G. Designation of the Offense (Sec.

8)
MINORITY AND RELATIONSHIP MUST BE ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION
People vs. Ernesto Malibiran, GR 173471

Facts:

The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor hereby accuses

Ernesto Malibiran of the crime of rape committed as follows:
 
That [before Christmas in December 2001; one morning after Christmas in
2001 but before May 13, 2002; and one afternoon after Christmas in 2001 but
before May 13, 2002, respectively] in Dipasaleng, Diniog, Dilasag, Aurora, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his eight (8)
year old granddaughter [AAA]. CONTRARY TO LAW.

Issue:

Whether or not minority and relationship is sufficiently alleged in the

information?

Held:

Yes. Minority and relationship which, in a prosecution for rape,

constitute special qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the
information and proved during trial.In the instant case, the twin aggravating
circumstances of minority of the victim and her blood ties to the offender were
properly appreciated. Ernestos filial ascendancy was properly alleged in the
informations and duly established by the presentation of the birth certificates of
BBB and AAA as well as the marriage certificate of Ernesto.

The birth certificate of BBB as well as the marriage contract of Ernesto and
his wife Edna Caballe proved BBB to be Ernestos daughter. And the birth
certificate of AAA proved that she is the daughter of BBB and, thus, the
granddaughter of Ernesto. Ernesto was duly identified by AAA as her
grandfather, the latter not even impugning the relationship during trial. Likewise,
alleged in the information and duly proved during trial by virtue of her birth
certificate was AAAs minority.
H. Cause of Accusation – Sec. 9
People vs. Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014

Facts:

On November 26, 2002 at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Vicente

Ringor was staying with his two-year old granddaughter, Maureen Joy Ringor, at
the terrace of their house located at Villanueva, San Manuel, Isabela. Suddenly,
Roger Ringor Umawid appeared and started attacking Vicente with a long bolo
(panabas) without any reason. While Vicente was able to escape Umawid's
blows, the latter nevertheless hit Maureen on her abdomen and back, causing
her instant death. Upon seeing Maureen bloodied, Umawid walked away.
Thereafter, Umawid went to a nearby house which was only five meters away
from Vicente's house where his nephew, Jeffrey Mercado, was sleeping. Awaken
by the sudden noise, Jeffrey went outside only to see his uncle rushing to attack
him with his panabas. Jeffrey, along with his sister and cousin, rushed inside the
house to seek for safety. However, Umawid was able to prevent Jeffrey from
closing the door and the former barge into the house. Jeffrey crouched and
covered his head with his arms to shield him from Umawid's impending attacks.

Umawid delivered fatal hacking blows to Jeffrey, causing the mutilation of

the latter's fingers. Umawid only stopped upon seing Jeffrey, who was then
pretending to be dead, leaning on the wall and blood-stained. In court, Umawid
set up the defense of insanity, but did not, however, take the witness stand to
attest the same.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is exempted from criminal liablity due to

insanity?

Ruling:

The Court observes that Maureen’s death is a case of aberratio

ictus, given that the fatal blow therefor was only delivered by mistake as it was
actually Vicente who was Umawid’s intended target. Based on the foregoing,
Umawid should have been punished for committing the complex crime of Murder
and Attempted Murder, pursuant to Article 48 in relation to Article 4(1) of the
RPC. However, considering that the information in Criminal Case No. 23-0471
only charged him with the Murder of Maureen, Umawid cannot be convicted of a
complex crime because to do so would be violative of his right to due
process. As held in the case of Burgos v. Sandiganbayan:

In criminal cases, where the life and liberty of the accused is at stake, due
process requires that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it
is clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense
other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of
this constitutional right.
Consigna vs. People, GR No. 175750-51, April 2, 2014

Facts:

Petitioner, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte,

obtained as loan from private respondent HermelinaMoleta, the sum of
P320,000.00, to pay for the salary of the employees of the municipality and to
construct the municipal gymnasium as the IRA of the municipality has not yet
arrived. As payment, petitioner issued 3 LBP check signed by Mayor Jame
Rusillon. Upon several attempts on different occasion, Moleta demanded
payment from petitioner and Rusillon, but to no avail. Hence, Moleta deposited
the 3 LBP checks to her account in Metrobank-Surigao. However, the check had
no funds. The following day, Moleta again deposited the check to her LBP
account but were again returned for the reason, “Signature Not on File.” Upon
verification, LBP informed Moleta that the municipality’s account was already
closed and transferred to DBP, and that petitioner, the municipal treasurer, has
been relieved from her position.

Hence, Moleta filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 sets of information against

petitioner and the Mayor Rossillon. The Sandiganbayan found the petitioner
Consigna guilty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Estafa under Article
315 (2) (a) of the RPC but exonerated Rusillon.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Estafa as penalized under Art. 315
(2)(a) of the RPC?

Ruling:

Entrenched in jurisprudence is the dictum that the real nature of the

criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts
in the complaint or information, as held in People v. Dimaano.

Petitioner’s argument is as outdated as it is erroneous. The averments in

the two (2) sets of Information against petitioner and Rusillon clearly stated facts
and circumstances constituting the elements of the crime of estafa as to duly
inform them of the nature and cause of the accusation, sufficient to prepare
their respective defenses.

The inevitable conclusion is that petitioner capitalized on her official

function to commit the crimes charged. Without her position, petitioner would not
have induced Moleta to part with her money. In the same vein, petitioner could
not have orchestrated a scheme of issuing postdated checks meddling with the
municipality's coffers and defiling the mayor's signature.
I. Place of Commission – Sec. 10
US. vs. APOLINARIO CUNANAN

Facts:

Apolinario Cunanan was charged with the crime of Desertion. Cunanan,

before the term of his enlistment had expired, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously absent himself for more than ten (10) days, without
license from his superiors, and with the intention not to return, by then and there
abandoning said steamship Rover in said port of Cebu, Philippine Islands and
deserting from the service, in order not to return, in violation of Section 9 (c) of
Act No. 1980, enacted by the Philippine Legislature.

Issue:

Whether or not the court of Manila had no jurisdiction of the person,

Cunanan or of the subject of the action? NO.

Ruling:

The complaint in this case alleges that the offense was committed in the
Province of Cebu, but there is no allegation that it was committed within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila. When a complaint shows that
the offense charged was not committed within the jurisdiction of the court, it is
demurrable.

The Court does not feel at the present time to decide whether the offense
of desertion under Act No. 1980 is a continuing offense or not. The Court decides
that, inasmuch as there is no allegation in the complaint alleging that the crime
with which Cunanan is charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila, and that said court is without jurisdiction to
try said offense.
People vs. Judge Pedro Navarro

Facts:

Respondent Catuday was charged in the Municipal Court of Makati, Rizal,

with the crime of light threat allegedly committed against Henry Dioquino
(Criminal Case No. 12846). Almost a year later, or on February 3, 1969, and
while the light threat case was still pending, he was charged in the same court,
with a different offense, frustrated theft, allegedly committed against the
Commonwealth Foods, Inc. In two separate decisions rendered on September
10, 1969, the Municipal Court convicted him of the two charges. He appealed
both decisions to the Court of First Instance.

Judge Pedro C. Navarro took over in the two cases. The theft case was
then in the rebuttal stage. On March 20, 1973, rebuttal evidence closed, and
upon order of the court, the parties filed their respective "offer and submission of
exhibits", and submitted the theft case for decision. On July 20, 1973, respondent
Judge rendered one decision, acquitting Catuday of both charges for lack of
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

Whether or not the determination as to where the crime was committed as

to the commission of Theft is material? NO.

