Rohin Arora & Another

v.
D.D.A
High Court Of Delhi)
Civil Writ Petition No. 19495 of 2005 & 19496 of 2005 | 13 11 2006

S. Ravindra Bhat, J.

1. The writ petitioners here seek a quashing order in respect of a letter dated 23.6.2005 issued by the Delhi Development Authority

(hereafter DDA) informing the petitioners about a demand a for Rs.17,76,015/- on account of composition issued on 13.6.2005.

2. The facts necessary to decide this case are that on 19.2.1974, the DDA allotted a plot of land being industrial plot No. X-10, Okhla

Industrial Area, Phase -II New Dellhi measuring 601.64 yards (hereafter the plot) to M/s. Wirk Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., (hereafter the

original allottee) in an open auction. On 17.2.1977, DDA executed lease deed in favour of the original allottee. Some of the relevant

conditions are extracted below:

“11. The lease for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and designs covenants with the lessor in the manner following that to say: -

xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx

(3) The lessee shall, within a period of two years from the 11th day of February one thousand nine hundred Seventy ve (and the time so

speci ed shall be of the essence of the contract) after obtaining sanction to the building plan with necessary designs, plans and

speci cations from the proper municipal of other authority at his own expenses, e ect upon the industrial plot and for requisiter proper

walls, sewers and drains and other convenience in accordance with the sanctioned building plan and to the satisfaction of such municipal

or other authority.

xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx

(6) Whenever the title of the lessee in the Industrial plot is transferred in any manner whatsoever the transferee shall be bound by all the

covenants and conditions contained herein and be answerable to all respects therefor. Provided that, notwithstanding anything contained

herein, to the contrary the Lessor may without prejudice to his right of re-entry as aforesaid, and in his absolute discretion, waive or

condone breaches, temporary of otherwise on receipt of such amount and on such terms and conditions as may be determined by him and

may also accept the payment of the rent which shall be in arrear as aforesaid together with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum.”

3. On 21.02.1977, DDA permitted the original allottee to mortgage the plot in favour of Punjab and Sind Bank for raising loan. Since the

original allottee failed to repay the loan amount, the Bank led a suit for recovery against it, in 1980; it was registered as Suit No.470 of

1980, Punjab and Sind Bank Vs. M/s. Wirk Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., and Ors. This Court, on 9.10.1985, directed the sale of the said plot for

the recovery of the amounts outstanding against the allottee. The Court further directed, on 15.11.1991, that the property to be sold by

Court auction with a direction that no o er below Rupees 28 lakhs inclusive of the unearned increase be accepted. A court auction notice

was issued on 2.3.1993; it contained, inter alia, the following conditions:

“d) the buyer shall pay in addition the charges on account of unearned increase to the authorities concerned and shall also pay all other

expenses of registration etc. as per orders of the Court.”

4. The petitioners bid for the plot; their bid being the highest, was accepted. They led an application for con rmation of sale. On

1.11.1993, this court directed that the certi cate of sale be issued in favour of the petitioners subject to a No Objection Certi cate from the

DDA certifying that the latter had no objection to the transfer of the plot in favour of the petitioners. Thereafter the petitioners 
approached the DDA for a No Objection Certi cate (NOC). Having failed to receive the NOC from the DDA, the petitioners herein led

CW No.4329 of 1995. In that proceeding, the question raised was also as to the rate of unearned increase the DDA could have claimed. On
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17.09.1999, CWP No.4329/95 was disposed o with a direction to the DDA to re-calculate the unearned increase on the basis of the

guidelines issued in 1996 namely Unearned Increase Guidelines and Simpli ed Procedure for calculation published by DDA and upon the

petitioners depositing the unearned increase, to issue a NOC. The Petitioners paid the sum of Rs.10.53 lakhs on account of unearned

increase and thereafter, a sale certi cate was also issued in their favour by this High Court.

