Marx and Human Rights

George G. Brenkert

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 24, Number 1, January 1986,

pp. 55-77 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1986.0019

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/226797/summary

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 Marx and Human Rights
G E O R G E G. B R E N K E R T

1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
A GREAT DEAL is claimed on behalf o f human rights in contemporary phi-
losophy. H u m a n rights, it is said, give a person a basis upon which to stand;
they are the ground of human dignity; they constitute the essence of respect
for persons.' Crucial to the significance of human rights is the claim that
they hold not simply for modern, Western society but for all societies, mod-
ern as well as ancient, Western as well as Eastern. Thus, human rights can be
used to evaluate the social life and practices of all humans throughout
history.
Whether Marx did or could accept such a notion of human rights has
been of late a matter of considerable dispute. Some hold that Marx criticized
inadequate or mistaken conceptions of rights, but still was committed to
rights. G. A. Cohen, for instance, maintains that natural rights occupy a
place of central importance in revolutionary Marxist belief.' Others, how-
ever, deny this. Accordingly, Steven Lukes claims that those Marxists who
believe in human rights can only be " . . . revisionists who have discarded or
abandoned those central tenets of the Marxist canon which are incompatible
with such a belief. ''s
~ See Joel Feinberg, "The Nature and Value of Rights," Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (Winter
~97o): 249-55.
2 G. A. Cohen, "Freedom, Justice and Capitalism," New Lrft Review, No. ~26 (March-April
~98i): ~~-12. In this paper I will concentrate simply on human rights (sometimes also referred
to by others as moral rights, natural rights, or innate rights) and the question of their relativity
or universality. I will thus not consider questions of distributive justice as such, nor will I
consider questions of legal rights. The moral or human rights at issue here may be the basis for
legal rights, may be linked with distributive justice, and may or may not be the same as the civil
and political rights which individuals in modern society claim for themselves. Ziyad I. Husami
also appears to attribute to Marx an acceptance of human rights inasmuch as he claims that
Marx held a view of equal rights and justice which can be validly applied to any society. See
Ziyad I. Husami, "Marx on Distributive Justice," Marx, Justice and History, edited by Marshall
Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanoln (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 198o).
3 Steven Lukes, "Can a Marxist Believe in Human Rights?," Praxis International, ~ (January,
~98~): 344.

[551
56 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 94:~ JANUARY ~98~
In the following, I shall also argue that Marx rejected the notion o
human or natural rights. Those rights claimed to be human rights are, h~
held, relative to capitalist society. 4 However, in contrast to other recent dis
cussions, I believe it is possible to identify a basis for Marx's views on humai
rights which explains the relativism Marx attributes to human rights, link..
his views on human rights with his characterization o f bourgeois distributiw
justice, and indicates the dialectical origin of human rights out of earlie~
forms of society. T h o u g h this account of Marx's understanding of huma~
rights enables us to evaluate more accurately than alternative recent discus
sions other aspects o f his views on human rights, e.g., their egoism, I shal
not concentrate on this internal evaluation. Rather, I shall focus on Marx':
argument that human rights, as such, do not exist. What have been callec
human rights are simply those rights fundamental to capitalist society whict
it has proclaimed to be universal.

9. THE CRUCIAL CHARACTERISTIC OF H U M A N R I G H T S

Though Marx was aware of at least some of the major issues concerning th~
nature o f rights which trouble philosophers today, he says very little abow
these topics. Thus, for example, though Marx refers to a wide variety oi
rights, e.g., "human rights," "the rights of man," "natural rights," "civi~
rights," "political rights," "legal rights," "abstract rights," "nominal rights,'
"existing rights," etc., and occasionally suggests their interrelations, in gen.
eral he rarely seeks to subordinate some either conceptually or logically tc
others. 5 He mentions various interrelations between rights and duties, bu~
did not concern himself with the nature or acceptability of such correla.
tions. ~ Finally, even though in "The German Ideology" Marx discusses th~
views of Hobbes and others that rights are simply powers, he does no~

4 Accordingly, when I speak without qualification of Marx's views on h u m a n rights i

should be understood that I refer to his views or claims regarding what others have believed t~
be h u m a n rights.
5 "On the Jewish Question" is one instance in which Marx suggests certain conceptua
subordinations of some rights to others; see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Work
(New York: International Publishers, ~975), 3: 158-68- For the G e r m a n see Karl Marx an~
Friedrich Engels, Werhe (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, ~973), ~: 359-7o- Hereafter, both in the text an~
in the footnotes, citations o f the original German from the Werke will be abbreviated by "MEW'
followed by volume and page number.
6 For example, Marx claimed in "General Rules of the International Working Men's Asso
ciation" that that association "acknowledges no rights without duties, no duties without rights'
(Selected Works [Moscow, ~95o], 1." 351; MEW, ~6: ~5). However, see Marx's letter to Engel.
dated November 4, ~864 in which Marx seems to disavow all talk of rights and duties. See also
Karl Marx, " T h e Poverty o f Philosophy," in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Work
(New York: International Publishers, 1976), 6: 174; MEW, 4: 14o. Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans
Martin Nicholaus (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 458; MEW, 4~: 3 7 o - 7 ~. References to th~
Grundrisse hereafter will be inserted into the text with the designation "Grund.; MEW."
 MARX AND HUMAN RIGHTS 57
determine for himself whether moral or human rights are powers, claims,
valid claims, entitlements, demands, or something else. 7
Instead, Marx fastens on that aspect of human rights according to
which they pertain simply to humans qua humans, e.g., qua rational, qua
having basic needs, or qua capable of choice) As such, human rights do
not pertain to a person due to any status or relationship which one occu-
pies, e.g., slave, serf, lord, proletarian, mother, or cousin. Nor are such
rights created or conferred by human voluntary action, e.g., promises,
elections, or appointments) Rather, human rights exist independently of
any such circumstances. Thus, they require that we view humans ab-
stractly rather than concretely, l° We are to view humans simply according
to some, supposedly essential, feature, e.g., rationality or capability of
choice, rather than according to the particular form which this character-
istic may take in this or that individual during this or that historical
period. As such, human rights may be said to be bound up with a view of
the individual as an abstract individual.
Finally, since the characteristics in terms of which humans have rights
have been taken to apply to humans independently of their relations to
other h u m a n beings, natural or h u m a n rights are supposed to exist indepen-

? Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, " T h e G e r m a n Ideology," in Collected Works, (New York:
International Publishers, ~976), 5: 3 ~ - 3 o ; MEW, 3:3o3 - ~ .
8 Hart, for example, speaks of a natural right as "one which all men have if they are
capable of choice; they have it qua men and not only if they are members of some society or
stand in some special relation to each other" (H. L. A. Hart, "Are T h e r e Any Natural Rights?,"
in Rights, ed. David Lyons, [Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., ~979], ~5). A variety of
items have historically been mentioned as characterizing h u m a n s qua humans. T h e list given in
the text does not pretend to be complete. However, usually some one feature is noted as basic
and the ground for h u m a n or moral rights. As Wasserstrom says, "It is e v i d e n t . . , that almost
any argument for the acknowledgment of any rights as h u m a n rights starts with the factual
assertion that there are certain respects in which all persons are alike or equal. T h e a r g u m e n t
moves typically from that assertion to the conclusion that there are certain h u m a n rights"
(Richard Wasserstrom, "Rights, H u m a n Rights, and Racial Discrimination," in Rights, ed. David
Lyons, 5~).
Evidence of Marx's views on these matters must await the discussion in the following
sections of this paper. However, that Marx did understand views on h u m a n rights to rest on
claims that such rights pertain to h u m a n s qua h u m a n s is suggested by his references to Bruno
Bauer's view that Jews are incapable of acquiring the rights of man b e c a u s e " 'As long as he is a
jew, the restricted nature which makes him a Jew is bound to t r i u m p h over the h u m a n nature
which should link him as a man with other men'." "On the Jewish Question," in Karl Marx and
Frederick Engels, Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, ~975), 3: ~6~; MEW, ~:
364. See also Marx's citation from the Constitution of Pennsylvania: "All men received from
nature the imprescriptible right ~o w o r s h i p . . . ' , Ibid., ~6 ~; MEW, ~: 363 .
9 Hart, "Are T h e r e Any Natural Rights?" ~5.
~o Gould characterizes the notion of concreteness as referring to that "which stands in
relation to other things." Abstractness connotes "that which is taken out of context, apart from
its relations." Carol Gould, Marx's Social Ontology (Cambridge, Mass.: M I T Press, ~978), ~8~.
58 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 24: I JANUARY a98~
dently of any society or its legal structureY They are said to exist transcu]
turally and transhistorically. Thus, human rights are general and univers~
in nature. It is this view o f human rights as universal, general, and applyinl
to humans qua abstract individual, i.e., on the basis of some abstract charac
teristic, which is crucial for understanding Marx's views and criticisms. Mar.
was interested in the conditions under which this view of human rights couh
arise, the grounds on which, accordingly, such rights could be said to b,
valid, and the consequent implications of this view.

