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Integrity Management and Life Extension for a CALM Buoy Oil Export Terminal

Conference Paper · September 2016

DOI: 10.1115/IPC2016-64495

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 Proceedings of the 11th International Pipeline Conference
IPC2016
September 26-30, 2016, Calgary, Alberta, Canada

IPC2016-64495

INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT AND LIFE EXTENSION

FOR A CALM BUOY OIL EXPORT TERMINAL
Robert B. Gordon Juan Carlos Ruiz-Rico
DNV GL DNV GL
Katy, TX, USA Dublin, OH, USA
Michiel Peter Hein Brongers Julian David Gomez Martinez
DNV GL Ocensa
Dublin, OH, USA Bogotá, Colombia

ABSTRACT swivel, flexib le jo ints, valves and floating hoses. The Buoy
This paper applies state-of-the-art integrity management Structure consists of the turret and buoy body.
and life extension methodologies to address degradation and
failure modes specific to CA LM buoy export terminals. The Based on experience, the follo wing are the leading issues
main objectives are to (1) classify the components of the affecting CALM buoy performance (Kumar, 2013):
export terminal according to their crit icality, (2) establish risk-
based inspection and maintenance plans to reduce or mitigate  Floating hose and hawser damage by boats/tanker
risk to acceptable levels and (3) assess remaining life.  Worn out wheels and rails
 PDU seal leakage
The method is applied to a CALM buoy operating off the  Broken hawser
coast of Colo mb ia. This buoy serves as the oil export terminal  Water ingress through hatch cover
for all crude oil transmitted by the Ocensa pipeline, which has  Cracking of outboard pipe spool
a capacity of 560 kBPD or around 60% of total Colo mb ia oil  Broken mooring leg
production. The buoy is nearing the end of its design life, and  Hull integrity
options for life extension have been investigated based on an  Collision
integrity assessment of the current condition of the equip ment.  Bearing failure
As part of the assessment, detailed p lans for future Risk Based  Under-buoy hose damage
Inspections (RBI) and Mitigation, Intervention, and Repair
(MIR) have been developed. Figure 1 shows a typical CALM buoy configuration.
INTRODUCTION
More than one hundred Catenary Anchor Leg Mooring
(CA LM) buoys have been placed into service as oil export
terminals world-wide since 1959. CA LM buoys are used in
over 80 countries. CA LM buoys handle roughly half of the
crude oil maritime transit. However, many CALM buoys are
close to or have exceeded their des ign life posing challenges
for their continued safe operation.

The Mooring System typically consists of anchor piles,

mooring chains, chain stoppers, main bearing, uni-joint,
hawser and chafe chain connecting to the tanker. The Product
Transfer System typically consists of a Pipe-Line End
Manifold (PLEM ), flexible subsea hoses (risers), p roduct Figure 1: Typical CALM buoy configuration
(courtesy of Asan International Ltd).

