Ethnographic Representation, Statistics and Modern Power

Ethnographic Representation, Statistics and Modern Power
Author(s): TALAL ASAD

Source: Social Research, Vol. 61, No. 1 (SPRING 1994), pp. 55-88
Published by: The New School
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Ethnographic /
Representation, /
Statistics /
and Modern /
Power / BY TALAL ASAD
/
IVlucH has been written recentlyon how the anthropolo-
gist's experience in the field comes to be inscribed as
authoritativeethnography. Althoughin thiseffortthe rhetor-
ical structuresof ethnographicrepresentationhave been
usefullyexplored,mymaininterestin thisessayis different. I
ask how the problemof representation is addressedwhenthe
mode of inquiryis fieldworkand how this compares with
representationin social statistics.I then reflecton some
political implicationsof this contrast.My answer to the
questionis inevitablysketchy.It is a resultof preliminary
attemptsto explorethe idea of Westernhegemonyfroman
anthropological standpoint.I stressat theoutsetthatI am not
concernedwiththe meritsand demeritsof qualitativeversus
quantitativemethodsin reachingthetruthaboutsocialreality.
Rather,I wanttoexaminetherolestatistical representationhas
playedin creatingtheworldof modernpowerthatanthropol-
ogistsinhabit.
I beginbystatingbaldlysomeofthecontrasts I havein mind
whenI juxtapose ethnography and statistics.
First,unlikethe
"realculturalwholes"of ethnography, the statistical
universe,
as wellas thecategoriesof whichthatuniverseis made up, are
the productsnot of experiencebut of enumerativepractices.
SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Spring1994)

56 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Second, statisticaluniverses can be expanded or contracted,

segmentedor merged,depending entirelyon pragmaticrather
than veridical considerations. Third, sampling techniques in
statisticalpractice allow one to move from representingsocial
types(whichis a characteristicof ethnographicrepresentation)
towardsrepresentingthe variationalpatternsof a population.
In making these contrasts,I am not sayingthat anthropolo-
gistsnever employ statistics.They do, and many anthropolo-
gists have long advocated that they should do so more
systematically. Statisticalinferencein the service of evolution-
ary theory, exemplifiedin the attemptsby Tylor (1889) and
as
Murdock (1949), may have virtuallydisappeared in social and
cultural anthropology,but social surveysand other forms of
quantificationhave not. Nearly sixty years ago, Malinowski
regretted that he had not collected quantitative data more
systematically:"Were I able to embark once more on
fieldwork, I would certainly take much greater care to
measure, weigh and count everythingthat can be legitimately
measured, weighed and counted" (Malinowski, 1935, Vol. II,
p. 459). Many anthropologistssince then have proposed that
statisticsare indispensable in determiningsocial norms. Clyde
Mitchell, for example, suggested that statistical methods
should be seen as a complement to qualitative information
collected on the basis of field experience:
Quantitativemethodsare essentially aids to description.They

help to bring out in detail the regularitiesin the data the
fieldworker has collected.Means, ratios,and percentagesare
ways summarizingthe featuresand relationshipsin data.
of
measuresbasedon thetheoryofprobability
Statistical go beyond
the mere quantitativedata and use devicesto bringout the
associationbetweenthe varioussocial factsthe observerhas
collected1(Mitchell,1967,p. 20).
But, in general, statisticalreasoning has remained relatively

marginal to the discipline.
I stressthatmypurpose here is not to press fora greateruse
of quantificationin anthropology.Stillless is it my intentionto

ETHNOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION 57
attackthe value of interpretive understanding(althoughI

thinkit is necessaryto remindsome anthropologists thatsuch
understanding is not inextricablylinked to ethnographic
fieldwork).My aim is to explore the idea thatethnographic
fieldwork invokesa conceptionof knowledge
characteristically
modeledon subjectivevisionbut thatstatistics does not. (I use
the term"statistics"- following historiansof the subject-to
referbothto socialsurveysand to probability theorybecause
the twoare connected.2)I argue thatstatistical conceptsand
practicesare essential to the systematicmanipulationof
complexsocialformations and timeseries.
Doingethnography has notalwaysbeen a centralconcernof

anthropologists.In the nineteenthcentury,anthropologists
addressedthemselvesto the historyof institutions and ideas
withoutthemselvesever doing ethnography.Even in the
twentiethcenturysome anthropologists have attemptedto
compare structuresof behavior or systemsof belief-but
usuallyonlyafterhavingestablishedtheircredentialsbydoing
originalethnography.
The definitionof anthropologyin termsof ethnographic
fieldworkhas had two interesting consequenceswhichhave
oftenbeen noted: (1) A heavyemphasison the present-and
on thepastas a symbolic construction in thepresent;and (2) A
preoccupation with local conditions as an experientialwhole.
In consideringwhatis relevant,thefieldworker is encouraged
not only to direct her attentionat small-scaleevents and
butalso to identify
structures, eventsthatare typical withinthe
fieldunderinvestigation. This lastpointis especiallyimportant
formytheme.
Personal field research-in which the anthropologistob-
servesand participatesin the activitiesof the people being
studied3-was originallyjustified as the basic method in
ethnography on thegroundsthatthesocietiesanthropologists
studiedwere"simple"and "small."But itwas as a consequence
of fieldworkthat the anthropologist's object of study was

58 SOCIAL RESEARCH
limited in particular ways. In other words, many spatio-

temporal complexitiesand variationswere excluded from the
object of studybecause theywere not directlyobservablein the
field. For example, the systematicforce of European eco-
nomic, military,and ideological powers in non-European
regions was, and stillis, oftenconceptualized as being external
to locally observable discourse and behavior or as being an
abstractsystemhaving littleto do with the belief and conduct
of people "on the ground."4
Anthropological investigation into the contrasts between
historically diverse institutional practices and modes of
reasoning also tends to get marginalized. In the late fifties,
Franz Steiner complained that comparative work in social
anthropology had all but disappeared, owing partly to the
emphasis on intensive fieldwork(given the time and energy
thatthatdemanded) and partlyto the functionalistdoctrineof
social integration(which discouraged the separation of beliefs
and practicesfrom their "full" context).5Since Steiner spoke,
the great wave of Levi-Straussianstructuralismhas come and
gone, and one consequence is that comparative work is not
quite as exceptional as it once was. And partly due to the
growth of Marxist anthropology,studies based on historical
textshave become more common.6
Anthropological research, novices are told, is based on
fieldwork,which means that ethnographersmust live withthe
people being studied. Of course, while they are in the field,
ethnographers observe, ask questions, conduct surveys,and
read local documents. It would be a mistake to suppose that
anthropologistsdepend on a single method. However, the
primaryfoundationof anthropologicalresearchas a distinctive
formof enquiryis a particularkindofexperience. In the words of
G. Condominas,
the mostimportantmomentof our professionallife remains

fieldwork:at the same time our laboratoryand our ritede
each ofus intotrueanthropologists.
passage,thefieldtransforms

