Hazop & Check List PDF

INTRODUCTION
TO
PROCESS HAZARD EVALUATION
&
Hazard and Operability Studies (HazOp)
Plant & Environmental Safety
Colin S. ‘Chip’ Howat Ph.D.
Kurata Thermodynamics Laboratory

Department of Chemical & Petroleum Engineering
University of Kansas
1
C. S. Howat - Hazard & Operability - © 2002
Introduction to Process Hazard Evaluation & HazOp
Lecture: One to Two Class Periods
Title: Process Hazard Identification and HazOp
Thought: I don’t like work - no man does - but I like what is

in work - the chance to find yourself. Your own
reality - for yourself, not for others - what no other
man can ever know.
Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 1902
Question: What are the implications of: ‘What you don’t

have can’t leak’ and ‘People who aren’t there
can’t be injured’?
Purpose: Introduce hazard evaluation procedures and introduce

Hazard & Operability Studies
Objective Synthesis and Evaluation
2
Outline
• Purpose of Hazard Evaluation
• Introduction to Risk Assessment
• Types of Hazard Identification Procedures
• Focus on Two Methods
• Focus on Identification
HazOp
•Focus on Identification
Checklist
3
We have discussed the steps of process synthesis, in general. Again this is not
a step-by-step procedure. But it does give a rough guide to what needs to be
considered during the development of the base case, in particular, and of any
design tier, generally. The steps are given below. The focus of this talk is to
address the beginnings of Hazard Identification. Recall that the purpose of
of Inherent Safety is to reduce or eliminate the hazard. In order to do that
we need to know what the hazards are and where they exist in the process.
• Input Information
• Batch v. Continuous
Process • Input-Output Structure

Design & • Inherent Safety Structure
Process • Recycle Structure
Analysis • Separation Structure
• Heat Integration Structure
• Process Control Structure
4
As a refresher, the strategies that we have for inherent safety are listed
below from the previous lecture. After we identify our hazards during
synthesis and analysis, we can incorporate these strategies into developing
the recycle, separation, heat integration and process control structures.
Inherently Safer Processes Strategies

MINIMIZE Use smaller quantities of hazardous substances.
SUBSTITUTE Replace a material with a less hazardous substance.
MODERATE Use less hazardous conditions, a less hazardous form

of a material, or facilities which minimize the impact
of a release of hazardous material or energy.
SIMPLIFY Design facilities which eliminate unnecessary complexity

and make operating errors less likely, and which are
forgiving of errors which are made.
Chemical manufacturing processes

which reduce or eliminate hazards associated
with the materials and operations of the process
such that this is permanent are
INHERENTLY SAFER.
5
Purpose of Hazard Evaluation
‘A hazard is an inherent physical or chemical characteristic that has the

potential for causing harm.’ Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures
We need to identify and evaluate the significance

of Hazardous Situations.
Hazard Evaluation Procedures are an organized effort to

identify and analyze the significance of hazards.
6
Introduction to Risk Assessment
Probabilistic Risk Assessment
RISK = PROBABILITY * CONSEQUENCE
• Identify Hazard
• Identify Scenario
• Determine Event Probability
• Determine Event Consequences
For the purposes of this course, we are primarily interested in

identifying the hazard, and then, subsequently, we are interested
in identifying scenarios, determining probabilities and determining
consequences.
7
Our first emphasis in synthesis
is to try to eliminate or reduce
the hazard during the process
process design stage. Our
System Description
second emphasis is to try to
eliminate the hazard once the
plant is in operation. So, our Risk Assessment
focus is on inherent safety. is an integral part
Nevertheless, when hazards Hazard Identification of the design,
still exist in the design and
operation, there is the potential start-up, operation
that they can escape and cause procedure.
harm.
Scenario Identification
Event Probability Event Consequence
Risk Determination
Once the hazard is identified,

we attempt to identify accident
or excursion scenarios No
so that we can determine the Acceptable? Re-Design
risk. System
8
Types of Hazard Identification Procedures
The successful Hazard Evaluation program meets the following:
• The need for risk information has been met;
• The results are of high quality and are easy for decision
makers to use;
• The study has been performed with the minimum