3" A B S T R A C T I O N S , V A L I D I T Y AND R A T I O N A L I T Y
H u m a n rights, it has been noted, have been said to be based on variou
abstract features which all humans share. Supposedly claims regarding hu
man rights would be `justified if some such abstract feature could be identi
fied and its connection with rights established by rational argument. If thi
were successful, we could ascribe human rights to the Greek freeman, th,
French peasant, and the English capitalist, even if none of them would hay,
made a similar abstraction in characterizing his own essential nature or lin]
such an abstraction with rights. Accordingly, if one may justifiedly attribut,
rights to concrete individuals whom we abstractly consider according to cer
rain essential characteristics, then one can maintain that human rights ex
isted earlier but people had not yet discovered or become aware of them
In contrast, Marx holds that human rights claims cannot be said to b~
fully .justified unless they rest upon a basis which is not simply an abstrac
tion we conceptually make, but a feature (albeit abstract) of humans whicl
plays a concrete role in the (productive) life o f a society. In defending thi
view, Marx is concerned with the conditions under which the claims w~
make may be validly applied to various circumstances. He wishes to avoi¢
the situation in which the idea of some ideologist is said to have validir
simply because it coheres with other ideas and reasons the ideologist con
jures up. '2 In effect, Marx suggests (albeit obscurely) the conditions fo
something to be valid or rationally justified. His argument can be recon
structed in the following manner.
First, Marx is quite prepared to admit that from different cultures o
individuals we may abstract certain similar features which we capture i~
general concepts (Grund., 8 5 - 8 8 , Io4f; MEW, 4~,: 2o-~'4, 38f). He is eve~
11 Cohen emphasizes this aspect of natural rights; cf. "Freedom, Justice and Capitalism,
1 ~-12. T h e characterization of h u m a n rights in the text fits quite comfortably with the fou
characteristics of h u m a n rights which Wasserstrom notes; cf. "Rights, H u m a n Rights, and Raci~
Discrimination," 4 9 - 5 ° .
*2 See Marx's attack on ideologies in " T h e G e r m a n Ideology," Karl Marx and Frederic
Engels, Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, ~976), 5 : ~ 7 - 3 °, 43-45, 59 -6~
MEW, 3: 17-ao, a 9 - 3 ~, 4 6 - 4 9 •
 MARX AND HUMAN RIGHTS 59
willing to allow that, given the generality of such categories, they may be said
to have a certain validity. Thus, he comments that "the simplest abstraction
[labor], then, which modern economics places at the head of its
discussions . . . . expresses an immeasurably ancient relation valid in all forms
o f s o c i e t y . . . " (Grund., ~o5; MEW, 4~: 39)- Such abstract concepts, catego-
ries, and the claims made using them can be said to be valid simply due to
the general commonalities which different societies and times have in fact
shared. ~3
The value of such abstractions, however, is a matter of some ambivalence
on Marx's part. On the one hand, he considers some of them quite useful:
"Production in general is an abstraction, but a rational [versti~ndige] abstraction
in so far as it really brings out and fixes the common element and thus saves
us repetition" (Grund., 85; MEW, 4z: zo-z~). On the other hand, in other
cases he claims that "abstractions in themselves, divorced from real history,
have no value whatsoever. T M T h e problem Marx sees here is that an under-
standing of man and society on the basis of these abstract, general concepts
may lead to simple tautologies, false conclusions, and misunderstandings.
For example, if the specific form of capital is abstracted away, then "nothing
is easier than to demonstrate that capital is a necessary condition for all
human production" (Grund., 258; MEW, 4~,: 18:t)--a view which, Marx be-
lieves, is simply false. Similarly, since at least some abstractions are obtained
by leaving out elements which, though not general and common, neverthe-
less determine social and historical development, the actual development of
a social formation may be misunderstood to be independent of the real
forces in society (see Grund., 85, 86, 87; MEW, 49; ~o, ~ , ~,2).,s Accordingly,
such abstractions may not help us to understand the real bases of social
change and development.
Secondly, Marx distinguishes between the validity and the full validity
which may be attributed to various categories. He denies that categories held
to be valid simply on the basis o f being the abstraction of a common element
or characteristic can be said to have "full validity" (Grund., ~o5; MEW, 42:
39). There appear to b e two interrelated aspects to the notion of full validity.
On the one hand, full validity attaches only to categories, whether abstract or
concrete, in light of their historically specific qualities (Grund., ~o5; MEW,
4~: 39). Thus, for example, though Marx claims that exchange value is a

13 See, for instance, "The Manifesto of the Communist Party," in Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels, Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1976), 6: 5o4; MEW, 4: 38o.
~4 Karl Marx.and Frederick Engels, "The German Ideology," 37; MEW, 3: ~7.
15 See Karl Marx, "The Poverty of Philosophy," in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,
Collected Works .(New York: International Publishers, ~976), 6: ~~7-~9, ~6~-64; MEW, 4: 74-
76, ~ 6 - 2 9 .
6o J O U R N A L OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 24:1 JANUARY 1 9 8
simple economic category, nevertheless he notes that it "presupposes popu
lation, moveover a population producing in specific relations; as well as
certain kind of family, or commune, or state, etc." (Grund., lo~; MEW, 4~
35-36). Only within these specific relations does Marx attribute full validit
to exchange value.
On the other hand, Marx links "full validity" with "true in practice" o
"practical truth." Full validity attaches only to those categories which, withi~
their historical and conceptual specificity, achieve practical truth (Grund
~o5; MEW, 42: 39). To achieve practical truth, I take it, is for the phenc
mena such (fully valid) categories express to play an actual and concrete rol
in the practical life o f a society. It is this notion to which Marx refers in th
Second Thesis on Feuerbach: "The question whether objective truth can b.
attributed to h u m a n thinking is not a question of theory but is a practic~
question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this
worldliness of his thinking in practice. '''6 That is, only those categories ca1
be accorded full validity which, in light of their historically specific chat
acters, express p h e n o m e n a (relations, structures, etc.) which actually func
tion as part o f and promote human practical activity.
Such practical activity, according to Marx, is centered on the productio~
of means to fulfill h u m a n capacities and needs. Consequently, only thos,
categories which express phenomena that play an actual or effective role i~
the social productive process by which such needs are fulfilled can be said t~
be fully valid. In playing such a role they are practical truths manifestinl
their reality and power. Accordingly, in the Economic and Philosophic Manu
scripts, Marx says "No doubt the demand [e.g., for "a particular dish," or %
take the mail-coach"] also exists for him who has no money, but his demant
is. a mere thing of the imagination without effect or existence for me, for ~
third party, for the [others], and which therefore remains even for me unrea
[unwirklich] and objectless.'''7 Thus, that which has no effect is unreal ant
powerless. Wage labor and capital, on the contrary, are categories which ar,
fully valid only for the m o d e r n bourgeois epoch, for it is only in this histori
cal period that these abstractions in their specificity express phenomen~
which play an effective role in the social production process.
T h e r e is a third aspect to Marx's views which also deserves mention here
Marx speaks of various phenomena such as capital, wage labor, money, etc.
appearing at an early historical epoch but only achieving their "full develop
ment" u n d e r capitalism (see Grund., 239; MEW, 4~: I65). Part of this fu]

