Penalties for grave offenses
, which was duly
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1588 June 5, 2009
(Formerly No. 04-9-511-RTC)
JUDGE DIVINA LUZ P. AQUINO-SIMBULAN,
Complainant,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE NICASIO BARTOLOME (retired),
ACTING CLERK OF COURT ROMANA C. PASCUAL, CLERK
OF COURT MILAGROS P. LEREY (retired), and DOCKET
CLERK AMOR DELA CRUZ, all of the Municipal Trial
Court, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a letter-complaint1 dated April 27, 2004
filed by complainant Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan
with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), alleging
that respondents Judge Nicasio V. Bartolome, together with
Romana Pascual, Milagros Lerey, and Amor dela Cruz, Acting
Clerk of Court, retired Clerk of Court and Docket Clerk,
respectively, all of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, committed grave errors and discrepancies in
processing the surety bond for the accused Rosalina Mercado
in Criminal Case No. 13360, entitled People of the Philippines
v. Rosalina Mercado, et al.
In her complaint, Judge Simbulan alleged the following:
Criminal Case No. 13360 was originally raffled to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, San Fernando,
Pampanga, where complainant Judge presides. On
September 18, 2003, said branch of the RTC received an
Indorsement from Warrant/Subpoena Officer PO3 Edwin
Villacentino of the Sasmuan Municipal Police Station stating
that the accused Mercado voluntarily surrendered before the
MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan and posted her bail bond through
Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co., Inc.
approved by respondent Judge Bartolome on August 21,
2003. This prompted complainant to issue an Order2 dated
October 29, 2003, directing respondent Lerey, then Clerk of
Court of the MTC, to transmit to the RTC within twenty-four
(24) hours from receipt of said Order, the bond which the
former court approved.
When the Clerk of Court failed to comply, complainant Judge
issued an Order3 dated January 12, 2004 directing the
former to explain in writing within three (3) days from
receipt thereof why she should not be cited in contempt for
delaying the administration of justice.
On January 29, 2004, the RTC received a letter4 from
respondent Romana Pascual, then Acting Clerk of Court of
the MTC, explaining that the bail bond in Criminal Case No.
13360 was approved by respondent Judge during the tenure
of Lerey, and that the latter had retired on August 26, 2003.
On February 12, 2004, the RTC received a written
explanation5 from Lerey stating that she had misplaced and
overlooked the subject surety bond, which resulted in the
delay of its transmission to the RTC. Attached to Lerey’s
letter were the following documents: (1) the Court Order
dated August 21, 2003 signed by respondent Judge; (2)
Bond No. 46485 dated August 21, 2003 with attachments;
(3) Undertaking dated November 22, 2003; (4) Certification
from the Office of the Court Administrator, dated October 29,
2003; and (5) Certification from Summit Guaranty and
Insurance Company, Inc., dated November 22, 2003.
Upon perusal of the documents, complainant Judge
discovered that the subject surety bond bore some erasures,
and its attachments were highly anomalous. In view of these
findings, the RTC issued a subpoena to respondents Pascual
and Lerey directing them to appear before it to explain the
aforementioned errors.
During the hearing held on April 26, 2004, respondents
Pascual and Lerey appeared before the RTC, Branch 41, San
Fernando, Pampanga, and the following facts were
established therein:
1. That respondent Judge issued an Order of Release dated
August 21, 2003 without a Certificate of Detention and
Warrant of Arrest attached to the documents presented to
him;
2. That while the Order of Release was dated August 21,
2003, the Undertaking and Certification from the bonding
company were dated November 22, 2003 and October 29,
2003, respectively;
3. That it was Lerey who reviewed the documents before the
surety bond was referred to respondent Judge for the latter’s
approval; and
4. That the delay in the transmission of the bond and its
supporting documents was attributed to Amor dela Cruz,
Docket Clerk of the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.6
After the hearing, Public Prosecutor Otto Macabulos stated
that he found the explanation too shallow and self-serving,
and that he would file an indirect contempt case under Rule
71, Section 3 (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure against
Lerey and Dela Cruz. He filed said complaint7 on June 21,
2004. The RTC, Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga then
directed Lerey and Dela Cruz to explain in writing within
fifteen (15) days why they should not be cited in indirect
contempt of court or improper conduct in the processing of
the bail bond of accused Mercado.8
In her Manifestation/Compliance9 dated October 25, 2004,
Lerey admitted lapses and negligence in processing the
subject bail bond and was remorseful for what happened. On
the other hand, Dela Cruz stated that there was no
wrongdoing on her part in the processing of the subject bail
bond and that she merely followed instructions in mailing the
said bail bond to the RTC.10
In an Order11 dated December 14, 2004, the RTC found
Lerey guilty of indirect contempt and sentenced her to pay a
fine of ₱10,000.00, which she duly paid. However, it
absolved Dela Cruz from any liability as it found her
explanation meritorious.
In the meantime, in his 1st Indorsement12 dated February
26, 2004, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Jose P. Perez
referred to the Clerk of Court of the MTC of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan the Orders issued by complainant Judge relative to
the surety bond for comment. However, there was nothing
on record to show that said Clerk of Court complied with the
directive.
DCA Perez also issued a 1st Indorsement13 dated June 22,
2004 to respondent Judge referring to the letter dated April
27, 2004 of complainant Judge, which discussed the errors
and discrepancies regarding the approval of the bail bond of
the accused in Criminal Case No. 13360, with the instruction
to the former to submit his comment thereto.
In compliance, respondent Judge submitted his 2nd
Indorsement14 dated July 13, 2004, wherein he denied any
liability concerning his approval of the subject surety bond.
According to him, Lerey had expressly admitted her
negligence and lapses which caused the delay in transmitting
the bond to the RTC. He stressed that just like any other
judge, his Clerk of Court (Lerey) enjoys his trust and
confidence on matters pertaining to the affairs of the court,
including the review and approval of bail bonds. He added
that he had no reason to doubt the official actions of Lerey
as the latter had been serving the court for around 37 years.
In a Memorandum15 dated March 1, 2005, then Court
Administrator, now Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr., recommended that the letter dated April 27, 2004 (and
the Orders attached thereto) of complainant Judge be
treated as a formal administrative complaint and redocketed
as such against respondents Judge Bartolome, Pascual,
Lerey, and Dela Cruz, with the directive that the named
respondents submit their respective Comments within ten
(10) days upon receipt of the Order from the Court. Said
Order16 was issued by the Court on April 13, 2005, and all
the respondents submitted their Comments on May 13,
2005.
Respondent Judge and Pascual both averred that in the case
for indirect contempt, only Lerey was found guilty of
negligence in the performance of her duties, and no other
indictment was made against them.17
On the other hand, Lerey stated in her Comment18 that she
has already been found guilty of indirect contempt for failure
to transmit the bail bond within the period directed by the
court, and paid the fine therefor, while Dela Cruz clarified
that she has already been exonerated from any liability or
participation in said incident.
In a Resolution19 dated June 22, 2005, the Court referred
the administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the RTC
of Malolos City, Bulacan for investigation, report and
recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the record.
On April 7, 2006, 2nd Vice-Executive Judge Candido
Belmonte submitted his Report,20 which contained the
following findings:
The Investigating Court takes judicial notice that certain
functions of court which are not directly related to decision-
making are delegated or reposed to court personnel. Under
this category falls the preparation and evaluation of
documents for bail, for the final approval of the judge.
However, to rely solely on the representation made by the
Clerk of Court without making even a perfunctory perusal of
the records is also a mark of neglect. As such, this court
finds the explanation of the respondent judge to be
inadequate to exculpate him for the oversight he committed.
xxxx
With respect to court personnel Romana Pascual, it was
established that, at the time of the commission of the
subject administrative offense, she was not yet discharging
the functions of an Officer-in-Charge. She had no hand in the
approval of the bail. As a matter of fact, she immediately
informed respondent Milagros Lerey, the former Clerk of
Court, of the Order coming from Judge Simbulan of RTC-
Branch 41, Pampanga requiring them to transmit the
supporting documents for bail. However, it was the inaction
of Milagros Lerey on the matter which caused the delay in
the transmission. The Court notes that the Order of Judge
Simbulan was received at the MTC-Sta. Maria, Bulacan at a
time when there was a transition between Milagros Lerey and
the present Clerk of Court. During that interregnum, it was
Romana Pascual who was the OIC. As such, the letter-
explanation of Romana Pascual, dated February 11, 2004,
addressed to Judge Simbulan is deemed sufficient
explanation by this Investigating Court. Hence, she is
exonerated of the charges against her.
Regarding the charge against court personnel Amor dela
Cruz, it appears to this Court that although she was the one
who finally delivered the supporting bail documents to RTC-
Branch 41, Pamapanga, she has nothing to do with the act of
delay. This seems to be the implication of the admission of
Milagros Lerey that at the time of the approval of the bail
bond the supporting documents were incomplete. She only
put the documents in order after there was an Order from
RTC-Branch 41, Pampanga to transmit the same. The delay
took place during this period. Once Milagros Lerey handed
the documents to Ms. Dela Cruz, she immediately
transmitted them to RTC-Branch 41, Pampanga. These facts
borne out by her Comment submitted in the Indirect
Contempt Case before RTC-Branch 41, Pampanga dated July
19, 2004, which this Investigating Court finds sufficient.21
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Judge submitted
the following recommendations:
1) For respondent Judge Nicasio Bartolome, he be found to
be negligent of his duty to supervise his court employees in
the discharge of their respective functions. It is further
recommended that a fine of ₱5,000.00 be imposed on him.
2) For respondent Milagros Lerey, she be found to be grossly
negligent of the discharge of her functions as a Clerk of
Court. It is further recommended that a fine of ₱5,000.00 be
imposed on her over and above the fine of ₱10,000.00
imposed on her in the Indirect Contempt Case.
3) For respondents Romana Pascual and Amor dela Cruz,
there was no direct documentary or testimonial evidence that
shows they have handled the bail bonds. Furthermore, they
are not responsible for the delay in the transmission of the
pertinent documents. As such, it is recommended that they
be exonerated of the charges against them.
City of Malolos, Bulacan, April 7, 2006.22
In a Resolution23 dated October 11, 2006, the Court referred
the Report of the Investigating Judge to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation within thirty (30)
days from receipt of records.
In his Memorandum24 dated November 20, 2007, DCA Jose
P. Perez observed that:
1. In approving the surety bond of the accused, respondent
Judge violated Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.25
In the instant case, the accused Rosalina Mercado was not
arrested. That being the case, she should have filed her bail
bond with the court where her case was pending, i.e., the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, San Fernando City,
Pampanga. In the absence of the judge thereof, it could be
done at another branch of the same court within the province
of Pampanga or City of San Fernando. Instead, accused
Mercado filed her bond in the Municipal Trial Court of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, where respondent Judge presides, who
approved the same and ordered her release from custody.
2. Respondent Judge did not require the accused to submit
the supporting documents pertinent to the application for a
bond. It appears that there was no Certificate of Detention
presented to him; hence, there was no legal justification for
him to issue the Order of Release and process the bond since
the accused was not detained within his jurisdiction. Also,
there was no Warrant of Arrest attached to the documents
presented to him. Moreover, all the supporting papers were
belatedly filed: (a) Undertaking was dated 22 November
2003; (b) Certification from the Office of the Court
Administrator was dated 29 October 2003; and (c) the
Certification from Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co., Inc.
was dated 22 November 2003.
3. Respondent Judge failed to live up to the standards of a
good magistrate. Not only did he approve the bail bond of
the accused without the requisite authority to do so, his
manner of doing so showed a flagrant disregard for the
applicable procedural law he had sworn to uphold and serve.
He committed gross misconduct by blatantly disregarding the
Rules and settled jurisprudence.
These findings led DCA Perez to recommend the following:
Considering that Judge Bartolome has compulsorily retired
from the service effective on 11 October 2006, we
recommend that a fine in the amount of Forty Thousand
Pesos (₱40,000.00) be deducted from his retirement
benefits.
With respect to Clerk of Court Milagros Lerey, who already
retired from the service on 26 August 2003, we also find her
guilty of gross misconduct. As can be gleaned from the
records, she admitted her wrongdoing. Had she not retired,
we could have meted her the extreme penalty of dismissal.
We, therefore, recommend that she be fined in the amount
of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00).
With respect to respondents Romana Pascual and Amor dela
Cruz, there being no evidence linking them to the processing
of the questioned bond, it is recommended that the charges
against them be dismissed.26
In a Resolution27 dated April 2, 2008, the Court required the
parties to manifest within ten (10) days from notice whether
they were willing to submit the case for decision on the basis
of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted. All
respondents manifested their willingness to submit the case
for decision: respondents Lerey, Pascual and Dela Cruz
having complied on May 13, 2008, and Judge Bartolome on
May 23, 2008. The Court submitted the administrative case
for resolution on July 25, 2008.
After a careful evaluation of the records and the Reports of
the Investigating Judge and the OCA, the Court holds that
there were indeed grave errors and discrepancies committed
by respondents Judge Bartolome and Lerey in processing the
surety bond for the accused in Criminal Case No. 13360.
The following provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure apply before an accused can be released on bail:
Sec. 14. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may
be filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in the
absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another
branch of the same court within the province or city. If the
accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other
than where the case is pending, bail may be filed also with
any regional trial court of said place, or, if no judge thereof is
available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein. x x x
Sec. 16. Release on bail. The accused must be discharged
upon approval of the bail by the judge with whom it was filed
in accordance with Section 14 hereof.
Whenever bail is filed with a court other than where the case
is pending, the judge accepting the bail shall forward the
bail, the order of release and other supporting papers to the
court where the case is pending, which may, for good
reason, require a different one to be filed.
The OCA’s Report revealed that the accused Rosalina
Mercado was not arrested. The proper procedure, according
to the above-cited rules, would have been to file her bail
bond with the RTC Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga
where her case was pending. Had complainant Judge been
absent or was unavailable at that time, the accused could file
for bail with another branch of the RTC in Pampanga or in
San Fernando City. However, the accused filed her surety
bond with the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, where it was
approved by respondent Judge.
Not only did respondent Judge erroneously order the release
of the accused, but he also failed to require submission of
the supporting documents needed in the application for a
bond. There was no Certificate of Detention or Warrant of
Arrest attached to the bond transmitted by the MTC to the
complainant Judge. Moreover, the other supporting
documents were belatedly filed. Records show that
respondent Judge approved the bail bond on August 21,
2003, but the Undertaking was dated November 22, 2003,
the Certification from the OCA was dated October 29, 2003,
and the Certification from Summit Guaranty and Insurance
Co., Inc. was dated November 22, 2003.
Respondent Judge contends that Lerey, who has been Clerk
of Court for 37 years, was given the simple matter of
examining the documents attached to the application for a
bail bond. For her part, Lerey admitted her negligence when
she misplaced and overlooked the surety bond policy,
resulting in the delay in the transmission of said documents
to the RTC. Notably, she also failed to give an explanation for
the erasures which complainant discovered on the surety
bond. By such acts, it is evident that Lerey did not measure
up to the standards required by Section 1, Canon IV of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel28 as quoted:
Section 1. Court personnel shall at all times perform official
duties properly and with diligence. They shall commit
themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of
their office during working hours.
In addition, a clerk of court has a vital function in the prompt
and sound administration of justice since his or her office is
the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes,
and concerns.29 He or she also has the duty to ensure an
orderly and efficient record management system in the court
and to supervise the personnel under her office to function
effectively. 30
However, Lerey’s admission of negligence cannot excuse
respondent Judge from liability in the irregular processing of
the bail bond. Pertinent provisions of the Code of Judicial
Conduct31 state that:
Rule 3.08. – A judge should diligently discharge
administrative responsibilities, maintain professional
competence in court management, and facilitate the
performance of the administrative functions of other judges
and court personnel.
Rule 3.09. – A judge should organize and supervise the court
personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business, and require at all times the observance of high
standards of public service and finality.
In Bellena v. Judge Perello,32 wherein respondent Judge
attributed the delay in transmittal of records to her clerk of
court, the former was still found guilty and sentenced to pay
a fine. The Court held that, although the clerk of court is
primarily responsible for the implementation of respondent
judge’s orders, the fact remains that respondent judge is
tasked with administrative supervision over his or her
personnel. It is the responsibility of the judge to always see
to it that his/her orders are properly and promptly enforced,
and that case records are properly stored and kept. Thus, in
the present case, respondent Judge himself should have
verified that the documents for bail were complete and
correct instead of relying on the representations of his clerk
of court.
With regard to respondents Pascual and Dela Cruz, the Court
observes that there is no evidence to show that they have
contributed to the irregularities or delay in transmittal of the
bail bond. At the time of the commission of the
administrative offense, Pascual was not yet discharging the
functions of an Acting Clerk of Court. Dela Cruz, on the other
hand, merely delivered the supporting documents to the
RTC.
Having thus established the respondents’ liabilities, what
remains for the Court’s contention are their penalties.
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,33 the acts of respondent Judge and Lerey may be
classified as gross neglect of duty, which is punishable by
dismissal under Rule IV, Section 52 A(2) thereof. Neglect of
duty denotes the failure of an employee to give one’s
attention to a task expected of him. Gross neglect is such
neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency
of instances, becomes so serious in its character as to
endanger or threaten the public welfare.34
In Ulat-Marrero v. Torio, Jr.,35 the Court has categorized as
a grave offense of gross neglect of duty, the failure of a court
process server to serve summons which resulted in the
delayed resolution of a case. As corollarily applied to the
present case, where respondents released the accused on
temporary liberty despite the absence of the required
supporting documents for bail, the former are likewise liable
for gross neglect of duty.