1 Copyright © 2016 by ASME

 A CA LM buoy installation is a collection of sub-systems IMS should include the fo llo wing elements, as illustrated in
each with a design life and bath tub curve. There is a co mp lex Annex A:
picture of maintenance schedules, inspection histories and
failure rates. Econo mics play a part in planning inspections,  Authority requirements
maintenance, repairs and life extension.  Company policy
 Organization and personnel
It is imperat ive to understand issues and obtain  Reporting and communication
informat ion on the condition of the installation to enable  Operation controls and procedures
assessment of risks and prioritization of the issues. There is a  Management of change
need for a realistic plan to be executed over a number of years
 Contingency plans
with senior management endorsement.
 Audits and review
This paper provides an overview of existing, state-of-the-  Information management
art integrity management and life extension methodolo gies to  Integrity management
address degradation and failure modes specific to CA LM buoy
export terminals. This paper provides guidance on These elements should be reviewed and revised to ensure
(1) classifying the components of the export terminal that they support the Integrity Management Process.
according to their criticality, (2) establishing risk-based
Historically, however, a CALM buoy does not start its
inspection and maintenance plans to reduce or mit igate risk to
service under a well-defined Integrity Management program.
acceptable levels and (3) assessing remain ing life. It illustrates
Typically, the manufacturer defines an inspection and
the methodology through its application to Ocensa’s
maintenance plan, and this is fo llowed to varying levels by the
Monobuoy TLU-2 offshore Colombia.
operator. If the CA LM buoy is under Class, then the Class
NOMENCLATURE Rules are also in effect and the facility is periodically
inspected by the Class Society surveyor.
ABS American Bureau of Shipping
API American Petroleum Institute These inspection and maintenance programs are
ASNT American Society for Nondestructive Testing prescriptive (e.g., inspection intervals are at fixed times) and
CALM Catenary Anchor Leg Mooring do not necessarily p rovide the type of data needed to make
CML Condition Monitoring Location good decisions regarding life extension.
CoF Consequence of Failure
CP Cathodic Protection The following describes the steps (and associated
FEA Finite Element Analysis methods) that can be taken to improve the operator’s
IM Integrity Management understanding of the current condition and remaining life of
IMR Inspection, Maintenance and Repair the CALM buoy.
IMS Integrity Management System
IMT Inspection, Monitoring and Testing Baseline Assessm ent
IOGP International Association of Oil & Gas Producers If the CALM buoy has been already operating for an
kBPD Thousands of Barrels Per Day extended period of time without an Integrity Management
MIC Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion program, it is necessary to perform a baseline assessment to
MIR Mitigation, Intervention and Repair define the current condition in sufficient detail for risk
NACE National Association of Corrosion Engineers assessment, inspection planning, and remaining life estimat ion.
NDT Non-Destructive Testing
OTC Offshore Technology Conference All of the existing inspection data including a current
PDU Product Distribution Unit visual inspection of the buoy should be assembled.
PLEM Pipe-Line End Manifold Maintenance inspection reports dealing with subsystems such
PoF Probability of Failure as turret and swivel bearings (e.g., grease analysis, vibration
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority (Norway) measurements), structure (e.g., wall thickness), floating hoses
RBI Risk Based Inspection (e.g., loose bolts, wear, and flange corrosion), mooring hawser
RLA Remaining Life Assessment (e.g., cracks in end fittings) and PLEM (e.g., leaks,
SBM Single Buoy Mooring maintenance of hydraulic system) should be carefu lly
SPE Society for Petroleum Engineering reviewed. Major events (e.g. accidental damage) should be
SPM Single Point Mooring carefully documented.
SNAME Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers
TLU Tanker Loading Unit Unfortunately, it is all too common that some inspections
have not been carried out and also that data from the
METHODOLOGIES OVERVIEW inspections that have been performed are missing. This
Ideally, a co mprehensive Integrity Management System stresses the need for good record keeping and continuity of
(IMS) should be in place prior to CA LM buoy operation. The Integrity Management staff.

