raw materials (Freemantle and Stevens, 2012). Crude
oil alone accounted for nearly 60 per cent of China’s imports from the
continent, with Angola, Sudan, and the Republic of Congo (ROC) in
the lead, while new sources such as Ghana, the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) and Egypt, have recently emerged (Freemantle and
Stevens, 2012). The same trend is apparent in China’s investment flows
into Africa. Chinese Outward Direct Investment (ODI) in Africa has
grown exponentially from USD 500 million in 2003 to USD 13 billion
250 New Challenges and Opportunities

in 2010 (non-financial investment stock), much of it concentrated in

natural resources sectors (Davies, 2012: 3). As the continent’s economic
dynamism intensifies, Chinese investment should expand further along
the same lines. According to a forecast by South Africa’s Standard Bank,
Chinese investment in Africa is expected to soar by 70 per cent in
the period 2011–2015, when it will reach USD 50 billion (Bloomberg,
2011). The bulk of China’s investments in oil and mining in the con-
tinent is conducted by state-owned enterprises (Davies, 2012: 4), with
strong financial backing from policy banks (Downs, 2011; Freemantle
and Stevens, 2012: 7).

The idiosyncrasies of Chinese engagement in Africa’s

resource sectors

In this regard, infrastructure-for-resources loans figure among the

most criticized instruments used by China to penetrate resources in
Africa, mostly owing to the opacity of the deals, its impact on debt
sustainability of these countries, Chinese labour practices and the
environmental impact. This funding arrangement offers resource rich
countries the provision of much needed infrastructure in exchange for
access to resource assets and long-term supply (Corkin, 2011; Downs,
2011; Alves, 2012; Gallagher et al., 2012). In general this type of loan
is rooted in two legal instruments: a framework co-operation agreement
signed by the two governments stating the general terms (volume, pur-
pose, interest rate, and maturity) and a loan agreement signed by China
Exim Bank and the borrower. The reimbursement period is relatively
long (up to 15–20 years, including 5–7 years grace) (Information Office,
2010). Since most of these credit lines export credit facilities, they come
tied to the procurement of services, goods, and labour in China (mini-
mum of 50%), leaving in general only a small margin for local content
in the target country. Drawing on the practices of Western banking
institutions throughout the 1990s in financing African countries with
low creditworthiness rates, these credit lines are guaranteed by proceeds
from sales of resources.
Angola was the first African country to sign a large resources-backed
deal with China (Alves, 2010), exchanging long-term oil supply for
infrastructures, hence the designation ‘Angola mode’. According to the
office responsible for running the Chinese loans in the Ministry of
Finance, three agreements were signed with China Exim Bank (from
2004–2007) worth a total of USD 4.5 billion.1 The loan is to be repaid
over 17 years following a grace period of five years, with an interest
 Christopher Alden and Ana Cristina Alves 251

rate of Libor + 1.5 per cent, and is secured by the proceeds originating
from the sale of a pre-determined volume of oil to a Chinese company
(UNIPEC). The Chinese credit line is entirely directed to projects listed
in the government’s public infrastructures programme. The Chinese
loan came at a particularly auspicious timing. Angola had been try-
ing unsuccessfully to raise funds for the national reconstruction project
since the end of the civil war in 2002. All countries approached by
Luanda imposed as a condition that Angola implement a Staff Mon-
itoring Agreement with the IMF. China’s infrastructure for oil loan
offered Angola a way out of this predicament. In Gabon (see Dittgen,
2011), a modest oil producer with significant under-exploited deposits
of iron ore and manganese, the Chinese were actively encouraged by
the Gabonese government to put in a bid for the Belinga iron ore
project, which had been contracted out to the Brazilian miner Vale
(Alves, 2008: 4–5). Following the visit of Hu Jintao, a Chinese consor-
tium led by China National Machinery and Equipment Corporation
(CMEC) won exclusive rights to Belinga and its outputs in exchange for
a USD 3 billion investment aimed at developing Gabon’s infrastructure
underwritten by the China Exim Bank. The project includes the con-
struction of a brand-new 560-kilometre railway line linking Belinga to
the coast, a deep-water mining harbour for transportation located north
of Libreville, a hydroelectric dam in the Ivindo River and the iron min-
ing factory (Alves, 2008: 4–5). Realizing the deal, however, proved more
difficult as a coalition of local and international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), along with the World Bank, launched protests
over the secretive nature of the contract, the concern over the Chinese
‘control’ over national resources and the building of a dam in a national
park. Delays in initiating the work, partly a product of the structure of
the consortium itself, have meant the project has yet to produce results.
As of mid-2012, there were rumours in the media that Ali Bongo was
courting BHP Billiton and Vale to take over the project (AAP, 2012).
A similar ‘infrastructures for resources deal’ was signed between the
DRC and China Exim Bank in September 2007 worth USD 5 billion.
Notably this loan is well above other loans secured by the DRC in
recent years with its Western donors. As with Gabon, repayment terms
include rights over its natural resources, namely mining and timber con-
cession (Montia, 2007), and toll revenue deals for Chinese companies.
In January 2008, this loan was expanded to USD 9 billion, reallocating
USD 6 billion to infrastructure and USD 3 billion to mining. A deal was
then signed between the Congolese state miner Gécamines, Sinohydro,
and China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC) through which a
252 New Challenges and Opportunities

joint venture came into existence. The joint-venture named Sicomines

is 68 per cent owned by the Chinese (Bavier, 2008). The loan (for
both infrastructures and mining) is to be repaid with revenue obtained
through the exploration rights over two copper and cobalt concessions
located in Katanga province. The project development, however, has
been delayed by traditional donors’ pressure to renegotiate the contract
due to excessive debt concerns. The loan was revised and downsized to
USD 6 billion in 2009 at Kinshasa’s request.2 The new contract signed in
2009 is only partially under implementation as the bulk of the loan is
yet to be released, currently pending approval by the relevant authorities
on both sides (Jansson, 2011).
This same pattern of Chinese investment flowing jointly into mining
and infrastructures also emerged in other resource rich countries such
as Sudan, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad. As a latecomer and still
lagging far behind the technology and expertise of its Western competi-
tors, Chinese resource-oriented state-owned enterprises (SOEs) rely on
this approach and on the government’s deep pockets to create joint ven-
tures with local companies and to expand its stakes in assets controlled
by Western companies.
China has extended a new batch of infrastructure for resources loans
in recent years, taking advantage of the financing difficulties in some
resource rich African countries in the context of the global economic cri-
sis. After two years of negotiations, in 2011 China’s Exim Bank extended
another USD 3 billion infrastructure oil-backed credit facility to Angola.
That same year China Development Bank (CDB) signed a USD 3 billion
loan agreement with Africa’s newest oil producer, Ghana, to fund down-
stream gas infrastructure linked to the ‘Jubilee field’ and other types of
infrastructure (Verma, 2011).
A number of other loans are reportedly in the pipeline. In February
2012, Lagos was negotiating with China Exim Bank and CDB a USD 3
billion credit facility for completion of various projects in the fields
of transportation, aviation, education, and agriculture (Ahmed, 2012).
In late April 2012, South Sudan also announced it was negotiating with
China a USD 8 billion loan for infrastructure, namely, road construc-
tion, agriculture, hydroelectric plants, and telecommunications (Sudan
Tribune, 2012b).
While China seems to still perceive the extension of soft loans to well-
endowed African states as a valuable instrument in its quest for resources
security in Africa, its companies appear to be increasingly confident
in venturing outside the comfort of Beijing’s umbrella. In a context
of contracting liquidity in international financial markets, Chinese
 Christopher Alden and Ana Cristina Alves 253

SOEs were well positioned to make the most out of their best com-
petitive advantage: their unmatched financial might, largely rooted in
Beijing’s massive foreign exchange reserves. Sinopec’s takeover of Addax
Petroleum in 2009 was the largest example of a successful overseas
acquisition by a Chinese company. The acquisition has given Sinopec
access to sizeable oil and gas equity in Nigeria, Gabon, and the Kurdistan
region in Iraq (Brunswick, 2009). In February 2012, CNOOC confirmed
its entry visa in Uganda’s oil industry, out of Kampala’s attempt to avoid
Tullow’s monopoly over the country’s oil resources. CNOOC now has a
third in the oil project whose development is valued at USD 20 billion,
including a refinery and a pipeline to Mombasa on the Indian Ocean
(Lee and Poon, 2009).
During this period, Chinese SOEs have been particularly successful
in Africa’s mining sector. Some of the largest deals over the last cou-
ple of years have been signed over iron ore deposits in Western Africa.
Chinalco’s acquired 47 per cent of Simandou project (Guinea) from
Rio Tinto (in which Chinalco has a 9% stake) for USD 1.4 billion in
March 2010 (Smith and MacNamara, 2010). In Sierra Leone, Chinese
companies have partnered up with African Minerals to finance the
development of Tonkolili iron ore mine (Sierra Express Media, 2010a).
China Railway Materials acquired 12.5 per cent of African Minerals for
USD 250 million in March 2010, and a few months later an agreement
was signed with Shandong Iron and Steel Group to inject USD 1.5 bil-
lion for a 25 per cent stake in the project (Sierra Express Media, 2010b).
In October 2011, Sichuan Hanlong Group, with the backing of China
Development Bank, signed a USD 1.6 billion agreement to take over
Australian Sundance Resources Limited, owner of Mbalam iron ore
project, cutting across Cameroon and ROC.
In recent years, Chinese miners have also been increasingly active in
Southern Africa, particularly in the copper-belt region (Zambia-DRC).
In July 2011, nickel miner Jinchuan group outbid Brazilian competi-
tor Vale and acquired Meteorex for USD 1.3 billion, which holds
significant copper and cobalt assets in DRC’s Katanga province and
Zambia’s Copperbelt (I-net bridge, 2011). That same year Minmetals
finally acquired its first mining acreage in Africa, paying USD 1.3 bil-
lion for 90 per cent of Canada-listed Anvil Mining, which owns
Kinsevere and Mutoshi copper and cobalt projects in the DRC (Paul,
2012). In February 2012, Non-Ferrous China Africa (NFCA), a subsidiary
of China Nonferrous Metals Corporation (CNMC), announced a fur-
ther USD 832 million investment to develop the Southeast side of its
Chambishi copper mine in Zambia.
254 New Challenges and Opportunities

Beijing’s political backing and financial support to its SOEs seems to be

gradually offsetting any deficiencies in technological skills, experience,
and expertise considerations in the face of Western competitors, partic-
ularly so in the global crisis context. In a framework marked by financial
contraction of its contenders, Chinese SOEs unmatched financial capac-
ity gives them a decisive competitive edge, allowing easy access to assets
through mergers and acquisitions. This has allowed them to circumvent
the normal bidding processes (now more scarce in the continent owing
to ongoing regulatory revisions and the crisis context) in which they
would have to face fierce competition from better equipped Western
mining firms and oil corporations. Although Western and local com-
panies still dominate the mining extractive industries in the continent,
China’s presence is growing fast – as are complaints over Chinese labour,
environmental and corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices.