Were it not for the fact that both respondents, Judge
Bartolome and Lerey, have retired on October 11, 2006 and
August 26, 2003, respectively, the Court would have
dismissed them from the service. Instead, it orders
respondents to pay a fine to be deducted from their
retirement benefits, in accordance with its rulings in Moncada
v. Cervantes,36 Office of the Court Administrator v.
Paredes,37 and Soria v. Oliveros.38
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds:
1. Presiding Judge Nicasio Bartolome (retired) GUILTY of
gross neglect of duty for which he is meted a fine in the
amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00), to be
deducted from his retirement benefits; and
2. Clerk of Court Milagros Lerey (retired) GUILTY of gross
neglect of duty for which she is meted a fine in the amount
of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00), to be deducted from
her retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Penalties for grave offenses
A.M. No. P-03-1720 May 28, 2004
JACINTO R. FERNANDEZ, JR., complainant,
vs.
MARIETTA M. GATAN, Clerk III, RTC, Br. 23 Roxas,
Isabela, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Public office is a public trust.1 All public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, and act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.2 Regrettably, this did not happen in this case.
On November 6, 2000, the Office of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court received the Letter-Complaint of Mr. Jacinto
R. Fernandez dated October 27, 2000 accusing Marietta M.
Gatan, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Roxas,
Isabela, of violating Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), for discourtesy and failure to issue
official receipts for payments received in behalf of the court.3
According to complainant’s mother, Mrs. Angeles R.
Fernandez (Mrs. Fernandez), on October 25, 2000, she went
to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela to
secure her court clearance. Thereat, respondent Marietta
Gatan assisted her, handing over the clearance. Respondent
demanded one hundred fifty (₱150.00) pesos as payment.
After paying the amount, Mrs. Fernandez asked for an official
receipt to prove payment of the clearance fee. Respondent,
however, told her that the receipt would no longer be
necessary.4
Upon her return to her residence, Mrs. Fernandez further
narrated, complainant advised her to return and obtain from
the respondent a receipt for the clearance fee. She heeded
the advice. Unfortunately, however, instead of respondent
issuing a receipt, she yelled at her saying "Ang kulit mo. Sa
dinami-dami ng kumukuha ng certification ikaw pa lang ang
bumalik dito. Yan ang pera mo kunin mo, kunin mo."5
After a while, Mrs. Fernandez added, respondent went to her
table, brought out money from her drawer and angrily
dumped it on the table, addressing her in Tagalog, "Yan ang
pera mo, kunin mo." She did not take the money back.6
Later on, respondent made amends to Mrs. Fernandez, the
latter added.7
Feeling that her mother was humiliated and aggrieved on
account of the incident, complainant conducted his own
investigation. According to him, he got confirmation even
from the officemates of the respondent that she has been
collecting ₱150.00 from every person who seeks court
clearance through her. He pointed to a certain Mr. Conrad
Pua who paid the amount for a clearance but was not issued
an official receipt by the respondent. He added there are
some well-known persons in their community who also had
the same experience.8
On December 21, 2000, then Court Administrator Alfredo L.
Benipayo referred the complaint of Jacinto Fernandez, Jr. to
Hon. Teodulo E. Mirasol (Judge Mirasol), then Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela, for
investigation and report.9 Judge Mirasol took the statements
of the complainant10 and Mrs. Fernandez.11 He also took
the statement of Mr. Pua who confirmed having been
charged by the respondent without issuing a receipt for a
court clearance.12 Respondent submitted her counter-
affidavit in which she disputed almost all the allegations of
Mrs. Fernandez.13
In his report dated March 6, 2001, Judge Mirasol
recommended that respondent be merely warned and
directed to exercise more prudence and caution in the
future.14
On April 17, 2001, then Deputy Court Administrator
Bernardo T. Ponferrada referred the complaint to respondent
Marietta M. Gatan for comment.15
Respondent, in her Comment dated June 11, 2001,
practically repeated what she stated in her counter-affidavit.
She denied anew having collected ₱150.00 from Mrs.
Fernandez for a court clearance and engaging in an
altercation with her in connection with her alleged demand
for an official receipt. Once again, she admitted processing
the court clearance requested by Mrs. Fernandez and
releasing it immediately after the Clerk of Court signed it.
However, for the first time, she declared that she saw Mrs.
Fernandez leave something on the table before the latter
left.16
On June 2, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
submitted its recommendation that respondent be suspended
for six (6) months, with a warning that a repetition of the
same in the future shall be dealt with more severely.17 The
OCA found, among others, that respondent collected P150.00
from Mrs. Fernandez for a clearance without issuing the
corresponding receipt.18
The crucial factual issues are whether Mrs. Fernandez paid
₱150.00 to the respondent and whether she was issued the
corresponding receipt by the respondent for the court
clearance. We resolve both issues in the affirmative.
To begin with, the amount of ₱150.00 which according to
Mrs. Fernandez the respondent had collected from her for the
court clearance she secured corresponds to the fee
prescribed by this Court for such a service. Under A.M. No.
00-02-01-SC19 which took effect on March 1, 2000 and
therefore, was still applicable when the incident subject of
this case took place, the prescribed fee for any service that
may be required by the Clerk of Court that is not specifically
prescribed therein is ₱150.00. Consequently, respondent
must have demanded the payment of the fee before she
handed the court clearance, duly signed by the Clerk of
Court, from Mrs. Fernandez. As the collection of the
clearance fee is standard procedure, Mrs. Fernandez must
have paid the fee. If she did not, she could not have secured
the court clearance.
In a significant way, respondent herself confirmed the fact of
payment of the clearance fee. She declared that Mrs.
Fernandez left something on the table after she secured the
clearance and before she left the office of the respondent.
Moreover, a witness in the person of Mr. Conrad Pua stated
that he had a similar experience with the respondent. He
secured a court clearance from the respondent for which he
paid ₱150.00 but he was not given a receipt.
Basically, respondent found herself in a quandary as to what
position or defense she would take in relation to the charge.
On one hand, she could not make an out-and-out denial of
the fact of payment of the clearance fee. If she did, she
would have to explain why he released the clearance to Mrs.
Fernandez. That is why she said Mrs. Fernandez left
something on her table. On the other hand, she could not
explicitly admit that she did receive the payment. If she did,
her case is irretrievably doomed. Indeed, she was caught in
a bind. But she had nobody to blame but herself.
Clearly, therefore, the respondent is guilty of grave
misconduct.
Grave misconduct is a malevolent transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer or
employee which threatens the very existence of the system
of administration of justice. An act that manifests the serious
lack of integrity, uprightness and honesty demanded of an
employee in the judiciary, and for which a respondent, in
such a case, does not deserve to stay a minute longer.20
The Supreme Court cannot countenance any conduct, act or
omission, which diminishes or even just tends to diminish the
faith of the people in the judiciary.21 The Court has
reiterated time and again the rule that the conduct of every
employee of the judiciary must be at all times characterized
with propriety and decorum, and above all else, it must be
above and beyond suspicion.22 The conduct and behavior of
every official and employee of an agency involved in the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the
most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility.23
This being the first offense of the respondent, suspension
from office for six (6) months appears to be the proper
penalty.24
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Marietta Gatan
GUILTY of grave misconduct, and hereby suspends her for
six (6) months,25 with a warning that a repetition of the
same in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Penalties for grave offenses
[ A.M. No. 16-02-01-CTA, November 15, 2016 ]
MA. ROSARIO R. ESCAÑO, CHIEF JUDICIAL STAFF
OFFICER, HUMAN RESOURCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCE SERVICES, COURT OF
TAX APPEALS, COMPLAINANT, VS. ADRIAN P.
MANAOIS, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OFFICER
III, HUMAN RESOURCE DIVISION, COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case against respondent Adrian P.
Manaois (Manaois) initiated by complainant Ma. Rosario R.
Escaño (Escaño) in her Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated
February 25, 2015 for grossly disrespectful behavior,
discourtesy in the course of official duties, gross
insubordination, knowingly making false statements against
co-employees, being notoriously undesirable, neglect in the
performance. of duty, failure to act promptly on letters and
requests, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.[2]
I
Manaois is employed as Human Resource Management
Officer III (HRMO III) of the Human Resource Division
(HRD), Office of Administrative and Finance Services (OAFS),
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Escaño is the Chief Judicial Staff
Officer of the HRD, and is the immediate supervisor of
Manaois.
This administrative case is an offshoot of previous OAFS
Grievance Reports filed by Escaño[3] (OAFS Grievance
Report No. 02-2014) and Manaois[4] (OAFS Grievance
Report No. 01-2014) against each other before the OAFS.
Their Grievance Reports were docketed as Office of the
Presiding Justice (OPJ) Grievance No. 01-2015.[5] Manaois,
however, indicated that he was withdrawing his complaint for
direct filing before the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA).[6] Nonetheless, these complaints were elevated to
the CTA Grievance Committee for proper disposition
pursuant to the rules.[7] Subsequently, on December 11,
2014, the CTA Grievance Committee issued a Resolution[8]
to "REFER and FORWARD the Complaint of Ms. Escaño to the
CTA Employees' Rules on Discipline (CTA EROD) for proper
disposition,"[9] and tore-docket the case as a regular
administrative case. Manaois moved for the reconsideration
of this Resolution, but the motion was denied. The
proceedings in OAFS Grievance Report Nos. 01-2014 and 02-
2014 were considered closed and terminated.[10]
Pursuant to the December 11, 2014 CTA Grievance
Committee Resolution, the records of the case were
forwarded to Associate Justice Ma. Belen M. Ringpis-Liban
(Investigating Officer Justice Ringpis-Liban), as the
Investigating Officer of the CTA EROD. In a Resolution[11]
dated February 23, 2015, Investigating Officer Justice
Ringpis-Liban noted a formal defect on the complaint of
Escaño, but found that it "is not fatal to the initiation of an
administrative complaint against Mr. Manaois."[12] Thus,
citing Section 6, Rule II of the CTA EROD, Investigating
Officer Justice Ringpis-Liban ordered Escaño to amend her
complaint.[13] In her amended complaint[14] (redocketed
as CTA EROD No. 2015-01), Escaño identified the following
instances as bases for the Formal Charge against Manaois:
Manaois failed to submit the service record of Atty. Agnes
Arao and Ms. Tanya Galapon under the Office of Associate
Justice Caesar A. Cassanova on time which caused the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) to follow up with HRD regarding
the delayed submission.[15]
Manaois showed and/or granted access to unauthorized
persons strictly confidential personnel files, such as 201 files,
statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, and
performance ratings, which prompted Escaño to issue a
memorandum to the entire department.[16]
Complaints from CTA employees assigned to Manaois
regarding his rude and hostile demeanor, which led Escaño
to rotate and change employees assigned to HRMOs.[17]
Manaois issued memoranda to Escaño, his immediate
supervisor, and to then Acting Section Chief, Ms. Mary Anne
Miralles (Miralles), without Escaño's knowledge and approval,
and in excess of his authority.[18]
Manaois' accusation, in front of other HRD employees,
against Ms. Maria Lourdes Mayor (Mayor), a fellow HRMO,
that the latter is incompetent and was delegating work within
the scope of her responsibilities.[19]
Manaois falsely accused a co-terminous court employee from
the Office of Justice Amelia C. Cotangco-Manalastas of
entering and registering two time cards without any basis.
[20]
On several occasions, Manaois had neglected to timely
provide Escaño with status reports regarding pending
matters assigned to him.[21]
Manaois publicly accused another co-employee, Ms. Ana Ria
Sundiam, of being incompetent, and upon being counseled
by Escaño on the matter, turned his back on her while she
was speaking and then stormed out of the room.[22]
Manaois, on several occasions, left the office without
informing or asking permission from Escaño.[23]
Manaois usurped the duties of Mr. Redd Ryan Adayo (Adayo)
as Liaison Officer of HRD, despite being relieved of such
function.[24]
Manaois questioned the overtime services rendered by senior
tax specialists when the request for overtime had already
been approved by the presiding justice upon the request of
other associate justices.[25]
Manaois was absent without official leave from September 9-
11 and 15, 2014.[26]
In the proceedings before Investigating Officer Justice
Ringpis-Liban, Manaois filed a manifestation with motion to
dismiss[27] instead of a counter-affidavit. He claimed that
the investigating officer has no jurisdiction over the
administrative case, but that only the Supreme Court has the
disciplinary authority over court personnel, considering that
he is being charged with grave or less grave offenses.
Investigating Officer Justice Ringpis-Liban denied the motion,
and instructed Manaois to file his counter-affidavit.[28]
Again, instead of filing his counter-affidavit, Manaois filed an
"appeal" with the OPJ, and furnished Investigating Officer
Justice Ringpis-Liban a copy of his "appeal."[29]
When the case was set for preliminary investigation, only
Escaño appeared.[30] Manaois excused himself from
attending in view of the pendency of his appeal. He said that
he "would like to exhaust all legal remedies available to
him,"[31] including his appeal with the OPJ. Investigating
Officer Justice Ringpis-Liban noted the manifestation, and
said that CTA EROD does not provide for an appeal
mechanism at this stage of the proceedings.[32]
Meanwhile, the CTA En Banc noted without action Manaois'
appeal, and stated that the appeal with the OPJ "is not an
available remedy under the [CTA EROD]."[33] In view of this
development, Investigating Officer Justice Ringpis-Liban
extended to Manaois another opportunity to attend a
preliminary investigation conference, as well as to submit
any affidavits or counter-affidavits supporting his cause.[34]
However, Manaois filed a manifestation ad cautelam[35]
expressing his intent to elevate the case to the Supreme
Court.
When the preliminary investigation terminated,[36] and after
evaluation of the witnesses presented by Escaño,
Investigating Officer Justice Ringpis Liban issued her
Preliminary Investigation Report[37] finding probable cause
to formally charge Manaois. She also recommended for his
preventive suspension for the maximum period of 90 days,
or in the alternative, for his immediate lateral transfer to a
different department.[38] On May 18, 2015, a Formal Charge
was filed by Investigating Officer Justice Ringpis-Liban
against Manaois.[39] On the same day, the CTA Third
Division affirmed the recommendation of Investigating
Officer Justice Ringpis-Liban, and resolved to refer the
matter regarding the preventive suspension to the Office of
the Presiding Justice Roman G. Del Rosario for proper
disposition.[40]
On June 29, 2015, Investigating Officer Justice Ringpis-Liban
endorsed to Presiding Justice Roman G. Del Rosario the
records of CTA EROD No. 2015-01 for raffling of the hearing
on the Formal Charge.[41] On June 30, 2015, the case was
raffled to the CTA First Division which was composed of
Associate Justices Roman Del Rosario (Chairman), Erlinda
Uy, and Cielito Mindaro-Grulla (hearing committee). They set
the case for preliminary conference on July 13, 2015,[42]
where only Escaño appeared. Instead of attending the
conference, Manaois filed an omnibus motion to cancel the
preliminary conference. He moved for the inhibition of the
members of the hearing committee, and the referral of the
case to the OCA. The hearing committee denied the omnibus
motion.[43]
Despite due notice, Manaois failed to appear in the July 23,
[44] July 29,[45] and August 28, 2015[46] hearings set by
the hearing committee. He likewise failed to submit his
memorandum, hence, the formal investigation was
considered terminated, and submitted for decision.[47] To
establish the allegations in the Formal Charge, Escaño and
five other witnesses testified by way of judicial affidavits.[48]
In its Formal Investigation Report[49] dated October 15,
2015, the hearing committee found Manaois guilty of simple
neglect of duty, simple misconduct, discourtesy in the course
of official duties, violation of Sections 1 and 2, Canon IV of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, frequent
unauthorized absences from duty during regular office hours,
insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, and being notoriously undesirable. Accordingly,
it recommended, subject to the approval of the Supreme
Court, that Manaois be dismissed from service with
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
and perpetual disqualification from holding public office and
from taking the civil service examination.[50]
On November 3, 2015, the hearing committee formally
endorsed the case to this Court for its approval.[51]
II
We first discuss the issue of jurisdiction which Manaois used
as basis for ignoring the proceedings below. He argues that
the power to discipline justices, judges and court employees
is constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court. Citing OCA
Circular No. 30-91,[52] he maintains that the disciplinary
authority of the presiding justices of lower collegiate courts is
limited to light offenses only. However, since he is being
charged with grave and less grave offenses, it is the
Supreme Court that has jurisdiction.[53]
The contention lacks merit. Manaois misapprehends the
nature of the proceedings before the hearing committee, and
the actions it undertook.
The proceedings below were essentially investigative and the
hearing committee's actions were merely recommendatory.
The hearing committee did not directly impose any sanction
on Manaois. In fact, it was explicitly stated in the dispositive
portion that the penalty was "subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court."[54] The hearing committee acted within the
bounds of its authority, as embodied in Rule II Section 14 of
the CTA EROD, the governing rules on disciplinary cases
involving CTA employees, to wit:
Sec. 14. Referral of the CTA's Formal Investigation Report on
the Administrative cases to the Supreme Court - Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA). The CTA's Formal Investigation
Report (including all the records of the administrative case)
for the meting out of the proper penalty(ies), which has
already become final, shall be submitted by the CTA to the
Supreme Court, through the OCA, within fifteen (15) days
therefrom, for its approval. The Supreme Court may affirm,
reverse or modify the CTA's Formal Investigation Report.