2 Copyright © 2016 by ASME

 Once the historical data is collected and assessed, then a and structure may then be summarized in a table showing the
Baseline Inspection and Testing Plan should be developed. highest threats with their associated risk levels. An examp le of
This inspection plan establishes the minimu m inspections and this type of table is provided belo w (Table 2) in the example
testing to be conducted to assess the current condition of the for the Ocensa TLU-2 monobuoy.
system co mponents of the buoy. The baseline inspection also
is used to establish the inspection frequencies of the short-term Inspection Plans & Methodologies
and long-term inspection and testing plans. Inspection and testing plans should be developed for each
of the buoy components (Soland, Sigurdsson, & Ghosal, 2011).
Risk Assessment Table 1 provides a representative list of components.
Different failures of SPM buoys have been experienced
by the industry, as reported in the open literature. CA LM buoy Separate considerations should be given for baseline,
mooring failures due to wear have occurred in the past (e.g., short-term and long-term survey requirements. The plans
Shoup & Mueller, 1984). Hawser failu res are documented in include systematic methods, consistent over time, and specify
(Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2007) . Examp les of frequencies for the inspection and tests for each of the system
turret roller bearing failures are provided in (Mazallon, 2010) components. Assessing the condition at the specified
and (AEA, 2001). Failure of swivel systems is discussed in frequencies will allow establishing trends and comparison to
(OGP, 2006). Failure o f floating hose marine breakaway set criteria to estimate the remaining life of the components.
couplings is described in (OCIMF, 2008) and (BEA R, 2006)
while experience with failures of the floating hose itself is Table 1: Representative list of CALM buoy
discussed in (PSA Norway, 2008). Failures of CALM buoys components
have also occurred due to ship collision (Moan, et al., 2002).
Mooring chains Floating hoses
The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers Mooring piles Pressure relief tanks
(now IOGP and formerly known as OGP) (Shoup & Mueller, Chain stoppers Buoy dead-leg piping
1984) provides useful guidance for identify ing potential
Hawser Flexible joints
hazards associated with CALM buoys. The OGP checklist for
CALM buoy hazard identification is summarized below: Chafe chain Main bearing
Mooring lug (uni-joint) Turret structure
 Oil leaks (riser/PLEM; piping; swivel, floating hose) PLEM Spider
 Fires PLEM dead-leg piping Water-tight tanks
 Marine events (collisions; failure & loss)
Subsea hoses (risers) Fenders
 Structural events (extreme loadings; failures)
Product swivel Sacrificial anodes
Annex B contains a table of general threats, threat Inside buoy piping Coatings
descriptions and associated failures for CALM buoys. Overboard piping
Risk of a failure is the co mbination of the probability of
failure and the consequences of failure, wh ich can be
Inspection methodologies can include:
expressed as a risk matrix. Mateus, et al. (2013) describe the
development and application of a risk analysis methodology  Visual Inspection
specific to CALM buoys that is similar to that adopted here.
 Ultrasonic Thickness Inspection
The overall integrity management (IM) process, including the
 Ultrasonic Thickness Scanning
risk assessment, consists of the following main steps :
 Guided-waves Ultrasonic Testing
 Risk Assessment and IM Planning  Magnetic Particle Testing
 Inspection, Monitoring & Testing  Corrosion Mapping
 Integrity Assessment  Wear Mapping
 Mitigation, Intervention & Repair  Coating Thickness Survey
 Pressure Testing
A suitable risk matrix is used which consists of:  Electrical-continuity Testing
 Valve Testing
 Risk categories and interpretation of these,  Lubrication Media Testing
 Probability of failure (PoF) categories and  Vibration Monitoring
interpretation of these, and  Cathodic Protection Potentials Survey
 Consequence of failure (CoF) categories and
interpretation of these. An inspection and testing plan should be prepared that
includes Condition Monitoring Locations (CM L) with
The overall results of the risk assessment for d ifferent reference to the associated drawings. To ensure efficient,
components of the mooring system, product transfer system, reliable, and safe operation of buoy, the inspection and testing