Held:

When accused was asked by his counsel where he was living or residing
on January 31, 1969 when he was arrested for frustrated theft of coffee items,
Atty. Funk again objected to it as being immaterial, and he was sustained by the
Court. Said the Court, It has nothing to do with this case of theft. That may be
good if you file a civil suit, maybe, but in this crime of theft, that is immaterial.
Therefore, in the crime of Theft, the place is immaterial as to how the crime was
committed.
J. Date or Time of Commission – Sec. 11
People vs. Delfin

Facts:

On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio)—a 51-

year-old fisherman from Navotas City—was killed after being gunned down at a
store just across his home. On 13 March 2001, the Rael Delfin was formally
charged with the murder of Emilio before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malabon.

In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Delfin assails the validity of the
information under which he was tried and convicted. He specifically points out to
the discrepancy between the date of the commission of the murder as alleged in
the information i.e., "on or about the 27th day of November 2000" and the one
actually established during the trial i.e., 27 September 2000.

Delfin protests that the failure of the information to accurately allege the
date of the commission of the murder violated his right to be properly informed of
the charge against him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare an
intelligent defense thereon.

Issue:
Whether or not the discrepancy on the date of the commission of the
murder would render the Information against Delfin invalid? NO.

Ruling:
In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like
murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or
certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of
properly informing an accused, that the date of commission be approximated.
Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the
allegation in an information of a date of commission different from the one
eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an
error fatal to prosecution.

In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed

supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial or may even be corrected
by a formal amendment of the information. The inaccurate allegation in the
information is simply the product of a mere clerical error. This is obvious from the
fact that, while all its supporting documents point to the murder ashaving been
committed on the 27th of September2000, the information’s mistake is limited
only to the month when the crime was committed. Such an error is evidently not
fatal; it is deemed supplanted by the evidence presented by the prosecution.

The Court sustains the information for murder, under which Delfin was
tried and convicted, as valid.
People v. Balino, GR 194833, July 2, 2014

Facts:
Porferio Balino was charged and convicted for violation of Article 266-A of
the RPC as amended by RA 8353, Statutory Rape. He willfully, unlawfully and
criminally with the use of force and intimidation raped AAA who was 8 years old
during that time. It was when AAA was at the house of Balino watching TV
Show,Balino was able to perfect his criminal intent towards AAA.

The RTC convicted Balino of Statutory Rape. They gave weight to the
positive testimony of AAA considering that the testimonies of rape victims who
are young and of tender age are credible especially if they are without any motive
to falsely testify against the accused. It was also corroborated by the testimony of
Dr. Villapane who examined AAA. Balino’s defense of alibi was rejected since the
physical impossibility to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of the
commission was not given credence.

The CA affirmed RTC Ruling. They adhered to the rule that no woman,
especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration,allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a
public trial, unless she is motivated solely by desire to havethe culprit
apprehended and punished.

Issue:

Whether or not date and time is essential as to the crime of rape? NO.

Ruling:

This Court has likewise repeatedly held that the date of the commission of
rape is not an essential element of the crime. It is not necessary to state the
precise time when the offense was committed except when time is a material
ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element
except to prove that the victim was a minor below twelve years of age at the time
of the commission of the offense. Therefore, given the victim’s established date
of birth on the basis of the evidence adduced, she was definitely short of 12
years of age when the crime of rape was committed against her.
Corpuz vs. People, G.R. No. 180016

Facts:
Danilo Tangcoy, private complainant, and Lito Corpuz, petitioner, met at
the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Tangcoy was
then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon
hearing that Tangcoy had some pieces of jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached
him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of
jewelry on commission basis. Tangcoy agreed, and as a consequence, he turned
over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's
bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate
value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed
that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the
same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When
Tongcoy was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will
pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

A criminal complaint for estafa was filed against Corpuz. On the

prosecution, it was established that Tongcoy and Corpuz were collecting agents
of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of extending
loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a commission.
Petitioner denied having transacted any business with Tongcoy. However, he
admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was
made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated
May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to
sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see. RTC and CA –
accused is guilty of estafa.

Issue:
Whether or not date of the occurrence of the crime alleged in the
information was materially different from the one testified to by the private
complainant? NO.
Ruling:
The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that
the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime
herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not
render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near
the due date within which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds
or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence,
there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore,
cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges
proferred against him.
Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 189343. July 10, 2013.

Facts:
Alan Gaviola, Eustaquio Cesa, Benilda Bacasmas and Edna Jaca, public
officers, being then the City Administrator, City Treasurer, Cash Division Chief
and City Accountant, respectively, of the Cebu City Government are accused of
violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 commonly involving willful, intentional, and
conscious acts or omissions when there is a duty to act on the part of the public
official or employee. The Sandiganbayan held that the accused were all guilty of
gross inexcusable negligence. Thus, the Sandiganbayan convicted them and
sentenced them of the penalty of 12 years and 1 month to 15 years.

Issue:
Whether or not stating the exact date is necessary in the said case? NO.

Ruling:

It is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, except when it is a material ingredient thereof. The offense may be
alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date
of its commission. Here, the date is not a material ingredient of the crime, not
having been committed on one day alone, but rather within a period of time
ranging from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998. Hence, stating the exact
dates of the commission of the crime is not only unnecessary, but impossible as
well. That the Information alleged a date and a period during which the crime was
committed was sufficient, because it duly informed petitioners that before and
until 5 March 1998, over nine million pesos had been taken by Gonzales as a
result of petitioners’ acts. These acts caused undue injury to the government and
unwarranted benefits to the said paymaster.
K. Name of Offended Party – Sec. 12
Senador vs. People and Jaime, GR No. 201620, March 6, 2013

Facts:

Petitioner Ramoncita Senador entered into a consignment agreement of

various kinds of jewelry worth over P700k with Rita and Cynthia Jaime. Senador
was given fifteen (15) days to sell the jewelry and remit the money less her
commission. Unsold jewelries shall also be returned by petitioner to respondent
Cynthia. The fifteen-day period lapsed and petitioner failed to sell them or remit
the money. Several demands were not enough for Ramoncita to comply with her
obligations. Cynthia filed a criminal case against petitioner for estafa. In the
information, the private complainant was Cynthia.

Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information
is not the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. According
to Senador, the private complainant in the Information went by the name "Cynthia
Jaime," whereas, during trial, the private complainant turned out to be "Rita
Jaime." Further, Cynthia Jaime was never presented as witness.

Issue:

Whether or not failure to name or designate the party in a crime against

property is a ground of dismissal of the information? NO.

Ruling:

In case of an error in the designation of the offended party in crimes

against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the
correction of the information, not its dismissal:

SEC. 12. Name of the offended party.—The complaint or information must state
the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property
the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person
has been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be
described under a fictitious name.

(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is

unknown, the property must be described with such particularity as to
properly identify the offense charged.

(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property
the offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court
must cause such true name to be inserted in the complaint or information
and the record. x x x 
L. Duplicity of Offense – Sec. 13
Soriano vs. People, G.R. Nos. 159517-18, June 30, 2009.

Facts:
Soriano and Ilagan were the President and General Manager, respectively,
of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM). Allegedly, on June 27,
1997 and August 21, 1997, during their incumbency as president and manager of
the bank, petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They falsified the loan
applications and other bank records, and made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang
and Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans of P15M each, when in fact they did not.
Petitioners moved to quash the informations arguing that the prosecutor
charged more than one offense for a single act. Soriano was charged with
violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial document for
allegedly securing fictitious loans. They further argued that the facts as alleged in
the information do not constitute an offense. RTC denied the motion to quash.
CA sustained the denial of petitioners’ separate motions to quash.
Issue:
Whether or not there is duplicity of suits in the instant case? NO.
Ruling:
In Loney v. People, this Court, in upholding the filing of multiple charges
against the accused, held:
―As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single
act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one
offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for ―the same offense.‖ In People
v. Doriquez, we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are
not ―the same‖—
x xx if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element
which the other does not, x xx. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or
articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is
no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the
same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential
element of the other.
In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging
more than one offense, but with more than one information, each charging a
different offense—violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged
with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in separate informations.
Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash
the Informations.
Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, G.R. 103102.
Facts:
Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information for the
crime of frustrated murder. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner
was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However,
before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.
Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion for
leave of court to file an amended information and to admit said amended
information. The amended information, filed on October 31, 1991, reads: “x xx
thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said Maureen
Hultman. x xx” Corollary thereto, petitioner then postulates that since the
amended information for murder charges an entirely different offense, involving
as it does a new fact, that is, the fact of death whose cause has to be
established, it is essential that another preliminary investigation on the new
charge be conducted before the new information can be admitted.

