EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY.
ARROYO
ASSIGNMENT 6-II: EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE (PART 1)
DYING DECLARATIONS (RULE 130, SECTION 37)
1. PEOPLE V. LAQUINON (RR)
GR L-9181 | 11/28/1955 | REYES, J.B.L., J.
Petitioner/s: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
Respondent/s: GREGORIO LAQUINON, alias “JOLLY”, defendant-appellant
SUMMARY: Laquinon was charged with the crime of murder for killing Remonde.
On the night of the incident, the barrio captain heard gunshots coming from the
river, so he went to see what was happening. He found Remonde lying on the
sand and asked the latter his name and the name of his assailant. Laquinon was so
named. Remonde died because of the bullet wounds. Laquinon’s defense was that
it was Cabardo, CO of the KM, who shot Remonde. Trial court found him guilty. He
is now contesting the admissibility of Remonde’s ante-mortem statement. While
the SC agreed that such would not qualify as an ante-mortem declaration since it
failed to show that the accused believed himself to be “at the point of death when
every hope of recovery is extinct,” it may be admitted as part of the res gestae
since it was made immediately after the incident and the deceased had no
sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused. SC affirmed the conviction
FACTS
 Accused Gregorio Laquinon was charged with the crime of murder in the
CFI of Davao del Sur for killing Pablo Remonde and trial court sentenced
him with a fine of Php12,000 and reclusion perpetua.
 The accused-appellant argues that the lower court erred in finding him
guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the statement attributed to
the deceased Pablo Remonde which reads:
Q State your name and other personal circumstances.
A Pablo Remonde y Saballa, 24 years old, laborer and resident of Pob. this
mun.
Q Who shot you?
A Mr. Laquinon, a person who ran for councilor before the ticket of Liberal
last local election and son of Suelo Maravllias whose name I don't know.
Q Why you were shot by said persons above?
A They are suspecting me that I'm an informer of Vice Mayor Viran
regarding KM .
Q Do you think you'll die with your wound?
A I don't know sir.
Page 1 of 50
PEOPLE’S VERSION OF THE STORY
 At about 11:30pm of Nov. 13, 1972, Samama Buat, barrio caption of Clib,
Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, was at his residence when he heard gunshots
coming from the bank of a river some 300 meters to the south of his
house.
 His brother Leocario arrived and told him that a man was shouting for
help at the bank of the river.
 After instructing his brother to call the barrio councilman, Samama
proceeded to said riverbank. His brother and the barrio councilman
arrived thereafter.
 They saw a man lying face down on the sand with his hands tied on his
back. Upon Samama’s inquiries, they found out that his name is Pablo
Remonde and that it was Gregorio Laquinon who shot him. When asked
if he think he would survive, his answer was “I do not know.”
 Samama then went to the municipality to report the incident to Vice
Mayor Antonio Biran, and upon the latter’s arrival and after the latter
inquired from Remonde who shot him, Laquinon was brought to the
hospital through the Vice Mayor’s jeep. (IDK bakit tinanong muna siya
and all that jazz bago siya dinala sa ospital  )
 At Canos Hospital in Digos, Davao del Sur, Remonde was attended by Dr.
Alfonso Llanos who, after performing an operation, recovered a slug
from his body.
 He died in the hospital. According to Dr. Llanos, it was because of the
bullet wounds.
DEFENSE’S VERSION OF THE STORY
 In his defense, the accused declared that he was a KM member who was
ordered by Noli Cabardo, their CO, to fetch Remonde
 He requested one Cristino Nerosa to go with him and together they
brought Remonde to the riverbank where Cabardo and 10 companions
were waiting, but that before reaching the place, Nerosa separated and
he alone brought Remonde to Cabardo et al.
 A confrontation ensued between Cabardo and Remonde, where the
former asked the latter why he never returned after being told to buy
provisions in Matanao, to which the latter replied that the money was
spent on drinking and gambling.
 Obviously, this angered Cabardo.
 Remonde tried to escape.
 Laquinon said he heard a gunshot, presumably fired by Cabardo, who
was holding a .38 cal. revolver that night. (Laquinon admitted though
that he himself was carrying a Cal. 22paltik)
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
 Thereafter, he saw Laquinon sprawled on the ground.
 Cabardo instructed them to go the mountains, and they did.
 Two days thereafter, the PC raided their camp, Cabardo and two others
were killed, but he was able to escape.
 He stayed with his relatives who were engaged in farming in Magpet,
North Cotabato for a while, but thereafter thought of surrendering
himself to the Davao PC Barracks, thinking that as a member of the KM,
he has committed something.
ISSUE:
1. WN Remonde’s statement is admissible as an ante mortem declaration –
NO
2. WN trial court erred in convicting Laquinon - NO
HELD:
 GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER
QUALIFIED BY TREACHERY.
 Wherefore, with the modification that indemnity be paid to the heirs of
the deceased is increased to Php30,000.00, the judgment appealed from
should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED. With costs against the appellant.
RATIO
1.Remonde’s statement is inadmissible as an ante-mortem declaration
 The dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible
as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to
whether he would die or not.
 The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in
extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is
extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as
an exception to the hearsay rule."
2.Nonetheless, it may be admitted as part of the res gestae.
 It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the
statement was made immediately after the incident and the deceased
Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct the charge against the
accused.
 One of the arguments of the accused was that the deceased was an
incompetent witness.
 But the Court said that:
- The fact that the deceased had named the son of Suelo Maravillas
who turned out as Cristino Nerosa as one of those who shot him in
Page 2 of 50
his dying declaration does not make the deceased an incompetent
witness.
- Nor does it render said dying declaration incredible of belief. The
testimony of the accused that he and Nerosa separated and that he
alone brought the deceased to Noli Cabardo is not corroborated. It
may be that Nerosa was with the accused when the latter shot the
deceased, as stated in the dying declaration, but that the accused
testified that Nerosa was not with him when he brought the
deceased to Noli Cabardo in order to free Nerosa from criminal
liability.
- Nor does the testimony of Barrio Captain Samama Buat that the
place was dark and that the victim had told him that he was shot by
members of the KM make the deceased an incompetent witness.
On the contrary, it strengthens the statement of the deceased since
the accused is a member of the KM.
3. On the whole, the Court is satisfied with the finding that the accused was
responsible for the killing of Pablo Remonde.
 FIRST. When the deceased was allegedly delivered to CO Cabardo, he was
already hand-tied at his back, that the place of the shooting was "covered
by thick bushes and beside the river", and that CO Cabardo was with ten
men excluding the accused.
 Under these circumstances, it is hard to believe that the deceased,
with all those overwhelming handicap, would attempt to flee.
 SECOND. If the deceased truly tried to flee, the logical thing he would do
would be to flee away from and not towards Cabardo; in doing the
former he would turn to his right or to his left or towards his back; if he
fled to his left or right, or towards his back, he would be exposing one
side of his body, or his back, and when fired upon in that position he
would have been hit on one side of the body or at his back.
 The evidence — as testified to by Dr. Llanos — however, shows that
the deceased had onlyone wound a gunshot wound, in the abdomen; this
shows he was fired upon frontally, the bullet going through and through
the intestines and lodged, presumably in the bony portions of his back,
that is why the slug was recovered.
 WITH THESE OBSERVATIONS, it’s hard to believe the accused’s version of
the story.
- Cabardo, having gone to the other world, and can no longer speak
in his behalf, it is not unlikely that the accused conceived of this
outlandish defense by pointing to CO Cabardo, to free himself from
responsibility.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
- When the deceased gave his “dying” statement, his "dying"
statement, Cabardo was still alive; that per the accused himself, he
had no previous differences with the deceased or with the barrio
captain; under such circumstances it is hard to believe that the
deceased would name the accused with whom he had no quarrel
and Nerosa as his killers if that was really not the truth.
2. PEOPLE V. SABIO (RS)
No. L-26193 | 01/27/1981 | Melencio-Herrera, J.
Plaintiff: People
Defendant: Rodulfo SABIO, alias “PAPU”
SUMMARY
Catalino was discovered with a wound on the forehead. When the police asked
him who hacked and robbed him, he answered that Sabio was the culprit.
Patrolman Fuentes asked him questions, which, together with the answers, were
written on a page taken from a calendar hanging about in the house. It was
thumbmarked by Catalino and witnessed by Fuentes and another policeman. The
trial court found Sabio guilty of robbery with homicide. WN the antemortem
declaration was admissible – YES, but only to establish the crime of homicide, not
robbery. The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to
criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder [not robbery] as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of death. That death did not ensue till
three days after the declaration was made will not alter its probative force since
it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the
belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact,
that renders the dying declaration admissible
FACTS
 CASE: Automatic review of the death penalty imposed upon accused
Sabio by the CFI of Cebu in a criminal case for robbery with homicide.
 10/05/1965 – about 5 am, Bo. Looc, Argao, Cebu, CATALINO Espina, 80
y/o, single, owner of a small sar-sari store located in his house, was found
nd
wounded on the forehead on the 2 floor of his dwelling; he died 3 days
later from the injury.
PROSECUTION WITNESSES
 JESUSA Birondo – fish vendor; testified that at about 5 am of 10/05, as
she was preparing to go to the seashore, she heard her neighbor
Page 3 of 50
Catalino’s shout for help coming from his house, which was just across
the street from hers. She recognized it as Catalino’s
o She looked out, saw SABIO come out of the door of the store at
the victim’s house. Sabio wore a black shirt with sleeves up to
the elbow, and dark trousers.
o Knows Sabio since birth since his house is just 40 meters away
(near the shore) from her own.
o Jesusa got scared; retreated to her house and shouted for help.
Later on saw 50-100 people congregate in Catalino’s house.
o 10/06/1965 – She recounted to Police SGT. JESUS Alberca what
she heard and saw
 CAMILO Semilla – 27 y/o fisherman and grandnephew of victim; lived
with the latter since childhood; left Catalino’s house at past 4 am of
10/05/1965 to go fishing.
o At the seashore, he waited for somebody to help him drag his
boat to the sea but, instead, saw Sabio running past him about 6
meters away, towards his (Sabio’s) house.
o Sabio wore a black shirt, with sleeves reaching past his elboy
and long “maong” pants.
o Camilo demonstrated that accused had his 2 hands tucked
inside his shirt in front of the stomach while running.
o ENOK Calledo – arrived minutes later to inform Camilo that his
grand-uncle “Noy Ino” had cried for help.
o Victim could speak only when his head was raised; asked Camilo
to fetch the police.
o Camilo noticed that the merchandise were in disarray, and that
the tin can called “barro” was lying empty on the floor
(contained about P8.00 from the Sunday and Monday cash
sales; they counted it the night before)
o Police officers Paulino FUENTES and Pedro BURGOS arrived
o Fuentes asked Catalino questions, which, together with the
answers, he wrote on a page torn from a calendar hanging
somewhere in the room
o Camilo took the victim to the town dispensary where he was
treated, but the latter was transferred to Southern Islands
Hospital where he died 3 days later.