However, in cases where the CTA's Formal Investigation
Report imposes only a penalty of suspension for not more
than thirty (30) days or a fine in an amount not exceeding
thirty (30) days' salary, and have already become final, the
same shall be deemed immediately executory by the CTA
without further need of submitting the aforesaid Formal
Investigation Report to the Supreme Court.
In promulgating the CTA EROD, the CTA knew the extent of
its disciplinary authority under OCA Circular No. 30-91. It
made the same delineation between light offenses and
grave/less grave offenses as prescribed in the circular.
Because the charges against Manaois involved grave[55] and
less grave[56] offenses, the hearing committee correctly
limited itself to conducting an investigation, recommending
penalties, and forwarding the case to this Court for
appropriate action. The hearing committee, therefore, did
not usurp the Court's administrative power over the
employees of the judiciary.
The power of justices and judges of lower courts to
investigate and recommend to the Supreme Court the
necessary disciplinary action is well recognized.[57] In Nery
v. Gamolo,[58] we held that "[a]s administrator of her court,
she is responsible for its conduct and management. She has
the duty to supervise her court personnel to ensure prompt
and efficient dispatch of business in her court."[59] Thus, in
that case, we ruled that the order of suspension issued by
Judge Nery finds support in Rule 3.10 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which provides that, "A judge should take or initiate
appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court
personnel for unprofessional conduct which the judge may
become aware of."[60]
The same principle applies why the CTA, through
the·procedure laid down in its EROD,[61] is allowed to
investigate and recommend appropriate disciplinary
measures against erring employees. In administrative
complaints involving grave offenses, the role of the CTA
(through the designated hearing committee) is confined to
the investigation of the case, and the recommendation of the
appropriate disciplinary action. Consistent with existing rules,
this Court receives the Formal Investigation Report, which
we can affirm, reverse, or modify based on our independent
judgment.
III
We agree with the findings of the hearing committee that
Manaois is guilty of simple neglect of duty, discourtesy in the
course of official duties, frequent unauthorized absences, and
being notoriously undesirable.
Simple Neglect of Duty
Neglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give one's
attention to a task expected of him.[62] Section 1, Canon IV
of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel commands court
personnel to perform their official duties properly and
dilligently at all times. Since the image of the courts, as the
administrators and dispensers of justice, is not only reflected
in their decisions, resolutions or orders but also mirrored in
the conduct of court personnel, it is incumbent upon every
court personnel to observe the highest degree of efficiency
and competency in his or her assigned tasks. The failure to
meet these standards warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions.[63]
In this case, Manaois failed to timely process the service
records of Atty. Agnes D. Arao (Court Attorney IV), and Ms.
Tanya B. Galapon (Executive Assistant V), both employees
under the Office of Associate Justice Caesar A. Cassanova. In
finding Manaois guilty, the hearing committee relied on the
testimony of Escaño. She testified that the CSC had been
following up the service records with her, prompting her to
issue a Memorandum[64] addressed to Manaois instructing
him to submit the documents to the CSC Field Office the next
day. The submission of the service records may be
considered as a clerical job, thus any delay in its
performance is considered unreasonable.[65] Manaois'
inaction in processing the service records shows that he was
remiss in his duty, and therefore guilty of simple neglect of
duty.
Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties
The hearing committee also recommended that Manaois be
adjudged guilty of discourtesy in the course of official duties
based on the following instances:
First, Escaño alleged that she has been receiving complaints
from CTA employees assigned to Manaois regarding his
rudeness, callousness, and notorious undesirability, which
caused her to frequently change the employees assigned to
him, as evidenced by a Memorandum[66] dated May 10,
2013.
Second, Manaois disregarded the hierarchy of positions and
acted in excess of his authority when he bypassed the
authority of Escaño (as the Division Chief) by directly issuing
a memorandum against Miralles, who was then Acting HRD
Section Chief. In a Memorandum[67] dated March 28, 2012,
Escaño reminded her staff of the proper protocol in case of
intradivision disputes, and expressed that Manaois' act was
"prejudicial to [her] capacity as the Chief of the Division and
to Ms. Miralles who [was] acting as Section Chief x x x."[68]
Third, Manaois accused Mayor (HRMO III) of giving false
instructions to Karla D. Aspa (HRMO I). In a letter addressed
to Escaño, he stated that in his view, Mayor should "refrain
from verbally instructing her subordinates especially in the
performance of [their] duties and responsibilities, if she is
not familiar to [sic] the same x x x."[69] In response, Mayor
expressed that she was indignant with Manaois' statement
because it intended to malign her work value.[70]
Fourth, Manaois was rude and discourteous in his dealings
with Escaño. In one instance, Manaois stormed out of the
room while Escaño was clarifying another incident involving
Manaois and a fellow HRMO, Anna Ria Sundiam. Mayor also
testified that Manaois had a tendency to talk back to Escaño
in an arrogant manner.[71] Another employee, Rowena
Lising (Lising), also attested to Manaois' impolite behavior
towards Escaño.[72]
Based on the foregoing, we find Manaois guilty of discourtesy
in the course of official duties. As a public officer, Manaois is
bound, in the performance of his official duties, to observe
courtesy, civility, and self restraint in his dealings with
others.[73] "All judicial employees must refrain from the use
of abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing or otherwise
improper language. They are expected to accord due
respect, not only to their superiors, but also to all others.
Their every act and word should be characterized by
prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity."[74] In this case,
it has been shown that Manaois failed to live up to these
standards on several occasions.
Frequent Unauthorized Absences
The hearing committee found that Manaois incurred
absences without official leave (AWOL) on September 9, 10,
11, and 15, 2014, and was "no-call, no-show" during those
days. These acts constitute violations of the Human Resource
Department's Internal Policy on Office Protocol which
requires all Human Resource Department employees to
inform their Chief of their absences.[75] Manaois' fellow
HRMOs - namely, Miralles, Lising, and Adayo - also testified
that he often left the office during working hours without
informing Escaño of his whereabouts.[76]
We agree with the recommendations of the hearing
committee. Manaois' unauthorized absences and loafing
during office hours are impermissible. Due to the nature and
functions of their office, officials and employees of the
judiciary must be role models in the faithful observance of
the constitutional canon that public office is a public trust.
Inherent in this mandate is the observance of the prescribed
office hours and efficient use of every moment for public
service, if only to recompense the government, and
ultimately, the people who shoulder the cost of maintaining
the judiciary. Thus, to inspire public respect for the justice
system, court officials and employees are, at all times,
behooved to strictly observe official time.[77]
Notorious Undesirability
Finally, we agree with the hearing committee's finding that
Manaois' notorious undesirability is manifest from his general
reputation among his co-workers in the HRD, as well as his
previous transfers from different divisions of the CTA due to
his inability to work well with others and his disrespect for
his immediate supervisors. Escaño,[78] Mayor,[79] Lising,
[80] Miralles,[81] and Adayo,[82] testified that Manaois was
difficult to work with and that he had negative interactions
with his co-employees. Manaois' former supervisor in the
Budget Division, Isidro Barredo, Jr., also stated that Manaois
displayed unruly attitude towards him and had asked that he
be transferred to another division.[83]
In determining whether an employee is notoriously
undesirable, the CSC prescribes a two-fold test: (1) whether
it is common knowledge or generally known as universally
believed to be true or manifest to the world that the
employee committed the acts imputed against him; and (2)
whether he had contracted the habit for any of the
enumerated misdemeanors.[84] We are satisfied that
Manaois' general reputation within the HRD as someone who
is quarrelsome and difficult to work with, in addition to his
history of rude and discourteous conduct towards his
supervisors, adequately show that he is notoriously
undesirable. Manaois' actions have been substantiated and
corroborated by the testimonies of the witnesses presented
during the investigation.
An employee who cannot get along with his co-employees
and superiors can upset and strain the working environment
and is therefore detrimental to institution.[85] Such instance
calls for us to exercise our prerogative to take the necessary
action to correct the situation and protect the judiciary.
The Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service prescribes the following penalties for respondent's
violations:
Sec. 46. Classification of Offenses. - x x x
(A). The following grave offenses shall be punishable by
dismissal from the service:
xxx
4. Being notoriously undesirable;
xxx
(B). The following grave offenses shall be punishable by
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year
for the first offense and dismissal from the service for the
second offense:
xxx
5. Frequent unauthorized absences, or tardiness in reporting
for duty, loafing from duty during regular office hours;
xxx
(D). The following less grave offenses are punishable by
suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day suspension to
six (6) months for the first offense; and dismissal from the
service for the second offense:
1. Simple neglect of duty;
xxx
3. Discourtesy in the course of official duties;
xxx
Section 50 of the same Rules provides that if the respondent
is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty
to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most
serious charge and the rest shall be considered as
aggravating. In this case, the most serious charge for which
we find Manaois guilty of is the grave offense of being
notoriously undesirable, which is punishable by dismissal
from service. We therefore adopt the hearing committee's
recommendation that Manaois be imposed the penalty of
dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Adrian P. Manaois
GUILTY of simple neglect of duty, discourtesy in the course
of official duties, frequent unauthorized absences, and being
notoriously undesirable. Accordingly, he is meted with the
penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with the accessory
penalties of cancellation of his eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding
public office, and bar from taking civil service examinations.
[86]
SO ORDERED.
Penalties for grave offenses
A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006
ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant,
vs.
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.
DECISION

PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of
Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the
Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction
of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together
with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates
Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;2 and constitutes sufficient ground for his
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.3
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to
the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004,
informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte
hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.4 After that
hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the
case on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments.5
Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper,
which he did on July 27, 2004.6 Afterwards, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa
rendered her Report and Recommendation, which was later
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent
had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for
frustrated homicide,7 which involved moral turpitude, should
result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were
summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City in this wise:
"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and
was on his way home after gassing up in preparation for his
trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street,
a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not
knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not
just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the
Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor.
Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter
stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets.
The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and
held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver
forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the
ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been
drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the
accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car
to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood
up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist
blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The
accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about
to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned
his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until
he could be pacified and then released him. The accused
went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that
the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver
was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the
eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up
intending to return them to the accused. But as he was
handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel
of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him
hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused
so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was
witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated
that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto
Soriano."8
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came
to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital.
Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the
left side of his neck,9 complainant would have surely died of
hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance,
according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez,
Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused
paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his
job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29,
2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application
for probation, which was granted by the court on several
conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities
imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party,
Roberto Soriano."10
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty.
Dizon, who has yet to comply with this particular
undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of
Appeals.11
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa
recommended that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been
convicted of such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an
obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following
facts:
"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault
Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi, had
overtaken him;
"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted
assault, Respondent went back to his car, got a gun,
wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot
Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply
pushed him out and fled;
"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming
evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant;
"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he
claimed that he was the one mauled by Complainant and two
unidentified persons; and,
"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent
has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to
Complainant."12
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final
action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of
Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground
for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is
deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of
justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral
character.13 In the instant case, respondent has been found
guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of
frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been
established and is no longer open to question, the only
issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1)
whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral
turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is
done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals."14
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves
moral turpitude has been discussed in International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,15 a labor case concerning
an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his
conviction for homicide. Considering the particular
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this
Court rejected the employer’s contention and held that
homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it
did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRI’s
Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for
dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the
attendant circumstances, the employer made a
pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not
for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime
involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the
courts, as explained thus:
"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not
involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every
known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any
particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances. x x x."16 (Emphasis supplied)
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not
involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence
of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision,
the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:
"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI
employee] was then urinating and had his back turned when
the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim
then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that
Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was
ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that
he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and
desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on
Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times.
These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the
victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his
favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and
voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any
aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's
character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or
unjust."17
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly
found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude
of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and
shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of
aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the
fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by
complainant. Under the circumstances, those were
reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s
assault.
We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a
further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He
shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to
defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault
was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely
returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter
unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent
wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not
to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly
intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of
moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his
extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were,
he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be
venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate
reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his
fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His
overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely
an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In
the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not
the persistence of a person who has been grievously
wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false
sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously
transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed
firearm18 and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil
liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and
disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him
that, both in his attorney’s oath20 and in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the
laws of the land."
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he
is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the
benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his
sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been
four years21 since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities
to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in
refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity
and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple
traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity,
good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty.
Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could
never even fully restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate,
not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly
to their good moral character.22 Where their misconduct
outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show
them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the
privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law,
the court may be justified in suspending or removing them
from that office.23
We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an
utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential
qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law.
Good moral character includes at least common honesty.24
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed
dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial
court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel
Fariñas, an out-of-court settlement with complainant’s
family.25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a
complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s
family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his
referral to a neurosurgeon.26
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to
fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been mauled
by complainant and two other persons.27 The trial court had
this to say:
"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three
(3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his
allegation that three people including the complainant helped
each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he
sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not
downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said
were bent on beating him to death could do so little damage.
On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant’s
version of the incident particularly when he said that he
boxed the accused on the chest. x x x."28
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification
for bar membership is more important than truthfulness.29
The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on
honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Hence,
lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled
by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act
in good faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public
perception of the legal profession. They constitute moral
turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble
profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only
upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally. Because they
are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must
at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings
with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach."31
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely
dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the
depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function be competent, honorable and reliable
-- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.32 Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate
and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence,
we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious
members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised
with great caution, and that disbarment should never be
decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end
desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot
extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so
despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society
and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a
lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty
aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a
shining exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a
privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character,
not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein
respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide,
the attending circumstances – not the mere fact of their
conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the
legal profession. In the present case, the appalling
vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of
respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a
member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby
DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in
his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Penalties for grave offenses
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN
A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO,
Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for
disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) with the
Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty.
Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo
(Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty.
Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960’s when they
were both students at the University of the Philippines, but
they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the
paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at
that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr.
Perez.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed
to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the latter on
May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita,
Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the
Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig
however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got
her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a
scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her,
which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard
Law School.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of
obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his
marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her
once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime
in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree
from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty.
Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful
and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to
their marriage.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in
the State of Virginia in the United States of America (USA).
Their union was blessed with a child whom they named
Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to
Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was
obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and
Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she
confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly
assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he
obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez
under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally
adopt their son.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his
promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to nullify
his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would
still have to get the consent of Gomez to the said
petition.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an
anonymous letter9 in the mail informing her of Atty.
Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that
sometime later, she came upon a love letter10 written and
signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25,
2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to
Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is
removed.” Apparently, five months into their relationship,
Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their
affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment
of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a
petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to
Gomez.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez
and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in
Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was
frequently seen.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed
the respondents to file their respective comments, which
they separately did on November 25,
2002.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married
Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that
immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that
she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations,
as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their
union was blessed with four children, their relationship
simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de
facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty.
Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the
agreement to separate and live apart could be implemented.
Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property
regime of complete separation of property. She likewise
advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the
Dominican Republic for whatever value it may have and
comfort it may provide them.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each
executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a Judge
of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic,
appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action
under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce
by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic
court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133,
which was granted on June 23,
1984.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing,
including the fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican
Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines.
Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty.
Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that
Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr.
Perez in July 1984 in the USA.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their
marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to Gomez
was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez
because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if
he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of
legitimacy to their relationship.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez
turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in October 2001
to prevent any acrimony from
developing.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr.
Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to
fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo
joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that while
he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and
in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo
resigned from his firm in January
2001.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with
Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began
courting her while she was employed in his firm. She
however rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic overtures; she
told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he
was married and that he was too old for her. She said that
despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her,
which was the reason why she resigned from his law
firm.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation within 90 days from
notice.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) issued an Order24 setting the mandatory conference
of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later
reset to August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties
manifested that they were already submitting the case for
resolution based on the pleadings already submitted.
Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their
respective position papers within 10 days from notice.
Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their
position papers on October 17, 200325 and October 20,
2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on
October 24, 2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of
Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out
that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite
knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still
subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which
warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The
Investigating Commissioner further opined
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the
evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig established a
pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation
and his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or
unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor
of law, both in his official and personal conduct, must display
exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous marriage and
his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely
caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How
can he hold his head up high and expect his students, his
peers and the community to look up to him as a model
worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of
morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding
knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting
marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an
otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the
generally accepted moral standards of the community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be
dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present
clear and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged
affair between the respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution,30 which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December
10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, claiming
that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely
on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out
that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a
complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of
persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or
by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said
that despite the absence of any corroborating testimony, the
Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’
testimony.
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of
committing any felony; that he never concealed the status of
his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted
that he had always been transparent with both Gomez and
Dr. Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated
December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s motion for
reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed
gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the
parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court agrees
with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.cralawred
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much
greater import, as far as the general public is concerned,
than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character
is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal
profession, but it must also remain intact in order to
maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the
absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in
the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must
be so because “vast interests are committed to his care; he
is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals
with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.”34
(Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from
the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court
on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct
showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.”35 Immoral conduct
involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is
gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or
when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of
decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly
immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous
one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties
and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed
establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is
not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a
high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a
wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968, which was
then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig
started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again.
Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children
after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then
already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy
problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto
separation from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal partnership
of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the
Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in
the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr.
Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth just so
he could marry her right away – a marriage that has at least
a semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce
decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic
was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were
both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still
validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless
his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity.
Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing
circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social
propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful
disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty.
Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty.
Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the
logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the
USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy
by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine
jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is
true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage
is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various
legal strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his
otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the
very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the
highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and
despite the various legal actions he resorted to in order to
give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left
her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally
decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to
Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with the
much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by
his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from
Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be
considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part
of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral
conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of
gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s
desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to
Gomez.
“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member
of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages
the generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage.’”37 In various cases,
the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a
lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has borne him a
child.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate disregard
of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by
the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own
admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the
institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in
the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus
warrant the penalty of disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as
a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this
case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to
wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most
appropriate penalty.
Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him
are not credible since they are uncorroborated and not
supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty.
Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed
married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with
Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides
ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction
against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the
respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating
Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove the
claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it
is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her
claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing
her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and
the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by
Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or
disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys
the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received
by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed received a
letter informing her of the alleged relations between the
respondents; it does not prove the veracity of the allegations
therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only
proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter
professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty.
Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions,
the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross
immorality and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the
Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Penalties for grave offenses
G.R. No. 199549               April 7, 2014
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DEPARTMENT OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Regional Office No.
V, Petitioners,
vs.
MARILYN G. ARANDIA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari  are the
1 to Manila of Director Eriberta B. Nepomuceno for the
decision  dated June 30, 2011 and the resolution  dated
2 3
November 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 100422.
The CA dismissed the administrative complaint for gross
insubordination, gross neglect of duty, conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of public service, grave
misconduct and gross inefficiency in the performance of duty
filed against respondent Marilyn. G. Arandia, then
Administrative Officer V of the Department of Science and
Technology Regional Office No. V (DOST-V) in Rawis, Legazpi
City.
The Facts
In March 2000, Eriberta Nepomuceno, Regional Director of
DOST-V, filed an administrative complaint  for
4
gross
insubordination, gross neglect of duty, conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of public service, grave
misconduct and gross inefficiency in the performance of duty
against the respondent with the Civil Service Commission
Regional Office No. V (CSCRO-V), Legazpi City. Nepomuceno
alleged that the respondent refused to sign, without justifiable
cause, documents for the payment of certain miscellaneous and
travelling expenses, phone bills, and the release of salaries and
allowances of Nepomuceno and other employees of DOST-V.
In her answer  to the complaint, the respondent justified her
5 previous marriage be obtained by a married woman in
refusal to sign and attributed it to the failure of Nepomuceno
and the other concerned employees to submit sufficient
supporting documents for their claims for reimbursement and
the release of their salaries and allowances.
On March 22, 2002, a Formal Charge  was issued against the
6
respondent for the offenses of grave misconduct, gross
insubordination and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. These offenses were committed as follows:
1. That Marilyn G. Arandia intentionally refused to sign
boxes A not only of the disbursement vouchers as
payment for the approved and official travelling expenses
period from October 20-28, 1999, but also that of the
vouchers as payments for the official travelling expenses
incurred by Accountant Remegia Caluya and Budget
Officer Susana Bertes from October 26-28, 1999 and that
of the disbursement voucher as payment for the official
travel to Manila of Dr. Felina D. Ferro from February 20
to 25, 2000;
2. That Arandia refused to sign box A of the
disbursement voucher as payment for the actual services
rendered by one Jobert Mejillano from October 18 to 30,
1999 and from November 16 to 30, 1999;
3. That Arandia continuously refused to sign box A of the
disbursement voucher as cash advance payment for
diesel expenses to be incurred by Director Nepomuceno
while on official travel to Manila from February 18 to 22,
2000 in the amount of ₱3,000.00 of ₱4,301.00 for the
primary reason that Eriberta N. Navera is the authorized
and recognized person who can get cash advance and
not Eliberta (sic) B. Nepomuceno
In Bringas-Dayson, Carmencita Giselle E.B., CSC
Resolution no. 96-2351 the Commission said that "xxx a
judicial decree of nullity of a previous marriage is not
necessary before a woman can resume using her maiden
name. No law require that a judicial decree of nullity of a
order to validly use her maiden name;"
4. That Arandia vehemently refused to obey various
directions of Director Nepomuceno on the approval of
 telephone call slip for the two division chiefs per
memorandum dated 6 March 2000 and on the issuance
directing Arandia to immediately turn-over all documents
under her direct supervision and the exchange of room
assignments with the duly constituted Administrative
Officer-Designate pursuant to Special Order No. 023, s.
of 2000 (dated 9 June 2000); and;
5. That on December 15, 1999 and February 16, 2000,
Arandia, respectively, refused to sign box A of the
disbursement voucher, to the prejudice of the interest of
the service, as payment for the registration fee of three
(3) participants to the two-day training on the "Revised
Policies on Performance Evaluation System" and
"Updates on Civil Service Matters." 7
In an Order  dated April 26, 2006, Director Cecilia R. Nieto of
8 accounting functions, budget operation and control." Clearly,
CSCRO-V found respondent guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service only and imposed on her the penalty
of suspension for six months and one day. The respondent filed
a motion for reconsideration but Director Nieto denied the
motion in a subsequent order  dated June 8, 2006. She then
9
appealed her case to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
National Office.
Ruling of the CSC
The CSC partially found merit in respondent’s appeal. In a
Resolution No. 070801 dated April 23, 2007,  the CSC made the
10
following findings:
After careful evaluation of the records of the case, the
Commission finds no substantial evidence to hold Arandia guilty
of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
xxxx
First, it must be first pointed out that Arandia was held liable for
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for her
refusal to sign "box A" of various disbursement vouchers
pertinent to the transactions of her office, namely, the
disbursement vouchers for official travelling expenses of the
complainant Director Nepomuceno for her trip to Manila
covering the period of October 20 to 28, 1999, the
disbursement vouchers for the travelling expenses of Remegio
Caluya (Accountant) and Susana Ferro (Budget Officer) from
October 26-28, 1999, and that of Felina Ferro from February
20-25, 2000 and the disbursement voucher for the payment of
the salary of Jobert Mejillano for the period of October 18- 30,
1999 and November 16-30, 1999. The records are replete with
evidence that indeed Arandia had justifiable reasons in not
signing these disbursement vouchers.
It must be emphasized that the functions performed by Arandia
are not merely clerical in nature, neither are they ministerial.
The Position Description Form (PDF) of Arandia as
Administrative Officer V states "supervises and coordinates
these functions require a degree of discretion which is even
more amplified considering that it involves the disbursement of
public funds. x x x
Clearly, the provisions of the foregoing law [referring to Section
171 of the GAAM] rendered Arandia to be more circumspect in
(sic) performance of the duties of her office, specifically in
affixing her signatures on undocumented disbursements. This
circumspection with regard to her duties cannot be classified as
an undue prejudice to the best interest of the service, thus
making her liable for the offense.
Also, her cautious attitude in approving disbursements is not
without basis. Records show that in the audit conducted by the
DOST Central Office for the period January to August 1999
signed by then DOST Assistant Secretary Imelda D. Rodriguez
yielded adverse findings with regard to the transactions of
DOST Region V. In the said report, it was indicated that: "The
findings covered disbursement of public funds principally
approved by Regional Director Eriberta N. Navera, which
indicate a pattern of dishonesty, consisting largely of claims of
the Regional Director which are unnecessary, irregular,
excessive and extravagant. The disbursements indicate,
likewise, a pattern of wanton disregard for accounting and
auditing rules and regulations involving other finance officials
such as the Budget Officer and the Accountant."
With respect to the salary of Jobert Mejillano, Arandia did not
affix her signature in box of the disbursement voucher, since
there was no valid basis to do so. This Commission in
Memorandum Circular No. 46., s. 1990 (Prohibiting the Practice
of Issuing Job Orders in Hiring Casuals) prohibits the hiring of
Job Orders in hiring casuals. In DOST Memorandum dated May
24, 1999, then Assistant Secretary Imelda D. Rodriguez,
instructed all Directors of DOST, to comply strictly with the
aforementioned CSC memorandum circular. Thus, Arandia
cannot be held liable for her refusal to sign the said
disbursement voucher considering that she merely obeyed the
DOST memorandum prohibiting the hiring of casuals thru job
orders.
xxxx
Records are bereft of any showing that the aforementioned
requirements [referring to Section 168 of the GAAM] have been
complied with. In fact, the audit investigation conducted by the
DOST Central Office showed that DOST Regional Office No. V
incurred several unnecessary, irregular, excessive and
extravagant disbursement of public funds. Thus, Arandia, in
refusing (sic) affix her signature was exercising her prudent
discretion, which by reason of the office she holds, was
incumbent upon her.
On the issue of the (sic) Arandia’s refusal to sign the
appropriate box in the disbursement voucher for the travelling
expenses for the period of January 20-February 14, 2000 of
Director Eriberta Nepomuceno, the Commission likewise finds
Arandia’s refusal valid. While it is true that Arandia was
furnished a copy of the (sic) Director Nepomuceno’s affidavit
that the latter is reverting to her maiden name, records show
that Arandia relied on the opinion of the Assistant Secretary
when she refused to sign the same. In fact, Arandia requested
for a legal opinion from then DOST Assistant Secretary Apolonio
B. Anota Jr., with regard to the procedure to be followed. In a
Memorandum addressed to Director Nepomuceno dated
February 28, then Assistant Secretary Anota relying on Articles
371-373 of the Civil Code replied:
"Considering that our records show that your appointment
paper, oath of office and other official documents are clear that
the one appointed to, and who assumed, the position of
Regional Director DOST Regional Office 5 carries the name
ERIBERTA N. NAVERA, the following requirements should be
complied with before we can consider that the person bearing
said name and ERIBERTA NEPOMUCENO is one and the same:
xxx
"For the meantime, this Department will be recognizing all acts
and official matters coming from the Regional Director, DOST 5
under the official name ERIBERTA N. NAVERA only." 11
These findings, notwithstanding, the CSC still found the
respondent liable for insubordination for her refusal to obey
several memoranda issued by Nepomuceno requiring her to
immediately turn-over the documents under her supervision to
the new Administrative Officer-Designate, Engr. Manuel Sn. B.
Lucena, Jr., and to comply with the exchange of room
assignment (as well as the memoranda directing her to answer
or submit an explanation for her refusal) brought about by the
respondent’s reassignment from the position of Administrative
Officer to Planning Officer.
It appears that, on August 29, 1999, Nepomuceno issued
Special Order No. 32 designating the respondent as Planning
Officer and Co-Division Chief of the Technical Services Division
of DOST-V, which order was temporarily suspended (pending a
motion for clarification) and then re-issued on June 9, 2000 as
Special Order No. 23. The respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration questioning her reassignment on June 27, 2000.
Also, the CSC found that the respondent refused to comply with
an office memorandum dated March 6, 2000 requiring her and
another Division Chief, to secure Nepomuceno’s
approval/signature before using the office telephone. For these
reasons, the CSC found the respondent guilty of two counts of
insubordination and imposed on her the penalty of three
months suspension.  The respondent filed a motion for
12
reconsideration which the CSC denied; thus, the appeal with the
CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, the CA ruled in the respondent’s favor
and dismissed the administrative complaint filed against the
respondent after it found that she actually complied with the
subject office memoranda:
Immediately upon receipt of such denial [referring to the denial
of the respondent’s motion for reconsideration to her
reassignment], petitioner [respondent herein] complied with
Nepomuceno’s order and forwarded to Engr. Lucena pertinent
documents in her possession. This is evinces by the Letter
dated 28 June 2000 detailing the list of documents entrusted
into the custody of Engr. Lucena, The Letter speaks for itself as
it ineluctably established that petitioner complied with her
superior’s order – to turn over pertinent documents despite her
reluctance to relinquish her post as Administrative Officer V.
Next, the records unearthed that it was Engr. Lucena who was
hesitant, if not, unwilling to exchange room assignments with
petitioner. His Letter dated 28 February 2002 to Nepomuceno
cannot be any clearer –
This is to request retention of my present room assignment at
PMES for the very reason that key ASD officers’ (Accountant,
Budget Officer and Supply Officer) offices are already located on
the first floor adjacent to it. It would be most convenient and
advantageous to all if we were to be located near one another
for an efficient and effective flow of official transactions.
I hope that this will merit your kind approval.
This was followed by another missive explaining at greater
length why he was skeptic in exchanging rooms with petitioner
–
Anent your memo dated 1 August 2003 of same subject, may I
request that my transfer to TSD Room be temporarily put aside
for the following reasons:
1. As I repeatedly conveyed to you, taking into
consideration my assignment in planning where a lot of
concentration is needed, movement and sound common
in a shared room easily distract me. My previous
Directors recognized it that is why I am assigned in this
present room since 1996. And the whole are including
the computer room is assigned to PMES and IT where I
also belong as its Project Manager. We worked as a
team.
2. Scattering me and my Team members in PMES-IT will
effectively destroy our teamwork to the detriment of the
projects and in total contrast to sound management
practice of teamwork and team building. Also, I can
easily attend to the computer server LAN-internet
requirements together with and/or in the absence of Mr.
Serrano because it is just within the same work area.
xxxx
How then could petitioner transfer to Engr. Lucena’s room given
that it was the latter who refused to surrender his office space?
Petitioner found herself in an apparent cul-de-sac as she was
unable to move in to Engr. Lucena’s room through no fault of
her own.13
The CA likewise found that the respondent did not violate the
March 6, 2000 memorandum that required her to seek
clearance from the Regional Director’s Office before making any
phone call because at the time the respondent made the
contested telephone calls, she had not yet received any copy of
the memorandum.
The Issue
The sole issue raised in the present petition for review on
certiorari is the respondent’s liability for insubordination.
Our Ruling
We find the present petition partially meritorious.
respondent is guilty of simple insubordination.
Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order,
which a superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed. The
term imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and
reasonable instructions of the employer. 14
In this case, the respondent committed insubordination when
she failed to promptly act on the June 16, 2000
memorandum  issued by her superior, Regional Director
15
Nepomuceno, reminding her of her duties to immediately turn-
over documents to and exchange room assignments with the
new Administrative Officer-Designate, Engr. Lucena. The
subject memorandum was a lawful order issued to enforce
Special Order No. 23, s. of 2000 reassigning the respondent
from Administrative to Planning Officer, and which warranted
the respondent’s obedience and compliance.
The reiteration of the directives in the June 16, 2000
memorandum in several succeeding memoranda issued by
Nepomuceno (dated June 19, 2000,  June 23, 2000  and June
16 17
26, 2000),  all the more demonstrates the respondent’s inaction
18
and non-compliance with her superior’s orders.  The records
1âwphi1
show that it was only on June 28, 2000 that the respondent
complied with the document tum-over through a letter
addressed to Engr. Lucena containing a list of personnel files,
human resource management and general administration
documents under her accountability. 19
We see in the respondent's initial inaction her deliberate choice
not to act on the subject memoranda; she waited until the
resolution of her motion for reconsideration of her reassignment
(that she filed on June 27, 2000) before she actually complied.
The service would function very inefficiently if these types of
dilatory actions would be allowed.
As for the memorandum on the use of the office telephone, we
find, as the CA did, the charge against the respondent
unmeritorious. Though the subject memorandum was issued on
March 6, 2000, the respondent's office received it only on March
The 7, 2000 at around 10 o'clock in the moming.  Thus, respondent
20
could not have committed a violation for the telephone calls she
made earlier that day.
Insubordination is a less grave offense punishable by
suspension of one month and one day to six months.  Since we
21
merely found the respondent guilty of insubordination in not
promptly complying with the memoranda for the turn-over of
documents, we find the suspension of one month and one day
as sufficient penalty for her offense.
Considering, however, that respondent is no longer with DOST-
V and is now working abroad, we can no longer impose on her
the penalty of suspension from service. In lieu thereof, we
impose on the respondent the penalty of a fine of one month
salary, which amount is to be deducted from her retirement
benefits or from whatever benefits, if any, that she is still
entitled to receive after her resignation. If there is none, the
respondent is ordered to pay the fine directly to and within the
period to be directed by the CSC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Marilyn G. Arandia
GUILTY of INSUBORDINATION and impose on her the penalty of
a FINE equivalent to her one month salary.
SO ORDERED.
Penalties for less grave offenses
G. R. No. 140519 - August 21, 2001
PHILIPPINE RETIREMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, v.
THELMA RUPA, Respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner PHILIPPINE RETIREMENT AUTHORITY (PRA) is a
government-owned and controlled corporation under the
Office of the President. It was created to oversee an
unconventional program designed to meet the tight foreign
exchange situation in the country. Its objective is to promote
and develop the Philippines as a retirement destination for
foreign nationals and former Filipino citizens. To become a
PRA member, a retiree must maintain a minimum U.S. dollar
time deposit account with a PRA-accredited bank. The PRA
then converts this account into active investment. In return,
the foreign retiree is extended benefits and incentives, such
as grants of certain tax exemptions, resident status,
balikbayan privileges, etc. The qualified retiree is also given
a multiple entry Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV).
Should he decide to withdraw his dollar account, he shall
surrender his passport to the PRA for cancellation of the
SRRV by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
(CID). The PRA shall then issue the retiree's withdrawal
clearance to the bank where he has a deposit. Only then
shall the bank concerned return the dollar deposit to the
retiree.