resources needed.
Selection of Hazard Evaluation Program
• The motivation for the study and types of results needed
• The type of information available, perceived risks,

characteristics
• The resource availability and analyst/management preference

9
Examples of Hazard Identification & Evaluation Procedures
?
• Safety Review -- Qualitative descriptions of potential safety
problems
• Checklist -- Written list of items to verify status of system
• Relative Ranking -- A strategy to compare systems for further
study
• Preliminary Hazards Analysis -- General method to focus on system
• What-if Analysis -- Brainstorming approach concerning
undesired events
• What-if/Checklist -- Combined brainstorming/detailed list
• Hazard and Operability Study -- Systematic method to identification
• Failure Modes/Effects Analysis -- Tabulate equipment failure modes
• Fault Tree Analysis -- Deductive approach from event to cause
• Event Tree Analysis -- Inductive from initiating to all outcomes
• Cause Consequence Analysis -- Combined Fault and Event Trees
• Human Reliability Analysis -- Systematic evaluation of factors affecting
personnel
10
Examples of Hazard Identification & Evaluation Procedures
?
• Safety Review -- Qualitative descriptions of potential safety
problems
• Checklist -- Written list of items to verify status of system
• Relative Ranking -- A strategy to compare systems for further
study
• Preliminary Hazards Analysis -- General method to focus on system
• What-if Analysis -- Brainstorming approach concerning
undesired events
• What-if/Checklist -- Combined brainstorming/detailed list
• Hazard and Operability Study -- Systematic method to identification
• Failure Modes/Effects Analysis -- Tabulate equipment failure modes
• Fault Tree Analysis -- Deductive approach from event to cause
• Event Tree Analysis -- Inductive from initiating to all outcomes
• Cause Consequence Analysis -- Combined Fault and Event Trees
• Human Reliability Analysis -- Systematic evaluation of factors affecting
personnel
11
Typical Uses of Hazard Evaluation Procedures
(Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, p.77)
12
The previous slide indicates that the
checklist procedure is applicable for
conceptual design and operation.
Checklists do give insight into the
exploration step because they help
engineers consider initiating events
beyond intended performance.
So what is our focus? I have included checklist information
at the end of this talk.
The identification of toxicity, high pressure and high

temperature hazards may be relatively straightforward.
With that identification you can invoke the inherent safety
strategies to reduce the hazard. Oftentimes, though,
the hazard is not clearly evident. A formal method is
useful to analyze the design as it evolves. This can be
considered ‘routine operation’ in the previous table.
The most widely used method for identifying hazards
is the Hazard & Operability Study ~ HazOp, for short.
13
Hazard and Operability Studies
Hazard and Operability Analysis was developed to
identify and evaluate safety hazards in a process
plant and to identify operability problems which could
compromise a plant’s ability to meet design productivity.
The purpose is to carefully review a process or operation

in a systematic fashion to identify excursions which
could lead to undesirable consequences. This gives insight
into the hazards that are present in the plant.
The results are identified hazards and operability

problems, recommended changes and studies etc.
These are typical requirements when analyzing an existing plant or new
design. Accurate P&I’s , detailed process info, knowledge of
instrumentation and operation etc. are required. The team requires
design, operation, maintenance etc. experience.
We will be able to apply this method.

It will guide us in selecting inherently safer
14 strategies.
HazOp Procedure
A HazOp Guide Word is combined with a Process Parameter to
Identify:
Deviations from intended design/operation
Causes of those deviations
Identification Consequences of those deviations

is the focus!
Safeguards to prevent causes and mitigate
consequences of the deviations
Actions (recommendations) for design or

operation changes to avoid deviation
HazOp Studies do not provide insight into the probability or likelihood

of the deviation.
15
HazOp Guide Words
No or Not The complete negation of the intention