 Patrolman FUENTES – received a report at about 5:30 am on 10/05/1965
that Catalino was hacked in Bo. Looc.
o He and Burgos found the victim wounded and bleeding on the
forehead.
o He asked the victim who had hacked him. Answer: “Papu” Sabio,
son of Menes.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
 Papu demanded money from him, but was not able to
say how much.
o He had known the accused for the past 3 years
o Sensing that the wound was serious, he tore a page from a
calendar hanging about, wrote down the questions he
propounded, and answers of the victim.
 He then had it thumb marked by the victim with the
latter’s own blood as no ink was available. Present at
the time were Burgos, another police officer, and
Camilo. Fuentes himself and Burgos signed as
witnesses.
 Statement in Bisaya was reproduced in English –
condensed:
 Who slashed you and robbed you? Rodulfo
Sabio (Papu) the sone of Menez from Look
 If you will die, who is responsible for your
death? Only Papu Sabio is responsible for my
death.
 Are you going to sign this or affix your
fingerprint? Yes.
 Brownish fingerprint with “Catalino Espina”
written across it.
 Signatures of Fuentes and Burgos
o Fuentes advised Camilo to bring the victim to the hospital. He
observed that the things of Catalino and the store items like
canned sar­dines were all in disarray while the tin can (“barro”)
was already opened.
 DR. Merlita Remotigue ANO – resident physician at the Southern Islands
Hospital, Surgery Dept. – examined victim on the day of the crime; found
that the victim had suffered “compound fracture on the skull, bilateral at
the front­ parietal area” with “laceration and cerebral contusion.”
o Injuries could have been inflicted by a sharp instrument or by a
bolo, and although the laceration was not too deep as to cause
instantaneous death, the injury was fatal because it had injured
the brain.
 LETTER dated 2/17/1966 of the Cebu Provincial Warden - Other evidence
offered by the prosecution as part of the accused’s cross-examination
o Accused had been previously convicted by final judgment and
had served sentence for two previous crimes of Theft
committed in the years 1963 and 1964.
DEFENSE WITNESSES
Page 4 of 50
 SABIO – 18 y/o, fisherman – claimed that in the evening of 10/04/1965
(night before crime happened), he was at listening to the radio till past 9
pm after which he went to sleep until about 6 am of the next day, when
he was awakened by his younger brother who said that policemen were
looking for him
o Police took him to the municipal building and incarcerated him
without asking any question.
o Released the next day, but was arrested again on 11/24/1965 at
P. Del Rosario St. in Cebu City.
o Knew Camilo because they were neighbors, but denied that
Camilo had seen him running by the seashore at about 5 am of
10/05 because he was still asleep at home at that time
o Knew JESUSA, but alleged she could not have seen him coming
out of the door of the house of Catalino at about 5 am of 10/05
because he was still asleep at home at that time
 JACINTO Mendez - corroborated accused’s defense of alibi by testifying
that in the evening of 10/04/1965, he slept in the house of HERMOGENES
Sabio, father of the accused, because he and Hermogenes had planned
to go fishing the following morning.
o In the house he saw the accused and Hermogenes’ other
children.
o When he woke up at 5 am the following day, he saw that the
accused and the other children were all in the house.
o He repaired the nets after waking up, then went out to sea with
Hermogenes at about 7 am and came back at past 8 am.
 TC – accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide attended by
the aggravating circumstances of disregard of respect due to the victim,
an octogenarian, and recidivism, without any mitigating circumstance,
and sentenced him to death
o Recommended that in view of the youthful age of the accused,
the death penalty be commuted to life imprisonment.
ISSUES
1. WN TC erred in concluding that the felony of Robbery with Homicide,
instead of only Homicide, had been established by the evidence. – YES,
only homicide was committed.
2. WN TC erred in admitting Exhibit ‘A’ of the prosecution as an ante-
mortem declaration of the victim – NO [MOST IMPORTANT]
3. WN TC erred in giving credence to the testimony of JESUSA, witness for
the prosecution – NO.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
4. WN TC erred in finding that SABIO was the perpetrator of the crime –
NO, but the crime is only homicide, not robbery with homicide.
HELD
Accused is guilty only of Homicide, attended by the aggravating circumstances of
disregard of respect due the offended party on account of his age, and dwelling.
Recidivism is not to be considered because of our finding that the crime of
Robbery has not been conclusively established.
RATIO
1. ONLY THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE HAD BEEN COMMITTED.
a. Evidence indicative of robbery consisted merely of Camilo’s and
Patrolman Fuentes’ testimonies
i. Camilo testified that he saw Sabio running towards his
(Sabio’s) house, with his hands tucked inside his shirt;
that, upon arrival in Catalino’s house, he noticed that
the “barro” was empty; that the barro, which was
beside Catalino’s bed when Camilo left the house that
morning, contained P8.00 as proceeds from the cash
sales of Sunday and Monday; that he knew the amount
because they counted it the night before.
ii. Fuentes testified that the house was in disarray when
he arrived in Catalino’s house to investigate; that when
victim was asked why Papu hacked him, the former
answered that the latter demanded money from him;
that, in his opinion, Catalino’s answers were
st nd
immediate/outright after the 1 and 2 questions; that
rd
the 3 question pertained to the amount of money he
(victim) lost, but that the latter was not able to answer
because he thought “he did not answer that because
when he was hacked he had not yet given money to
Papu;” and that the “canned sardiness were disarrayed,
others had dropped to the ground; the ‘barro’ was
already opened, and other things in the store were in
topsy­turvy state.”
b. Evidence supportive of the charge of robbery is at best
circumstantial and does not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused had carried away personalty belonging to the
offended party.
i. There was no eyewitness to the alleged robbery, nor
was any part of the alleged missing object recovered.
Page 5 of 50
ii. The consummation of the robbery cannot be inferred
nor presumed from the circumstance that the accused
was seen running “with his hands inside his shirt”, or
that the “barro”, alleged to have contained cash
amounting to P8.00, was seen on the floor, open and
empty, or that the things and merchandise inside the
house were in disarray
c. A conviction for Robbery with Homicide requires that the
robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other essential
element of a crime, it not being enough to infer said robbery
from mere suspicion and presumption
d. Also, the dying declaration was inadmissible to establish the
fact of robbery
i. The admission of dying declarations has always been
strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide
or murder [not robbery] as evidence of the cause and
surrounding circumstances of death.
2. [EVIDENCE] ANTEMORTEM STATEMENT ADMISSIBLE
a. Defense says that there was no evidence that victim was under
consciousness of an impending death when the declaration was
uttered; that there were doubts as to when Exhibit A was thumb
marked because accused was never confronted with the
document when the was taken into custody by the police,
implying that the document did not yet exist at that time. – SC:
UNAVAILING.
b. The seriousness of the injury on the victim’s forehead which had
affected the brain and was profusely bleeding; the victim’s
inability to speak until his head was raised; the spontaneous
answer of the victim that “only Papu Sabio is responsible for my
death”; and his subsequent demise from the direct effects of
the wound on his forehead, strengthen the conclusion that the
victim must have known that his end was inevitable.
c. That death did not ensue till three days after the declaration
was made will not alter its probative force since it is not
indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter.
d. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession
of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration
admissible.
e. Further, the fact that the victim told his grandnephew Camilo
to fetch the police does not negative the victim’s feeling of
hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the realization
EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
that he had so little time to disclose his assailant to the
authorities.
f. The mere failure of the police to confront the accused with the
ante-mortem declaration the first time the latter was arrested
and incarcerated from October 5 to October 6, 1965, neither
militates against the fact of its execution considering that it
was evidence that the police was under no compulsion to
disclose.
3. TC WAS CORRECT TO GIVE CREDENCE TO JESUSA’S TESTIMONY.
a. Defense says it was impossible for Jesusa to identify the accused
considering that the distance from her window to that house
was 17 meters, and at 5 am it was still dark and raining;
secondly, there is a glaring divergence between her testimony at
the trial and her statement at the preliminary investigation,
which statement was suppressed and not made known to the
trial Court; thirdly, she was uncertain as to when she actually
brought to the attention of the authorities the matter of her
having seen the accused; and finally, if it were true that the
accused had been identified by her to the Chief of Police even
before the accused was taken into custody, why was not the
accused confronted with such fact? – SC: UNAVAILING
b. For one who has known the accused since the latter’s infancy
and who is very familiar with the accused’s appearance because
she sees him almost everyday passing by her house or at the
seashore where the accused has his house, it is not incredible
that Jesusa recognized the accused, at side view, even at a
distance of 17 meters (which was the trial Court’s estimate of
the distance between Catalino Espina’s house and that of Jesusa
Birondo as described by the accused) at 5 am, and even if it
were raining.
c. Jesusa’s description of the clothes that the accused was
wearing was corroborated by Camilo who also saw the accused
that same morning.
d. The alleged divergence between Jesusa’s statement at the
preliminary investigation and her testimony at the trial neither
merits serious consideration since an affidavit, “being taken is
almost always incomplete and often inaccurate.”
i. Besides, the discrepancies pointed out by the defense,
to wit: whether or not Jesusa saw what the accused did
after leaving the house of the victim and whether or
not she went down from her house after the incident,
Page 6 of 50
refer to minor details or collateral matters which do
not destroy the effectiveness of her testimony.
ii. Further, the discrepancy as to the exact date when the
witness actually disclosed to the authorities her having
seen the accused on the morning of the incident, is also
a minor detail, which does not detract from the
reliability of her identification of the accused.
iii. Moreover, the defense has not shown any ulterior
motive on the part of witness Jesusa that would make
her implicate and testify falsely against the accused,
who was a neighbor and an acquaintance.
4. TC WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING SABIO AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE
CRIME.
a. Defense decries the speed with which the TC decided the case,
alleging that the Decision was prepared and signed on April 29,
1966, or one day after the close of trial on April 28, 1966, and
was read to the accused on April 30, 1966, without benefit of a
transcript of stenographic notes nor memoranda of the parties,
so that the TC could not have seriously considered the merits of
the case or must have prejudged it even before the trial ended.
i. SC: This contention is belied, however, by the detailed
findings of facts in the Decision of the trial Court duly
supported by the transcript of stenographic notes now
on record.
b. Defense says that the guilt of the accused has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
i. SC: Alibi put up by the accused, however, crumbles
under the positive identification by witnesses Jesusa
and Camilo and the dying declaration of the victim,
aside from the fact that because of the proximity of the
house of the accused to that of the victim, it was not
impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of
the crime.
