Article VII Cases

(Compiled by: Tuazon, 4A)

Sec. 18

Kulayan v. Tan (2012) – Commander-in-Chiefship

FACTS:

 SC said that call-out power is within the SOLE discretion of the President.
 3 members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.
o Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly
inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they
were seized by 3 armed Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) members.
o The Sulu Crisis Management Committee was then formed to investigate
the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the leadership
of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan (Provincial Governor of Sulu).
 Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1-09 declaring a state of emergency
in Sulu.
o The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the
declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security
Act.
o It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code (LGC), which
bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency
measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to
call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress
disorder and lawless violence.
o In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian
Emergency Force to set up checkpoints/chokepoints, conduct general
search, seizures, and arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure
public safety.
 Petitioners Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that the Proclamation was issued ultra
vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

ISSUE/HELD:

MAIN ISSUE: Can a provincial governor exercise the calling-out powers of the
President?—NO. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power SOLELY vested in his wisdom.

 One executive, one commander-in-chief.

o As held in the case of Villena v. Secretary, there is only one repository of
executive powers, and that is the President. “The executive power shall
be vested in the President.” (Sec. 1, Art. VII).
 o Therefore it is only the President who is authorized to exercise
emergency powers (Sec. 23, Art. VI) and calling-out powers (Sec. 18, Art.
VII)
 The exceptional character of commander-in-chief powers dictate that they are
exercised by one president.
o The calling-out power, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare
martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone. (SC compares calling-
out power with emergency powers w/c are subject to limitations of
Congress and power to declare martial law/suspend privilege of writ
subject to SC review)
 IBP v. Zamora and ConComm deliberations: When the President
calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
 Constantino, Jr v. Cuisia: Since these powers are exceptional in
nature, they are exclusive to the President.
 In addition, the President also exercises control over the police
thru the National Police Commission, and a local chief executive
exercises operational supervision and may exercise control only in
day-to-day operations.
 Also, as against the respondent’s argument, it is the clear intent of
the framers that in all situations involving lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, even in localized areas, it is still the
President who possesses the sole authority to call-out.
o Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution: civilian authority is, at all times, supreme
over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme
military leader.
 The Constitution does not require that the President must be
possessed of military training, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has
the power to direct military operations and to determine military
strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual
command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate
power is his.

Can the LGC be invoked to justify the powers enumerated in the Proclamation?—
NO. The powers granted by the LGC are fiscal, economic, and administrative in
nature and do not involve diminution of powers vested in national gov’t.

 First, SC said general searches and seizures are violative of the Bill of Rights.
This alone would have invalidated the Proclamation.
 Respondent relies upon the ff. LGC provisions, that he has the power to:
o Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in
the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities
 SC said NOPE. This expressly refers to calamities and disasters,
whether man-made or natural. The governor is certainly
empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during
these occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in the case at bar
cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster.
o Call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress
disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to apprehend
 violators of the law when public interest so requires and the police forces
happening are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators.
 SC said NOPE. First, AFP does not fall under the category of
a “national law enforcement agency,” to w/c NAPOLCOM
belongs. Second, no evidence/allegation that the local police
forces were inadequate to cope with the situation or
apprehend the violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse
is to ask assistance from DILG and other authorized officials
from national law enforcement assistance.

Is the governor authorized to convene the CEF?—NO. Constitution proscribes it.

 Sec. 24, Art XVIII of Constitution: Private armies and other armed groups not
recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled.

 It is clear that the Constitution does not authorize the organization of private
armed groups similar to the CEF convened by the respondent Governor

OTHER ISSUE: Was the hierarchy of courts disregarded?—NO. This involves an

issue of transcendental importance (restrictive custody exercised by governor) so
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts must be relaxed.
Sec. 19

Constitutional limits on executive clemency

Torres v. Gonzales (1987) – Violation of conditional pardon

FACTS:

 SC said that the determination of a breach of condition in a conditional pardon is

within the prerogative of the President.
 In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa.
 In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the condition that he shall not
violate any penal laws again (CONDITIONAL PARDON).
 In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa (VIOLATION).
 In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for
the cancellation of Torres’ pardon.
o Hence, the president cancelled the pardon (CANCELLATION OF
PARDON).
 Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Executive Department
erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the
estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on
appeal.