Issue:
Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial
amendment, without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested
on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted? YES.
Ruling:
Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 14.Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in

substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads;
and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights
of the accused.

In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both

the original and the amended information. What is involved here is not a variance
in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of
execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This is
being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice
and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is
proper.

The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary

investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and
public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of
a public trial. The amended information could not conceivably have come as a
surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it charges essentially
the same offense as that charged under the original information.
People vs. Fernandez, G.R. 62116.

Facts:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1982, at 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, at barangay Taloy, municipality of Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
offended party Rebecca M. Soriano, a virgin and 15 years old, by means of force
and intimidation and against the will of the latter.
Issue:
Whether or not the Lower Court was correct in sentencing the accused-
appellants to suffer two penalties of Death? YES.
Ruling:

The original death sentence was correctly imposed pursuant to the

provisions of the Revised Penal Code, namely, Article 335 which states that
when the crime of rape is committed by two (2) or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death, and Article 63, which provides that when the
penalty prescribed is composed of two (2) indivisible penalties (as in this case)
and the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty
shall be applied.

However, since the original death penalties imposed by the trial court are
no longer imposable under the present Constitution and are reduced to reclusion
perpetua, the sentence on appellant Federico Conrado has to be reduced to two
(2) penalties of reclusion perpetua. But the indemnity he has to pay to the victim
must be increased to P20,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
People vs. Quemaggan, G.R. 178205

Facts:
Four men, Quemeggen and De Luna were arrested for allegedly robbing
the passengers of a jeepney. However, Quemeggen was able to escape which
prompted the other police officers to run after Quemeggen .The three suspects
were left under the care of a police officer, Suing, while the other police officers
pursued Quemeggen. Taking advantage of the situation, the three suspects
ganged up on Suing; de Luna held his hand, while the other suspect known as
Weng-Weng shot him on the head. The suspects escaped. Although Suingwas
brought to the hospital, he eventually died .An information was filed against
appellants charging them of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. The RTC found
them guilty. The CA however modified the decision of the trial court and
convicted Quemeggen of Robbery, and de Luna of the separate crimes of
Robbery and Homicide. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the CA’s convictions against Quemeggen and de Luna are

erroneous? NO.

Ruling:

No. Though appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide,

Quemeggen is guilty of robbery, and de Luna of two separate crimes of robbery
and homicide. Controlling in an information should not be the title of the
complaint or the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited.
There should also be no problem in convicting an accused of two or
more crimes erroneously charged in one information or complaint, but later
proven to being dependent crimes, as if they were made the subject of separate
complaints or informations. As worded, the Information sufficiently alleged all the
elements of both felonies.
M. Amendment or Substitution of Complaint or Information – Sec. 14
Dr. Mendez vs. People, G.R. No. 179962

Facts:
Dr. Joel Mendez was the sole proprietor of 6 different businesses.
Petitioner failed to file an income tax return on those businesses during the
taxable years 2001 to 2013. When a complaint was filed against him by the BIR
for failure to file an income tax return, petitioner admitted that he has been
operating as a single proprietor under these trade names in Quezon City, Makati,
Dagupan and San Fernando. But he countered that these businesses were
registered only in 2003, and thus were not yet in existence.
An information was filed against him in the Court of Tax Appeals for
violation of Art. 255 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 to which he plead not guilty.
After his arraignment, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information.
Petitioner failed to file a comment on the motion. The motion was granted.
Petitioner now assails the validity of the amended information.

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution’s amendments made after the petitioner’s
arraignment are substantial in nature and must perforce be denied? NO.

Ruling:

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure governs
the matter of amending the information:

Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be

amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

In short, amendments that do not charge another offense different from

that charged in the original one; or do not alter the prosecution's theory of the
case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he
has or will assume are considered merely as formal amendments.

In the present case, the amendments sought by the prosecution pertains to

(i) the alleged change in the date in the commission of the crime from 2001 to
2002; (ii) the addition of the phrase "doing business under the name and style of
Mendez Medical Group;" (iii) the change and/or addition of the branches of
petitioner’s operation; and (iv) the addition of the phrase "for income earned." We
cannot see how these amendments would adversely affect any substantial right
of the petitioner as accused.
Leviste vs. Alameda, G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010.

Facts:

Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was, by Information, charged with homicide

for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City. Petitioner was placed under police custody while
confined at the Makati Medical Center. After petitioner posted a bond which the
trial court approved,he was released from detention, and his arraignment was
set. The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the
public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the
deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the
evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper
offense. Petitioner also separately moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer
action on the admission of the Amended Information.

Issue:

Whether or not the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
admitted the prosecutor’s amended information? NO.

Held:

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is

whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available
after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have
would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An
amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime
alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been
held to be one of form and not of substance.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the
fact that what was conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does not
invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no substantial
distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both
are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining
whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial
Buhat vs CA, 265 SCRA 701

Facts:
On March 25, 1993, an information for HOMICIDE was filed in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) against petitioner Danny Buhat, "John Doe" and "Richard Doe".
Even before petitioner could be arraigned, the prosecution moved for the
deferment of the arraignment on the ground that the private complainant in the
case, one Betty Yu, moved for the reconsideration of the resolution of the City
Prosecutor which ordered the filing of the aforementioned information for
homicide. On February 3, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
finding Betty Yu's appeal meritorious, ordered the City Prosecutor of Roxas City
"to amend the information by upgrading the offense charged to MURDER and
implead therein additional accused Herminia Altavas, Osmeña Altavas and
Renato Buhat."

Issue:
Whether or not the additional allegation or conspiracy is a substantial
amendment? NO.

Ruling:
The additional allegation of conspiracy is only a formal amendment,
petitioner's participation as principal not having been affected by such
amendment. General rule: the allegation of conspiracy among all the private
respondents accused, which was not previously included in the original
information, is x x x a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the
need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial
court(people vs Montenegro). Exception: where an amendment after plea
resulting in the inclusion of an allegation of conspiracy and in the indictment of
some other persons in addition to the original accused, constitutes a mere formal
amendment permissible even after arraignment(people vs. Zulueta)

Such amendment to insert in the information the real name of the accused
involves merely a matter of form as it does not, in any way, deprive any of the
accused of a fair opportunity to present a defense; neither is the nature of the
offense charged affected or altered since the revelation of accused's real name
does not change the theory of the prosecution nor does it introduce any new and
material fact.19 In fact, it is to he expected that the information has to be
amended as the unknown participants in the crime became known to the public
prosecutor
Pacoy vs. Cajigal, G.R. 157472.

Facts:

On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in

the RTC against petitioner. Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by a counsel
de parte pleaded not guilty to homicide. Pretrial and trial was set by the judge.
However, on the same day after arraignment, the judge issued another order
directing the trial prosecutor to amend the information to murder, in view of the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the information, which
public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. The
prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word homicide and
instead wrote the word murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the
Information.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of

the charge from Homicide to Murder? NO.