3. PEOPLE V. SALISON (DU)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
*
REY SALISON, JR., TIRSO ANDIENTE, RUFINO DIGNARAN and LEONILO
FEDILES, accused. REY SALISON, JR., accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 115690 February 20, 1996; SECOND DIVISION - Regalado J.
Summary:
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
Salison approached Valmoria at a store and brought him behind a
neighbor’s house. Former boxed the latter, other accused joined in the fight. They
later picked up pieces of woods and started hitting Valmoria. Valmoria ran to his
house. Later, after feeling dizziness and pain, Valmoria and his parents went
Alcoseba’s (Purok leader) house so that Valmoria may execute a signed
declaration of what had happened. Valmoria’s purpose was to use this declaration
as evidence in case he dies. He conferred to Alcoseba that he believed that he was
dying because he felt terrible pain on his head. He died 3 days later. Trial went
ahead only for Salison as other accused remained at large.
As to credibility, SC affirmed Lower Court’s finding that the 3 prosecution
witnesses were credible and had more weight compared to defense’s sole witness
Salison who merely denied the charges without presenting other witnesses to
back them up. As to conspiracy, SC prosecution witness adequately testified that
there was conspiracy. Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy, it may be
inferred from the acts of the accused.
As to the Declaration, though it was in Cebuano, it is still admissible since
defense did not object. The court would just order its translation. Further,
Alcoseba was presented to confirm its contents and she was duly crossed-
examined. The declaration was also made when Valmoria was “under the
consciousness of an impending death” as he felt pain in his head, therefore it is a
valid Dying Declaration.
Facts: (if Italicized, they are not important)
 around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of November 30, 1990, witness Maria
Magdalena Ayola saw appellant Salison approach the victim, Rolando
Valmoria
o Valmoria was then watching television in a store at Cory Village,
Agdao, Davao City
 Salison placed his arm around Valmoria's shoulder and brought him
behind a neighbor's house where there was a mango tree. There,
appellant Salison boxed Valmoria in the abdomen.
o During the fistfight between Salison and Valmoria, the three
other accused Andiente, Dignaran and Fediles suddenly
appeared and joined the fight and simultaneously attacked
Valmoria.
o It was then when witness Emilia Fernandez approached them
that the three co-accused disappeared, leaving Salison and
Valmoria behind
o Fernandez was able to separate Salison from Valmoria.
However, the three co-accused returned and started to maul
Valmoria again, with Salison rejoining the three in assaulting the
victim.
Page 7 of 50
 When Valmoria fought back, accused Salison, Fediles and Andiente
picked up pieces of wood and started to hit Valmoria at the back on his
nape, and on the rear part of his head, Valmoria fell to the ground and,
upon finding a chance to do so, he stood up and ran towards his house
which was a few meters away.
 All of the accused shouted for Valmoria to come out but the latter
refused, causing his four assailants to hit the walls and windows of the
Valmoria residence.
o During this time, the victim remained seated inside the house.
Shortly thereafter, Valmoria started to complain of dizziness
and pain in his head which was bleeding at that time.
 at the request of Valmoria, his parents accompanied him to the house of
witness Patricia Alcoseba, the purok leader.
o The victim asked Alcoseba to write down his declaration
regarding the incident explaining that if he should die and no
witness would testify, his written declaration could be utilized as
evidence.
 After Alcoseba’s house, the Valmorias went to the hospital, nagpa-x-ray
and was treated for his injury. Victim Valmoria was allowed to go home
but Convulsed at 4am, was rushed back to the hospital and died 3 days
later.
 The information against appellant and the co-accused Tirso Andiente,
alias "Sano"; Rufino Dignaran, alias "Jongjong"; and Leonilo Fediles, alias
"Ondoy," was filed as Criminal Case No. 21805-91 in the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Branch 16 (see full text for information)
 Upon arraignment, appellant Rey Salison, Jr., assisted by counsel de
officio, entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial then proceeded only against
him, because his three other co-accused were and, still are, at large.
TRIAL
 At the trial of the case, Witness Alcoseba (Purok Leader) presented the
written and signed declaration of Valmoria and she affirmed what was
written in the declaration. (See Full Text for the Transcript)
o Basically, Alcoseba just described that she saw the victim
arriving to her house. Vialmoria (?) requested her to write his
dying declaration etc.
o She testified that upon arrival at her house, Rolando Valmoria
[sat] on the chair and he was so weak[,] his neck and head
slumped on the chair and the Valmorias requested me that he
has something to say and requested it to be written and he
stuttered in talking. (so Valmoria narrated to Alcoseba what
happened)
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
o She further said that “I observed that he was so weak and he
was in pain and I believed at that time he was dying.” He even
told her that "I believe that I will die". [b]ecause he said that
he felt a terrible pain on his head.
o As to the reason why he requested the favour, she said that
“[Valmoria] told me that if anybody will testify regarding my
death this declaration of mine could be utilized as evidence.”
o She was then shown a document, which she confirmed to be the
written declaration and she further confirmed that the signature
above the printed name “Rolando Valmoria” was indeed the
signature of the deceased Valmoria.
o She gave the written declaration to the mother of the Valmoria
after the Valmoria died.
o She further testified that Valmoria told her who were the
assailants and wrote it in the declaration. The assailants were...
“Rufino Dignaran, Jr. alias Jongjong and the second is Loloy
Salison and the third one is name(d) Tirso and the fourth, I
cannot remember the name of the fourth person who hit the
victim . . . yes, now I remember, it's Leonilo Fideles.”
 prosecution likewise presented Dr. Edmundo Visitacion, Jr. who had
conducted the necropsy
o Dr. Edmundo Visitacion explained that the head injury sustained
by the victim caused by a blunt external trauma probably made
by a solid object and this trauma caused the subdular
hemorrhage
 On December 12, 1990, the parents of the victim and those of the
accused Salison and Dignaran entered into a written agreement for the
refund of hospital expenses of Valmoria. However, no reinbursement was
actually made.
o Note: the decision did not discuss further anything about this
agreement in the ratio part.
DEFENSE
 the lone defense witness was appellant Salison himself
o he merely denied having killed the victim
 Basically he said that he visited her girlfriend when he heard Valmoria
and other accused were fighting. He was trying to stop the fight when
the witness saw him and when CAFGU arrested them.
o he testified that on that day, together with his friends Andiente,
Dignaran, Fideles and a certain Andy, he was visiting his
girlfriend, a certain Neneng Edpalina
Page 8 of 50
o when he heard Valmoria and Andiente shouting at each other.
He tried to pacify the two but the victim told him not to interfere
because he had nothing to do with them
o Then he saw Valmoria, Andiente, Dignaran, Fideles and a certain
Andy engaged in a fistfight. He was trying to stop the group
from fighting when witness Fernandez came and told him not to
interfere.
o He then left and while he was on his way home, he heard
somebody shout "agay," so he went back and saw Andiente
holding a piece of wood while Valmoria was running towards his
house. He had just grabbed the piece of wood from Andiente
when two CAFGU's arrived and arrested him, Andiente, Dignaran
and Fideles.
o All of them were subsequently released after the investigation.
On November 26, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision with the following
decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rey Salison guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, with no modifying circumstance present, the Court
has no other alternative but to impose the proper penalty of "reclusion
perpetua", the same being the medium period within the range of the
penalty imposable and to pay the cost(s); to indemnify the offended party
(in) the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P7,270.70
as actual damages.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred (1) in finding that there was proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused conspired with his co-accused in killing the
victim, (2) in not holding that accused is only responsible for the injuries that he
actually inflicted on the victim, and (3) in admitting in evidence the alleged
"dying declaration" of the victim, as well as the "agreement" between the
parents of the accused and the victim.
Ratio
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS (NOT RELEVANT)
We agree with the findings of the trial court giving full faith and credit to the
witnesses for the People
 lower court held
o The testimony of the prosecution's witnesses were clear, strong
and convincing to deserve full faith and credence. As against the
pure denial of the accused of his direct participation as a
conspirator, the positive, clear and straightforward declaration
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
of the prosecution's witnesses, must prevail. No motive or
reason has been shown, why they would falsely impute to the
accused the commission of such a grave crime. The accused Rey
Salison has no quarrel or bickering with the prosecution's
witnesses. In fact, two of the prosecution's witnesses are friends
of the mother of Rey Salison. These prosecution's witnesses
declared that they saw (that) the accused Rey Salison together
with the other accused participated in boxing and mauling
Rolando Valmoria with pieces of wood.
 The uncorroborated testimony of appellant can not prevail over the
positive declaration of the prosecution's witnesses. In fact, there were
three eyewitnesses, with no ill motives whatsoever, who testified against
appellant and confirmed Salison's direct participation in the commission
of the crime.
 The defense did not present any evidence to support the denials of
appellant.
o The putative girlfriend of Salison not presented to confirm that
the latter saw the former that day thereby prove that he did not
participate in the fight
o His testimony pinpointing Andiente as the killer was only a
convenient way to avoid liability since Andiente remained at
large and could not refute Salison's testimony
o denial is a self-serving negative evidence that can not be given
greater weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who
testified on affirmative matters
CONSPIRACY (NOT RELEVANT)
 the manner by which the killing was executed clearly indicated a
confederacy of purpose and concerted action on the part of the accused.
 The testimony of prosecution witness Magdalena Ayola, who saw the
incident (together with other neighbours), clearly showed conspiracy.
(see full text for transcript)
o She testified that “[w]hen Salison brought Valmoria under the
mango tree, they were only 2 but later, alias Sano, Fideles and
alias Ondoy and alias Jong-jong boxed Valmoria.” The three
appeared from the bushes
o Valmoria fought back and there was exchange of fist(icuffs) and
Loloy Salison, alias Ondoy and alias Sano picked up some
wooden pieces of wood (sic)
o These 4 persons struck Rolando Valmoria many times, latter was
hit at his back and at the back of his head
 these simultaneous attacks on the victim proved the common intent of
the accused to inflict fatal blows upon the victim
Page 9 of 50
 Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy. A conspiracy may be
inferred without need of showing that the parties actually came together
and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common
20
design. For collective responsibility among the accused to be
established, it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression all of them
acted in concert each doing his part to fulfill their common purpose to kill
the victim.
 doctrine is well settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime, Very seldom would
such prior agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things,
criminal undertakings are only rarely documented by agreements in
writing.
 where a conspiracy has been established, evidence as to who among the
accused rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and the character of their
participation, because the act of one is the act of all
THE WRITTEN DYING DECLARATION
 Appellant says the declaration is inadmissible because it was in Cebuano
and was not accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino
o that Section 33, Rule 132 of the revised Rules of Court now
prohibits the admission of such document in an unofficial
language
 SC via SOLGEN: the defense waived whatever infirmity the document had
at the time of its submission as evidence when it did not offer any
objection to the declaration’s admission.