The case at bar stems from a complaint filed with the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) by ATTY. VERNETTE UMALI-PACO,
Chief Executive Officer and General Manager of petitioner
PRA against her subordinate, respondent THELMA RUPA, PRA
Human Resource Management Officer III, for four (4)
offenses: Insubordination, Gross Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Service and Neglect of Duty.
Respondent's alleged misdemeanors started in January 1991.
Respondent was then with the PRA Administrative Servicing
Group under complainant Atty. Paco. She was tasked to
convert retirees' deposits into investments. From March-May,
1991, she also processed and evaluated requests of retirees
to withdraw their deposits and has issued clearances for the
purpose.
On April 30, 1991, respondent allegedly refused to prepare
the withdrawal clearances of two (2) Indian retirees, Mrs.
Mirani and Chatlani, when requested by Mr. Edwinador
Racho, Retiree Assistance Office II. Days later, when Mr.
Racho made a follow-up of the clearances, the respondent
allegedly replied: "Hee, marami pa akong pre-noprocess."
Mr. Racho was constrained to refer the matter to CEO and
General Manager Atty. Paco who issued a Memorandum
directing the respondent to render overtime service to finish
processing the clearances. It was only then that respondent
completed the requested task.
The second incident occurred in October, 1991. Under the
program, a PRA retiree is granted a Special Resident Retiree
Visa (SRRV) which is attached to his passport. Before a
retiree can terminate his membership and claim his deposit,
he must first surrender his SRRV to the PRA which shall then
forward his passport to the CID for cancellation. Only then
shall the PRA issue the retiree's withdrawal clearance to the
bank allowing the retiree to withdraw his deposits. In
October, 1991, the respondent released the withdrawal
clearance directly to retiree Jess Roberts although his visa
has not yet been cancelled.
Subsequently, the respondent's office table became the
object of discord. On August 27, 1993, Atty. Paco noticed
that the respondent was using three (3) tables and one (1)
computer table. To save space and reduce their office space
rentals, she ordered the respondent to choose only one side
table. Instead of complying, the respondent allegedly defied
the order and scribbled her comment on the written
directive, thus: "Give me one good reason why I should do
so."
The office quarrels continued to rage. On November 12,
1993, Mr. Roberto Navera, a PRA employee, requested the
respondent to process the papers of retirees Mr. and Mrs.
Berthram Pereira who wanted to withdraw their money and
terminate their PRA membership. Respondent allegedly
refused and remarked: "Hindi pwede sa akin ang rush no! At
least 3 to 5 days ang processing niyan upon receipt. "
The hostilities culminated on June 1, 1994 when Atty. Paco
issued Office Order No. 045 reassigning the respondent to
the Marketing Group allegedly due to exigency of the
service.1 The respondent defied the Order and scribbled her
comment thereon: "If it is in the exigency of the service as
you try to make it appear, modesty aside and you know it
too well, I am better qualified to perform more responsible
functions other than those you want me to do."
On September 20, 1995, after a fact-finding investigation of
the complaint, the CSC found a prima facie case against the
respondent. It issued CSC Resolution No. 9558972 formally
charging respondent with three (3) offenses, viz:
Insubordination, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, and Neglect of Duty.
The formal charge reads:
"On May 7, 1991, Rupa was requested under the PRA
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) by Mr. Edwinador
Racho, a bonafide PRA employee, to process the withdrawal
clearance of two (2) Indian nationals namely Mesdames
Kamlabai Mirani and Ishwari Chatlani who were intending to
withdraw their memberships from the PRA program, so that
they may withdraw their dollar deposits from the bank.
Rupa, in willful violation of her duty refused to process the
withdrawal clearance of the two (2) Indian National despite
repeated requests;
"Rupa, in violation of PRA policy, knowingly released the
Withdrawal Clearance of Mr. Jess Carl Roberts, a PRA retiree-
member when he expressed his desire to withdraw his
deposit from the PRA Program, despite the non-cancellation
of his Special Resident Retiree Visa (SRRV);
"Rupa, in utter defiance of Office Order No. 052, refused to
process the papers of Mr. and Mrs. Bertram U. Pereira, when
they signified their intention to withdraw their membership
from the PRA program, on the pretense that she did not
entertain 'rush' assignments;
"On August 27, 1993, Rupa defied the request/order of the
PRA Chief Executive Officer and General Manager Paco to
choose only one (1) side table for her own use for space-
saving purposes;
"Rupa defied Office Order No. 103, amending Office Order
No. 101, both dated November 22, 1993, which necessitated
her transfer from the 3rd floor to the 2nd floor of the PRA
office building."
Of particular relevance to the case at bar is the first charge.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the charges against
her. On the first charge, she alleged that she refused to
process the withdrawal clearance of the two (2) Indian
nationals as this was not part of her job description. As early
as February 25, 1991, Atty. Paco reassigned her to another
department merely to answer written queries of retirees. The
respondent protested as she was reduced to a mere typist
preparing pro forma letters. In response to her protest, Atty.
Paco issued the May 29, 1991 Memorandum where she
included in respondent's duties the task of converting the
retirees' deposits into investments. Respondent stressed that
she processed the requested clearances pursuant to the
Memorandum issued to her by Atty. Paco to render overtime
service for said purpose. She did the job without collecting
overtime payment.
The respondent claimed that the administrative complaint
against her was the climax in the series of oppression and
maltreatment she suffered in the hands of Atty. Paco. She
added that the case was filed against her in retaliation for
the Ombudsman case she brought against Atty. Paco.
The CSC found respondent guilty of the grave offense of
Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service solely for neglecting to promptly process the
requests of the two (2) Indian retirees. She was meted the
penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay. The CSC
absolved the respondent from the other charges.3
The respondent moved for reconsideration. She contended
that her neglect in the performance of her duties was not
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In the
alternative, she argued that her suspension from service for
one year without pay is excessive and harsh. Thus, she
prayed that her suspension be reduced to one month.
The CSC denied her motion. It upheld the penalty meted out
to her, i.e., one year suspension without pay, as it is in
accordance with the Schedule of Penalties provided under
Section 22 (t) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987.4
The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On July
19, 1999, the Court of Appeals modified the appealed CSC
Resolution. It found the respondent guilty of the less grave
offense of simple neglect of duty and imposed on her the
lesser penalty of three (3) months suspension without pay.5
Hence this petition for review, with the petitioner PRA
assigning the following errors:
I constitutes the grave offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING
THE CSC DECISION FINDING RESPONDENT GUILTY OF
CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING
THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
On the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals had
sufficient basis to modify the offense committed by the
respondent from the grave offense of Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service to the less grave offense of
Simple Neglect of Duty. A careful examination of the records
reveals that there is no cogent reason to reverse this finding.
Neglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give one's
attention to a task expected of him and is censurable under
the Civil Service Rules. The facts show that the respondent
failed to immediately act on the papers of the Indian
nationals. The processing of clearance was a clerical job as it
merely involves filling up a form that does not require an in-
depth analysis or evaluation to accomplish. Under the
circumstances, the respondent's delay was unreasonable.
The respondent cannot seek refuge in her excuse that the
processing of the withdrawal clearance was not included in
her job description. The record bears that she has been
performing this function as early as March, 1991, two (2)
months before she declined to issue the clearance of the
Indian retirees. Given the circumstances in the case at bar,
we find just cause for disciplinary action against the
respondent for her delay in the processing of the clearance.
We now come to the classification of the offense committed
by the respondent. The CSC found that the respondent's act
Best Interest of the Service, while the Court of Appeals held
it to be only a case of Simple Neglect of Duty, a less grave
offense under the Civil Service Rules.
Under the Civil Service law and rules, there is no concrete
description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense
of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
Jurisprudence, however, is instructive on this point. The
Court has considered the following acts or omissions, inter
alia, as Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service: misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of
office, failure to report back to work without prior notice,6
failure to safe keep public records and property,7 making
false entries in public documents and falsification of court
orders.8
Gross Neglect of Duty, on the other hand, denotes a flagrant
and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform
a duty.9 The Court has categorized the following as
constitutive of the grave offense of Gross Neglect of Duty:
negligence in the prosecution of cases and malicious delay in
the administration of justice by a police officer,10 act of
provincial warden in retaining a prisoner in his custody
without authority and just cause instead of sending him to
the Muntinlupa penitentiary,11 failure to transcribe
stenographic notes of 18 cases which dated as far back as
1972,12 failure of a judge to decide a case within a period
fixed by law,13 and exerting undue influence by a deputy
clerk of court on a judge in the disposition of cases pending
before the court.14
Simple Neglect of Duty, however, signifies a disregard of a
duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.15 The Court
has decided the following, inter alia, as constituting the less
grave offense of Simple Neglect of Duty: delay in the
transmittal of court records,16 delay in responding to written
queries, and delay of more than one (1) year and seven (7)
months in furnishing a party with a copy of the court's
decision.17 As can be gleaned from the foregoing cases,
mere delay in the performance of one's function has been
consistently considered as a less grave offense of simple
neglect of duty, punishable by suspension without pay for
one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.18
Following the foregoing jurisprudence, we find that the
respondent was properly adjudged guilty only of Simple
Neglect of Duty. The respondent's offense is not of the same
gravity or odiousness as in the aforecited cases as would
amount to Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service or Gross Neglect of Duty. Respondent's delay in
processing the withdrawal clearance of the Indian retirees
took only thirteen (13) days. Indeed, the respondent
complied with the Memorandum requiring her to render
overtime work to finish the subject clearance on the very
same day she received the written order and she did it
without claiming overtime pay as authorized in said
Memorandum. We reiterate that of the five (5) charges
against the respondent, she was found guilty of only one
delay in the processing of papers. It does not appear that
she had any previous conviction prior to the administrative
case at bar.
In light of the over-all backdrop of the case, we hold that the
Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
finding the respondent guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty and
imposing on her the penalty of three (3) months suspension
without pay.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated July 19, 1999, and its Resolution, dated
October 21, 1999, are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Penalties for less grave offenses
A.M. No. P-02-1574. April 17, 2002
ATTYS. FIDEL R. RACASA and OLIVA P. PEDERE,
complainants, vs. NELDA COLLADO-CALIZO, Court
Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 140,
Makati City, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint filed against respondent Nelda Collado-
Calizo, Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 140, Makati City, for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and for violation of R.A. No. 6713,
7(a), which, prohibits public officials and employees from
directly or indirectly having any financial or material interest
in any transaction requiring the approval by their office, and
5(a), (c), and (d), which require public officials and
employees to act promptly and expeditiously in the
performance of their functions. The complaint was filed by
Attys. Fidel R. Racasa and Oliva P. Pedere, both of the
Pastelero Law Office, the counsel for the petitioners in an
adoption case (SP Proc. No. M-4871) filed in the RTC, Branch
140, Makati City.
It appears that, on July 21, 1999, an order was issued
setting the case for hearing on August 31, 1999 and
directing publication of said order in a newspaper of general
circulation. In their complaint, complainants allege: Shortly
after the issuance of the July 21, 1999 order, Atty. Racasa
instructed a messenger of their law firm, Hector Gedocruz, to
inquire from the RTC to which newspaper the award for the
publication of the order had been given. Atty. Racasa wanted
to find out the publication charge so that he could file a
motion for reraffle if it was higher than the charges of other
newspapers. Twice Gedocruz was told that someone would
be going to the complainants law firm regarding the matter.
On August 2, 1999, respondent Nelda Collado-Calizo went to
complainants law firm and introduced herself as someone
from the newspaper Pilipino Ngayon, which had allegedly
won in the raffle for the publication of the order of the RTC.
To verify her claim, Atty. Racasa asked for a copy of the
Certificate of Raffle, but respondent said she forgot to bring
it with her. She promised to give it the next time she came
over to the office. She told Atty. Racasa that the publication
charge was P8,000.00. Atty. Racasa then asked, Bakit
naman ang mahal, may tao bang humihingi ng cut o
komisyon sa transaksiyong ito? Alam mo, kawawa naman
kayong mga taga-diyaryo dahil kayo ang nagtatrabaho
samantalang ang ibang tao ay kumikita ng walang kapagod-
pagod. (Why is the charge for publication so expensive? Is
that because there are people who want to have a
commission? You know, you newspaper people are to be
pitied. You earn for work you do, but there are those who
make money without lifting a finger.)
Eventually, Atty. Racasa agreed to the reduced amount of
P5,000.00. Apparently feeling uneasy about Atty. Racasas
remarks and realizing that he would eventually discover her
identity, respondent revealed that she was really an
employee of Branch 140 of the Makati RTC. For this purpose,
she showed her Supreme Court I.D. as Atty. Racasa handed
over the payment of P5,000,00. In return for the business
given to her, respondent promised that she would help speed
up the transcription of the stenographic notes she had taken
of the hearings of the adoption case.
Three days later, a representative of a rival publication, Ada
Abueme of Kabayan, went to complainants office, claiming to
have won in the raffle for the publication of the courts order.
Since Kabayan, unlike Pilipino Ngayon, which was a tabloid,
was a broadsheet, its publication charge was P7,000.00. An
argument ensued between Ada Abueme and respondent,
who was also in complainants office at that time. Respondent
told Abueme that she had already paid Pilipino Ngayon and
that publication of the first of three notices was forthcoming.
Atty. Racasa told respondent and Abueme to settle the
matter between themselves because it would be awkward for
him to ask the petitioners in the adoption case for an
additional amount because he (Atty. Racasa) might be
suspected of receiving kickbacks as he had already told
petitioner Jorge Alves that he (Atty. Racasa) had already
paid the charge for publication.
As Ada Abueme and respondent could not settle their
differences, Atty. Racasa asked respondent to pay the
P5,000.00 he had paid her to Ada Abueme, while he and
Abueme would take care of paying the balance of P2,000.00.
He warned respondent that if she failed to produce the
money, he would file an administrative complaint against
her.
The second incident between complainants and respondent
occurred after the hearing on November 26, 1999 of the
adoption case. A male employee of the court ran after Atty.
Oliva Pedere as the latter was leaving to ask for an advance
for the TSN allegedly at the instance of respondent.
Remembering their unpleasant experience with respondent,
Atty. Pedere refused to pay.
Complainants allege that respondent deliberately did not
transcribe her notes of the November 26, 1999 hearing
because of the previous incident with them. On January 24,
2000, Atty. Racasa went to the court to complain about the
delay. He was told that respondent had already started
typing her notes.
Commenting on the allegations against her, respondent
alleges that it was actually Atty. Racasa who had been calling
her for help in the publication of the RTC order of July 21,
1999 as the time for publication was running short, For this
reason, she says she went to Atty. Racasas law office after
the latters fourth call, telling her: Pumunta ka na dito ngayon
at baka hindi na aabot ang publication bago mag-hearing.
(You come here now as there might not be enough time for
publication before the hearing.) Respondent denies having
represented to Atty. Racasa that she was a representative of
Pilipino Ngayon, stating that she even showed to Atty.
Racasa her Supreme Court I.D.
As to complainants claim that she had neglected to
transcribe the notes she had taken on November 26, 1999,
respondent claims that it was because she was on leave on
January 24, 2001 when Atty. Racasa went to see her in the
RTC. Respondent denies asking for an advance for the TSN,
claiming that her officemate, Neil Armstrong Consuegra,
mistakenly approached Atty. Oliva Pedere when the TSN she
(respondent) was telling him about was the TSN in another
case in which the counsel was also a lady lawyer.
Consuegras affidavit was attached to respondents comment.
1cräläwvirtualibräry
Atty. Racasa filed a reply in which he denies making
telephone calls to complainant. He insists he merely sent his
messenger to inquire about the newspaper publication. He
claims he only told respondent to go to his law office after
respondent had told him that Pilipino Ngayon won in the
raffle for the publication of the court order.
The Court Administrator finds respondent guilty and
recommends that respondent be suspended for three (3)
months without pay with warning that repetition of the same
or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Except as to the penalty, the recommendation is well taken.
The Court finds respondents administrative liability to have
been established in this case.
On the parties conflicting accounts regarding the
circumstances under which respondent went to complainants
law office, the Court finds complainants version more
credible. As the Court Administrator aptly points out:
Respondents allegation that she went to the office of the
complainants because she received telephone calls from
Atty. Racasa telling her: Pumunta ka na dito ngayon at baka
hindi na aabot ang publication bago mag-hearing does not
inspire belief. The court employee who should be contacted
regarding publication of notice in a newspaper is the Clerk of
Court. The assignment to which newspaper a notice will be
published is done by raffle which is conducted in the Office of
the Clerk of Court. As stenographer, respondent has nothing
to do with [the] publication of a notice in a newspaper. Her
duty is to take stenographic notes of the proceedings and
transcribe them, and [the] typing of decisions, resolutions,
and orders issued by the court.
Indeed, it is difficult to believe that respondent was only
trying to be of assistance to complainants because the latter
asked for her help. Respondent did not elaborate as to how
she thought she might be of assistance to complainants.
Surely, the proper thing for her to do is to refer complainants
to the Clerk of Court who, after all, is the one in charge of
the publication of court orders.
Respondent argues that if Atty. Racasas claim that she had
introduced herself as someone from Pilipino Ngayon was
true, she would not have presented her Supreme Court I.D.
to him. But if, as respondent claims, Atty. Racasa knew her
to be a court employee from the start and in fact had made
at least four phone calls to her to ask for her assistance, we
are at a loss why there was a need for respondent to present
her I.D. to him.
