On 21 January 1958, petitioner-appellant Lam Sok Kam, a Portuguese woman, filed with the Philippine consulate general in Hongkong

a non-immigrant
application for passport visa for the Philippines, "for the purpose of visiting a friend" and "to remain in the Philippines for a period of 30 days," according
to her application. She also therein stated that she was married to one Tan Pio, a resident of Macau.
She arrived in the Philippines on 19 April 1958 and was admitted as a temporary visitor for a limited stay up to 18 May 1958. On 7 May 1958, she
petitioned for, and was granted, an extension of her temporary stay up to 17 November 1958. On 17 October 1958, however, she married one Jose Yap
Joaquin, a Filipino citizen, in a wedding solemnized by the Justice of the Peace of Siniloan, Laguna. Four (4) days after the marriage, she applied for the
cancellation of her alien registry on the ground of having acquired Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to Joaquin. Her application was granted
in an order, dated 21 October 1958, by Associate Commissioner of Immigration Francisco de la Rosa, and she was issued an identification certificate
recognizing her as a citizen of the Philippines.
Upon further investigation, however, Immigration Commissioner Emilio L. Galang discovered that Lam Sok Kam was not a divorcee, as she had stated in
her marriage contract with Joaquin, because the document of divorce by mutual consent that she had presented was defective and irregular on its face and,
therefore, she had no right to contract another marriage. The Commissioner sought the opinion of the consul of Portugal on the force and validity of a
"Divorcio Por Muto Consentimento" and its effect upon the marriage of Lam Sok Kam to Tan Pio, and the consul replied that he considered the document
not valid for the lack of the signature of Lam Sok Kam; the document was supposedly executed in Macau on 19 July 1958, when Lam Sok Kam was
already in the Philippines. Neither had the consul issued to petitioner any certificate of legal capacity to marry, required by Article 66 of the Civil Code.
Thereupon, respondent-appellee Commissioner revoked, on 15 January 1959, the previous order of 21 October 1958 of Associate Commissioner de la
Rosa, and ordered her to leave the country within five (5) days.  In the meanwhile, two (2) daughters, Lita and Cita, had been born, on 20 January 1960 and
26 March 1961, respectively, to the petitioners-appellants
The power of the Commissioner of Immigration to determine the validity of a marriage for the purpose of deporting aliens was upheld in  Brito, et al. vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 106 Phil. 417, in the following language:
The pivotal issue is whether or not the respondent Commissioner of Immigration has the power to determine the validity of the
marriage contracted by the petitioners for the purpose of arresting and deporting Tan Soo alias So Wa. There is no question that the
power to deport is limited to aliens, that the citizenship of the respondent in deportation proceedings is determinative of the
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Immigration, and that the power to deport carries that of determining the respondent's
nationality. But if the question of nationality is dependent upon the validity of the respondent's marriage, may the Commissioner of
Immigration pass judgment thereon?
The lower court rules against appellant Commissioner of Immigration. The latter, however, drew a distinction between a voidable
marriage and one which is void ab initio. He argues that in the first case the court may be correct, but in the second, where the
marriage is void ab initio, the Commissioner of Immigration may pass upon the validity of said marriage ... no judicial decree being
necessary to establish its nullity.
It is true that in relation to the marriage of petitioners no assumption can arise or should be made from the mere discovery of a
marriage contract between Olegario Brito and Narcisa Maya executed in 1943, without proof that the first wife was still alive or that
said first marriage was otherwise subsisting in 1954. As a matter of fact, it is to be supposed that the marriage between the herein
petitioners in 1954 is valid altho this is only a prima facie  presumption which may be overcome by evidence that it was contracted
during the lifetime of Narcisa Maya and before the first marriage of Olegario Brito was annulled or dissolved. In any event, these
considerations going into the validity of the marriage of petitioners are not an obstacle to the preliminary proceedings to be
conducted in this particular case by the appellant Commissioner of Immigration pursuant to Section 37(a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act, as amended, to determine whether or not a prima facie case exists against appellee Tan Soo alias So Wa to warrant
her deportation.
Though the decision in the aforecited case was subsequently set aside, the ground therefor was on new relevant evidence (See Brito, et al. vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-16829, 30 June 1965, 14 SCRA 539) which did not reject or alter the ruling or opinion aforequoted upholding the power
of the Commissioner to determine the validity of a marriage, in the exercise of his jurisdiction to deport aliens, where such marriage is claimed as a ground
for non-alienage or citizenship.
But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the divorce from her first husband and her second marriage were both valid, petitioner Lam Sok Kam is
plainly deportable because her marriage to Joaquin did not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of the extended
period of her temporary stay, which was on 17 November 1958, because her marriage did not  ipso facto  make her a Filipino citizen (Ly Giok Ha, et al. vs.
Galang, L-10760, 17 May 1957, 101 Phil. 459; Morano vs. Vivo, 
L-22196, 30 June 1967, 20 SCRA 568; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Go Tieng, et al., L-22581, 21 May 1969, 28 SCRA 237).
Petitioners oppose consideration of the foregoing issue on the ground of its being raised for the first time on appeal. The opposition is unacceptable;
petitioners themselves raised the issue in their fourth assignment of error (Brief, 32) by citing Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law, providing that:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Besides, the circumstances shown by the record before us are convincing that the marriage was not entered into in good faith but only for the purpose of
evading Lam Sok Kam's promise to leave the country upon expiration of her temporary stay. Her case is identical to that dealt with in  De Austria vs.
Conchu, L-20716, 22 June 1965, 14 SCRA 336, wherein this Court held the temporary visitor to be deportable, notwithstanding her marriage to a natural-
born Filipino citizen some forty days before expiration of her permit to remain in the Islands. Such devious maneuvers to circumvent our immigration laws
and confront the authorities with a "fait accompli" must be firmly discouraged if the country is not to be flooded by illegal entrants, abetted by unthinking
citizens devoid of regard for the country's higher interest.
That Lam Sok Kam now has children by her second husband, and that her deportation would tear her apart from them, is not a ground that would bar
exclusion. In Vivo vs. Cloribel, L-25411, 26 October 1968, 25 SCRA 616, this Court held:
It is contended that two-year old respondent Uy Tian Siong cannot, under Article 363 of the Civil Code, be separated from his mother
_ _ _ _ _ _; and that to make said wife depart from the Philippines is destructive of family solidarity (Articles 218-221). These
arguments are beside the point. Said laws govern the relations _ _ _ _ _ between private persons, not the relations between visiting
aliens and the sovereign host-country
Facts

Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.Hethen embraced and was converted to Islam.

He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned to the Philippines. Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in

Manila as the “guests” of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability
extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,” for his “guests.” As “guests,” petitioner and her two

children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael discovered the true

relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage”, however, subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status

of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration. Banez’ eldest son,

Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the

deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent

Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. They revoked the visa previously granted to her.

Issue

Whether or not the Djumantan’s admission and change of immigration status from temporary to permanent resident legal.

Ruling

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into the country and the change of her immigration status from temporary

visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained throughmisinterpretation.Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the

immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent residency.

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the

right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country. This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into

the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay.

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in

the Philippines.The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and

exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her

failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien. It is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies

for a visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change

of status and “may be admitted” as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a

Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino

citizens.

The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.

Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13, 1979 on the basis of false and misleading statements in her application and in
the other supporting documents submitted to the immigration authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about
the manner petitioner was admitted into the country and asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the EDSA Revolution, he sent a follow-up letter
to the CID requesting action on his 1980 letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78).
Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country,
more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990.
In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred under Section 37(b) is the deportation of an alien and claimed that what they ordered was
not the deportation of petitioner but merely the revocation of Section 13(a) which refers to the visa previously granted her (Rollo, p. 102).
The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying out an order for deportation and not the arrest prior to
proceedings to determine the right of the alien to stay in the country. When public respondents revoked the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner,
they, in effect, ordered her arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien.

Consti II case digest: MO YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

NATURALIZATION / DENATURALIZATION
FACTS:
This is  a case filed to enjoin the Commissioner of Immigration from causing the arrest and deportation of the
petitioner herein - Lau Yuen Yueng.

Petitioner herein applied for  a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. She is a Chinese
residing in Kowloon, Hongking and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines and to visit her
great grand uncle for a period of one month.