5. The civil suit which was decreed against the original allottee stood transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Delhi. The petitioners

herein, being the auction purchasers of the said plot, led an application for the release of the original lease deed in their favour. Later, on

25.01.2001, the Petitioners surrendered the original lease deed of the said plot to the DDA for the execution of a fresh lease deed in their

names. The DDA issued a draft lease deed which contained a clause whereby the petitioners had to raise construction within two years

from 17.04.1993. The petitioners immediately represented by their letter dated 10.09.2001, against the insertion of the said clause in the

lease deed and requested the DDA to execute the lease deed from 2000. The DDA, on 9-1-2002 merely informed the petitioners that their

demand could not be acceded to since as per the rules the date of levy of ground rent and composition fee could not be changed. Later, on

7.4.2004, the DDA executed a fresh lease deed in favour of the petitioners. The petitioners, it is claimed, were shocked to see the lease

deed which though executed in 2004, contained a clause No.II (3) that provided for construction to be raised within two years from 11th

February, 1975, upon the plot.

6. On 19.7.2004, the Petitioners applied to the DDA for an NOC so that the building plans be got approved from the MCD. As DDA neither

issued an NOC nor sent any reply, the petitioners visited the o ce of the DDA when they were advised by the o cials dealing with the

matter to address a letter/application to the DDA for extension of time for construction. The petitioners protested, since according to

them, there was no delay on their part in raising construction on the said plot in as much as the lease deed was executed only on 7.6.2004

and the petitioners could have raised any construction on the said plot of land only after they perfected their title by the execution of a

lease deed in their favour. However, the petitioners were made to believe that addressing such a letter was just a bare formality and was

the only way by which the NOC could be granted. That having left with no other alternative the petitioners addressed a letter dated

12.08.2004 and its reminder dated 31.03.2005. In this background, it is claimed that on 13.06.2005, they were shocked and surprised to

receive a letter of demand dated 13.6.2005 issued by DDA whereby it raised demand of a provisional sum of Rs.17,76,015,00 towards

composition fee. The petitioners sought clari cation as to their liability, from the DDA; on 23.6.2005, by the impugned demand, DDA

informed the petitioners that a demand letter of Rs.17,76,015/- on account of composition fee has been issued on 13.6.2005 after

exempting the period from 09.11.1993 to 21.2.1999 being the case under litigation . Thus though the DDA stated that it exempted the

period from 9.11.1993 to 21.2.1999 from calculation of composition fee, as being under litigation, yet, it still failed to give a detailed

breakup of the period and the sums claimed. The DDA declined the request on 28-5-2005.

7. The petitioners claim that DDA cannot saddle them with the liability for default of the original allottee, since they acquired rights in the

plot only in 1993, and till 1999, there was a litigation with the DDA, on the issue of unearned increase amounts to be paid; that was

resolved in the previous writ petition. It is claimed that the petitioners acquired liabilities only to the extent it was speci cally stated, in

the auction notice. The auction notice merely con ned liability towards payment of unearned increase; the petitioners could not be

saddled with any other liability. If the respondent DDA had any liability or reservation about the petitioners' rights or obligations it ought

to have put it fairly to the petitioners at the stage of auction, to avoid such misrepresentation. Not having done so, and not having taken

any action all this while, the DDA could not pro t by its lapses and inaction, by claiming unreasonable and demanding amounts which can

never be part of the petitioners liabilities.

8. The DDA in its response has stated that the petitioner, after acquiring the lease hold rights, stepped into the shoes of the original

purchasers, as far as the liabilities were concerned. The original lessee had agreed to this as per Clause II (6) which unequivocally

stipulated that the transferee shall be bound by all the covenants and conditions in the deed. The original allottee had not complied with

the terms of the clause II (3) and constructed upon the plot within the time agreed. Therefore, the petitioner, the subsequent purchaser

could not escape from its liabilities which accrued on that score. It is alleged that when the petitioners had approached this Court earlier,

there was no challenge to that condition; being a registered document, it bound them.

9. The DDA has also relied upon letters written by the petitioner on 12.8.2004 and 31.8.2005 requesting for extension of time, till

31.3.2007 for completing construction. It is also claimed that the petitioners had voluntarily led an a davits undertaking to pay

composition fee after execution of the lease deed, on demand by the DDA in terms of the letter dated 4.6.2004 The undertakings dated

7.6.2004 were therefore furnished. In this circumstances, the complaint that the composition fee was being claimed arbitrarily is refuted.

