PER SON AL ITYAND SO CIAL PSYCHOL OGYBUL LE TIN
When Be liefs Yield to Evidence: Re ducing
Biased Evaluation by Af firming the Self
Geoffrey L. Co hen
Yale University
Joshua Aronson
University of Texas, Austin
Claude M. Steele
Stan ford University
People often cling to beliefs even in the face of disconfirming evi-
dence and interpret ambigu ous information in a man ner that
bolsters strongly held attitudes. The authors tested a motiva-
tional account suggesting that these defen sive reactions would be
ameliorated by an affirmation of an alternative source of
self-worth. Con sistent with this interpretation, participants were
more persuaded by evidence impugn ing their views toward capi-
tal pun ishment when they were self-affirmed than when they
were not (Studies 1 and 2). Affirmed participants also proved
more critical of an advocate whose argu ments con firmed their
views on abortion and less con fident in their own attitudes regard-
ing that issue than did unaffirmed participants (Study 3).
Results suggest that assimilation bias and resistance to persua-
sion are mediated, in part, by iden tity-main tenance motivations.
On e of th e great est pains to hu man n a ture is the pain of
a n ew idea.
—Walter Bageh ot
Man y of us h ave h ad th e puzzling expe rien ce of pre -
sent ing argu ments that challen ge a friend’s endorse -
men t of a presiden tial can didate or belief in ESP only to
find our appeals met with resistan ce. As social psycholo -
gists h ave lon g observed, peo ple tend to per sist in ch er -
ish ed beliefs an d attitudes even wh en con fronted with
clear and con tra dictory evidence ( Festinger, Riecken, &
Schachter, 1956; Ross & Lepper, 1980) . Th ey also ten d to
evalu ate ambigu ous infor ma tion in a man n er that bol-
sters pre exist ing views ( Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979) .
From work on self-fulfilling proph e cies ( Snyder, Tanke,
& Bersch eid, 1977) an d in ter per son al expectan cies
( Darley & Gross, 1983) to investiga tions of ste reo types
and preju dice ( Ham ilton & Rose, 1980; Munro & Ditto,
1997) , much research has dem on strated th e power ful
influ ence that beliefs can have on the inter pre ta tion of
new information ( see Gilovich, 1991, for a review) .
This article begins with the assump tion th at beliefs
can con stitute valued sources of iden tity. They may thus
be given up on ly with great reluctan ce, and they may be
embraced even when they con flict with the demands of
fact, logic, or mate rial self-in ter est ( e.g., Abelson, 1986;
Sears & Fun k, 1991) . Cap ital pun ish ment pro po nents,
for exam ple, migh t clin g to a belief in th e death pen alty’s
deter rent efficacy in large part because it rein forces their
iden tity as polit ical con ser va tives ( Ellsworth & Ross,
1983) . The con flict ing attitudes that Blacks and Whites
h ad about th e O.J. Simpson trial migh t also h ave arisen ,
in part, from a desire to affirm racial iden tity and solidar -
ity. Eviden ce th at ch allenges th e valid ity of such cher -
ish ed beliefs presents a self-threat inso far as givin g up
that belief would entail losin g a source of esteem or iden -
tity. To neu tralize that threat, peo ple are apt to evalu ate
evidence defen sively ( Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Dunning,
Leuenberger, & Sherman, 1995; Kunda, 1990; Munro &
Ditto, 1997; Zuwerink & Devine, 1996). Scru tinizing belief-
discon firmin g evidence for fault or accept in g at face
Co h en et al. / WH EN BE LIEFS YIELD TO EV I DENCE
Authors’ Note: We thank Joshua Correll for his work on this pro ject
and his in sight ful con tribu tions to th is ar ticle and Da vid Sh erman an d
Sa rah Wert for com ments on ear lier drafts. In ad dition, we owe Lee
Ross an d Mark Lepper a large debt for th eir feed back on this re search
and for the primary title of th e present ar ticle, which we bor row from
their 1980 ar ticle on be lief per se ver an ce. Cor re spon dence con cern ing
th is ar ticle sh ould be ad dressed to Geoffrey L. Co hen, De part ment of
Psychology, Yale Univer sity, 2 Hillhouse Ave nue, Box 208205, New Ha-
ven, CT 06520-8205; e-mail: co h en @psych .stan ford.edu.
PSPB, Vol. 26 No. 9, September 2000 1151-1164
© 2000 by the So ciety for Per son ality an d So cial Psychology, In c.
1151
1152 PERSO N ALITY AND SO CIAL PSYCH O LO GY BULLETIN
value belief-con firm in g evidence h elps to pro tect on e’s
belief and the iden tity it affirms.
Buffering peo ple against self-threat, however, should
atten u ate defen sive pro cessing. Accord ing to self-affir -
ma tion th e ory, the potency of a psych o logical threat lies
in its capacity to imperil a global sen se of self-worth
( Steele, 1988) . Because global self-worth derives from
man y sources, peo ple have much flexibility in h ow th ey
cope with a par ticu lar self-threat. They can reaffirm th eir
self-worth directly—in this case, by defen sively evalu ating
th e per sua sive evidence—or th ey can do so in directly—
by affirm in g other equally valued domains of self-worth.
In deed, research suggests th at such “self-affir ma tions”
can reduce defen sive pro cessin g of h ealth risk in for ma -
tion ( e.g., Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Sherman, Nelson, &
Steele, 2000) . They have also been shown to increase
peo ple’s open n ess to in for ma tion that threat ens th eir
self-inter ests or motives ( Bastardi & Ross, 2000) .
Accord in g to our analysis, peo ple sh ould prove less
defen sive an d resistant in th e face of a coun terattitudin al
message wh en alter n a tive sources of self-worth are but -
tressed or activated. For exam ple, a cap ital pun ish ment
pro po n en t should feel more open to evidence challen g -
ing the death pen alty’s effective n ess if h e or sh e feels
affirmed as a good friend or valued employee. Self-affir -
ma tions, we argue, trivialize th e attitude as a source of
self-worth and thus make it easier to give up.
The presen t con cep tual analysis may be com pared
with that offered by research ers workin g in oth er th e o -
ret ical tra ditions. Cogn itive disso n an ce th e o rists, for
exam ple, would suggest that infor ma tion in con sistent
with stron gly h eld beliefs in duces an aversive state of
arousal. Peo ple can reduce that arousal, and restore con -
so nance, by ch allenging the valid ity of th e disso nant
infor ma tion, for exam ple, by den igrat ing its source as
untrust wor thy ( E. Aron son , Turn er, & Carlsmith , 1963;
Zimbardo, 1960) . Like disso n an ce th e ory, our an alysis
implies th at an aversive drive state mediates, in part,
resistan ce to coun terattitudin al m essages ( see also
Mun ro & Ditto, 1997; Zuwerin k & Devin e, 1996) . In con -
trast to disso n an ce the ory, however, we argue that this
drive state reflects th e activa tion of ego-pro tective moti-
va tion s rath er th an con sistency-restor ing ones ( Steele,
1988) . Accord ingly, disso n an ce may be atten u ated by
addressin g th e pro vok in g in con sisten cy directly ( by
attacking th e spe cific per sua sive appeal) or indirectly
( by reflect ing on alter n a tive sources of self-worth ) . Cog-
nitive disso n an ce the ory, at least in its most straight for -
ward form, would n ot pre dict th at h eigh t en ed feelin gs of
self-worth in one domain would reduce disso nance ( an d
thus resistan ce to per sua sion) in an oth er.
The pat tern of fin d in gs that we pre dict also differs
from th at pre viously obtained in research exam in in g the
role of self-esteem in mod er at ing persuasibility. High -
self-esteem individ u als, it h as been foun d, ten d to resist
per sua sive messages more than do low-self-esteem indi -
vid u als, pre sum ably because peo ple with h igh self-
esteem have greater con fidence in the valid ity of their
beliefs ( e.g., Coh en , 1959; Jan is, 1954; Zelln er, 1970; cf.
Rhodes & Wood, 1992) . Based on this find in g, it would
seem th at en h an cing self-worth with an affir ma tion pro -
ce dure should increase resistan ce to per sua sion rath er
th an decrease it. On e rea son for th e differ en ce between
ear lier results an d our own pre diction s involves the pres-
en t research ’s use of affir ma tions un re lated to the atti-
tude issue. Th e effective ness of such self-affir ma tion s lies
in their capacity to remin d peo ple that their self-worth
derives from sources other than the attitude issue. Al-
though high self-esteem might increase self-con fidence,
it would n ot n ecessar ily con fer th e flexibility th at an affir -
ma tion does in terms of cop in g with self-image threats.
In deed, research suggests th at un less th ey are first re-
min ded of th eir esteem resources, h igh -self-esteem in di-
vid u als will prove just as defen sive as their low-self-esteem
p eers in resp on se to a sp e cific self-th reat ( Steele,
Spencer, & Lynch, 1993; cf. Brown & Smart, 1991) .
