general

Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. people consistently regard pleasure
and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem
to be instrumentally valuable for anything.
Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value
Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a

widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is
that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable . On virtually any
proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is
included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive
sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something
undeniably bad about the way pain feels , and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness
of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure”
and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The
special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in
our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask:
“What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually
do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further
that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice
thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further
question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the
pleasure of drinking it.” If
I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good
for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not
good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying
the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased,
because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself. ”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the
case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted
that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning
about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in
matters of value.

Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. all other values can
be explained with reference to pleasure; occam’s razor requires us to treat
these as instrumentally valuable.
Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value
Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, I
do not think the burden of
proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone
claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her
to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. Possibly, this could be done
through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, there is something peculiar
about the list of additional intrinsic values that counts in hedonism’s favor: the listed values have a
strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain. To go
through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about
pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is
arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and
proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other
things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, wisdom,
freedom, peace, and security, although they are
perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such,
they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues,
cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective
level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if
this were something sought after. To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic
instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably
explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some
have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its
application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of
conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue
and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest
sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often,
indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject
pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are
potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain (which, following my argument in the previous
chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), then—by appeal to Occam’s razor —we have at
least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues . It
is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all
values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue,
we have reason to reject more complicated accounts. The fact that suggested non-hedonic
intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of
hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in
virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. The challenge can be phrased as the following
question: If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own
right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain ?27
Thus, the standard is to maximize pleasure.
More stuffs:
a. Only consequentialism explains impacts in gradients, e.g. killing one
person is wrong but killing a thousand is more wrong – this is key to
being able to analyze impacts in a real-life context, which is a
constitutive feature of a moral framework – other ethical frameworks’
declarations of absolute wrong make it impossible to evaluate actions on
a case by case basis.
b. Evaluating consequences is a prereq to all other normative ethics.
Assumptions of ideal situations are necessary for “perfect moral actors”
to act; resolution of threats to life and security inhibit actors’ abilities to
make moral judgements, so it’s a prereq to their methodology. Precludes
and outweighs under their own framework.
c. Key to equal ground, I get plans and neg gets disads; other standards and
rotbs are side-skewed and self-serving.
d. Actor specificity – collective action results in tradeoffs and conflicts that
only act util can resolve. Policies must maximize expected wellbeing.
Woller 97
[Gary Woller, “An Overview by Gary Woller”. A Forum on the Role of Environmental Ethics. 1997. pp. 10. AS 12/5/13]

Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that public
policies inevitably entail trade-offs among competing values. Thus since policymakers cannot
justify inherent value conflicts to the public in any philosophical sense, and since public only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs and do not
themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they create a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem or actually making it worse.
For example, a moral obligation to preserve the environment by no means implies the best way, or any way for that matter, to do so, just as there is no a priori reason to believe that any policy
that claims to preserve the environment will actually do so. Any number of policies might work, and others, although seemingly consistent with the moral principle, will fail utterly. That

deontological principles are an inadequate basis for environmental policy is evident in the rather significant irony that most forms of
deontologically based environmental laws and regulations tend to be implemented in a very utilitarian manner
by street-level enforcement officials. Moreover, ignoring the relevant costs and benefits of environmental policy and their attendant incentive structures can, as alluded to above, actually work at
cross purposes to environmental preservation. (There exists an extensive literature on this aspect of regulatory enforcement and the often perverse out- comes of regulatory policy. See, for
example, Ackerman, 1981; Bartrip and Fenn, 1983; Hawkins, 1983, 1984; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984.) Even the most die-hard preservationist/deontologist would, I believe, be troubled by this

outcome. The above points are perhaps best expressed by Richard Flathman, The number of values typically involved in public policy
decisions, the broad categories which must be employed and above all, the scope and complexity of the consequences to be anticipated militate against reasoning so conclusively that
they generate an imperative to institute a specific policy. It is seldom the case that only one policy will meet the criteria of the public interest (1958, p. 12). It
therefore follows that in a democracy, policymakers have an ethical duty to establish a plausible link between policy alternatives and the problems they address, and the public must be

reasonably assured that a policy will actually do something about an existing problem; this requires the means-end language and methodology of utilitarian ethics. Good
intentions, lofty rhetoric, and moral piety are an insufficient, though perhaps at times a necessary, basis for public policy in a democracy