The point cannot be overemphasized that everyone in the
judiciary, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
bears a heavy responsibility for the proper discharge of his
duty, and it behooves each one to steer clear of any situation
in which the slightest suspicion might be cast on his conduct.
Any misbehavior on his part, whether true or only perceived,
is likely to reflect adversely on the administration of justice.
Respondent failed to live up to this standard of ethical
conduct. She took an undue interest in the publication of a
court notice, when she ought to know that the publication of
notices is given by raffle precisely to preclude favoritism. She
went to the extent of misrepresenting herself to be a
representative of the newspaper to which publication of the
July 21, 1999 order of the court had been awarded.
Respondent is guilty of misconduct which has been defined
as a transgression of an established or definite rule of action.
2cräläwvirtualibräry
The Court likewise finds respondent guilty of neglect of duty
for her failure to timely transcribe her stenographic notes of
the November 26, 1999 hearing. Administrative Circular No.
24-90, promulgated on July 12, 1990 by this Court, directs
stenographers to transcribe all stenographic notes and to
attach the transcripts to the record of the case not later than
twenty (20) days from the time the notes are taken, in effect
giving stenographers twenty (20) days from the taking of the
notes to deliver their transcription to the clerk of court. 3
Respondent failed to deliver her TSN on or before December
16, 1999. Her claim that she had already finished the TSN
before going on leave from January 24 to February 1, 2000
to attend to the burial of her father-in-law is belied by the
affidavit, 4 dated September 8, 2000, of Atty. Ma. Agnes
Alibanto-Sadsad, Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch
140, Makati City, stating that respondent failed to submit the
TSN even prior to her leave despite follow-ups from her and
complainants and that, on January 24, 2000, she (Branch
Clerk of Court Alibanto-Sadsad) discovered that respondent
had not finished the transcription of her notes. It is
noteworthy that as respondents superior, Atty. Alibanto-
Sadsads word carries weight against respondents self-
serving claim that she finished the transcription on time.
Indeed, despite receipt of a copy of Atty. Alibanta-Sadsads
affidavit and the fact there was ample time to comply,
respondent made no effort to refute allegations therein
against her.
However, the evidence is insufficient that respondent asked
complainants for advance payment for her TSN of the
November 26, 1999 hearing or that she delayed finishing the
same because she did not get her commission for the
publication of the RTC order of July 21, 1999. The fact is that
as Branch Clerk of Court Alibanto-Sadsad stated in her
affidavit, other lawyers had been complaining because of
respondents inaction on their requests for TSNs so that it is
not really clear whether the delay in complainants case was
malicious.
In Guillen v. Constantino, 5 a court employee found guilty of
simple misconduct was fined P5,000.00. On the other hand,
for failure to transcribe stenographic notes within the
required period, the Court in two cases 6 imposed a fine of
P3,000.00 on a stenographer similarly found guilty of simple
neglect of duty.
WHEREFORE , respondent Nelda Collado-Calizo, Court
Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 140, Makati
City, is hereby found guilty of simple misconduct for which
she is hereby fined five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and of
neglect of duty for which a fine three thousand pesos
(P3,000.00) is imposed on her and WARNED that commission
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Penalties for less grave offenses
G.R. No. 207010, February 18, 2015
MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., A.P. MOLLER
SINGAPORE PTE. LIMITED, AND JESUS AGBAYANI,
Petitioners, v. TORIBIO C. AVESTRUZ,*Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated January 4, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated
April 16, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 125773 which reversed and set aside the
Decision4 dated April 26, 2012 and the Resolution5 dated
June 18, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. (M) 07-10704-11 [NLRC LAC
No. (OFW-M)-01-000123-12] dismissing the illegal dismissal
complaint filed by respondent Toribio C. Avestruz (Avestruz)
and awarding him nominal
damages.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Facts
On April 28, 2011, petitioner Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc.
(Maersk), on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner A.P.
Moller Singapore Pte. Ltd. (A.P. Moller), hired Avestruz as
Chief Cook on board the vessel M/V Nedlloyd Drake for a
period of six (6) months, with a basic monthly salary of
US$698.00.6 Avestruz boarded the vessel on May 4,
2011.7cralawred
On June 22, 2011, in the course of the weekly inspection of
the vessel’s galley, Captain Charles C. Woodward (Captain
Woodward) noticed that the cover of the garbage bin in the
kitchen near the washing area was oily. As part of Avestruz’s
job was to ensure the cleanliness of the galley, Captain
Woodward called Avestruz and asked him to stand near the
garbage bin where the former took the latter’s right hand
and swiped it on the oily cover of the garbage bin, telling
Avestruz to feel it. Shocked, Avestruz remarked, “Sir if you
are looking for [dirt], you can find it[;] the ship is big. Tell us
if you want to clean and we will clean it.” Captain Woodward
replied by shoving Avestruz’s chest, to which the latter
complained and said, “Don’t touch me,” causing an argument
to ensue between them.8cralawred
Later that afternoon, Captain Woodward summoned and
required9 Avestruz to state in writing what transpired in the
galley that morning. Avestruz complied and submitted his
written statement10 on that same day. Captain Woodward
likewise asked Messman Jomilyn P. Kong (Kong) to submit
his own written statement regarding the incident, to which
the latter immediately complied.11 On the very same day,
Captain Woodward informed Avestruz that he would be
dismissed from service and be disembarked in India. On July
3, 2011, Avestruz was disembarked in Colombo, Sri Lanka
and arrived in the Philippines on July 4, 2011.12cralawred
Subsequently, he filed a complaint13 for illegal dismissal,
payment for the unexpired portion of his contract, damages,
and attorney’s fees against Maersk, A.P. Moller, and Jesus
Agbayani (Agbayani), an officer14 of Maersk.15 He alleged
that no investigation or hearing was conducted nor was he
given the chance to defend himself before he was dismissed,
and that Captain Woodward failed to observe the provisions
under Section 17 of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC) on disciplinary procedures. Also, he averred that
he was not given any notice stating the ground for his
dismissal.16 Additionally, he claimed that the cost of his
airfare in the amount of US$606.15 was deducted from his
wages.17 Furthermore, Avestruz prayed for the award of the
following amounts: (a) US$5,372.00 representing his basic
wages, guaranteed overtime, and vacation leave; (b) on
board allowance of US$1,936.00; (c) ship maintenance
bonus of US$292.00; (d) hardship allowance of
US$8,760.00; (e) P300,000.00 as moral damages, (f)
P200,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (g) attorney’s fees
of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary
award.18cralawred
In their defense,19 Maersk, A.P. Moller, and Agbayani
(petitioners) claimed that during his stint on the vessel,
Avestruz failed to attend to his tasks, specifically to maintain
the cleanliness of the galley, which prompted Captain
Woodward to issue weekly reminders.20 Unfortunately,
despite the reminders, Avestruz still failed to perform his
duties properly.21 On June 22, 2011, when again asked to
comply with the aforesaid duty, Avestruz became angry and
snapped, retorting that he did not have time to do all the
tasks required of him. As a result, Captain Woodward
initiated disciplinary proceedings and informed Avestruz
during the hearing of the offenses he committed, i.e., his
repeated failure to follow directives pertaining to his duty to
maintain the cleanliness of the galley, as well as his act of
insulting an officer.22 Thereafter, he was informed of his
dismissal from service due to insubordination.23 Relative
thereto, Captain Woodward sent two (2) electronic mail
messages24 (e-mails) to Maersk explaining the decision to
terminate Avestruz’s employment and requesting for
Avestruz’s replacement. Avestruz was discharged from the
vessel and arrived in the Philippines on July 4,
2011.25cralawred
Petitioners maintained that Avestruz was dismissed for a just
and valid cause and is, therefore, not entitled to recover his
salary for the unexpired portion of his contract.26 They
likewise claimed that they were justified in deducting his
airfare from his salary, and that the latter was not entitled to
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.27 Hence,
they prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit.28cralawred
The LA Ruling
In a Decision29 dated November 29, 2011, the Labor Arbiter
(LA) dismissed Avestruz’s complaint for lack of merit. The LA
found that he failed to perform his duty of maintaining
cleanliness in the galley, and that he also repeatedly failed to
obey the directives of his superior, which was tantamount to
insubordination.30 In support of its finding, the LA cited the
Collective Bargaining Agreement31 (CBA) between the
parties which considers the act of insulting a superior officer
by words or deed as an act of insubordination.32cralawred
Aggrieved, Avestruz appealed33 to the
NLRC.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision34 dated April 26, 2012, the NLRC sustained the
validity of Avestruz’s dismissal but found that petitioners
failed to observe the procedures laid down in Section 17 of
the POEA-SEC,35 which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 17. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES.
The Master shall comply with the following disciplinary
procedures against an erring seafarer:
The Master shall furnish the seafarer with a written notice
containing the following:
Grounds for the charges as listed in Section 33 of this
Contract or analogous act constituting the same.
Date, time and place for a formal investigation of the charges
against the seafarer concerned.
The Master or his authorized representative shall conduct the
investigation or hearing, giving the seafarer the opportunity
to explain or defend himself against the charges. These
procedures must be duly documented and entered into the
ship’s logbook.
If after the investigation or hearing, the Master is convinced
that imposition of a penalty is justified, the Master shall issue
a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it to the
seafarer, with copies furnished to the Philippine agent.
Dismissal for just cause may be effected by the Master
without furnishing the seafarer with a notice of dismissal if
there is a clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew
or the vessel. The Master shall send a complete report to the
manning agency substantiated by witnesses, testimonies and
any other documents in support thereof. (Emphases
supplied)
As the records are bereft of evidence showing compliance
with the foregoing rules, the NLRC held petitioners jointly
and severally liable to pay Avestruz the amount of
P30,000.00 by way of nominal damages.36cralawred
Avestruz moved for reconsideration37 of the aforesaid
Decision, which was denied in the Resolution38 dated June
18, 2012. Dissatisfied, he elevated the matter to the CA via
petition for certiorari.39cralawred
The CA Ruling
In a Decision40 dated January 4, 2013, the CA reversed and
set aside the rulings of the NLRC and instead, found Avestruz
to have been illegally dismissed. Consequently, it directed
petitioners to pay him, jointly and severally, the full amount
of his placement fee and deductions made, with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum, as well as his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his contract, and attorney’s fees of
ten percent (10%) of the total award. All other money claims
were denied for lack of merit.41cralawred
In so ruling, the CA found that the conclusion of the NLRC,
which affirmed that of the LA, that Avestruz was lawfully
dismissed, was not supported by substantial evidence, there
being no factual basis for the charge of insubordination which
petitioners claimed was the ground for Avestruz’s dismissal.
It found that petitioners, as employers, were unable to
discharge the burden of proof required of them to establish
that Avestruz was guilty of insubordination, which
necessitates the occurrence of two (2) conditions as a just
cause for dismissal: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct
must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful
and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have
been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and
must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge. The CA found that, contrary to the rulings of the
labor tribunals, there was no evidence on record to bolster
petitioners’ claims that Avestruz willfully failed to comply
with his duties as Chief Cook and that he displayed a
perverse and wrongful attitude.42cralawred
Moreover, it gave more credence to Avestruz’s account of the
incident in the galley on June 22, 2011, being supported in
part by the statement43 of Kong, who witnessed the
incident. On the other hand, the e-mails sent by Captain
Woodward to Maersk were uncorroborated. On this score,
the CA observed the absence of any logbook entries to
support petitioners’ stance.44cralawred
Similarly, the CA found that petitioners failed to accord
procedural due process to Avestruz, there being no
compliance with the requirements of Section 17 of the POEA-
SEC as above-quoted, or the “two-notice rule.” It held that
the statement45 Captain Woodward issued to Avestruz
neither contained the grounds for which he was being
charged nor the date, time, and place for the conduct of a
formal investigation. Likewise, Captain Woodward failed to
give Avestruz any notice of penalty and the reasons for its
imposition, with copies thereof furnished to the Philippine
Agent.46cralawred
In arriving at the monetary awards given to Avestruz, the CA
considered the provisions of Section 7 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 10022,47 amending RA 8042,48 which grants upon the
illegally dismissed overseas worker “the full reimbursement
[of] his placement fee and the deductions made with interest
at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract.” However,
with respect to Avestruz’s claims for overtime and leave pay,
the same were denied for failure to show entitlement
thereto. All other monetary claims were likewise denied in
the absence of substantial evidence to prove the same.
Finally, the CA awarded attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%)
of the total monetary award in accordance with Article 11149
of the Labor Code.50cralawred
Petitioners moved for reconsideration,51 which the CA
denied in its Resolution52 dated April 16, 2013, hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue advanced for the Court’s resolution is whether
or not the CA erred when it reversed and set aside the ruling
of the NLRC finding that Avestruz was legally dismissed and
accordingly, dismissing the complaint, albeit with payment of
nominal damages for violation of procedural due process.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
Generally, a re-examination of factual findings cannot be
done by the Court acting on a petition for review on certiorari
because the Court is not a trier of facts but reviews only
questions of law.53 Thus, in petitions for review on certiorari,
only questions of law may generally be put into issue. This
rule, however, admits of certain exceptions.54 In this case,
considering that the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC,
on the one hand, and the CA, on the other hand, are
contradictory, the general rule that only legal issues may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court does not apply,55 and the Court retains
the authority to pass upon the evidence presented and draw
conclusions therefrom.56cralawred
It is well-settled that the burden of proving that the
termination of an employee was for a just or authorized
cause lies with the employer. If the employer fails to meet
this burden, the conclusion would be that the dismissal was
unjustified and, therefore, illegal.57 In order to discharge
this burden, the employer must present substantial evidence,
which is defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion,58 and not based on mere surmises or
conjectures.59cralawred
After a punctilious examination of the evidence on record,
the Court finds that the CA did not err in reversing and
setting aside the factual conclusions of the labor tribunals
that Avestruz’s dismissal was lawful. Instead, the Court finds
that there was no just or valid cause for his dismissal, hence,
he was illegally dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that Avestruz was dismissed on the
ground of insubordination, consisting of his “repeated failure
to obey his superior’s order to maintain cleanliness in the
galley of the vessel” as well as his act of “insulting a superior
officer by words or deeds.”60 In support of this contention,
petitioners presented as evidence the e-mails sent by
Captain Woodward, both dated June 22, 2011, and time-
stamped 10:07 a.m. and 11:40 a.m., respectively, which
they claim chronicled the relevant circumstances that
eventually led to Avestruz’s dismissal.
The Court, however, finds these e-mails to be
uncorroborated and self-serving, and therefore, do not
satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence as would
sufficiently discharge the burden of proving that Avestruz
was legally dismissed. On the contrary, petitioners failed to
prove that he committed acts of insubordination which would
warrant his dismissal.
Insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an
employee, necessitates the concurrence of at least two
requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have
been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge.61cralawred
In this case, the contents of Captain Woodward’s e-mails do
not establish that Avestruz’s conduct had been willful, or
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. The Court
concurs with the CA’s observation that Avestruz’s
statement62 regarding the incident in the galley deserves
more credence, being corroborated63 by Kong, a messman
who witnessed the same.
Conversely, apart from Captain Woodward’s e-mails, no
other evidence was presented by the petitioners to support
their claims. While rules of evidence are not strictly observed
in proceedings before administrative bodies,64 petitioners
should have offered additional proof to corroborate the
statements65 described therein. Thus, in Ranises v. NLRC66
which involved a seafarer who was repatriated to the
Philippines for allegedly committing illegal acts amounting to
a breach of trust, as based on a telex dispatch by the Master
of the vessel, the Court impugned and eventually vetoed the
credence given by the NLRC upon the telex, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Unfortunately, the veracity of the allegations contained in the
aforecited telex was never proven by respondent employer.
Neither was it shown that respondent employer exerted any
effort to even verify the truthfulness of Capt. Sonoda’s report
and establish petitioner’s culpability for his alleged illegal
acts. Worse, no other evidence was submitted to corroborate
the charges against petitioner.67
Likewise, in Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. NLRC,68 the
Court ruled that the lone evidence offered by the employer to
justify the seafarer’s dismissal, i.e., the telexed Chief
Engineer’s Report which contained the causes for said
dismissal, did not suffice to discharge the onus required of
the employer to show that the termination of an employee’s
service was valid.69 The same doctrine was enunciated in
Pacific Maritime Services, Inc. v. Ranay,70 where the Court
held that the telefax transmission purportedly executed and
signed by a person on board the vessel is insufficient
evidence to prove the commission of the acts constituting
the grounds for the dismissal of two seafarers, being
uncorroborated evidence.71cralawred
As in this case, it was incumbent upon the petitioners to
present other substantial evidence to bolster their claim that
Avestruz committed acts that constitute insubordination as
would warrant his dismissal. At the least, they could have
offered in evidence entries in the ship’s official logbook
showing the infractions or acts of insubordination purportedly
committed by Avestruz, the ship’s logbook being the official
repository of the day-to-day transactions and occurrences on
board the vessel.72 Having failed to do so, their position that
Avestruz was lawfully dismissed cannot be sustained.
Similarly, the Court affirms the finding of the CA that
Avestruz was not accorded procedural due process, there
being no compliance with the provisions of Section 17 of the
POEA-SEC as above-cited, which requires the “two-notice
rule.” As explained in Skippers Pacific, Inc. v.