One other factor h elps to explain th e differ ence
between our pre diction s and find in gs obtained in past
research. In gen eral, ear lier stud ies did n ot present par -
ticipants with threat en in g per sua sive messages—these
stud ies typ ically used vague or oth er wise weak messages
addressin g issues tan gen tial to par ticipants’ self-in ter ests
or iden tities ( e.g., the effect of TV on the movie industry
or whether pen icillin con stitutes a won der drug) . Such
messages would trigger lit tle if an y defen sive pro cessin g
because par ticipants were un likely to h ave a per sonal
in vest men t in the issue. Even if they did have such an
in vest men t, th e messages often were insufficiently per -
sua sive to pose a serious th reat to par ticipants’ beliefs.
Accord in g to our an alysis, affirm ing self-worth should
atten u ate defen sive pro cessin g, an d to in duce such
defen sive ness it is essen tial to expose par ticipan ts to
strong evidence th at con flicts with a ch er ish ed attitude.
Our three stud ies thus fea tured social-polit ical par ti-
san s resp on d in g to h igh ly p er su a sive evi d en ce. In
Studies 1 an d 2, we expose cap ital pun ish ment par tisans
to a counterattitudinal scien tific report regard in g the
death pen alty an d pre dict th at a self-affir ma tion will lead
them to be more positively in flu en ced by that report. In
Study 3, we presen t prochoice and prolife advo cates with
a debate on abor tion. Here, we pre dict that a self-affir -
ma tion will atten u ate biased evalu a tion of the debate,
th at is, th e ten dency to rate th e like-min ded debater
more favor ably than the debater from the other side.
Alth ough th ese pre dictions follow from our con cep tual
analyses, it is worth reit er at in g th at pre vious per sua sion
mod els would anticipate the oppo site pat tern of results—
th at self-affir ma tions sh ould raise self-con fidence an d
 Co hen et al. / WH EN BELIEFS YIELD TO EVIDENCE
thereby increase biased evalu a tion and resistan ce to per -
sua sion ( Coh en , 1959; Jan is, 1954; Zelln er, 1970) . In a
sense, our stud ies pit the self-affir ma tion logic against
these ear lier the o ret ical frame works.
STUDY 1
Pro po n en ts and oppo n en ts of cap ital pun ish men t
were pre sen ted with a coun terattitudin al scien tific
report regard ing th e death pen alty ( see also Lord et al.,
1979) . Th ey were told th at th eir mem ory of the report
would be tested; thus, they pre sum ably felt motivated to
read th e report system at ically rath er th an periph er ally.
Before doing so, however, par ticipan ts were ran domly
assign ed eith er to an affir ma tion con dition or to a
no-affir ma tion con dition. In the affir ma tion con dition,
they wrote an essay about a per son ally impor tan t trait or
value un re lated to th eir views on cap ital pun ish ment
( Fein & Spen cer, 1997; Steele, 1988) . In the no-affir ma -
tion con dition, th ey wrote an essay about a per son ally
unim por tant topic. The depend ent mea sures in cluded
both attitude change and question n aire items assessing
the gen eral positivity of response to the scien tific report.
METH O D
Design and Participants
Th e exper iment fea tured a 2 × 2 facto rial design, with
par tisan sh ip of the par ticipant ( pro po nent of cap ital
pun ish ment or oppo nent) and affir ma tion con dition
(affir mation or no affir mation) the between-par ticipants
factors.
Par ticipan ts con sisted of 36 male an d 41 female
under grad u ates wh o eith er received credit in an in tro -
ductory psych ology course or were paid $6 for par ticipa -
tion . Stu den ts were recruited on th e basis of th eir
responses to a preselection sur vey admin istered ear lier
in the aca demic quar ter. On e item in th is sur vey asked
stu dents to indicate their attitude toward cap ital pun ish -
ment on a scale ranging from 1 ( very much in favor) to 13
( very much opposed) . Stu den ts who had indicated th at th ey
either strongly favored cap ital pun ish ment ( a 1, 2, or 3)
or stron gly opposed it ( an 11, 12, or 13) were tele phoned
an d in vited to par ticipate in the study. Data from 5 par tic-
ipants ( 3 in the affir ma tion con dition, 2 in th e n o-affir -
ma tion con dition) were discarded prior to an alyses, 4
stu dents wh o expressed suspicion about our con cern
with per sua sion and attitude ch an ge an d 1 stu dent wh o
doubted the authen ticity of the scien tific report. Th is
left a total of 72 par ticipants—25 oppo nents an d 47 pro -
po nents—ran domly assign ed to th e two exper imen tal
con ditions. ( Fewer oppo nents were recruited sim ply be-
cause of their dearth in our available par ticipan t pool.)
1153
At th e time th at th ey filled out th e preselection ques-
tion n aire, par tic ipan ts also com pleted a ver sion of
Harber’s ( 1995) Sources of Valida tion Scale—responses
to which would later be used in the prep a ra tion of the
self-affir ma tion man ip u la tion ( see the appen dix) . In the
presen t study, th e question n aire asked stu den ts to rate
several traits and values in terms of th eir per son al impor -
tan ce. Th e question naire included the values of sense of
h umor, ath letic skills, and rela tion s with friends but did
n ot in clude items such as religion an d fam ily values,
which might be related to cap ital pun ish ment attitudes.
Procedure
Because research h as sh own th at warn ing of per sua -
sive in ten t in creases resistance to per sua sion ( McGuire,
1985) , a cover story was n ecessary. Stu den ts par ticipated
in th e study in divid u ally, an d after bein g greeted by a
male exper imen ter, th ey were told th at th e study con -
cern ed m em or y. Th e research ers, th ey were told ,
wan ted to exam in e the rela tion ship between sub jective
mem ory—mem ory of per son al events as expe rien ced
first hand—and objective mem ory—mem ory of less per -
son ally rele vant stim uli. Par ticipants were in formed th at
th ey would first recall a few expe riences from their per -
son al life in a brief essay ( th e sub jective mem ory exer -
cise) and that they would then read a scien tific report,
aspects of wh ich th ey would later try to remem ber ( the
objective mem ory exer cise) . After sign ing the con sent
form an d bein g assured of th e con fiden tiality of their
responses, par ticipants were pro vided with wh at osten si-
bly was the sub jective mem ory exer cise. They were given
a sheet of paper titled “Per son al Recall Exer cise” with
in struction s printed under neath. In fact, this sub jective
mem ory exer cise con stituted the self-affir ma tion manip -
u lation. Par ticipants were ran domly assigned either to an
affir ma tion con dition or to a no-affir ma tion con dition.
Affirmation con dition. Respon ses to th e Sources of Vali-
da tion Scale ( which, as noted ear lier, h ad been admin is-
tered ear lier in the aca demic quar ter) were used to pre -
p ar e th e m ate r i als in th e affir m a tio n co n d i tio n .
Spe cifically, th e most h igh ly rated trait or value in each
par ticipan t’s Sources of Valida tion question naire h ad
been iden tified an d embed ded in th e in structions con -
tain ed on th e Per sonal Recall Exercise ( when more than
on e value h ad been rated h igh ly, the first one listed on
th e question n aire was used) . The instruction s on the
per sonal recall sheet asked par ticipan ts to describe three
or four per sonal expe riences in which their most highly
rated ch ar acter istic from the Sources Scale had been
impor tant to them and had made them feel good about
th em selves. For exam ple, a par ticipant who h ad rated
sen se of h umor most h igh ly on th e Sources Scale was
instructed to write about “per sonal expe riences in which
your sense of humor was impor tant to you an d made you
1154 PERSO N ALITY AND SO CIAL PSYCH O LO GY BULLETIN
feel good about your self.” Par ticipan ts were fur th er
instructed to pick one of these expe rien ces and to write a
sh ort story describ ing th e even t an d th eir feelin gs at the
time. Steele and his colleagues have found that reflect -
ing on a per son ally impor tant self-ch ar acter istic or value
is an effective means of inducin g self-affir ma tion ( Steele,
1988) .
No-affirmation con dition. In this con dition, th e in struc-
tion s on th e Per son al Recall Exer cise asked par ticipants
to list, in as much detail as th ey could, everything th at
they had eaten or drank in the past 48 hours. They were
fur ther told “n ot to worry about th ose th in gs you fin d
your self un able to remem ber.” We chose this con trol
con dition ( in stead of on e th at asked par ticipants to write
about an unimpor tant value) because stu den ts ten d to
turn almost any self-reflective writ in g task into a self-
affirm ing one. Nota bly, in our stud ies, th e affir ma tion
effects were un re lated to th e ch ar acter istic ch o sen an d
n o stu den t wrote about his or her social-polit ical beliefs.
After th e exper imen tal man ip u la tion ( which took up
to 13 min utes to com plete) , par ticipants were told th at
they would now com plete the objective mem ory exer -
cise, wh ose pur pose, th ey were remin ded, in volved
assessing th eir mem o ries of stim uli of a “more objective
an d less per son ally rele van t nature.” Par ticipants were
th us in formed th at th ey would read a scien tific article
an d th en try to remem ber as much of its con ten t as they
could.