16 Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Wor~
(New York: International Publishers, 1976), 5: 6; MEW, 3: 5.
17 Karl Marx, "The Power of Money," in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Wor~
(New York: International Publishers, 1975), 3: 325; MEW, Erg~inzungsband: 565-66.
 MARX AND H U M A N R I G H T S 61

development is that they now play an effective and primary role in the social
productive process. However, also part o f this notion is that characteristics
only implicit earlier are manifested or realized later. 18 Similarly, there are
other phenomena such as human labor, human capacities, talents and needs,
wealth, etc., which achieve full development only under communism
(Grund., ~6~,; 487f;, MEW, 4 2 : 9 5 - 9 6 , 395f). Now it is quite clear that the
former p h e n o m e n a are subordinate to the latter--they are but earlier, more
restricted and undeveloped forms out o f which the latter develop. Thus,
Marx comments that "in its historical forms as slave-labour, self-labour, and
wage-labour, labour always appears as repulsive, always as external forced
labour; and not-labour, by contrast, as 'freedom, and happiness'. This holds
doubly: for this contradictory labour; and, relatedly, for labour which has
not yet created the subjective and objective conditions for i t s e l f . . , in which
labour becomes attractive work, the individual's self-realization... [i.e.,
under communism]" (Grund., 6~ ~; cf. ~'49, 488, 5 oo, 541; MEW, 42: 5~2; cf.
174-75, 396, 4o7, 446) • That is, because of their nature and the contradic-
tions they promote, the realization o f wage-labor, capital, etc., permit only a
restricted realization of the forms o f which human labor, wealth, etc., are
capable. If mankind is to come into its own, Marx maintains, such limited
forms of wage-labor, capital, and so on, have to be overcome? 9
Accordingly, Marx defends a naturalistic view in which the full develop-
ment of human needs, capacities, and talents serves as a standard for mea-
suring the rationality of a diverse range o f human phenomena, e.g., labor,
individuals, as well as societies. "The practical relations of every-day life
[under communism]," Marx claims, "offer to man none but perfectly intelli-
gible and reasonable [durchsichtig verni~nftige] relations with regard to his
fellowman and to Nature. '''° His use o f the notion of rationality (reasonable-
ness) here implies that universality, necessity, and sociality characterize the
full development o f such phenomena. For example, human labor, but not
wage labor, develops "the universality o f [one's] real and ideal relations"
(Grund., 542; MEW, 42: 447). It is not subject to the fortuity of the market or
an unplanned production system, and aims at the fulfillment of social needs.
By extension the concepts and categories used to express such phenomena
can also be said to partake of this rationality. Only a social system embodying

~8 See, for example, Marx's and Engels's discussion o f the division o f labor in "The Ger-
man Ideology," 3~-35, 44-48; MEW, 3: ~1-24, 3 o - 3 4 •
~9 I do not wish to deny the distinctness o f each historical form. On the other hand, it is
important not to deny their interconnectedness. O n different forms o f exchange values see Karl
Marx, Grundrisse, ~49; MEW, 4~: a73-74.
~o Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International Publishers, ~967), ~: 79; MEW, ~3: 94-
Further references to Capital will be inserted in the text.
62 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2 4 : 1 JANUARY 198~

these characteristics a n d the claims capturing this level o f development cm

be said to be fully rational.
Accordingly, I suggest we distinguish three stages in Marx's views ol
the rational appraisal which can be m a d e of concepts a n d the claims mad~
with them: (a) some can be characterized as (merely) valid or (merely
rational; (b) others can be characterized as fully valid, having reality am
power; a n d (c) yet others are fully rational. T h o u g h Marx does not, as fa:
as I can ascertain, apply the notions of validity or full validity to thos~
p h e n o m e n a characteristic o f the third stage o f rational appraisal, he couk
do so. A concept such as labor might be valid for all societies (includin~
communism) since it applies indifferently a n d abstractly to all o f them
Wage labor, on the other h a n d , would be fully valid (only) u n d e r capital
ism, while h u m a n labor would be fully valid (only) u n d e r c o m m u n i s m
H u m a n labor, however, would be not only fully valid but also fully ra
tional. Contrariwise, h u m a n labor is not and could not be said to !~
(merely) valid, n o r can it or uses m a d e o f it be said to be fully valid priol
to c o m m u n i s m . Finally, Marx does n o t - - a n d could not--characterize p r e
communist societies as fully rational (vern~nftig). A particular category,
with its historically specific features which played an actual and concret~
role in a (pre-communist) society may nevertheless lack the above-men
tioned characteristics o f universality, necessity, a n d sociality. 2~ Thus, onl]
those p h e n o m e n a (and the concepts used to express them) possessing th~
features o f the third stage are fully rational.
T h e implication o f the preceding is that t h o u g h we may abstract certaiI
categories a n d apply t h e m to earlier epochs this may be, for Marx, primaril]
a verbal matter. I n d e e d , if h u m a n rights are f o u n d e d u p o n an abstractior
which an ideologist has merely d r a w n f r o m certain c o m m o n characteristic,.
of h u m a n k i n d , but which does not play an effective role in the m o d e o
production o f any (or all) social systems, t h e n that abstraction is neither rea
nor fully valid. At most it can be said to be (merely) valid. Further, if such a~
abstraction is not part o f the totality whereby h u m a n capacities, talents, ant
needs are fully realized, it c a n n o t be said to be fully rational. Thus, tht
question at issue becomes not simply which abstract characteristic(s) migh
serve as the basis for h u m a n rights, but which abstract characteristic actuall,,
exists a n d plays a role in all---or any--societies wherein h u m a n capacitie:
and needs are fully developed.

a ~ I use the designation "fully rational" to contrast this sense of rational with the one noteq
earlier in which Marx spoke of a "rational [verst~indige]abstraction", i.e., one that was sensibl,
or useful for the purposes at hand. I will refer to this other sense of "rational" as "merei
rational."
 M A R X AND H U M A N R I G H T S 63