Ruling:

The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same
upon the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as contemplated
under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

         Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when
the offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused
cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the information
even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a
substitution of a new information charging the proper offense.  Section 14 does
not apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In
this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in
the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the   essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
 
         Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the
respondent judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the
dismissal of the original Information.  To repeat, it was the same original
information that was amended by merely crossing out the word “Homicide” and
writing the word “Murder,” instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of
the homicide case.
Saludaga and Genio vs Sandiganbayan, GR No. 184537

Facts:

Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction

of Barangay Day Care Centers without conducting a competitive public bidding
as required by law, which caused damage and prejudice to the government. An
information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing undue
injury to the Government. The information was quashed for failure to prove the
actual damage, hence a new information was filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e)
of RA 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused
moved for a new preliminary investigation to be conducted on the ground that
there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the first information.

Issue:

Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the

information that would warrant an new preliminary investigation.

Ruling:

No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment.

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,

or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

That there are two (2) different modes of committing the offense: either by
causing undue injury or by giving private person unwarranted benefit. That
accused may be charged under either mode or under both. Hence a new
preliminary investigation is unnecessary.
Cabo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 169509

Facts:

On June 26, 2004, an information for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against petitioner and her
co-accused Bonifacio C. Balahay. The information alleged:

That on or about 08 August 2000 in the Municipality of Barobo, Surigao del

Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, BONIFACIO C. BALAHAY, then Mayor of the Municipality of
Barobo, Surigao del Sur, a high ranking public official, with the use of his
influence as such public official, committing the offense in relation to his office,
together with JOCELYN CABO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously receive and accept the amount of ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND 31/100 (P104,162.31)
from said JOCELYN CABO, Business Manager of Orient Integrated
Development Consultancy, Inc. (OIDCI), a consultancy group charged with
conducting a feasibility study for the Community-Based Resource Management
Project of the Municipality of Barobo, with accused Cabo giving and granting the
said amount to accused Balahay in consideration of the said accused having
officially intervened in the undertaking by the OIDCI of such contract for
consultancy services with the Municipality of Barobo.

On February 7, 2005, the prosecution filed an amended information which

incorporated all the essential elements of the crime charged. Consequently,
Balahay was sent a notice for his arraignment on the amended information.
Petitioner was likewise notified of her re-arraignment which was set on April 14,
2005.17 However, on April 11, 2005, petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Second
Arraignment18 on the ground that the amended information pertained to Balahay
alone. Petitioner claimed that she could no longer be re-arraigned on the
amended information since substantial amendment of an information is not
allowed after a plea had already been made thereon.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred inamending said information?

Ruling:

Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ordered

the re-arraignment of petitioner on the amended information. Double jeopardy did
not attach by virtue of petitioner’s "conditional arraignment" on the first
information. It is well-settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the
same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid
arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted
or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express
consent.29 The first and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

FILING OF INFORMATION IF THERE IS PENDING MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
Ramiscal vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140576-99. December 13, 2004

Facts:

Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and
Jesus Garcia were charged with Malversation through Falsification of Public
Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The Information alleged that Ramiscal,
et. al. misappropriated and converted the amount of P250,318,200.00 for their
personal use from the funds of AFP-RSBS. Ramiscal filed with the
Sandiganbayan an “Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.” He argued, that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the case because the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. The said
Urgent Motion was later adopted by Alzaga and Satuito. The Urgent Motion was
denied by the Sandiganbayan. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued, the Sandiganbayan sustained
Ramiscal, et. al.’s contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it
reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of their criminal
case. Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the
present special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Did the Sandiganbayan err in denying petitioner’s motion to set aside his
arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against?

Ruling:

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, sanction the

immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable
cause, even during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of an
information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration.
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable
cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it
bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal
procedure logically follows the filing of the information.
PRESCRIPTION
Panaguiton, Jr. vs. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571

Facts:

In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from Panaguiton amounting to P1,979,459.

In 1993, Cawili with his ‘business associate’ Tongson issued 3 checks as
payment Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and
Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were
dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account.
During preliminary investigation, Tongson claimed that he was not Cawili’s
business associate. On Dec. 6 1995 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found
probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.
Petitioner then appeal before DOJ and in 1997 DOJ found that it was indeed
possible for Tongson to co-signed the checks. It then directed the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against
Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP
Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter
to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution. ACP Sampaga held that
the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which
provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4)
years. Moreover, ACPSampaga stated that the order of the Chief State
Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative
should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor.

Issue:

Whether or not the rule on prescription as provided for in Act No. 3326
applies to offenses under B.P. 22? YES.

Ruling:

We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An
offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No.
3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission
of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case
in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December
1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of
the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment,”[39] and the prevailing rule at the time was that
once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary
investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
People vs. Romuladez, G.R. 166510

Facts:

Private respondent Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez was charged with

violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
committed “on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986”.
However, the subject criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan only on 5
November 2001, following a preliminary investigation that commenced only on 4
June 2001. The Information alleged that from 1976 to February 1986,
Romualdez, then the Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte, using his
influence with his brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had
himself appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to foreign countries,
particularly the People's Republic of China (Peking), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(Jeddah), and United States of America (Washington D.C.), knowing fully well
that such appointment and/or assignment is in violation of the existing laws as
the Office of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is incompatible with his position
as Governor of the Province of Leyte, thereby enabling himself to collect dual
compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial
Government of Leyte to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the
amount of P5,806,709.50.

Issue:
Whether or not the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by
prescription?

Ruling:
The time span that elapsed from the alleged commission of the offense up
to the filing of the subject cases is clearly beyond the fifteen (15) year
prescriptive period provided under Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 3019.
The initial filing of the complaint in 1989 or the preliminary investigation by
the PCGG that preceded it could not have interrupted the fifteen (15)-year
prescription period under Rep. Act No. 3019. As held in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, the investigatory power of the PCGG extended only to alleged
ill-gotten wealth cases, absent previous authority from the President for the
PCGG to investigate such graft and corruption cases involving the Marcos
cronies. Accordingly, the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG
leading to the filing of the first information is void ab initio, and thus could not be
considered as having tolled the fifteen (15)-year prescriptive period,
notwithstanding the general rule that the commencement of preliminary
investigation tolls the prescriptive period. After all, a void ab initio proceeding
such as the first preliminary investigation by the PCGG could not be accorded
any legal effect by this Court.
The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the prescriptive
period is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or
otherwise initiates its investigation. As such preliminary investigation was
commenced more than fifteen (15) years after the imputed acts were committed,
the offense had already prescribed as of such time.
TEST OF PREJUDICE BY AMENDMENT
Dr. Mendez vs. People, G.R. No. 179962

Facts:
Dr. Joel Mendez was the sole proprietor of 6 different businesses.
Petitioner failed to file an income tax return on those businesses during the
taxable years 2001 to 2013. When a complaint was filed against him by the BIR
for failure to file an income tax return, petitioner admitted that he has been
operating as a single proprietor under these trade names in Quezon City, Makati,
Dagupan and San Fernando. But he countered that these businesses were
registered only in 2003, and thus were not yet in existence.
An information was filed against him in the Court of Tax Appeals for
violation of Art. 255 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 to which he plead not guilty.
After his arraignment, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information.
Petitioner failed to file a comment on the motion. The motion was granted.
Petitioner now assails the validity of the amended information.

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution’s amendments made after the petitioner’s
arraignment are substantial in nature and must perforce be denied? NO.

Ruling:

To be sure, the jurisprudential test on whether a defendant is prejudiced by

the amendment of an information pertains to the availability of the same defense
and evidence that the accused previously had under the original information. This
test, however, must be read together with the characteristic thread of formal
amendments, which is to maintain the nature of the crime or the essence of the
offense charged.