ISSUE/HELD:

Is conviction of a crime by final judgment necessary before the petitioner can be

validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional
pardon?—President has prerogative which is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

 SC cited the cases of Tesoro, Sales, and Espuelas which have settled the rule
on the matter:
o First, the grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and
conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not
subject to judicial scrutiny.
o Second, the determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of
a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either (2
OPTIONS):
 OPTION 1: a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny
under Sec. 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or
 Sec. 64(j) empowers President to: authorize the arrest and
recommitment of any such person who, in his judgment,
shall fail to comply with the condition or conditions, of his
pardon, parole or suspension of sentence.
 In this case, the remitted portion of sentence is reimposed
 OPTION 2: a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of
violation of a conditional pardon under Art. 159 of the RPC.
 Art. 159 imposes the penalty of prision correccional, 
minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted
 conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any
of the conditions of such pardon.
 In this case, the grantee of conditional pardon must be
convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent
crime before the penalty for such subsequent offense can
be imposed upon him.
 Where the President opts to proceed under the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by
final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
o Third, because due process is not necessarily always judicial process,
and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been
accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for
which he was conditionally pardoned, Revised Administrative Code is not
afflicted with a constitutional vice.
 In this case, the President picked OPTION 1 in proceeding against petitioner so
valid and not subject to judicial scrutiny.
People v Casido (1997) – Amnesty

FACTS:

 SC discussed the difference of pardon and amnesty in this case.

 In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin applied for: 
o pardon before the Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release
or Pardon (PCGBRP), and
 PCGBRP was constituted in line with the confidence-building
measures of the government.
o amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC).
 NAC was created under a Proclamation by President Ramos “to
receive, process, and decide on applications for amnesty.”
 NAC found that the applicants are indeed confirmed members of
the CPP/NPA/NDF whose killing of Victoriano Mapa was
committed in pursuit of their political beliefs.
 Accused-appellants were granted conditional pardon.
 But the SC ruled in a resolution that the conditional pardon granted to accused-
appellants is void for having been extended during the pendency of their appeal
(in violation of Sec. 19, Art. VII).
 Prior to the resolution, the NAC favorably acted on the applications for amnesty
of accused-appellants.
 In its comment, OSG contended that: since amnesty, unlike pardon, may be
granted before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes
even after conviction (Barrioquinto v. Fernandez), the amnesty then granted
accused-appellants Casido and Alcorin rendered moot the question of the
premature pardon granted to them.

ISSUE/HELD:

Is the release of the accused-appellants valid?—YES, on the basis of the amnesty

granted to them and not by pardon.

 The SC reiterated the ruling in Barrioquinto which differentiated pardon from

amnesty.

PARDON AMNESTY

Private act of Chief Executive which Public act of Chief Executive (by
must be pleaded and proved; courts take Proclamation) and with concurrence of
no notice thereof. Congress, which the courts should take
judicial notice.

(IMPT!) Granted to classes of

Granted to one after conviction. persons/communities who may be guilty
of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. 

Looks forward; abolishes the Looks backward; abolishes and puts

punishment; therefore no restoration of into oblivion the offense itself; therefore
the rights to hold public office/of the person released by amnesty stands
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly before the law precisely as though he
restored by the terms of the pardon, and had committed no offense.
it in no case exempts the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed
upon him by the sentence.

Forgives but does not forget. Forgives and forgets.

 The grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under the
Proclamation, concurred in by Congress, is valid.
 SC admonished members of PCGBRP for failing to observe due care in the
performance of their duties, particularly for granting pardon even before
conviction.
Pardon: Nature and Legal Effects

Monsanto v Factoran (1989) – reinstatement to former rights

FACTS:

 SC said in this case that the grant of absolute pardon does not carry with it
reinstatement to former rights.
 The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant
treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents.
o She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of
around P5K
o SC affirmed the decision.
 She then filed a MR but while such was pending, she was extended by President
Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (NOTE: at that time, the rule was
that clemency could be given even before conviction [1973 Constitution as
amended by 1981 plebiscite]).
 By reason of said pardon, Monsanto wrote the Calbayog City treasurer
requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city
treasurer since the same was still vacant.
o Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may
be reinstated without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than
the date she was extended the absolute pardon. 
o Monsanto wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on
her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate
share of the amount of gov’t indemnity.
 The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President.
 Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her
former position.

Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment?—NO.

 Pardon…
o is “an act of grace…which exempts the individual…from the punishment
the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though
official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual and not
communicated officially to the Court.
o does not operate for all purposes. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase
the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does
 not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not
forgetfulness.
o looks to the future. It does not impose upon the government any
obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered.
o “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings,
that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is
presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required.”
o granted to Monsanto has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that.
o To regain her former post, she must re-apply and undergo the
usual procedure required for a new appointment (NO
REINSTATEMENT).
 (NO BACKPAY). As such, Monsanto, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
 (NO EXTINGUISHMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY). Finally, the civil liability arising
from the crime subsists notwithstanding the pardon. Petitioner's civil liability may
only be extinguished by the causes recognized in the Civil Code (payment, loss,
remission, etc)

ALSO:

 Monsanto had been convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of
public documents and sentenced to imprisonment of 4y, 2mos, and 1d of prision
correccional as minimum, to 10y and 1d of prision mayor as maximum.
 The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal penalty. Temporary
absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or employment, such
disqualification to last during the term of the sentence
o Even if the offender be pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the
accessory penalties remain unless the same have been expressly
remitted by the pardon. 
 The penalty of prision correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties,
suspension from public office.