The Potential of the Quadrilateral | RAND 10/06/20 17:54

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COMMENTARY (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (CSIS))

The Potential of the Quadrilateral

Chinese boats fish at the disputed Scarborough Shoal, April 5, 2017 Photo by Erik de Castro/Reuters

by Jeffrey W. Hornung
February 22, 2018

n Donald Trump's first National Security Strategy (NSS), reference is given to the

I importance of increasing cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India. The idea is not
new. The Quadrilateral Security Framework (also Quadrilateral Initiative; hereafter,
the Quad), was initiated by Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe in 2006, but the idea

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fell apart after China vociferously objected to its formation, and a change of leadership in
Australia led to a more ambivalent China policy. Prime Minister Abe has once again signaled
support for the Quad, as did the United States' NSS. At the same time, India and Australia
are taking firmer stances against China. If the Quad's time has finally come, what purpose
would cooperation among these four countries serve in the contemporary strategic
environment?

The initial narrative surrounding the Quad was tied up almost exclusively in democratic
values. While there is no question that shared values can and should serve as a tool of
statecraft, values alone do not establish a robust basis upon which to craft policy or strategy.
Nor do they help delineate specific partnerships. Instead, in addition to values, states should
consider shared interests as well as capabilities. The United States, Australia, India, and
Japan have the most capable militaries in the region save China's, and share a fundamental
interest in maintaining a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. Confronting the broad
array of challenges to that order matters to them less because they are democracies, but
more because those threats affect their common strategic interests.

But what could cooperation among the Quad members mean in practice? The debates
surrounding the Quad have revolved around what these states can do in the maritime
domain. This does not mean the Quad's focus should be confined to maritime issues, but the
heart of this arrangement is maritime security. Many discussions have focused on what role,
if any, these states should play to supplement U.S. Navy freedom of navigation operations in
the South China Sea. Often unexplored are other important maritime issues that require
coordination from the region's most capable powers. Three potential areas deserve more
attention.

The first is enhancing the region's maritime situational awareness (MSA). Given the
fragmented information maritime environment where Chinese vessels are thriving, there is
a crucial need for regionally-coordinated MSA capabilities to better monitor developments
at sea. While Quad members individually already support these capabilities, the Quad could
serve as the main platform through which these capabilities are strengthened in a more
coordinated manner. For example, Australia has supported MSA in the South Pacific
through the Forum Fisheries Agency and Pacific Patrol Boat Program, and Japan backs
several South China Sea states via donations of patrol boats, communication equipment,
and training. The United States too has funded projects with South China Sea countries
under the $425 million Maritime Security Initiative (MSI). Grants from MSI vary by nation,
but include the provision of automatic identification systems, secure communication

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networks, devices for data collection, assessment, analysis, and dissemination,

enhancements in communications-networks, increased training, and improvements in
maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Including India in these
MSA efforts in the Indian Ocean could greatly expand the area of visible ocean space among
those littoral states. The Quad's value lies in better coordination of efforts to improve MSA
capabilities across the region.

A second area of cooperation is safeguarding exclusive economic zones, or EEZs. Although

other countries are not entirely innocent, Chinese fishing vessels appear the worst culprits
of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing within other states' EEZs. With
dwindling fish stocks close to home, Chinese fishermen are encouraged and even subsidized
to sail farther offshore and into distant waters in pursuit of IUU fishing, including in other
states' EEZs. In addition to strengthening maritime patrols of their own waters and assisting
smaller states in their coastal defenses, the Quad could serve as a public coalition to speak
out against these EEZ violations. It could also serve as a vehicle to build the maritime
enforcement capacities of smaller vulnerable states and work to implement measures at
regional ports that require fishing vessels to demonstrate the provenance of their catch
before entry. More actively, as signatories to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Quad members
could conduct high seas boarding and inspection of vehicles, gear, and catch to ensure
compliance with international rules.

A final potential area is championing the rule of law. There is a growing list of Chinese para-
military ships illegally entering other states' waters and being involved in confrontations
between fishing trawlers and coast guards. A greater Chinese security role in waters outside
the South China Sea is inevitable as its economic interests expand, but increasing examples
of force used against other ships and gray zone activities show China openly violating the
norms and rules governing the maritime domain. In addition to the MSA efforts listed above,
the Quad could become a platform to act collectively in other domains. Diplomatically, Quad
members could coordinate activities that raise awareness about Chinese activities in the
Indo-Pacific, and create a more unified interpretation of international law. Economically,
Quad countries could coordinate their commercial infrastructure investments to provide
alternatives to the influx of Chinese capital into regional construction projects in littoral
states. This could help draw smaller states away from over-dependence on Chinese
investments. Providing such economic alternatives could also provide long-lasting
structural additions that aid regional sea lines.

The challenge for the Quad to effectively pursue any of these areas will likely be politics.

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Although the United States and Japan have shown an increasing willingness to talk tough
on China, historically there has been less willingness in India and Australia. This is
particularly true if New Delhi and Canberra fear that possible benefits in maritime
coordination are outweighed by Chinese opposition. For example, India's acquiescence to the
April 2016 Russia-India-China foreign ministers joint communique that called for the “full
respect of all provisions of [the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea]” at a time
that China was openly violating those provisions raised questions of India's willingness to
be tough. There have also been questions regarding Australia due to Canberra's policy of
relying on an economic relationship with China and a security relationship with the United
States. In looking to maintain the right balance, Canberra was often viewed as hesitant to
speak critically of Chinese behavior.

Yet, there is evidence that Australia and India have recalibrated their considerations.
Canberra's 2016 Defence White Paper (PDF) called on China to be “more transparent” about
its defense policies and stipulated that competing claims for territory and natural resources
in Southeast Asia will provide a potential source of tensions. In its 2017 Foreign Policy White
Paper, Canberra notes that Australia and China have “different interests, values and political
and legal systems” that will give rise to “friction.”

Similarly, India is taking a firm line against China in the maritime domain. During his March
2015 visit to the Seychelles and Mauritius, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi laid out a
framework for maritime engagement that signaled his commitment to the Indian Ocean
littoral. This was followed by the Indian Navy's maritime strategy (PDF) which indicated a
shift toward more naval engagement and the need for a network of regional cooperation to
ensure peace and stability. Events like last year's standoff on the Doklam plateau do nothing
to improve Sino-India relations; instead, they push India closer to countries willing to
counter China.

The maritime domain suffers from a lack of collective action unless those with vested
interests act. Quad members are the region's four most capable maritime powers, and
naturally concerned with China's assault on international rules and norms. If ever realized,
the Quad could serve as a platform to tackle some of the important maritime issues that
require coordination in today's strategic environment.

Jeffrey W. Hornung is a political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

This commentary originally appeared on Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (CSIS) on

February 21, 2018. Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based

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on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.

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