In the present case, this thread remained consistently under the amended
information, alleging the petitioner’s failure to file his return and consequently to
pay the correct amount of taxes. Accordingly, the petitioner could not have been
surprised at all.
AMENDMENT OR SUBSTITUTION OF INFORMATION
Pacoy vs. Cajigal, G.R. 157472.

Facts:

On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in

the RTC against petitioner. Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by a counsel
de parte pleaded not guilty to homicide. Pretrial and trial was set by the judge.
However, on the same day after arraignment, the judge issued another order
directing the trial prosecutor to amend the information to murder, in view of the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the information, which
public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. The
prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word homicide and
instead wrote the word murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the
Information.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of

the charge from Homicide to Murder? NO.

Ruling:

The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same
upon the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as contemplated
under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

         Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when
the offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused
cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the information
even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a
substitution of a new information charging the proper offense.  Section 14 does
not apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In
this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in
the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the   essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
 
         Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the
respondent judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the
dismissal of the original Information.  To repeat, it was the same original
information that was amended by merely crossing out the word “Homicide” and
writing the word “Murder,” instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of
the homicide case.
N. Venue – Sec. 15
VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES IS JURISDICTIONAL
Navaja vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 180969*, September 11, 2017

Facts:

The instant case is an offshoot of a preliminary investigation proceeding

initiated by DKT Philippines, Inc. (DKT) before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bohol (OPP-Bohol) in Tagbilaran City, charging its then-Regional
Sales Manager for Visayas, Ana Lou B. Navaja (Ana Navaja), of the crime of
falsification of a Private Document. MCTC-Jagna denied petitioner's Motion to
Quash. It held that petitioner had no right to invoke the processes of the court,
since at the time he filed said motion, the MCTC-Jagna has yet to acquire
jurisdiction over his person.

Issue:

Whether or not the case may be filed either in Jagna or Tagbilaran?

Either.

Ruling:

Applying the principle of delito continuado, petitioner should only be

charged with one (1) count of violation of PD 1829 which may be filed either in
Jagna, Bohol where Ms. Magsigay was allegedly prevented from appearing and
testifying in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, or in Tagbilaran City, Bohol where petitioner
allegedly presented a false affidavit in the same case. However, since he was
already charged - and in fact, convicted in a Judgment dated July 3, 2007 - in the
MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed as the events
that transpired in Jagna, Bohol should only be deemed as a partial execution of
petitioner's single criminal design.
Union Bank vs. People, G.R. No. 192565. February 28, 2012.

Facts:

Desi Tomas was charged in court for perjury when she falsely declared
under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping. Tomas filed a motion to
quash citing that the Makati MTC has no jurisdiction as the document was
submitted and used in Pasay and that there was no crime committed as not all of
the elements of perjury was present. The lower courts denied the motion saying
that Makati has jurisdiction as it was notarized there and ruled that she was
sufficiently charged with perjury.

Issue:

Whether, in a crime of perjury, the proper venue is where it was notarized

or where it was used? The SC ruled that Makati was the right venue.

Ruling:

The SC cites Rule 110, Sec. 15 of the Rules of Court where it was stated
that criminal action shall be instituted where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential elements occurred. 

The SC, one-by-one stated the elements of perjury and provided that
Tomas did all things in Makati, thus making Makati the right venue for the case.
ESTAFA BY POSTDATING OR ISSUING A BAD CHECK IS A TRANSITORY
OR CONTINUING OFFENSE (EXCEPTIONS)
People vs. Yabut, G.R. No.L-42847. April 29, 1977
 
Facts:

Accused Cecilia Que Yabut as treasurer and her husband

GeminianoYabut, Jr. as president of the Yabut Transit Line were charged with
estafa for issuing several checks payable to the Free Tires Supply and Free
Caltex Station owned and operated by Alicia P. Andan. The complaint alleged
that the accused by means of false pretenses and pretending to have sufficient
funds in the Merchants Banking Corporation and Manufacturers Bank and Trust
Company in Caloocan City prepared, issued and made out several checks
despite full knowledge that at the time there was no or insufficient funds in said
bank, that upon presentation of the said checks, the checks were dishonored and
inspite of repeated demands by Freeway to deposit the necessary funds to cover
the checks within the reglementary period enjoined by law, the accused failed
and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Andan. Respondents
instead of entering a plea respectively filed their motions for the quashal of the
information citing as one of their reasons that the venue was improperly laid in
Malolos, Bulacan, because the postdated checks were issued and delivered to,
and received by the complainant in Caloocan.
 
Issue:

Where was the Estafa in Post Dated Checks is a continuing offense? YES.

Ruling:

Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of
the Revised Penal Code may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic
elements of deceit and damage may independently arise in separate places. In
the event of such occurrence, the institution of the criminal action in either place
is legally allowed. Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the
Court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any
one of the essential ingredients thereof took place." The theory is that a person
indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the
offense was in part committed. However, if all the acts material and essential to
the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or
province, the court of that municipality or province has the sole jurisdiction to try
the case. The estafa charged in the two informations involved in the case before
Us appears to be transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in
Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage in Caloocan City, where the checks were
dishonored by the drawee banks there. Jurisdiction can, therefore, be entertained
by either the Malolos court or the Caloocan court. While the subject checks were
written, signed, or dated in Caloocan City, they were not completely made or
drawn there, but in Malolos, Bulacan, where they were uttered and delivered.
That is the place of business and residence of the payee. The place where the
bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the
place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery
thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to
its consummation as an obligation.

People vs. Grospe, G.R. L-74053-54

Facts:
Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corp
(SMC). He was charged with BP 22 at the RTC for issuing a dishonored check in
1983 in favor of SMC (for insufficiency of funds) and, in spite of repeated
demands, failed and refused to make good said check to the damage of
SMC. He was also charged with Estafa for issuing another check for payment of
the beer he purchased and refused to redeem said check despite repeated
demands. Trial court of Pampanga dismissed the case because it said, that
deceit and damage, the elements of the crimes did not occur in Pampanga,
therefore, this court has no jurisdiction. The checks were made in Guiguinto,
Bulacan, and delivered to SMC also in Bulacan.  Were deposited in Planter’s
Bank (drawee bank) at Santa Maria, Bulacan and was received by BPI at San
Fernando, Pampanga for clearing purposes. Sol Gen points that 2 checks are
involved. That Parulan issued PDB’s check (Bulacan) and was received by SMC
at Bulacan. Then it was forwarded to SMC San Fernando, Pampanga where it
was received by te Finance Officer and deposited with BPI San Fernando Branch
then the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of
funds" from the drawee bank, the PDB, in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This check was
the subject of Estafa. For Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other
hand, the elements of deceit and damage are not essential nor required. An
essential element of that offense is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer
of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, it being mala prohibitum.

Issue:
Wheether or not the venue (RTC Pampanga) was proper ? YES.

Ruling: 
Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure: (a) In
all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place.
In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly
tried in any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed.
However, if the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its
consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of that
municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case Estafa by
postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its
basic elements of deceit and damage may arise independently in separate
places. In this case, deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, while the
damage was inflicted in Bulacan where the cheek was dishonored by the drawee
bank in that place. Jurisdiction may, therefore, be entertained by either the
Bulacan Court or the Pampanga Court.
 What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the
instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation.
VIOLATION OF BP 22 IS A CONTINUING OFFENSE
Yalong vs. People, G.R. 187174

Facts:

Stemming from a complaint filed by respondent Lucila C. Ylagan (Ylagan),

an Information was filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Batangas
City, Branch 1 (MTCC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 45414, charging Yalong
for the crime of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).

In her defense, Yalong averred that she already paid her loan but did not
require Ylagan to issue a receipt or acknowledge the same. Likewise, she
claimed that the subject check belonged to her husband and that while she knew
that the said check was not covered by sufficient funds, it was already signed by
her husband when she handed it to Ylagan.

Issue:

Whether or not BP 22 is a continuing offense? YES.

