CHAPTER II

The Question of Selfhood

What is the concept of self according to Paul Ricouer?

“I cannot give value to myself

Without giving value to the
Other as myself”
(Paul ricouer)

“ PERSON” AND IDENTIFYING REFERENCE

Ricouer begins to draw this analytic philosophy and its discussion of identifying

reference which he considers as a stemming approach to the use of ordinary language.

1
The identifying reference is one as such use of language. It designates individuals

rather than classifying them in terms of a concept although it presupposes to other

1
RICOUER:A GUIDE FOR A PERPLEXED, David Pellauer: Northwestern University Press, 1973; page 92
language. Ricouer used the semantic approach in the notion of individuals in which he

gives emphasis on, in order to move from a general idea of an individual that which he

reacted on to Strawnson.

Following Strawnson notion of Individuals, 2Ricouer made a distinction between

physical bodies and persons, where the idea of a person does not yet include the ability

of a person to designate himself or herself by speaking. Every person in this in world is

being identified and referred by any languages in general. This language will be

elaborate on the next chapter in connection to symbolism of Ricouer. 3 But this already

suggests that when self identification occurs, it takes place into situations of

interlocution where person speak into one another and also it will draws into

demonstratives such as personal pronoun s and possessive adjectives to express

itself. By this, we can be able to identify who we are with another person and to whom

we co- exist with others. Nonetheless, it is a noteworthy here that the predicate that we

use in a person that can be applied into basic particulars.

The body plays an important role in the individuals in which applicable into the

question of selfhood. This will be a starting point for us to understand of the question of

selfhood. Thus, the identifying reference is a tool in order to analyse what is to be a

human. Ricouer, here he draws on Peter Strawnson’s with his idea of 4basic particulars

that function with the identifying reference that the bodies are the basic particular. It is a

fact person is also a thing but not just a thing

2
RICOUER:A GUIDE FOR A PERPLEXED, David Pellauer: Northwestern University Press, 1973; page 93

3
Ibid 93,
4
Ibid 92,
NARRATIVE IDENTITY

Paul Ricouer sets forth three conceptual themes which guides in his study of the

self: the use of the self in natural languages “same” in the sense of idem and ipse and

the correlation between the self and the other than self. This permits us to understand

and interpret our own identity to our self and with the others identity.

5
We are subjects in others’ stories, others are
subjects in our stories; others are authors of
our stories, we are authors of other’s stories.
Our narratives are essentially interwoven with
other narrative. We are characters in others
narratives. Also, through our discussion and
interactions with others we facilitate the
articulation and direction of their narratives,
and they ours.

It represents therefore, that our identity is never simply our own. It is embedded

with relationship with the others and we do not have ultimate control over this nature of

these relationships much less the nature of our identity. This statement entails that our

identity is separate from that of the others. Being a unique individual underscores that

each individual is distinct from others. However, by examining the reality of the self, we

come to realize that it is not just something given or inborn endowed with exclusive

characteristics that define our self – identity. Rather, we configure and design our own

lives not by being alone but with meaningful interaction with others. We create a more

beautiful artwork of our lives by the colors that other persons add up into our lives. Our

5
http://www.davevessey.com/VesseyRicouer.html; the Polysemy of Otherness: On Ricouer’s Oneself as Another.
original colors mixed up with others will décor our identities more lively. When the colors

are bleached, there will be discoloration of one’s relationship with others.

Self-identity is attained with the influence of our interaction with others in the

society. Man as a social being strives to maintain a satisfactory connection to his

community. The self mingles with the other personalities around him. Despite the

incommensurable aloneness and existence of diversity, man undeniable strives to exist

with the others. As to no man is an island, we interact with others’ lives for us to co –

exist. He communicates with the other beings surrounding him, reaching out to them. It

is thereby with others that one attains his self-identity.

Thus, in order for us to understand and interpret the real essence of the
hermeneutic self of Paul Ricouer. The cogito of René Descartes is a contradiction in the

This may serve for us to understand and to give us

We comprehend ourselves as unique individual. In simple terms, the self has his

own and lone identity. This statement entails that our identity is separate from that of the

others. Being a unique individual underscores that each individual is distinct from

others. However, by examining the reality of the self, we come to realize that it is not

just something given or inborn endowed with exclusive characteristics that define our
self – identity. Rather, we configure and design our own lives not by being alone but

with meaningful interaction with others. We create a more beautiful artwork of our lives

by the colors that other persons add up into our lives. Our original colors mixed up with

others will décor our identities more lively. When the colors are bleached, there will be

discoloration of one’s relationship with others.

Self-identity is attained with the influence of our interaction with others in the

society. Man as a social being strives to maintain a satisfactory connection to his

community. The self mingles with the other personalities around him. Despite the

incommensurable aloneness and existence of diversity, man undeniable strives to exist

with the others. As to no man is an island, we interact with others’ lives for us to co –

exist. He communicates with the other beings surrounding him, reaching out to them. It

is thereby with others that one attains his self-identity.

Our identities are not simply static and predefined. It does not end in the inborn

personalities of our individual selves. It is nurtured and developed day in and day out as

a lifetime endeavor as we cohabitate with others. We are influenced by one another and

thus the “I” also becomes “somebody” else. Our perceptions towards others, facilitates

the illumination of their identities. Our identities are embedded with our relations with

others – that we do not have the sole and ultimate control to the nature of our identities.
 As we interact with others, we come to relate ourselves to them. This is because

despite our individual differences, we recognize similarities and commonalities. There is

something within us which mediates vis-à-vis others which we interpret as part of what

makes up our selves. The sameness mediates us to maintain our mutual relationship

with others. When we accept other’s perceptions as a part of our identity, we can

thereby translate oneself into another. We will be able to accept that part of our being is

the content of other personalities – that deep within us are our fellowmen. We do not

see a single conception to our self but multiple aspects of our identity.