3 Copyright © 2016 by ASME

programs should be performed by experienced, qualified, and
certified personnel. For the critical co mponents of the buoy,
such as the main bearing, the product swivel bearing, and the
mooring chains; the inspection plan should be carried out by a
competent and specialized company.
In any case, as a minimu m, the personnel executing the
inspections for the buoy should be certified by a recognized
industry organization such as API, ASNT, and NACE.
Remaining Life Assessment
Remaining life estimates of the buoy components are
based on the results of the risk assessment and the inspection
and operating history. The use of analytical tools (e.g., Fin ite
Element Analysis) to assess remain ing strength and fatigue
life may also provide useful information. Ho wever, remain ing
life of the buoy as a whole is primarily estimated based on an
accurate picture of the current condition of the buoy
components, and trends from the inspection data and industry
wide data.
Ideally, t ime-dependent variables (e.g., plate thickness;
metal shavings in bearing grease) can be defined for each of
the major components of the buoy system.
A structural integrity assessment of the buoy structure
(including mooring) must be performed to estimate the
remain ing life. In risk assessments, a barrier is defined as
some piece o f equip ment, procedure or measurement that is
used to form a “barrier” that eliminates or reduces the
consequences of a failure. Fo r examp le, the use of an oil
containment boom to surround the tanker and buoy would
form a true physical barrier to prevent discharge of o il to the
surrounding environment in the case of a failu re to one of the
offloading hoses. Another examp le of a (non-physical) barrier
is the use of a buoy position monitoring system to detect
whether the buoy offsets are large enough to indicate the loss
of a mooring line.
The buoy assessment should consider such factors as:
 How much longer the buoy will be operated beyond
its original design life
 Modifications due to operational changes
 Increased loads due to new knowledge (e.g., larger
tankers, revised metocean data)
 Changes in barriers (e.g., loss or degradation of buoy
position monitoring)
 Damages inflicted to the structure (e.g., from buoy
hull overload)
 Reduced structural capacity due to degradation
mechanisms like fatigue or corrosion
 The original design requirements are no longer
fulfilled
 Regulatory or company specific requirements
The main challenges for estimat ing the remaining life
accurately include (Kumar, 2013):
 Quality of data
o Have any intentional changes/modifications been
made to the buoy structure?
o What is the current condition of the buoy
structure?
 Capacity and performance of damaged structures
o How much has the damage event to the buoy
hull reduced its strength?
o Is Finite Element Analysis (FEA) required to
assess the capacity?
o What inspection program is required to monitor
the structure?
 Remaining life
o Has the corrosion protection system adequately
protected the structure?
o Is the material loss within the amount planned?
o Is the fatigue life adequate?
o Can the inspection data be used to infer
remaining life?
Sound methods are needed to assess the remain ing life of
the mooring system (Gordon, 2015). Such methods are
normally “condition based” where life predict ion using
analytical models along with inspection, maintenance, and
repairs are included in the assessment in an integrated way.
For example, close visual inspection data can be used to
prepare a 3D geo metric model of mooring that can be used to
quantify the residual strength of the mooring system
components.
Analyses that are required to predict remaining life are
often based on advanced techniques and methodology (Soland,
Sigurdsson, & Ghosal, 2011). Advanced analysis methods
such as reliability analysis can be used to better determine the
performance of the aged mooring system.
Mitigation, Intervention and Repair
This section discusses mitigation, intervention, and repair
(MIR) options to extend the life of a buoy. In particular, MIR
activities used previously are evaluated to determine if they
were successful. The evaluation considers such factors as
overall cost, impact to export operations, and risk. The
monobuoy components of primary interest are the buoy chain,
main bearing and hull corrosion.
Long-term inspection plans or event-based inspection
plans developed by the “Risk Assessment & Integrity
Management Planning” activ ity should form the basis for MIR
activities. The following definitions are useful:
 Mitigating activities are measures taken to reduce the
likelihood of failure or the consequence of failure.
 Intervention activities are mainly corrective actions.
 Repairs are mainly corrective actions with the
objective to restore compliance with requirements
related to functionality and structural integrity of the
CALM system.
4 Copyright © 2016 by ASME
 In some cases, there may be a need for technology A photograph of Monobuoy TLU-2 is provided in Figure 2
qualification of activit ies prior to execution. Th is can for (DNV GL, 2015). The buoy is ABS classed.
instance be qualifying of a new inspection tool.

MIR activit ies should not impair the safety level of the
CA LM system below the specified safety level, as defined in
design. All M IR activ ities should be carried out by
experienced and qualified personnel in accordance with agreed
procedures.