4" C A P I T A L I S M A N D T H E A B S T R A C T I N D I V I D U A L
It is under capitalism, Marx contends, that an abstract individual first
develops which would permit the development of human rights as anything
more than an ideologist's conceptualization. Marx's historical materialism
traces the development o f this abstract being. It is not possible here to go
into the historical details which Marx develops. T h o u g h Marx distinguishes
in The German Ideology several historical stages in the development of society,
for purposes of the development of rights the division in the Grundrisse is
more appropriate, viz., pre-capitalist, capitalist, and communist. There are
admittedly distinctions within the pre-capitalist period, but these are less
significant than the similarities.
In brief, during pre-capitalist periods there is a unity between people and
their conditions of production (their property) which is mediated by the
community. O n e takes one's identity from the position one has in society.
The conditions in which one acquires that identity are viewed as natural and
unchangeable. This is most strongly the case during early forms of society
and property, e.g., tribal forms, and less strongly the case during feudal
times. Thus, Marx claims that "the more deeply we go back into history, the
more does the i n d i v i d u a l . . , appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater
whole: in a still quite natural way in the family and in the family expanded
into the clan [Starara]; then later in the various forms o f communal society
arising out o f the antitheses and fusions of the clans" (Grund., 84; MEW,
42:~o). To the extent one can speak of rights in these early societies, they are
attached to roles and positions within the particular society. Thus any rights
in pre-capitalist society are legal, civic, customary, etc. They are not, and
cannot be, human rights. "Individuals," Marx says, "in such a s o c i e t y . . .
enter into connection with one another only as individuals imprisoned
within a certain definition, as feudal lord and vassal, landlord and serf, etc.,
or as members of a caste etc. or as members of an estate etc." (Grund., 163;
MEW, 42: 96-97). T h e notion of rights which might hold simply because
one was a human individual, independently of the society in which one lived,
had no basis. What we see culminating in capitalism is the development,
through various historical measures, of individuals who are identifiable with-
out reference to their positions, roles, or relations to others,, but are identifi-
able simply as h u m a n beings qua possessors or owners of labor power. Capi-
talism, as the exchange of commodities, is only possible in so far as the
products of labor, commodities, are implicitly seen to be "merely a mode of
expressing all labour as equal human labour, and consequently as labour of
equal quality" (Capital, a: 6o; MEW, ~'3:74)- In contrast, Marx notes,
Greek society was founded upon slavery, and had, therefore, for its natural basis the
inequality of men and of their labo.ur-powers. The secret of the expression of value
64 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y ~ 4 : I JANUARY ~9 8
[under capitalism], namely, that all kinds of labour are equal and equivalent, becaus~
and so far as they are human labour in general, cannot be deciphered, until th
notion of human equality has already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudio
This, however, is possible only in a society in which the great mass of the produce ~
labour take the form of commodities, in which, consequently, the dominant relatio
between man and man is that of owners of commodities. (Capital, ~: 6o; MEW, ~3:7~
In such a society, each individual becomes simply an exchanger o f labc
power. T h e e x c h a n g e value o f the commodities b o u g h t a n d sold is merely
p h e n o m e n a l f o r m o f this u n d e r l y i n g reality (Capital, ~: 37; MEW, ~3:51
"As far as the formal character is concerned, there is absolutely no distint
tion between [individuals], a n d this is the economic character, the aspect i
which they stand towards one a n o t h e r in the exchange relation; it is th
indicator o f their social f u n c d o n or social relation towards one another
(Grund., ~41; MEW, 4~,: 167). In short, u n d e r capitalism all products an,
activities are dissolved into exchange values (See Grund., 156; MEW, 4a: 9oi
"Exchange value is a generality, in which all individuality and peculiarity ar
negated and extinguished" (Grund., 157~ cf. a42; MEW, 4 a : 9 o - 9 1 , cf. 167"
68). In Capital, Marx c o m m e n t s that "the characters who appear on th
economic stage are b u t the personifications o f the economic relations thz
exist between t h e m " (Capital, 1: 85; MEW, ~3: loo).
Accordingly, in the m o d e r n era, Marx claims, an e n d is put to "all feudal
patriarchal, idyllic relations"2'; "differences o f age a n d sex have no longe
any distinctive social validity for the working class. ''23 T h e result is the mod
ern i n d i v i d u a l o f capitalism. Thus, Marx says that "the bourgeoisie ha
stripped o f its halo every occupation hitherto h o n o u r e d and looked up t,
with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, th,
poet, the m a n o f sciem=e, into its paid wage-labourers. T M
It should be e m p h a s i z e d that Marx holds that the preceding, accoun
applies not only to the proletarian, but also to the capitalist. Both the capital
ist a n d the worker are alienated. Both live only as abstract beings. Th,
capitalist may have the semblance o f a real life, but does not in fact hav,
such a life. Further, as the capitalist too is an e x c h a n g e r t h e n formally he i
indistinguishable f r o m the worker with w h o m an exchange is made. Mar:
explicitly comments that "each o f the subjects is an exchanger; i.e. each ha
the same social relation towards the other that the o t h e r has towards him. A
subjects of exchange, their relation is therefore that o f equality. It.is impossi

a2 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in Karl Mar
and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, (New York: International Publishers, ~976), 6: 48~
MEW, 4:464 •
a3 Ibid., 49~; MEW, 4:469 •
24 Ibid., 487; MEW, 4:465 •
 M A R X AND H U M A N R I G H T S 65

ble to find any trace o f distinction, not to speak of contradiction, between

them; not even a difference" (Grund., 24x; MEW, 42: 167). Accordingly, for
Marx capitalist and worker are distinguished not by the form of the ex-
change in which they engage, but by the content of that exchange. But this
latter distinction does not deny that both are simply abstract beings!
Consequendy, with the historical development of capitalism occurs the
development of an abstract individual who lives not simply as a conceptual-
ization o f this or that thinker, but has a real extra-mental existence as simply
a source of homogeneous human labor power. It is on this basis that modern
society operates; its actual movement can only be understood on this basis.
"The simplest abstraction [abstract, homogeneous labor], then," Marx com-
ments, "which modern economics places at the head of its discussions, and
which expresses an immeasurably ancient relation valid in all forms of soci-
ety, nevertheless achieves practical truth as an abstraction only as a category
of the most modern society" (Grund., ~o5; MEW, 4~: 39).
As such people are regarded simply as centers of productive activity
which can be expended for certain purposes .and which are qualitatively
equal to such activity that others might expend. Admittedly, part and parcel
of such labor power is intelligence, capability of choice, etc. However, no one
of these characteristics by itself plays or can play the role which abstract
labor power plays in capitalist society. Surely people still exist as flesh and
blood, and can be characterized as rational beings, volitional beings, or what-
ever. But such facts, by themselves, are matters of indifference to the social
system within which people live. What is crucial is the human ability to
produce various amounts of homogeneous labor.

