Policy Brief January 2011

Lord’s Resistance Army-

affected Areas in Uganda,
Southern Sudan, DRC and CAR
Problem Recommendations & Actions
The Lord’s Resistance The Administration’s development of an interagency LRA strategy is a positive step.
Army (LRA) has been Increased U.S. Government support is needed to guarantee civilian access to life-saving
terrorizing civilians in services. By simultaneously working to protect civilians, support civil society initiatives and
East and Central Africa constrain LRA movements, the United States can reduce the LRA’s lines of support (includ-
for over two decades. ing village raids and abducted fighters). Ongoing engagement of the LRA issue and a com-
While it began as a mitment to implement the U.S. Government’s strategy to address LRA violence will require
specifically Ugandan high-level coordination across the National Security Council, the State Department and the
rebel movement, it Department of Defense.
has since established • Protect civilians in DRC, southern Sudan, and CAR from LRA attacks by pressuring the
bases in multiple governments of these countries to make civilian protection a priority. Work to ensure UN
African countries and missions in DRC, Sudan, CAR and Chad fulfill their mandates to protect civilians from
has fighters of several LRA attacks and investigate LRA activities.
nationalities. These • Work with the UN and regional governments to support targeted efforts to encourage the
troops have raped, escape and reintegration of LRA members, including those isolated from LRA leaders
kidnapped, forcibly indicted by the International Criminal Court.
conscripted children • Develop and implement projects to expand telecommunications infrastructure in LRA-
and killed civilians in affected areas of DRC, including mobile phone and HF/FM/short-wave radio networks;
Uganda, Sudan, the and develop projects for expanding communications infrastructure in southeast CAR
Democratic Republic and South Sudan.
of the Congo (DRC) • Ensure protection of abductees by pressuring national militaries, the UN Mission in the
and the Central African Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)
Republic (CAR), creating to make this a priority, especially during military operations against the LRA.
massive displacement, • Support a robust international humanitarian response and adequate funding for humani-
leaving a legacy of tarian activities in LRA-affected areas, including DRC, southern Sudan and CAR.
poverty and fear, • Support civil-society peace and reconciliation initiatives to ensure a lasting and sustainable
and causing political peace and ensure efforts to address LRA violence include local civil society consultation.
instability. • Pressure the Ugandan government to implement the Peace, Recovery and Development
Plan (PRDP) in northern Uganda in order to ensure basic services are available to over 1
million Ugandans who have returned home after displacement due to LRA attacks.
• Support UN efforts to improve intelligence-sharing and coordination between UN peace-
keeping missions in countries affected by LRA activities.

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Results
Implementation of the strategy mandated by the 2010 Lord’s Resistance Army
Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act offers the opportunity for the
U.S. to adopt a targeted, multilateral response that could improve lives of mil-
lions of people across the region.
Background
The LRA in Uganda
Led by Joseph Kony, the LRA emerged in northern Uganda
in the mid-1980s to protest violence inflicted against the
Acholi people of the North by the new Ugandan president,
Yoweri Museveni. However, the aims of the rebel group
have never been clear; rather than using its weaponry and
fighters to attack government forces, the LRA terrorized the
very civilians it claimed to protect.
Between 1986 and 2006, when a ceasefire was declared
between the LRA and the Government of Uganda, 1.8 mil-
lion people were displaced in northern Uganda, 12,000
people were killed, and tens of thousands more died of
malnutrition and preventable diseases in over-crowded
camps. Additionally, between 20,000 and 60,000 children
and young adults were abducted by the rebels and used as
porters, soldiers, and sex slaves.
During a ceasefire from August 2006 to April 2008, a final
peace deal was negotiated between the LRA and the Ugan-
dan government. However, Joseph Kony refused to sign
the deal and a December 2008 military operation ended
the Juba peace process. Although 1.3 million people have
moved out of the large internally displaced persons (IDP)
camps and are now living in small camps or their home
villages, many are apprehensive about a possible return of
the LRA. The Ugandan Government’s lack of commitment
to the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan in northern
Uganda has impeded reconstruction in the North.
The LRA in Sudan
Beginning in 1994, the National Congress Party (NCP),
the ruling party in Sudan, funded the LRA as a proxy force
in its civil war against Southern Sudan, arming the rebel
group to destroy villages, murder, rape and loot.
When the U.S. listed the LRA as a terrorist organization in
December 2001, the NCP distanced itself from the group,
at least superficially. It is believed that funding ended com-
pletely after the signing of Sudan’s North-South Compre-
hensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 but this remains
unclear.
For the past two years, the UN has documented LRA
attacks in south Sudan, disrupting the ability of some cit-
izens to vote in the April 2010 elections. There is also a
growing body of evidence that LRA rebels, possibly includ-
ing Joseph Kony, have recently taken refuge in South Dar-
fur. The Sudanese government is also struggling to cope
with the 120,000 displaced by LRA violence, in addition to
over 20,000 refugees from the DRC.
The LRA in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC)
After leaving south Sudan in 2005, the LRA set up sev-
eral camps in northeast DRC. While LRA attacks on civil-
ians were minimal during much of the 2006-2008 ceasefire,
they resumed once the peace talks began unraveling in the
spring of 2008, and hundreds of people were abducted in
village raids between September and November.
On December 14, 2008, following the final dissolution
of the peace talks, the Ugandan military led an assault on
five LRA bases in DRC. While U.S. intelligence reportedly
aided the coalition, limited cooperation from the Congolese
Armed Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and
little advance notice to UN and MONUC (the predecessor
of MONUSCO) made the offensive ultimately unsuccessful.
The LRA vacated the camps in advance and not one senior
LRA leader was captured or killed.
In retaliation, the LRA stepped up atrocities against civil-
ians. In the “Christmas Massacres” of December 24-27,
2009, the LRA murdered over 600 people in the Haut Uele
province of the northern DRC. Since then, LRA attacks on
civilians have continued at a steady pace, with LRA mas-
sacres claiming over 1,000 victims. Many villages in north-
east DRC are now empty or destroyed and 291,500 people
have fled their homes, including 23,500 who sought refuge
in CAR. Due to security concerns, lack of funding and poor
transportation and telecommunications infrastructure in
the region, 26 percent of IDPs in Haut Uele and 43 percent
of IDPs in nearby Bas Uele have not received humanitarian
assistance. Thousands of families are in need of protec-
tion, food, clean water and shelter. In addition, over 2,000
children and adults have been kidnapped by the LRA since
September 2008, boosting the capacity of the rebel forces.
The LRA in the Central African Republic (CAR)
LRA rebels have been active in southeastern CAR at
least since March 2008, when they abducted dozens of
people near the town of Obo. LRA activity in CAR surged
in the latter half of 2009, and since then rebel attacks have
expanded throughout the country. Most recently, LRA
attacks have been reported in northeastern CAR, including
near Birao, where UN troops were stationed. At least 30,000
people have been internally displaced by the continuing
LRA attacks, but humanitarian assistance is inadequate,
and the international community has made little effort to
document the number of people killed and abducted over
the past two years.