Assessing the impact of Chinese involvement in Africa’s

resource sector

The onset of the global financial crisis placed China in a unique posi-
tion to shape African economies and influence the continent’s policies
and business practices to an unprecedented degree. Underlying this sit-
uation is the fact that China has become Africa’s largest trading partner
(as of 2009), an important investor, and a very significant co-operation
partner, surpassing traditional donors and international financial insti-
tutions. To put China’s growing influence as a development partner in
perspective, as early as 2006 China’s financial commitments in only
three African countries (Angola, Nigeria, and Mozambique – USD 8.1 bil-
lion) already equalled the combined contributions to Sub-Saharan Africa
from the World Bank, the US, and France (Swann and McQuillen, 2006).
For many observers, the concern is not only with China’s growing influ-
ence as an unconditional donor, but also with debt sustainability and
its long-term impact on economic stability in the continent. China has
been expanding its credits to Africa in the framework of various Western
initiatives for debt relief, namely the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPCs) initiative3 and the Paris Club, which together have forgiven a
total of USD 89 billion (as of 2007) to Sub-Saharan Africa (Foster et al.,
2008: 48), while China’s equivalent figure for 2000–2009 period is below
USD 3 billion (Information Office, 2010).
Any overall assessment of China’s involvement in the resource sector
in Africa necessarily deals in generalities that may gloss over some par-
ticular examples. Having said that, the development impact of Chinese
 Christopher Alden and Ana Cristina Alves 255

investments in commodities in Africa has been generally quite positive,

though not without controversy in certain settings; China’s influence
on governance matters has been on the whole more contentious, even
though in most cases this impact has been extremely difficult to mea-
sure. In both instances, however, it is necessary to go beyond the media
accounts to get a fuller understanding of the Chinese role and impact in
these areas.

Impact on African development

On the positive side of the development ledger, through its engagement
in resources sectors in Africa, China has made a substantial contribu-
tion to provisions for ‘hard infrastructure’, such as roads, railroads,
power plants and distribution grids, pipelines, and refineries, and so
forth, which will make a significant contribution towards the revamp-
ing of Africa’s poor transportation networks. This development is taking
place mostly in the framework of infrastructure for resources loans (e.g.,
Angola, the DRC, Nigeria, Sudan, and Ghana) and potentially through
infrastructure commitments taken over acquisition of resource assets
over the past couple of years (e.g., Simandou iron ore project in Guinea;
Mbalam iron ore project in Cameroon-ROC). As underscored by a World
Bank study, the investment backlog in infrastructure is set at USD 22 bil-
lion annually (Foster et al., 2008) and Chinese investment stock in the
continent, peaking in 2011 at USD 13 billion (Freemantle and Stevens,
2012: 7), is making a major contribution to addressing this need.
These activities are well tailored to address China’s excess capacity in
its domestic construction industry, which had like other sectors been
encouraged by Beijing to ‘go global’. As such, it is a fine illustration of
the principle of ‘mutual benefit’ in developing country co-operation.
Chinese project finance, which has in some instances ignored the
conventional assessments of risk produced by Western banks, has set
off a process of reviewing industry-standard risk metrics and, concur-
rently, the investment potential in Africa.4 It should also be noted
that while poverty reduction is not being addressed directly in Chinese
investments into mineral commodities, insofar as provisions for hard
infrastructure release untapped or underexploited resources the Chinese
are making an important indirect contribution to the amelioration of
poverty levels. The elimination of bottlenecks by providing new trans-
portation and port facilities, and increasing power generation are all
contributing to laying the foundation for Africa’s economic take-off.
Problematic features of the relationship are the wilful ignoring of
some of the features of financing which have been designed to improve
256 New Challenges and Opportunities

African governance (so-called soft infrastructure); the accompanying

lack of transparency in financial support (primarily oil-backed loans)
for investment projects; the poor quality of some of the infrastructure
built by Chinese companies which raises questions regarding is durabil-
ity; and the conduct of some Chinese companies (state and non-state
owned) in violating labour and environmental standards in host coun-
tries. In the mining sector specifically, this has resulted in practices such
as the illegal use of child labour and substandard health and safety con-
ditions in Katanga (Bloomberg, 2008: 89–90). The import of Chinese
labour practices (lower salaries and safety conditions, long-hour shifts,
short-term contracts, etc.) into the African continent has led to serious
confrontations between Chinese miners (public and private) and the
local work force, which are particularly recurrent in Zambia (Haglund,
2010). In response to these problems, Beijing has committed itself to
introduce corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures into business
practices among Chinese SOEs – a theme we expand upon in the next
section of the chapter.
More broadly, there are concerns around the structural impact of
Chinese trade and investment patterns on African economies, which
because being highly concentrated in resources raises concerns of lead-
ing to a ‘Dutch disease’ effect. These patterns, however, are a function of
Africa’s comparative advantage, and as such replicate Africa’s traditional
standing with the industrialized West as a provider of primary products
in exchange for finished manufactured goods. The fluctuation in com-
modity prices highlights the dangers of reliance on this sole source of
revenue and the need for a diversification. According to a study by the
African Development Bank (AfDB), however, Chinese engagement in
Africa has made no significant impact so far in Africa’s economic diver-
sification (Berthelemy, 2011: 27). Thus, the desire to enhance African
development prospects through the pursuit of beneficiation strategies
that complement the extraction of resources is seen to be an imperative
to breaking Africa’s poverty cycle.
Finally, there are concerns as to the structure of loans being pro-
vided by the Chinese, which could put these countries into a new cycle
of debt, something that is especially disturbing given the hard-fought
concessions necessary to win debt-forgiveness in the last decade. The
perception that China (as well as new emerging donors) is free riding
on long-standing debt-relief efforts by traditional donors and multilat-
eral institutions while adding to the debt burdens of African countries is,
however, contested by a number of studies. As underlined by the Organ-
isation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the major
 Christopher Alden and Ana Cristina Alves 257

beneficiaries of Chinese loans are resource-rich states that did not ben-
efit from HIPC (e.g., Angola, Sudan, Nigeria) and in which debt ratios
have actually declined in recent years (Reisen and Ndoye, 2008). In addi-
tion, China debt relief arrangements directed at Africa have benefited
mostly HIPCs, and its subsidized export buyers credit facilities would
be considered concessional by current Development Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC) standards of the OECD (Reisen and Ndoye, 2008). While
supporting the idea that Chinese loans have not impaired Africa’s debt
sustainability so far, AfDB considers that this may become a problem
in the future as China’s engagement in the continent intensifies, draw-
ing attention to the case of the DRC, which had to modify the terms of
Chinese financial assistance in 2009 to qualify for completion of HIPC
debt relief (Berthelemy, 2011).

Impact on governance of African resources

A number of China’s resource rich African partners have consistently
appeared at the bottom of the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Gover-
nance, namely, Angola (42 out of 53 in 2010), Guinea (43), Equatorial
Guinea (45), Sudan (48), DRC (50), and Zimbabwe (51) (Mo Ibrahim
Foundation, 2011). Against this backdrop, concerns have been expressed
over China’s expanding engagement in the continent as it is feared that
China’s ‘no strings attached’ approach to investment and development
assistance might undermine their long-standing efforts in improving
governance and transparency through the application of strict con-
ditionalities. Chinese funding formula, the so-called Angola mode,
allegedly allows countries with no creditworthiness in the interna-
tional market to contract loans against resources output, allowing them
to circumvent International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank
transparency requirements. While linear regression models have found
evidence that Chinese investment in Africa is resource driven (Cheung
et al., 2012: 217), the linkage between Chinese foreign direct investment
(FDI) and poor governance of African resource-rich countries remains
very unclear (Lawrence et al., 2012: 21).
In fact, a closer look at the case of Angola demonstrates that even
though China’s credit lines may have contributed to Luanda’s dis-
engagement with ‘Washington Consensus’ mechanisms like the IMF,
HIPCs, and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),5 the
Angolan government has been repaying its creditors and improving
transparency in public accounts. For instance, the Ministry of Finance
has become increasingly transparent, making public information pre-
viously undisclosed, including the government’s public accounts, the
258 New Challenges and Opportunities

management of China’s EximBank loan, and financial reports on

Endiama and Sonangol, diamonds and oil parastatals respectively. More-
over, it has resumed ties with the IMF in 2009 and notable progress has
been made in diversifying the economy away from oil exports. This sug-
gests that closer ties with China do not necessarily entail a decline in
transparency and economic performance. Nevertheless, a lot remains to
be done regarding poverty reduction monetary policy, and caution in
government spending. Further progress is also needed in the areas of
government transparency and governance in Angola.
The arrival of China as an explicit alternative to the West has
also raised fears that it emboldened rogue regimes (i.e., Sudan and
Zimbabwe) to pursue policies that might otherwise be subject to coun-
teraction by the donor community and international financial insti-
tutions. Persistent human rights violations and electoral fraud, which
have characterized the conduct of Bashir and Mugabe in their respec-
tive countries, though by no means endorsed by Beijing, nonetheless
have been allowed to continue with only limited public criticism from
China – thus giving at least the impression of China’s tacit support.
Traditional development partners are also concerned with the risks
entailed for sustainable development in terms of resource exploration
and environmental impact, since Chinese companies have a weak
record in this regard and African regulations are generally poorly imple-
mented and thus provide low protection standards. There are already
wide concerns over the environmental impact of Chinese projects in
the region, especially in the timber industry. Central Africa covers the
largest tropical rainforest on the continent and as such has been sub-
ject to predatory deforestation in the last few years. As the largest
importer of logs from the region, China is under fire from Western
environmental NGOs.
Western firms are easier to control because they possess strict import
regulations and are often subject to direct pressure within their domestic
political framework by civil society groups. China’s domestic environ-
mental concerns are quite recent and as such regulations and standards
are yet to be significantly improved. Beijing’s interest in promoting bet-
ter standards of operation by its SOEs is slowly taking root (see below),
but if the Western pattern is any guide, this needs to be complemented
by active Chinese civil society engagement on these topics. Though
civil society forms of environmental activism are growing in China
(especially in the wake of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games), they are
overwhelmingly focused on domestic issues and do not, as yet, link up
with environmental matters beyond the country’s borders.
 Christopher Alden and Ana Cristina Alves 259

China: A change in behaviour?