 Also, while such statement was given, as in the nature of things they are
generally in oral form, they are not thereby rendered inadmissible as
they may even be communicated by means of signs. If the declarations
have thereafter been reduced to writing and signed by the declarant, the
writing is generally held to be the best evidence, and it must be
produced.
 More than once, this Court has taken into consideration documents
written in a Philippine dialect, unaccompanied by the required
translation but which had been admitted in evidence without objection
by the accused
o In those instances, the Court merely ordered official translations
to be made
 SC also believes that in the interest of justice, [prohibition by Sec 33 Rule
132] should not be taken literally here, especially since no objection
thereto was interposed by appellant, aside from the fact that appellant,
the concerned parties and the judicial authorities or personnel
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
concerned appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano in
which the document was written.
o therefore, no prejudice caused to appellant and no reversible
error was committed by that lapse of the trial court
 Also, the written declaration was duly presented during the trial and the
person who reduced the victim's declaration into writing was thoroughly
questioned by the court and the prosecutor, and cross-examined by the
defense counsel. The witness was able to explain and discuss what was
written in the declaration and how she came to prepare the same.
 Appellant's argument regarding the inadmissibility of the declaration on
a mere technicality would mean the loss of a vital piece of evidence that
could yield the true facts and give retributive justice in the murder of
Valmoria.
NOT A DYING DECLARATION? (RELEVANT)
 Appellant likewise argues that the declaration made by the victim before
the purok leader cannot be considered as a dying declaration because it
was not made by the deceased "under the consciousness of an impending
death."
 As earlier narrated, at the time the deceased made the declaration he
was in great pain. He expressed a belief on his imminent death and the
hope that his declaration could be used as evidence regarding the
circumstances thereof.
o A person would not say so if he believes he would recover and
be able to testify against his assailants.
 At all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying
declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was
made shortly after the startling incident and, under the circumstances,
the victim had no opportunity to contrive.
COURT’S RULING
We are in conformity with the verdict of the lower court finding appellant guilty of
murder since the killing was qualified by the circumstance of the accused having
taken advantage of their superior strength. The victim was unarmed and
defenseless at the time when all of the accused mercilessly bludgeoned his back
and head with big pieces of wood. The number of assailants and the nature of the
weapons used against the hapless victim show a notorious inequality of force
between the latter and the aggressors, assuring a superiority of strength
advantageous to Salison and his co-accused in the commission of the crime. The
accused purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked.
Page 10 of 50
Since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was present in the case at bar,
the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the same being
the medium period in the range of the imposable penalty.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant Rey Salison, Jr.
4. PEOPLE V. ADOR (HV)
GR 140538-39 | 06/14/2004 | PUNO, J.
Petitioner/s: People of the the Philippines Appellee
Respondent/s: GODOFREDO B. ADOR and DIOSDADO B. ADOR III, appellants
SUMMARY
On March 10, 1997 a shooting incident happended in Pacol, Naga City. The Adors
were charged of murder aggravated by evident premeditation, nighttime,
treachery and aid of armed men in shooting Abe Cuya. The Adors and Cuyas have
a long standing grudge. The prosecution presented 16 witnesses against the
Diosdado Sr., Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan all
surnamed Adors. The said Adors are all positive before a paraffin test conducted
the following morning. The trial court acquitted all others except Godofredo and
Diosdado III. On appeal to the Supreme Court, all must have been acquitted. The
dying declaration of Abe saying that “Tinambangan nila ako” is not definite as to
whom Abe is referring to. See ratio.
FACTS
 In two (2) separate informations, Diosdado Sr., Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III,
Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan, all surnamed Ador, were charged with
the murder of Absalon “Abe” S. Cuya III and Rodolfo “Ompong” S.
Chavez.
 That on or about March 10, 1997, in the City of Naga, Philippines, the
Adors, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with treachery and the aid of armed men, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot ABSALON
“ABE” CUYA III (RODOLFO “OMPO” CHAVEZ y SAN ANDRES for Crim.
Case No. 97-6816) with firearms, inflicting upon him multiple and mortal
gunshot wounds which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs. With the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
and nighttime.
 However, only four (4) of the six (6) Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr.,
Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan, were taken into custody as of .
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
(HOWEVER THE OTHER TWO LATTER SURRENDERED). The two (2),
Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III, remained at large. Trial thus proceeded
only against Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan who all pleaded
not guilty. Diosdado Sr. is the father of Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III and
Godofredo, while Rosalino is the father of Allan. Diosdado Sr. and
Rosalino are brothers.
 Prosecution presented 16 witnesses.
 From the evidence of the prosecution, it appears that on March 10, 1997,
at around seven-thirty in the evening, while Mercy Beriña, Larry Cado
and some eleven (11) others were leisurely walking along Kilometer 11 on
their way to Zone 1, Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, to attend a wedding
anniversary, they heard several gunshots. Shortly after, they met a
certain Pablito Umali who told them that “Ompong” Chavez had been
shot. They ran to Chavez straight off and saw him already lying on the
ground, about 1½ meters away from a lighted electric post, holding on to
his intestines which were starting to come out. Beriña shook Chavez and
asked him what had happened. Chavez replied “tinambangan kami na
Ador” and requested that he be brought to the hospital as he was
dying. About eight (8) meters from where Chavez was, in a dark spot, lay
“Abe” Cuya, dead.
 SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa, together with PO2 Alexander Diaz, immediately
proceeded to the crime scene to conduct an investigation. SPO3 Eduardo
Bathan and SPO1 Wilfredo Fernandez, among others, were already there.
SPO1 Barbosa collected some pieces of evidence, took some pictures and
made some sketches. SPO1 Fernandez on the other hand interviewed
one Cresenciana Mendoza in her house which was nearby, and when he
heard people shout that Chavez was still alive, he brought Chavez to the
hospital but the latter expired on the way.
 The following morning, March 11, 1997, Barangay Captain Perez
accompanied the Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr., Diosdado III, Godofredo,
Rosalino, Allan and Reynaldo, to SPO1 Barbosa at the PNP Central
Police Headquarters. The Adors were informed of their constitutional
rights to remain silent and to choose their own counsel. They were then
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the Provincial Headquarters and
subjected to paraffin tests.
PARAFFIN TEST RESULTS
 (1) Diosdado A. Ador – both hands, positive;
 (2) Diosdado B. Ador III – right hand, positive; left hand, negative;
 (3) Godofredo B. Ador – right hand, positive; left hand, negative;
 (4) Rosalino A. Ador – both hands, positive;
 (5) Reynaldo T. Ador – both hands, negative;
Page 11 of 50
 (6) Allan T. Ador – both hands, positive.
LONG-STANDING GRUDGE:
 Adors had a long-standing grudge against the Cuyas. Diosdado Jr. had
earlier accused his other son Liberato of frustrated homicide for
allegedly stabbing him (Diosdado Jr.). (DATI NAGKAKASUHAN LANG SILA
PERO NGAYON NAGKAPATAYAN NA)
 SPO1 Barbosa sought the help of then Barangay Captain Josue Perez to
accompany him to the residence of the Adors. They arrived at the Adors
at around ten o’clock that evening and spoke with their patriarch,
Diosdado Ador Sr. SPO1 Barbosa looked for the other male members of
the Ador family but was told by Diosdado Sr. that they were already
asleep. Diosdado Sr. nevertheless promised to present them the
following day.
 Efren Chavez, brother of deceased Chavez, likewise spoke of the
animosity between the Chavez and the Ador families. He produced a
certification from the PNP Naga City Police Station that on February 17,
1997, a blotter was entered in the Daily Record of Events showing that
deceased Chavez reported a certain Ricardo Ador who while under the
influence of liquor caused him physical injury. The witness likewise
presented an official receipt showing that the family spent P3,500.00
for the funeral of the deceased Chavez. After presenting Chavez, the
prosecution rested its case.
RETRIEVAL OF THE PALTIK:
 On the way to the crime laboratory, Godofredo told his police escort
that he had been entrusted with a handgun which he kept in his
residence.The information was relayed to Major Ernesto Idian, then
Deputy Chief of Police of Naga City, who ordered PO3 Augusto I.
Nepomuceno to accompany him in recovering the gun because
Godofredo said that he would turn in the gun only to PO3 Nepomuceno.
Thus, Major Idian, PO3 Nepomuceno and some others accompanied
Godofredo to the latter’s residence.
 Upon reaching the Ador residence, Godofredo, together with PO3
Nepomuceno, went to their backyard, retrieved the gun from under a
fallen coconut trunk and turned it in to the latter. Godofredo allegedly
told the police that he fired the said gun outside their house on the
night of March 10 after he heard several gunshots. PO3 Nepomuceno
identified the gun as a caliber .38 “paltik” handgun which had no serial
number. PO3 Nepomuceno then turned over the handgun to Major Idian
who likewise identified it as a .38 caliber revolver. Major Idian returned
the handgun to PO3 Nepomuceno for ballistic and paraffin examination.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
Thereafter, PO3 Nepomuceno placed his initials on the gun and put it in
his private locker while preparing the documents for the examinations
and the possible filing of a case for Illegal Possession of Firearm.
 Also, on the same day, March 11, 1997, Dr. Joel S. Jurado, Medico-Legal
Officer of Naga City, conducted an autopsy on the bodies of Chavez and
Cuya. Based on the autopsy reports, Dr. Jurado testified that Cuya
sustained five (5) gunshot wounds and died from “cardio-pulmonary
arrest, massive intra-thoracic, intra-abdominal, intra-cranial hemorrhage
secondary to multiple gunshot wounds penetrating the heart, brain,
lungs and digestive tract.
 Police Inspector Reynaldo Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification
Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Ola, Legaspi City, testified
that based on the ballistic examination he conducted on the bullets
submitted to his office, the .38 caliber slug recovered from Cuya’s head
matched the three (3) .38 caliber test bullets which were test-fired from
the suspected firearm surrendered by Godofredo. He however averred
that the .38 caliber bullets were actually fired from a .357 Smith and
Wesson Magnum homemade revolver without serial number, and not
from a .38 caliber revolver.
 Absalon Cuya Sr., father of deceased Cuya III, said that the killing of his
son was driven by the long-standing feud between the Adors and his
family. He said that Diosdado Jr. had earlier accused his other son
Liberato of frustrated homicide for allegedly stabbing him (Diosdado
Jr.)