Of course,beforeundertaking one's fieldwork,one needsa solid

background,but intelligence
intellectual and trainingalone are
insufficient.A minimumof human warmthand a certain
openness necessaryin orderto establishcontactwithothers,
are
and to maintainit (Condominas,1973,p. 2).
E. Evans-Pritchard put the matterof ethnographicexperi-
ence thus:"Whatcomes out of a studyof a primitive people
derivesnot merelyfromintellectual impressions of nativelife
but fromitsimpacton the entirepersonality, on the observer
as a totalhumanbeing.. . . The workof theanthropologist is
notphotographic. He has to decide whatis significant
in what
he observesand by his subsequentrelationof his experiences
to bringwhatis significant intorelief"(Evans-Pritchard,1951,
p. 82).
How did experiencecome to be so centralto the definition
of anthropology as an academicdiscipline?
In 1951,Evans-Pritchard recounteda neatlittlestorywhich
is probablystillacceptedin its essentialsby mostanthropolo-
giststoday.7I reproduceitherenotto invokeitsauthority but
to examineitsreasoning.He writes:
Betweenthe heydayof the moralphilosophersand the earliest
anthropological writingsin thestrictsense,between,thatis, the
middle of the eighteenthcenturyand the middle of the
nineteenth century, knowledgeof primitive peoples and of the
peoples of the Far East was generally increased. European
colonization of Americahad been widelyexpanded,Britishrule
had been establishedin India,and Australia,New Zealand,and
South Africahad been settledby European emigrants.The
characterof ethnographicdescriptionof the peoples of these
regionsbeganto changefromtravellers' talesto detailedstudies
by missionariesand administrators who not only had better
opportunities to observe,but were also men of greaterculture
thanthegentlemenof fortuneof earliertimes(Evans-Pritchard
(1951, p. 67).
The accumulationof thisethnographicinformation based
on extendedstaysby sophisticatedmissionariesand colonial
administrators
allowedforspeculationand new hypotheses by
men such as Morgan,McLennan,and Tylor, who devoted
themselvesto the study of "primitivesocieties."However,

60 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Evans-Pritchard tellsus that"it became apparentthatif the

study of social anthropology was to advance,anthropologists
wouldhave to maketheirownobservations" (Evans-Pritchard,
1951,p. 71). How did this become apparent?
In the nineteenthcentury,Evans-Pritchard notes,anthro-
pologists were generallylawyers, biblical scholars,or classicists,
and, consequently, theywereaccustomedto dealingwithtexts
that had been composed by someone else. But the next
generationwas recruitedlargelyfromthe naturalsciences.
Thus, Boas was a physicist and geographer,Haddon a marine
zoologist,Riversa physiologist, Seligmana pathologist, Elliot
Smith an anatomist, Balfour a zoologist, Malinowski a
physicist, and Radcliffe-Brown an experimentalpsychologist.
"These men,"Evans-Pritchard explains,"had been taughtthat
in scienceone testshypotheses byone's ownobservations. One
does not relyon laymen to do it for one" (Evans-Pritchard,
1951,p. 72). The significance ofexperience,at thispointin the
story,lies in its being close to the idea of laboratory
experimentation.8 That is to say,theexperiencethatis invoked
hereis conceptual(involving classifications,hypotheses, expla-
nations) and active the
(involving systematic manipulationof
of
data and manufacture events). It has nothingto do with
empathy.
So it was- the storygoes- that anthropologicalfieldwork
came intobeing,and anthropological analysisand explanation
werethusprovided with a sounder basis thantheycould have
had in the nineteenthcentury.However,we are given to
understandthatalthoughthescientific attitudeto researchwas
introducedintoanthropology by trainednaturalscientists, its
fullbenefitswerenotobtaineduntilmuchlater,because most
of theearlyscientific fieldworkers werelargelyignorantof the
languages of the peoples they studied and did not staylong
enoughamongthem.This deficiency, Evans-Pritchard relates,
was eventuallyput rightby the pioneersof anthropological
fieldwork, Boas and Malinowski.
"We have now," concludesEvans-Pritchard, "reached the

final,and natural,stageof development, in whichobservations

and theevaluationof them are made by the same personand
thescholaris broughtintodirectcontactwiththesubjectof his
study. Formerlythe anthropologist, like the historian,re-
garded documents as the raw material of hisstudy.Nowtheraw
materialwas social life itself (Evans-Pritchard, 1951, p. 74;
emphasis added). Evans-Pritchard stresses that this raw
material can be collected only through an appropriate
commandof therelevantlanguageand longperiodsof stayin
thesocietystudied,so thattheethnographer "lives,thinks,and
feels in their culture" (p. 79). Here the anthropologist's
experiencehas become somethinghe undergoes; it is by
exposinghimselfto it thatthe ethnographercan spontane-
ously reproducethe thoughtsand feelingsof his subjects,
understanding and interpreting thingsas theydo.
Accordingto thisconceptionof fieldwork, directaccess to
"social life itself" does not preclude interpretationand
analysis-hence the phrase "raw material." But it does
presupposetherepresentation of sociallifeas a real,experiential
whole,whichis one reason why anthropologists even today
accept that fieldwork calls for extended of
periods residence
and sound knowledgeof the language."It is impossible,"says
Evans-Pritchard, "to understandclearlyand comprehensively
any partof a people's social lifeexceptin the fullcontextof
theirsociallifeas a whole"(Evans-Pritchard, 1951, p. 80). In
other words, social life as a whole is not only real and
representable, it is represen table becauseit is accessibleas a
totalityto theethnographer's livingexperience.
Evans-Pritchard's notionof sociallifeitselfas rawmaterialis
an interestingfusionof twoquitedifferent metaphors.On the
one hand,itsuggeststhattheanthropologist's accountis taken
fromthe experienceof social life; so the emphasisis on the
contrastbetweenexperienceand its representation. On the
otherhand, it refersto the processby whichexperienceis
transformed fromone form(raw data) intoanother(finished
text). Here, experienceis thoughtof as itselfcapable of

62 SOCIAL RESEARCH
modificationand directlyopen to public inspection.9It is the

former,however,thatseems to give the dominant sense to the
idea of "fieldwork." In this sense, "social life itself" is
experienced and representedthroughthe device of typification.
The "typical"is what the investigatorcomes to recognize in the
field and writesabout in the ethnography.But to the extent
that her personal experience is offeredas the foundation for
that knowledge, others with a different experience may
reasonably receive it with skepticism. This fact becomes
especially critical when, as in our day, ethnography is
consciouslyplanted in the domain of identitypolitics.It is then
that the experiential basis of ethnographic representationis
directly challenged- not by analyzing the latter but by
confrontingone experience withanother.
In her essay on anthropologicalfieldworkpublished in 1939,
A. Richards explained and justified ethnographic method in
what had become a standard formula:
The studentof primitive societiesenjoyscertainadvantagesin

observation. The communities he observesare forthemostpart
so smallthattheycan be investigated wholes,and
as functioning
not merelyas subdivisions of a largersociety.He is therefore
able to collectdata to showtheworkingof all the fundamental
institutionsofa particulartribe,and is notlimited,as in thecase
ofa complexcivilization, to a studyofone particularaspect,such
as theeconomicor theeducational(Richards,1939,p. 293).
The object of study as a functioningwhole is thus defined in

terms of the activitiesand relationships that are seen and
heard by the anthropologistin the field. More precisely,that
object is constitutedby what her personal experience yields.
But equally important,the ethnographerof a small community
(or locality)generalizeson the basis of case studiesin whichshe
has learnt to identifysocial types.When she writes up her
ethnography,these social types often appear as representative
samplesof the community.
Richards' earlier article on the village census dealt with the
use of "case-histories"for comparing social types classified

accordingto generationand area. In it,she explainedthatthe

informationshe had collected about a large number of
individualscould be tabulatedto yieldsystematic information
about historicalchange and local differences.Richards
declared:
It willbe clearthatanysetofvillagecase-histories
can be used in
two ways-to give information about individualtypes,if the
and to throwlighton thestructure
entriesare read horizontally;
of the group by comparingthe entriesin any one column
vertically.For instance,the marriageand divorceratesof one
village could be comparedwiththoseof anotherin a different
part of the area,or thecustomsof twodifferentgenerationsin a
villagecould be comparedbyexaminingthehistoriesof theold
men withthose of the middle-agedmen and boys (Richards,
1935,p. 28).
Richardsthusadvocatesthatanthropologists carryout social

surveysof the localitybeing studied,but the purpose of the
surveyseemsto be to construct socialtypes.
AlthoughRichards'methodof deployingcase historiesmay
not be very common among ethnographerstoday, the
recordingof case studies is still regarded as central to
anthropologicalfieldwork.In his Introductionto TheInterpre-
tationofCultures,
Geertzexplainsthe value of case studiesfor
ethnography as follows:
theessentialtaskof theorybuilding... is notto codifyabstract

regularitiesbut to make thick descriptionpossible, not to
generalizeacrosscasesbut to generalizewithinthem.
To generalizewithincases is usuallycalled,at leastin medicine
and depth psychology, clinicalinference.... In the studyof
culturethesignifiersare notsymptoms or clustersof symptoms,
butsymbolic actsor clustersof symbolic acts,and theaim is not
therapybuttheanalysisofsocialdiscourse.But thewayin which
theory is used- to ferret out the unapparent import of
things-is thesame (Geertz,1973,p. 26).
The drawing of parallels between ethnography and psycho-
analysisis a favoritetheme among anthropologists.10Whatever