To heighten the plau sibility of th is cover story, and to
fur ther allay suspicions regard ing the study’s con cern
with per sua sion an d cap ital pun ish ment attitudes, par -
ticipants were given a choice between two articles to
read, alth ough th is ch oice was forced. Th ey were told
that the research ers wanted par ticipan ts to have at least a
min imal in ter est in the stim u lus article. Th e exper i-
men ter gave th e par ticipan t a sh eet of paper list ing two
abstracts and asked par ticipan ts to pick an article to read
on the basis of these abstracts. The abstracts were ficti-
tious but each appeared to be an excerpt from an
authen tic scien tific article. Th e first abstract described a
dry article about research on structure-map ping an d
systematicity in lin guistics, whereas the second described
an article about the var ious issues in volved in cap ital
pun ish ment policy. All but 2 par ticipants ch ose to read
the cap ital pun ish ment article. In response to the 2 less
coop er a tive par ticipan ts, th e exper imen ter fum bled
th rough papers an d fold ers, cursed a research assistan t
for havin g misplaced th e lin guistics article, an d asked
whether the par ticipan t would con sider read in g the cap -
ital pun ish ment article instead. Both par ticipants were
h appy to acquiesce, although postexperimental debrief-
ing indicated th at 1 of th ese par ticipants suspected the
true pur pose of the study; his data were discarded from
an alysis ( as noted ear lier) .
Counterattitudinal scien tific report. Par ticipan ts were
then given a 4 -page scien tific report addressin g the mer -
its ( or lack th ereof) of cap ital pun ish men t, and they
were pro vided as much time as they wanted to read this
report care fully. The report appeared to be a lead article
from a recent issue of the Journal of Law and Human
Behav ior, writ ten by two research ers from Yale, titled
“Th e Death Pen alty: New Evidence Informs an Old
Debate.” In fact, the report was fictitious. It con tain ed
facts, sta tistics, an d argu ments whose cumu la tive effect
was to wage a per sua sive attack on par ticipan ts’ attitudes
toward cap ital pun ish ment. Pro po nents of the death
pen alty th us read an an ti–cap ital pun ish men t report. By
con trast, oppo nents read a pro–death pen alty report.
The argu ments that each report pre sen ted addressed
the effective ness of the death pen alty as a deter rent, its
eco nomic sound n ess, its mer its as a mean s of in capacitat -
ing known mur der ers, and its eth ical value. The argu -
ments were highly per sua sive and backed up, where pos-
sible, with rele van t sta tistics and research find ings. The
research pre sented was styled after auth en tic cap ital
pun ish ment lit er a ture ( see Lord et al., 1979) . Impor -
tan tly, the report that pro po nents read was iden tical in
for mat to th e on e th at oppo n en ts read—both described
rele vant research iden tical in meth od ology—but the two
reports pre sented oppo site fin d ings and con clu sions.
For exam ple, pro po nents of cap ital pun ish men t read
th e following excerpt:
New research tools have helped research ers to over come
so m e o f t h e sh o r t co m in gs t h at p lagu e d e ar lie r
work. . . . Cran dall ( 1991) fin ished a 10-year study com -
par ing mur der rates for th e years before an d th e years
after adop tion of cap ital pun ish ment in 14 states. In 12
of the 14 states, mur der rates were significantly h igh er
after th e adop tion of the death pen alty, in man y states by
as much as 35%. This find ing h eld even wh en com pet ing
factors, such as changes in a state’s social and eco n omic
sta tus and in its prior mur der rate, were accounted for.
Finally, much evidence has shown that when an exe cu -
tion is h igh ly pub licized . . . state and national mur der
rates increase dra mat ically ( Vidmar, 1991) .
By con trast, oppo nents of cap ital pun ish ment read
the same para graph except th at th e ph rases “h igh er
after” and “increase dra mat ically” were replaced with the
ph rases “lower after” an d “decrease dra mat ically.”
Dependent measure. After th ey read th e scien tific
report, par ticipants were given the depend ent measure
question n aire design ed to assess th e favorability of th eir
responses to the report. To probe for attitude change,
one item asked, “What is your attitude toward cap ital
pun ish men t?” on a scale ran gin g from 1 ( very much in
favor) to 7 ( undecided) to 13 ( very much opposed) . Another
item asked, “How much , if at all, did th e article affect
 Co hen et al. / WH EN BELIEFS YIELD TO EVIDENCE
your over all attitude toward cap ital pun ish ment?” on a
scale rangin g from 1 ( much more opposed) to 7 ( no change
in attitude) to 13 (much more in favor) . Two other items
asked, “In your opin ion, how effective a deter ren t is cap i-
tal pun ish men t?” an d “In your opin ion , how eco n om i-
cally sound is cap ital pun ish ment?” on sep a rate 13-point
scales ran ging from 1 (extremely) to 7 ( moderately) to 13
( not at all) . Finally, several items assessed evalu a tions of
th e auth ors of th e article. One item asked, “How would
you describe the polit ical orien ta tion of th e research ers
wh o wrote th e article?” on a scale ran gin g from 1
( extremely liberal) to 7 (neu tral) to 13 ( extremely con serva-
tive) . Th e oth er items asked, “In your opin ion, how rea -
son able are th e research ers?” an d “How in formed do
you think the research ers are?” on sep a rate scales ran g -
ing from 1 (extremely) to 7 (moderately) to 13 ( not at all) .
These lat ter items con stituted estab lish ed mea sures of
open ness to per sua sion ( e.g., E. Aronson et al., 1963;
Ross & Ward, 1995) . As past research suggests, polit ical
par tisans are apt to main tain th e san ctity of their beliefs
by attrib ut in g opposing views to polit ical ide ology, ign o -
rance, or irra tio nality ( Ross & Ward, 1995) .
After com plet in g th e question n aire, par tic ipan ts
were probed for suspicion an d debriefed. Th e exper i-
menter explained that the report they read was fictitious
and discussed the necessity of with hold ing the true pur -
pose of the study until its com ple tion. Par ticipants were
eith er paid $6 or pro vided with the rele van t signa ture to
obtain course credit.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIO N
In Studies 1 and 2, data were ana lyzed using a two-way
ANOVA, with par tisan ship ( oppo nents or pro po nents)
and exper imen tal con dition ( affir ma tion or n o affir ma -
tion ) as between -p ar tic i p an ts fac tor s. Gen d er was
included as a factor in all three stud ies an d, un less oth er -
wise noted, there were neither main effects nor inter ac-
tion s in volving it. Also, some par ticipants failed to com -
plete several question naire mea sures; as a result, degrees
of free dom vary slightly.
Creation of “Favorability of
Response” Composite and In dex
of “Attitude Change”
To obtain a gen eral in dex of th e exten t to wh ich par -
ticipan ts were positively in flu enced by th e scien tific
report, we sim ply aver aged th e depen d en t mea sure
items into a sin gle “favorability of response” com posite.
Several item s were first reverse-coded, h owever, to
en sure th at h igh er rat in gs along all scales would reflect,
for pro po n en ts an d oppo n en ts alike, more positive
responses to the scien tific report. Rat in gs of the rea son -
able ness an d in formedn ess of th e auth ors were th us
reverse-coded for all par ticipants. Oppo nents’ attitude
1155
toward cap ital pun ish men t, th eir rat in gs of its deter -
ren t efficacy and eco nomic sound n ess, an d th eir rat ings
of the authors’ polit ical orien ta tion were also reverse-
coded, as were pro po nents’ rat ings of th e exten t to
wh ich th e article affected th eir over all attitude. The
result ing postmanipulation items are con cep tu ally sim i-
lar an d form a reliable in dex of th e favorability of par tici-
pan ts’ respon se to th e report ( Cron bach ’s alpha = .70) .
Con se quen tly, these items were aver aged ( after being
stan dard ized to equate their varian ce) in to a sin gle
com posite.
An index of attitude change also was com puted by
sub tract in g each par ticipant’s preman ipulation attitude
rat in g from h is or h er postman ipulation attitude rat ing.
The result in g change score of oppo nents was th en multi-
plied by –1 so th at positive num bers for oppo nents an d
pro po n en ts alike would reflect greater attitude change
in the direction of the report.
Effects Along Favorability
of Response Composite
Results sup ported th e pre diction that the affir ma tion
wou ld p ro duce more favor able evalu a tion s of atti-
tu d e-d iscon firm in g evid en ce. Affirm ed par tic ipan ts
responded more positively to th e scien tific report (M =
0.18) than did unaffirmed par ticipan ts (M = –0.23) , F( 1,
63) = 7.10, p = .01.
Of less impor tan ce, the analysis also yielded a main
effect of par tisan ship; pro po nents of cap ital pun ish ment
responded more favor ably to the report ( M = 0.16) than
did oppo n en ts ( M = –.21) , F( 1, 63) = 5.93, p < .02. One
possible rea son for this find in g is th at th e an ti–cap ital
pun ish ment report ( that pro po n en ts read) may have
been more per sua sive than the pro–cap ital pun ish ment
report ( th at oppo nents read) . Th ose wh o oppose cap ital
pun ish ment may regard scien tific evidence as less con -
vincing because their oppo sition may derive from a
moral con viction rather than a scien tific ratio nale.