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE GRANTED TO 4 ADORS and were thus ACQUITTED:
 On April 7, 1998, the four (4) accused filed a demurrer to evidence “for
utter lack of evidence.”[28] On May 13, 1998, the trial court dismissed
the cases against Diosdado Sr., Rosalino and Allan but denied the
demurrer to evidence against Godofredo –
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the demurrer to evidence to be justified for the
accused Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and Rosalino Ador, hence, the same is
hereby granted insofar as these accused are concerned. Said accused therefore,
namely: Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and Rosalino Ador are ACQUITTED in
Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816. The bailbonds posted for their provisional
liberty are hereby cancelled. Trial of the case insofar as Godofredo B. Ador is
concerned shall proceed.
SURRENDER OF DIOSDADO III AND ARREST OF DIOSDAOR JR:
 Meanwhile, Diosdado Jr. was arrested on October 9, 1998, at Barangay
Doña, Orani, Bataan, and committed to the Naga City Jail on November
17, 1998, while Diosdado III surrendered to the court and was committed
Page 12 of 50
to the same city jail on November 22, 1998. On November 23, 1998,
both Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III were arraigned and entered a plea of
not guilty. Hence, trial against them commenced and proceeded jointly
with the case of the remaining accused, Godofredo.
CONTENTION OF THE PROSECUTION:
 The prosecution presented Pablo Calsis as a witness against Diosdado Jr.
and Diosdado III. Calsis testified that on March 10, 1997, at around
7:30 in the evening, he dropped by the house of Cresenciana Mendoza
whom he fondly called Lola Kising at Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City,
before going home from work. After asking permission from her to go
home and while about to urinate outside her house, he heard several
gunshots. He ducked by a sineguelas tree at a nearby flower
plantation. As he was about to stand up, he saw Disodado Jr.,
Diosdado III, Godofredo and another unidentified man run away.
Godofredo was carrying a short firearm while Diosdado Jr. had a long
firearm
 Calsis saw Chavez and Cuya lying on the road. Chavez was about five (5)
meters away from where he stood while Cuya was ten (10) meters away.
The place was illuminated by a bright light from an electric post. There
were no other people around. Calsis ran away for fear that he might be
identified by the assailants. He heard Chavez mumbling but shirked
nevertheless.
 Calsis only narrated 1 year 9 months after the accident. Fear struck him.
Immense fear prevented him from attending to Chavez, even while he
heard him murmuring, and from informing the families of the victims of
the incident that very same night. He was about to tell the Chavez family
the following morning but was counseled by his Lola Bading, the sister of
his Lola Kising, against getting involved in the case. Calsis and his family
left their residence in Pacol one (1) month after the incident because he
was afraid the assailants might have identified him. Even Lola Kising left
her residence two (2) months after the incident.[39] It was only after he
learned from Absalon Cuya Sr. that the trial court dismissed the cases for
lack of evidence insofar as some of the original accused were concerned
that he took pity on the respective families of the victims who have failed
to get justice for the death of their loved ones.
DEFENSES MAINTAINED BY THE ASSAILANTS (Godofredo)
 Godofredo denied any participation in the killings of Cuya and Chavez.
He said that on March 10, 1997, at around seven o’clock in the evening,
he heard several gunshots while he was having dinner with his wife and
four (4) children in their house in Pacol, Naga City. Since his wife advised
EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
him not to go out anymore, he slept after dinner. The following day,
while he was gathering pili nuts, his long-time friend Dominador
Bautista arrived and asked him to go down from the tree. Bautista
wanted to borrow money and on his way to see him, found a gun by the
footpath. Bautista gave the gun to him. It was his first time to hold a
gun. He tried it out and fired three (3) times. After firing the gun, he
removed the empty shells from its chambers and threw them away. He
then wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it under a coconut trunk.
Bautista left when he told him that he had no money. He then continued
to gather pili nuts until Major Idian and three (3) other policemen came.
 Bautista corroborated Godofredo’s story. He testified that he found the
gun which Godofredo yielded to PO3 Nepomuceno.
 In defense, Diosdado Jr. testified that on March 10, 1997, he was in
Marikina City working as a warehouseman and timekeeper of the
Consuelo Builders Corporation. He was there the whole time from
February 15, 1997, until March 24, 1997. Pablo Aspe, a co-worker of
Diosdado Jr., corroborated the latter’s testimony. He said that on
February 15, 1997, he and Diosdado Jr. left Pacol, Naga City, together to
work in Consuelo Construction in Marikina City. They were with each
other in Marikina City the whole time from February 15, 1997, until he
(Aspe) went home to Naga City on March 22, 1997. While in Marikina
City, they resided and slept together in their barracks at the construction
site.
 Diosdado III also took the witness stand. On March 10, 1997, at around
seven o’clock in the evening, he was at their house at Zone 1, Pacol, Naga
City, watching television with his parents and cousins Reynaldo and Allan
when they heard gunshots. They ignored the gunshots, continued
watching television and slept at eight o’clock. The following day, at
around six o’clock in the morning, while he was fetching water, four (4)
policemen arrived at their house and talked to his father. Thereafter, his
father called him, his brother Godofredo, uncle Rosalino and cousins Allan
and Reynaldo. The policemen then requested all of them to go to the PNP
Central Police Headquarters for investigation regarding the killings of
Chavez and Cuya. Upon reaching the police headquarters, they were
interviewed by the media and afterwards brought to the provincial
headquarters where they were subjected to paraffin tests. They were
then brought back to the Central Police Headquarters and later allowed
to go back home to Pacol.
 Barangay Captain Josue Perez and an uncle of Diosdado Jr. and
Disodado III testified that he was the barangay captain of Pacol from
1982 until May, 1997. In 1996, Cresenciana Mendoza left their barangay
permanently to live with her children in Manila because she was sickly
Page 13 of 50
and alone in her house. He said that Mendoza never came back. He
does not know any Pablo Calsis and the latter could not have talked to
Mendoza on March 10, 1997, because at that time, Mendoza was not
there and her house was already abandoned.
 Similarly, Jaime Bobiles (witness for Adors) confirmed the testimony
that Diosdado III worked as a fisherman in Tabaco and stayed in his
residence from May 1, 1998, until November 1998 when Diosdado III
received a letter from his father and had to go home.
 Lower court  Diosdado III and Godofredo GUILTY of murder. Diosdado
Jr., ACQUITTED for failure to prove beyond reasonable the crime
charged.
 Appeal before the Supreme Court
ISSUE
 WN the trial court gravely erred in convicting them of murder based on
circumstantial evidence. – YES (YOU MAY SKIP THIS PART)
 WN there was an admissible dying declaration of the victim Abe – NO SEE
RATIO
HELD:
 Meritorious.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Br. 25, in
Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816 dated August 2, 1999, finding accused-
appellants Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of murder and imposing on them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Godofredo B.
Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and their
IMMEDIATE RELEASE is hereby ORDERED unless they are being held for some
other legal cause.
RATIO
 The convicted Diosdado III and Godofredo aver on appeal that The
testimony of prosecution witness Pablo Calsis that he saw them running
away from the scene of the crime was concocted. The handgun turned
in by Godofredo was not the same gun presented by the prosecution
during the trial. The unusual discovery of a slug from the head of the
deceased - three (3) days after the autopsy was conducted and after the
cadaver was turned over to the family of the victim - was quite
doubtful. Even the supposed dying declaration of the victim specifically
pointed to neither Diosdado III nor Godofredo. And, the trial court
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
erred in admitting in evidence those taken against them in violation of
their constitutional rights to counsel during custodial investigation.
CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE
 1 POINT/ISSUE - THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ALLOW THE COURTS TO RELY ON
ST
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION OF GUILT
 IT MAY BE THE BASIS OF A CONVICTION SO LONG AS THE COMBINATION OF ALL THE
CIRCUMSTANCES PROVEN PRODUCES A LOGICAL CONCLUSION WHICH SUFFICES TO
ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. ALL THE
CIRCUMSTANCES MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH EACH OTHER, CONSISTENT WITH THE
THEORY THAT ALL THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED, AND AT THE
SAME TIME INCONSISTENT WITH THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THEY ARE INNOCENT AND WITH
EVERY OTHER POSSIBLE, RATIONAL HYPOTHESIS EXCEPT THAT OF GUILT. THE EVIDENCE
MUST EXCLUDE EACH AND EVERY HYPOTHESIS WHICH MAY BE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR
INNOCENCE. ALSO, IT SHOULD BE ACTED ON AND WEIGHED WITH GREAT CAUTION.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHICH HAS NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY ESTABLISHED, MUCH
LESS CORROBORATED, CANNOT BY ITSELF BE THE BASIS OF CONVICTION.
 THUS, FOR CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUFFICE, (1) THERE SHOULD BE MORE THAN
ONE CIRCUMSTANCE; (2) THE FACTS FROM WHICH THE INFERENCES ARE DERIVED ARE
PROVEN; AND (3) THE COMBINATION OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES IS SUCH AS TO
PRODUCE A CONVICTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
 MEASURED AGAINST THE GUIDELINES SET, WE CANNOT UPHOLD THE CONVICTION OF
THE ACCUSED BASED ON THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED.
 THE FIRST CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH THE PROSECUTION SOUGHT TO PROVE IS THAT THE
ACCUSED WERE SUPPOSEDLY SEEN FLEEING FROM THE LOCUS CRIMINIS, ARMED WITH
THEIR RESPECTIVE WEAPONS. THUS, THE TRIAL COURT, GLEANING FROM THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED, FOUND THAT “[W]HEN ABOUT TO STAND, CALSIS SAW GODOFREDO B.
ADOR, DIOSDADO B. ADOR, JR. AND DIOSDADO B. ADOR III, AND A PERSON GOING TO
THE DIRECTION OF THE HOUSE OF THE ADORS WHICH IS ABOUT 500 METERS AWAY.” IN
FACT, PROSECUTION WITNESS CALSIS ALLEGEDLY EVEN SAW DIOSDADO JR. CARRYING “A
LONG FIREARM BUT X X X COULD NOT DETERMINE WHAT KIND OF GUN IT WAS.
 THE TESTIMONY OF CALSIS, IF AT ALL, COULD HARDLY BE USED AGAINST DIOSDADO III
WHOM HE MISERABLY FAILED TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY DURING TRIAL. IN FACT, THE
ACQUITTAL OF DIOSDADO JR. BY THE TRIAL COURT RENDERS THE ENTIRE TESTIMONY OF
CALSIS IN SERIOUS DOUBT. CALSIS WAS PRESENTED TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE
ASSAILANTS WHO WERE SUPPOSEDLY PERSONALLY KNOWN TO HIM AND WERE JUST TEN
(10) METERS AWAY FROM HIM. IT PUZZLES US NO END WHY HE CANNOT EVEN
IDENTIFY THE ADORS IN OPEN COURT.