64 SOCIAL RESEARCH
we maythinkof Geertz'sresortto thatparallelhere,thereis,it

willbe noted,an implicitacknowledgement that"generaliza-
tion withincases" depends on and helps to constructsocial
or ethnographic.
types-medical,psychiatric, The recordingof
can mergeintothereportageoflifehistories.
case histories But
whetherit is constructedthrough "case or
history" through
"lifehistory,"thetypestandsfora universeof thesame.
In ethnographicsociology-as distinctfromsocial anthro-
pology-thereis a tendencyto constructrepresentative types
directlyin the formof individualizedcharacters, thus, self-
consciouslywritingethnography as a formof literature.
and ethnographicmonographs,"
The 'heroes' of life-histories
Atkinsonclaimsof this genre,"providethe reader withtwo
parallelsets of potentiallysatisfying experiences.On the one
hand they furnishthe sense of intimateacquaintancewith
characters thatmostreadersthemselves wouldnotencounterat
firsthand in theireverydaylives. On the other hand, these
charactersilluminatea range of settingsin which,again, the
respectablereader may have no direct involvement.The
individualcharactermaythusembodyopportunities forsocial
explorationand discovery. . .: [Thus] Matza's deviant,Paul
Cressey'staxi-dancer,Donald Cressey'sembezzler,Sutherland's
professionalthief,Marvin Scott'sjockeyand Becker'smarihuana
user are assembledand thenset freeto bringback intelligence
about the natureof social life. . . . The detailedportrayalof
individuals-usuallythrougha mixtureof theirown wordsand
the observations of the ethnographer-thus helps to establish
the warrantforcredibility and authority in the text(Atkinson,
1990,p. 133).
Accordingto Atkinson,characteris richer,more "real" than

type;itsdepictionin ethnography is not onlybased on direct
experience but can (re)createthat experienceforthereader.
Etymologically, character-like type-is an inscription("in
Arabiccharacters,""in bold-facetype")whichis made to be
read. As such,characterand typeare visibledifferences that
are infinitely
reproducible and also part of a set by means of
whicha continuousreadingand writingis made possible.A
creativeselectionof readable signs,in which a continuous

exchange takes place between reading and being read,

characteris oftentakento representbothitselfand theessence
expressedby it. It is at once Atkinson's"sense of intimate
[personal]acquaintance"and the "range of [social] settings"
illuminatedby thatacquaintance;both Geertz'svisible"sym-
bolic acts" and their "unapparentimport."For Geertz,in
particular,characterexpressesat once the individualhuman
beingand theindividualized to whichhe belongs.11
collectivity
Of course,theconceptof character(or type)is necessaryto an
understanding of sociallife.But it becomesproblematic when
it is seen as expressing an irreducibleessence that is
apprehendedbyexperience.
In theempiricisttradition,theethnographer mayencounter
"characters"in the fieldbut she typifiesthem by way of a
systemin her ethnography. They becomebrotherand sister,
husband and wife,affines,clan members,and so on with
specifiablerightsand obligations.I quote fromRichardsyet
again:
The individual withall theirtemperamental
characters, and
physical and
peculiarities thedramaticincidentsofeveryday
life,
seemto standout in boldrelief,whiletheformalpatterns of
whichwe havejustdescribed,
kinship, fadefromview.We are
watching a numberof peoplewholikeor hateto sharetheir
food,or to prepareitin common, and notplottinga systemof
on a
relationships kinship chart.
But thisis,ofcourse,how the
sceneappearsinthecontext ofeveryday life(Richards,
1939,p.
160).
Here typification
consistsnotin an inevitablesimplification
of
experiential
complexity but in theimposition
by theanthropol-
ogist of an idealized culturalsystemon rememberedand
recordeddata.
It should be stressed that in social anthropologythe
emphasis on observationin the field did not necessarily
committhe ethnographerto a naive empiricism.Certainly,
despite Radcliffe-Brown's methodologicalpronouncements,
manyof his followersinsistedthatthe local social structures

66 SOCIAL RESEARCH
whichtheyattempted to studyand describewerenotaccessible

to directobservation. As Fortesput it in an essaypublishedin
1949,"Structure is notimmediately visiblein 'concretereality'.
. . . When we describestructure we are alreadydealingwith
generalprinciplesfarremovedfromthecomplicatedskeinof
behaviour,feelings,beliefs,&c. that constitutethe tissueof
actualsociallife.We are, as it were,in the realmof grammar
and syntax,not of the spoken word" (Fortes,1949, p. 56).
Accordingto Fortes, the ethnographer'sconsciousnessof
"actualsociallife"needstobe distanced,sifted,and analyzed,a
process that reveals local appearances to be the varying
expressionsof an enduringessence.He, therefore, regarded
theproblemofethnographic representation as the explanation
of social types (that is, recurringevents)in terms of the
variantsof a singleunderlyingform-the cultural
statistical
whole.12Five years afterFortes'sessay,Leach developed a
more complexversionof thisargumentin non-quantitative
terms.13Yet in spite of their sophisticatedapproach to
ethnographicrepresentation, anthropologists like Fortesand
Leach retainthe empiricist distinctionbetween"observation"
and "theorization" as twolinkedbut separatemomentsin the
ethnographic enterprise. There is supposedto be actualsocial
lifeone observesin the field,and thenthereis theoryone is
expectedto applywhenone returnshomewiththedata. And
yet if pressed, such anthropologistswould concede that
"observation"is informedby theoreticalconcepts(of which
typificationis one) and that "theorization" is scarcelymore
thanthe organizationof observational(and textual)"data" in
ethnographic form.
There is an awareness of this complexityin a recent
collectionof essaysby John and Jean Comaroff(1992). For
althoughthey begin by reaffirming the centralityof "the
observer'seye" in the ethnographicenterprise,theygo on
immediately to registerthe urgent"need of a methodological
apparatus to extend its range" (p. x). The extensionthey
advocateis clearlymetaphoric:

Indeed,wewouldarguethatno humanist accountofthepastor

can(ordoes)goveryfarwithout
present thekindofunderstand-
ingthattheethnographicgazepresupposes.To theextentthat
is
historiography concernedwiththe recoveryof meaningful
withtheinterplay
worlds, ofthecollective
and thesubjective,
it
cannotbutrelyon thetoolsoftheethnographer (p. xi).
In thisconception,itis not"theobserver's eye"thatis actually

extendedin range (as in "observing" withinterference micro-
scopes and radar but
telescopes)14 something within the subject-
"themind'seye"- thatsimulatesits function."The eye,"now
transposed ontoan imaginary plane,is able to inhabitfreelythe
categoriesof timeand space (likeanygood storytellerand lis-
tener).In otherwords,the"ethnographic gaze"istakentobe the
sourceof a knowledgebecause it is rootedin the researcher's
abilityto observe,thento imaginea meaningful worldaround
whatis witnessed, and finallyto presenta verbalimage15corre-
sponding to thatpartly-imagined, witnessedworld.Exist-
partly-
ing textsare admittedto be importantfor the ethnographic
researcher, buttheyplaya supplementary role;itis thedirectly
visibleand locatablefieldthatremainsthe privilegedfounda-
tion.However,in theComaroffs' presentation, theprecisecon-
nectionof thatempiricist foundationto theextendedworldof
theethnographer's imagination isobscurebecausethehistorian-
who can have no such privilegedfoundation-is also said to
dependon "theethnographic gaze."Yet thehistorian's "field"is
not,liketheethnographer's, a visiblegroundon whichpeople
livebuta conceptualspacewithinwhichshe interacts withtexts.
Thisobscurity maybe resolvedifby"theethnographic gaze"we
take the Comaroffsto mean the construction of a discursive
universeinhabitedbyrepresentative types.
So theethnographer's to
attempt represent a realculturaluni-
verseis rooted,in thefinalanalysis,in "theexperienceof field-
work"and mediatedbyan imaginative actofconsciousness. The
ethnographer "knows"whathe has experiencedonce he has
learnttointerpret "a culturefromwithin;"histaskis to commu-
nicatethatknowledgein textualform.16He mayconcedethat