When she arrived in the Philippines, Asher Y Cheng filed a bond in the amount of PHP1, 000 to undertake
among others that Lau Yuen Yueng would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of
her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, petitioner was allowed to stay until Feb. 13, 1962. But on January 25, 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino Citizen.

Because of the contemplated action of the respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest deportation,
after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction.

During the hearing, it was admitted that Lao Yuen Yueng could not write either English or Tagalog. Except a
few words she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not even name any Filipino neighbor, with
a Filipino name except one, Rosa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not marriage by Lao Yuen Yueng made her ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:
Pertinent part of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No 473, upon which petitioners rely, reads.

Any woman who is not or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalised shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Citing several cases decided by the Supreme Court, the phrase, "who might herself be lawfully naturalised,"
refer to a class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the
naturalization laws was not required.

Being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalised," what should be required is
not only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but she must also possess the qualifications
enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying
principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real
estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal  local languages, education of
children in certain schools, etc.

In Philippine jurisprudence it was held that an alien wife is required to prove only that she may herself be
lawfully naturalized, that she is not one of the disqualified persons enumerated in the Section 4 of the law, on
order to establish her citizenship status as a fact.

Section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act 473), an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native
born or naturalised, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who i subsequently
naturalised here follows the Philippines citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino
 citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

Seciton 4 reads:
1. Person opposed to organised government or affiliate with any associations or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organised governments.
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity
of propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their
ideas.
3. Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy.
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially
with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos.
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines are at war, during the period of such
war.
8. Citizens or subjects of  a foreign country other than United States, whose laws does not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

 Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of
an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be
considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
SUNTAY
On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City
Attorney of Quezon City, as follows:
On or about June 21, 1954, the accused took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's Colleges in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere
near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years.
On 15 December 1954, after an investigation, an Assistant City Attorney recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took
exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against the herein petitioner.
On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs (No. 5981 [A39184]). On 20 January 1955
the petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955 the offended girl
subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary
investigation had been conducted (crim. case No. Q-1596, Exhibit B). On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue
an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign
Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." (Exhibit C.) On 10
February 1955 the Court granted the motion (Exhibit D). On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States
instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to
answer the criminal charges against him. 
The petitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court directing the department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the"
petitioner "may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," may be carried out only "through the cancellation
of his passport," the said order is illegal because 'while a Court may review the action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in cancelling a passport and grant
relief when the Secretary's discretion is abused, the court cannot, in the first instance, take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order
a passport to be cancelled." The petitioner further contends that while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such
discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the
Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law.
HELD
The petitioner is charged with seduction. And the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order
that the accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," is not beyond or in excess of its
jurisdiction.
True, the discretion granted, to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued may not be exercised at whim. But here
the petitioner was hailed to Court to answer a criminal charge for seduction and although at first all Assistant City Attorney recommended the dismissal of
the complaint previously subscribed and sworn to by the father of the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that no final action had been taken by the City
Attorney of Quezon City as the case was still under study. And as the Solicitor General puts it, "His suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient
time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate attemption his part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if
the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice." In issuing the order in question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a
miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out.
Counsel for the petitioner insists that his client should have been granted a "quasi-judicial hearing" by the respondent Secretary before withdrawing or
cancelling the passport issued to him. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were
not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously
in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested
with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as
a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of
the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in
order to comply with the due process of clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued  ex parte would be violative of the said
clause.

MEJOFF
The Governmet's alternative contention is that defendants, by misbehavior after conviction, have forfeited their claim to bail. Grave public danger is said to
result from what they may be expected to do, in addition to what they have done since their conviction. If I assume that defendants are disposed to commit
every opportune disloyal to act helpful to Communist countries, it is still difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jailing of persons by the
courts because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. lmprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so
unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort it, even as a discretionary judicial technique to
supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which defendants stand convicted. Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the
respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or
their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport
him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for
decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the
Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.

Secretary of Justice vs. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion

Facts:

On January 13, 1977 P.D. 1069 was issued prescribing the Procedure of the Extradition of Persons who have committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country. The Decree is founded on The Doctrine of Incorporation under the Constitution Art II, Sec 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

On November 13, 1994 Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon signed in Manila the Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines
and the Government of U.S.A. It was ratified by the Senate.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of U. S. a request for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the United States who are charged in the U.S. with the violation of the following: conspiracy, attempt to evade tax, false statement or
entry, election contributions in the name of another.