DYING DECLARATION
 2 POINT/ISSUE - NEITHER CAN THIS COURT RELY ON THE DYING DECLARATION OF
ND
THE DYING CHAVEZ NOR ON THE RESULTS OF THE PARAFFIN TESTS TO CONVICT EITHER
Page 14 of 50
DIOSDADO III OR GODOFREDO OR BOTH. TO REFUTE THESE, WE NEED NOT GO FAR
AND BEYOND THE 13 MAY 1998 ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT PARTIALLY GRANTING
THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED BY THE ACCUSED
THUS, WHILE A DYING DECLARATION MAY BE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, IT MUST IDENTIFY WITH
CERTAINTY THE ASSAILANT. OTHERWISE, IT LOSES ITS SIGNIFICANCE. ALSO, WHILE A PARAFFIN
TEST COULD ESTABLISH THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF NITRATES ON THE HAND, IT CANNOT
ESTABLISH THAT THE SOURCE OF THE NITRATES WAS THE DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS – A PERSON
WHO TESTS POSITIVE MAY HAVE HANDLED ONE OR MORE SUBSTANCES WITH THE SAME POSITIVE
REACTION FOR NITRATES SUCH AS EXPLOSIVES, FIREWORKS, FERTILIZERS, PHARMACEUTICALS,
TOBACCO AND LEGUMINOUS PLANTS.
 SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS CONCUR IN THE VIEW THAT THE RESULT OF A PARAFFIN TEST IS NOT
CONCLUSIVE. WHILE IT CAN ESTABLISH THE PRESENCE OF NITRATES OR NITRITES ON THE
HAND, IT DOES NOT ALWAYS INDUBITABLY SHOW THAT SAID NITRATES OR NITRITES
WERE CAUSED BY THE DISCHARGE OF FIREARM. THE PERSON TESTED MAY HAVE
HANDLED ONE OR MORE OF A NUMBER OF SUBSTANCES WHICH GIVE THE SAME
POSITIVE REACTION FOR NITRATES OR NITRITES, SUCH AS EXPLOSIVES, FIREWORKS,
PHARMACEUTICALS AND LEGUMINOUS PLANTS SUCH AS PEAS, BEANS AND ALFALFA. A
PERSON WHO USES TOBACCO MAY ALSO HAVE NITRATE OR NITRITE DEPOSITS ON HIS
HANDS SINCE THESE SUBSTANCES ARE PRESENT IN THE PRODUCTS OF COMBUSTION OF
TOBACCO. THE PRESENCE OF NITRATES OR NITRITES, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE TAKEN
ONLY AS AN INDICATION OF A POSSIBILITY BUT NOT OF INFALLIBILITY THAT THE PERSON
TESTED HAS FIRED A GUN. –PEOPLE V MELCHOR
 IN FINE, THE ADMISSIONS MADE BY GODOFREDO TO MAJOR IDIAN AND PO3
NEPOMUCENO INCLUDING THE GUN IN QUESTION CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM WITHOUT VIOLATING HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
GODOFREDO WAS ALREADY UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION WHEN HE MADE HIS
ADMISSIONS AND SURRENDERED THE GUN TO THE POLICE AUTHORITIES. THE POLICE
HAD ALREADY BEGUN TO FOCUS ON THE ADORS AND WERE CARRYING OUT A PROCESS OF
INTERROGATIONS THAT WAS LENDING ITSELF TO ELICITING INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS
AND EVIDENCE: THE POLICE WENT TO THE ADOR RESIDENCE THAT SAME EVENING UPON
BEING INFORMED THAT THE ADORS HAD A LONG-STANDING GRUDGE AGAINST THE
CUYAS; THE FOLLOWING DAY, ALL THE MALE MEMBERS OF THE ADOR FAMILY WERE TOLD
TO GO TO THE POLICE STATION; THE POLICE WAS ALSO INFORMED OF THE DYING
DECLARATION OF DECEASED CHAVEZ POINTING TO THE ADORS AS THE ASSAILANTS; THE
ADORS WERE ALL SUBJECTED TO PARAFFIN EXAMINATION; AND, THERE WERE NO OTHER
SUSPECTS AS THE POLICE WAS NOT CONSIDERING ANY OTHER PERSON OR GROUP OF
PERSONS. THE INVESTIGATION THUS WAS NO LONGER A GENERAL INQUIRY INTO AN
UNSOLVED CRIME AS THE ADORS WERE ALREADY BEING HELD AS SUSPECTS FOR THE
KILLINGS OF CUYA AND CHAVEZ.
 CONSEQUENTLY, THE RIGHTS OF A PERSON UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION,
INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, HAVE ALREADY ATTACHED TO THE ADORS, AND
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
PURSUANT TO ART. III, SEC. 12(1) AND (3), 1987 CONSTITUTION, ANY WAIVER OF
THESE RIGHTS SHOULD BE IN WRITING AND UNDERTAKEN WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL. ADMISSIONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION MADE WITHOUT THE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ARE BARRED AS EVIDENCE.
 THE RECORDS ARE BARE OF ANY INDICATION THAT THE ACCUSED HAVE WAIVED THEIR
RIGHT TO COUNSEL, HENCE, ANY OF THEIR ADMISSIONS ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
AGAINST THEM. AS WE HAVE HELD, A SUSPECT’S CONFESSION, WHETHER VERBAL OR
NON-VERBAL, WHEN TAKEN WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WITHOUT A VALID
WAIVER OF SUCH ASSISTANCE REGARDLESS OF THE ABSENCE OF SUCH COERCION, OR THE
FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN VOLUNTARILY GIVEN, IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, EVEN IF
SUCH CONFESSION WERE GOSPEL TRUTH.[79] THUS, IN ABALLE V. PEOPLE,[80] THE
DEATH WEAPON, A FOUR-INCH KITCHEN KNIFE, WHICH WAS FOUND AFTER THE ACCUSED
BROUGHT THE POLICE TO HIS HOUSE AND POINTED TO THEM THE POT WHERE HE HAD
CONCEALED IT, WAS BARRED FROM ADMISSION AS IT WAS DISCOVERED AS A
CONSEQUENCE OF AN UNCOUNSELED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION.
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST (RULE 130, SECTION 38)
1. PEOPLE V. MAJURI (VG)
G.R. No. L-38833 | March 12, 1980 | AQUINO, J.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
AIROL ALING Y MAJURI, accused whose death sentence is under review.
SUMMARY
[This is a parricide case] Norija T. Mohamad (Nori) was stabbed in the chest and
diaphragm by her own husband Airol Aling at Calarian, Zamboanga City. She died
at the Brent Hospital 2 days later. Later, Airol was investigated by the police. He
declared in the Chavacano dialect (his declaration was translated into English) that
he killed his wife (whom he married according to Muslim rites because he was
informed in prison by his relatives that his wife was living with another man and
fooling around with other men). In his version, he said that he was an escapee
from prison. He went to his father’s house and saw Nori who ran away from him.
He chased Nori with a bolo and stabbed her in different parts of her body. He then
ran towards the far end of Calarian. 2 policemen in their affidavit affirmed that
Airol admitted to Sergeant Antonio Macrohon in their presence that he stabbed
his wife because she had been going with many men. He was charged with
parricide, with the arraignment being postponed four times. The information was
translated into the Tausug dialect which is spoken by the accused. With the
assistance of his counsel, he pleaded guilty. The accused then was placed on the
witness stand, was examined and declared among other things that: he killed his
Page 15 of 50
wife, he understood that by pleading guilty he could be sentenced to death and
he said that he was not coerced nor cajoled into entering a plea of guilty. He
also identified his signature in his confession which was sworn to before the
clerk of court. The issue is WON he was guilty of killing his wife – YES. The
accused said that that he was married to the deceased was an admission against
his penal interest. Also, accused understood fully the nature and effect of his plea
of guilty. The arraignment was postponed 3 times in order to enable his counsel
to confer with him and explain to him the consequences of his plea of guilty. His
confession and the affidavit of the policemen who investigated him were
presented in evidence.
FACTS
 [This is a parricide case] Norija T. Mohamad (Nori), 30, was stabbed in
the chest and diaphragm on January 28, 1972 at Calarian, Zamboanga
City. She died at the Brent Hospital two days later.
 Girlie Aling a relative of Airol Aling (Husband of Norija) stated in her
affidavit of February 21, 1972 that she and Darla Aling (Norija's
daughter) brought the victim to the hospital. They learned from the
police that Norija was stabbed by her husband.
 On March 24, 1972 Airol Aling 35, was investigated by the police. He
declared in the Chavacano dialect (his declaration was translated into
English) that he killed his wife (whom he married according to Muslim
rites because he was informed in prison by his relatives that his wife was
living with another man and fooling around with other men. He
recounted the killing in this manner:
o At or about 1:00 pm of January 28, 1972, I was at the seashore of
Calarian relaxing since I have just arrived from Jolo, Sulu that day.
o At that time, I was already running away from the authorities
because I am an escapee from San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm.
o Later on, I proceeded to my father's house which is just near the
seashore. Upon reaching the house, I saw Nori Mohamad but I had
no time to talk to her because immediately after seeing me, Nori ran
away, going to the direction of the street.
o Armed with the bolo which I had been carrying with me, I chased
after Nori and I catch up with her at the street where I started
stabbing her with the bolo, hitting her on the different parts of the
body.
o When I saw Nori fell down on the street badly wounded, I hurriedly
left the place and ran towards the far end of Calarian.
EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
 2 policemen in their affidavit of March 24, 1972, affirmed that Airol
admitted to Sergeant Antonio Macrohon in their presence that he
stabbed his wife because she had been going with many men.
 On April 19, 1972, Airol Aling was charged with parricide in the CFI
Zamboanga City. It was alleged in the information that Airol was a convict
serving sentence at the penal colony for robbery with frustrated
homicide.
 [Arraignment was postponed 4 times]The case was first called for
arraignment on March 15. The accused signified his willingness to plead
guilty although he had no lawyer. A counsel de oficio was appointed for
him. Then it was transferred to March 18.
 On that date, by agreement of the parties, the arraignment was
transferred to March 29, then to April 5, and later to April 30, 1974. On
that last date, the information was translated into the Tausug dialect
which is spoken by the accused. With the assistance of his counsel, he
pleaded guilty.