The pressure and scrutiny on Chinese foreign policy and the conduct of
its firms based in Africa has been a growing feature since 2004. At the
same time, the adaptability of the Chinese government to new circum-
stances and its willingness to consider – if not always act upon – the
impact and reaction of African and even Western actors to its engage-
ment in the continent is now recognized. Moreover, greater exposure
on the part of Chinese firms to Africa has meant that they have increas-
ingly been targeted by militants in conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, and
Nigeria. More recently, Chinese resource and infrastructure operations
in Northern Africa have been severely affected by the impact of the Arab
Spring, particularly in Libya where Chinese authorities had to evacuate
over 35,000 Chinese nationals. The result of this is that China’s resource
strategy towards Africa is undergoing some modest changes which are
in no small part a result of this exposure to the African context risks and
international scrutiny.
For instance, China has shown some openness towards a number
of international regulation initiatives to improve governance, trans-
parency, and sustainability of natural resources development in Africa,
namely the Kimberley Process,6 EITI, and the Equator Principles.7
Chinese firms’ compliance with these global governance initiatives has,
however, been a matter of contention.
Some measures have been taken by Beijing to improve the environ-
mental impact of China’s overseas investments, namely the inclusion
of an environmental safeguard among the nine principles regulating
Chinese companies investments overseas issued by the State Council in
October 2007; similar initiatives in a number of ministries (e.g., Ministry
of Commerce) and agencies (State Banks); and the agreement signed
in January 2008 between the Chinese environmental watchdog, State
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), and the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) to introduce the Equator Principles in China
(Bosshard, 2008). China’s Industrial Bank became in November 2008
the first Chinese financial institutions to adopt the Equator Principles.
Despite progress at the political level, the lack of an efficient supervi-
sion mechanism at the bottom of the hierarchy has led to slow progress.
Although the above measures do not necessarily apply to China’s over-
seas investments it offers the blueprint from where Chinese financing
institutions such as the China Exim Bank may extract guidance in
the near future. The implementation of the Equator Principles in their
projects overseas, however, remains as of now far below expectations.
260 New Challenges and Opportunities

As for China’s Exim Bank (which is becoming the world’s largest

funding agency in Africa), it adopted its own environmental policy in
2004, which it made public in mid-2007 and complemented with fur-
ther guidelines in August 2007 concerning social and environmental
impact assessment urging the companies to comply with host country
policies but no reference made to any international regulations. Nev-
ertheless, the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding with the
World Bank in late 2007 to exchange information on project evalua-
tion procedures and look for opportunities to cooperate in development
projects in other countries, may have a positive impact on Exim Bank’s
environmental and transparency standards in the future.
In the realm of the EITI, progress has been far slower. Although a
significant number of resource-rich African countries have joined the
list of candidate countries (including some of China’s strategic part-
ners, such as Equatorial Guinea, the DRC, Nigeria, Gabon, and Ghana),8
some of the most strategic Chinese partners have chosen to remain at
large, namely Angola and Sudan. Even though China prefers to keep
the EITI at bay, international pressure has forced some progress on
this, and Beijing has shown support for the EITI in a number of inter-
national fora. The EITI has put some effort in recent years to engage
Chinese authorities and companies with the initiative and sees as posi-
tive recent developments in China, namely the issuing of governmental
CSR directives for Chinese companies operating abroad (EITI, 2009).
More recently, some Chinese extractive companies have reported under
the EITI framework in a few countries, namely Nigeria and Gabon (Paris,
2010).
There have also been other signs of policy shifts. Sudan represents
the most paradigmatic case regarding the principle of non-interference,
which was openly challenged by the political situation in Sudan in
2008. Pressed by the twin forces of the African Union and interna-
tional public opinion around the Beijing Olympics (the ‘Genocide
Olympics’ campaign), Beijing felt compelled to modify its once staunch
‘non-interference’ stance and authorize a hybrid UN-AU sponsored
peacekeeping force in Darfur. Endorsing international intervention took
a step further in Libya with Beijing’s abstention of the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1973 in early 2011 which, in the view
of most parties, were pushed by NATO action into an unauthorized
Western effort at regime change. China’s attempts during the war to
build bridges with rebels while seeking to sell arms to Qaddafi seemed to
have backfired, leaving Chinese interests isolated from the reallocation
of oil interests and post-conflict reconstruction projects to date. Beijing
 Christopher Alden and Ana Cristina Alves 261

is facing a similar backlash in South Sudan in view of Juba’s decision

to expel China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) senior rep-
resentative in February 2012 owing to accusations of complicity with
Khartoum in committing fraud in order to deny Juba its proper share of
oil revenues (Sudan Tribune, 2012a).
These recent events and the impact they had on Chinese resource
interests in the countries affected, have raised Beijing’s awareness of
the volatility of Africa’s political context. As China accumulates expe-
riences in the continent, it is becoming more aware of the need to
engage with all stakeholders, and in a more constructive way. These
changes notwithstanding, contrast with China’s uncompromising pos-
ture regarding the political situation in Zimbabwe, another African state
over which China has influence, but whose own regime continues to
receive the backing of important countries like South Africa. This sug-
gests that changes in China’s policy are mostly ad hoc and prompted by
strong African pressure or by reaction to changing circumstances.

Conclusion: Reflections on natural resources and Africa’s

Chinese future

Though much is made of China’s unique relationship with the conti-

nent, in fact China’s foray in Africa follows patterns that were previously
set by traditional partners insofar as it emphasizes local elites, is founded
on resource-backed loans, and subscribes to a clear profit motive. African
natural resources remain the primary draw for outside investment. A key
challenge for Africans and development practitioners alike is to take
this economic driver of engagement and use it to promote a develop-
mental agenda for Africa. Doing so requires African governments to
demonstrate leadership and innovative thinking, building upon the
best-established practices from their own experience with traditional
partners and integrating these with the insights and policies of emerging
economies.
The most significant impact that China has had on Africa’s resource
sector is that it offers a new opportunity for Africa to reshape its
relationships with external partners in ways that can enhance the con-
tinent’s overall development prospects. It is a relationship which will
continue to grow as a priority for Beijing, as witnessed by its announce-
ment at the FOCAC V ministerial meetings in July 2012 to provide
a further USD 20 billion in loans to Africa. For its own part, China
has proven to be sensitive to African and international pressure, hav-
ing recently introduced changes in its policies towards the continent.
262 New Challenges and Opportunities

Unfortunately, policy shifts in Beijing do not necessarily translate into

tangible changes at the bottom of the ‘chain’; national (ideational) and
corporate (profit driven) interests do not always overlap and there is no
effective supervision mechanism to ensure compliance.
Bearing in mind that China has shown signs of sensitiveness to exter-
nal pressure – explained by the need to please some constituencies in the
West (e.g., the urge to play the ‘responsible stakeholder’ role) – there is a
strategic role to be performed by civil society and international institu-
tions in this process – not only over Chinese conduct but most especially
around the policy choices and implementation strategies on natural
resources by local African governments. Among the measures that could
be encouraged would be the introduction of effective surveillance and
related transparency mechanisms to ensure compliance by all players
involved in this sector, including traditional Western partners. Equally,
international and African actors could do more to ensure local benefici-
ation and promote policy regimes at the regional and continental levels
aimed at improving African development, be they environmental reg-
ulations, labour standards or improving taxation collection revenues.
For example, the highlighting of best practice by African firms would be
particularly useful and informative for Chinese firms. More generally,
having African stakeholders work more closely with Chinese author-
ities (who are increasingly aware of the political and economic costs
of their interests in African countries like Zambia and South Sudan),
would provide another lever to ensure better governance. In this way,
those natural resources which have too often been seen to be a form of
a ‘curse’ can truly act as the source for African development.

Notes
1. In-person interview with an official at the Ministry of Finance, Luanda,
Angola, 5 March 2008.
2. In-person interview with an official at the Exim Bank, Beijing, China, 26
August 2009.
3. The IMF and IDA created this classification in 1996 (enhanced in 1999), in
order to provide debt relief to the world’s poorest economies. The criteria that
a country needs to meet before becoming eligible under the initiative can
include good governance, accountability for public funds, and the adoption
of a national anti-corruption strategy.
4. In-person interview with an anonymous banking official, Beijing, China,
2 September 2008.
5. The initiative, that was launched in 2005 by a coalition of governments, com-
panies, civil society groups, investors, and international organizations, sets a
global standard for companies to publish what they pay and for governments
 Christopher Alden and Ana Cristina Alves 263

to disclose what payments they receive. As of mid-2014, 44 countries had

sought membership in the EITI, and a subset of 27 countries were considered
‘EITI-compliant’. Sierra Leone was the most recent compliant member, having
had its suspension by the EITI lifted.
6. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) process imposes extensive
requirements on its members to enable them to certify shipments of rough
diamonds as ‘conflict-free’ and prevent conflict diamonds from entering the
legitimate trade. See, for example, Grant and Taylor (2004) and Grant (2011;
2013).
7. The principles are a voluntary set of guidelines based on International Finance
Corporation (IFC) policies to incorporate social and environmental issues in
project financing.
8. In this case China is not alone, as other emerging economies, such as India,
Brazil, and South Africa, which are acquiring growing stakes in African natural
resources, have failed to produce solid proof of commitment to the initiative,
arousing growing concern among OECD countries.