Effects Along Attitude
Change In dex
The analysis yielded on ly a main effect of par tisan -
ship. Pro po n en ts sh owed more attitude change in the
direction of th e report (M = 2.33) than did oppo nents
( M = 0.97) , F( 1, 64) = 6.34, p < .015. Con trary to pre dic-
tion s, h owever, affirmed par ticipan ts did not change
their attitudes more ( M = 1.74) than did unaffirmed par -
ticipants ( M = 1.56) , F < 1. ( The pat tern of means, at
least, was in th e direction anticipated by our con cep tual
an alysis rath er th an by mod els con cern ing the role of
self-esteem in persuasibility [ e.g., Jan is, 1954] .)
In sum, the affir ma tion led par ticipants to respond
more favor ably to the disconfirming eviden ce, although
it did n ot prompt th em to give up th eir gen eral attitude
1156 PERSO N ALITY AND SO CIAL PSYCH O LO GY BULLETIN
toward cap ital pun ish ment. It seems likely that attitudes
about cap ital pun ish ment are sim ply more resistan t to
change than are spe cific beliefs about its deter rent effi-
cacy or par ticu lar impressions of the authors of the
report. In a sense, one’s gen eral attitude toward cap ital
pun ish ment is overdetermined, tied to rele van t values
an d refer ence groups ( Katz, 1960) , an d groun ded in
past beh avioral com mit ments ( Festin ger, 1957) . As dis-
so nance research ers have long noted, cen tral, self-defin -
in g cogn ition s prove more resistan t to ch an ge th an
noncentral ones ( Coo per & Mackie, 1983; Pilisuk, 1968;
Zu werin k & Devin e, 1996) . Th u s, th e d isso n an ce
involved in givin g up a cen tral attitude may have been
too great, and par ticipants in Study 1 may h ave ch o sen
other, less pain ful ave nues of ch an ge th at were assessed
by the question naire. In th is respect, writ ing about a per -
sonal trait may not have been affirm in g enough to neu -
tralize the self-threat inher ent in givin g up one’s gen eral
attitude toward cap ital pun ish ment.
STUDY 2
Accord in gly, in Study 2, we used a more power ful
self-affir ma tion p ro ce dure—par tic ipan ts were given
positive feed back regard ing a per son ally impor tant skill.
Whereas in Study 1 par ticipan ts reflected on a prob a bly
familiar event that had taken place in the past, in Study 2
they expe rien ced a n ew sit u a tion designed to induce
self-affir ma tion. We also decided to focus our depend ent
mea sure question naire almost exclu sively on attitude
change. We suspected th at multiple measures might
dilute the affir ma tion effects by pro vid ing alter na tive
out lets for par ticipants to relieve pressures to ch an ge.
In deed, past research suggests th at disso nant infor ma -
tion will exert less in flu en ce on cen tral, resistan t
cognitions if par ticipan ts believe th at th e question naire
includes response items other than those rele van t to
change along this cen tral cognition ( Götz-Marchand,
Götz, & Irle, 1974) .
As in Study 1, Study 2 pre sen ted oppo nents an d pro -
po nents of cap ital pun ish men t with a scien tific report
that challenged th eir views on th e death pen alty. As in
Study 1, prior to read in g th is report, h alf of th e par tici-
pants were ran domly assigned to an affir ma tion con di-
tion , wh ereas th e remain ing par ticipants were assigned
to a no-affir ma tion con dition. But, in the case of the
presen t study, par ticipants in the affir ma tion con dition
received positive feed back regard ing their per for man ce
on a test of their social per cep tive ness. Par ticipan ts in
th e n o-affir ma tion con dition com pleted the same test
but received no feed back. The depend ent mea sures en-
com passed attitude change and one additional item
assessing impressions of the con vin cingness of the article.
METH O D
Design and Participants
Once again, the exper imen t fea tured a 2 × 2 facto rial
design , with par tisan ship of th e par ticipan t ( pro po nent
or oppo n en t of cap ital pun ish men t) an d affir ma tion
con dition ( affir ma tion or no affir ma tion) as between-
par ticipan ts factors.
Par ticipan ts were 35 female an d 47 male Stan ford
under grad u ates wh o received course credit for an in tro-
ductory psychology course. Study 2 used the same gen -
eral selection pro ce dure used in Study 1. However, in the
presen t study, a 7-point scale was used instead of the
13-poin t scale described in Study 1 ( with par ticipants
who cir cled a 1 or 2 qualifying as pro po n en ts and those
who cir cled a 6 or 7 qualifyin g as oppo n en ts) . Data from
2 par ticipan ts—1 in the affir ma tion con dition, 1 in the
no-affir ma tion con dition—were discarded prior to anal-
yses because th ey expressed suspicion about our con -
cern with per sua sion and attitude ch an ge amon g cap ital
pun ish ment par tisan s. Th is left a total of 80 par tici-
pants—38 oppo n en ts of cap ital pun ish men t, 42 pro po -
n en ts—ran domly assign ed to th e two exper imen tal
con dition s.
Procedure
Stu dents again par ticipated in the study individ u ally.
They were greeted by a female exper imen ter who told
them that the study con cern ed “social per cep tive n ess,”
th at is, “th e ability to read th e mean in g beh in d oth er
peo ple’s physical gestures an d facial expressions.” Par tic-
ipants were told th at th is ability had proved highly cor re -
lated with career success and that the research ers were
attempt in g to under stand the nature and origin of this
impor tant skill. Par ticipants were informed that they
would first take a well-validated test of social per cep tive -
n ess. After ward th ey were told th ey would com plete
another exer cise in social per cep tive n ess—th ey would
watch a vid eo taped pre sen ta tion made by a per son
speaking on a social issue an d th ey would th en try to
assess the pre sen ter’s true thoughts and feelings. After
sign ing the con sen t form, an d bein g assured of th e con fi-
den tiality of all th eir respon ses, par ticipants began the
social per cep tive ness test.
Test of social perceptiveness. The test was pre sented as th e
“Archer Test of Social Per cep tive ness,” an d it con sisted
of 25 pho to graph s of peo ple inter act in g in var ious sit u a-
tion s ( taken from Arch er, 1980) . For each pho to graph, a
multiple-choice question was pre sen ted th at pre sum ably
required par ticipants to infer the thoughts and feelin gs
of th e ph o to graphed in divid u als. For exam ple, one pho -
to graph por trayed two men workin g side-by-side in a
store, and par ticipants were asked to assess which per son
was th e man ager and which the employee. Par ticipants
 Co hen et al. / WH EN BELIEFS YIELD TO EVIDENCE
marked th eir an swers on a Scan tron sh eet. Wh ile th ey
worked on th e test, th e exper imenter waited out side
and, by coin toss, assigned the par ticipant either to the
affir ma tion or to th e n o-affir ma tion con dition . Th e
exper imen ter return ed to th e lab room wh en th e par tici-
pant fin ished th e test.
Affirmation con dition. In th is con dition , par ticipants
were told th at cer tain eth ical con sid er ation s legally
obliged the research ers to sh are th e results of an y per -
son ality test ing. Th e exper imenter th en left th e room to
grade the par ticipan t’s exam an d asked th at th e par tici-
pant com plete a demo graph ics question naire in the
m ean tim e. A few m in u tes later, th e exp er im en ter
returned. Appearing slightly disap pointed, she asked,
“Have you taken this test before?” When the par ticipant
said that he or she had not, the exper imen ter expressed
relief and then explained, “Wow, I have to say you’ve
don e extraor dinarily well; it’s almost as if you had the
answer sheet in front of you while taking the test.” She
returned the par ticipan t’s answer sheet, where 22 of the
25 the items had been marked cor rect. Th e exper i-
menter showed the par ticipan t where his or her score
fell in a dot-plot distribu tion of the scores of pre vious
test-takers, makin g it clear th at th e par ticipan t’s score
fell in the top 5%. The exper imenter th en said, “Because
of th e quality of your scores, I h ave a few spe cial ques-
tions I’d like to ask you if that’s okay” and pulled out a
sheet marked “Follow-Up Questions for High Scorers,”
marking the sheet with the par ticipant’s iden tifica tion
num ber an d per cen tile score. Read in g aloud from this
sheet, the exper imen ter asked par ticipants to describe
the expe rien ces and skills that they believed con trib uted
to th eir social per cep tive ness skills an d took n otes on
th eir respon ses. Th is in ter view served to but tress the
plau sibility an d power of th e feed back man ip u la tion by
h avin g par ticipants gen er ate causal expla n a tion s for
th eir per for man ce ( Ross, Lepper, & Hub bard, 1975) .
No-affirmation con dition. In th is con dition, par ticipants
also were told th at cer tain eth ical con sid er ation s obliged
th e research ers to sh are th e results of per son ality test in g.