10. It is also stated that the occasion for demanding any arrears towards composition fee could not have arisen so far as the petitioners

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were concerned, because their status as lessees stepping into the shoes of the original allottees, took place only upon the execution of the

lease deed by the DDA. The lease deed was executed only 7.6.2004; it unequivocally spelt out liabilities for not constructing upon the plot

within the time and also stipulated that the subsequent transferee would be bound by the liabilities of the original owner. In these

circumstances, the petitioner could not escape its liability.

11. Ms. Pragya Gupta, learned counsel submitted that the impugned demand for the sum of Rs.17, 760.47, was utterly arbitrary. She

submitted that there was no occasion for the DDA to claim amounts for the period between 1978 to 1993 since the petitioners were

nowhere in the picture. As per the undisputed facts, the original purchaser/allottee had, after acquiring title and possession of the plot,

failed to put up construction. He also defaulted in his liabilities to the Bank and nancial institutions, leading to a decree which eventually

culminated in an auction held on 17.4.1993. As per condition (d) of the Court Auction notice, the only liability cast in addition to payment

of consideration were charges on account of unearned increase to the concerned authority i.e. the DDA as well as expenses of registration

as directed by the Court.

12. Ms. Gupta further submitted that the petitioner had to approach this Court, by ling WP(C) No. 432/95 as the DDA did not issue a No

Objection Certi cate/sale permission in respect of the plot. The petitioners had approached the DDA for No Objection Certi cate

admittedly on 4.11.1993 and, upon being informed that the unearned increase was 21.13 lakhs without disclosing any particulars, as

against much lower amounts, the writ petition was led. She relied upon the ndings of the Division Bench that till the date of its decision

namely 17.9.1999, no nal demand towards unearned increase had been raised and communicated, the new guidelines issued by the DDA

on 20.2.1996 were issued on unearned increase which had to be calculated according to those rates. The writ petition was therefore

allowed and consequently the petitioners deposited a sum of Rs.10.53 lakhs towards unearned increase.

13. Learned counsel also relied on the fact that after the original lease deed was deposited with the DDA, a letter had written on 28.9.2001

enclosing copy of unsigned proposed perpetual lease deed for stamping which stipulated that the lease deed was to be made e ective from

1993, i.e. after the property was auctioned by the Court. The petitioner had written on 10.9.2001, stating that if the lease deed were to be

executed in such a manner, they were to be burdened by composition fee. She also relied on the fact that sale certi cate was issued by this

Court as late as on 19.5.2000. The DDA, on 9.1.2002 declined to waive the condition of composition but agreed to relax it and exempt the

period when the matter was pending litigation.

14. Learned counsel submitted that cumulatively, the above circumstances show that the petitioner, a third party purchaser through Court

process, could not be saddled with the liability for default on the part of the original allottee. The auction took place in 1993; the DDA had

demanded exorbitant unearned increase amounts which were held unjusti ed in 1999; the sale was con rmed in May, 2000. In the

background of these facts the DDA could not have claimed any amounts as composition fee for non-construction upon the plot, in this

case since the transfer was not by the original allottee but through Court process, by way of an auction. It was also submitted that the

petitioner's liabilities could not be expanded beyond the auction notice which had con ned it only to payment of earned increase, vis-à-vis

DDA.

15. Learned counsel further submitted that the DDA could not in any event extract further amounts over and above unearned increase

charges, as composition fee for non-construction or late construction. If there was any default by the original allottee on that score, the

DDA ought to have initiated action within reasonable time and recovered the amounts. It could not use the occasion of the petitioner's

application for a no objection certi cate to construct upon the plot, since this issue could always have been indicated in the previous

proceedings. In any event the DDA was also a party to the default, if any, by the original allottee, as it took no steps, in that regard. It was,

therefore, estopped from burdening the petitioner, an innocent purchaser with such liabilities.

16. Learned counsel also relied upon a judgment of this Court in WP(C) No.7372/2002 (Hamdard Waqf Laboratories Vs. DDA) decided on

22.11.2004 The Court had analyzed the various provisions of law and concluded that imposition of retrospective liability under similar

circumstances was arbitrary and unreasonable.

