KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et. al.
, Petitioners, requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 221318       December 16, 2015
 
 
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe
TOPIC: Biometrics validation
 
FACTS:
                RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to
implement a mandatory biometrics registration
system for new voters in order to establish a
clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of
voters through the adoption
of biometric technology.
                RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered
voters whose biometrics have not been captured
shall submit themselves for validation.” “Voters
who fail to submit for validation on or before the
last day of filing of application for registration for
purposes of the May 2016 elections shall
be deactivated x  x x.”
                COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721
as amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013.
Among others, the said Resolution provides that:
“the registration records of voters
without biometrics data who failed to submit for
validation on or before the last day of filing of
applications for registration for the purpose of the
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall
be deactivated.
 
                Herein petitioners filed the instant
petition with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing
the constitutionality of the biometrics validation
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013,
all related thereto.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the statutory requirement
of biometrics validation is an unconstitutional
requirement of literacy and property.
2. Whether or not biometrics validation
passes the strict scrutiny test.
3. Whether or not Resolution No. 9863
which fixed the deadline for validation on October
31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189.
 
HELD:
 
FIRST ISSUE: No.
 
                The Court held that biometrics validation
is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the right
of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration
procedure, of which the State has the right to
reasonably regulate.
                The Court reiterated their ruling in
several cases that registration regulates the
exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a
qualification for such right. The process of
registration is a procedural limitation on the right
to vote.
                Thus, although one is deemed to be a
“qualified elector,” he must nonetheless
still comply with the registration procedure in
order to vote.
                Thus, unless it is shown that a registration
requirement rises to the level of a literacy,
property or other substantive requirement as
contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution
-that is, one which propagates a socio-economic
standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a
person’s ability to intelligently cast his vote and to
further the public good -the same cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional, as in this case.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes. during the period starting one hundred twenty
(120) days before a regular election and ninety
                In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on (90) days before a special election.
the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the                 The Court held that the 120-and 90-day
absence of less restrictive means for achieving periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive
that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State period beyond which voter registration may no
to prove the same. longer be conducted. The subject provision does
not mandate COMELEC to conduct voter
Presence of compelling state interest registration up to such time; rather, it only
provides a period which may not be reduced, but
                Respondents have shown that may be extended depending on the administrative
the biometrics validation requirement under RA necessities and other exigencies.
10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was
precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of
orderly, honest, and credibleelections by
containing -if not eliminating, the perennial
problem of having flying voters, as well as dead
and multiple registrants. The foregoing
consideration is unquestionably a compelling state
interest.

Biometrics validation is the least restrictive

means for achieving the above-said interest

                Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the

procedure for biometrics validation, whereby the
registered voter is only required to: (a) personally
appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b)
present a competent evidence of identity; and (c)
have his photo, signature, and fingerprints
recorded.

                Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No.

9721 did not mandate registered voters to submit
themselves to validation every time there is an
election. In fact, it only required the voter to
undergo the validation process one (1) time,
which shall remain effective in succeeding
elections, provided that he remains an active
voter.

                Lastly, the failure to validate did not

preclude deactivated voters from exercising their
right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify
such status, they could still apply for reactivation.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

                Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:

