Philnabank Employees Association vs.

Estanislao

Republic Act No. 6971 was signed into law on 22 November 1990 by then
President Corazon C. Aquino
Labor Secretary Ruben D. Torres and Finance Secretary Jesus P. Estanislao
promulgated the Rules Implementing Republic Act No. 6971.
PNB Executive Vice-President Domingo A. Santiago, Jr., sent a letter to petitioner
Philnabank Employees Association, through its president Jerry P. Tan, advising the latter
that in view of the Estanislao memorandum, PNB was "constrained to wait for the
issuance of the said clarificatory guidelines."
Allegedly without due notice and hearing, Secretary Estanislao and Secretary
Torres subsequently issued the Supplemental Rules Implementing Republic Act No.
6971, clarifying or amending the previously promulgated rules because "the coverage
of GOCCs(government owned and controlled corporations) performing proprietary
functions would require harmonization with present definitions, concepts, strategies,
policies and thrusts involving the rationalization of the government corporate sector.
In a letter sent by Tan, informing the heads of the two departments that the
supplemental rules were creating "serious demoralization(s)" among the officers and
employees of the GFIs and that failure to revoke and recall the Supplemental Rules
"would mean drastic legal actions and massive concerted activities" on the part of GFI
employees.

Issue:
Whether the petition for certiorari via rule 65 can be granted

Held:
A petition for certiorari is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions. Although not inflexible, we have
repeatedly declined on grounds of prematurity, as well as in the interest of good order, a
hasty recourse to the courts when administrative avenues are still open. Since the
petitioners' recourse should have first been administratively pursued with the Civil Service
Commission. While this case is styled as a petition for certiorari, there is, however, no
denying the fact that, in essence, it seeks the declaration by the court of the
unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned rule, thus partaking the nature, in reality,
of one for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate,
not original, jurisdiction.
THOMAS YANG v. MARCELINO R. VALDEZ

Respondent spouses Ricardo and Milagros Morante brought an action in the

Regional Trial Court against petitioner Thomas Yang and Manuel Yaphockun, to recover
possession of two (2) Isuzu cargo trucks. In their complaint, the Morante spouses alleged
that they had actual use and possession of the two (2) cargo trucks, having acquired them
during the period from 1982 to 1984. The trucks were, however, registered in the name
of petitioner Thomas Yang who was the Treasurer in the Morante spouses' business of
buying and selling corn.
To obtain immediate possession of the Isuzu trucks, respondent spouses applied
for a writ of replevin and put up a replevin bond of P560,000.00 executed by respondent
Milagros Morante and Atty. Bayani Calonzo (counsel for respondent spouses).
Defendant Manuel Yaphockun filed a motion seeking repossession of the cargo
trucks, and posted a replevin counter-bond of P560,000.00 executed by himself and
one Narciso Mirabueno. For his part, petitioner Yang moved, on 21 January 1985, for an
extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file an answer to the complaint
for replevin. Four days later, on 25 January 1985, petitioner put up a counter-bond in the
amount of P560,000.00 which counter-bond was, however, rejected by the respondent
judge for having been filed out of time.

Issue:
Whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge

Held
The provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and the
applicant who seeks immediate possession of the property involved need not be holder
of the legal title to the property. It suffices, if at the time he applies for a writ of replevin,
he is, in the words of Section 2, Rule 60, "entitled to the possession thereof."
Under Section 5, petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the property to
the plaintiff" require the return of the property; in Section 6, he may do so, "within five (5)
days after the taking of the property by the officer". Both these periods are mandatory in
character. Thus, a lower court which approves a counter-bond filed beyond the statutory
periods, acts in excess of its jurisdiction.
We consider, accordingly, that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the orders here assailed.
Yu vs. Court of Appeals