68 SOCIAL RESEARCH
his success has been only partial,because the qualitativecharac-

terof his personal experience is difficultto translateinto public
language. Yet that concession does not disprivilegehis experi-
ence. Thus, the gap between"experience"and "representation"
parallels the notoriousgap between incommensurable cultures.In
whatfollows, I wantto take up some politicalimplicationsof that
double gap by contrastingstatisticalrepresentationto what I
have said about ethnographicrepresentation.
In the interviewswith Raymond Williams published under

the title Politicsand Letters,there is an arresting passage in
which Williams attempts to reformulate his views on the
question of experience. The interviewerurges him to reflect
on the limitedcharacterof experience as a foundationof social
knowledge. Williamsagrees and responds as follows:
It is verystriking thattheclassictechniquedevisedin response

to theimpossibility ofunderstanding contemporary societyfrom
experience,the statisticalmode of analysis,had its precise
originswithinthe [1840s]. For withoutthe combinationof
statisticaltheory,whichin a sense was alreadymathematically
present,and arrangementsfor collectionof statisticaldata,
symbolizedby the foundationof the ManchesterStatistical
Society,the societythat was emergingout of the industrial
revolutionwas literallyunknowable.. . . Afterthe industrial
revolutionthe possibility of understandingan experiencein
termsof theavailablearticulation of conceptsand languagewas
qualitatively altered.There were manyresponsesto that.New
formshad to be devisedto penetratewhatwas rightly perceived
to be to a largeextentobscure.Dickensis a wonderful example
ofthis,becausehe is continuallytrying formsfor
to findfictional
seeingwhatis notseeable.. . .
Fromthe industrialrevolutiononwards,qualitatively alteringa
permanent problem, therehas developeda typeof societywhich
is less and less interpretablefrom experience-meaningby
experience a lived contact with the available articulations,
includingtheircomparison.The resultis thatwe have become
increasinglyconscious of the positive power of [statistical]
techniquesof analysis,whichat theirmaximumare capable of
interpreting,let us say,the movements of an integratedworld

economy, and of thenegative

qualitiesof a naiveobservation
whichcannevergainknowledge ofrealitieslikethese(Williams,
1982,pp. 170-71).
Williams'sremarksin thispassage parallelthe distinction I
indicatedat thebeginningof thisessaywhenI referredto eth-
nographicand statistical modesof representation. His primary
concernis to defend"experience" as a legitimate basisof knowl-
edge againstAlthusserians who had soughtto dismissit. For
Williamsas a democraticsocialistthe experienceof livingin a
particular societyis a necessary basisof responsible politics.But
itis onlyone basis,becausean understanding ofhistorical struc-
turesand movements thatare inaccessible to experienceis also
essentialto an informedpolitics.It is thispoliticalcommitment
thatsetsWilliams's interest in "experience"apartfromtheeth-
nographer's dedication to fieldwork experienceas a sourceof
disinterested knowledge-and also (morelatterly) fromexperi-
mentalethnographers in theserviceof identity politics.
However,inan earlierwork,Williams(1983) had madea sum-
marydistinction whichseemspartlyto overlapthe contrasthe
notesin thepassageI have quoted: between"experiencepast"
(in thesenseof lessonslearnt)and "experiencepresent"(mean-
inga fulland activeawareness).Althoughitis apparently more
carefully constructed, this distinctionis and
conceptually politi-
cally less clear than the one employedcasuallyin theinterview
becausethetwokindsof "experience"are conceptualized at the
sametimepartly as typesofauthorized knowledge-material ("per-
sonal"/"unsystematic" or "impersonalT'systematic"), partlyas
knowledge-purviews (more inclusiveor less so), and partlyas
knowledge-stances (reflective or unreflective).The Keywords dis-
tinction is also politically moretroubling thantheformulation in
PoliticsandLetters becauseofitsconclusion:"inthedeepestsense
ofexperience, all kindsofevidenceand itsconsideration shouldbe
tried."Thisrecommendation be
might open to thechargethatit
is eithervacuous(of course,one shouldsearchforall evidence
relevant to theproblemin hand) or a recipeforchaos (theobli-
gationtotryeverything makesa sustainedand responsible politics

70 SOCIAL RESEARCH
highlyproblematic).However, one could defend Williams by

reformulatingthissense of "experience"as a continuouslyself-
correctingprocess,guided by specificstandards,throughwhich
a particularpracticallearningtakesplace. In such a processthere
is no epistemologicalfoundation- neither "subjective"experi-
ence nor "objective"social life itself.17Both ethnographicand
statisticalrepresentationsare part of the materialfor learning
and teachingcertainkindsof practice,includingthe practicesof
a nonfoundationalanthropology.
Something else must be said about Williams's comments.
When Evans-Pritchard gave his account of the fieldwork
revolutionin anthropology,he spoke approvinglyof the shift
from reliance on reading reports (compiled by others with
experience of the object of study) to reliance on personal
experience of "social lifeitself."This view of experience makes
two assumptions, both questionable: First, that publicly
accessible writingdoes not connect directlywithsocial life,but
that the memory of personal encounters does do so; and,
second, that inscriptionis always a representation(either true
or false) of social life but can never constitutesocial life itself.
Williams would almost certainly have disputed both these
assumptions. It is, therefore,all the more surprisingthat he
fails to make the point that since the nineteenth century,
statisticshas been not merelya mode of representing a new kind
it.
of social life but also of constructing
In the newly constructed formations of the nineteenth
century, administrativetechniques had to be devised that
would deal effectivelywithhighlydifferentiatedand continu-
ously changing classes of population. The way in which such
populations constituted a social problem (poverty, disease,
education, racial imbalance) was identified,represented, and
addressed in statisticalterms.18Statisticswas ideally suited to
modern administration.More precisely, social surveys and
probabilitytheory have together become integral to modern
life,and increasinglyto life in societiesbecoming modernized.
I shall say something about the significanceof statisticsfor

modernizationin the non-European world after a brief

discussionofhowtheproblemof representationwas dealtwith
in thedevelopmentof statistical fromroughlythelast
thinking
twodecadesofthenineteenth centurythroughthefirstfourof
thetwentiethcentury.19
The problemof representation in the historyof statistical

theoryconcernedthe question of how one could grasp a
complexand changing"whole"fromknowledgeof a "part,"
and the answer to that question evolved out of changing
political and conceptual practicesin the nineteenthand
twentieth centuries.
There were, in effect,two methods of generalization
dependingon whetherthe part was selectedpurposivelyor
randomly.The first,associatedsuccessively withLe Play and
his followers(1830-1900) and withHalbwachs(1900-1940) is
similarto the kind thatethnographers offeron the basis of
fieldwork experience.Whatis commonto all theseinquiries,
otherwiseso different, is that informantswere deliberately
chosen from among people known to the investigator,
informants who were consideredto be in a crucialsense at
once trustworthy and representative.This required the
of actorsas "typical"on thebasisof intuition
classification and
experience.Althoughideas of probability were not entirely
absentin the "typification" approach,theydepended on the
conceptof the average,a conceptthatsubsumeddispersion
and variabilityin the "typical"figurewho stoodforthe social
whole.
These earlierstudiesweredirectedat particularsectionsof
societywho were the objectsof reformingzeal: the working
classes and the out-of-work in particularcities or trades
(factory-hands, immigrants),
prostitutes, thatis to say,all those
whoseconditionsof lifewerethesourceof moraland material
dangerto themselves and to others.
It was clearlyrecognizedthat older stabilitieswere being
radicallyunderminedbypoliticaland economicdevelopments,