ex. No flow to reactor
Less Quantitative decrease in the intent
ex. Less flow to the reactor
More Quantitative increase in the intent
ex. More flow to the reactor
Part of Qualitative decrease in the intent
ex. Part of the reactants to the reactor
As well as Qualitative increase in the intent
ex. Cooling water in the reactor
Reverse Logical opposite of the intention
ex. Reverse flow into the reactor
Other than Complete substitution
ex. Another material besides reactants in the
reactor
Other words may be more appropriate such as sooner for other than when
considering time, higher instead of more when considering level, etc. --
Consider the intent of the words.
16
Common HazOp Parameters
Flow Frequency
Pressure Viscosity
Temperature Voltage
Level Information
Time Mixing
Composition Addition
pH Separation
Speed Reaction
This list is tailored to the task at hand -- not all used, more added
as required.
17
Preparing for the Review
Attitude Meeting
Preparation Leadership
HazOp
Review
by Documentation Follow-up
Team
Knowledge/ Information
Experience for Study
Team’s HazOp
Experience Table
Deviation Causes Conseq. Safeguard Action
18
HazOps require discipline. The use of the guide word must be strictly
followed. Usually there is a moderator whose purpose is to keep the
committee on task. As we have seen in our discussions, it is easy to drift
to other topics or explore other ideas. In the context of the HazOp, this
could lead to failure to identify the hazards in the process and to evaluate
the systems in place the control the hazard.
While it is possible to apply HazOp to an entire process, it is typically applied

to specific areas which have been prescreened for potential hazards.
In our case, we will be focusing on issues such as inventory, toxicity,

reactivity, pressure and temperature. We will also be concerned with our
control system ability to keep the process operating at intended
conditions as the base case evolves.
Basically, we take a very small section of the process to focus on at one time.
We select the process parameter that we want to investigate and then
select the menu of guide words that we wish to study. We then successively
fill in HazOp forms for each guide word applied to each process parameter
for each section of the plant that we might study. Finish one guide word
before going on to the next.
19
Example Problem
The reaction system shown below is exothermic. A cooling system is

provided to remove the excess energy of reaction. In the event the
cooling function is lost, the temperature of the reactor would increase.
This would lead to an increase in reaction rate leading to additional
energy release. The result could be a runaway reaction with pressures
exceeding the bursting pressures of the reactor.
20
Intent: Guide: Process Parameter:
Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
21
Intent: Guide: Process Parameter:
22
Intent: Cooling Flow in Coils Guide: No Process Parameter: Cooling
No Cooling Plug in Line Temperature Increases None Temperature

Alarm
Blocked Line Possible Runaway
Relief Valve
Pipe Breaks Broken Coils due to
Block in CW Low Flow
CV Fails Alarm
Controller Fails Study of Water

Reactant
Interaction
Emergency
Shutdown
CW System Back up CW
Fails System
Air System Fail AFO Valve
Sewer Backs Up Filter on CW
23
HazOp
Hazard & Operability Studies will help us identify the

principal hazards in our plant. We can use this
identification to invoke the Inherent Safety Strategies
to reduce the hazards and to invoke High Reliability System
Theory to evaluate Layers of Protection.
Remember, while HazOp’s identify hazards, they do

not give insight into the probability that they will escape
and cause harm.
24
Checklists
Process Hazard Checklists
Another method to identify hazards is the process safety checklist.

While the literature calls this hazard identification, the use of ‘hazard’
in this context is broader than the specific definition that I want us to
use for Inherent Safety.
Ø This is a list of items that the reviewer needs to consider.
Ø This list contains itemizes problems and failures.
Ø The items on the list may or not apply to the situation.
Ø The list acts as a reminder to stimulate thought.
Ø The list can be used for:
Conceptual Design
Pilot Plant Operation
Detailed Design
Construction
Start up
Routine Operation
Modification/Expansion
25
Decommissioning
Checklists
The checklist reminds the reviewer or operator of potential

problem areas.
A check-off is required. For a checklist to be effective the

reviewer or operator must respond.
Further Study Required

ACTION REQUIRED! Does Not Apply
Completed
All controls fail safe?
The following is an example from Crowl & Louvar.
26
Does Not Apply
Completed
General Layout
1. Areas properly drained?