5" R I G H T S A N D C A P I T A L I S M

There is, Marx believes, an intimate and necessary connection between the
abstract individual o f capitalism and human rights. Indeed, Marx refers to
"the sphere of simple circulation or o f exchange of commodities" in which
this individual participates as "a very Eden of the innate rights o f man"
(Capital, i: i76; MEW, ~3: 189). What is the nature of this connection and
why do human rights arise and attach to this abstract person which develops
with capitalism? T h e r e must be some internal connection between this indi-
vidual and rights. After all there were owners and exchangers of products
before capitalism. Similarly, prior to capitalism people embodied their wills
in the products they made. Accordingly, Marx must indicate why human
rights uniquely .arise with capitalism as well as the role they play under
capitalism.
It should be clear, at the outset, that Marx cannot simply hold that hu-
man rights and principles o f justice arise because the mode of production of
66 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 24:1 JANUARY 198(
capitalism o r the conditions o f life p r i o r to c o m m u n i s m have defects st
serious that principles o f distributive .justice and rights b e c o m e necessary?
I f Marx held this view, t h e n since he attributes principles of.justice to earliel
societies he should also c l a i m - - u n l e s s he could establish a significant d i f f e r
ence b e t w e e n rights a n d principles o f j u s t i c e - - t h a t h u m a n rights may b~
attributed to earlier societies. Or, if the defects which give rise to h u m a i
rights are only "really" serious in capitalism, then M a r x s h o u l d attributt
neither principles of.justice n o r h u m a n rights to earlier societies, b u t only tt
capitalism. Obviously, n e i t h e r instance is the case. Accordingly, such an ac
c o u n t does not explain why h u m a n rights would arise only in the moder~
era, t h o u g h it might, p e r h a p s , explain why all previous societies have hac
principles o f distributive justice. "6
We must look elsewhere for the c o n n e c t i o n between h u m a n rights ant
the abstract individual o f capitalism. We must look to the n a t u r e o f th~
e x c h a n g e relation which implicitly involves such an abstract individual anc
which becomes fully d e v e l o p e d u n d e r capitalism (Grund., 240; M E W , 42
~66). As we have seen above, t h e r e is, formally, absolutely n o distinctior
between the subjects o f the e x c h a n g e relation (Grund., 241; M E W , 42: 166-
67). Each presents h i m s e l f as having o r being an equivalent a m o u n t ol
h o m o g e n e o u s h u m a n labor. Formally both are equals. ~7
H o w e v e r , if they were wholly equal t h e r e would be n o r e a s o n for ex.
change. Accordingly, such sub.jects are led to e x c h a n g e because o f a conten~
which lies outside the act o f e x c h a n g e . H e r e individuals have natural differ.
ences a n d b e c a u s e o f these d i f f e r e n c e s in needs, etc., are motivated tc
exchange. " O n l y the d i f f e r e n c e s between their needs a n d between theil
p r o d u c t i o n gives [sic] rise to e x c h a n g e and to their social e q u a t i o n in ex.
c h a n g e . . . " (Grund., 242; M E W , 42: I68). Such natural differences are
t h e r e f o r e , o n e o f the p r e c o n d i t i o n s o f the e x c h a n g e relation. A n o t h e r pre.
~5 Allen Buchanan, Marx and Justice (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, ~98a), 59; cf
67, 8~.
~6 Cf. Hume's account of the circumstances of justice; David Hume, "An Enquiry Con
cerning the Principles of Morals," Section III, in Hume's Ethical Writings, ed. Alasdair MacIntyr~
(New York: Collier Books, ~965). Of course, it might be said that, though earlier societie
recognized principles of justice, they did not recognise human rights even though they wer~
valid for them. But why, one wonders, was there this difference? Steven Lukes appeals t~
Humean views on justice (and morality) in order to show that Marxists cannot believe in humm
rights; "Can a Marxist Believe in Human Rights?," Praxis International, vol. ~ (January, ~98~)
Buchanan also appeals to Humean views in his analysis of Marx's views on justice and rights
Marx and Justice, chap. 4.
~7 Given the present account of rights, it should be obvious that Marx's views on humm
rights and bourgeois distributive justice spring from the same source. If, under capitalism, th~
wage-relation is just according to the bourgeois standard of justice, namely, equivalents ex
changed for equivalents, then this standard of justice is also tied to the notion of exchange valu,
and the abstract person under capitalism.
 MARX AND HUMAN RIGHTS 67
condition is that such individuals have a "surplus" in the sense that they have
something which they do not themselves absolutely need (cf. Capital, 1:87;
MEW, ~3: 1o~). T h e y have something which they can give up, transfer to
another, without irreparable harm to themselves.
Now, given these preconditions, Marx claims that "In order that these
objects may enter into relation with each other, as commodities, their guardi-
ans must place themselves in relation to one another, as persons whose will
resides in those objects, and must behave in such a~way that each does not
appropriate the commodity of the other, and part with his own, except by
means of an act done by mutual consent" (Capital, ~: 84; MEW, ~3: 99)-
Significantly, Marx immediately goes on to say that "they must, therefore,
mutually recognise in each other the rights of private proprietors" (Capital,
~: 84; MEW, ~3: 99). Similarly, in the Grundrisse Marx says that each of the
individuals involved in the exchange relation "does not appropriate it [the
other's product] by f o r c e . . , but rather they recognize one another recipro-
cally as proprietors, as persons whose will penetrates their commodities.
Accordingly, the juridical m o m e n t o f the Person enters h e r e . . . " (Grund.,
~43; MEW, 42: 169).
In effect, then, Marx holds that individuals enter into the exchange rela-
tion because of different needs and desires they have. They could of course
simply seize each other's commodity, but then we would have an instance of
conquest, or mutual plunder, but not exchange. Exchange proceeds differ-
ently. In the preceding quotations Marx suggests that exchange proceeds by
each person treating the other as having embodied his will jn the commod-
ity: "the equivalents exchanged are the objectification of one subject for
another" (Grund., 24~; MEW, 4~,: 167). He then seems simply to equate this
with each person treating the other as an owner or proprietor, in short, as
having property rights (cf. Grund., ~42; MEW, 4~: 167-68).
As such, however, any connection between rights and the abstract person
would be undercut. Rather, any (human) rights which arose u n d e r capital-
ism would simply rest on the rather Hegelian view that exchangers, having
placed thier wills in their objects, must not violate each other's will or the
rights essentially involved with that will. However, surely this would be an
inadequate interpretation of Marx's views on the source of human rights,
since according to this interpretation there would be little need to emphasize
the exchange relation. Indeed, insofar as any person produced a product,
whether for immediate consumption or exchange, whether under capitalism
or feudalism, he could be said to have a right to it. Finally, it is not obvious
how such a view could be the basis of human rights rather than simply
property rights. Thus, we must look beyond this simple and misleading first
suggestion Marx makes.
68 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2 4 : 1 JANUARY 198{~
We must look to the kind o f reciprocity which Marx identifies as "~
necessary fact, presupposed as natural precondition of exchange" (Grund.,
244; MEW, 42: I69). T h e r e are three essential characteristics to such reci-
procity. First, exchange reciprocity is constituted by the fact, as noted above~
that not only are the products of equal value, but also their possessors whc
have objectified themselves in their products are o f equal worth. "The sub-
jects in exchange," Marx claims, "exist for one another only through these
equivalents, as of equal worth, and prove themselves to be such through the
exchange of the objectivity in which one exists for the o t h e r . . . IT]hey only
exist for one another in exchange in this way, as equally worthy persons~
possessors of equivalent things, who thereby prove their equivalence...'~
(Grund., 242; MEW, 42: 167). The social relation o f individuals within the
exchange relation is one of strict equality. This does not imply, of course,
that there may not be a great social and economic imbalance between the
actual individuals (e.g., the capitalist and the worker) who are subjects o f this
exchange. Nevertheless, considered simply within the exchange relation
such individuals are abstract individuals and as such formally equal.
Secondly, exchange reciprocity presupposes that in the exchange relation
individual A gets what he wants only insofar as and because he provides
individual B with what he wants, and vice versa: "each serves the other in
order to serve himself; each makes use of the other, reciprocally, as his
means" (Grund., 243; MEW, 4~,: 169). As such Marx claims each individual,
as objectified in his commodity, is a need of the other individual (Grund.,
a42; MEW, 42: 168). Sdll, A must treat B not simply as the object and
supplier o f his needs but also as a being who will fulfill A's needs only if A
supplies B's needs. It is, Marx suggests, a uniquely human relation. "It does
not happen elsewhere--that elephants produce for tigers, or animals for
other animals" (Grund., 243; MEW, 42: 168).
Finally, exchange reciprocity arises only insofar as each individual posits
himself as end in himself, as being for self [Seinfur sich]. Were he not to do
this, that is, to consider himself as an end whose goals, needs and wants are
worthy of fulfillment, there would be no reason for the one person to be-
come the means for another. In this Marx assumes that such reciprocity
interests each individual "only in so far as it satisfies his interest to the
exclusion of, without reference to, that of the other" (Grund., 244; MEW, 42:
169). This is one of the main reasons why such a relation can only develop
on the boundaries o f primitive communities. Within such communities, as
we have seen above, individuals are joined by close, integrative relationships.
Only on the edges of such communities can the indifference crucial to the
reciprocity of individuals in exchange arise.
Given the preceding account of reciprocity, Marx claims that "out of the
 MARX ANn HUMAN RIGHTS 69
act of exchange itself, the individual, each one of them, is reflected in him-
self as its exclusive and dominant (determinant) subject" (.Grund., 244; MEW,
4~: ~7o). That is, the act of exchange must wait upon the consent of each
separate individual. Inasmuch as such consent is the consent of separate
individuals (not groups or associations of individuals) the subjects of this
exchange relation are exclusive. Further, inasmuch as there is no exchange
without the consent of each individual who is party to the exchange, the
subjects of this exchange are also dominant (determinant). This means,
Marx directly concludes, that in the exchange relation "the complete free-
dom of the individual [within this relationship] is posited: voluntary transac-
tion; no force on either s i d e . . . " (Grund., 244; MEW, 42: ~7o). In short, in
the exchange relation--as opposed to relations involving conquest or domi-
nation--each refuses to appropriate the other's product by force, but awaits
upon the other's voluntary consent. Not to wait for the other's voluntary
consent would be to undercut the very basis of this relation. Hence, this
fundamental relationship o f capitalism practically embodies not only the
equality but also the liberty of individuals. Since others must wait upon the
individual's voluntary consent, each individual may do as he wishes with
himself and his goods--at least insofar as he does not violate this relation-
ship--i.e., not wait for someone else's consent, and in this sense, harm
him. 's This, I take it, is something each member to the relation can legiti-
mately demand. As such each person is at liberty to act in certain ways of his
choice.
Now the context of such liberty regards the relations of individual pro-
ducts. Each individual expects and insists that his own product can only be
given up with his own agreement. But with this we have, in essence, arrived
at Marx's above description (64-65) o f how one person relates to another as
the proprietor or owner of a product and hence as having rights of private
property! However, now our understanding of Marx's characterization of
the exchange relation does not rely simply on the Hegelian account of indi-
viduals objectifying their wills in their products. Instead, we have a much
more Marxian account based upon the reciprocity which obtains in exchange
between individuals who have so objectified their wills. Accordingly, if each
participant in the exchange relation may legitimately demand or claim that
the other await his own consent, then arguably we have here an instance o f
individuals asserting their rights. And if the rights asserted relate to the
product of each individual, then we have an instance of property rights.
Thus, Marx discovers equality, freedom, and property rights in the ex-
change relation between the abstract individuals of capitalism.