17. Mr. Pawan Mathur learned counsel for the DDA submitted that the condition in the lease deed which required that construction had to

be completed within a stipulated time, bound subsequent trasferrees in unambiguous terms. The petitioners were fully aware of this; even

the letter written by them in September, 2001 revealed the knowledge about their liability. Therefore, it is not reasonable on their part to

question the DDA's power to claim the impugned amounts. It was also submitted that in any event the petitioners had sought for waiver of

composition fees which implied that they were aware and acknowledged their liability. The letter was written to them on 9.1.2002

declining that waiver. Therefore, the petition is not maintainable.

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18. Learned counsel further submitted that the DDA took into consideration all the circumstances while claiming the disputed amounts. It

was submitted that the calculation sheet which discloses the break up of the impugned demand clearly shows three distinct periods

namely, February, 1978 to February, 1993 when the liability accrued to the original allottee and stood transferred by virtue of Clause II(6)

to the petitioner; the second period was between was between 9.11.1993 and 21.2.1999. The DDA did not claim any amounts for this

duration, as the inter se disputes between parties was pending before this Court, on the issue of unearned increase. The subsequent

liability had to be worked out after 22.2.1999 when admittedly the petitioner's rights stood crystallized pursuant to the orders of the

Court. The DDA did not claim amounts blindly and has merely enforced the terms of the lease deed which have no where been challenged.

19. Learned counsel also submitted that after being told that the request for waiver of composition stood rejected, the petitioners did not

take any steps for two years; upon approaching the DDA in May/June, they were clearly informed that past liabilities would have to be

discharged. They even undertook to do so by ling a davits on 7.6.2004 In these circumstances the impugned order is neither

unreasonable nor arbitrary.

20. Mr. Mathur submitted that the decision in Hamdard revolved around the facts of the case when the DDA was found to be at fault. In

the facts of the present case, the purchaser i.e the petitioners were, at all material times aware of the liabilities; it negotiated with DDA for

waiver or reduction of such liability. They entered into the transaction and executed the lease deed with open eyes; they even furnished

undertakings. In these circumstances, they cannot be allowed to lead hardship or that they were not liable.

21. The question is whether the petitioner is liable for composition fee, as determined by DDA. Undoubtedly, Clause II(3) of the

empowered the DDA to recover such charges if the allottee failed to put up construction within the speci ed period. Clause II (6) states

that the rights and liabilities would also devolve on a subsequent purchaser. The phraseology of the latter condition, according to me,

holds the clue to whether the liabilities can be fastened upon the petitioner. The clause no doubt states that whenever the title of the lessee

in the plot is transferred in any manner whatsoever the transferee shall be bound by all the covenants and conditions contained in the

deed, and be answerable to all respects. Textually, it undoubtedly indicates that the transferee would be bound by clause II(2). Yet, that

itself is not determinative of the entire issue. Here, the allottee defaulted; he even defaulted in the payment of his dues to banks. That led

to a decree, and court auction in 1993, in which the petitioners successfully participated. This was followed by another litigation, triggered

by the DDA's unreasonable calculation of unearned increase. The petition ended in 1999. The sale was con rmed by the court in 2000. All

this while, the petitioner's rights remained in a state of ux. Though the DDA proposed to the petitioner to make the lease deed e ective

from 1993, this was not acceptable. Eventually, the lease deed was executed, with condition that if the petitioners did not construct upon

the plot within two years from 1977, they would be liable to pay composition charges. The lease deed was admittedly executed in 2004 The

DDA's stand is that it could not communicate the charges, till the lease deed was executed. This would show that the amount itself was

indeterminate.

22. Stipulations such as composition fees were devices to ensure that the object of developing areas, as industrial areas, was achieved. If

the allottee defaulted in setting up a unit, or putting up a factory, he had to pay a composition fee. The DDA did not deem it worthwhile in

this case to take any action against the defaulter, i.e. the original allottee, nor did it indicate such liabilities at any time, to him, or even in

the previous writ proceeding. Its justi cation, i.e. that the right to demand composition fee crystallized only after the lease deed was

executed, rings hollow, since both parties were in correspondence with each other, and were aware of this issue. The DDA's intention here

was to ensure that the lease deed was executed, and then slap the charges, which should have been recovered in the rst place, within

reasonable time from the original allottee, or instead had recourse to appropriate enforcement measures.