Ruling:

BP 22 is a continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and

essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in
another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material
acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other.
Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part
committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may
be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred – in particular,
the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored. Library

In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn,
issued, and delivered in Manila, records reveal that Ylagan presented the same
for deposit and encashment at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned
of its dishonor.38 As such, the MTCC correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case
No. 45414 as it had the territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve the same. In this
light, the denial of the present petition remains warranted.

As the Court finds the above-stated reasons already sufficient to deny the
present petition, it is unnecessary to delve on the other ancillary issues in this
case.
Rigor vs. People, G.R. No. 144887
Facts:
Alfredo Rigor applied for a P500k commercial loan from Rural Bank (RB)
San Juan on Nov 16 1989. Rigor signed a Promissory Note (PN) stating a 24%
interest per year. The loan was approved by RB San Juan Manager de Guzman
and Controller Agapito Uy. A cashiers check with P487k net proceeds of loan
was issued to Rigor. Rigor endorsed and encashed the check with the RB San
Juan teller Cruz who stamped the word “Paid”. Rigor issued an undated
Associated Bank (AB) Tarlac Branch check in the amount of P500k payable to
RB San Juan. The application, approval and receipt of proceeds were all in one
day because Rigor is the kumpare of RB San Juan President and he is well-
known to directors because they all come from Tarlac. Rigor failed to pay the
loan upon maturity of the loan on Dec 16 1989. Rigor personally asked a 2 month
extension but still failed to pay so asked for another 2 month extension. Rigor
failed to pay and asked for a 30 day extension on Apr 16 1990 but was now
denied by de Guzman. De Guzman sent a formal demand letter on Apr 25 1990.
Issue:
Wheether or not the Trial Court of Pasig had jurisdiction to try and decide
case for violation of BP 22? YES.
Ruling:
A person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Violations of BP
22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes because some acts material
and essential to the crimes and requisite to their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory and some in another. Either court has jurisdiction to try
cases given that the 1st court taking the case excludes other courts.
LIBEL
Bonifacio vs. RTC of Makati, G.R. 184800

Facts:
Private respondent Jessie John Gimenez (Gimenez) filed, on behalf of the
Yuchengco family and of the Malayan Insurance Co. a criminal complaint before
the RTC of Makati for 13 counts of libel under Art 355 in relation to 353 of the
RPC against herein petitioners who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents
Coalition, Inc (PEPCI). Pepci is a large group of disgruntled plan holders of
Pacific Plans, Inc (PPI) who had previously purchased traditional pre-need
educational plans but were unable to collect thereon due to liquidity concerns,
filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of payments before the
Makati RTC. Petitioner then filed before the Makati RTC a Motion to Quash the
information on the ground that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC.
Citing Macasaet v people, petitioners maintained that the information failed to
allege a particular place within the trial court’s jurisdiction where the subject
article was printed and first published or that the offended party resided in Makati
at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published. The
RTC of Makati, despite finding probable cause, quashed the information, but
upon motion for reconsideration, allowed the prosecution to amend the
information and the latter moved to have the amended information admitted.
Petitioners once more moved to have the amended information quashed on the
same ground but the RTC ruled that the information was sufficient in form.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC of Makati acted with grave abuse of discretion in
admitting the amended information despite the failure to allege that the libelous
articles were printed and first published by the accused in Makati? YES.
Ruling:
The venue of the action seeks to prevent undue harassment on the part of
the publisher by the complainant who, if the amended information would be
allowed, can file in all other locations where the pep coalition website is likewise
accessed or capable of being accessed. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions
such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. It is clear
that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is
limited to only two places. 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense, and 2) where the alleged defamatory article
was printed and first published. The old rule allows the filing of an action for libel
in any jurisdiction where the libellous article was published or circulated. Clearly,
the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment was the indiscriminate or
arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas,
meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. To
credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on
petitioner’s website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the
very ills that the amendment to Art 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and
prevent. For the Court to hold that the amended information sufficiently vested
jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was
accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other
locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being
accessed.
WRITTEN DEFAMATION
Foz, Jr. vs. People, G.R. 167764

Facts:

In an Information filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz,
Jr., and Danny G.Fajardo, columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay
News were charged with the crime of libel. They wrote and publish in the reular
issue of the Panay news a certain article maliciously injuring and exposing
one Dr. Edgar Portigo, a company physician of San Miguel Corporation office,
SMC, as anincompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the
expense of the poor.The RTC rendered its Decision finding petitioners guilty as
charged. Dissatisfied, petitioners filedan appeal with the CA which rendered its
assailed Decision affirming in toto the RTC decision. Hence, thispresent petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the o
ffense of libel ascharged in the Information dated October 17, 1994? NO.

Held:

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court h
eld in Macasaet v. People:“ xxx the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case
is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is
so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. Xxx”

Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for
a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no
jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime
of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing
with the court of competent jurisdiction.
People v. Marlene Olermo, G.R. 127848
Facts:
In separate informations filed before the RTC of
Valenzuela, Marlene Olermo was accused of crimes, one of which w as ill egal
recruitment in l arge scal e. Ol ermo contends that the RTC of
Valenzuela has no jurisdiction since the complainant's affidavit provides that
he first met O l e r m o i n Q C a n d t h a t i t w a s o n l y d u r i n g t r i a l t h a t
complainant said that he actually first met Olermo in Valenzuela City.n
separate informations filed before the RTC of Valenzuela, Marlene Olermo was
accused of crimes, one of which was illegal recruitment in large scale. Olermo
contends that the RTC of Valenzuela has no jurisdiction since the complainant's
affidavit provides that he first met Olermo in QC and that it was only during trial
that complainant said that he actually first met Olermo in Valenzuela city.Issue:
Does the RTC of Valenzula have jurisdiction? Yes. In the case at bar, the
prosecution proved that the element of offering, promising and advertising
overseas employment took place in Olermo's office in Valenzuela. In all criminal
prosecutions, the action shall be tried in the territory wherein the offense was
committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
Issue:
Does the RTC of Valenzula have jurisdiction? YES.
Ruing:
In the case at bar, the prosecution proved that the element of offering,
promising and advertising overseas employment took place in Olermo's office in
Valenzuela. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be tried in the territory
wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof
took place.
ABDUCTION IS A CONTINUING OFFENSE
People vs. Feliciano Gorospe (G.R. No. L-51513)

Facts:

In a verified complaint filed on October 8, 1974, with the Municipal Court of

Pulilan, Bulacan, ANASTACIA DE JESUS accused GERARDO FAJARDO,
RUFINO BULANADI and FELICIANO GOROSPE of the crime of forcible
abduction with rape. (Expediente, p. 1.) The crime was said to have been
committed on September 30, 1974, starting in Plaridel, Bulacan, thru Pulilan, and
thence to Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Municipal Judge Alfredo V. Granados of the
Municipal Court of Pulilan received the complaint and conducted a preliminary
investigation, first stage. On October 25, 1974, the Complaint was amended.
Rufino Bulanadi and Feliciano Gorospe were again named but Gerardo Fajardo
was dropped and OSCAR ALVARAN was named instead. The date when the
crime was said to have been committed was changed from September 30, 1974,
to September 25, 1974.

Issue:

Whether or not Abduction is a continuing offense? YES.