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13
Prospects and Trends in the
Governance of Africa’s Natural
Resources: Reflections on the Role
of External and Internal Actors
J. Andrew Grant, W.R. Nadège Compaoré, Matthew I. Mitchell,
and Timothy M. Shaw

Introduction

Contemporary studies of Africa’s natural resource sectors are concerned

with concepts such as governance, transnationalism, regionalism(s),
‘network’/‘public’ diplomacy, norms (e.g., good governance and corpo-
rate social responsibility), and conflict commodities. By way of conclu-
sion, this chapter aims not only to identify and elaborate upon the most
important theoretical, empirical, and policy trends associated with these
concepts and place them in a broader perspective but also to reflect
upon what generalizations may be made regarding the diffusion of such
concepts and their impact on governance in Africa’s natural resource
sectors. To this end, the chapter is divided into five main sections. The
first section revisits the theme of oil in Africa by examining the shift
away from privileging a focus on energy ‘security’ towards the embrac-
ing of a new agenda on energy ‘governance’. This provides us with
a new lens to understand why governance challenges in the oil sec-
tor (and other natural resource sectors) must move beyond dominant
state-centric approaches. The second section explores the prospects and
trends in Africa’s natural resources by focusing on a series of interre-
lated themes around the continent’s most important resource – land.
This section is divided into three subsections that explore the follow-
ing issues related to the governance of land in Africa: the rise of land
grabs, the growth of Chinese investments in Africa’s natural resource

267
268 New Challenges and Opportunities

sectors, and land conflicts and the politics around land reform. The third
section identifies a number of enduring challenges in the governance of
Africa’s natural resource sectors. In so doing, the section takes stock of
some of the main findings that emerge from the volume in order to
reiterate the need for a ‘new’ approach in the governance of Africa’s
natural resources. The penultimate section continues this discussion by
highlighting the underlying tension and important distinction between
the concepts of natural resource management and natural resource gov-
ernance. In the final section, the chapter reiterates the need for more
inclusive modes of governance that both acknowledge and attempt to
address the unequal power relations throughout Africa’s natural resource
sectors.

Africa’s oil: From energy security to energy governance?

In the African context, discussions of energy sectors essentially refer to

the petroleum sectors. While coal and nuclear power provide a very
minor segment of the continent’s energy needs (solar, wind, biofuels,
and other ‘renewable’ sources of energy remain largely absent), oil is the
most important commodity when discussing energy governance. Yet,
from a scholarly perspective, Florini and Sovacool (2011: 57) contend
that ‘energy constitutes a rich, but underexplored, arena for global gov-
ernance scholars and policymakers’. In accordance with the volume’s
focus on oil governance in Africa, this section will take up Florini and
Sovacool’s challenge and seek to fill in some of the gaps in the extant
literature.
The contributors to this collection have been concerned with incor-
porating governance concerns around emerging natural resource and
energy governance issues from a variety of analytical perspectives. This
is consistent with similar work that seeks to emphasize the impor-
tance of the ‘transnational’ aspects of International Relations (IR) and
International Political Economy (IPE) rather than simply inter- or trans-
governmental factors (see, for example, Dingwerth, 2007; Phillips and
Weaver, 2010; Bevir, 2011; Hale and Held, 2011; Shaw et al., 2011). The
shift from energy security to energy governance reinforces the impera-
tive of interdisciplinarity and the transcendence of state-centrism, while
taking care not to ignore the enduring centrality of national oil compa-
nies (NOCs).1 In turn, this ontological shift enables a rich variety of
assumptions to be analysed, a choice of methodologies to be employed,
and the importance of informal and illegal sectors to be recognized.
Goldthau and Witte (2010) suggest that the established concentration
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 269

on energy security is being superseded by a focus on energy governance,

which in turn reflects the appearance and growth of significant energy
consumers such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa). In a similar vein, South-South Cooperation (SSC) is witnessing a
resurgence (Grant, 2015), driven in large measure by a thirst for access to
energy sectors. Other scholars are less optimistic regarding the promise
of energy governance. Klare (2012) continues to expound on the nega-
tive potential of oil in terms of instigating ‘resource wars’.2 Florini and
Sovacool also urge caution and seek to identify the limits of energy gov-
ernance at both the global and regional levels. The authors contend
that:

The existing institutions of global energy governance are demonstra-

bly ill-equipped to handle humanity’s daunting energy challenges,
which require simultaneous attention to issues related to geopolit-
ical stability, the security of energy infrastructure, trans-boundary
environmental externalities, the proliferation of nuclear technol-
ogy, investment and trade rules, economic development, and water
and agricultural policy. Together, these challenges constitute a com-
pelling rationale for a sustained research agenda in global energy
governance.
(Florini and Sovacool, 2011: 70)

We are pleased that Florini and Sovacool include water policy and
agricultural policy as elements of a comprehensive approach to under-
standing global energy governance. While we would add fisheries to
the water policy angle (Sumaila and Tesfamichael, see Chapter 10) and
emphasize rivers (Turton, see Chapter 11) as well as the relevance of
forestry (Grant et al., see Chapter 8), Florini and Sovacool are moving
the natural resource governance debates forward in a positive direction
by incorporating environmental issues as well as social and political
concerns.
The legacy of past governance practices around Africa’s oil – and its
impact on human security – are difficult to ignore. Nigeria often comes
to the fore in such discussions. The country’s Niger River Delta region
has had a troubled contemporary history, ranging from being coveted
during the Nigerian Civil War and Biafra’s attempt to secede in the late-
1960s, to Ken Saro-Wiwa’s hanging in November 1995, to the more
recent inflammable mix of flaring, bunkering, attacks on oil installa-
tions, hostage-taking, and militia violence under the auspices of the
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Adding
270 New Challenges and Opportunities

to the complexity are the transnational relations of exploration, pro-

duction, exportation, and accumulation that have been met with local
resistance, which in turn has been exacerbated by identity politics and
diasporic connections (Obi, 2009). Nigeria’s democratic development
is in jeopardy for a range of reasons, including widespread corruption
and transnational mafia networks (Glenny, 2009: 161–182) as well as
environmental pressures and socio-economic inequalities (Obi, 2009:
108–111). While the length of time since oil discovery in Uganda has
been shorter compared to Nigeria, the governance record may face
similar criticisms (Shaw and Mbabazi, 2007). Tullow, an Irish oil com-
pany, has faced difficulties and extended delays in efforts to gain final
presidential approval (from Yoweri Museveni) for oil exploration and
exploitation in the Lake Albert region. Although the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) is in disarray and scattered across several neighbouring
countries, it would be foolhardy to dismiss the possibility that the rebel
group might return to Ugandan territory and copy the MEND’s tac-
tics of kidnappings and violent attacks on oil installations as part of
its decades-long armed struggle against the central government. Oil dis-
coveries on the Congolese side of Lake Albert will complicate matters,
as Uganda–Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) relations are strained
owing to clashes between government forces as well as Uganda’s med-
dling in the DRC’s long-running efforts to control armed militias within
its borders.
The above cases underscore the comparative dimensions and com-
plexity that make energy governance an elusive challenge for academics
and policy-makers alike. Concomitantly, there are opportunities and
pressures arising from the BRICS (Cheru and Obi, 2010) as well as a
variety of global standards and norms that are proliferating and seek-
ing to enhance resource governance. The latter initiatives include the
EITI, Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS),3 African Timber
Organization/International Tropical Timber Organization (ATO/ITTO),4
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC),5 Africa Mining Vision (AMV),6 Nat-
ural Resource Charter (NRC),7 and International Conference on the
Great Lakes Region-Regional Certification Mechanism (ICGLR-RCM).8
The promise and potential of such global governance initiatives are also
fraught with challenges and crises. For every ‘Ghana’ that joins the EITI
and becomes compliant, there is a ‘DRC’ whose EITI status is suspended,
or a ‘Uganda’ that appears content to ignore the EITI altogether. In the
case of the Kimberley Process, Zimbabwe has been a problematic mem-
ber and only very narrowly avoided suspension from the KPCS (Grant,
2013a; 2013b).
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 271

Prospects and trends in Africa’s natural resources

Notwithstanding this volume’s focus on a range of key natural resource

sectors such as oil, mining, forestry, and fishing, Africa’s most critical
resource of all is arguably ‘land’. As such, it is important to shed addi-
tional light on the central role of land when considering the prospects
and trends in Africa’s natural resources. As Shipton (1994: 347) notes,
‘nothing excites deeper passions or gives rise to more bloodshed than do
disagreements about territory, boundaries, or access to land resources’.
Unlike other resources, the importance of land ‘transcends economics
into a breadth of social, spiritual, and political significance’ (Alao, 2007:
63). It is therefore hard to imagine a more significant and yet com-
plex resource in Africa. Although land does not easily fall under the
traditional category of ‘natural resources’, a closer examination of the
multifaceted issues related to land management highlights the crucial
importance of governance challenges attached to this most precious
resource. Despite the fact that only one of our contributors (Collins, see
Chapter 9) directly explores governance challenges linked to land man-
agement issues, the vast majority of the chapters in this volume consider
research questions that are deeply intertwined with governances chal-
lenges related to land. This is indeed illustrated in Yates’ chapter on oil,
Dashwood and Puplampu’s chapter on mining, Grant and colleagues’
chapter on forestry, and Turton’s chapter on transboundary river basin
management. While none of these chapters focuses on ‘land’ per se,
the issues they explore are closely tied to other developments through-
out the continent that are fundamentally linked to the governance
of land.
In order to map key emerging trends and consider future prospects
around the governance of Africa’s natural resources, we therefore pro-
pose to briefly consider three interrelated themes regarding the gover-
nance of land: the rise of land grabs; the growth of Chinese investments
in Africa’s natural resource sectors; and land conflicts and the politics
around land reform. In so doing, we argue that these issues constitute
critically important developments in determining whether Africa’s nat-
ural resources (e.g., oil, mining, forestry, etc.) might serve as a boon to
economic development or a politically contentious and potential source
of future conflict. In short, how these governance challenges related to
land are managed could determine whether the above resources may
be a ‘blessing’ or a ‘curse’ for economic growth and political stability.
Moreover, this short section also provides further evidence of the need
to move beyond a state-centric approach to understanding governance
272 New Challenges and Opportunities

challenges. We must recognize the micro-, meso-, and macro-level

implications related to these emerging trends, as land management ini-
tiatives in Africa are influenced by governance processes at the global,
regional, national, and local levels.