Yu's loans in time became due and demandable but, despite TRB's repeated
demands, Yu failed to effect payment. TRB filed a complaint against Yu with the Regional
Trial Court (Civil Case No. CEB-1765) for recovery of personal property, with an
alternative prayer for payment of the due obligation. TRB based its complaint on the
promissory notes and the chattel mortgage; no mention, however, was made of the trust
receipts, although in the statement of account, attached to the complaint, reference was
made to unsettled obligations under two trust receipts.
TRB instituted before the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu City a criminal complaint
(I.S. No. 87-2502) against Yu and his wife for two counts of violation of the Trust Receipts
Law (P.D. No. 115).
Two days after the filing of the criminal case, or on 18 June 1987, TRB instituted
before the same court CEB-6035 against Yu for the recovery of sums of money. Yu
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of litis pendentia, alleging that the
complaint was identical with Civil Case No. CEB-1765.
Yu filed Civil Case No. CEB-7483 with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City against
TRB for the declaration of nullity of the two trust receipts, claiming that TRB made him
sign the documents, apparently referring to the trust receipts, "which he did not fully
understand."

Issue
Whether there is litis pendencia

Held
For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following
requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two cases
should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res adjudicata to the other.
In the case at bench, there is, except for the identity of parties, a substantial
disparity between CEB-1765 and CEB-7483. In the former, TRB seeks the recovery of a
sum of money from Yu on account of his unpaid loan obligations. In its complaint, TRB
has not even alleged specifically the existence of the trust receipts, although, of course,
it would appear that such trust receipts have been among the documents executed in
order to secure the outstanding loans of Yu. In CEB-7483, Yu impugns the validity of the
trust receipts which he claims to be null and void. It is clear that a judgment in either of
the two cases will not necessarily foreclose the other on the mere basis of res adjudicata.
We agree, nonetheless, with both the court a quo and the appellate court in holding that
the action in CEB-7483 has prescribed. Both courts have ratiocinated that Yu's cause of
action in reality rests on fraud, an action which prescribes in four (4) years.
Paglaum Management & Development Corp. vs. Union Bank of the Philippines

Facts:
Union Bank filed this motion for reconsideration saying that restructuring agreement is
null and void because the borrower has not complied with the condition precedent of the
bank. It is also unenforceable because it was only between Health and Union bank.
Paglaum was a party only to the real estate mortgages and not in the restructuring
agreement. The venue is exclusively in Cebu City, and the assumption of the RTC's
jurisdiction was without basis.

Held:

We deny the Motion for Reconsideration.

Issues raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before this Court are
deemed waived, because these should have been brought up at the first opportunity.7
Nevertheless, there is no cogent reason to warrant a reconsideration or modification of
our 18 June 2012 Decision.

Union Bank raises three new issues that require a factual determination that is not
within the province of this Court.8 These questions can be brought to and resolved by
the RTC as it is the proper avenue in which to raise factual issues and to present
evidence in support of these claims.

Anent Union Bank's last contention, there is no need for the Court to discuss and revisit
the issue, being a mere rehash of what we have already resolved in our Decision.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we DENY the Motion for Reconsideration with
FINALITY.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, PETITIONER, VS. JULIE CHANDUMAL

BF Homes, Inc. and Chandumal entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land. BF
Homes then sold to PDB all its rights and interests over the contract. On June 18, 1999,
an action for judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of possession was
filed by PDP against Chandumal.

Consequently, summons was issued. According to the Sheriff's return, Sheriff Galing
attempted to personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on three dates but it was
unavailing as she was always out of the house on said dates. Hence, the sheriff caused
substituted service of summons by serving the same through Chandumal's mother who
acknowledged receipt thereof.

For her failure to file within the prescribed period, PDB filed an ex parte motion to declare
Chandumal in default which was granted by the RTC. On February 23, 2001, Chandumal
filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default maintaining that she did not receive
the summons and/or was not notified of the same. RTC denied Chandumal's motion
which was reversed by the Court of Appeals due to invalid and ineffective substituted
service of summons.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether there was valid substituted service of summons
(2) Whether Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court

Held

1. Correctly ruled that the sheriff’s return failed to justify a resort to substituted service
of summons. According to the CA, the Return of Summons does not specifically
show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of efforts or any positive step taken
by the officer or process server in attempting to serve the summons personally to
the defendant.
2.
Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.

When Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit
Attached Answer, she effectively submitted her person to the jurisdiction of the trial court
as the filing of a pleading where one seeks an affirmative relief is equivalent to service of
summons and vests the trial court with jurisdiction over the defendant's person.