28 Cf. Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," 162; MEW, ~: 364.
70 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 4 : 1 J A N U A R Y 198
T h r e e aspects o f this account deserve brief notice. First, the precedin
suggests that, for Marx, rights involve claims or demands which individua
can make on one another. And the basis of these claims or d e m a n d s - - a n
eventually, with capitalism, o f human rights--is the relationship o f exchan 8
between abstract individuals which first occurs between people at the bou~
daries o f tribes, etc. (cf. Capital, 1: 87; MEW, 23: lo2). Second, on the abo~
account it becomes clearer why, for example, Marx claims that "equality an
freedom a r e . . , not only respected in exchange based on exchange valu~
but, also, the exchange of exchange values is the productive, real basis of a
equality and freedom" (Grund., 245; MEW, 42: 17o). That is, if exchang
reciprocity requires and involves equality, freedom, and property righ~
then, as this relation becomes generalized throughout society, other relatior
will be transformed accordingly. New rights will be generated. Thus, Mar
says of the right o f security that it expresses the fact that "the whole c
society exists in order to guarantee to each of its members the preservatio
of his person, his right and his property. ''~9 Similarly, "the 'libert~ ind~finl
de la presse' ['unlimited freedom of the press'] (Constitution of 1793, Articl
1',2) is guaranteed as a consequence of the right of man to individual lit
erty . . . . ,,so Accordingly, Marx's account of the exchange relation is esser
tially an account o f how equality, freedom, and the right o f property ar
intimately bound up and form the basis o f "human rights" in bourgeoi
society. Thirdly, one can directly understand why Marx believes that amon
human rights the right of property is first among equals. It is only within th
context o f the exchange relation which arises between producers and buyer
that bourgeois equality and freedom develop. It is in this sense that born
geois property is the foundation of human (i.e., bourgeois) rights, s~
Now though exchange (value) has an antediluvian existence (Grund., lo~
MEW, 49: 36), it only achieves full development and occupies the .center c
society with capitalism; thus though the categories o f equality and ownershi]
which exchange presupposes were previously existent, they too were nc
central to society. Understood analogously, Marx's comment that "huma~
anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape" (Grund., lo5; MEW, 42

~9 Ibid., ~63; MEW, t: 365-66.

3° Ibid., ~65; MEW, ~: 367 .
3 ~ Betty A. Sichel simply asserts that the right of private property is "the one foundatiom
limitation on all other rights, according to Marx" in "Karl Marx and the Rights of Man,
Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch 3~ (t97~): 355. L. J. Macfarlane also simply notes th~
"the foundation of bourgeois rights is bourgeois property"; cf. "Marxist Theory and Huma
Rights," Government and Opposition ~7 (Autumn, ~98~): 4~7. Neither Sichel nor Macfarlam
however, show or explain why, on Marx's views, the right to property is the fundament~
human right. This deficiency is typical of most interpretations of Marx's views on human right
The account offered in the text, I believe, remedies this situation.
 MARX AND HUMAN R I G H T S 71

39) befits this situation. Only with the full development of the exchange
relation under capitalism can we more clearly understand the earlier forms
of exchange. Historically, there occurs a dialectical development of the no-
tion of exchange. H o w a mode of production with exchange value at its
center developed is a long story which Marx seeks to trace in the Grundrisse
and other writings, s' This account, partially indicated above, cannot be re-
viewed here. Marx summarizes its nature when .he says, "the dissolution of
all products and activities into exchange values presupposes the dissolution
of all fixed personal (historic) relations o f dependence in production, as well
as the all-sided dependence o f the producers on one another" (Grund., 156;
MEW, 4a: 89).
Consequently, even though before the existence of capitalism there was
in exchange value the grounds for human rights, nevertheless, human rights
did not arise until capitalism because the exchange system of prior modes of
production was not based on exchange value. Previous modes of production
possessed only undeveloped systems of exchanges (Grund., 163; MEW, 4~:
96). Thus, Marx comments that "it is simply wrong to place exchange at the
centre of communal society as the original, constituent element" (Grund.,
lo3; MEW, 42: 37)- Pre-capitalist societies did not presuppose in their pro-
duction system the formal equality o f all individuals. Hence, the basis of
rights did not exist in those societies. For example, Marx comments that
equality and freedom as developed to this extent [i.e. under capitalism] are exactly
the opposite of the freedom and equality in the world of antiquity, where developed
exchange value was not their basis, but where, rather, th6 development of that basis
destroyed them. Equality and freedom presuppose relations of production as yet
unrealized in the ancient world and in the Middle Ages. Direct forced labour is the
foundation of the "ancient world; the community rests on this as its foundation;
labour itself as a 'privilege', as still particularized, not yet generally producing ex-
change values, is the basis of the world of the Middle Ages. (Grund., ~45; MEW, 4~:
17o)
What wc see with the development of human rights is the development of
a moral notion (and o f the individual required for it) which is historically
and dialectically linked with certain practical features of prior societies. As
such, contemporary accounts of rights are mistaken if they suggest that
rights simply appeared in bourgeois society with little or no earlier connec-
tions. The development of human rights rests upon the development which
exchange value has undergone in earlier forms of society. On the other
hand, it is also mistaken to attempt to project these (bourgeois) rights in
their contemporary form back into history as natural rights. As such, Marx
3 2 Cf. Marx's account o f primitive accumulation, of money, etc. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1;
MEW, vol. ~3-
72 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 24:1 JANUARY 198f
derides the attempt to see such features of bourgeois society as "encased ir
eternal natural laws independent of history" such that "bourgeois relation~
a r e . . , quiedy smuggled in as the inviolable natural laws on which society ir
the abstract is founded" (Grund., 87; MEW, 42: 22). H u m a n rights requirt
the development of exchange value to the point that it plays a central role ir
society. But this occurs only with capitalism. Hence, human rights are limi.
ted to capitalism. ~

5" I M P L I C A T I O N S
Given the above account, a number of implications concerning Marx's view:
on human rights and contemporary interpretations of Marx's views seem t~
be indicated. First, though Marx does criticize the rights o f man for bein~
" . . . nothing but the rights o f a member of civil society, i.e., the rights ot
egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community, ''s~
it is mistaken to conclude that he means that the rights of man are valuabl~
as social guarantees only for egoistic, isolated man, i.e., for individual.,
among whom there are basic conflicts of interest, s5 If this were the case, ther
there would be merit to Buchanan's criticism that Marx's view is implausible
since the rights of man to property, free speech, equality before the law, etc.~
are not valuable only for the isolated, egoistic individual of civil society, st
However, Marx's views cannot be so easily dispatched.
To begin with, if Marx did hold that human rights are valuable as social
guarantees only for egoistic individuals, then, since surely there were egoist~
before capitalism, he would also be committed to hold that human rights were
valuable before capitalism. But this Marx explicitly rejects. Further, Marx doe~
not even hold that h u m a n rights are valuable merely as social guarantees. On
the one hand, human rights cannot themselves be social guarantees. This k,
plausible only when conjoined with the law, i.e., when we consider coercive b