But here, the exper imen ter explained that the par tici-
pant would be shown his or her score at the end of the
exper imen t. The exper imen ter then left the room while
the par ticipant filled out the demo graph ic question -
naire noted ear lier. Par ticipan ts in this con dition were
n ot pro vided with feed back regard in g th eir per for -
mance on the test. After com plet ing th e demo graph ics
question naire, they sim ply pro ceeded to the next phase
of the study.
Provision of scien tific report. After th e exper imen tal
manip u lation, par ticipants were told that they would now
watch the vid eo taped pre sen tation and were in formed
th at th e pre sen ter would speak about a pop u lar social-
1157
polit ical issue, th at is, cap ital pun ish ment. Par ticipants
were told th at th ey sh ould try to assess th e speaker’s
th ough ts an d feelings about the issue. As she osten sibly
pre pared the TV and VCR, the exper imen ter explained
th at “to con trol for differ ences in prior knowledge, it was
n ecessary first to equalize all par ticipants in terms of
th eir kn owledge of cap ital pun ish ment.” Par ticipants
were then pre sented with th e appro priate coun terattitu -
dinal scien tific report regard in g th e death pen alty (as
described in Study 1) .
Dependent measures. Par ticipants were next given a ques-
tionnaire that assessed cap ital pun ish ment attitudes.
Again, the exper imen ter emph a sized the con fiden tiality
an d an o nym ity of th eir respon ses to th e question naire,
wh ich , wh en com pleted, was to be sealed in an enve lope.
Th e first question naire item asked par ticipants to indi-
cate h ow con vincing they found the article on a scale
ranging from 1 (not at all con vincing) to 7 (extremely con -
vincing) . The secon d item asked par ticipants to indicate
their cur ren t attitude toward cap ital pun ish men t on a
scale from 1 ( very much opposed) to 7 ( very much in favor) .
Finally, as a manip u la tion check, par ticipan ts ( with the
excep tion of an initial wave of 11 stu den ts) were asked by
th e exper imen ter to rate their social per cep tive ness on a
scale rangin g from 1 ( very bad) to 7 ( very good).
After ward, par ticipants were debriefed ( in th e same
man n er described in Study 1) , th an ked for th eir par tici-
pa tion , an d pro vided with th e rele van t signa ture to
obtain course credit.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIO N
Manipu lation Check
Affirmed par ticipants reported having stron ger social
per cep tive ness skills ( M = 5.49) than did unaffirmed par -
ticipants ( M = 4.43) , F( 1, 61) = 14.13, p < .001.
Effects Along Attitude
Change In dex
Results con firmed the hypoth e sis that the self-affir -
ma tion would make par ticipants more willin g to give up
their attitude in th e face of discon firmin g eviden ce. We
used th e same pro ce dure reported in Study 1 to com -
pute an in dex of attitude change. Affirmed par ticipants
ch an ged th eir attitude significantly more in the direc-
tion of th e coun terattitudin al scien tific report (M = 1.93)
th an did un affirmed par ticipants (M = 1.25) , F( 1, 72) =
4.12, p < .05. No other effects were significant.
An illustra tive way to describe the data involves assess-
ing the per cen t age of par ticipants who displayed sub -
stan tial attitude change within each con dition . Sub stan -
tial attitude ch an ge was defin ed as a sh ift of two or more
points in the direction of the report. (In addition to bein g
th e median ch an ge score, two poin ts reflects mean ingful
1158 PERSO N ALITY AND SO CIAL PSYCH O LO GY BULLETIN
attitude change—enough to move an extreme par tisan
to n eu trality.) A minor ity of unaffirmed par ticipants
( 39.5%) showed sub stan tial attitude ch an ge, wh ereas a
major ity of affirmed par ticipan ts ( 61.9%) did so. A
chi-square con tin gency table, com par in g th e observed
with the expected count of par ticipan ts showin g sub stan -
tial ver sus unsub stan tial attitude change in the two con -
ditions, par alleled the results of ANOVA, indicat ing th at
th e h ypoth e sis of equal attitude change in both con di-
tions could be rejected, χ2(1, N = 80) = 4.02, p < .05. As in
Study 1, it was also foun d th at pro po nents were more
likely to change their attitude in the direction of the
report ( 64.1% did so) th an were oppo nents ( 39.0% did
so) , χ2(1, N = 80) = 5.03, p < .05.
Effects Along Ratings of
Article’s Con vin cingness
A main effect for exper imen tal con dition alon g th is
mea sure again con firmed our pre dictions, although the
results proved some wh at weaker than those involving
attitude change. Affirmed par ticipan ts rated the article
som e wh at m or e con vin c in g ( M = 4.70) th an d id
unaffirmed par ticipants (M = 4.13) , F( 1, 72) = 3.79, p =
.055. In ter est ingly, a mar ginal inter action with par tici-
pant gen der qualified th is con dition effect, suggest ing
th at, alon g th is mea sure at least, the affir ma tion effect
was con fined to women, F( 1, 72) = 3.39, p = .07. Whereas
men reported bein g con vin ced by the article regard less
of whether they were affirmed ( M = 4.47) or n ot affirmed
( M = 4.44), women showed the expected pat tern of bein g
more con vin ced when affirmed ( M = 4.93) th an wh en
un affirmed ( M = 3.82) . Alth ough th is Gen der × Con di-
tion inter action is inter est in g, an inter pre ta tion would
be at best specu la tive in ligh t of its absen ce on th e pri-
mary mea sure of attitude ch an ge ( an d on eith er mea -
sure in Study 1) .
Wh at is clear in Study 2, h owever, is th e pre dicted
main effect of th e affir ma tion on attitude ch an ge.
Affirmed par ticipants proved significantly more likely
than unaffirmed par ticipants to ch an ge th eir attitudes in
th e face of th e cou n terattitu d in al rep ort. Su p p le -
menting the eviden ce pro vided by Study 1, Study 2 dem -
o n st r a t e d a t t i t u d e c h a n g e a lo n g a n e n d u r in g
social-polit ical attitude.
STUDY 3
Wh ereas Studies 1 an d 2 exam in ed respon ses to
disconfirming eviden ce, Study 3 exam ined respon ses to
mixed or ambigu ous evidence. As several classic stud ies
attest, peo ple tend to find con fir ma tion of their pre exist -
ing beliefs in such ambigu ous in for ma tion ( e.g., H astorf
& Cantril, 1954; Lord et al., 1979) . Scien tists ten d to
believe that the stud ies th at con firm their the o ret ical
position are more valid than those that do not. Par tisan s
involved in a con flict see their side’s argu ments and con -
cern s as more legit imate than those of the other side.
The net result of this biased evalu a tion is that attitudes
per sist an d may even be stren gth en ed ( Lord et al.,
1979) .
Th e stu d y r e p o r te d h e r e e xam in e d p ar ti san s’
responses to a polit ical debate and thus explored two
par ticu lar con se quen ces of such biased assim ila tion.
Th e fir st co n se q u e n ce is “b iased so u r ce p er ce p -
tion ”—th e ten dency to rate the debater rep re sent ing
on e’s own side more positively than the debater rep re -
sen t in g th e oth er sid e. After extract in g su ch atti-
tude-con firm ing eviden ce, par ticipants also are apt to
show “attitude polar iza tion”—the ten den cy to embrace
on e’s views with even greater con viction following expo -
sure to mixed eviden ce or argu men ts ( Lord et al., 1979) .
In vestiga tors h ave lon g debated wh eth er th ese two biases
have motiva tion al or purely cogn itive origins, an d recen t
research suggests that they have at least some motiva -
tion al basis ( Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Edwards & Smith ,
1996; Mun ro & Ditto, 1997) . Th e study to be reported
here illustrates on e implica tion of the role of motiva -
tion al pressures in mediat in g these biases. If biased
source per cep tion and attitude polar iza tion reflect a
motiva tion to pro tect an esteem-bolster ing belief, then
th ese two b iases sh o u ld b e atten u ated by a self-
affir ma tion .
Study 3 also began th e effort to disen tan gle th e effects
of th e affir ma tion that result from enhanced mood and
those that arise from height en ed self-regard. We asked
par ticipan ts sim ply to indicate their cur rent mood and
self-regard along two sin gle-item response mea sures. If
our th e o ret ical an alysis is accu rate, th en self-regard
sh ould cor re late with our depen d en t mea sures but
mood sh ould n ot.
Overview
Prolife an d proch oice par tisan s par ticipated in a
study osten sibly related to com mu nica tion and impres-
sion for ma tion . Th ey were pre sen ted with a debate
between two opposing advo cates of th e abor tion issue.
Before com plet in g a depend en t mea sure question naire,
h alf of th e par ticipants were ran domly assign ed to an
affir ma tion con dition where they wrote about a per son -
ally impor tant trait or value ( as in Study 1) ( see Fein &
Spencer, 1997; Liu & Steele, 1986) . The remain ing par -
ticipants were assign ed to a n o-affir ma tion con dition
where they wrote about a per son ally unim por tan t trait or
value. We pre dicted that par ticipants would rate the advo-
cate rep re sent ing their own side (the attitude-con firm ing
advo cate) more favor ably th an th e advo cate rep re sent -
ing the other side ( the attitude-disconfirming advo cate) .