Land grabs
One of the most significant developments and formidable governance
challenges in Africa’s natural resource sector is the dramatic rise in
‘land grabs’. Since 2000, African countries have reportedly ‘given away’
some USD 100 billion in land (Kantai et al., 2012). This trend has been
described by many as a ‘new scramble’ for Africa’s resources and led
some in the international community to caution against the ‘growing
scandal surrounding the new wave of investments in land’ (Oxfam,
2011). Indeed, some commentators may point out that many of these
developments are not entirely new. As Amanor (2012: 732) reminds
us, ‘the dynamic towards land grabbing arises internally from the logic
of agribusiness accumulation’. Yet, the scale of these recent transfers is
novel as well as alarming. Although this phenomenon is not unique
to Africa – massive land transfers have taken place in Asia and Latin
America (see Oxfam, 2011) – the continent has witnessed the largest
transfer of lands in recent memory.
According to one report, in 2009 alone nearly 40 million hectares of
land changed hands – a transfer of land representing more than the cul-
tivated areas of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
and Switzerland combined (Kantai et al., 2012: 23). This trend consti-
tutes one of the most urgent global governance challenges facing African
countries at national and local levels. While transnational corporations
and foreign governments prize the largely untapped agricultural poten-
tial of Africa’s massive arable lands, national governments appear to
be ignoring local demands for consultation. To quote Saudi Arabia’s
agricultural minister, Fahd bin Abdulrahman bin Sulaiman Balgunaim,
‘We open doors for the private sector to go and negotiate. It is up to the
local governments to decide what they want to do, whether they want
to lease the land, or they want to sell the land’ (Kantai et al., 2012: 23).
To be sure, local communities and national governments obviously have
the right to manage their land as they see fit. However, there is much evi-
dence to suggest that in so doing local populations are bearing the brunt
of these unprecedented land transfers. In a recent report, Oxfam Interna-
tional (2011: 3) suggests that ‘local rights-holders are losing out to local
elites and domestic or foreign investors, because they lack the power to
claim their rights effectively and to defend and advance their interests’.
This is precisely the finding in a recent study by Amanor (2012: 731),
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 273

who states that ‘increasing competitiveness and concentration within

agriculture creates pressures on smallholders that ultimately result in
dispossession’, thus increasing insecurity among millions of smallholder
farmers in the agricultural sector. In sum, these dramatic developments
in the global economy have ushered in new governance challenges for
national and local communities who must work together to mitigate
future problems related to land transfers.

China’s influence in Africa’s natural resources

For more than a decade, scholars and pundits alike have become
preoccupied with discerning the ramifications of China’s growing eco-
nomic and diplomatic influence in Africa. A common theme in such
works – aimed at academic, policy-making, and public audiences – is the
unparalleled success that Chinese firms enjoy in terms of access to var-
ious natural resource sectors across the continent. As a result, the study
of China–Africa relations has become a mainstream issue in African pol-
itics. This has led scholars to urge fellow researchers to move beyond
the dominant ‘dragon in the bush’ preoccupations over China’s foray
into Africa (Large, 2008).9 While Chinese investors and workers have
entered a wide range of sectors in Africa’s booming economy, much of
the focus in media and scholarly circles has been on China’s appetite for
Africa’s natural resources. As Alden and Alves note in this volume (see
Chapter 12), China has been highly active in a wide range of African
countries and in diverse natural resource sectors. While some experts
believe China’s venture into Africa holds great promise (e.g., Moyo,
2009), others point to the country’s poor record on human rights and
the potential negative implications for governance in Africa (e.g., Taylor,
2008).
One thing is certain – the growth of Chinese investments in Africa
is directly related to governance issues around land. Despite some of
the common perceptions that China is exploiting Africa’s land as part
of the abovementioned land grabs to feed its billion-plus population,
research suggests this is likely not the case. According to a 2009 report,
there is very weak evidence that China is acquiring land as a means
to implement its national food security strategy, as most of its land
purchases were in the ‘medium scale’ below 1000 hectares (Cotula
et al., 2009). Notwithstanding these observations, it is clear that China
remains deeply interested in acquiring land in Africa for a wide range
of reasons, one of which could one day conceivably be to tackle its
impending food crisis. However, Chinese appropriations of land have
not been limited to the agricultural sector, as many Chinese workers
have also flooded into the large-scale and small-scale mining sectors.
274 New Challenges and Opportunities

These developments have been particularly contentious in places such

as Ghana, where Chinese workers work as ‘galamsey’ in some of the
illicit artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) camps where relations are
often hostile between Chinese and indigenous populations. This was
made clear in a recent interview conducted by one of the authors with
a member of a local NGO. When asked to comment on indigenous-
Chinese relations, the interviewee revealed: ‘Really, I must confess, they
don’t like the Chinese at all! They don’t like them because some see the
Chinese as cheats . . . . And after working, instead of covering the pit they
will just leave it and just go back to their country. And children will fall
into the pit and die.’10 These tensions recently erupted in violence in
October 2012, when a young Chinese galamsey miner was killed (BBC,
2012a).11 These episodes ultimately highlight how the rise of Chinese
investments and interest in Africa’s natural resource sectors – including
land – represent another governance challenge with global, national,
and local implications.

Land conflicts and land reform

Perhaps no land-related issue provides a greater illustration of the com-
plex governance challenges linked to this resource than the problem of
land conflicts. Although there is a long-standing history of land conflicts
in Africa, there is much evidence to suggest that these conflicts are on
the rise. As one recent study of changing dynamics in warfare in Africa
reveals, despite the decline in overall levels of conflict, conflicts over
land represent an alarming new trend throughout Africa (Straus, 2012).
While many have argued that land disputes are largely a function of
growing resource scarcity (e.g., Homer-Dixon, 1999), more compelling
evidence suggests that land conflicts owe more to governance failures
around land management. For example, in the introductory essay to a
volume of studies that examine conflicts over land and water in Africa,
Derman and colleagues (2007) found no direct link between resource
scarcity and violence, instead noting a mixture of social inequality, lack
of secure land rights, history of conflicts, and the use of land as a politi-
cal reward as contributing factors to violent conflict over land. In other
words, land conflicts often stem from breakdowns in the governance of
this vital resource, at both the national and local levels.
Interestingly, while land conflicts are generally played out at the
micro-level, they are often deeply connected to macro-level transforma-
tions in the global governance of land. This is nowhere more the case
than with land tenure reforms, where external actors such as the World
Bank have played critical roles in pressuring national governments
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 275

to adopt new land legislation, often with dire consequences at the

local level.12 Notwithstanding their original intention in the late 1960s
through the early 1980s to reform land policies with a view to promote
economic growth via increased efficiency and by securing private rights
to land (Amanor, 2012), many of these policy reforms and titling pro-
grammes ‘exacerbated conflicts by ignoring overlapping and multiple
rights and uses of land, and led to or reinforced patterns of unequal
access to land based on gender, age, ethnicity, and class’ (Peters, 2009:
1318). As Boone (2007: 558) rightly points out, ‘to reform the rules of
land tenure is to redefine relationships between and within communi-
ties, and between communities and the state’. As reforms are currently
underway in over 20 countries in Africa, the issue of land reform repre-
sents an immensely important development in the governance of land
tenure throughout Africa. One of the greatest challenges in navigat-
ing these reforms is the need to integrate and balance national and
local demands in formulating new land legislation. Despite the need for
state-level interventions in supporting such reforms, some experts worry
about the ‘limits of state-led reform’, arguing instead for community-
led reforms (Sikor and Müller, 2009). Given the complex nature of land
tenure systems and the increased propensity for land conflicts, it would
seem that both external and internal actors have a vested interest in
integrating stakeholders at all levels of governance in order to improve
existing legislation.13

Governing Africa’s natural resources sector: Identifying

the challenges

As varied as the contributions to this volume have been, they all point
to one key direction, namely the need to re-evaluate current governance
strategies for the continent’s natural resources. Furthermore, a com-
mon message emanating from the various chapters is the affirmation
that such a re-evaluation requires the participation of a comprehen-
sive range of actors, cutting across societal, political, economic, and
geographical spheres. This concern in itself is not new, and has been
echoed by academics and practitioners alike. Analysts, especially within
the global governance scholarship, have stressed the need to tran-
scend state-centric approaches, so as to make space for a multi-level,
multi-actor understanding of governance. To be sure, global governance
scholars conceptualize the world as a complexity of networks (Rosenau
and Czempiel, 1992; Weiss, 2000; Rosenau, 2002; Söderbaum, 2004;
Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2006), which comprises state and non-state
276 New Challenges and Opportunities