2. Aisle ways provided?
3. Fire walls, dikes and special guardrails needed?
4. Hazardous underground obstructions?
5. Hazardous overhead restrictions?
6. Emergency accesses and exits?
7. Enough headroom?
8. Access for emergency vehicles?
9. Safe storage space for raw materials and finished products?
10. Adequate platforms for safe maintenance operations?
11. Hoists and elevators properly designed and safeguarded?
12. Clearance for overhead power lines?
13.
14.
15.
27
Does Not Apply
Completed
Buildings
1. Adequate ladders, stairways and escape-ways?

2. Fire doors required?
3. Head obstructions marked?
4. Ventilation adequate?
5. Need for ladder or stairway to roof?
6. Safety glass specified where necessary?
7. Need for fireproofed structural steel?
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
28
Does Not Apply
Completed
Process
1. Consequences of exposure to adjacent operations considered?

2. Special fume or dust hoods required?
3. Unstable materials properly stored?
4. Process laboratory checked for runaway explosive conditions?
5. Provisions for protection from explosions?
6. Hazardous reactions possible due to mistakes or contamination?
7. Chemistry of processes completely understood and reviewed?
8. Provisions for rapid disposal of reactants in an emergency?
9. Failure of mechanical equipment possible cause of hazards?
10. Hazards possible from gradual or sudden blockages in piping?
11. Hazards possible from gradual or sudden blockages in equipment?
12. Public liability risks possible from sprays, fumes, mists or noise?
13. Provisions made for disposal of toxic materials?
14. Material safety data sheets available for all chemical species?
15. Hazards possible from simultaneous loss of two or more utilities?
29
Does Not Apply
Completed
Process (cont.)
16. Hazards involved in sewering materials?

17. Safety factors altered by design revisions?
18. Consequences of reasonably worst incident reviewed?
19. Consequences of combination of incidents reviewed?
20. Process diagrams correct and up-to-date?
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
30
Does Not Apply
Completed
Piping
1. Safety showers and eye baths required?

2. Sprinkler systems required?
3. Provisions for thermal expansion?
4. All overflow lines directed to safe areas?
5. Vent lines directed safely?
6. Piping specifications followed?
7. Washing-down hoses needed?
8. Check valves provided as needed?
9. Protection and identification of fragile pipe considered?
10. Possible deterioration of exterior of piping by chemicals?
11. Emergency valves readily accessible?
12. Long and large vent lines supported?
13. Steam condensate piping safely designed?
14. Relief valve piping designed to prevent plugging?
15. Drains to relieve pressure on suction/discharge of process pumps?
31
Does Not Apply
Completed
Piping (cont.)
16. City water lines not connected to process pipes?

17. Flammable fluids feeding prod units shut off from safe distance?
18. Personnel protective insulation provided?
19. Hot steam lines insultated?
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
32
Does Not Apply
Completed
Equipment
1. Designs correct for maximum operating pressure?

2. Corrosion allowance considered?
3. Special isolation for hazardous equipment?
4. Guards for belts, pulleys, sheaves and gears?
5. Schedule for checking protective devices?
6. Dikes for any storage tanks?
7. Guard rails for storage tanks?
8. Construction materials compatible with process chemicals?
9. Reclaimed and replacement equipment checked structurally?
10. Reclaimed/replacement equipment checked for process pressures?
11. Pipelines independently supported to relieve pumps?
12. Pipelines independently supported to relieve other equipment?
13. Automatic lubrication of critical machinery?
14. Emergency standby equipment needed?
15.
33
Does Not Apply
Completed
Venting
1. Relief valves or rupture disks required?

2. Materials of construction corrosion resistant?
3. Vents properly designed? (Size, direction, configuration)
4. Flame arrestors required on vent lines?
5. Relief valves protected from plugging by rupture disks?
6. Telltale pressure gauges installed between rupture disk/relief valve?
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
34
Does Not Apply
Completed
Instrument and Electrical
1. All controls fail safe?

2. Dual indication of process variables necessary?
3. All equipment properly labeled?
4. Tubing runs protected?
5. Safeguards for process control when instrument out of service?
6. Process safety affected by response lag?
7. Labels for all start-stop switches?
8. Equipment designed to permit lockout protection?
9. Electrical failures cause unsafe conditions?
10. Sufficient lighting for both outside and inside operations?
11. Lights provided for all sight glasses, showers and eye-baths?
12. Breakers adequate for circuit protection?
13. All equipment grounded?
14. Special interlocks needed for safe operation?
15. Emergency standby power on lighting equipment required?
35
Does Not Apply
Completed
Instrument and Electrical (cont.)
16. Emergency escape lighting required during power failures?