Generally, the main activities are:

 Detailed planning of the operation;

 Technology qualification, if necessary;
 Mobilization;
 Execution of the operation (transportation to site,
safety activities, coordination activities, meetings,
tests, drills, completion, inspection, NDT, testing,
demobilization and close-out activities, etc.);
 Documentation.
Figure 2: Ocensa Monobuoy TLU-2
Intervention may introduce new constraints to the system
which must be assessed and approved by relevant engineering The owner was loo king for an evaluation of the buoy for
disciplines before in itiation. Typical aspects to be assessed are life extension based on an integrity assessment of the current
3rd party protection (e.g., Class Society), CA LM buoy condition of the equipment and the development of detailed
integrity with the new constraints and load scenarios, and plans for future inspections, mitigation, intervention, and
corrosion protection. repair. The plans are based on a risk assessment as well as
sound methodologies, criteria, regulations, and best practices.
All interventions and repairs should be verified / tested
and inspected by experienced and qualified personnel in Threat ID & Risk Assessm ent
accordance with agreed procedures. NDT personnel, A Threat Identification and Risk Assessment was
equipment, methods, and acceptance criteria should be agreed performed, using the company’s established risk matrix to
upon in accordance with appropriate standards and codes. quantify the risk levels. The threat analysis was based on the
following sources of information:
Once the buoy is in service, MIR becomes largely
Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair (IMR). Consequently,  Historical information gathered and analyzed
the application of IMR in this report is intended to be including a special visual inspection
consistent with most industry Standards and published  Characteristics of crudes exported through TLU-2
literature.  Information from the open literature and knowledge
from historical failures
Criteria, Regulations and Best Practices  Subject matter expertise
Buoys may be classed, e.g. (A BS, 2014; DNV GL, 2015).
These rules consider design, testing and surveys (DNV GL, The resulting initial risk d istribution (prio r to mit igation
2015). Requirements typically include “Special Periodical actions) is shown in Figure 3.
Surveys” which govern the buoy structure, mooring hard ware,
cargo hoses and flexible risers, and swivel and cargo transfer Options were developed for the extent of inspections and
equipment. maintenance required to achieve different lengths of life with
an ultimate goal of “as long as possible.” The inspection and
DNV GL’s Offshore Standard for Offshore Loading testing plans consist of a baseline assessment followed by
Buoys (DNV GL, 2015) also gives criteria and guidance on periodic short and long term inspections. Input included
design, fabrication, installation and testing of offshore loading industry guidelines and recommended practices,
buoys. manufacturer’s recommendations, offshore class requirements
and the company’s plans for life extension.
APPLICATION TO OCENSA MONOBUOY TLU-2
The Oleoducto Central S.A. (Ocensa) Single Po int
Mooring (SPM) Tanker Loading Unit (TLU) Monobuoy
TLU-2 was designed, constructed, and delivered by Bluewater
Terminal Systems, BV in 1995. The buoy was installed and
has been operated offshore the coast of Co lo mbia near the city
of Coveñas since 1996. The design life o f the buoy is 20 years.