Ruling:

The above questions are easily answered. Abduction is a persistent and

continuing offense. (U.S. vs. Bernabe, 23 Phil. 154 [1912].) Hence it may be
"tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was
committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place." (Rules of
Court, Rule 110, Sec. 14[a].) The Municipal Court of Pulilan had jurisdiction
because the abductors and their captive passed Pulilan on their way from
Plaridel to Talavera. And the CFI of Bulacan (as well as the CFI of Nueva Ecija)
had jurisdiction because essential elements of the offense took place in Bulacan
(and also in Nueva Ecija).
KIDNAPPING IS A CONTINUING OFFENSE
People vs. Suriaga, G.R. 123779

Facts:
Edwin Ramos was cleaning the car of his older brother, Johnny who was
taking care of his 2-year old daughter, Nicole, playing inside the car. Suriaga, a
cousin of the Ramos brothers, arrived. He was accompanied by his live-in-
partner Rosita. Suriaga requested Edwin if he could drive the car, butte latter
declined, saying he did not have the keys. Meanwhile, Johnny returned to his
house because a visitor arrived. At this instance, Rosita held Nicole and cajoled
her. Rosita asked Edwin if she could take Nicole with her to buy barbeque.
Having been acquainted with Rosita for a long time and because he trusted her,
Edwin acceded. When Rosita and the child left, Suriaga joined them. More than
an one hour has passed but the two failed to return with Nicole. Edwin, Johnny
and his wife, Mercedita, then began searching but they could not find their
daughter and Rosita. Nicole’s grandfather then receive a call from Suriaga asking
for ransom in the amount of P100,000.00. Johnny immediately reported the call
to the PACC Task Force. The next day, Suriaga called Mercedita, introduced
himself and asked her if she and her husband would give the amount to which
the latter responded in the positive. Suriaga instructed Mercidita as to the how
the money should be delivered to him with a warning that if she will not deliver
the money ,her daughter would be placed in a plastic bag or thrown in a garbage
can. Thereafter, with the cash money, and while being tailed by PACC agents,
Mercida proceeded to deliver the money to Suriaga. The PACC agents arrested
Suriaga and his companion Isidera after Mercida gave the money to them. Prior
thereto, Nicole was rescued in a shanty where Rosita’s sister lived.

Issue:
Whether or not Kidnapping is continuing offense? YES.
Ruling:
The chain of events as narrated by the prosecution’s witnesses could only
lead to the conclusion that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping for ransom, a continuing crime, defined and penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659.
ESTOPPEL TO QUESTION JURISDICTION
Figueroa vs. People, G.R. 147406

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. The RTC found him guilty. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner,
for the first time, questioned RTCs jurisdiction on the case. The CA in affirming
the decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches has already
precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial
went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without
him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters
that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any
time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein,
the principle of laches will not be applicable. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during
the trial of this case, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately
raised in petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeals? NO.
Ruling:
Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general
rule, the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches may be
invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual
milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be
applicable, that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to
warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or
declined to assert it. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so
only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been
elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the
presence of laches.
In the case at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not
present. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals
resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for
Reconsideration assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on procedural
infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate court’s
directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a
single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active
participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of
Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court
that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply.
Austria vs. People, G.R. No. 83530

Facts:

Petitioner Austria was charged of murder before the Circuit Criminal Court
(CCC) of the 7th Judicial District for shooting Roberto Miranda inside the San
Miguel Magnolia Poultry farm compound in Alfonso, Cavite. The accused denied
having shot the deceased and claimed that they were grappling for the
possession of shotgun that is why it was accidentally fired. The case was filed by
the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite in the defunct of the Circuit Criminal Court sitting in
Pasig, presided by Judge Pena. However due to the death of said judge and the
reorganization of the courts (Aug. 14, 1981) creating the RTC and abolishing the
CCC, the same was referred to Pasig presided by Judge Migrino and
subsequently upon the appointment of Judge Caguioa to her sala.

Petitioner assails jurisdiction of Caguioa court that upon the abolition of the
CCC, the case should have been assumed by RTC Cavite which was the venue
of the crime .

Issue:

Whether or not Pasig Court has jurisdiction over the case? NO.

Ruling:

Moreover, the records show that the petitioner had pursued vigorously the
case before the lower court, on the supposition that it had jurisdiction, and had
asked it to render a judgment of acquittal, as he in fact requests this Court to set
aside its decision (as well as the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals). It
is a behavior that forces him to accept the jurisdiction of the Pasig court; because
if the latter lacked jurisdiction, it cannot act, much less render a decision, whether
of a conviction or acquittal. Surely, he cannot rightfully maintain an attack on the
trial court's competence after having accepted — and invoked — it.  Estoppel is
an impediment against any attack.
CHANGE OF VENUE
People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393

Facts: 

CFI issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased

bodies of 7 persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his
hacienda in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. Armed with the above warrant, the
Philippine Constabulary proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a
canefield yielded two common graves containing the 7 bodies. Seven (7)
separate complaints for murder were thus filed against Pablo Sola and 18 other
persons before CFI of Kabankalan. The trial court ordered their arrest. However,
without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt
of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail. Pablo Sola
and two others have since been released from detention. The witnesses in the
murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the
CFI Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could
be jeopardized. At least 2 of the accused are official with power and influence in
Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the
accused remained at large. There had also been reports made to police
authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses. Prosecution
petitioned for a) change of venue for trial and b) cancellation of the bail bonds.

Issue:

Whether or not change of venue is proper? YES.

Ruling:

The Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order "a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." The exercise
by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be
appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid
they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days
of trial. Because of fear, they may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to
save their lives. It may be added that there may be cases where the fear,
objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the
question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. The
primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of
doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue.
O. Intervention by Offended Party – Sec. 16
Lee Pue Liong vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee, GR181658

Facts:
Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion
Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies
(CKC Group) which includes the pioneer company Clothman Knitting Corporation
(CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of... intra-corporate disputes between
petitioner and his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a
majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
Presence and intervention of the private prosecutor in the perjury cases
are not prohibited by the rules, stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party,
being a stockholder, an officer and the treasurer of CHI and the private
complainant.
Issue:
Whether or not the honorable court of appeals committed a grave error
when it upheld the resolution of the metropolitan trial court that there is a private
offended party in the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest? NO.
Ruling:
Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence
should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered. There was neither a
waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate
civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings
to establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the private
offended party has the right to intervene through the private prosecutors. Such
right to intervene exists even when no civil liability is involved." she submits that
pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the right to intervene even if no
civil liability exists in this case.
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the
right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising
from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can
intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
RULE 111: PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
A . Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions – Sec. 1

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, G.R. No. L-139465

Facts:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The Department of Justice received a request from the Department of
Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting
documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges
include: Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US, Attempt to evade or
defeat tax, Fraud by wire, radio, or television, False statement or entries, and
Election contribution in name of another.

Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC
presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to
issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.
Thus, this petition is now at bar.

Issue:

Whether or not extradition proceeding is subject to the Rules of Court?

YES.

Ruling:

The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition
proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph
[1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the
provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with
the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section
8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon
application by the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the
proceedings.
People vs. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102207, September 2, 1994

Facts:

Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4,

1992 due to cardio respiratory arrest. The Solicitor General then submitted a
comment stating that the death of the accused does not excuse him from
his civil liability (supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs
Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed that in the
Supreme Court’s decision in People vs Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before the final judgement is rendered.

Issue:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of

his conviction extinguish his civil liability? YES.

Ruling:

The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and
Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the Court said that civil liability is extinguished
only when death of the accused occurred before the final judgement. Judge
Kapunan further stated that civil liability is extinguished because there will be “no
party defendant” in the case. There will be no civil liability
if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court stated “it is, thus, evident
that… the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on
whether the same can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than
delict.

In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977

where it states that civil liability will only survive if death came after the final
judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the Civil Code could
not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. The
Court also gave a summary on which cases should civil liability be extinguished,
to wit:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes

his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Therefore,
Bayotas’s death extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely on the act
complained of.
B. When Separate Civil Action is Suspended –Sec. 2
Manantan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107125, January 29, 2001

Facts:

In the evening of September 25, 1982, at the National Highway of Malvar,

Santiago, Isabela, George Manantan was driving a Toyota car going home. At
that time, he was with Fiscal Ambrocio, Miguel Tabangin and Ruben Nicolas.
Suddenly, a jeepney, coming from the opposite direction hit the driver side of the
car, driven by Manantan. Consequently, Manantan, Ambrocio and Tabangin
were injured while Nicolas died. Trial followed.