We also pre dicted that the debate would cause them to
feel even more con fiden t in their abor tion attitudes.
 Co hen et al. / WH EN BELIEFS YIELD TO EVIDENCE
Most impor tant, h owever, we expected that both of these
ten den cies would be dimin ish ed in th e affir ma tion
con dition.
METH O D
Design and Participants
Th is exper iment involved a 2 × 2 facto rial design, with
par tisan sh ip of the par ticipan t ( prolife or prochoice)
and affir ma tion con dition ( no-affir ma tion or affir ma -
tion ) as th e between -par ticipants factors. The depend -
ent mea sures com prised rat in gs of the two debat ers
along several evaluative dimen sions an d par ticipants’
reports of how the debate had affected their con fidence
in their own attitude toward abor tion.
A total of 30 male and 34 female Stan ford un der grad -
u ates par ticipated. They were recruited from an intro -
ductory psychology class or a pool of Stan ford un der -
grad u ates who had expressed inter est in par ticipat in g in
psych ology stud ies for paymen t. Par ticipan ts from the
psych ology class received course credit; all oth er par tici-
pants were paid $5.
As in Studies 1 an d 2, stu den ts were selected for par tic-
ipa tion based on th eir respon ses to a preselection ques-
tion naire admin istered ear lier in th e quar ter. O n e ques-
tion naire item asked stu dents to in dicate their attitude
with regard to abor tion righ ts on a scale ran ging from 1
( extremely prolife) to 9 ( extremely prochoice) . A second item
asked stu den ts to indicate how per son ally impor tant the
abor tion issue was to th em on a scale from 1 (not at all
important) to 9 (extremely important) . This lat ter item was
included because research suggests that attitude impor -
tan ce mod er ates, in part, motivated biases in per sua sion
( e.g., Edwards & Smith , 1996; Zuwerin k & Devin e, 1996)
an d th is mea sure of attitude impor tan ce was used both
in our selection crite ria an d in our later an alyses, where
it proved a significant covariate. Stu den ts qualified for
par ticipa tion if th ey rated th em selves extremely prolife
( a 1 or 2 on th e rele vant scale) or extremely prochoice
( an 8 or 9 on the rele vant scale) and if they gave an atti-
tude impor tance rat ing at or above th e median score of
4. A total of 38 prochoice and 26 prolife stu dents ulti-
mately par ticipated in th e study ( th ere were fewer
prolife par tisans in th e available par ticipant pool) .
Procedure
Stu dents again par ticipated in the study individ u ally.
On arrival, th ey were welcomed by a male exper imen ter
who pre sen ted the study as a two-part investiga tion of
impression for ma tion an d com mu nica tion. As part of
th is cover story, it was explained that the first part of the
study would exam ine peo ple’s impression of other peo -
ple and par ticipants would th us be asked to read a com -
mu n ica tion in volving two stu den ts debat in g a social-
1159
polit ical issue. The second part of the study, par ticipants
were told, would exam in e peo ple’s attempts to con vey
impression s of them selves. Par ticipants would thus be
asked to write a com mu nica tion about a per sonal value
or ch ar acter istic. In prep a ra tion for that exer cise, par tic-
ipan ts first com pleted a ver sion of Harber’s ( 1995)
Sources of Valida tion Scale, wh ere th ey ran ked a list of
11 traits an d values in order of th eir per son al impor -
tan ce ( see th e appen dix) . Th e list in cluded var ious
qualities but, as in Study 1, it excluded top ics th at migh t
poten tially be asso ciated with th e attitude issue. Wh ile
th e par ticipants ran ked th e list, th e exper imenter left
the room.
Abortion debate. Par ticipants n ext read a th ree-page
tran script of a debate between two opposin g advo cates of
abor tion righ ts. Par ticipants were given as much time as
they needed to read the debate thor ough ly. Importan tly,
in craft in g th is debate, we reviewed rele vant prochoice
an d prolife lit er a ture an d in cor po rated into the debate
th e most per sua sive argu ments that we could find in sup -
port of each side of the issue. For exam ple, in one sec -
tion , th e debate pre sented the following exchange:
Eric ( prochoice ad vo cate) : For me, on e of th e fun da men tal
issues is that only the woman should have con trol over
her body. . . . Anti-abor tion laws un fairly legislate what a
woman can or can’t do with her body. Th ey’re essen tially
woman-con trol laws. . . . Sh ould th e state be allowed to
exer cise th at kin d of power over a per son’s most private,
in timate affairs? . . . I think that un der an ti-abor tion laws,
women don’t re ally have the full hu man righ ts . . . guar -
an teed th em un der th e Bill of Righ ts.
Mike (prolife ad vo cate): It’s not about choice or con trol. It’s
about life. I un der stand the im por tance of the privacy and
sanctity of a per son’s body. But . . . how can you justify kill-
ing an un born child to vin dicate a woman’s “privacy” and
“free dom of choice”? . . . We’re talking about two bod ies,
two sep arate lives. Should n’t the state assume pro tection
of the un born baby—as it assumes the re spon sibility of
pro tect ing children from, say, abu sive par ents?
Self-affirmation manipu lation. After read in g the tran -
script, par ticipan ts were asked to write about one of the
per sonal ch ar acter istics or values th ey h ad ran ked ear -
lier. Th is task con stituted the exper imen tal man ip u la -
tion and was sim ilar to the pro ce dure used in Study 1 an d
in past research ( e.g., Fein & Spen cer, 1997; Liu & Steele,
1986; Steele, 1988) . Par ticipan ts were ran domly assigned
to one of two con ditions. In the affir mation con dition ,
par ticipan ts wrote about wh y th eir first-ran ked value or
char acter istic was impor tant to th em an d described a
time in their lives when it had proved mean in gful. In the
no-affir ma tion con dition, par ticipan ts wrote about why
their ninth most impor tan t value or ch ar acter istic might
be impor tan t to th e typ ical Stan ford stu dent. All par tici-
pan ts were in structed to write as much or as lit tle as they
wanted.
1160 PERSO N ALITY AND SO CIAL PSYCH O LO GY BULLETIN
Dependent measures. Par ticipants then com pleted the
depen d en t measure question naire. To assess th e degree
to wh ich par ticipants became more con fident in th eir
attitudes, th ey were asked to in dicate h ow th e debate h ad
affected th eir con fidence in th eir views con cern ing abor -
tion on a scale from 1 ( made me much less con fident in my
views) to 5 ( did not affect my views at all) to 9 (made me much
more con fident in my views) —a self-report mea sure of atti-
tude polar iza tion sim ilar to that used in past research
( e.g., Lord et al., 1979) . ( As Lord et al. [ 1979] note, this
mea sure is appro priate because par ticipan ts had been
selected on th e basis of h aving extreme attitudes. Thus,
th ey would h ave lit tle room to polar ize in their views fur -
th er on a scale sim ilar to that used in preselection.) To
assess the extent to which par ticipants were biased in
favor of the attitude-con firm in g advo cate rela tive to the
attitude-disconfirming advo cate, they were asked to rate
each of th e advo cates alon g several dimen sion s. Spe -
cifically, on sep a rate, appro priately labeled 9-poin t
scales, par ticipan ts rated h ow rea son able, how polit ically
extrem e, h ow close-m in d ed , h ow in tel li gen t, h ow
biased, an d h ow in formed th ey th ough t each of th e advo -
cates was.
Afte r co m p let in g th e se m e a su r e s, p ar tic i p an ts
answered two question naire items design ed to assess
their cur ren t mood and state of self-regard. Following a
question n aire prompt request in g that they, “Take a
momen t to th in k about h ow you are feelin g,” they were
asked, “How would you describe your mood right now?”
on a scale from 1 ( extremely bad) to 5 ( neu tral) to 9 (extremely
good). Next, they were asked to rate their cur rent self-
regard by answer ing the question, “In gen eral, how do you
feel about your self ?” on a scale ranging from 1 (extremely
negatively) to 5 ( neu tral) to 9 ( extremely positively) .
At the con clu sion of th e exper imen t, par ticipan ts
were fully debriefed ( with a pro ce dure sim ilar to the one
used in Studies 1 and 2) , thanked for their par ticipa tion,
an d eith er paid $5 or pro vided with the rele van t signa -
ture to obtain course credit.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIO N
Analyses of th e primary depend ent variables were
con d u cted u sin g a two-way an alysis of covarian ce
( ANCOVA) with par ticipant par tisan ship ( proch oice or
prolife) an d exper imen tal con dition ( affir ma tion or n o
affir ma tion) as in de pend ent variables and rat in gs of per -
sonal impor tan ce of the abor tion issue ( as mea sured in
preselection) as the covariate.