Mira:73cralawred
An erring seaman is given a written notice of the charge
against him and is afforded an opportunity to explain or
defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then a written
notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the
erring seafarer. It is only in the exceptional case of clear and
existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the
required notices are dispensed with; but just the same, a
complete report should be sent to the manning agency,
supported by substantial evidence of the findings.74
In this case, there is dearth of evidence to show that
Avestruz had been given a written notice of the charge
against him, or that he was given the opportunity to explain
or defend himself. The statement75 given by Captain
Woodward requiring him to explain in writing the events that
transpired at the galley in the morning of June 22, 2011
hardly qualifies as a written notice of the charge against him,
nor was it an opportunity for Avestruz to explain or defend
himself. While Captain Woodward claimed in his e-mail76
that he conducted a “disciplinary hearing” informing Avestruz
of his inefficiency, no evidence was presented to support the
same.
Neither was Avestruz given a written notice of penalty and
the reasons for its imposition. Instead, Captain Woodward
verbally informed him that he was dismissed from service
and would be disembarked from the vessel. It bears
stressing that only in the exceptional case of clear and
existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the
required notices may be dispensed with, and, once again,
records are bereft of evidence showing that such was the
situation when Avestruz was dismissed.
Finally, with respect to the monetary awards given to
Avestruz, the Court finds the same to be in consonance with
Section 10 of RA 8042, as amended by RA 10022, which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 10. Money claims. – x x x.chanrobleslaw
xxxx
In case of termination of overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, or
any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker’s
salary, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement
of his placement fee and the deductions made with interest
at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less.77cralawred
xxxx
Similarly, the Court affirms the grant of attorney’s fees of ten
percent (10%) of the total award. All other monetary awards
are denied for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 4, 2013 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2013
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125773
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Penalties for light offenses
[A.M. No. P-00-1428. January 18, 2001.]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
v. IMELDA S. PERLEZ, CLERK OF COURT, MTC, BRANCH
2, SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint filed by Judge Gloria B. Aglugub of the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch 2, San Pedro, Laguna against
the Clerk of Court, Imelda Perlez, for allegedly failing to
submit the transcript of stenographic notes in certain cases
and hiding the records of other cases resulting in the failure
of Judge Aglugub to decide 19 cases 1 assigned to her within
the prescribed time. For this reason, Judge Aglugub had to
ask for an extension of time to decide the aforesaid
cases.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Upon the recommendation of the Court Administrator, Clerk
of Court Imelda S. Perlez was required to comment on the
complaint against her. Meantime, Judge Aglugub was
granted an extension of 90 days within which to decide the
19 cases.
Ms. Perlez’ comment, slightly edited, states:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Undersigned Clerk of Court I, MTC Br. 2, San Pedro, Laguna,
in compliance with the Order of the Honorable Court En Banc
dated October 5, 1999, respectfully manifest:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
With due respect she vehemently denies Judge Aglugub’s
allegation blaming her for her (Aglugub) failure to resolve 19
cases within the time frame required of her due to
undersigned’s propensity to hide records.
a. Firstly, I have no physical control of the stenographers
who fail to transcribe their stenographic notes for one reason
or another except to remind them from time to time. In fact,
I used to report to Judge Aglugub stenographers who do not
heed my reminders. Just to cite an appropriate example, is
an order of Judge Aglugub ordering Jennifer Lancion, our
former stenographer, to bring to court all transcript of
stenographic notes within ten (10) days from receipt hereof
and copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A" ; and
another order dated October 8, 1997 ordering again Jennifer
Lancion under pain of arrest should she fail to do so within
five (5) days from receipt thereof and copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "B" ; This incident clearly indicates that if
Hon. Judge herself could not discipline stenographer how
much more for a Clerk of Court like me? Hence, I could not
be used as an alibi or a fall guy for Judge Aglugub’s failure to
comply with the rules;
b. Secondly, most if not all of the transcript of stenographic
notes in the cases cited by Judge Aglugub were all assigned
to former stenographer Jennifer Lancion to wit; Criminal
Case Nos. 22262, 23855-58, 23300, 14668, 14700, 25457,
26739 and 22240 who, despite my continuous pounding and
repeated reminders to come out with the corresponding TSN
of the above cases, stubbornly and repeatedly failed and
refused to do so until she left for good without a trace, and
this was known to Judge Aglugub as per my manifestation
dated July 16, 1999, a copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex "C" .
c. Finally, why should I be blamed for the failure of an
irresponsible and stubborn stenographer with temporary
appointment status when I have exercised the necessary
diligence of a good father of the family so to speak(?) It is
the failure of stenographer Jennifer Lancion to transcribe and
submit the required TSN that virtually hinders Judge
Aglugub’s compliance and not because I hide the records of
these to which I vigorously deny. Before the unauthorized
suspension of the undersigned, all of the above cases are
intact and with the care of the Acting Clerk of Court.
In fine, undersigned has nothing to do with Judge Aglugub’s
failure to comply with the reglementary period required of
her to decide cases but the failure of one stenographer who
refused to transcribe or submit the TSN taken by her. In
other words, Judge Aglugub knows from the very beginning
that I have no hand in the delay or failure of Ms. Lancion’s
submission of the TSN but because she has some ax to grind
against me, she is implicating me in all her failure(s) in the
performance of her duties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed that undersigned be absolved from Judge Aglugub’s
propensity to incriminate innocent persons like me. 2
In a manifestation dated July 16, 1999, Ms. Perlez submitted
copies of two orders, 3 dated July 28, 1997 and October 8,
1997, issued by Judge Aglugub to stenographer Jennifer
Lancion directing the latter to submit the transcripts of
stenographic notes taken by her in Case No. 25456 on pain
of arrest. However, according to Ms. Perlez, when these
orders were issued, Stenographer Lancion was no longer
reporting for work, and, therefore, she should not be blamed
for Ms. Lancion’s failure to submit the transcripts of
stenographic notes in question.
Both parties manifested that they were submitting the case
for resolution without further hearing. Ms. Perlez reiterated
her denial of the judge’s allegations. 4 On the other hand,
Judge Aglugub attached to her letter 5 submitting the case
for resolution orders and memoranda 6 issued by her to
respondent Imelda S. Perlez ordering her to produce the
records of cases or to submit transcripts of stenographic
notes. It appears from the orders and memoranda submitted
that in the course of a periodic physical inventory, Judge
Aglugub found the records of 87 criminal cases and 8 civil
cases to be missing. This was the subject of her orders dated
September 12, 1997 7 and February 10, 1999 8 directing
respondent Imelda Perlez to locate the records and submit
them to the judge. On July 26, 1999, Judge Aglugub also
issued an order to respondent Perlez requiring her to explain
why she could not produce the records of a criminal case
which Atty. Joaquin Misa wanted to examine. 9 In another
order, dated July 28, 1999, respondent Perlez was directed
to explain why she failed to issue a writ of demolition in a
civil case considering that the order for its issuance had been
issued by the court as early as October 2, 1998.
10chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
From October 22, 1998 to April 5, 1999, the judge issued
orders to respondent Imelda Perlez to submit to her the
transcripts of stenographic notes in 12 cases submitted for
decision. 11 Four of the cases (Case Nos. 22240, 14668,
14700, and 23300) are among the 19 cases in which Judge
Aglugub asked for an extension of time to decide because
the transcript of stenographic notes were unavailable. The
testimonies of witnesses in these four cases were recorded
by Stenographer Jennifer Lancion. The cases covered by the
orders and memoranda are the subject of a separate
administrative complaint (A. M. No. P-99-1348) 12 filed by
Judge Aglugub against respondent Imelda S. Perlez.
In his report, the Court Administrator recommends that Clerk
of Court Imelda S. Perlez be suspended for a period of one
(1) month and one (1) day. The pertinent portion of his
report, dated August 23, 2000, reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Judge Aglugub in her letter 19 July 2000 manifested that
although she is amenable to have the case submitted for
resolution without the need of further proceedings; however,
to bolster her point, she deemed it best to furnish the Court
with copies of memoranda addressed by her to Perlez, as
well as orders for her compliance. Thus, she attached to her
letter five (5) memoranda and eight (8) orders requiring
respondent either to produce records of cases or to submit
transcripts of stenographic notes.
A careful study of the records of this case shows that Perlez
has been remiss in the performance of her duties. As Clerk of
Court, she exercises supervision and control over the
employees under her and is tasked to see that they
discharge their duties properly and diligently. This she failed
to do.
Perlez’ contention that she is powerless against the
stenographers is thoroughly misplaced. Administrative
Circular No. 21-90 of this Court mandates
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Clerks of Court and stenographers are enjoined to
faithfully comply with Rule 136, Section 17, paragraph 1 of
the Rules of Court, which is quoted thereunder:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
SECTION 17. Stenographers. — It shall be the duty of the
stenographer who has attended a session of court in the
morning or in the afternoon, to deliver to the Clerk of Court,
immediately at the close of such morning or afternoon
session, all the notes he has taken, to be attached to the
record of the case, and it shall likewise be the duty of the
Clerk of Court to demand that the stenographers comply with
said duty. The Clerk of Court shall stamp the date on which
notes are received by him. When such notes are transcribed,
the transcript shall be delivered to the Clerk of Court duly
initialed on each page thereof, to be attached to the records
of the case.
2. (a) All the stenographers are required to transcribe all
stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts to the
record of the case not later than twenty (20) days from the
time the notes are taken. The attaching may be done by
putting all said transcripts in a separate folder or envelope,
which will then be joined to the record of the case.
(b) The stenographer concerned shall accomplish a verified
monthly certification as to compliance with this duty. In the
absence of such certification, or for failure and/or refusal to
submit, his salary shall be withheld."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is no question that under this circular, Branch Clerk of
Court Perlez has the obligation to see that the stenographers
under her supervision regularly perform their duties. The
circular also provides a penalty for any stenographer who
fails or refuses to submit the required verified monthly
certifications. When Lancion refused to transcribe her
stenographic notes, Perlez should have reported immediately
the matter to this court through Judge Aglugub and
recommended the withholding of Lancion’s salary. This she
again failed to do.
The continuous defiance of Clerk of Court Perlez of the
directives of Judge Aglugub that she submit the transcripts of
stenographic notes of the nineteen (19) cases constitutes
Insubordination which under the Civil Service Law and Rules,
Book V of Executive Order 292 and Omnibus Rules, is
classified as a less grave offense with the penalty of
suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months, for the first offense and dismissal for the second
offense.
For the additional information of the Court, in Administrative
Matter No. P-99-1348 (formerly OCA IPI NO. 99-696-P),
Judge Aglugub charged Perlez with Insubordination for
refusal of the latter to submit the transcripts of stenographic
notes of ten (10) cases, three (3) of which were subject of
Judge Aglugub’s 12 July 1999 request for extension of time
to decide. In the same case, Perlez was likewise charged
with Infidelity in the Custody of Court’s Records for her
failure to locate missing court records. The case has been
referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation in a Resolution of the
Court’s First Division dated 17 January 2000.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we respectfully submit the
consideration of the Honorable Court our for
recommendations that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. this matter be FORMALLY DOCKETED as an administrative
complaint against Imelda S. Perlez, Clerk of Court, MTC,
Branch 2, San Pedro, Laguna; and
2. Clerk of Court Imelda S. Perlez be SUSPENDED for one (1)
month and one (1) day.
The findings of the Court Administrator are well taken.
Respondent Imelda S. Perlez is the administrative officer of
the court. 13 As such, she is charged with the control and
supervision of all subordinate personnel of the court,
including the stenographers. 14 It is thus incumbent upon
her to ensure that they perform their duties well.
15chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In the case of stenographers, the Rules of Court requires
that they submit the transcript of stenographic notes taken
by them not later than 20 days from the time the notes were
taken. 16 As administrative officer of the court, the duty of
the Clerk of Court is to ensure that the stenographers comply
with this rule. In her comment, respondent Perlez lays the
blame on stenographer Jennifer Lancion for her failure to
submit the transcripts of stenographic notes. But, as the
Court Administrator observes in his report, respondent Perlez
should have reported the matter to the judge and
recommended the imposition of administrative sanctions
against the erring stenographer. Supervision is not a
meaningless thing. Respondent Perlez has shown passivity, if
not indifference, to the failure of those under her supervision
to perform their duties faithfully and well.
The Court Administrator recommends that respondent
Imelda S. Perlez be found guilty of insubordination and that,
in accordance with the Civil Service Law, she be suspended
for one (1) month and one (1) day. Although the penalty is
the same, respondent should only be considered guilty of
simple neglect of duty, not of insubordination, as this
appears to be her first offense consisting of her failure to
exercise effective supervision over the stenographers.
Under the Civil Service Law and the Omnibus Rules
implementing the same, 17 simple neglect of duty is a less
grave offense, punishable by suspension for one (1) month
and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense and
dismissal for the second offense. As this appears to be the
first infraction committed by respondent and it has not been
shown that her failure to submit the transcripts was willful or
intentional, 18 we find the suspension of respondent Perlez
for one (1) month and one (1) day without pay a sufficient
penalty for her offense.
The incidents concerning missing court records 19 and
respondent Imelda S. Perlez’s alleged failure to produce
them and make them available to concerned parties or to the
court are the subject of another complaint in A.M. No. P-99-
1348 and, therefore, no findings concerning them are made
in this case.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Imelda S. Perlez
guilty of simple neglect of duty and hereby suspends her for
one (1) month and one (1) day without pay with warning
that a repetition of the same acts or omissions will be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Penalties for light offenses
A.M. No. P-01-1469. March 26, 2001
ATTY. ROEL O. PARAS, complainant, vs. MYRNA F.
LOFRANCO, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Digos, Davao del Sur, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This pertains to the administrative complaint filed on March
12, 1997 by Atty. Roel O. Paras against respondent Myrna F.
Lofranco, Clerk III of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
20, Davao del Sur, for discourtesy and conduct unbecoming
a court employee. Upon recommendation of the Office of the
Court Administrator, 1 this matter was referred for
investigation to the Executive Judge of the RTC, Digos,
Davao del Sur who, in a report, dated September 25, 2000,
recommended the suspension of respondent for fifteen (15)
days with the warning that a stiffer penalty will be imposed
in case of repetition of similar acts. 2cräläwvirtualibräry
During the investigation, complainant adopted the allegations
in his complaint-affidavit, dated February 28, 1997, as his
direct testimony, to wit:
1. That complainant is a law practitioner with office at
Magsaysay St., Digos, Davao del Sur and presently elected
as Vice-President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Davao del Sur Chapter;
2. That respondent MYRNA LOFRANCO is a public employee
occupying the position of clerk of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Digos, Davao del Sur;
3. That sometime in February 28, 1997, complainant
approached the respondent in a nice way for the withdrawal
of a cash bail bond on behalf of his client. Respondent, after
reading the Court Order for the release of the said bail bond,
told [complainant] that one of the signatories was absent
and so [complainant] asked her if it can be withdrawn by the
present signatory and further asked her whether the bank
account is joint or not. Respondent in a gesture of disrespect
and in a sarcastic manner answered Ambot lang kay dili ra
man ikaw ang tig-withdraw diri, sa Lunes na lang ni which
means I do not know because you are not the only one
withdrawing here, it can be on Monday. Respondent then
advised the complainant to reproduce the receipts of the bail
bond;
4. Not wanting any trouble, complainant complied. [A]fter he
came back and handed over the receipts including the
necessary documents to the respondent, respondent told
complainant in the presence of several court employees and
a certain Judge, that Unsaon man pag-received ana nga usa
ra ma na ka kopya (referring to the above-mentioned COURT
ORDER), dapat abogado ka kahibalo ka sa requirements
which means How could we receive that when that is only a
single copy, you are a lawyer and you are supposed to know
the requirements;
5. [Feeling] insulted, complainant told respondent You are
not supposed to talk like that to a lawyer, but she continued
raising [her] voice and even made several accusations
against complainant and so in [the] heat [of] anger,
complainant called her crazy but [respondent] responded in
a loud voice, calling complainant crazy also;
6. That complainant learned later that respondent is not the
person in charge of the withdrawal of bank deposits of RTC,
Branch 20 but one of her officemates who was present that
time;
7. That respondent has been reportedly [exhibiting] the
same unethical and arrogant attitude in her dealing with
several persons having transactions in the abovementioned
court, in fact, she was once [featured] in a local newspaper
for [her] conduct; . . . .3cräläwvirtualibräry
On cross-examination, complainant testified that he was the
counsel for accused in the case entitled People of the
Philippines v. Rogelio T. Vale and Durico Dablo, 4 pending
before the RTC, Branch 18, Davao del Sur. He testified that
on February 28, 1997, he went to the RTC, Branch 20, Davao
del Sur, presided by Executive Judge Magno Cruz, to ask for
the withdrawal of the cash bond. Thinking that respondent
Myrna Lofranco of RTC, Branch 20, was the one in charge of
releasing cash bonds, complainant handed over to her the
order of the RTC, Branch 18, the original receipt of the cash
bond, and the special power of attorney (hereafter referred
to as SPA) to her. He, however, denied the allegations of
respondent that he detached the copy of the receipt from the
records of the case without the permission of the RTC,
Branch 18. 5cräläwvirtualibräry
On the other hand, respondents counter-affidavit, dated
March 7, 1997, which she presented as her direct testimony,
stated:
a) While sitting in my table entertaining one Liza Baldoza
who has an official business in connection with the
petitions/cases of Mr. Romualdo Crispino and Lourdes B.