When the other will care to notice the “self” as a meaningful symbol of his being,

the self will realize the implication of this not only in his self-identity but also in others.

We ask ourselves what truly mean to exist with others, and when we figure out the

answer, it we will redound to the attainment of our own self – worth. The other is the

resemblance of my own self-identity, that in him I can see and love my own self.

IDENTITY: SAMENESS AND SELFHOOD

Probably the most important insight that I owe to Ricoeur is his reflection on

identity.
Especially in our time, characterized by the fear of the homogenizing effect of

globalization, identity is being used as an ideological call to rejection of both

contact and change, as a call to a defensive and hostile preservation of one’s

cultural essence.

Ricoeur addresses this issue by distinguishing, within the concept of  “same”,

two radically different meanings. In order to do it, he uses two Latin words:

Idem and Ipse.  Idem meaning unchanging through time, immutable.  Ipse

meaning a continuation of the self, whatever the possible changes.

In French, he opposes memete’ (sameness)  to ipseite’ (selfhood). 5

Confusing selfhood with sameness is probably the most dangerous

distortion, the biggest challenge to ethics and coexistence. If every change is

perceived as a menace to our identity, but if, at the same time, change is

inevitable, the result is a true pathology of fear, of rejection, of violence. A

violence that is all the more total, boundless, insofar as it is the product of the

fear of cultural defeat, spiritual annihilation, personal humiliation.

Ricoeur has given us a precious instrument to address this danger, one that

should be systematically used also on a political level. Identity and change, in

fact, are compatible. More: only through change can one maintain a viable,

healthy, ethically compatible identity. 

5. Selfhood and otherness  (ipseite’  et alterite’) 

Here Ricoeur touches upon the very essence of the ethical question: the

relationship between the individualized subject, the person, and the Other.

Ipseite’  et alterite’ : selfhood and otherness.

Rejecting, both philosophically and morally, the individualist dogma, he denies

the very possibility of the existence of the human subject apart from,

abstracting from, the relationship with the other. With total coincidence with

another extremely important French thinker, Emmanuel Levinas, he stresses

that the Other is constitutive of the self.  That there is no self without the other,

and that this, indeed is the defining trait, the specificity, of being human6

Ricoeur’s ethical approach gives us a remarkable view on how to overcome

the alternative between the self and the other. I will quote him :” I cannot give

value to myself without giving value to the other as myself”. (In French: Soi-

meme comme un autre: which, incidentally, is the title of Ricoeur’s

fundamental book on ethics). 

Going back to his definition of ethics, I will quote again the “with and for the

other” (avec et pour autrui). Again in a very “classical” mode, Ricoeur refers in

this context to the Greek concept of philia, the bond of selfless friendship

between humans. Friendship which can also be defined in terms of

compassion and solidarity. He talks about “ l’aveu partage’ de la fragilite’ ”7

(the shared admission of fragility). Which reminded me of one of my favorite

quotes from Albert Camus: La longue solidarite’ des hommes aux prises avec

leur destin. 

6. Reciprocity and justice 

Analyzing the concept of philia, Ricoeur, while recognizing , as he writes, “a

debt” to Levinas8, spells out something that differs from Levinas’s reflection on

ethics. Whereas for Levinas the recognition of the other, after his “epiphany” 

is unconditional, one could say “irresistible”, R. stresses the necessary

reciprocity of the human relationship. Oneself as the Other, yes. But also the

Other as oneself on the basis of reciprocity. And for R. reciprocity borders with

justice.

Reading Levinas, one is struck by the fact that his ethical precept could be

summarized in the phrase: “ The Other, right or wrong”.  This is not so in

Ricoeur. Indeed, he writes:  “ L’estime de soi sous le regime de la loi mais-

j’ajoute aussi – l’ estime de l’ autre sous le respect de la loi”.9

Justice is seen as a limit, a condition of the recognition of the other, and it

entails both reciprocity and impartiality.  

7. An ethical triad 
Ricoeur is indeed one of the most eminent penseurs de l’alterite’, together

with Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas. But it is important to stress that he

recognizes that the human person’s ethical world is structured on three levels.

The first one can be defined as the preservation of the self. It is what Spinoza,

a thinker that is very dear to Ricoeur 10, defines as conatus essendi, i.e. the

urge of everything that exists to persist in its existence. To quote Spinoza’s

Ethics:” Every thing, as long as it depends from it, strives to persevere in its

own being.” To Ricoeur, this urge is not only natural, but it is the necessary

premise of ethics (I will quote here Jankelevich: There can be no love without

being). And R. explicitly distances himself with Kant’s denunciation of

Selbstliebe. 11Nor does R. accept Kant’s definition of desire as pathology. I

would observe here that it seems to me that the reference is again Spinoza

and his rejection of dualism between reason and passion: for Ricoeur ethics

itself is a realm both of reason and  of passion.

The second level of the ethical is the recognition of the other. Love, friendship,

solidarity. The core, indeed, of an ethically sound cosmos.

But there is a third level. That of justice. Justice that sets general standards

that are applicable also to “the Third”, meaning the person with which we will

never enter into contact, the person whose face we will never see. This level
requires an effort towards objectivity and impartiality even beyond the striving

for the preservation of the self and the recognition of the other.

And R. leaves no doubt on the necessity of this “third ethical level”  when he

writes: Que dire de l’autre quand il est le bourreau? 12 In other words, if the

Golden Rule is “love thy neighbor as yourself”, it is clear that, since you

cannot morally love yourself against justice, you cannot love your neighbor

against justice, either.