**Pummer here? – instead of bostrom I mean**

Extinction must matter under any framework. Traditional ethics must be
abandoned in the face of extinction in order to ensure that deliberation over
the alternatives can continue.
Bostrom ’11
Nick Bostrom ‘11, “The Concept of Existential Risk”, 2011, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School & Faculty of
Philosophy http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking

at existential risk.  Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be
confused.  We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would
count as a big win for humanity ; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of
our journey.  If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should
recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability
to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly.  Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with
great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that

the future will contain a lot of value.  To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe. We thus
want to reach a state in which we have (a) far greater intelligence, knowledge, and sounder judgment than we currently do; (b) far greater ability to
solve global-coordination problems; (c) far greater technological capabilities and physical resources; and such that (d) our values and preferences are
not corrupted in the process of getting there (but rather, if possible, improved). 
stock justifications
 actor spec
Actor specificity – collective action results in tradeoffs and conflicts that
only act util can resolve. Policies must maximize expected wellbeing.
Woller 97
[Gary Woller, “An Overview by Gary Woller”. A Forum on the Role of Environmental Ethics. 1997. pp. 10. AS 12/5/13]

Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that public
policies inevitably entail trade-offs among competing values. Thus since policymakers cannot
justify inherent value conflicts to the public in any philosophical sense, and since public only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs and do not
themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they create a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem or actually making it worse.
For example, a moral obligation to preserve the environment by no means implies the best way, or any way for that matter, to do so, just as there is no a priori reason to believe that any policy
that claims to preserve the environment will actually do so. Any number of policies might work, and others, although seemingly consistent with the moral principle, will fail utterly. That

deontological principles are an inadequate basis for environmental policy is evident in the rather significant irony that most forms of
deontologically based environmental laws and regulations tend to be implemented in a very utilitarian manner
by street-level enforcement officials. Moreover, ignoring the relevant costs and benefits of environmental policy and their attendant incentive structures can, as alluded to above, actually work at
cross purposes to environmental preservation. (There exists an extensive literature on this aspect of regulatory enforcement and the often perverse out- comes of regulatory policy. See, for
example, Ackerman, 1981; Bartrip and Fenn, 1983; Hawkins, 1983, 1984; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984.) Even the most die-hard preservationist/deontologist would, I believe, be troubled by this

The number of values typically involved in public policy

outcome. The above points are perhaps best expressed by Richard Flathman,

decisions, the broad categories which must be employed and above all, the scope and complexity of the consequences to be anticipated militate against reasoning so conclusively that
they generate an imperative to institute a specific policy. It is seldom the case that only one policy will meet the criteria of the public interest (1958, p. 12). It
therefore follows that in a democracy, policymakers have an ethical duty to establish a plausible link between policy alternatives and the problems they address, and the public must be

reasonably assured that a policy will actually do something about an existing problem; this requires the means-end language and methodology of utilitarian ethics. Good
intentions, lofty rhetoric, and moral piety are an insufficient, though perhaps at times a necessary, basis for public policy in a democracy
 phenomenonal introspect
- sinhababu: has article “epistemic arg for hedonism,” says that when you experience
pain, you just know that it’s bad – you should trust that over anything else, it’s
historically accurate
- didn’t sinhababu sexual assault a ton of women? Maybe not the best card to use lol
 moral uncertainty
Extinction must matter under any framework. Traditional ethics must be
abandoned in the face of extinction in order to ensure that deliberation over
the alternatives can continue.
Bostrom ’11
Nick Bostrom ‘11, “The Concept of Existential Risk”, 2011, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School & Faculty of
Philosophy http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking

at existential risk.  Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be
confused.  We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would
count as a big win for humanity ; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of
our journey.  If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should
recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability
to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly.  Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with
great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that

the future will contain a lot of value.  To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe. We thus
want to reach a state in which we have (a) far greater intelligence, knowledge, and sounder judgment than we currently do; (b) far greater ability to
solve global-coordination problems; (c) far greater technological capabilities and physical resources; and such that (d) our values and preferences are
not corrupted in the process of getting there (but rather, if possible, improved). 
 resolves moral dilemmas
- gives an answer to every moral situation
- not really a reason to pref though, doesn’t mean it’s good – might be bad, if it gives an
easy answer then it’s probably not nuanced
 empiricism
- nagel
- similar to sinhababu
- cut sep for naturalism, papikau card
- only natural facts are verifiable not abstract moral reasoning
 reductionism
- personal id doesn’t exist so we can’t have ethics grounded in practical reflection – e.g.
notion of personhood in kantian ethics doesn’t exist
- we’re all just molecules and we’re non-continuous groups of molecules – p-i is not
constant (means i’m not responsible for what i did 7 years ago)
- we must default to looking at consequences
- doesn’t directly justify util, but takes out other fwks
 tjfs
Accessibility