System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x

x No registration shall, however, be conducted
BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT v. COMELEC, GR automated election system to have the capability
No. 222731, 2016-03-08 of providing a voter-verified paper audit trail.
Facts: he current vote-counting machines should meet
the minimum system capability of generating a
Petitioners Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New VVPAT. However, the Commission on Elections'
Philippines Movement, Inc. (Bagumbayan-VNP, act of rendering inoperative this feature runs
Inc.) and Former Senator Richard J. Gordon contrary to why the law required this feature in
(Gordon) filed this Petition[2] for mandamus the first place.
before this court to compel respondent
Commission on Elections to implement the Voter . A "voter verified paper audit trail" requires the
Verified Paper Audit Trail security feature. following: (a) individual voters can verify whether
the machines have been able to count their votes;
The Commission on Elections is a government and (b) that the verification at minimum should be
entity[9] "vested by law to enforce and administer paper based.
all laws relative to the conduct of elections in the
country."... epublic Act No. 8436[11] authorized
the Commission on Elections to use an automated
election system for electoral exercises.
Republic Act No. 9369 introduced significant
changes to Republic Act No. 8436, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code, and other election-related statutes.
In 2010 and 2013, the Commission on Elections
enforced a nationwide automated election system
using the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
machines. For the 2016 National and Local
Elections, the Commission on Elections has opted
to use the Vote-Counting Machine.[16] The vote-
counting machine is a "paper-based automated
election system,"[17] which is reported to be
"seven times faster and more powerful than the
PCOS because of its updated processor."[18]
Likewise, it is reported to have more memory and
security features,[19] and is "capable of producing
the Voter Verification Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT)."[20] This VVPAT functionality is in the
form of a printed receipt and a touch screen
reflecting the votes in the vote-counting machine.[
Issues:
whether the Commission on Elections may be
compelled, through a writ of mandamus, to enable
the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail system
capability feature for the 2016 Elections.
Ruling:
Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
empowered the Commission of Elections to
"[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election." One of the
laws that the Commission on Elections must
implement is Republic Act No. 8436, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9369, which requires the
G.R. No. 207851 Case Digest
G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014
Angel Naval
vs COMELEC and Nelson Julia
Facts:
Naval had served as member of the Sanggunian,
2nd District of CamSur. On October 12, 2009, RA
9716 was approved, reapportioning the legislative
district of Province of CamSur.
Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the
old Second District to form the present Third
District. The present Second District is composed
of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor,
merged with five towns from the old First District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as
among the members of the Sanggunian, Third
District. He served until 2013.
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-
elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third
District.
Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member
candidate from the Third District in the 2013
elections. On October 29, 2012, he invoked Section
7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and
filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to
Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had
fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur
for three consecutive terms as a member of the
Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had
been elected from. The three-term limit rule’s
application is more with reference to the same
local elective post, and not necessarily in
connection with an identical territorial
jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a
Sanggunian member for the fourth time is
violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule
enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which
must be strictly construed.
COMELEC cancelled Naval's COC.
The conditions for the application of the three-
term limit rule are present in the instant case as
the records clearly establish that [Naval] is
running for the 4th time for the same government
post. To put things in a proper perspective, it is
imperative to review and discuss the salient
points in the case of Latasa v. [COMELEC]. The
case involves the question of whether or not a
municipal mayor, having been elected and had
already served for three (3) consecutive terms,
canrun as city mayor in light of the conversion of
the municipality to a city. In applying the three-
term limit rule, the Court pointed out that the
conversion of the municipality into a city did not
convert the office of the municipal mayor into a
local government post different from the office of
the city mayor. The Court took into account the
following circumstances: (1) That the territorial
jurisdiction of [the] city was the same as that of
the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the
same group of voters who elected the municipal
mayor for three (3) consecutive terms; and (3)
That the inhabitants were the same group of
voters [over] whom he held power and authority
as their chief executive for nine years.
Ruling:
Court denies the petition.
A republic is a representative government, a
government run by and for the people. It is not a
pure democracy where the people govern
themselves directly. The essence of republicanism
is representation and renovation, the selection by
the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who
derive their mandate from the people and act on
their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after
which they are replaced or retained, at the option
of their principal.
R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second
Districtis to be created, but the Third Districtis to
be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The
terms used in a legal provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers mean what they say.
The rationale behind reapportionment is the
constitutional requirement to achieve equality of
representation among the districts. It is with this
mindset that the Court should consider Naval’s
argument anent having a new set of constituents
electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.
Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation
of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine
the right to equal representation of any of the
districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him,
the renamed Third District, which he labels as a
new set of constituents, would still be
represented, albeit by another eligible person. 
Nolasco v COMELEC  the second highest number of votes cannot be
FACTS
A disqualification case was filed against
Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect Florentino
Blanco for alleged performing acts which are
grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus
Election Code – giving money to influence, induce
or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
election functions: for committing acts of
terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for
spending an amount for his campaign in excess of
what is allowed by the law.
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate
be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption
that the second placer would have received the
other votes otherwise it is a judgment substituting
the mind of a voter. It cannot be assumed that the
second placer would have won the elections
because in the situation where the disqualified
candidate is excluded, the condition would have
substantially changed.

The COMELEC First Division required both parties

to submit their position papers. The case was
decided against Blanco.

A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the

COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect
took part as intervenor, urging that should Blanco
be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be
turned over to him. The parties were allowed to
file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and
Nolasco’s motions thus this petition for certiorari. 

Issues:

1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal

protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly
elected mayor

Held: 

1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal

protection of the laws. He was given all the
opportunity to prove that the evidence on his
disqualification was not strong. Blanco’s
contention that the minimum quantum of
evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646
and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a
mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to
justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning
candidate’s proclamation.

2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of

Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle in the
case of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with