33 William L. McBride has forcefully argued that Marxists should believe in h u m a n right.,
for both theoretical and practical reasons. I believe that the preceding a r g u m e n t meets th~
criteria which McBride himself establishes for any account to show that Marx did not believe ir
h u m a n rights as traditionally conceived. This does not imply, however, as McBride argues, that
Marxists could not or should not believe in some new and differently defined conception oi
h u m a n rights. See William L. McBride, "Rights and the Marxian Tradition," Praxis Internationc~
4 (April, a984): 57-74.
34 Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," ~6~; MEW, a: 364 .
35 Buchanan, Marx and Justice, 6~. It should be noted that B u c h a n a n uses the notion ot
egoism here in its ordinary meaning, i.e., a person is egoistic if he or she give preference to hi:
or her own desires, ends, etc. over those of others. It is in this sense of "egoistic" that I argu~
that Marx did not object to h u m a n rights. Drucilla Cornell seems to make a similar mistake ir
her article which defends the view that Marxists should believe in rights; see "Should a Marxis~
Believe in Rights?," Praxis International, 4 (April, ~984): 5 o. In general, Cornell's article defend,,
the interesting and important view that Marxists can believe in legal rights. This issue is quite
different from the one addressed in this paper.
36 Buchanan, Marx and Justice, 6 3 - 6 4 .
 MARX AND HUMAN RIGHTS 73
backed rights, but this is not always the case with h u m a n rights. O n the other
hand, Marx does not hold that h u m a n rights arise simply because they are
valuable. T h e rights at stake serve to define the very relationship at issue,
i.e., the exchange relationship. It is for this reason that Marx himself does
not use the a r g u m e n t that with the material abundance c o m m u n i s m brings
rights will disappear. T h e issue is not one o f abundance, but that c o m m u n -
ism will bring d i f f e r e n t relationships--it will abolish the exchange relation-
ship, and hence rights will disappear, a7 Finally, it is clear that Marx allows
that the rights which define the exchange relationship arise even t h o u g h
there are not "basic conflicts o f interest" within this relationship. All Marx
requires is that the members o f this relationship are indifferent a n d self-in-
terested. These are sufficient g r o u n d s for Marx to characterize the relation-
ship as "egoistic." In short, even in a Nozickean Eden o f h u m a n rights in
which everyone got just what he wanted a n d by mutual consent, Marx would
still criticize h u m a n rights for being the rights o f egoistic man, o f m a n
separated f r o m other m e n a n d the community. Accordingly, when Marx
claims that h u m a n rights are n o t h i n g but the rights of the m e m b e r of civil
society, he should be u n d e r s t o o d to be attacking the abstract n a t u r e of the
bourgeois or m o d e r n individual which h u m a n rights presuppose. He is not
saying that these rights are o f value only to egoistic or selfish individuals. ~8
Second, the preceding account permits a clearer u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the
claim that h u m a n rights are moral defenses or expressions o f the interests o f
the bourgeois class. Such claims are often m a d e on behalf o f Marx but
seldom explicated. ~9 For example, if they are taken to m e a n that h u m a n
rights necessarily serve particular interests o f the bourgeois class, they must
be rejected as mistaken. As a m a t t e r o f brute fact, it should be obvious that
appeals to h u m a n rights may serve the particular interests o f the proletariat.
On the other hand, since the basis on which h u m a n rights develop only
comes to occupy its position o f central importance due to a variety o f histori-
cal measures which ultimately p r o m o t e the bourgeois class, we can say that
h u m a n rights necessarily serve the general interests o f the bourgeois class.
However, it should be noted that serving the general interests o f the ruling
class is not itself the basis o f h u m a n rights. Otherwise, we might speak o f

37 Thus, the arguments of Steven Lukes and Allen Buchanan--that Marx rejects rights
because of the material abundance of communismmmust be seen as supplementing Marx's
arguments rather than explicating them. See Steven Lukes, "Can a Marxist Believe in Human
Rights?," 342-44; Buchanan, Marx and Justice, 6o-69, 81-82.
38 It also follows that Gewirth has misinterpreted Marx's views when he (Gewirth) claims
that Marx opposes rights for their egoism and exl~licatesthis to mean that, on Marx's views,
rights are egoistic because they entail "the view that persons have rights but no dudes toward
others." See Alan Gewirth, Human Rights (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, ~982)~ x8.
My initial comments, on page 56 above, are also relevant here.
39 L.J. Macfarlane, "Marxist Theory and Human Rights," 4t4.
74 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 4 : 1 JANUARY 198~

h u m a n rights in a n y e p o c h . Rather, h u m a n rights as fully valid serve th~

g e n e r a l interests o f the b o u r g e o i s class insofar as it is itself an e x p r e s s i o n o
the e x c h a n g e r e l a t i o n a n d its abstract individual. I n short, h u m a n r i g h t
serve to define the basic set o f relationships u p o n which the b o u r g e o i
class--as well as b o u r g e o i s society--is based. It is in this sense that we s h o u h
u n d e r s t a n d M a r x ' s claim that "right can n e v e r be h i g h e r t h a n the economi,
s t r u c t u r e o f society a n d its cultural d e v e l o p m e n t c o n d i t i o n e d t h e r e b y . TM
T h u s , the c o n n e c t i o n o f h u m a n rights a n d the bourgeoisie, t h o u g h a tea
c o n n e c t i o n , is n o t a simple o r direct connection.
T h i r d , it m i g h t b e objected that rationality, capability o f choice, basi,
needs, etc., a r e also h u m a n characteristics which h a v e existed t h r o u g h o u
history a n d m i g h t f o r m the basis o f h u m a n rights. M a r x ' s answer, it s h o u k
now be clear, m u s t be t h a t (at least so far) these h u m a n f e a t u r e s h a v e n o
served as objective bases f o r p r e s e n t (or prior) systems o f p r o d u c t i o n . I t i:
not rationality, M a r x c o n t e n d s , but chance, arbitrariness, which rules rood
ern society. ~ T h e o n l y n e e d p r o d u c e d by capitalism is the n e e d f o r m o n e y . ~
I n d e e d , u n d e r capitalism " e v e n the n e e d for fresh air ceases to be a n e e d fol
the w o r k e r . . . . It is n o t only that m a n has no h u m a n n e e d s - - e v e n his anima
n e e d s cease to exist. ''43 F u r t h e r , capability o f choice a n d basic n e e d s d o n o
r e q u i r e t h a t we actually t r e a t each o t h e r as equals, w h e r e a s f o r t h e r e to b~
e x c h a n g e individuals m u s t t r e a t themselves as equals. Again, o n the basis o:
rationality we m a y o r m a y not treat each o t h e r as equals, b u t only exchang~
requires that we actually recognize o u r equality. T h u s , given his views or
validity a n d justification, M a r x c a n n o t base h u m a n rights on rationality, th~
capability o f choice, o r u p o n h u m a n needs. ~
I n s t e a d , it is h o m o g e n e o u s h u m a n p r o d u c t i v e activity which is distinc
tively h u m a n a n d which plays a concrete, f o u n d a t i o n a l role in capitalis
society. I t is this a b s t r a c t aspect o f h u m a n s which serves as the f o u n d a t i o n o:
h u m a n rights. N o t e that this is not the s a m e as the fact that h u m a n s at,
active a n d p r o d u c e t h e i r m e a n s o f subsistence. I f this latter characteristic o:
h u m a n s , a n i m p o r t a n t characteristic o f h u m a n s f o r Marx, w e r e the basis o:

4° Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program,'! in Robert Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engei
Reader, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., ~97~), 388; MEW, 19: ~l.
4~ Cf. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The German Ideology," 48; MEW, 3: 35.
4~ Karl Marx, "Human Requirements and Division of Labour Under the Rule of Privat~
Property," in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works (New York: Irtternadonal Pub
lishers, ~975), 3: 307; MEW, Erg~inzungsband: 547-
43 Ibid., 3o7-08; MEW, Erg~inzungsband: 548.
44 Mihailo Markovic seeks to found human rights on a theory of basic needs; see "Philoso
phical Foundations of Human Rights," PraMs International ~ 098~): 391 . Steven Lukes suggest
that human rights are based on "people's vital interests"; see "Can a Marxist Believe in HumaJ
Rights?," 336 . The argument in this paper implies that neither of the bases for human right
which Markovic and Lukes suggest could be a basis for a Marxist (in the sense of Marx's
account of human rights.
 MARX AND HUMAN RIGHTS 75
human rights, then again Marx could well have maintained that h u m a n
rights were universal and not simply relative to capitalism. However, he does
not connect human rights with this aspect of humans and accordingly does
not maintain that human rights are universal. 45
Fourth, the above account casts additional doubt on claims that Marx
condemns bourgeois society for its injustice on the basis of a theory of justice
which rests upon human rights. 46 If h u m a n rights are linked to the abstract
individual of capitalism which is implicit in the exchange relation, and if the
exchange reladon is to be overcome in communism, then, so too will be the
abstract individual, the basis for human rights and the grounds for claims of
injustice. Thus, unless Marx had other bases for condemning capitalism as
injust, he could not, given his views on human rights, assert its injustice.
On the other hand, an argument used to show that Marx rejects human
rights becomes less plausibly attributable to Marx. Lukes and Buchanan have
recently argued that the notion of rights arises in response to "the conditions
of morality," i.e., "a view of human life as inherently conflictual, and poten-
tially catastrophically so, thus requiring a framework of authoritative rules,
needing coercive enforcement, that can be rationally justified as serving the
interests of all. ''~7 Since, they continue, Marx denies that these conditions hold
for all time and all societies--they do not hold for communism--he necessar-
ily rejects the notion o f rights. And since human rights are supposed to hold
transculturally and transhistorically, he must also reject human rights. How-
ever, the claim that this is Marx's argument against human rights has two
defects. First, as stated, it is aimed more at legal rights, i.e., coercively backed
rights, than human rights. If the h u m a n condition requires legal rights,
whether or not Marx rejects this view, we have learned nothing about human
rights. Second, Marx does not formulate his own analysis of human rights by
appeal to the conditions of morality. Rather, as we have seen, he appeals to
the exchange relation and its full development under capitalism. It is because
this relation, central to capitalism, and the conditions surrounding it will be
transcended by communism that Marx rejects claims of human rights. T h e
advantage of this interpretation, in addition to its faithfulness to Marx's ac-
count, is that it does not require that Marx postulated incredible levels of
abundance, brotherhood, or human love under communism in order for him
to claim that human rights will not exist under communism. ~8
Finally, the preceding sections have explicated Marx's rejection of the
view that there have always been h u m a n rights, even though people only

45 Sichel makes this mistake; Ibid., 356-57 .

46 Cf. Cohen, "Freedom, Justice and Capitalism"; HusamL "Marx on DistributiveJustice";
Macfarlane, "Marxist Theory and Human Rights."
47 Lukes, "Can a Marxist Believe in Human Rights?," 342.
48 Cf. Lukes, "Can a Marxist Believein Human Rights?," 343.
76 J O U R N A L OF T H E HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 94: i JANUARY 198~
came to discover or be aware of human rights in the modern epoch. Mar~
might agree that "it is not a necessary condition of something's being ~
universal right that it is universally believed to be a right, ''49 but this does no
of itself give us any reason to believe that rights could be meaningfully o:
validly said to exist prior to the modern period. The valid existence of right
is bound up with the real existence of the bearer of rights and this occur.
only in the modern epoch. Thus, Marx would also reject the claim that w~
can coherently evaluate other societies on the basis of h u m a n rights. Fo:
example, Buchanan claims that a moral principle or set of rights may still b~
valid for some group if it can be coherently used to evaluate the interaction:
or institutions o f that society by those who understand the moral principle ol
set of rights and know the relevant facts for applying such to that society
Accordingly, even if members of that group or society were incapable o:
comprehending that principle or rights, they could still be normativel~
evaluated. What we could not do, on this view, is to morally blame persons ir
that society, or fault them for violations of those rights, s°
Nevertheless, Marx would reject this claim since the abstract persor
required for h u m a n rights did not exist for such earlier societies. Indeed
Marx would hold that this objection merely assumes that we are all ulti.
mately simply individuals; it assumes the modern, bourgeois individual. W~
modern individuals can make this assumption because we believe tha~
Greeks and Turks are relevantly similar, and not as dissimilar as apple~
and oranges. But we assume this on the basis of our modern moral views
Thus, Buchanan's response begs the question. We can say that the Greek,,
violated the rights of women and slaves; but this is merely our own moral.
istic indulgence.

7. CONCLUSION
Marx's views on h u m a n rights rest upon an analysis o f the abstract individ.
ual which is the basis of claims regarding human rights. His argument is tha~
any such moral foundation to be fully valid and rational must, while playin~
an actual, effective role in society, promote the full development of humar
capacities, talents, and needs. Accordingly, Marx rejects the claims of other.,
that human rationality, capability of choice, or basic needs form the basis ol
human rights. The abstractions involved in identifying humans as rationa
beings, as beings capable of choice, or having basic needs cannot, at least b~
themselves, be the g r o u n d of human rights, since humans do not actuall)
exist simply qua rational being or qua being capable o f choice in any socia
49 Henry Shue, Basic Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 198o), 72.
5o Allen Buchanan, Marx andJuaice, 154.
 MARX AND HUMAN RIGHTS 77

formation. O n the contrary, however, h u m a n s d o exist simply qua source o f

p r o d u c t i v e labor u n d e r capitalism. I n d e e d , the existence o f individuals
u n d e r capitalism is their existence as abstract persons. This abstraction actu-
ally exists as part a n d parcel o f capitalism. A n d t h o u g h it includes the no-
tions o f rationality a n d capability o f choice, it is not simply the same as these
notions. T h u s , t h o u g h wc may identify the abstract individual which serves
as the basis for h u m a n rights in the earliest instances o f the e x c h a n g e rela-
tion, it is, however, only u n d e r capitalism that this abstract individual comes
to play a central role in social activity. T h u s , the f o u n d a t i o n o f h u m a n rights
and the d e v e l o p m e n t o f capitalism arc essentially intertwined.
Given the above a r g u m e n t , wc can m o r e accurately u n d e r s t a n d criticisms
o f h u m a n rights which Marx makes: e.g., the egoism o f h u m a n rights, the
class n a t u r e o f h u m a n rights, etc. M o r e generally, wc can better u n d e r s t a n d
Marx's views on the relationship between h u m a n rights and capitalism, or
bourgeois society. T h e connection, we have seen, is not simply that such
rights are valuable to m e m b e r s o f b o u r g e o i s society but that they arc an
essential expression o f the capitalist system. T h e y define the relationships
basic to capitalism. As such, they f u n c t i o n as restraints on people and the
d e m a n d s which, in capitalism, p e o p l e may m a k e o n others. Accordingly,
Marx is o p p o s e d to those who hold that h u m a n rights arc historically a n d
culturally universal.
T h e extent, however, to which Marx has c o n t r i b u t e d to the debate o v e r
h u m a n rights is u n f o r t u n a t e l y m e a g e r since hc does not trouble to explicate
in any detail the bases for his views. T h e uniqueness o f Marx's a r g u m e n t is
twofold: first, it lies in his identification o f the core o f the meaningfulness o f
h u m a n rights, n a m e l y the abstract individual which develops in m o d e r n
times u n d e r capitalism; second, it lies in Marx's views on the validity which
may be attributed to such notions. T o the e x t e n t that either one or both o f
these views is problematic, Marx's views o n h u m a n rights will themselves
n e e d f u r t h e r d e f e n s e a n d d e v e l o p m e n t . 5'

University of Tennessee
51 It should be clear from the preceding paper that it is mistaken to suggest that "it is in
[the] early manuscripts and in scattered remarks in later works we find the basis of Marx's most
radical criticisms of capitalism and its juridical concepts" (Buchanan, Marx and Justice, 58). In
fact, Marx's account in the Grundrisseand Capital is quite as extensive and important as the early
works. In short, the present paper indicates that Marx's early and later works are more tightly
linked than many still think.
I should like to thank Daniel Little, William McBride, William Shaw, as well as two anony-
mous referees of the Journal of the History of Philosophy and its editor for their comments on an
earlier version of this paper. I am also indebted to the University of Tennessee for a summer
research grant which enabled me to work on this paper.