72 SOCIAL RESEARCH
and that this was leading to serious social problems. But in

order to understand and defend these older arrangements,
LePlay and his school argued, investigatorswould need to
spend extended periods of timewiththeirobjectsof study.For
only throughsuch intimatecontactcould the investigatorhope
to observe and understand social activities.Desrosieres notes:
That this observationshould take account of the entire

significanceof actionswhichthe investigatorcould not isolate
and code in a prioriterms,is found in other modes of
knowledge-creation whichdevelopedsubsequently, and which
embodyotherwaysof generalizing thanthatof representative
sample: ethnologicaldescriptionsof non-Westernsocietieson
the basis of long and patientperiods of field work in the
community bytheinvestigator,psychoanalysisbuildinga model
of the structureof the unconsciouson the basis of completely
individualdata, gatheredin course of personalexchangesof
verylongduration(Desrosieres,1991,p. 223).
Thus, already in the nineteenthcenturywe have in LePlay an

emphasis on the importance not of the social survey but of
participant observation as a precondition for representing
significantsocial types. Trained as a mineralogistbefore he
became a social researcher and reformer,he conceived of the
study of society as a kind of mineralogy, a science which
depended on the collectionand arrangementof specimens that
representeda total system of classification.20
Although Halbwachs' study of working-class budgets is
explicitlyconcerned withvariations(indeed, he is criticalof Le
Play for not taking these into account), the variations are,
nevertheless, attributed to macrosocial causes, like those
identifiedby Durkheim in Suicide,and thus subordinated to
unvaryingessences. I quote again from Desrosieres:
The objectiveof [Halbwach'sstudy],however,is quite as much
thetraitsof a common'workingclassconsciousness',
to identify
homogeneouscharacterstemsnotfroma divine
whoserelatively
essenceas withQuetelet(Halbwachswas a materialist)but from
common material conditionsof existence,which a quasi
Darwinianadaptationleads to similarrequirementsboth in

practicallife and in consciousness.

It was becausehe was
interestedin thisworking-class
consciousnessthattheproblems
ofsampling didnotpresentthemselvesin at all thesameterms
whichtheywoulddo forthosewho,halfa century later,would
use such studiesto promotenationalaccounts(Desrosieres,
1991,p. 226).
Incidentally, Kruskaland Mostellerpointout thatLeninwas

already aware of the differentimplicationsof statistical
representation in 1899. Thus, in Chapter2 of TheDevelopment
ofCapitalism in Russia,Lenin criticizedstatisticians
of the rural
administrativedistrictsfor relying on averages in their
representationof the agriculturalpopulation instead of
analyzingthevariability of economiccircumstances thatwas so
basic to the Marxistunderstanding of peasantclass relations
(Kruskal and Mosteller, 1980, p. 174, n4). But then Lenin's
primaryproblemin TheDevelopment ofCapitalismwas not that
of Halbwachs';his concernwithmeasuringthe distribution of
discontinuousvariablesissued fromthe Marxistconcept of
classas a contradictory, historicalphenomenon.
It was, ironically,not the work of socialistslike Maurice
Halbwachswho supportedworking-class movements, but the
preoccupationsof eugenicistslike FrancisGaltonwho advo-
cated "race improvement"that enabled modern statistical
theoryto makea breakthrough.21 This involvedmore thana
mereawarenessthataveragescouldbe misleading.Desrosieres
describesthis advance as follows:"by bringingattentionto
focusupon thevariability ofindividual cases,withthenotionsof
variance, of correlation,and of regression,the English
eugenistsmoved statisticsfromthe ground of the studyof
wholessummarizedby a singleaverage(holism)to analysisof
thedistributionof individualvaluestobecompared9' (Desrosieres,
1991,p. 235; emphasisin original).
The finalphase in this developmentturnedon a debate
aboutthelinkbetween"randomselection"and "whatis known
already."At first,even statisticians receivedthe notionof the
"representative sample" with skepticism,insistingthat no

74 SOCIAL RESEARCH
sample could replace a complete survey.As one statisticianput

it at the turn of the century, "no calculations when
observationscan be made."22 This skepticismwas eventually
overcome when the imprecise notion of "representative
sample" gave way to the technique of stratifiedsampling
accordingto a prioridivisionsof the (national) population. This
did not happen until the idea of the representativesample
having to be a microcosmof the total (national) territorywas
abandoned.23 The eventual realization that given develop-
mentsin probabilitytheory,samplingby random selectionwas
more reliable led to a conceptual break withterritoriality.This
did not mean, of course, that prior knowledge of a field of
inquiry,a global knowledge of a situationor group, would be
irrelevantto the statistician.It meant only that the solution to
the problem of representativenessdid not depend on complete
and certain knowledge of the entire geographical area under
investigation.It was preciselyuncertaintywithwhich probabil-
itytheorywas designed to deal.
The modern concept of representativenessemerged in close
connectionwiththe constructionof the welfarestate (a process
that began at the end of the nineteenth century) and the
centralizationof national statistics.Three developmentsoccur-
ring within and outside the domain of state practices were
especiallyimportantin the historyof statisticalrepresentations:
social securitylegislation, markets for consumer goods, and
market research and national election polls. All of these
developmentsproduced social knowledge that is continuously
and profoundlyinterventionist.They constitutesocial wholes
thatdo not depend logicallyeitheron the intimateexperience
of a given region or on the assumptionof typicalsocial actors.
They encourage and respond to individualized agents making
individual choices in a variety of social situations. Ways of
statisticalcalculation, representation,and interventionhave
become so pervasivethatcapitalistsocial economies and liberal
democraticpoliticsare inconceivablewithoutthem.

In a memorablepassage in his historyof probability

in the
nineteenth
century,Hacking writes:
Probability crowdin uponus. The statistics

andstatistics ofour
pleasuresand our vicesare relentlessly tabulated.
Sports,sex,
drugs,travel,
drink, sleep,friends- nothing escapes.Thereare
moreexplicit statementsofprobabilitiespresentedon American
primetime television
than acts
explicit of violence
(I'm counting
theads). Our publicfearsare endlessly debatedin termsof
chancesof meltdowns,
probabilities: cancers,muggings, earth-
quakes,nuclear winters,AIDS, globalgreenhouses, next?
what
Thereis nothingto fear(it mayseem)but the probabilities
themselves.Thisobsession withthechancesofdanger,andwith
treatments forchanging theodds,descendsdirectly fromthe
forgottenannalsofnineteenth-century information andcontrol
(Hacking, 1990,pp. 4-5).
Statisticalknowledgeand statisticalreasoning,Hacking re-
mindsus,havebecomecentralto thewaywe conceptualizeand
respondto our modernhopes and fears.But theyare central
also to thegroundswe nowadduce forregardingsomebeliefs
as morereasonablethanothersin a socialworldofuncertainty,
groundswe inheritfromclassicalprobability theory'salliance
withthe Enlightenment.24
What is the relevance of what I have said so far for

anthropology? I want to suggesttentatively that a mode of
knowledge which grew out of countinglarge numbersof
humanbeingslivingin variableconditions,bodies of knowl-
edge thatwere continuously directedthrougheconomicand
politicalpracticesat thosevariations,had to be marginalin a
disciplinethatregardeditselfprimarily as interpretative
rather
thanpractical,thatdefineditsobjectof investigation in terms
of spatialand temporaleventsaccessibleto the fieldworker's
personal experience,and that sought to representwhat is
locallytypical.
There is now increasingawarenessamongmanyanthropol-
ogistsof the limitationsof fieldworkand the need to pay
greaterattentionto heterogeneities withinwider spaces and