5 Copyright © 2016 by ASME


5% High risk 2% Very high (extreme) risk
 Mooring chains  Main bearing
 Chain stoppers  Overboard piping
 Hawser  Floating hoses
25%
Med.
69% Low risk
Figure 3: Initial risk distribution
Inspection Plans
Written inspection plans were created for each of the
23 subsystems/components. A total of 96 CM Ls were defined
with reference to current drawings.
Suitable inspection technologies were identified by
considering how the data fro m the resultant inspections could
be used for risk and integrity assessments. A total of
15 different inspection methodologies were defined in terms
of their applicability for the TLU-2 monobuoy subsystems and
components.
Table 2 provides an examp le of the threats, risk level and
inspection methodology identified fo r the chain stoppers.
Annex C p rovides an overall summary for the baseline
inspection and testing plan.
Detailed inspection-testing plans (not shown) were also
developed for each system component. These plans included
inspection methodology, requirements, CMLs, reference
drawings and documents, and inspection frequency.
Table 2: Inspection example for chain stoppers
Mitigation, Intervention and Repair for TLU-2
Long-term or event-based inspection plans developed as
part of a Risk Assessment & Integrity Management Plan
should form the basis for M IR activ ities . All M IR activ ities
should be carried out, verified, tested and inspected by
experienced and qualified personnel in accordance with agreed
procedures.
Options to improved life extension include:
 Adherence to an inspection & maintenance program
 Sound Integrity Management program in p lace &
used
 Use of technical verifiers
 Use of Key Performance Indicators
Maintenance alternatives can include:
 SPM rental
 Purchase of spare SPM
 Dry-dock inspection & maintenance
DISCUSSION
Alternatives to life extension of TLU-2 are possible (e.g.,
replacement with new or refurbished buoy, outage for dry-
dock repairs, etc.), however these considerations are outside
the scope of this paper.
SUMMARY
In this paper, a method was outlined for (1) classifying
the components of the export terminal according to their
criticality, (2) establishing risk-based inspection and
maintenance plans to reduce or mitigate risk to acceptable
levels and (3) assessing remaining life. The method was
applied to a CA LM buoy operating off the coast of Colo mbia
(TLU-2). The buoy is nearing the end of its design life, and
options for life extension were investigated based on an
integrity assessment of the current condition of the equip ment.
As part of the assessment, detailed p lans for future Risk Based
Inspections (RBI) and Mitigation, Intervention, and Repair
(MIR) have been developed.
Classification of co mponents based on their crit icality
was accomplished for the TLU-2 Monobuoy using a
qualitative risk analysis in which Ocensa’s corporate risk
matrix was emp loyed. A key element of this effort was the
identification of threats. The threats were found to not only
relate to degradation of materials and physical damage, but
also to design, operation and organization activities.
Inspection and testing plans were developed and
inspection methodologies were identified for a total of
23 co mponents of Monobuoy TLU-2. The inspection and
testing plans comprise of an inspection plan for a baseline
assessment to determine the current condition, and the short-
term and long-term inspections plans. The plans include
systematic methods, consistent over time, and specify
frequencies for the inspection and tests for each of the system
components. Assessing the condition at the specified
frequencies allows establishing trends and for comparison of
data to set criteria to estimate the remaining life of the
components.
The inspection and testing plans were also developed to
mitigate the risk level of the Monobuoy TLU-2. The plans are
based on the threat assessment and risk analysis. The risk
analysis identified 2% of the total of system co mponents with
very high risk level, included the main bearing, the overboard
piping, and the floating hoses. The threats to this group of
6 Copyright © 2016 by ASME
components are due to wear, e xternal corrosion (potential
problems with CP system and coatings), and mechanical
overloading. Also, the risk analysis indicated that 5% of the
evaluated components present a high risk level, included the
mooring chains, the chain stoppers, and the hawser. The
threats on this group of components of the buoy are derived
mainly fro m corrosion damage, wear, mechanical overload,
aging of seals, and extreme weather.
Based on a review of the buoy’s historical information,
the inspection data was deemed inadequate to provide a
comprehensive condition assessment and service life
extension estimate. Quantitative data taken periodically is
required so that condition trends may be determined.
Conducting the inspection and testing plans proposed will
provide the required quantitative data.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors thank the management of Ocensa for
allowing this paper to be published.
REFERENCES
ABS. (2014). Rules for Building and Classing Single Point
Moorings.
AEA Technology Engineering Solut ions. (2001). Failure
modes, reliability and integrity of floating storage unit (FPSO,
FSU) turret and swivel systems. Offshore Technology Report
2001/73 prepared for UK HSE.
Australian Transport Safety Bureau. (2007). Hawser failure
and maneuvering difficulties on board Dampier Spirit during
Cyclone Hubert. Marine Occurrence Investigation No. 226.
Berkely Engineering And Research, Inc. (2006). Gall
Thomson Connector Release - Hawaii Single Point Mooring
Terminal, May 19, 2008. report prepared for Tesoro Corp.
DNV GL. (2008). Offshore Loading Buoys. DNV-OS-E403.
DNV GL. (2015). Integrity management of submarine pipeline
systems. DNV-RP-F116.
Go rdon, R. (2015). Considerations for Mooring Life
Extension, Texas Sect ion of SNAM E. Proceedings of the 20th
Offshore Symposium.
Ku mar, K. (2013). Maintenance Imperatives and Life
Extension of a CALM Buoy. IX Monoboya Conference. Chile.
Mateus, M., Zabala, L., Sarmiento, E., Rivera, D., & Perez, O.
(2013). Development and Application of a Risk Analysis
Methodology Using RBI Philosophy to Ports and Marine
Terminals. IBP1279_13, Rio Pipeline 2013.
Mazallon, J. (2010). Ro ller Bearing Failures and Offshore
Change-Out Feasibility. SBM Offshore presentation, Punta del
Este, Uraguay.
Moan, T., Amdahl, J., Wang, X., & Spencer, J. (2002). Risk
Assessment of FPSOs, with Emphasis on Collision. SNAME
Annual Meeting. Boston.
OCIMF. (2008). Information Paper - Marine Breakaway
Couplings.
OGP. (2006). Guideline for managing marine risks associated
with FPSOs. Report No. 377.
PSA Norway. (2008). PSA Norway State of the Art Bonded
Flexible Pipes. Doc. No. 5662.
Shoup, G. J., & Mueller, R. A. (1984). Failure Analysis of a
Calm Buoy Anchor Chain System. OTC 4764.
Soland, G., Sigurdsson, G., & Ghosal, A. (2011). Life
Extension and Assessment of Existing Offshore Structure.
SPE 142858.
7 Copyright © 2016 by ASME
ANNEX A: Integrity management system (DNV, 2015)