23. It is one thing to say that the subsequent transferee is bound by all conditions, and entirely another to say that he would be bound by

some inchoate, and indeterminate liabilities for the defaults of the original allottee. In this case, the liabilities (impugned in this petition)

were indicated for the rst time in 2005. These liabilities cannot be characterized as a charge , in terms of Section 100 of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882. In State of Karnataka v. Shreyas Papers (P) Ltd and Ors 2006 (1) SCC 615, the Supreme Court declined to uphold a

transferee’s liabilities towards sales tax dues, on the ground that it had no notice in that regard. It was held as follows: 19. While the

expression charge is not de ned by the KST Act, this concept is well known in property law and has been de ned by Section 100 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter the TP Act). Here charge is de ned as:

Where immovable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another, and

the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the latter person is said to have a charge on the property; and all the provisions

hereinbefore contained which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to such charge. Nothing in this section applies to

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 the charge of a trustee on the trust-property for expenses properly incurred in the execution of his trust, and, save as otherwise expressly

provided by any law for the time being in force, no charge shall be enforced against any property in the hands of a person to whom such

property has been transferred for consideration and without notice of the charge. (Emphasis supplied)

20. As the section itself unambiguously indicates, a charge may not be enforced against a transferee if s/he has had no notice of the same,

unless by law, the requirement of such notice has been waived. This position has long been accepted by this Court in Dattatreya Shanker

Mote v. Anand Chitaman Datar, (1974) 2 SCC 799 at p. 811 (paragraph 18) and in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of the City of

Ahmedabad v. Haji Abdul Gafur Haji Hussenbhai, AIR 1971 SC 1201 at pp. 1202- 1204 (paragraph 3) (hereinafter Ahmedabad Municipal

Corporation). In this connection, we may refer to the latter judgment, which is particularly relevant for the present case.

21. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was a case where a person was in arrears of property tax, due under the Bombay Provincial

Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. Consequently, the Municipal Corporation created a charge over the property of the defaulter. However,

the property was sold in execution of a mortgage decree. When the Municipal Corporation purported to exercise their charge over the

property, the purchaser in Court auction led a suit for a declaration that he was the owner of the property and that the arrears of

municipal taxes due by the transferor were not recoverable from him by proceeding against the property purchased in auction. In the

appeal before this Court, the Municipal Corporation s main argument was that where the local law provided for the creation of a charge

against a property for which municipal taxes were due, transferees of such properties were imputed with constructive knowledge of any

charge created against the properties that they had purchased. This argument was, however, rejected. This Court held that while

constructive notice was su cient to satisfy the requirement of notice in the proviso to Section 100 of the TP Act, whether the transferee

had constructive notice of the charge had to be determined on the facts and circumstances of the case [Ibid at pp. 1207-1208 (paragraph

8)]. In other words, this Court held that there could be no xed presumption as to the transferee having constructive notice of the charge

against the property. In fact, the principle laid down in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation has been correctly applied in a sales tax case

similar to the present case [Deputy Commercial Tax O cer, Thudiyalur Assessment Circle, Coimbatore and Anr. v. R.K. Steels, (1998) 108

STC 161 (Mad.)].

22. In the present case, rstly, no provision of law has been cited before us that exempts the requirement of notice of the charge for its

enforcement against a transferee who had no notice of the same. It remains to be seen, therefore, if in the facts of the present case, the

rst respondent had notice actual or constructive of the charge. At the outset, in the advertisement/notice dated 17.3.1992 issued by the

Corporation, mention is only made of the sale of the Defaulting Company s assets and there is no indication, whatsoever, of any sales tax

arrears. Further, the bid o er made on behalf of the rst respondent on 5.6.1992 speci cally excludes any statutory liabilities, including

sales tax. This o er was accepted by the Corporation on 15.7.1992. Even at that stage, there was no mention of any sales tax arrears. The

sale of the assets took place pursuant to the agreement dated 12.8.1992 in which a speci c Clause was inserted that the rst respondent

would be liable to pay all property taxes, other taxes, electricity bills, water taxes and rents from the date of the agreement (i.e. 12.8.1992).