Creation of Biased Source
Perception Composite
A differ ence score was com puted by sub tract ing, along
each dimen sion, ratings of the attitude-disconfirming
advo cate from rat ings of the attitude-con firm in g advo -
cate. These differ en ce scores are con cep tu ally sim ilar
and, after being reverse-coded where appro priate, form
an index of the extent to which par ticipan ts rated the
attitude-con firm in g advo cate more favor ably than the
attitude-disconfirming advo cate ( Cron bach ’s alph a =
.73) . Th ey were aver aged in to a sin gle com posite ( after
th e differ en ce scores were stan dard ized to equate th eir
varian ce) , with h igh er n u m bers in d icat in g greater
favorability toward the attitude- con firm ing advo cate
than the attitude-discon firmin g one.
While our analyses use stan dard ized scores, we report
com posite rat in gs based on aver aging unstan dard ized
differ en ce scores. Th is way, the zero point reflects the
absen ce of biased source per cep tion. ( Sta tistical sign ifi-
can ce is un affected by whether a stan dard iza tion pro ce -
dure is used.) Th e differ ence score com posite had a nar -
row spread ( the interquartile range was 0.67 to 2.38) ,
reflect ing par ticipants’ ten dan cy to rate both advo cates
favorably.
Effects Along Biased Source
Perception Composite
The results indicated that the affir ma tion atten u ated
biased source per cep tion, th at is, th e ten dency to rate
th e attitude-con firm ing advo cate more favor ably th an
the attitude-disconfirming on e. Th e differ en ce between
par ticipan ts’ rat in g of the attitude-con firm ing advo cate
an d th eir rat in g of th e attitude-disconfirming advo cate
proved smaller in th e affir ma tion con dition (M = 1.00)
than in the no-affir mation con dition (M = 1.74), F(1, 55) =
4.85, p < .035.
Two other less impor tan t find in gs emerged. Among
prochoice par tisan s, men proved more likely than did
women to en gage in biased source per cep tion, whereas
the reverse was true among prolife par tisan s, as reflected
by a mar ginal Par tisan ship × Gen der in ter action , F( 1,
55) = 3.66, p = .06. In addition, prochoice par ticipan ts
showed less biased source per cep tion when affirmed ( M =
2.35) th an wh en un affirmed ( M = 1.03) , whereas the cor -
re spon d in g affir ma tion effect amon g prolife par tici-
pants was, at least along this mea sure, weaker (Ms = 1.13,
0.97, respectively) , as indicated by a mar ginal Par tisan -
sh ip × Affir ma tion in ter action , F( 1, 55) = 2.89, p < .10.
Does the Affirmation Reduce Bias in
Favor of the Attitude-Con firming Advocate
or Bias Against the Attitude-Disconfirming One?
Sur prisingly, the affir ma tion reduced bias in favor of
the attitude-con firm ing advo cate. Affirmed par ticipants
rated that advo cate less positively ( M = 5.76) than did
un affirmed par ticipants (M = 6.17) , F( 1, 55) = 4.04, p <
.05. By con trast, th e affir ma tion h ad lit tle reliable effect
on rat in gs of th e attitu d e-d iscon firm in g ad vo cate,
although the pat tern is such that ( as would be expected)
 Co hen et al. / WH EN BELIEFS YIELD TO EVIDENCE
affirmed par ticipants rated the attitude-discon firmin g
advo cate more positively (M = 4.76) than did unaffirmed
par ticipan ts ( M = 4.43) , F( 1, 55) = 1.56, p = .22.
Effects Along Attitude
Polarization In dex
The results also indicated that affir ma tion atten u ated
attitude polar iza tion. Con sisten t with Lord et al. ( 1979) ,
par ticipan ts over all reported that the debate made them
more con fiden t in their views on abor tion, as in dicated
by a com par ison of the mean con fidence rat ing (M =
5.94) with the point of neu trality on the scale, t( 50) =
5.24, p < .001. However, this height en ed con fidence was
sign ifican tly lower in th e affir ma tion con dition ( M =
5.53) th an in th e n o-affir ma tion con dition ( M = 6.35) ,
F( 1, 50) = 5.49, p < .025.
Disen tan gling Effects of
Mood and Self-Regard
We tried to assess th e exten t to wh ich th ese effects
resulted from ele vated mood an d en h an ced self-regard.
Recall th at par ticipants h ad in dicated both their cur ren t
mood and the level of self-regard that they felt at the
presen t moment. As might be expected, these two items
were sign ifican tly cor re lated, r( 62) = .37, p < .005. Con sis-
tent with the find ings of Liu and Steele ( 1986) and Fein
an d Spen cer ( 1997) , th e man ip u la tion of self-affir ma -
tion h ad n o sig n ifican t effect on mood ( p > .20) .
Affirmed par ticipants did, h owever, report some what
h igh er feelin gs of self-regard ( M = 7.15) th an did
unaffirmed par ticipants (M = 6.79) , but th e distribu tion
of th is mea sure was severely skewed to th e left, posing
inher ent sta tistical difficulties for para met ric tests. Con -
se quently, a Kruskal-Wallis n on parametric test was per -
formed. It yielded a mar ginal effect of con dition ( H =
2.91, p = .088) . ( Th e same n on parametric an alysis
yielded no such effect along the mood mea sure.)
If th e reduction in biased assim ila tion and attitude
polar iza tion in the affir ma tion con dition arose from ele -
vated mood, th en self-reported mood sh ould cor re late
with that depend en t mea sure; it did n ot, r( 62) = –.12, ns.
More over, the cor re la tion between mood and rat in gs of
attitude con fidence was slightly positive, r( 57) = .14, ns,
oppo site of what a mood-based expla n a tion would pre -
dict. Con sistent with our the o ret ical per spective, h ow-
ever, higher rat in gs of self-regard proved significantly
cor re lated with less biased source per cep tion , r( 62) =
–.31, p < .02. Higher self-regard also tended to be cor re -
lated ( albeit n on sign ifican tly) with lower rat in gs of con -
fidence, r( 57) = –.15, ns. Self-regard th us cor re lated with
th e depen d ent mea sures more system at ically than did
mood, pro vid ing fur th er evidence that mood does not
pro vide a sufficien t expla n a tion for th e affir ma tion
effects. Higher feelings of self-regard—not better mood—
pre dicted less bias.
1161
GEN ERAL DISCUSSION
Beliefs can con stitute impor tan t sources of iden tity.
Th is n otion h elps to explain wh y peo ple resist evidence
th at ch allenges th e valid ity of strongly held beliefs, as
th ey did in Studies 1 an d 2, an d wh y th ey in ter pret
ambigu ous infor ma tion in a man ner th at rein forces pre -
exist in g attitudes, as they did in Study 3. In each study,
pressures to main tain a valued self-image impeded a bal-
an ced con sid er ation of the evidence ( see Ellsworth &
Ross, 1983) . However, an affir ma tion of an alter na tive
source of iden tity both atten u ated resistan ce to per sua -
sion an d pro duced a more even -h an ded evalu a tion of
evidence. Shoring up global self-worth, it seems, takes
th e stin g out n ew ideas, makin g them less pain ful to
accept as true. We have dem on strated th e effective ness
of self-affir ma tions in ame lio rat ing defen sive reaction s
to per sua sion in two social-polit ical domains and with
two man ip u la tions of self-affir ma tion . Taken togeth er,
th e results illustrate th e valid ity and gen er ality of our
con cep tual frame work.
O n e obviou s question is wh y th e affir ma tion in
Studies 1 an d 2 led to more positive evalu a tions of the
attitude-disconfirming infor ma tion, wh ereas in Study 3
it led to more n ega tive evalu a tions of th e attitude-con -
firm in g infor ma tion. It seems that the affir ma tion atten -
u ated a disconfirmation bias in the first two stud ies but
ame lio rated a con fir ma tion bias in the third. One possi-
ble rea son for this pat tern sim ply involves the availability
of counterattitudinal and proattitudinal evidence in the
th ree stud ies. In Studies 1 and 2, par ticipants could pro -
tect th eir attitude only by den igrat in g th e coun terattitu -
dinal eviden ce. In Study 3, however, par ticipants had the
addition al option of exalt ing th e merit of th e proattitu -
dinal in for ma tion. We can only specu late as to why they
ch ose a con fir ma tion bias rather than a disconfirmation
bias in th at study, but we suspect the rea son involves the
per sua sive nature of the evidence they read ( cf. Edwards
& Smith, 1996) . Praising a per sua sive ally may be less
effortful th an crit icizin g a per sua sive adver sary.
Con siderations of
Un derlying Process
Par ticipan ts felt less th reat en ed by eviden ce th at
impugn ed th eir attitudes, it seems, wh en th ey received
an affir ma tion of an alter na tive source of self-worth. As a
result, th ey en gaged in fewer defen sive man eu vers
aimed at pro tect ing an iden tity at the expense of a lost
oppor tu n ity to learn. Future research will exam ine the
spe cific mech a nisms by wh ich self-affir ma tion attenu -
ates bias. It is possible, for exam ple, th at th e self-affir ma-
tion reduced resistance to per sua sion by trivializing the
impor tance of the attitude as a source of iden tity or self-
worth ( see Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995) . Indeed,
per son ally unim por tant attitudes have been shown to be
1162 PERSO N ALITY AND SO CIAL PSYCH O LO GY BULLETIN
less resistan t to ch an ge th an per son ally impor tan t on es
( Zu we r in k & De vin e , 1996; se e also Po m e r an tz,
Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995) . It is also possible that the
affir ma tion sim ply made par ticipants less extreme an d
con fident in th eir attitudes.