Crispino, Atty. Roel Paras approached me. From his
appearance, he was already drunk. This was last February
28, 1997 at about 11:00 oclock in the morning;
b) Atty. Paras, being a practicing lawyer in Digos, Davao del
Sur, is known to me so that there is no reason for me to
argue with him although he treated me like his own
househelp;
c) Atty. Paras handed to me a duplicate original of an Order
of Judge Rodolfo A. Escovilla dated February 27, 1997, a
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex B;
d) After reading the Order, I courteously informed Atty.
Paras that his client could not possibly withdraw the amount
that day because the persons [required] to sign the
withdrawal slip are not available and, while saying this, I
asked for a copy of the receipt. Atty. Paras informed me that
the receipt is in the records at Regional Trial Court, Branch
18, and at the same time was asking me if the account is a
JOINT ACCOUNT. Since I am not also aware, I answered that
it may be AND/OR. Upon hearing this, he angrily told me
that if it is an AND/OR ACCOUNT, our Branch Clerk of Court
Michael Francisco could sign alone. He proceeded to lecture
me on the various intricacies of bank accounts. Stunned by
the manner he raised his voice. I told him in these words:
Ambot lang kay dili man ko taga-Bangko. Basta silang duha
si MICHAEL and JUDGE CRUZ and mo-pirma or I do not know
as I am not from a bank [but] the fact remains that the two
of them, MICHAEL and JUDGE CRUZ will sign;
e) After hearing this, Atty. Paras left and I thought that was
the end of it;
f) A minute later, Atty. Paras came back and brought with
him the records of Criminal Case No. 114(93) and arrogantly
showed to me the receipt and at the same time detached the
receipt from the records (Carpeta) without any authority
from the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 18. When Atty.
Paras tried to give me the receipt, I declined by saying: Dili
ko mo-receive ana Atty. Kay naa pa ra ba kay permahan ani
nga imong na-receive and receipt gikan sa Branch 18 or I
will not receive it Attorney because before that receipt could
be given to you there is a need for you to sign a receipt from
Branch 18;
g) After hearing this, Atty. Paras left with the records;
h) Minutes later, a co-employee or Branch 20 named
Luzminda Baba who is in charge of the withdrawal of the
bond arrived. I informed Minda about it;
i) Then Atty. Paras arrived in our place again and handed the
duplicate copy of the Order with the receipt to Minda Baba
and said: O, reciba ni or Here, you receive this. I made a
remark that how can our Court receive it when there was
only one copy. Minda Baba told Atty. Paras in this wise: May
akong resibon nga usa ra man ni, wala nay akoa or What will
I receive when there is only one copy, I will have no copy.
Atty. Paras angrily told Minda: Taga-i lang ko ug papel diha,
pirmahi lang or Just give me a piece of paper with your
signature. Minda told him Magpa-xerox lang ako ani or I will
have it xeroxed. Atty. Paras told Minda: I have a xerox copy
and after saying this, he left;
j) At this time, Minda Baba gave the Court Order to me and
asked me what was the import of the Order since she could
not understand it;
k) Then Atty. Paras arrived and I asked him where was Mr.
Vale (the accused and the one who is the very person to
receive the bond) and the very person whose name appeared
in the receipt;
l) Atty. Paras suddenly shouted at me WALA or He is not
here;
m) I still kept my patience since I am not a lawyer like him. I
still asked him who was authorized by Mr. Vale to withdraw;
n) Atty. Paras, still raising his voice, said: KINSA PA MAN
DIAY or who else proclaiming that he was the one; I asked
him to hand to me a Special Power of Attorney or any
Authorization;
o) At this point in time, Atty. Paras again shouted at me
saying: USAY PAGTOO NIMO, MO-FOLLOW UP KO KUNG
WALAY AUTHORIZATION or What do you think of me, I will
make follow-up without any authorizations?
p) At this juncture, I already felt very small in the presence
not only of the employees but other persons as well
(including Judge Albarracin), so that I told him back in this
wise: Abogado man kaha ka, nganong mag-follow up man ka
nga dili kompleto ang papeles nga imong dad-on or You said
you are a lawyer, why will you make any follow-up without
complete papers;
q) Shocked that a lowly clerk could say that to him, Atty.
Paras shouted: KAHILAS NINO. MORA KA UG SI KINSA.
BUANG KA or You are repulsive, as if you are somebody. You
are crazy;
r) Hearing this slanderous remark, I held back my tears and
before I went inside the Chamber of the Judge, I told Atty.
Paras: Ayaw ko ug hinganli ug Buang, Atty; . . .
6cräläwvirtualibräry
On cross-examination, respondent reiterated the facts which
she stated in her counter-affidavit. Additionally, she testified
that she was in charge of the civil and criminal cases in the
RTC, Branch 20, including the withdrawal of cash bonds,
while her officemate Luzminda Baba was only in charge of
typing the bank withdrawal slip for the bonds release.
According to her, complainant approached her in the office
(RTC, Branch 20) drunk, and she noticed that his face was
flushed.
Respondent stated that complainant pointed his finger at her
and called her buang or crazy but denied retaliating and
calling him crazy. She likewise stressed that, contrary to the
allegations of complainant, the latter did not present all the
requirements needed for the withdrawal of the cash bond,
particularly the SPA. 7cräläwvirtualibräry
Lastly, Luzminda Baba testified that there was no SPA
attached to the record of the case pending before the RTC,
Branch 18, but only an acknowledgement receipt issued by
complainant that he received the amount of P9,400.00 from
the RTC, Branch 20. 8 Complainant objected to the
presentation of Mrs. Baba on the ground that she was not
the proper person to testify on the contents of the records of
the case pending before the RTC, Branch 18. Counsel for the
respondent, therefore, brought the records of the case and
manifested that no SPA was attached to it. Complainant
admitted that he did not submit any copy of the SPA to the
RTC, Branch 18. However, he insisted that he gave a copy of
the same to the RTC, Branch 20. 9cräläwvirtualibräry
Based on the foregoing evidence, Executive Judge Hilario T.
Mapayo recommended in its report dated September 25,
2000 that respondent MYRNA S. LOFRANCO be SUSPENDED
for FIFTEEN (15) days with a warning of a stiffer penalty in
case of repetition of similar acts. 10cräläwvirtualibräry
The issue in this case is whether or not the acts and/or
utterances of respondent constitute discourtesy and/or
conduct unbecoming a court employee. After due
consideration of the parties evidence, we find Executive
Judge Hilario T. Mapayos findings to be well taken.
The parties did not present other witnesses to corroborate
their respective testimonies. Consequently, the decision in
this case hinges on credibility of one or the other party.
First. Respondent claims that it was complainant who lost his
temper. She claims that complainant asked her if the bank
account was a joint account so the signatory who was
present can sign alone. According to respondent, when she
responded that she was not certain and that perhaps it was
an and/or account, complainant got angry. Complainant then
arrogantly gave her a lecture on the difference between an
and/or and a joint account. 11 The tenor of her allegations
sought to establish that complainant was angered when she
responded the way she did to his inquiry. This Court,
however, cannot believe that complainant would get angry
just because she did not know if the bank account was a
joint one or not. Human nature dictates that a person would
not be easily infuriated unless provoked. It was unlikely that
complainant would lecture her on the intricacies of bank
accounts if respondent had politely answered his questions.
Complainant may have been angered not so much by the
words respondent uttered but by the manner in which she
did so. Consequently, this Court gives credence to the
allegations of complainant that when he asked respondent if
the bank account can be withdrawn by the signatory who
was present and whether it was a joint account, respondent
with disrespect and in a sarcastic manner answered, Ambot
lang kay dili ra man ikaw ang tig-withdraw diri, sa Lunes na
lang ni which means I do not know and besides you are not
the only one withdrawing here, just come back on Monday.
The investigating judge observed:
It would be very unlikely for a neophyte in the practice of
law, like herein complainant, to act discourteously and
arrogantly in his dealings with court personnel, if not at the
least provoked by the latter. 12cräläwvirtualibräry
Even assuming that complainant got irritated despite the fact
that respondents answer was made in a friendly manner, still
it was no excuse for her to treat him arrogantly after
complainant gave her the alleged lecture. Such arrogant
gesture on her part was admitted by respondent when she
stated:
Q: Is that what you are trying to tell the court, that the
complainant arrogantly explained to you the intricacies of a
bank account?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. PARAS:
Q: And that is the reason you addressed him the following
words - -
Ambot lang dili man ko taga-Bangko. Basta silang duha si
Michael and Judge Cruz and mo-pirma. I do not know as I
am not from a bank, the fact remains that the two of them,
Michael and Judge Cruz will sign.
Do you confirm that you have uttered that, Mrs. Lofranco?
WITNESS:
A Some of them are put in my affidavit.
Q I am asking you if you confirm the statment as you read to
you?
A Yes.
Q You said that you know already Atty. Paras when he
approached you?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you know him to be an officer of the court?
A I know you before [when] you [were] still a student.
Q The question is, if you know him to be an officer of the
court?
A Yes sir.
Q And you know that as an employee or clerk of Branch 20,
you are duty bound to give him utmost respect as an officer
of the court?
A The way the complainant approached me that is why I
answered him back arrogantly.13cräläwvirtualibräry
In one case, 14 this Court admonished a court employee
when he answered back an old lawyer who is also an officer
of the court. He was held to have shown discourtesy in the
performance of his official duties for which he should be
disciplined under the Civil Service Law.
Second . Complainant alleged that when he presented only
one copy of the court order, respondent sarcastically
remarked, Unsaon man pag-received ana nga usa ra ma na
ka kopya (referring to the court order), dapat abogado ka
kahibalo ka sa requirements which means How could we
receive that when that is the only copy. You are a lawyer,
you are supposed to know the requirements.
15cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent has her own version of what happened. She
explained that when she asked where the accused was and
required complainant to present an authorization from the
accused, complainant shouted that his client was not around
and that he would not follow up matters in the court if he
was not duly authorized. Feeling embarrassed, because the
utterances were made in the presence of several people, she
said, Abogado man kaha ka, nganong mag-follow up man ka
nga dili kompleto ang papeles nga imong dad-oni which
means You said you are a lawyer, why will you make any
follow-up without complete papers. 16cräläwvirtualibräry
On the other hand, we think complainant likewise acted
improperly in a manner unbecoming to an officer of the
court. Complainant uttered provocative words because it
appeared that he did not have complete documents at the
time he approached respondent. Nonetheless, we think this
does not justify respondents discourteous behavior towards
complainant. Despite the fact that complainant and
respondent gave different accounts of what happened, as
well as of the words uttered by respondent, the latter
admitted having said words which to the mind of this Court
were uncalled for, as those words were by themselves
inappropriate. This is to say that it was unnecessary, if not
improper, for respondent to emphasize that complainant,
being a lawyer, was supposed to know and to bring all the
requirements before the withdrawal of the cash bond can be
done.
For her defense, respondent claimed that she uttered those
words because she was embarrassed by the alleged display
of arrogance by the complainant in the presence of several
people. This is not a valid reason. If at all, she was annoyed
and angered by what transpired rather than embarrassed.
Hence, it cannot be denied that such utterances of
respondent were made to get back at complainant. Being a
public officer who renders public service, respondent could
have prevented the unfortunate incident from happening by
graciously ending their discussion. Complainant, who was the
vice-president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Davao
Chapter at the time, was probably the one who felt more
embarrassed by the incident.
The investigating judge opined:
In fact, it was respondents approach in asking and answering
questions of complainant verifying therein the required
documents in his hands for the release of [the] cash bond of
his client which later gave rise to an exchange of heated
argument in the presence of other court employees.
Complainant felt offended, humiliated, and embarrassed
leading to the filing of this complaint.
Respondent, on cross, candidly admitted that she answered
back arrogantly and indeed uttered this line: Abogado ka
man kaha, nganong mag-follow-up man ka nga dili kompleto
ang papeles nga imong dad-on (You said you are a lawyer,
why will you make any follow-up without complete papers),
in retaliation [to] complainants utterance.
However, to our mind, this could not justify the demeanor of
respondent who is a civil servant as mandated by law. She
should at all times be of service to litigants as well as
counsels and should treat them RIGHT at all
cost.17cräläwvirtualibräry
It is time to reiterate what was said in another case in
stressing on the need for promptness, courtesy, and
diligence in public service: 18cräläwvirtualibräry
It is the policy of the state to promote a high standard of
ethics in the public service. Public officials and employees are
under obligation to perform the duties of their offices
honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their ability. They, as
recipients of the public trust, should demonstrate courtesy,
civility, and self-restraint in their official actuations to the
public at all times even when confronted with rudeness and
insulting behavior. Losing ones temper by loudly uttering
unsavory remarks and pointing a finger at a litigant or any
other person for that matter exhibits a failure on the part of
respondent to act with self-restraint and civility. High-strung
and belligerent behavior has no place in the government
service; especially when done at the workplace and during
working hours, such conduct shows discourtesy and
disrespect not only towards the public but to the court as
well.
The court is looked upon by people with high respect and is
regarded a sacred place where litigants are heard, rights and
conflicts settled, and justice solemnly dispensed. Misbehavior
within or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and
dignity. The conduct and behavior required of every court
personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all
times be characterized by, among other things, propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the publics respect and
confidence in the judicial service.
For the foregoing reasons, we find respondent guilty of
discourtesy and conduct unbecoming to a court employee for
which she should be reprimanded. 19cräläwvirtualibräry
Complainants allegation that respondent was once reported
in a local newspaper as guilty of misbehavior in the
performance of her duties, however, cannot be taken against
her because it was not substantiated in the complaint nor
proved during the investigation. Incidentally, there is a
pending case filed by respondent against complainant before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for alleged serious
misconduct.
WHEREFORE , respondent Myrna F. Lofranco, Clerk III,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Digos, Davao del Sur, is
hereby REPRIMANDED for discourtesy in the performance of
official duty with a WARNING that any similar act of
discourtesy in the future will be dealt with more severely. Let
this decision be noted in the personal record of herein
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Penalties for light offenses
[A.M. No. P-00-1421. April 11, 2002
CHRISTINE G. UY, complainant, vs. BONIFACIO
MAGALLANES, JR, PROCESS SERVER, RTC, BRANCH 30,
BAYOMBONG, NUEVA VIZCAYA, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed against respondent
Bonifacio Magallanes, Jr., a process server of the Regional
Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30, for
willful failure to pay debts.
The letter-complaint 1 dated June 16, 1998 states that on
several occasions in 1997, respondent bought construction
supplies amounting to P86,725.00 from complainant Cristine
Uy. It alleged that respondent represented that he could pay
his debt because he is an employee of the court.
Notwithstanding repeated demands, however, respondent
refused to pay and bragged that he is an employee of the
court.
In his comment, 2 respondent admits his debt but claims
that he had already made partial payments in the amount of
P12,000.00, the last of which was given on December 8,
1998 for which he was issued a receipt by complainant's
secretary; that he was not given a receipt for the payment
he made on October 12, 1998 although it was noted in
complainant's personal notebook; and that he has a verbal
agreement with complainant that he will pay monthly until
his obligation is fully paid.
In reply, complainant averred that the allegations of
respondent are false, the truth being that respondent
continuously failed to pay despite repeated demands.
In a Memorandum dated July 11, 2000, Court Administrator
Alfredo L. Benipayo found respondent's willful failure to pay
just debts unbecoming of a public official and hence a ground
for disciplinary action. He recommends that respondent be
suspended from the service for three months and be ordered
to pay his obligations with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the Court Administrator that respondent
should be held administratively liable for failure to pay his
debts. His allegation that he has made partial payments is
not supported by evidence. It is unnatural for respondent not
to ask for receipts to evidence his partial payments. Hence,
the Court gives more credence to the claim of complainant
that respondent refused to pay despite repeated demands.
It goes without saying that respondent is administratively
liable. In Martinez vs. Muoz, 3 the Court held the Branch
Clerk of Court administratively liable for his unjust refusal to
pay his indebtedness, pursuant to the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), specifically the provisions on
the Civil Service Commission which covers the respondent as
a court personnel. It applied Section 46, Chapter 7, Subtitle
A (Civil Service Commission), Title I, Book V thereof which
provides as follows:
"SECTION 46. Discipline: General Provisions. - (a) No officer
or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due
process.
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxxxxx
(22) Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay
taxes to the government; x x x"
"Just debts" as defined under Section 23, Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules refer to those claims the existence and
justness of which are admitted by the debtor. In the case at
bar, in light of respondent's admission of his indebtedness
and his unjust refusal to pay it, his administrative liability
under the Revised Administrative Code is settled. 4 The
penalty imposed by the law is not directed at his private life
but at his actuations unbecoming a public official.
The same rule classifies willful failure to pay just debts as a
light offense and prescribes the penalty of reprimand for the
first offense, suspension for one to thirty days for the second
offense, and dismissal for the third offense. Apparently, this
is respondent's first offense which would merit only a
reprimand and not suspension of three months as
recommended by the Court Administrator. It is not denied,
however, that respondent not only unjustly refused to pay
but worse, bragged about his being a court employee to
evade his obligation. Hence, he deserves a severe
reprimand. Following the ruling in Martinez, however, we
cannot order respondent to pay his indebtedness to
complainant as recommended by the Office of the Court
Administrator because this Court is not a collection agency.
WHEREFORE , respondent BONIFACIO MAGALLANES, JR.,
process server, Branch 30, of the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, is SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for
his willful failure to pay his just debts, which amounts to
conduct unbecoming a court employee. The commission of
the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.