The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide. The respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil
aspect of the lower court’s judgment. Even if the accused was acquitted from his
criminal liability, the Appellate Court held him civilly liable and ordered him to
indemnify the aggrieved party for the death of Nicolas.

Issue:

Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner extinguished his civil liability?

Ruling:

The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
Article 29 of the Civil Code provides that a civil liability is not extinguished
in criminal cases. Therefore, the accused cannot be exempted from paying civil
damages which may only be proven by preponderance of evidence.

Manantan claimed that he was placed on double jeopardy but the courts

did not give merit to this contention. The following elements must be present
for doublejeopardy to exist: (1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) The first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy
must be for the same offense as the first.

In the case at bar, the initially put into jeopardy but he it was terminated by his
discharge. When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the issue was
about the civil aspect of the criminal case. Thus, there could be
no double jeopardy.
F. Suspension by Reason of a Prejudicial Question – Sec. 6
Dreamwork vs. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, through its president and VP, filed a
complaint for violation of BP 22 against private respondent Janiola with the Office
of City Prosecutor. Janiola then instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for
the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well
as for damages. Notably, the checks that were subject of the criminal cases
before the MTC were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
Janiola filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the criminal case,
alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or
intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other
words, Janiola claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against
the criminal cases.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a prejudicial question in this case? NO
Ruling:
Sec. 6 Rule 111: Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition
for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed
in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action
at any time before the prosecution rests.
SEC. 7 Rule 111: Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action,
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
It is clear that the second element required for the existence of a
prejudicial question (resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine
whether the criminal action may proceed) is absent in the instant case. Thus, no
prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable in this case.
RULE 112: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
A . Preliminary Investgation defined; when required – Sec. 1

Sales vs. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 293

Facts:

Reynolan Sales, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte, fatally

shot his political rival, Atty. Benemerito in an alleged shootout in a barangay of
said municipality. After said shooting, Sales surrendered and placed himself
under the custody of the police and then asked that he be brought to the
Provincial PNP Headquarters. Chief Insp. Agno and the wife of the deceased
filed a criminal complaint for Murder against petitioner at MCTC Bangui, Ilocos
Norte.

Presiding judge, Hon. Calvan, conducted a preliminary examination of the

witnesses, found probable cause, and thereafter issued an order for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest with no bail recommended.

Petitioner belatedly received a copy of the foregoing Resolution of the graft

investigation officer only on June 21, 2000, and because he was thus effectively
prevented from seeking a reconsideration thereof, he then filed a Motion To
Defer Issuance Of Warrant Of Arrest pending determination of probable cause
dated June 22, 2000.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman followed proper procedure in conducting a
Preliminary Investigation? NO.
Whether or not petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to
submit controverting evidence? NO.

Ruling:

The records show that the supposed preliminary investigation was conducted
in installments by at least three (3) different investigating officers, none of
whom completed the preliminary investigation. There was not one continuous
proceeding but rather a case of passing the buck, so to speak, the last one being
the Ombudsman hurriedly throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan.

The charge against herein petitioner is Murder, a non-bailable offense. The

gravity of the offense alone, not to mention the fact that the principal accused is
an incumbent mayor whose imprisonment during the pendency of the case would
deprive his constituents of their duly-elected municipal executive, should have
merited a deeper and more thorough preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman,
however, did nothing of the sort and instead swallowed hook, line and sinker the
resolution and recommendation of Graft Investigation Officer II Cynthia V. Vivar,
among them the finding that, aside from the averment of respondent that the
victim fired at him and he was only forced to fire back, no other evidence was
adduced to indicate that such was what happened.
Baytan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 153945 February 4, 2003
Facts:
Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian Baytan were on
their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they met the newly elected
Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City, who
led them to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18. Upon realizing that their
residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28 not Barangay 18,
petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered anew.

Issue:

Whether or not the criminal cases should be dismissed on the ground of

lack of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of cancellation of
previous registration? NO.

Ruling:

Petitioners lose sight of the fact that the assailed resolutions were issued
in the preliminary investigation stage. A preliminary investigation is essentially
inquisitorial and is only the means to discover who may be charged with a crime,
its function being merely to determine probable cause. All that is required in the
preliminary investigation is the determination of probable cause to justify the
holding of petitioners for trial. The established rule is that a preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a
well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence. It is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that
an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Paderanga vs. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86
CASE DIGEST
Facts:
On 16 October 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in the
Regional Trial Court for the deaths on 1 May 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife
MelchoraBucag, and theirson Renato Bucag II. Only Felipe Galarion was tried
and found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused remained at large. Felipe
Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has not been apprehended since
then. In an amended information filed on 6 October 1988, FelizardoRoxas, alias
"Ely Roxas," "FelyRoxas" and "LolongRoxas," was included as a co-accused.
Roxas retained Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga as his counsel.

In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit,

FelizardoRoxas implicated Atty. Paderanga in the commission of the crime
charged. The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from
further conducting the preliminary investigation against Paderanga at the
instance of the latter's counsel, per his resolution dated 7 July 1989.

Issue:
What is the quantum of evidence needed for probable in preliminary
investigation?
Ruling:
General Rule: The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court. Hence, the general rule is
that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution.
Exception: (Citing the case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile)
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions;
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.

In this case, the circumstances of the case do not fall in any of the
exceptions.
Go vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 101837
Facts:
Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost
had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot
the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was
able to take down petitioner’s plate number and reported the same to the police,
who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting,
petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the
police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and
commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the
petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been
posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a
warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure
pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for
certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a
preliminary investigation.
Issue/s:
Whether or not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful?
Whether or not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary
investigation?
Ruling:
The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected
with a valid warrant. However, there are instances specifically enumerated under
the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful. Despite that, the
warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of
said rule. The police were not present at the time of the commission of the
offense, neither do they have personal knowledge on the crime to be committed
or has been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner
who has escaped from the penal institution. In this connection, petitioner has all
the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether is probable
cause that a crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty
thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation
brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial,
which he should not be deprived of. On the other hand, petitioner did not waive
his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the prosecutor's claim.
The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to
preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel
denied answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the
proper preliminary investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was
granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The
Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that failure
to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the
information charging the latter of the crime of murder.
Doroma vs. Sandiganbayan. G.R. 85468
Facts:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings
and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading
Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of
electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National
Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC). An information was then filed by the
“Tanod bayan” against Doromal for the said violation and a preliminary
investigation was conducted.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it
was invalid since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new
information that was filed against him. The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan
claiming that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old
and new informations involve the same subject matter.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the
Constitution? YES.
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both
informations involve the same subject matter? YES.
Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the
absence of preliminary investigation? NO.
Ruling:
(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal
as part of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with
having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "the President, Vice-
President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall
not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business.
(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial
one." Its denial over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the
accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law"
provided by the Constitution. Since the first information was annulled, the
preliminary investigation conducted at that time shall also be considered as void.
Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted.
(3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's
jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and
the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their
absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court
so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.
Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652

Facts:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with
the Department of Justice a letter- complaint charging petitioners Hubert
Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six other persons with the
crime of Rape with Homicide for the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of
Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde and her sister
Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons St., BF
Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely

abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them? NO.

Ruling:

The DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply
provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.

In arrest cases, there must be probable cause that a crime has

been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Before
issuing warrants of arrest, the judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt, of an accused.