76 SOCIAL RESEARCH
over longer periods of time than personal observationallows.

In a brief section entitled "Limitations of the Fieldwork
Perspective" at the conclusion of his textbook on cultural
anthropology,Roger Keesing notes:
The problemof samplinghas become much more acute in

larger-scale,more complex societies.Culturaldiversity,large
populations,social stratification,
and rapid change have made
fieldworkin large-scalemodernsocieties,whetherin theThird
World or the West, a complicatedbusinessin which more
concernwithsampling, and methodological
statistics, precisionis
needed.25
This is an acute comment, but as I remarked earlier in my

discussionof Raymond Williams,statisticsis much more than a
matterof representation;it is a tool of politicalintervention.As
a politicaltool, it is infinitely
more powerfulthan ethnographic
representation- for good or for ill.
As a tool of social intervention,statisticalknowledge has
been importantnot only to European societies.Especiallyfrom
the latterpart of the nineteenthcenturyon, statisticsbecame
increasinglyimportant in the European empires: Asia, the
Middle East, and Africa. Its importance, however, was
reflectedprimarilynot in social anthropologyas an academic
disciplinebut in colonial administrationas a politicaldiscipline.
Of course, academic ethnographersdescribingsocial change in
particularlocalitiesof the non-Westernworld oftenemployed
statistics.But withsome minorexceptions,colonial administra-
tions did not depend on them. All administratorshad their
own resources for carryingout surveys,compilingtabulations,
and keeping records. The point is that the practice of
assembling and classifying figures periodically on births,
deaths, diseases, literacy, crimes, occupations, natural re-
sources, and so on was, from a governmentalstandpoint,not
merelya mode of understandingand representingpopulations
but an instrumentfor regulatingand transformingthem.
This applies also, and even more strongly,to the "modern-

izing"nation-statesthathave succeededEuropeancolonies.It
is truethatthe were (and are) oftenunreliableand
statistics
based on questionable categories,26that administration-
inspired transformations were (are) often very uneven,
producing unintended butthatis notthepointforthe
results,
moment.Whatmattersis thatthefiguresand thecategoriesin
termsof whichtheywere (are) collected,manipulated,and
presentedbelongto projectsaimed at determining the values
and practices-the souls and bodies- of entirepopulations.
Centralto these projectshas been the liberalconceptionof
modernsocietyas an aggregateof individualagentschoosing
freelyand yet- in aggregate-predictably.27 The construction
of modern society in this sense is also, of course, the
construction of radicallynew conditionsof experience.
Conventionally,anthropologists havedealtwithsocietiesthat
are not- yet- liberalin thissense,whichmakestypification a
moreplausibledeviceforethnography. It maybe objectedthat
categoriesalso typify,
statistical and thatis certainlytrue.But
they are more readilychallengeable and alterablebecause they
can be subjectedto proceduresof disaggregation. Industrial
workingnorms,forexample,are based on statistical calcula-
tions of a typifyingsort, but the norms are open to
recalculationand negotiationin the familiarconflictbetween
unions and employers. It is less easy to question the
ethnographer'stypesor characters, partlybecause they are
presentedas indissolubleforms(to breakup a characteris to
undermineits"humanintegrity"), and partlybecausetheyare
guaranteedby the ethnographer'spersonalexperience(she
witnessedthecharacter,the readerdid not).
Today, each of the so-called"developingcountries"has its
own tabulationsin whichits relativesuccessesand failures
(fromGNP and international debt to health,familyplanning,
and educationto therecordon women'sliberationand human
rights)are measured,probabilized,and compared withthe
figuresof othercountries.Each nation-state compiles,manip-
ulates,and actsupon itsstatisticsand calculatestherisksof its

78 SOCIAL RESEARCH
policies failing. So, too, do multinational corporations, the

United Nations,and the World Bank. Withineach nation-state
and between them, almost all statisticsare contestable; but in
the domain of social power they have become indispensable.
Groups opposing the policies of particular business enter-
prises, a local administration,a national government, or
internationalagents contest the figuresand the categories on
which the figures are based, but in doing so they employ
statisticalarguments. In brief,moral and material "progress"
presupposes the continuous use of comparative statistics.Put
more strongly,the very concept of such progress is in great
measure the product of statisticalpractices. The politics of
progress differspreciselyin thisfromthe politicsof reform-it is
inconceivable withoutthe concepts and practices of statistics.
"Progress"- not mere "reform"- is the politicalaspirationthat
the non-European world has acquired from Europe.28
Statisticsis a vital part of what I have elsewhere called
"strong languages" (Asad, 1986), discursive interventionsby
means of which the modes of life of non-European peoples
have come to be radically transformedby Western power. I
want to say that modern statisticsis the strongestlanguage of
all. Of course, in saying this I do not refer to essentialized or
biassed Western representationsof non-European peoples.29
On the contrary,through statisticsit is Western representa-
tions of modern (that is, Western) society that are offered,
adopted, adapted, and employed. What makes statisticsa
strong language is that statistical figures and statistical
reasoning are employed in the attempt to reconstructthe
moral and material conditions of target populations. The
implicationsof this for the old problem of cultural relativism
are worthnoting. Statisticsconvertsthe question of incommen-
surablecultures into one of commensurable social arrangements
withoutrendering them homogeneous: the ranking of every
countrydiffersand changes in complex ways even when the
several variables remain constant; flexiblemarketingcaters to
consumers seeking a varietyof different(and incompatible)

experiences. I do not say statisticalthinkingsolves the

philosophicalproblem of incommensurability; I say that
statistical
practicescan affordto ignoreit. And theycan afford
to ignore it because theyare part of the great process of
conversionwe knowas "modernization."
Whensocialpoweris exercisedthroughstatistics, experience
is no longer a momentof awarenessbut an experimental
practice,thatis, a testof the precisedegree to whicha given
socialobjectivehas succeeded.
in themodernizing
The politicalsuccessof statistics worldis
a factof considerableanthropological From this
significance.
latterstandpoint, itis something to be analyzedand explained
as a culturalfeatureofmodernsociallife.If I suggestthatsuch
ana analysisbe conducted,it does not followthat I think
ethnographic fíeldwork has no merit.Nor- I repeat- do I say
that there is any essential superiorityof statisticalover
ethnographic methods.The onlygeneralopinionI offerabout
ethnography thatthe richhistoricaltraditionof anthropol-
is
ogy is undulynarrowedif it is definedsimplyin termsof
fieldwork.
Notes
1See also Nadel
(1951, p. 114).
Forexample,thecompilation of vitalstatistics
in theeighteenth-
century and "the avalanche of printed numbers" in the nineteenth-
centurywerebothcrucialto developmentsin probability theoryin
differentways.(See Hacking[1987] and Daston [1987a].) In turn,
samplingtheoryhas come to be indispensableto social
probabilistic
surveys.
3 Much
later, anthropologists began to speak of "participant
observation,"a termthatwas popularizedby Americansociologists.
In herinteresting of thisconcept,J. Plattwrites:
history
In the 1920s and 1930s,some of the keyideas now associated
with'participantobservation'were associatedwithothermeth-