 Then, the accused was placed on the witness stand and examined by his
counsel.
o He admitted that he killed his wife. He declared that after he was
informed by his counsel that the penalty for parricide is death or life
imprisonment but still admitted the killing of his wife because that
was the truth.
o In answer to the question of the fiscal, the accused said that he
understood that by pleading guilty he could be sentenced to death
or reclusion perpetua because he was an escaped convict.
o He described the confrontation with his wife: When he arrived at
his home, his wife ran and he pursued her. He overtook her, stabbed
her but she was able to parry the blow, and when -she fell on the
ground, he repeatedly stabbed her in the abdomen.
o He said that he was not coerced nor cajoled into entering a plea of
guilty. He admitted that he was a prisoner in the penal colony. He
was a Muslim belonging to the Samal tribe of Siasi Sulu. He killed
his wife because while he was in prison, she did not visit him and
she neglected their four children.
o He agreed that his father-in-law could have the custody of his
children. He was able to leave the penal colony because he was a
"living-out-prisoner".
o When he went to his house on January 28, 1972, his purpose was to
be reconciled with his wife but when she saw him, instead of waiting
for him, she ran away. He had information that his wife was guilty of
infidelity or had a "kabit". That was a grievous offense under Muslim
customs.
Page 16 of 50
o He identified his signature in his confession which was sworn to
before the clerk of court.
 The trial court sentenced Airol Aling to death and to pay an indemnity to
the heirs of Norija Mohamad. It noted that he pleaded guilty with full
knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his plea.
 The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review of the death
penalty.
ISSUE
WN Majuri was guilty of killing his wife – YES. He was fully aware of the
consequences of his admission.
HELD:
 Unmeritorious.
 WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the modification
that, for lack of one vote, the accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua
Costs de oficio.
RATIO
Counsel de oficio assigned to present the side of the accused in this review,
contends that:
1. The marriage of Airol to Norija was indubitably proven.
- The testimony of the accused that he was married to the
deceased was an admission against his penal interest. It was a
confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and
the presumption "that a man and woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage" (Sec. 5[bbl, Rule 131, Rules of Court).
- He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his
testimony to his father-in-law. That implies that the deceased
was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her
infidelity. Her failure to visit him in prison and her neglect of
their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their
marital status.
2. Accused understood fully he nature and effect of his plea of guilty.
- The trial judge, a Muslim, took pains to follow the rule that in
case a plea of guilty is entered in a capital case, evidence should
be received in order to leave no room for reasonable doubt that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged and that he had full
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his plea of
guilty (People vs. Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).
- In this case, the arraignment was postponed three times in
order to enable his counsel to confer with him and explain to
him the consequences of his plea of guilty. The accused
testified. His confession and the affidavit of the policemen who
investigated him were presented in evidence.
3. The crime was not mitigated by the plea of guilty lack of intention
to commit so grave a wrong and the circumstance that the accused
is a non-Christian.
- He is a quasi-recidivist. The special aggravating circumstance of
quasi-recidivism cannot be offset by generic investigating
circumstances.
- The fact that he escaped from confinement in order to kill his
wife shows a high degree of perversity and incorrigibility.
- His being a non-Christian cannot serve to extenuate the
heinousness of his offense. He understood the gravity of his
crime because he had attained some education. He reached first
year high school and he used to be a checker in a stevedoring
firm.
2. PEOPLE V. TOLEDO (MB)
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
Respondents: Eugenio Toledo and Sisenando Holgado
Appellant: Eugenio Toledo
G.R. No. L-28655 || August 6, 1928
Malcolm, J.:
SUMMARY:
Holgado and Morales engaged in a bolo duel. Morales was killed almost instantly.
Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring
house and from there to the municipal building. Before the municipal president,
Holgado made a sworn statement in which he declared that when he and Morales
fought there was nobody present. About one month later, Holgado died from the
wounds received in the fight. Toledo, a worker of Holgado, was charged with the
homicide of Morales and was convicted in the CFI of Mindoro. SC acquitted
Toledo and held that error was committed in not admitting the verified
declaration of Holgado as the statement of a fact against penal interest.
1) US rule states that GR: Hearsay evidence is excluded. One exception
concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits
Page 17 of 50
the reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of third
parties made contrary to their own pecuniary or proprietary interest (not
penal).
2) BUT It should not be received in the Philippine jurisdiction where the
principles of the common law have never been followed blindly. A study
of the authorities discloses that even if given application they are not
controlling, for here the fact is that the declarant is deceased and his
statements were made under oath, while they read in such a way as to
ring with the truth.
3) Any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerating himself is a bad
rule, even if it also hampers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent.
(Wigmore)
4) Wherever the state seeks to fasten criminality upon the party on trial,
the accused had a right to meet and rebut any testimony which may be
offered against him in any legitimate way. Any legitimate fact or
circumstance which would meet or tend to meet the state's case and
break the force of criminative facts introduced against the accused is
always admissible. (Pace vs. State)
5) Where a sworn statement against penal interest is admitted, the
question then is as to the effect to be given such a confession, which is
solely one of weight and credibility. (Lawyers Review Annotated editor)
FACTS:
 Facts agreed upon by the prosecution and defense:
o Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about
the occupation of certain land in the municipality of
Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro.
o On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two men met. The
argument was renewed, and they agreed to fight.
o They engaged in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno
Morales, who was killed almost instantly. Sisenando Holgado
was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a
neighboring house.
o From there, Sisenando Holgado was taken to the municipal
building where he made a sworn statement before the
municipal president, in which he declared that only he and
Filomeno Morales fought.
o About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the
wounds received in the fight.
 Disputable point: Whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the
quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno Morales.
o Prosecution
EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
 Presented witness Justina Villanueva (querida of
Filomeno Morales) who testified to the presence and
participation of Eugenio Toledo.
 Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the
witness Justina Llave.
o Defense
 Presented theory that Toledo was in another place
when the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred
and that his only participation was on meeting
Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in helping
him to a nearby house.
 To this effect is the testimony of the accused and of
Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado.
 The defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando
Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was sworn to it in the
presence of the municipal president of Pinamalayan.
 Exhibit 1 made originally in Tagalog, in translation reads as follows:
AFFIDAVIT
I, Sisenando Holgado, married, of legal age, and resident of this
municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro, P. I., after being sworn
in accordance with law, state the following:
My additional homestead situated in Calingag was cleaned by me and is
at present planted with palay (rice), on which I also plant hemp, but the
hemp planted by my workers is frequently uprooted by Filomeno
Morales who claims that said land is his, whereas when I was cleaning
said land nobody objected to it, but now that it is already cleaned,
Filomeno Morales says that one-half of the land occupied by me is his;
for this reason I decided to see Filomeno Morales about this matter and
when I talked to him this morning (Wednesday) at about nine o'clock, at
the hemp plantation of Victorio Saudan situated in Calingag, he told me
that if I should plant there anything he would cut my neck, and to this I
answered that if he was going to cut my neck we would fight and
thereupon he stabbed me with a penknife and then I slashed at him;
after this we separated, and went to Dalmacio Manlisic's house. When
we fought, there was nobody present.
Question by president: When you went to the house of Dalmacio
Manlisic, did you not meet anybody before reaching said house?
Answer: I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who
accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic.
Page 18 of 50
 CFI of Mindoro --- found Toledo guilty of homicide and sentenced him to
imprisonment for 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day, reclusion temporal,
with accessory penalties, indemnity, and costs.
 Hence this appeal taken by Eugenio Toledo.
ISSUES:
Counsel de oficio in this court makes the following assignment of errors:
1. The lower court erred in not admitting in evidence Exhibit 1. --- YES
2. The lower court erred in not finding that accused-appellant Eugenio
Toledo did not take part in the fight between accused Sisenando Holgado
and deceased Filomeno Morales, resulting in the death of the latter. ---
YES
3. The lower court erred in not giving accused-appellant Eugenio Toledo the
benefit of a reasonable doubt. --- YES
HELD:
 For three somewhat divergent reasons, we are all of the opinion that the
defendant-appellant Eugenio Toledo should be given the benefit of the
reasonable doubt which prevails in our minds.
 Accordingly, the judgment appealed from will be reversed and the
defendant and appellant acquitted, and as it appears that he is now
confined in Bilibid Prison, an order will immediately issue directing his
release, with costs de oficio.
RATIO:
1. The discussion of the case in court has revealed three different points of view
among the members participating, all leading to the same result of acquittal.
 The Chief and Mr. Justice Villamor --- would disregard entirely the first
assignment of error. Confining themselves exclusively to an analysis of
the evidence other than Exhibit 1, they find that Eugenio Toledo has not
been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In reality, there being but
one witness for the prosecution who, on account of her relations with
Filomeno Morales, and the land troubles, might be expected to
exaggerate, and there being on the contrary exculpatory evidence for the
defense, even without Exhibit 1, the Government has not made out its
case.
 Messrs. Justices Romualdez and Villa-Real --- Exhibit 1 should have been
admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae, and that giving it effect, in
relation with the other evidence, the accused has not been proved guilty.
The declaration of Sisenando Holgado fulfilled the test of the facts talking
through the party and not the party talking about the facts. There was
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
such a correlation between the statement and the fact of which it forms
part as strongly tends to negative the suggestion of fabrication or a
suspicion of afterthought. The modern tendency is toward the extension
of the rule admitting spontaneous declarations to meet the needs of
justice when other evidence of the same fact cannot be procured. (U.
S. vs. David)
 Messrs. Justices Street, Malcolm, and Ostrand --- The court erred in not
admitting Exhibit 1 as the statement of a fact against penal interest. Had
Exhibit 1 been received, it is believed that its influence would have been
felt by the trial court. Without Exhibit 1, the appellate court is bound by
the appreciation of the evidence made in the trial court, and could, with
little propriety, set aside the findings made by a learned trial judge.
2. Hearsay evidence
 Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, is excluded by
courts in the United States that adhere to the principles of the common
law.
o GR: The declarations of a person other than accused confessing
or tending to show that he committed the crime are not
competent for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine.
o One universally recognized exception concerns the admission of
dying declarations.
o Another exception permits the reception, under certain
circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to
their own pecuniary or proprietary interest.
3. By a large preponderance of authority in the US, the declarations of a person
other than accused confessing or tending to show that he committed the crime
are not competent for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine.
 Professor Wigmore --- attempted to demonstrate the false premises on
which the arbitrary limitation to the hearsay rule rests. He shows that the
limitation is inconsistent with the language originally employed in stating
the principle and is unjustified on grounds of policy.
 SC of Mississippi in Brown vs. State of Mississippi --- The editor of the
Mississippi case in L. R. A., however, comes to the support of Professor
Wigmore saying the unanimity of the decisions "is as complete as the
shock which they give the general sense of justice."
 SC of the US in Donnelly vs. United States --- The court below properly
excluded hearsay evidence relating to the confession of a third party,
then deceased, of guilt of the crime with which defendant was charged.