Pending evaluation of the extradition documents, Mark Jimenez, through a counsel, on July 1, 1999, requested copies of the official extradition
request from the U.S. Government as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the
request after he shall received copies of the requested papers.

Mark Jimenez insisted the constitutional rights particularly the following:

1. the right to be furnished the request and supporting papers;

2. the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence is support of the
opposition;

The Depart of Justice Denied the request.

On Aug 6, 1999 Mark Jimenez filed with the R.T.C against the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI for
Mandamus (to compel them to furnish to Mark Jimenez the extradition documents.), Certiorari (to set aside the Sec. of Justice letter dated July
13, 1999), Prohibition (to restrain the Sec of Justice from considering the extradition request).

On August 10, 1999 the Judge ordered:

The Secretary of Justice et al …ordered to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of.

Thus this petition, arguing that Honorable Lantion (Presiding Judge of RTC Manila)acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or abuse discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO:

1. …by ordering the Secretary of Justice to refrain from committing the acts complained of (i.e to desist from refusing Mark Jimenez access to
the official extradition request and documents.)
 2. Secretary of Justice was unqualifiedly prevented from performing legal duties under the extradition treaty and the Philippine Extradition Law.

Issue:

Would Mark Jimenez’ entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty?

Held:

Petition Dismissed.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him
(Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to
make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict
between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with
proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional
provision.

“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal
law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal
law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over
national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international
law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate
priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land,
such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
RULING: Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights
claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted
principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
ISSUE: 
i.    Whether or NOT the evaluation procedure is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases
ii.    Whether or NOT the twin basic due process rights granted by Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court on the right to be furnished a copy of the
complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within 10 days from
receipt is dispensable
iii.    Whether or NOT the right of the people to information on matters of public concern granted under Sec. 7 of Art. III of the 1987 Constitution is
violated

HELD:  DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to
grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

i.    NO.

Extradition Request
The Extradition Request (Sec. 4. PD 1069) is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the
Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.  The Secretary of Foreign Affairs has the executive authority to conduct the evaluation
process which, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself or is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation but it is also
erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: 
1)    to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers in form and substance
2)    to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable
3)    to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-
military penal legislation.  

The process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process (NOT an exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power) (Sec. 5.
PD 1069 and Pars. 2 and 3, Art. 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) that is indispensable to prosecution.   The power of investigation consists in gathering,
organizing and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.  
In Ruperto v. Torres, the Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory
functions applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents.   If the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence
submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the
parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.  Thus, the role of the administrative body is limited to an initial finding of whether or
not the extradition petition can be filed in court.  The court has the power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected.  The evaluation
procedure (in contrast to ordinary investigations) may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee or accused (Sec. 2[c] of PD 1069) at
2 stages: 
1)    provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request
This is because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation
of the request (Par. 1, Art. 9 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) to prevent flight but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days (Par. 4 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty) or 20 days (Sec. 20[d] PD 1069) if no request is submitted.  Otherwise, he can be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently
rearrested (Par. 5, Art 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty)
2)    temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Sec. 6, PD 1069).
The peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure is that:
1)    there is yet no extradite; BUT 
2)    it results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration

The evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.   Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary
investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. 
The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the
denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.  

In this case, the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999 (the following day the Department of Justice
received the request).  Thus, the Department of Foreign Affairs failed to discharge its duty of evaluating the same and its accompanying documents.  

Extradition Petition
    After delivery of the Extradition Request by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of Justice, the latter shall designate and authorize an
attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Par. 1, Sec. 5, PD 1069).  The attorney shall file a written Extradition Petition with the proper regional trial
court, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration (Par. 2, Sec. 5, PD 1069).  The presiding judge shall issue an order
summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition.  The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest
and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice or to prevent flight  (Par. 1, Sec. 6, PD 1069).  

Extradition Hearing
    The provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply during the
Extradition Hearing (Par. 1, Sec. 9, PD 1069)  The attorney may represent the Requesting state.  (Sec. 8, PD 1069).  The Court’s decision on whether the
petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty or
whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Par. 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty) shall be final and
immediately executory (Sec. 12, PD 1069) and appealable with the Court of Appeals where the provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in
criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Sec. 13, PD 1069).

ii.    YES.  

Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the twin rights of notice and hearing from a prospective extradite.  In the absence of a law or principle
of law, we must apply the rules of fair play.  Petitioner contends that United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure
of confidential information.  Such argument, however has been overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this
stage would be obtainable during trial.   If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition
proceedings.  The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights,
although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.

However in this case, with the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies
and certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly
authenticated) it cannot to be said to be urgent.  Therefore, notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and
shelved aside.  

iii.    NO.
During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is
premature.  Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by then
shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request.  
MR
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process

Held: No. Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill

of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in
the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an

accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As held by the US Supreme Court

in United States v. Galanis:

“An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an

accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.”

As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the

due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former.

The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances “must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function

involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” The concept of due process is flexible for “not all situations calling

for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.”

In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all

throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due,

and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all due and when they are

due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be “condemned to suffer grievous loss.”

As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against

him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court

of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition process to

accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the

basis of the request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of

a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign

relations. Needless to state, this balance of interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be adjusted as the extradition process moves from the

administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors that will come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary

hold on private respondent’s privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental

fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is

assured a party.

Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan

GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.

Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of Due Process and Fundamental Fairness in
Extradition

Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty 

FACTS:

    Petition
is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion”.  The Secretary was ordered to furnish
Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable
period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.  But, on motion for reconsideration by the
Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.  On May 18, 2001, the Government of the
USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition
praying for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez.  Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an
“Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. 
After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum.  Therein seeking an
alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of
P100,000.  The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty
at P1M in cash.  After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was
granted provisional liberty.  

    Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the
order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash
which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still  no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.
    
ISSUES: 
i.    Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential
extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
ii.    Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
iii.    Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED.  Regional Trial Court of
  Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it. 

i.    YES. 

By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage.  From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court
is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.  The prima facie existence of probable
cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the
Petition itself and its supporting documents.  Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima
facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing
upon motion of Jimenez.  The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation
that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.  It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature.  Sending to persons sought
to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would
give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could
have intended.

    EvenSection 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or
a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.   To determine probable cause for the issuance of
arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of
complainants and the witnesses they may produce.

The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The Ends Of Justice” In Extradition Cases
    Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and
make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a)    they are sufficient in form and substance
b)    they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c)    the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally
examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner.  If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima
facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.  On the other hand, if
the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for
the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
scheduled summary hearings.  Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the
potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and
frustrate the proceedings.  

ii.    Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained
for violation of Philippine criminal laws.  It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition
courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.  Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows
from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt.  In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue.  The provision in the Constitution stating
that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended” finds application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.”   

    That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case.  Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the
trial for the offenses for which he is charged.  He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal
cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule

    Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.  It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the
peculiar facts of each case.  Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing
1)    that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2)    that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in
extradition cases therein

    Since
this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from
general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered
requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. 

    It
must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it
was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition.  Therefore, his
constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case.  Thus, the
court ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him
bail.    

    Givingpremium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be
tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself.  It would also encourage him to stretch out and
unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more.   Extradition proceedings should be conducted
with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while
safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions,  delays and technicalities that may
negate that purpose.
    
    That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and
still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for
Extradition.
    
iii.    NO.

    Potentialextraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness.  The doctrine
of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.   A
subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.  He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently,
when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition.  Indeed, available during the hearings on the
petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible
with the summary nature of extradition.

    It
is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country.  He already had that opportunity in the requesting
state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.  Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory
upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable
but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.
WRIGHT  
To suppress crimes, Australia and the Government of the Philippines entered into a Treaty of Extradition on
the 7th of March 1988 . The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for
broader coverage of extraditable offenses between the 2 countries and embraces crimes punishable by
imprisonment for at least 1 year. It also allows extradition for crimes committed prior to the treaty's date of
effectivity, provided that these crimes were in the statute books of the requesting State at the time of their
commission.

Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite “persons wanted for prosecution of the
imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State for an extraditable offense."  A request for
extradition requires, if the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting State of either a
warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person, or, where appropriate, a copy of the
relevant charge against the person sought to be extradited. 1 count of Obtaining Property by Deception
In accordance to Section 5 of PD No. 1069 (September 10, 1990), an extradition proceedings was initiated
on April 6, 1993 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.  The Regional Trial Court on June 14, 1993
granted the petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australian concluding that the
extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense was committed.  The extradition proceeding
resulted in an order of his deportation.  The decision was sustained and Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the Court of Appeals.  Wright filed a review on certiorari to set aside the order of deportation
contending that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an
ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.  Moreover, he argues that the
trial court's decision ordering his extradition is based on evidence that failed to show that he is wanted for
prosecution in his country.

ISSUES:

a.       Whether or NOT the Regional Trial Court committed an order in granting the extradition proceeding.

b.      Whether or NOT enforcement of Article 18 of the Treaty states a prohibition for the retroactive
application of offenses committed prior to the date of its effectivity
HELD: AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit

                    i.            NO.

Complying with Article 2, Section 2 of the Treaty, the crimes for which the Mr. Wright was charged and for
which warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were offenses in the Requesting State at the time
they were alleged to have been committed.  The trial court correctly determined the offenses under our
penal laws are Articles 315(2) and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false
testimony/perjury, respectively. 

The provisions of the Treaty was properly complied with.  The signature and official seal of the Attorney-
General of Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement of the Acts
and Omissions, including the statement itself.  The last requirement was accomplished by the certification
made by the Philippine Consular Officer in Canberra, Australia.

            The relevant provisions merely requires "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant for the
arrest of the person sought to be extradited.”  It does not limited the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to a
person charged with an information or a criminal complaint as it will render the  Treaty ineffective over
individuals who abscond for the purpose of evading arrest and prosecution.  Moreover, the “Charge and
Warrant of Arrest Sheets” shows that he is not only wanted for prosecution but has absconded to evade
arrest and criminal prosecution.  Since a charge or information under the Treaty is required only when
appropriate such as in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the Requesting
State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is not required if the offender
has already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed. 
Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept of ex post facto laws in our Constitution was limited only to
penal and criminal statutes which affects the substantial rights of the accused.  As concluded by the Court
of Appeals, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute.  "It merely
provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or
crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified."

FACTS:

Respondent Muñoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of “accepting an advantage as agent”, and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the
common law of Hongkong. The Hongkong Depoartment of Justice requested DOJ for the provisional arrest of respondent Muñoz; the DOJ forward the
request to the NBI then to RTC. On the same day, NBI agents arrested him.

Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the order of arrest.

The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by the Hongkong Department of Justice thru DOJ.

DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and sustained the validity of the arrest.

Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for extradition and arrest of respondent. Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for bail,
which was opposed by the petitioner, initially the RTC denied the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in extradition cases and that
private responded is a “flight risk”.

Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent, which was granted. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases.

HELD:
In Purganan case, the right to bail was not included in the extradition cases, since it is available only in criminal proceedings.

However the Supreme Court, recognised the following trends in International Law.
1.    The growing importance of the individual person in publican international law who, in the 20th century attained global recognition.
2.    The higher value now being given in human rights in international sphere
3.    The corresponding duty of countries to observe these human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations
4.    The of duty of this court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition on the other.

The modern trend in the public international law is the primacy placed on the sanctity of human rights.

Enshrined the Constitution “The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the proceeding before the a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release
if justified.

Examination of this Court in the doctrines provided for in the US Vs Purganan provide the following.
1.    The exercise of the State’s police power to deprive a person of his liberty is not limited to criminal proceedings.
2.    To limit the right to bail in the criminal proceeding would be to close our eyes to jurisprudential history. Philippines has not limited the exercise of the
right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been
involved in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the tendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognisance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

The extradited may be subject to detention as may be necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time in the detention should be
reasonable.

In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent, Muñoz has been detained for 2 years without being convicted in Hongkong.

The Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the individual his right to liberty and due process and should not therefor deprive the extraditee of his right
to bail PROVIDED that certain standards for the grant is satisfactorily met. In other words there should be “CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE”.

However in the case at bar, the respondent was not able to show and clear and convincing evidence that he be entitled to bail. Thus the case is remanded in
the court for the determination and otherwise, should order the cancellation of his bond and his immediate detention.