Two alter n a tive expla n a tion s for th e present find in gs
war ran t discussion. Per h aps the affir ma tion pro duced
the effects it did by inducing self-focus. But past research
suggests that self-focus does not increase persuasibility
but decreases it ( Hutton & Baumeister, 1992) . A more
plau sible alter na tive expla na tion involves the possibility
th at th e affir ma tion induced positive mood and thus
caused par ticipants to evalu ate th e evidence less crit i-
cally or system at i cally ( see McGu ir e, 1985; Petty,
Sch uman n , Rich man , & Strath man , 1993) . Four argu -
men ts, h owever, cast doubt on this possibility. First, past
research suggests th at positive mood does n ot reduce sys-
tem atic pro cessin g when peo ple have ample time, as
th ey did in our stud ies, to read an d respon d to th e rele -
vant mate rials ( Mackie & Worth, 1989) . Secon d, pre vi-
ous stud ies suggest that the effects of positive mood on
per sua sion are dimin ish ed wh en ( as in our stud ies) peo -
ple pre sum ably h ave stron g prior opin ions or exten sive
kn owledge about th e attitude topic ( Bless, Boh n er,
Sch warz, & Strack, 1990; Worth & Mackie, 1987; see also
Bless, Sch warz, & Mackie, 1992; Mackie & Worth, 1989;
see also Petty et al., 1993) . Third, con sisten t with find -
ings obtained in ear lier stud ies, th e affir ma tion pro ce -
dure used in the first and third stud ies was foun d, in
Study 3, to h ave n o effect on self-reported mood ( Fein &
Sp en cer, 1997; Liu & Steele, 1986) . Fin ally, m ost
mood-based accounts, at least in their most straight for -
ward form, could n ot par simo niously explain why the
affir ma tion used in Study 3 made par ticipan ts more neg-
a tive in th eir evalu a tion of th e attitude-con firm in g
advo cate.
Although mood is prob a bly in sufficient to yield the
effects obtain ed in th e th ree stud ies, it may n ever the less
prove necessary. Affir ma tion effects may require both a
self-per cep tion of per sonal worth and an ele vated mood
state. In this sense, positive mood con stitutes less an
alter n a tive expla n a tion of affir ma tion effects th an on e of
several possible media tors of th em.
An oth er issu e rel e van t to u n d er lyin g p r o cesses
regards the place ment of th e self-affir ma tion . In Studies
1 an d 2, par ticipants were affirmed prior to the pre sen ta -
tion of th e scien tific report, wh ereas in Study 3, par tici-
pan ts were affirmed after th e pre sen ta tion of the debate.
If the affir ma tion oper ates through its effect on infor ma -
tion pro cessing, th en it seems n ecessary to affirm par tici-
pants prior to expo sure to the rele vant eviden ce. Th is
argu ment would be rea son able if all infor ma tion pro -
cessin g took place while par ticipants read th is evidence
an d n on e occurred after ward. But it is likely that both
on -lin e an d m em ory-based p ro cessin g d eter m in ed
responses to the infor ma tion. ( In deed, we would sub mit
th at much attitude change in the real word occurs not
dur in g expo sure to disconfirming evidence but in later
moments of calm reflection.) Th e affir ma tion may thus
reduce on -lin e defen sive pro cessin g, at th e time of
encod ing, as it pre sum ably did in Studies 1 and 2, or it
may atten u ate mem ory-based defen sive pro cessing, as it
p re su m ably d id in Stu d y 3. Past research p ro vid es
su p p ort for th is rea son in g by d em on strat in g th at self-
affir ma tions may both buffer against a future threat
(Steele, 1988) and dispel the effects of a past one (Tesser &
Cor nell, 1991) .
An addition al question that future research could
exam ine involves dispositional self-esteem as a poten tial
mod er a tor of self-affir ma tion effects. Peo ple low in
self-esteem, it could be argued, would ben e fit most from
a self-affir ma tion pro ce dure because after read in g a
th reat en in g message, they have fewer favor able self-con -
cepts with which to affirm and thus restore self-worth on
their own ( Steele et al., 1993; see also Greenberg et al.,
1993) . It is also possible, however, th at peo ple with low
self-esteem would ben e fit less from an affir ma tion pro ce -
dure than peo ple with high self-esteem. Low-self-esteem
par ticipan ts might find affirm in g feed back ( of the sort
used in Study 2) less plau sible than their high-self-esteem
peers, or th ey migh t h ave greater difficulty remem ber -
ing self-affirm in g expe rien ces ( as the pro ce dures in
Studies 1 an d 3 required) . Ultimately, of course, the role
of disposition al self-esteem in mod er at ing the effect of
self-affir ma tion is an empir ical question.
Theoretical and
Practical Implications
O ur th e o ret ical per spec tive h as implica tion s for
nego tia tion, edu ca tion , and ther a peu tic in ter ven tions.
Wh en alter n a tive sources of iden tity are affirmed, nego -
tia tors may more clearly see the mer its of the other side’s
argu men ts and more readily con cede their own biases
( Bastardi & Ross, 2000) . Stu den ts may prove more crit i-
cal of their long-held views and more open to infor ma-
tion that challenges th eir pre con cep tions. Clien ts in
ther apy may better recognize and change erro n e ous
beliefs th at cause th em psycho logical distress.
Our results also add to a growin g lit er a ture on th e
role of self-image main te n an ce motiva tion s in mediat -
in g a wide ran ge of social psych o logical ph e n om ena
( J. Aronson, Cohen, & Nail, 1999) . Not only does this
motiva tion h elp to explain th e present find in gs but it has
also been implicated in cognitive disso n an ce pro cesses
( Steele, 1988; Steele et al., 1993) , ter ror man age ment
phe nom ena (Greenberg et al., 1993), low self-esteem an d
depression ( Brown & Smart, 1991; Lin ville, 1987) , preju -
dice and ste reo typ ing ( Fein & Spencer, 1997; Green berg
 Co hen et al. / WH EN BELIEFS YIELD TO EVIDENCE
et al., 1993) , attributional analysis ( Liu & Steele, 1986) ,
biases in social judgment ( Dunning & Cohen, 1992;
Dunning et al., 1995) , behavioral in h ibition (Vohs &
Heath er ton , 2000) , decision making ( Joseph s, Larrick,
Steele, & Nisbett, 1992) , an d man y oth er rich ph e n om -
ena. Our find in gs suggest th at per sisten t biases in social
judgment arise from iden tity-main te nance motiva tions.
Con sisten t with Kunda ( 1990) and Dunning and his col-
leagues ( Dunning et al., 1995) , we argue that such moti-
va tion s pressure cognitive pro cesses to a desired en d.
Peo ple search for an inter pre ta tion of the evidence th at
best sup ports the con clu sion th ey h ope to draw, much as
a lawyer spin s court room evidence to present the stron -
gest case. Relieving these pressures fosters a more ratio -
nal and even-handed evalu a tion of evidence.
Our find in gs also address an older ten sion in West ern
art an d ph iloso phy con cern ing th e rela tion ship between
emo tion an d rea son . One artistic and philo soph ical tra -
dition ascribes h uman folly to th e misch ie vous dance of
th e passions and sees emo tion as a con tam inant of rea -
son. The other roman tic tra dition cele brates the role of
emo tion in imagin a tion an d rela tion ships. But both of
these tra dition s view rea son and emo tion as antago n is-
tic. Rea son is but a car riage bein g pulled by th e wild
horses of the passion s, or th e passions must be curbed by
a disciplin ed applica tion of rea son. In a sense, however,
our research sh ows th at th e two sides of h uman n ature—
the emo tion al side an d th e ratio n al side—are in ter -
twined ( Palfai & Salovey, 1994) . When peo ple are in a
good emo tional state, th ey are more ratio n al.
APPEN DIX
Sources of Validation Scale
RANKING OF PERSO NAL
CHARACTERISTICS AND VALUES
Be low is a list of ch ar acter istics an d values, some of which may
be im por tant to you, some of wh ich may be un im por tan t.
Please rank these values and qualities in or der of their im por -
tan ce to you, from 1 to 11 ( 1 = most important item, 11 = least im-
portant item) . Use each num ber only once.
 Ar tistic skills/ aesth etic ap pre cia tion
 Sen se of h u mor
 Re la tion s with frien ds/ fam ily
 Spon ta n e ity/ livin g life in the mo ment
 So cial skills
 Ath let ics
 Mu sical ability/ ap pre cia tion
 Ph ysical at tractive n ess
 Cre ativity
 Busin ess/ man a ge rial skills
 Ro man tic values
SOURCE: K. Harber ( 1995) .
1163
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Re ceived July 10, 1998
Re vision accepted May 12, 1999