actors, formal and informal, licit and illicit, at the global and local levels.
Policy-makers are also increasingly challenging the existing hierarchy
within global public policy approaches, which tend to favour economic
mechanisms. For instance, the World Bank adopted a new strategy in the
2012 fiscal year, to address development issues in Africa. This strategy
shifts away from a more general emphasis on ‘economic stability’, and
is built on the strengthening of ‘governance and public sector capacity’
(World Bank, 2012).
The present volume reiterates the above policy concerns and aligns
with the global governance literature, but also seeks to further the
debate by offering analyses that aim to enhance and improve our
understanding of what it means to govern natural resources in Africa,
and how to do so effectively. As reflected in the chapters through-
out this book, we adopt an inclusive understanding of governance,
whereby the actors involved participate in the decision-making process
that affect all members of society. In the introduction, we embraced
an understanding of governance as a set of fundamental rules that
guide the organization of the public sphere (Bøås, 1998: 120); in this
sense, governance is not necessarily concerned with government, and
as such the state need not occupy a central role vis-à-vis governance
matters. We thus propose here to take this initial conceptualization
of governance further, and emphasize the need for such fundamental
rules to be constructed in consultation with all the actors upon which
they impact. Specifically, such actors include individuals, communities,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, international
financial institutions (IFIs), states, and inter-governmental organiza-
tions (IGOs), be they at the sub-national, national, regional, or global
level.
Based on the comprehensive nature of the natural resources cov-
ered in this volume, and through the conceptualization of governance
described above, we locate the main challenges to an inclusive rule-
making process within existing governance practices that privilege a
certain type of knowledge (often Western) as most effective for orga-
nizing the public sphere. In doing so, certain types of actors (e.g.,
scientists, policy-makers, and donors) are viewed as experts in natu-
ral resources governance, thereby excluding those perceived to have
less or no expertise in the domain (local communities for instance).
The urgent need to address these issues of exclusion is illustrated
throughout the various chapters, where the contributing authors iden-
tify a wide range of excluded actors, types of knowledge, and modes
of governance. All these analyses point to fundamental power rela-
tions that construct divides between different actors, thus preventing
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 277

the possibility of an inclusive platform for dialoguing about how best

to organize the use of natural resources. Moreover, such divisions and
exclusions are enabled and further perpetuated by existing institu-
tional frameworks, which often emulate structures from the Global
North that may not necessarily find resonance and/or applicability
with local realities in Africa. For instance, Andrea Collins’ contribution
(see Chapter 9) on the gendered dynamics of land deals in Kenya and
Tanzania is illustrative of the need to construct a more inclusive con-
ceptualization of governance, which makes visible the presence and
relevance of local, vulnerable communities – notably women – at a
level of importance that is equal to that of powerful global agricul-
tural investors. Elsewhere, Sumaila and Tesfamichael’s contribution (see
Chapter 10) on Africa’s fisheries governance emphasizes the importance
of traditional governance schemes developed by many coastal com-
munities in Africa, which have effectively used local socio-economic
and cultural values to ensure the sustainable exploitation of marine
resources.
Given the above discussion, our approach shows scepticism towards
the easy diagnosis of corruption as the main challenge facing the gover-
nance of natural resources in Africa, and prescribing ‘good governance’
as the solitary means of addressing related challenges. We are not alone
in this diagnosis. The 2013 edition of the Africa Progress Report, which
focuses on the continent’s extractive resource sectors, underlines the
multifaceted aspects of corruption as well as the responsibility of the
international community to help prevent the phenomenon. Specifically,
the report notes that:

Foreign investors in Africa’s extractive industries operate across juris-

dictions and through enormously complex company structures.
Petroleum and mining companies channel their financial and trade
activity in Africa through local subsidiaries, affiliates and a web
of offshore companies. The combination of complexity, different
disclosure requirements and limited regulatory capacity . . . facilitates
aggressive tax planning, tax evasion and corruption. It also leads in
many cases to the undervaluation of Africa’s natural resources – a
practice that drains some of Africa’s poorest nations of desperately
needed revenues.
(Africa Progress Panel, 2013: 51)

This chapter now turns to a discussion that delves into one of the key
concepts that appears throughout the volume: the concept of ‘good
governance’.
278 New Challenges and Opportunities

Towards good management or good governance of

natural resources?

Many analysts who present ‘good governance’ as a policy prescrip-

tion often associate their assessments with the arguments made in the
‘resource curse’ literature (Sachs and Warner, 1995; 1997; Atkinson and
Hamilton, 2003). According to resource curse scholars, there is a nega-
tive relationship between natural resource wealth and economic growth
in resource-rich countries from the developing world, as seen especially
in Africa. Episodes of protracted violence are an important component
of the resource curse literature. In a 2014 report, Maplecroft, a firm
that advises investors on the potential for the eruption of violence
across the globe, suggested that six of the top nine countries ‘most at
risk’ for protracted violent conflict are found in Africa. Two countries
that figure prominently in the present volume – South Sudan and the
DRC – were ranked fourth and seventh ‘most at risk’ out of 197 coun-
tries studied, respectively.14 The other African countries in the top nine
included the Central African Republic (CAR) in second place, Somalia
in sixth place, Libya in eighth place, and Sudan in ninth place. Aside
from Somalia (which suffers from a dearth of geological survey data),
all these African countries found in the top nine are considered to be
‘resource-rich’.
Taken as a whole, such analyses have posited the paradoxical wors-
ening of economic and social welfare in resource-rich African countries
as the result of pervasive corruption that plagues institutional practices
on the continent (Leite and Weidmann, 1999). This kind of diagnosis
silences the structural and power relations that are in fact central to the
issues facing the governance of natural resources in Africa. In a paral-
lel analysis, it is equally unhelpful to downplay the degree to which
corruption afflicts governance in African countries, as there is a need
to make visible the political and social dimensions of the governance
of natural resources as discussed in the previous section. In the con-
temporary context in which powerful transnational corporations have
deeply penetrated the resource sector in Africa, particularly vis-à-vis
extractive industries, the susceptibility of both state and corporate actors
to resort to corruption as a means to ‘seal deals’ has become a growing
concern, especially without sufficient legal frameworks to regulate cor-
porate behaviour (Rossouw, 2005). As such, ‘good governance’ becomes
a meaningful policy strategy only when it engages with political, social,
economic, and ecological aspects of natural resources.
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 279

To anchor the concept of ‘good governance’ in a political mean-

ing, it is important to discuss two key terms that are sometimes used
interchangeably, ‘management’ and ‘governance’. Having already pre-
sented our understanding of what ‘governance’ entails, we build on
analyses that make a clear distinction between ‘management’ and ‘gov-
ernance’ (Rist et al., 2007), and argue that the politically neutralizing
aspects of management discourses run counter to our more inclusive
governance framework. It is useful to elaborate on Rist and colleagues’
understanding of the above distinction, and on how we propose to
contribute to their analysis.
According to Rist and colleagues (2007: 23), sustainable natural
resource management is ‘the application of scientific ecological knowl-
edge to resource management’. However, this definition largely ignores
the political, social, and economic dimensions of resource use. We apply
a similar conceptualization, but critique the ramifications of natural
resource management (NRM). That is, we suggest that while economic
concerns are privileged in discussions of NRM, such emphasis results
in the silencing of vital political and social dimensions of gover-
nance. An illustration of this state of affairs occurred as part of a
recent global conference organized by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in March 2012, and held in Kinshasa under the theme ‘Man-
agement of Natural Resources in Sub-Saharan Africa’. To be sure, the
conference essentially focused on the ‘macroeconomic management of
natural resource revenue’ (IMF, 2012). Most of the presentations dealt
with building government capacity, so as to effectively use economic
mechanisms to help maximize the benefits harnessed from the con-
tinent’s natural resources. Admittedly, this is an unsurprising focus
for the conference, given that the IMF is a high-profile IFI. Further-
more, NRM puts an unequal emphasis on state agency and power, thus
constructing a passive role for societal non-state actors. In contrast,
the concept of natural resource governance (NRG) is more inclusive
of stakeholders, as it seeks to promote a state–society dialogue and
aims to accommodate voices from all levels of society, while engaging
with different types of knowledge – such as expertise from environ-
mental scientists, bureaucrats, traditional authorities, local community
leaders, development practitioners, lawyers, activists, economists, and
politicians. The ultimate objective of NRG is to establish an equalizing
platform where state and non-state actors may interact and construct
the fundamental rules upon which to address the extraction of natural
resources.
280 New Challenges and Opportunities

Concluding remarks

In the context of Africa’s natural resources, acknowledging and indeed

politicizing unequal power relations among actors is crucial. Specifically,
it is essential to identify the extant power relations between: formal
and informal actors; vulnerable populations and decision-makers; and
indigenous forms of knowledge and more global (or predominantly
Western) forms of knowledge. In so doing, one can map out the fun-
damental ways in which to begin to equalize such relations, which is an
important first step in the construction of more inclusive modes of gov-
ernance. This understanding and conceptualization of governance could
certainly be helpful for the multitude of old, new, and emerging initia-
tives, institutions, and platforms that are present nationally, regionally,
and globally – which aim to foster a better governance of Africa’s natural
resources.
As Africa continues to face growing pressure from both its ‘old
partners’ – namely investors from Western countries as well as its ‘new’
or ‘emerging’ partners (specifically the BRICS countries) – competition
between these different partners will continue to accelerate, especially
between China and its Western counterparts (Abramova and Fituni,
2011). Yet, despite this so-called ‘new scramble’ for Africa’s natural
resources, there appears to be a manifest interest from partners both
internal and external to the continent (BRICS, Western, and other coun-
tries), to partner up in building strategies for the effective governance of
those resources in the form of national, regional, or global governance
initiatives. The challenge remains as regards the logistics of maintaining
an inclusive platform within these emerging institutional partnerships,
especially given the profound power imbalances between and among
the participating actors. Indeed, and paradoxically so, African actors
who are most directly affected by these governance initiatives tend to
have a lesser voice than their external counterparts, the latter being
more politically and economically powerful than the former. As such,
the impetus behind this volume is doubly crucial and prescient, mak-
ing the need for establishing a level playing field in Africa’s resource
governance even more evident.