80 SOCIAL RESEARCH
ods and categories.. . . Althoughit is obviousthatparticipant

observationstudiesare quite likelyto be in the 'case study'
traditionin at leastsome of itssenses,'case study'can certainly
notbe translated as 'participantobservation.' First,itis evidently
a categorynotdefinedin termsof themannerin whichitsdata
are collected;second,insofaras data collectionis mentioned, itis
written or oral statements, oftensolicited,thatare emphasized.
When participationis mentioned,which it seldom is, it is
primarily as a meansto the elicitation of such statements. ...
at
Initially, any rate, themere idea of recording solicited data in
thesubject'sown wordswas novelenoughto seem a significant
step in the directionof naturalreality.. . . The idea thatthe
furtherstep of observingthe behaviorin its normalcontext
shouldbe takenwas notraised[bysociologists]. The longmarch
away from the library had onlyrecently started, and perhaps
merelylivingamongpeople was seen as too likejournalisticwork
fromthe whichthe socialscientists wereanxiousto distinguish
themselves (Platt,1983,p. 381).
For anthropologists, "livingamongpeople"could be articulated as a

method onlywhenprofessional socialscientists
could be distinguished
from such non-professionals as missionariesand administrators.
Accordingto Platt,E.C. Lindemaninventedthe term"participant
observation," althoughhe meantsomethingverydifferent fromits
usage today.For Lindeman,the "participant observer" was not the
investigatorhimselfbuta memberof thegroupbeing studied whom
theinvestigator recruitedas an informant (Platt,1983,p. 386).
4 Thus: "It is our
capacity,largelydevelopedin fieldwork, to take
theperspective of the [smallcommunities we study] thatallows us to
learn anything at all- even in our own culture- beyond what we
already know. . . . Further, itis our location'on theground' thatputs
us in a positionto see people not simplyas passivereactorsto and
enactorsof some 'system,' but as activeagentsin theirown history."
See Ortner(1984, p. 143).
5 See
Chapter 1 of Steiner(1958). Steinerwas not thinkingof
comparisonssuchas Murdock's.
statistical
6J. Goody's materialistic studies (notablyGoody, 1983) were
influencedby this current,althoughthey do not belong to it.
Incidentally,the recentinaugurationof a periodicalentitledHistory
and Anthropology is an indicationof a growinginterestin analyses
based on historical sources.

7
(1951) in ChapterIV withthefuller
CompareEvans-Pritchard's
scholarlyone by Urry(1984).
8 In the sectionon Method in the first
chapterof Argonauts,
Malinowski employstheterm"experience"in exactlythissense:
No one woulddreamofmakingan experimental contribution to
physicalor chemical science, without givinga detailedaccount of
all the arrangementof the experiments.... In less exact
sciences,as in biologyor geology,this cannot be done as
rigorously,but everystudentwilldo his bestto bringhome to
the reader all the conditionsin whichthe experimentor the
observationswere made. In Ethnography,where a candid
accountof such data is perhaps even more necessary,it has
unfortunately in the past not always been supplied with
sufficientgenerosity. ... It wouldbe easyto quoteworksof high
repute, and with a scientifichallmarkon them, in which
wholesalegeneralizations are laid down beforeus, and we are
notinformedat all by whatactualexperiencesthe writershave
reachedtheirconclusion(Malinowski,1922,pp. 2-3).
9 P. the same storyabout the emergence
Kaberrytellsessentially
of fieldwork but with a somewhat differentfocus:"Untilthe end of
the nineteenthcentury, most anthropologistswrote from the
armchair and relied for their raw data on materialrecordedby
missionaries,explorers, travellers, government and settlers."
officials,
is
Her attention directed at the contrast between kindsof peoplewho
recordthe"rawdata"- the"professional" anthropologist on theone
hand and non-professionals on the other- not at the contrast
betweenkindsof "rawmaterial"-written accountsversus"sociallife
itself."But she shares with Evans-Pritchard the assumptionthat
ideallythepersonwhoreworksthe"rawdata/material" shouldbe the
one who records/collects it. See Kaberry(1957, p. 73).
10S.F. Nadel drewa
parallelbetweenanthropology and psychiatry
in thematterof interview techniquesthus:
If itis truethatthepsychiatristconcentratesalmostwhollyupon
the
problemsconcerning personality of his patient,perhapsfor
himno interview can everbe a complete'failure;'even themost
negativereactionsof the patienthave theirdiagnosticsignifi-
cance.In socialworkgenerally[includingsocialsurveys]. . . the
failure of an interviewmay obstructthe main source of
information. It mightbe expectedthatin anthropology, withits
of
pursuit 'objectivefacts,' the failureof the interviewwould be

82 SOCIAL RESEARCH
equallyserious.In fact,the successor failureof an interview,

irrespective of the information whichit produces or fails to
produce,may itselfbe of diagnosticvalue to the studentof
culture.For the 'objectivereality'withwhichtheanthropologist
is dealingis a socialreality,
and theinformant and hisresponses
are themselves elementsand factorsin thissocialreality(Nadel,
1939,p. 318).
11"It is
perhaps as true for civilizations as it is for men that,
howevermuchtheymaylaterchange,the fundamental dimensions
of theircharacter, thestructure withinwhichtheywill
of possibilities
in some sense alwaysmove,are set in the plasticperiodwhenthey
firstare forming" (Geertz,1968,p. 11). The themeofthisbookis the
way the individual characterof representativepersonand represen-
tativecivilization mirroreach otherand expressan essencecalled
"Islam"(typified by Moroccoand Indonesia).
12Forteswrote:
We are dealing not withtwo 'types'or 'forms'of domestic

organizationbut withvariantsof a single'form'arisingout of
quantitative differences in the relationsbetweenthe partsthat
make up the structure.We can imaginea scale varyingfrom
at one end to perfect'avunculo-locality'
perfect'patrilocality' at
the other.. . . Individualhouseholds are scattered
all along the
scale; and over a stretchof timea particularhouseholdmay
change its positionthroughthe loss of some kinsfolkand the
accessionof others(Fortes,1949,p. 75).
But because thisinterestin variability deals in averagesit remains
preoccupiedwithrepresenting "types" statistical
as "norms."
13In Leach
(1954). In thisbook, Leach argued thatbecause the
Kachin Hills Area was not culturallyhomogenous,he could not
followthe "classicalmannerin ethnography" of choosinga locality
"ofanyconvenient size"forintensivestudy and thenwriting "a book
abouttheorganization of thesocietyconsideredas a whole"on that
basis(p. 60). Leach'sprocedureinsteadwasto describetheShan and
Kachin "categories"common to the entire area which help to
generatea range of unstablepoliticalstructuresin a varietyof
ecologicalcontextsand over a cycleof historicaltime.His overall
conclusion was that "while conceptual models of society are
necessarilymodelsof equilibrium systems,realsocietiescan neverbe
in equilibrium" (p. 4; emphasisadded).
14See the
chapteron Microscopesin Hacking(1983).

15In
Iconology, W.J.T. Mitchellargues persuasivelyagainst the
beliefthatthereis a radical differencebetweenverbaland visual
images.This argumentseemsto me especiallyrelevantforexamining
critically the notionof the "ethnographic gaze." Because if "seeing"
merges into "reading," the epistemologicalpriorityof fieldwork
experience over textual engagementcan be questioned. The
anthropologist whocollectshisownmaterialin thefieldhas no more
grounds for certaintythan the anthropologistwho reads texts
composedby someone else.
16"
'Writingup' is a transformation of data fromthe category
'whatyou know'intoa new category:'whatyou communicate.' The
twoare related:at leastin an ideal world,whatyou knowsetsnearly
all the limitsof whatyou can write.And because you createboth
categories,theymaybe linkedalso by yourintentions froma very
earlystage"(Davis,1984,p. 295). The factthat"data"can be thought
of as belongingto the category"whatyou know"and ceasing to
belongto thatcategory(which"youcreate")whenit is "written up"
makes sense only because what the anthropologistknows is
indissolubly linkedto ethnographic experience.
17 whenJ. Scott,in herexcellentarticle(1991,p. 783),
Incidentally,
contendsthat,"The conceptsofexperiencedescribedbyWilliams[in
Keywords]precludeinquiryinto processesof subject-construction;
and they avoid examiningthe relationshipsbetween discourse,
cognition, and reality,therelevanceof thepositionor situatedness of
subjectsto theknowledgetheyproduce,and theeffects of difference
on knowledge,"she is, of course criticizing not Williamsbut the
conceptshe has analyzed.The majorlimitation ofWilliams'article,in
myview,is itsalmostexclusiveconcernwithcognition.It has nothing
to say about experience in the sense of a socially-developed,
embodied capability,as in "an experienced mountaineer,""an
experienced actor," "an experienced teacher"-that is, in the
Maussiansense of habitus. For anyoneinterestedin the problemof
subject-construction, the developmentof such capacitiesis of major
importance.WhenJ. Scottinsiststhatthe denial of the discursive
characterof experience is merelyan attemptto defend their
unquestionedauthority("it is preciselythe discursivecharacterof
experiencethatis at issue for some historiansbecause attributing
experienceto discourseseems somehowto deny its statusas an
unquestionable groundof explanation[Scott,1991]),she movestoo
in
quickly attributing obscurantist intentions to thoseshe criticizes.
Surely, the determination to prioritizecognitionand to assignit to