8 Copyright © 2016 by ASME

 ANNEX B: General threats, threat description, and associated failures for a CALM buoy

Threat Group Threat Threat Description Failure Mode

Material Corrosion  External corrosion due to CP system failure or Metal loss
Degradation lack of CP capacity (anode consumption) and/or Loss of function
coating failure Leak
 Internal under-deposit corrosion Burst
 External MIC / under deposit corrosion (soft mud
on seabed)
Material Aging  Elastomeric seal ageing Loss of function
 Gasket failure Leak
Wear  Change of friction on hard face seal surfaces (lack Metal loss
of lubrication, load increase) Loss of function
 Galling (Due to improper torque of bolts) Leak
 Relative movement between parts (chains-chain
stoppers)
 Movement relative to the seabed (touchdown
areas)
Structural Fatigue  Due to wave movement, fluid hammer, or process Yielding
variations Collapse
 Promote by vibrations Loss of function
Mechanical Overload  Due to over-torqueing, over-pressure operation, Leak
fluid hammer, over-displacement of the buoy Cracking
 Surge-pressure relief system malfunction Burst
Loss Bolt Tensioning  Bolt stress relaxation
 Under-torqueing
Marine Growth  Unable to inspect equipment, increased load, may
protect from corrosion attack
Burial  Insufficient burial depth of piles
Third Party Mechanical Impacts  Intervention tools
 Vessel impact
 Drop object during loading operation
Vandalism / Terrorism  Un-authorized boarding of the buoy
 Intentional damage to equipment
Natural Extreme Weather  Storms with high winds and severe waves
Hazard
Operational Incorrect Operation  Conditions of product flow
 Operation during loading of tankers
Incorrect Procedure  Procedures not updated
Human Errors  Overfamiliarity, lack of training, lack of experience

9 Copyright © 2016 by ASME

 ANNEX C: Summary of Baseline Inspection-Testing Plan

10 Copyright © 2016 by ASME

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