Notes
1. See, for example, Goldstein (2007: 33–40).
2. See also Shaxson (2007), and Power and colleagues (2012).
3. See, for example, Grant (2010; 2011).
 J. Andrew Grant et al. 281

4. See, for example, ATO & ITTO (2003), Gale and Haward (2011), and
Chapter 8 in this volume.
5. See, for example, Grant and colleagues (2013).
6. See, for example, African Union (2009), which employs a lexicon that
appears to be seeking to reinvigorate the ‘developmental state’ in Africa
(see also United Nations Economic Commission for Africa & African Union,
2011; 2012; Kyung-Sup et al., 2012).
7. See, for example, Schnurr and Swatuk (2011).
8. See, for example, Blore and Smillie (2011) and Grant (2014; 2015).
9. For an excellent overview of China–Africa relations, see Alden (2007) and
Taylor (2009).
10. Author’s interview with a NGO representative, Wassa Amenfi East District,
Western Region, Ghana, 16 June 2011.
11. Notably, a number of Chinese construction workers were murdered in north-
ern Nigeria around this time (BBC, 2012b). Although these killings may not
necessarily be related to land disputes, they nevertheless highlight the grow-
ing tension among some local communities over the arrival of increasingly
large numbers of Chinese migrant workers in the licit and illicit sectors of
African economies.
12. For an example of current World Bank policies on land reform in Africa,
see the recent report authored by its lead ‘Africa Region’ land specialist,
Byamugisha (2013).
13. On a related note, a major study by Crook and colleagues (2007) high-
lights the value in integrating and employing both local traditional (i.e.,
customary) authorities and state institutions in resolving land conflicts.
14. See http://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-analysis/2014/05/07/conflict-and
-political-violence-intensifies-48-countries-2013-ukraine-sees-biggest-increase
-risk-maplecroft/ (Accessed 8 May 2014).

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9 November 2012).
Index
AAGI, see Ahafo Agribusiness Growth
Initiative
Access to Information (ATI), 65–92
Accountability, 31, 56, 77, 97, 140–1
AFD, see under Development
AfDB, see under Development
African Union (AU), 124, 127, 260
Ahafo Agribusiness Growth Initiative
(AAGI), 147
Alternative Mining Indaba, 31
AMV, see under Mining
Angola, 28–9, 57–8, 96–109
‘Angola mode’, 29, 250, 257
Aquaculture, 208, 217, 220
ASM, see under Mining
ATI, see Access to Information
ATO, see Timber, African Timber
Organization
AU, see African Union
BAB, see Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai
BABDA, see Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai
District Assembly
Benin, 48, 207
Berlin Conference, 8–9
Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai (BAB), 148
Bibiani-Anhwiaso-Bekwai District
Assembly (BABDA), 148–9
Big international non-governmental
organization (BINGO), 30
BINGO, see Big international
non-governmental organization
Biofuels, 181, 268
Botswana, 28, 35, 224, 231–41
Brazil, Russia, India, and China
(BRIC), 29
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa (BRICS), 5, 8, 29,
269–70, 280
BRIC, see Brazil, Russia, India, and
China
BRICS, see Brazil, Russia, India, China,
and South Africa
285
CAEMC, see Central African Economic
and Monetary Community
Cameroon, 48, 97, 164, 166, 168, 170,
173–4, 253, 255
Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA), 148
CAR, see Central African Republic
CBFP, see Forestry Governance, Congo
Basin Forest Partnership
CDB, see China, Development Bank
CDD, see Centre for Democracy
Development
Central African Economic and
Monetary Community
(CAEMC), 167
Central African Republic (CAR), 164,
177, 278
Centre for Democracy Development
(CDD), 86
Chad, 28, 48, 50–1, 54–8, 252
chain-of-custody (COC), 172
Chiefs, 35, 126, 140, 146, 185
kgotla, 35
China, 14–16, 247–62, 273–4
Development Bank (CDB), 252
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC), 261
International United Petroleum &
Chemicals Company
(UNIPEC), 251
National Machinery and Equipment
Corporation (CMEC), 251
National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC), 253
National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC), 261
Non-Ferrous China Africa
(NFCA), 253
Nonferrous Metals Corporation
(CNMC), 253
Railway Engineering Corporation
(CREC), 251
286 Index
Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI),
98–9, 102–5, 108
CIDA, see Canadian International
Development Agency
CIFOR, see Forestry Governance,
Center for International Forestry
Research
Climate change, 172, 225,
238–42
CMEC, see under China
CMI, see Christian Michelsen Institute
CNMC, see under China
CNOOC, see under China
CNPC, see under China
COC, see chain-of-custody
Colonialism, 9–11
COMESA, see Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa
Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA), 124
Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA), 113, 115, 119–20, 125
corporate social responsibility (CSR),
6, 132–4, 137, 142, 146–7, 254,
256, 260
Corruption Perception Index (CPI),
53–4
Côte d’Ivoire, 48, 164, 166, 168–9,
176, 207
CPA, see Comprehensive Peace
Agreement
CPI, see Corruption Perception Index
CREC, see under China
CSR, see corporate social responsibility
DAC, see under Development
DDR, see Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
27–30, 34, 37, 125, 131, 164, 166,
173–4, 231–2, 234–7, 241,
251–60
Development, 11–14, 28–9, 34–9,
49–52, 56–62, 96–100, 131–51
African Development Bank (AfDB),
256–7
Agency for Development (AFD), 167
Development Assistance Committee
(DAC), 257
Development Workshop (DW),
98–109
Sustainable Development, 134–51,
154–77
Diamonds, 27, 96, 137, 258
Conflict diamonds, 27, 263
see also Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme
Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR), 123
DRC, see Democratic Republic of
Congo
DW, see under Development
EAC, see East African Community
East African Community (EAC), 124
ECA, see Economic Cooperation
Administration
Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), 167
Economic Cooperation
Administration (ECA), 11–14
Ecopath with Ecosim (EwE), 221
ECOWAS, see Economic Community
of West African States
EEZ, see Exclusive Economic Zones
EIA, see Environmental Impact
Assessment
EITI, see Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative
El Niño Southern Oscillation
(ENSO), 224
ENSO, see El Niño Southern
Oscillation
Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA), 75, 260
Equator Principles, 259
Equatorial Guinea, 48, 50–1, 55–8,
177, 252, 257, 260
ERP, see European Recovery Program
ET, see evapotranspiration
Ethiopia, 66–9, 73, 81–2, 86–8,
125, 259
EU, see European Union
European Recovery Program (ERP), 21
European Union (EU), 15, 155, 209,
224, 247
evapotranspiration (ET), 240

Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ),
200–6, 209, 212–13, 221
Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI), 14, 20–1, 29,
65–6, 257, 259–60, 270
Ghana Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative
(GHEITI), 140–1
Liberia Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (LEITI),
75–7, 80–2
Nigeria Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (NEITI),
65, 92
EwE, see Ecopath with Ecosim
FAA, see Fisheries Access Agreement
FAO, see Food and Agriculture
Organization
FDI, see Foreign Direct Investment
Fellowship of Christian Councils in
Southern Africa (FOCCISA), 31
Fisheries, 200–21
artisanal, 213–17
Eritrean Red Sea trawl fishery, 215
Fisheries Access Agreement (FAA),
208–10, 218, 220
‘modern fisheries development’, 218
subsidies, 211–13
FLEGT, see under Forestry Governance
FMU, see under Forestry Governance
FOCAC, see Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation
FOCCISA, see Fellowship of Christian
Councils in Southern Africa
Food and Agriculture Organization,
183–4, 204, 215–17
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),
135–6, 257
Forestry Governance, 154–77
Centre for International Forestry
Research (CIFOR), 155–73
Congo Basin Forest Partnership
(CBFP), 31
Forest Law Enforcement,
Governance and Trade (FLEGT),
166–7
Forest Management Unit
(FMU), 155
Index 287
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC),
31, 166–7, 169, 174, 270
FSC, see Forest Stewardship Council
Inter-African Forest Industries
Association (IFIA), 169
International Centre for Research in
Agro-Forestry (ICRAF), 173
Pan African Forestry Certification
(PAFC), 166, 169, 173–4, 178
Partnership on Congo Basin Forests
(PCBF), 167
permanent forest estate (PFE),
165–6, 177–8
Programme for the Endorsement of
Forest Certification (PEFC),
166–7, 175, 178
Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation
plus Conservation (REDD+),
163, 169, 173–5
sustainable forestry management
(SFM), 155–77
Gabon, 48, 50–1, 55–8, 155, 164–8,
170, 174, 177–8, 251, 253, 260
Galamsey, 136, 139, 143, 274
see also Artisanal and Small-Scale
Mining (ASM)
GBC, see Ghana, Bauxite Company
GDP, see gross domestic product
Gender
gender-sensitive analysis, 184–96
inequality, 188, 190–6
Ghana, 25, 35, 48, 65–9, 73, 76–83,
86–7, 131–51, 164, 168, 170, 174,
200, 207, 249, 252, 255, 260, 274
Bauxite Company (GBC), 148
Ghana’s National Petroleum
Authority (NPA) Act, 76, 78
Poverty Reduction Strategy
(GPRS), 147
Public Interest and Accountability
Committee (PIAC), 77
GHEITI, see under Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative
Gini coefficient, 49–50, 96–7, 109
Global governance, 4, 8, 15–17
initiatives, 4, 14, 182, 187, 196, 259,
270, 280
288 Index
Global political economy, 7, 16, 20
Global Witness, 21, 62
GNPOC, see Greater Nile Petroleum
Operating Company
Gold, 27, 137, 249
Golden Star Oil Palm Project
(GSOPP), 146
Golden Star Resources (GSR), 146–7
Good Governance, 31–9, 278–9
‘good enough governance’, 36
GOSS, see Government of South Sudan
Government of South Sudan (GOSS),
113–28
Southern Sudan Centre for Census,
Statistics and Evaluation
(SSCCSE), 49–50
South Sudan Anti-Corruption
Commission (SSACC), 116
see also ROSS
GPRS, see Ghana, Poverty Reduction
Strategy
Greater Nile Petroleum Operating
Company (GNPOC), 121
Greenwatch, 83, 86
gross domestic product (GDP), 29, 48,
58, 236
GSOPP, see Golden Star Oil Palm
Project
GSR, see Golden Star Resources
Gulf of Guinea, 214–7
Heavily Indebted Poor Country
(HIPC), 254, 257
HIPC, see Heavily Indebted Poor
Country
HIV/AIDS, see Human
Immunodeficiency
Virus/Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome
Human Immunodeficiency
Virus/Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome
(HIV/AIDS), 231
Hydropolitics, 224
hydropolitical complex, 224–5,
239–42
hydropolitical risk, 231–8
ICGLR-RCM, see International
Conference on the Great Lakes
Region-Regional Certification
Mechanism
ICRAF, see International Centre for
Research in Agro-Forestry
IDP, see internally displaced person
IDRC, see International Development
Research Centre
IFAD, see International Fund for
Agricultural Development
IFC, see International Financial
Corporation
IFI, see International Financial
Institution
IFIA, see Inter-African Forest Industries
Association
ILC, see International Land Coalition
illegal, unreported and unregulated
(IUU), 201, 204, 213–16, 220–1
ILO, see International Labour
Organization
IMF, see International Monetary Fund
Imperialism, 9–11
Institute for Agricultural Research for
Development (IRAD), 173
internally displaced person (IDP), 120
International Conference on the Great
Lakes Region-Regional
Certification Mechanism
(ICGLR-RCM), 270
International Development Research
Centre (IDRC), 86
International Financial Corporation
(IFC), 259, 263
International Financial Institution,
136, 184, 254, 258, 276
International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD), 183–4
International Labour Organization
(ILO), 232
International Monetary Fund (IMF),
16–17, 29, 48, 50, 54, 251,
257–8, 279
International Political Economy (IPE),
8, 16, 39, 268
International Relations (IR), 5, 8, 16,
39, 156