For the rst time, by letter dated 8.1.1993 of the second appellant to the Mandal Panchayath, Aloor Taluk, the issue of sales tax dues of the

Defaulting Company was brought to the surface. This is further borne out by the correspondence between the rst respondent and the

Corporation. Thus, it is evident that the rst respondent had no actual notice of the charge prior to the transfer. As to whether the rst

respondent had constructive notice of the charge, no substantive argument on this issue was made, either before the High Court or at any

rate before us. Hence, we cannot hold that the rst appellant had constructive notice of the charge.
 iDraf  

24. In this case too, the petitioners were unaware of the liabilities; the DDA never spelt it out, even in the previous writ proceeding. The

petitioners had reservation to even execution of the lease deed as from 1993, since they would have been exposed to the possibility of such

composition fee. The DDA insisted that they ought to furnish undertaking, without specifying the dues. The petitioners did so; the lease

was executed in 2004 Soon thereafter, the impugned demand was issued.

25. I am unconvinced by the simplistic, and indeed deceptive contention of the DDA that there was no occasion for it to indicate the

composition fee payable, prior to the execution of the lease deed. Soon after it became aware of the court sale, in 1994-1995, it could have

indicated the then liabilities. It did not choose to do so. It did not take any step for more than two decades to enforce its powers, and

recover composition charges from the defaulting party, i.e. the allottee. No sooner the plot stood transferred, and the petitioners sought to

achieve the object underlying the scheme, i.e. putting up a construction in the industrial plot, the DDA sought to recover the amounts

which should have been recovered in the rst instance from the defaulter. In other words, the DDA by its inaction has rewarded the

defaulter, by sparing him, and is burdening the third party, who has stepped into his shoes (albeit through involuntary transfer, by court

auction) by extracting the amounts, when it is being asked permission to put up industrial construction. This, to my mind, is

unsupportable; it has been held that the terms of an undertaking have to be seen in the context. In this case, the undertaking given by the

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petitioners were not preceded by the demand; they were unaware of the exact nature of their liabilities. As observed earlier, it is one thing

to say that subsequent purchasers, in terms of clause II(6) are bound by all the terms but entirely another to cast unspeci ed liabilities

upon them. The undertaking too has to be read in this context. This view is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Rekha

Mukherjee v. Ashish Kumar Das and Another, (2004) 1 SCC 483, where it was held as follows:

Rohin Arora & Another v. D.D.A  

16. An undertaking of this nature furthermore must be construed in favour of the person giving such undertaking. It should not 
be
Judgment Future Reference Advocates Bench Eq Citations
stretched too far. A party giving an undertaking is bound thereby but by reason thereof, the same cannot be given a meaning whereby the

scope and extent thereof is enlarged.

Similarly, in 128 (2006) DLT 534 (SC) SARUP SINGH GUPTA v. S. JAGDISH SINGH and ORS, the Supreme Court held as follows:

Waiver of a right implies his knowledge of the existing right. A person cannot be said to have waived his right unless it is established that

his conduct was such so as to enable the Court to arrive at a conclusion that he did so with knowledge that he had a right but despite the

same acted in such a manner which would imply that he has waived the same.

26. In Hamdard (supra) this court had observed, inter alia, as follows:

27. No one can take advantage of his own wrong and that no one should be penalised for no fault of his are two salutary guiding principles

of law while interpreting a policy decision or its applicability. If a party is prevented from doing of an act due to external reasons and for

no fault of his, it would be discharged from the obligations imposed upon the party. Policy of the DDA vide clause 1.4 recognises these

principles, but places unreasonable restriction of period in case of plot attracting ULCR Act to 3 years exemption, since made 8 years, and

delay occasioned due to mutation. In case of cancellation of allotment and restoration and in cases of orders prohibiting construction,

policy rightly excludes entire period.

27. The facts of this case establish that the condition that the petitioners had to complete construction within two years of the original

lease deed, i.e. 1975, was an impossibility; they came into the picture only in 1993; the sale was con rmed by court in 2000. In these

circumstances, the insistence that they should pay composition fees, in terms of that clause, in a lease deed indisputably executed on 7th

June, 2004 is arbitrary.

28. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petitioners are entitled to succeed. The impugned demand is hereby quashed. The respondent DDA

is directed to process the case for issuance of a no objection certi cate, without claiming composition fees, in terms of Clause II (3) of the

lease deed, within four weeks from today, and indicate its order to the petitioners. The writ petition is allowed in these terms. No costs.

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