84 SOCIAL RESEARCH
discoursemaybe resistedforreasonsotherthana desireto defend

the unquestionablestatusof particularcategories.Thus, in them-
selves,embodiedpracticesare not a groundofexplanation at all; they
are simplyskills,abilities,virtues(in the Aristoteliansense) thatare
exercisedwithgreateror lesserfacility. It is onlywhentheybecome
objectsof discoursethatexplanation-and criticism-can takeplace.
And then,of course,any conceptmaybe questioned-but not all
conceptsall of thetimeor practicallifebecomesimpossible.
18Even in as it was
earlymodernEurope, "politicalarithmetic,"
then called, had a close connectionwith government,religious
sectarianism,and commercialsociety.See the two articlesby Buck
(1977 and 1982).
19I am indebtedin theaccountthatfollowsto Desrosieres
(1991),
Hacking (1990), Kruskal and Mosteller(1980), and Lazarsfeld
(1961).
20Thus, on the first
page of the Forwardto Volume I of his Les
Ouvriers LePlaystates:"In orderto findthe secretsof the
européens,
governments which providemankindwithhappinessbased on peace,
I haveappliedto theobservation ofhumansocietiesrulesanalogous to
those whichhad directed my own mind in the studyofminerals and
plants.I construct
a scientific Cited in Lazarsfeld (1961, p.
mechanism."
314).
21For a detaileddiscussionof theconnectionbetween
projectsof
racialprogressand statisticaltheory,see MacKenzie(1981).
22CitedIn Kruskaland Mosteller
(1980, p. 175).
23But as Kruskal and Mosteller
(1980, p. 191) note, "Quota
samplingin publicopinionpollingand marketing wenton foryears,
and still continues,withoutmuch interactionwith the work of
academicor otherwise
¿4In the second half organizedstatistics."
of the seventeenthcentury,the fledgling
calculusof probabilitieswas firstapplied to the taskof providinga
mathematical basisforrulesof evidencethencurrentin Romanand
canon law. L. Dastonwrites:"In viewingtheirtheoryas the 'artof
conjecture,'classicalprobabilistsadoptedthe legal habitof thinking
about probabilityepistemically, as a continuumof degrees of
certainty.They also inherited a set of problemsrelated to legal
evidence- in particular,responsibilityfor establishingrational
grounds for belief not only in the courtroom but in the
world-at-large" (Daston, 1987b,p. 296). In the eighteenthcentury,
the subjectivism of this notionof probability joined associationist
psychology, and the two togetherhelped to constructthe Enlighten-

ment conception of beliefthatwas supportedby reason. The classical

probabilists held thattheirmathematical theorywas simply"good
sensereducedto a calculus,"saysDaston,buttheir"good sense"was
simplythe good sense of an Enlightenment elite. In our day,
calculationsof probabilities are regardedas crucialfor arrivingat
"rationaldecisions,"although probabilitytheoryhas developed
considerably sincethen.
25See
Keesing (1981, p. 7). However, this awareness of the
limitationsof a tradition thatrepresents thepartas "a microcosm of
the whole" (p. 6) seems to come up againsta contrarytendency,
namely,to regardthecontemporary worldas relatively homogenous
("thisStereotypie view, largely created by anthropologists, exagger-
ates the diversityof cultures"[p. 7]). The resolutionof thisconflict
clearlyresides in a more precise specificationof what is to be
regardedas "thesame"and whatas "different."
26This has
long been recognized.See Thorner and Thorner
(1962) for an impressivecritique of the categories used in
government statisticson theagricultural populationof India. In her
splendid essay on a statisticalreport on urban workers in
mid-nineteenth-century Joan Scottdemonstrates
Paris, the political
assumptions and concerns which motivated its classificationsand
inferences(Scott, 1986). Cullen (1975) argues that from its
beginnings in thenineteenth century, quantitative socialinquirywas
inherently political.
27Cf. Metz
(1987).
28 Foucault,whowroteinsightfully aboutthemodern
Incidentally,
concept and of
practice government (which he called "governmental-
ity"),nevertheorized"progress"in thatcontext.
Essentialized or biassedrepresentation in Westerndiscoursesof
non-Westernpeoplesis partofwhatcriticshavecalled"Orientalism;"
"orientalists"typically construct typifications.
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Ethnographic Representation, Statistics and Modern Power - Tallal Assad

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Ethnographic Representation, Statistics and Modern Power - Tallal Assad

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SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Spring1994)

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Second, statisticaluniverses can be expanded or contracted,

Quantitativemethodsare essentially aids to description.They

But, in general, statisticalreasoning has remained relatively

This content downloaded from 149.169.84.149 on Fri, 19 Apr 2013 15:46:30 PM

attackthe value of interpretive understanding(althoughI

Doingethnography has notalwaysbeen a centralconcernof

This content downloaded from 149.169.84.149 on Fri, 19 Apr 2013 15:46:30 PM

limited in particular ways. In other words, many spatio-

the mostimportantmomentof our professionallife remains

This content downloaded from 149.169.84.149 on Fri, 19 Apr 2013 15:46:30 PM

Of course,beforeundertaking one's fieldwork,one needsa solid

This content downloaded from 149.169.84.149 on Fri, 19 Apr 2013 15:46:30 PM

Evans-Pritchard tellsus that"it became apparentthatif the

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final,and natural,stageof development, in whichobservations

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modificationand directlyopen to public inspection.9It is the

The studentof primitive societiesenjoyscertainadvantagesin

The object of study as a functioningwhole is thus defined in

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accordingto generationand area. In it,she explainedthatthe

Richardsthusadvocatesthatanthropologists carryout social

theessentialtaskof theorybuilding... is notto codifyabstract

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we maythinkof Geertz'sresortto thatparallelhere,thereis,it

Accordingto Atkinson,characteris richer,more "real" than

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exchange takes place between reading and being read,

This content downloaded from 149.169.84.149 on Fri, 19 Apr 2013 15:46:30 PM

whichtheyattempted to studyand describewerenotaccessible

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Indeed,wewouldarguethatno humanist accountofthepastor

In thisconception,itis not"theobserver's eye"thatis actually

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his success has been only partial,because the qualitativecharac-

In the interviewswith Raymond Williams published under

It is verystriking thattheclassictechniquedevisedin response

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economy, and of thenegative

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highlyproblematic).However, one could defend Williams by

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modernizationin the non-European world after a brief

The problemof representation in the historyof statistical

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and that this was leading to serious social problems. But in

That this observationshould take account of the entire

Thus, already in the nineteenthcenturywe have in LePlay an

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practicallife and in consciousness.

Incidentally, Kruskaland Mostellerpointout thatLeninwas

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sample could replace a complete survey.As one statisticianput

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In a memorablepassage in his historyof probability

Probability crowdin uponus. The statistics

What is the relevance of what I have said so far for

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over longer periods of time than personal observationallows.