International Union for Conservation
of Nature (IUCN), 167
IR, see International Relations
IRAD, see Institute for Agricultural
Research for Development
ITTA, see International Tropical
Timber Association
ITTO, see International Tropical
Timber Organization
IUCN, see International Union for
Conservation of Nature
IUU, see illegal, unreported and
unregulated
Japan, 15
Kenya, 65–6, 109, 121, 125, 181–2,
193–5, 207, 227, 277
Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme (KPCS), 259, 263, 270
KPCS, see Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme
Land
arable, 160, 181, 272
conflicts, 274–5
deals, 181–96
grabs, 182–96, 271–4
International Land Coalition (ILC),
181, 183
ownership, 47, 119–22, 126, 143,
184–6, 190–7
reforms, 190, 274–5
League of Nations, 10–11
LEITI, see under Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI)
Lesotho, 224, 226–7, 231–8
Liberia, 29, 65–92, 122–3,
166, 168
National Oil Company of Liberia
(NOCAL), 73, 82
LRA, see under Uganda
Malawi, 224, 226–7, 231–2,
234–7
MAP, see mean annual precipitation
MAR, see mean annual runoff
Marshall Plan, 11–13
Mauritania, 48, 207, 209–10
Index 289
Mauritius, 28, 224, 231–8
MCS, see monitoring, control, and
surveillance
MDTF, see Multi Donor Trust Fund for
South Sudan
mean annual precipitation (MAP),
226, 228
mean annual runoff (MAR), 226,
228, 230
MEND, see Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta
Microcredit, 96–109
Minerals
Minerals Commission, 142
Minerals Development Fund, 141
rare earth minerals, 15, 249
strategic minerals, 11–12, 247, 249
Mining, 131–51
Africa Mining Vision (AMV),
xii, 270
Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining
(ASM), 30, 136, 143, 274
Galamsey, 136, 139, 143, 274
Mining codes, 16–17
Mining companies, 131–7, 146–51
Mining Indaba, 31
MNC, see multinational corporation
Mo Ibrahim
Foundation, 257
Index, 257
monitoring, control, and surveillance
(MCS), 214–15
Movement for the Emancipation of
the Niger Delta (MEND), 269
Mozambique, 25, 207, 224, 226–7,
232, 234–41, 254
multinational corporation (MNC),
3, 16
Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships,
131–51
Nairobi Declaration, 124
Namibia, 207, 224, 226–7, 231–43
National Oil Company (NOC), 268
national working group (NWG),
164–5, 174–5
NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
290 Index
Natural Resource Charter (NRC),
xii, 270
Network governance, 26, 31, 156–70
Newmont Ghana Gold Limited
(NGGL), 142, 147, 153
NFCA, see Non-Ferrous China Africa
NGGL, see Newmont Ghana Gold
Limited
NGO, see non-governmental
organization
Niger, 48
Nigeria, 48–51, 54–5, 57–8, 65–6, 97,
122, 137, 166, 207, 252, 253–5,
257, 259–60, 270
NOC, see National Oil Company
NOCAL, see National Oil Company of
Liberia
non-governmental organization
(NGO), 53, 83, 109, 133, 157, 183,
251, 276
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 260
NPA, see under Ghana
NRC, see Natural Resource Charter
NWG, see national working group
OASL, see Office of the Administrator
of Stool Lands
ODAC, see Open Democracy Advice
Centre
ODI, see Outward Direct Investment
OECD, see Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
Office of the Administrator of
Stool Lands (OASL),
139, 141
Oil
companies, 251–3
contracts, 53, 82, 87, 92, 121
curse, 7, 61–2
‘Dutch disease’, 60–1, 96, 256
governance of, 45-128
OLS, see ordinary least squares
Open Democracy Advice Centre
(ODAC), 86
‘Open Door’, 13–14
ordinary least squares (OLS),
103–4, 107
Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
(OECD), 123, 208, 256–7, 263
Outward Direct Investment (ODI), 249
PAFC, see under Forestry Governance
Patronage, 34, 53, 60, 96, 99, 123
PCBF, see under Forestry Governance
PCI, see principles, criteria, and
indicators
PEFC, see under Forestry Governance
Petroleum laws, 65–95
PFE, see permanent forest estate
PIAC, see under Ghana
PMMC, see Precious Minerals
Marketing Company
Precious Minerals Marketing
Company (PMMC), 139
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 145
principles, criteria, and indicators
(PCI), 155–6, 160, 162–78
production-sharing agreement (PSA),
77–83
PSA, see production-sharing agreement
Publish What You Pay (PWYP), 77
PwC, see PricewaterhouseCoopers
PWYP, see Publish What You Pay
Raw materials, 9, 11–15, 249
REDD+, see under Forestry Governance
Regional
frameworks, 122–5
governance, 154–77, 225–42
security, 124–6
Republic of Congo (ROC), 29, 48, 249
Republic of South Sudan (ROSS),
48–51, 57, 66, 114, 122, 252,
261, 278
Multi Donor Trust Fund for South
Sudan (MDTF), 115
see also Government of South Sudan
(GOSS)
Resource
curse, 6–7, 16, 61–2, 107–9
diplomacy, 248
governance, 4–11, 14–21, 25–39,
267–80
laws, 18, 28, 33, 65–92, 124
management, 5, 17, 278–80

revenues, 7, 45, 51, 56–9, 75–7, 83,
114–15, 120–1, 261–2, 277
wars, 269
Revenue Watch Index, 51
River basins, 224–42
ROC, see Republic of Congo
ROSS, see Republic of South Sudan
SADC, see Southern African
Development Community
SAIIA, see South African Institute of
International Affairs
SALW, see Small Arms and Light
Weapons
Save the Children, 21
Scramble for Africa, 8–10
‘New Scramble’, xi, 15, 181, 272
Security
energy security, 241–2, 267–9
food security, 225, 231–42
security sector reform (SSR), 122–4
water security, 231–42
SEPA, see State Environmental
Protection Administration
SFM, see under Forestry Governance
Sierra Leone, 65–6, 122–3, 207, 248,
253, 263
Small Arms and Light Weapons
(SALW), 124–5
Social Sustainability Initiative
(SSI), 148
SOE, see State-Owned Enterprise
South Africa, 29, 31, 48, 65–6, 131,
137, 224, 226–9, 231–41,
248, 250
South African Institute of
International Affairs (SAIIA), 225
Southern African Development
Community (SADC), 214, 224–42
South-South Cooperation (SSC), 269
South Sudan, see Government of
South Sudan
SPLA, see under Sudan
SPLM, see under Sudan
SSACC, see under Government of
South Sudan
SSC, see South-South Cooperation
SSCCSE, see under Government of
South Sudan
Index 291
SSI, see Social Sustainability Initiative
SSR, see under Security
State Environmental Protection
Administration (SEPA), 259
State-Owned Enterprise (SOE), 252–4,
256, 258
Sudan, 113–28
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA),
115–16, 123
People’s Liberation Movement
(SPLM), 115–16, 122–3, 125
see also ROSS and GOSS
Swaziland, 224, 226–7, 231–2, 234–8
SWE, see Sectoral Water Efficiency
Tanzania, 35, 125, 177, 181–5,
188–92, 195–6, 207, 219, 224–7,
231–2, 234–5, 237–8, 277
Timber
African Timber Organization (ATO),
154–75
International Tropical Timber
Association (ITTA), 160
International Tropical Timber
Organization (ITTO), 155–6,
160–76
TNC, see transnational corporation
transnational corporation (TNC),
30, 168
Transparency, 61–91
International (TI), 21, 28, 31, 33, 51,
53–4
Uganda, 25, 28, 48, 65–9, 72–4, 76,
78–80, 82–7, 105, 121, 125, 248,
253, 270
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 73, 82
UN, see United Nations
UNCLOS, see under United Nations
UNCTAD, see under United Nations
UNDP, see under United Nations
UNECA, see under United Nations
UNEP, see under United Nations
UNIPEC, see under China
United Nations (UN), 15, 55, 115, 124,
160, 202
Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), 183
292 Index
United Nations (UN) – continued
Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), 221
Development Programme
(UNDP), 28
Economic Commission on Africa
(UNECA), 225
Environment Programme
(UNEP), 230
United States (US), 11–16, 28–9, 50,
228, 242, 248
US, see United States
voluntary partnership agreement, 167
Water, 191–2, 202–42
Sectoral Water Efficiency (SWE),
233, 236–8
Water Crowding Index (WCI),
235, 240
water security, see under security
WCI, see water crowding index
WGA, see World Governance
Assessment
World Bank, 16–17, 28–9, 38, 49, 53,
55, 181, 183–4, 202, 254–5,
257, 260
World Governance Assessment
(WGA), 31
World Trade Organization (WTO),
14–15
World University Service of Canada
(WUSC), 148
World Wildlife Fund (WWF), 166–7
WTO, see World Trade Organization
WUSC, see World University Service of
Canada
WWF, see World Wildlife Fund
Zambia, 137, 224, 226–7, 231–2,
234–8, 241, 248, 253, 256, 262
Zimbabwe, 28, 66–9, 72, 74–5, 77,
80–2, 85–7, 92, 224, 226–7, 231–2,
234–9, 241, 257–8, 261, 270