- util is the most accessible because it’s the simplest and doesn’t require access to private
sights like jstor
- also it’s the easiest to weigh under which means novices understand it

Topic lit

- key to using the topic lit since most of it is from a util perspective

Ground

- there’s consequences to everything so there’s always gonna be util ground on both

sides but most are fwks definitively flow one way or the other

Resolvability

- weighing under util is super easy – u just weigh the consequences and impacts
- most other fwks are super unclear on how to weigh and the burden is on them to show
why weighing under their fwk is easy
 cummiskey
- deont says everyone has dignity that needs to be preserved, but part of that is also
equality (you can’t treat someone’s dignity > other person’s dignity so you have to
aggregate) you can’t pretend you respect one at the cost of another
- ppl have dignity  we must maximize respect
- kantian consequentialist
- makes aff impacts turn kant nc or proves util true
- article: kantian consequentialism
 determinism
- belief that there is no free will
- free will doesn’t exist, we’re influenced by external factors – we don’t actually make
decisions
- if free will doesn’t exist, we can’t use deont that’s all about choosing to do the right
thing
- util just wants a world w increased happiness
- doesn’t directly support util, but it takes out other (e.g. at: virtue ethics, we don’t have
the freedom to be good people)
 sinnot-armstrong
- only consequentialism allows you to weigh between different violations of deont
- intuitive that some lies are worse than others, unlike what deont says that all lies are
equally as bad
- difference between lies is one causes more harm
- I have this card (advika)
- It’s also key to explaining certain actions – moral substutability
 gino
- poll of ppl, most ppl are utilitarian
 act-omission distinction
- goodin makes similar arg, criticizes deont
- sunseen and burmuel (authors) + sartorio
- util criticizes it, util doesn’t care about intentions – all that matters is the outcome
- if you win that there’s no act-omission distinction against a kant nc and you have all
extinction impacts, this is strategic bc it proves that aff solves extinction and not
affirming (negating) means murdering
- is not a justification (can be but) it’s a turn, death is largest impact under kant too (he
would frown on murdering a lot of ppl) but not doing aff means murder
- actor spec – governments can yes/no bills and they have control over the entire public
sphere – that would make the yemen war moral
 intent-foresight distinction
- if they’re fwk is only intents matter, and you win that no distinction and that their intent
is murder (foreseen consequence of negating is extinction), they lose
- doctrine of double-effect by quinn (salvages the distinction in a reasonable way – gist of
it is trolley problem)
o 14 thought experiments
- cognitive dissonance v. intent-foresight distinction
- util says there’s no morally relevant distinction between pushing man in the railway and
pushing the lever to make the train kill them
 revisionary intuitionism
- yudkowsky
o thought experiments, our moral reasoning proves that we’re all utilitarian but
we don’t all recognize it
 necessary enabler
- sinnot-armstrong
- article
- primary obligation is to make the world a better place, question is are there side-
constraints and if you disprove that there are side-constraints then you win make the
world a better place, so use util as long as they reject any other moral theory
 universalizability
- leads to util is true
- pettit wrote nonconsequentialism and universalizability
o any non-conseq theory runs into problem w universalizing rules bc it may be
that not following a rule means rule gets followed (e.g. if i follow a rule, then
that prevents two others from following a rule)
- hijacks to kant fwk in 1a
 intuitons/degrees of wrongness
- breaking a promise to take a dying friend to the hospital is not as bad as breaking a
promise to meet a friend – only consequentialism accounts for that
- humer (I have it – saranya)
 epistemic modesty

use epistemic modesty – multiply probability of the fwk times the magnitude of
the impacts A) clash – encourages both substantive and phil debates so that we
talk about all the offense B) leads to the net most morality and proves that only
beating fwk is not enough to win the debate