17. All necessary communications equipment provided?
18. Emergency disconnect switches properly marked?
19. Special explosion proof electrical fixtures required?
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
36
Does Not Apply
Completed
Safety Equipment
1. Fire extinguishers required?

2. Special respiratory equipment required?
3. Diking material required?
4. Colorimetric indicator tubes required?
5. Flammable vapor detection apparatus required?
6. Fire extinguishing materials compatible with process materials?
7. Special emergency procedures and alarms required?
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
37
Does Not Apply
Completed
Raw Materials
1. Any materials and products require special handling equipment?

2. Any raw materials/products affected by extreme weather
conditions?
3. Any products hazardous from a toxic or fire standpoint?
4. Proper containers being used?
5. Containers properly labeled for toxicity, flammability,
stability, etc.?
6. Consequences of bad spills considered?
7. Special instructions needed for containers?
8. Special instructions needed for storage and warehousing
distributors?
9. Does warehouse have operating instructions covering
each product?
10.
11.
38
Checklists are not a substitute for a
more rigorous approach. However,
they can be a constant reminder
to reviewers of items to consider for
the situation at hand. They can be used
as a stimulant for more formal studies.
39

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INTRODUCTION

Plant & Environmental Safety

Colin S. ‘Chip’ Howat Ph.D.

Kurata Thermodynamics Laboratory

Lecture: One to Two Class Periods

Title: Process Hazard Identification and HazOp

Thought: I don’t like work - no man does - but I like what is

Question: What are the implications of: ‘What you don’t

Purpose: Introduce hazard evaluation procedures and introduce

Objective Synthesis and Evaluation

Process • Input-Output Structure

Inherently Safer Processes Strategies

SUBSTITUTE Replace a material with a less hazardous substance.

MODERATE Use less hazardous conditions, a less hazardous form

SIMPLIFY Design facilities which eliminate unnecessary complexity

Chemical manufacturing processes

‘A hazard is an inherent physical or chemical characteristic that has the

We need to identify and evaluate the significance

Hazard Evaluation Procedures are an organized effort to

Probabilistic Risk Assessment

RISK = PROBABILITY * CONSEQUENCE

• Determine Event Probability

• Determine Event Consequences

For the purposes of this course, we are primarily interested in

Event Probability Event Consequence

Once the hazard is identified,

• The need for risk information has been met;

• The study has been performed with the minimum

Selection of Hazard Evaluation Program

• The motivation for the study and types of results needed

• The type of information available, perceived risks,

• The resource availability and analyst/management preference

(Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, p.77)

The identification of toxicity, high pressure and high

The purpose is to carefully review a process or operation

The results are identified hazards and operability

We will be able to apply this method.

A HazOp Guide Word is combined with a Process Parameter to

Deviations from intended design/operation

Causes of those deviations

Identification Consequences of those deviations

Actions (recommendations) for design or

HazOp Studies do not provide insight into the probability or likelihood

No or Not The complete negation of the intention

Deviation Causes Conseq. Safeguard Action

While it is possible to apply HazOp to an entire process, it is typically applied

In our case, we will be focusing on issues such as inventory, toxicity,

The reaction system shown below is exothermic. A cooling system is

No Cooling Plug in Line Temperature Increases None Temperature

Controller Fails Study of Water

Air System Fail AFO Valve

Sewer Backs Up Filter on CW

Hazard & Operability Studies will help us identify the

Remember, while HazOp’s identify hazards, they do

Process Hazard Checklists

Another method to identify hazards is the process safety checklist.

The checklist reminds the reviewer or operator of potential

A check-off is required. For a checklist to be effective the

Further Study Required

All controls fail safe?

The following is an example from Crowl & Louvar.

1. Areas properly drained?

1. Adequate ladders, stairways and escape-ways?