Mr. Justice Pitney, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "In this
country there is a great and practically unanimous weight of authority in
Page 19 of 50
the estate courts against admitting evidence of confessions of third
parties, made out of court, and tending to exonerate the accused."
o Mr. Justice Holmes’s concurrence --- The rules of evidence in the
main are based on experience, logic, and common sense, less
hampered by history than some parts of the substantive law.
The exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations
against interest is well known; no other statement is so much
against interest as a confession of murder; it is far more
calculated to convince than dying declarations, which would be
let in to hang a man.
4. However, the US general rule “rejecting evidence of confessions of third
parties made out of court intended to exonerate the accused, examined in the
light of its history and policy, and found to be unjustified” should not be
received in the Philippine jurisdiction where the principles of the common law
have never been followed blindly.
 A study of the authorities discloses that even if given application they are
not controlling.
o Practically all of them give as the principal reason for denying
the admission of a confession of a third person that he
committed the crime with which the accused is charged, that it
was not made under oath.
o Here the declarant is deceased and his statements were made
under oath.
o The statements also read in such a way as to ring with the truth.
When Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was
nobody present," it was at the end of just such a rambling
statement as a wounded man would be expected to make.
When Sisenando Holgado declared "I met one of my workers
named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of
Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by the
municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been received not as
conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence to be taken
into consideration in connection with the other proven facts.
 SC of Mississippi --- A dying declaration is admitted of necessity in order
to reach those man slayers who perpetrate their crimes when there are
no other eyewitnesses.
o But the person accused of a crime, under the same principle of
necessity, is not permitted to free himself by offering in
evidence the admission of another under oath that this other
committed the crime.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
o Admissions are receivable against either a pecuniary or a
proprietary interest, but not against a penal interest. We fail to
see why it can be believed that a man will be presumed to tell
the truth in the one instance but will not be presumed to tell the
truth in the other instance.
o Again the exhibit would have been admitted against its maker at
his trial, if he had not died. But the document is held
inadmissible to exonerate another. Yet the truth of the exhibit is
not different in the first case that in the second.
5. History of the Rule (and some doctrines)
 Professor Wigmore --- Interest prejudiced by the facts stated must
be either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, and not a penal interest.
o From 1800 to about 1830 this was fully understood as the broad
scope of the principle. It was thus stated without other
qualifications. All such statements, in that they concerned
matters prejudicial to the declarant's self-interest, were fairly
trustworthy and might therefore (if he were deceased) be
treated as forming an exception to the hearsay rule.
 But in 1884, in a case in the House of Lords, a backward step and an
arbitrary limit put upon the rule. It was held to exclude the statement of
a fact subjecting the declarant to a criminal liability, and to confined to
statements of facts against either pecuniary or proprietary interest.
o This was adopted by English and American courts.
o BUT (turning point) The truth is that any rule which hampers an
honest man in exonerating himself is a bad rule, even if it also
hampers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent.
o It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to discard
this barbarous doctrine, which would refuse to let an innocent
accused vindicate himself even by producing to the tribunal a
perfectly authenticated written confession, made on the very
gallows, by the rule culprit now beyond the reach of justice.
 Pace vs. State --- appellant offered to prove in the trial court by the
witness that on Saturday morning following the killing of the deceased on
the previous Sunday he had a conversation with Dick Cain, one of the
parties to the homicide, in which Dick Cain admitted the he killed the
deceased. The court ruled that wherever the state seeks to fasten
criminality upon the party on trial, the accused had a right to meet and
rebut any testimony which may be offered against him in any legitimate
way. Any legitimate fact or circumstance which would meet or tend to
meet the state's case and break the force of criminative facts introduced
against the accused is always admissible.
Page 20 of 50
 Editor of L. R. A. (Lawyer’s report annotated) --- Where a sworn
statement against penal interest is admitted, the question then is as to
the effect to be given such a confession, which is solely one of weight
and credibility.
 Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical
procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence, and cumulative authority,
would say that if a man deliberately acknowledged himself to be the
perpetrator of a crime and exonerated the person charged with the
crime, and there was other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the
statement, the accused man should not be permitted to go to prison or
to the electric chair to expiate a crime he never committed.
3. FUENTES V. CA (JM)
GR 111692 | 02/06/1996 | BELLOSILLO, J.
Petitioner/s: Alejandro Fuentes—appellant
Respondent/s: Court of Appeals, People of the Philippines—appellee
SUMMARY
Alejandro Fuentes stabbed Julieto Malaspina with a hunting knife at a
benefit dance. Petitioner says it was his cousin Zoilo who killed Malaspina. Zoilo
allegedly made a confession to their uncle Felicisimo. Felicisimo reported this to
P/Sgt Conde who told the former that Zoilo should surrender if he indeed
committed the crime. When Conde went to investigate, he found out that Zoilo
already fled. Alejandro Fuentes assails that the said confession of his cousin
should be admitted as evidence. The Court ruled that it is admissible.
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration
against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the
declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the
circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
It is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of
evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused.
Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the
effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the
defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness.
FACTS
 At four o clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina together
with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a
benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner
EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter
saying, “Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short
hair.” Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a
hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground and his companions rushed to
his side. Petitioner fled.
 Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he
muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.
 Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician who autopsied the
cadaver of Julieto Malaspina on 24 July 1989, reported that death was
due to “stab wound at left lumbar region I V2 in. in length with
extracavitation of the small and large intestines.”
 Petitioner claims on the other hand that:
o it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias “Jonie” who knifed
Malaspina;
o when the victim was killed he was conversing with him;
o he was compelled to run away when he heard that somebody
with a bolo and spear would “kill all those from San Isidro”
because “Jonie,” the killer, was from that place;
o since he was also from San Isidro he sought refuge in his
brother’s house where he met “Jonie”;
o “Jonie” admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina
because after a boxing match before the latter untied his gloves
and punched him (so sinuntok ni Malaspina si Jonie after a
boxing match? Sorry this is how the SC worded it)
o as there were many persons milling around the house “Jonie”
jumped out and escaped through the window;
o he was arrested at eight o’clock in the morning of 24 June 1989
while he was in a store in the barangay.
 Lower court  The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur,
found petitioner guilty of murder qualified by treachery and imposed on
him an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayoras minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the victim
Julieto Malaspina the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as
actual damages plus costs.
 CA  affirmed the judgment of the trial court
 Fuentes contends that the CA erred when it held that petitioner was
positively and categorically identified as the killer of Malaspina.
Petitioner points to an alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Alberto Toling and Honorio Osok to the effect that
they saw petitioner stab Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and the
Page 21 of 50
testimony of the attending physician that the victim was stabbed on the
left lumbar region.
 **The Declaration that is in issue**: There was also an alleged
confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr. (the cousin of Fuentes). Accused argues
that since it is a declaration against penal interest and therefore an
exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was
allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo,
who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo
testified that on 24 June 1989 while he was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo
Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed Malaspina in “retaliation”; that he
even showed him the knife he used and asked his help in finding a
lawyer, in securing bail and, if possible, in working out a settlement with
the relatives of the deceased. The following day however he learned that
the self-confessed killer was gone and that petitioner had been arrested
for a crime he did not commit.
 For his part, Station Commander P/Sgt. Conde, Jr., testified that after the
criminal information for murder was filed on 26 July 1989, petitioner met
Felicisimo who informed him of the disclosure by Zoilo. Conde then
advised Felicisimo that if it was true that it was Zoilo who fatally stabbed
Malaspina Felicisimo must persuade Zoilo to surrender. Conde then
personally went to Barangay San Isidro to investigate. There he was told
by the townsfolk that Zoilo had already fled).
ISSUE
 WN Fuentes should be acquitted because of the discrepancies in the
statements of the prosecution witnesses – NO. This discrepancy is
inconsequential.
 WN the declaration made by Zoilo Fuentes is admissible as evidence –
NO. There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated
or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His
mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso
facto unavailable under this rule.
HELD:
 Unmeritorious.
 WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding petitioner ALEJANDRO
FUENTES JR. guilty of MURDER and directing him to indemnify the heirs
of Julieto Malaspina in the amount of P50,000.00 plus costs is AFFIRMED
with the modification that the penalty imposed should be as it is
corrected to reclusion perpetua, and the award of actual damages is
deleted.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
RATIO
 THREE PROSECUTION WITNESSES POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED FUENTES AS THE PERPETRATOR
o What is material is that Malaspina was stabbed to death and
that three (3) prosecution witnesses positively identified
petitioner as the knife wielder. It must be stressed that these
witnesses had known petitioner for quite some time and never
had any personal misunderstanding nor altercation with the
latter as to create any suspicion that they were impelled by ill
motives to falsely implicate him.
 FUENTES’ OWN WITNESS IDENTIFIED ALEJANDRO FUENTES AND JONI FUENTES TO BE
ONE AND THE SAME
o That it was another person who committed the offense is too
incredible. No less than petitioner’s own witness, Nerio Biscocho
who claimed he also saw the killing, testified that Alejandro
Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner, and “Jonie” Fuentes are one and the
same person.
o COURT:
Q. Who is this Joni Fuentes and Alejandro Fuentes?
A. That Joni Fuentes is the same of that or the accused
Alejandro Fuentes. I do not know his real name but he is called as
Joni, sir, x x x
On cross-examination witness Biscocho further admitted
that he himself would call petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., as
“Joni” or “Jonie” Fuentes, as some of his friends did, but victim
Malaspina occasionally called petitioner “Junior.”
DECLARATION AGAINST PENAL INTEREST ATTRIBUTED TO ZOILO FUENTES JR. IS NOT
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE
 One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to
declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides that “(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted
in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be
received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and
against third persons.” The admissibility in evidence of such declaration
is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.
 There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a
declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to
testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the
Page 22 of 50
declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a
motive to falsify existed.
 Case of People v Toledo:
o the Court, speaking through Justice Malcolm, endeavored to
reexamine the declaration of third parties made contrary to
their penal interest.
o In that case, the protagonists Holgado and Morales engaged in a
bob duel. Morales was killed almost instantly. Holgado who was
seriously wounded gave a sworn statement (Exhibit 1) before
the municipal president declaring that when he and Morales
fought there was nobody else present. One (1) month later
Holgado died from his wounds
o While the Court was agreed that Toledo, who reportedly
intervened in the fight and dealt the mortal blow, should be
exonerated on reasonable doubt, the members did not reach an
accord on the admissibility of the sworn statement.
o One group would totally disregard Exh. 1 since there was ample
testimonial evidence to support an acquittal. The second group
considered Exh. 1 as part of the res gestae as it was made on the
same morning when the fight occurred. A third group, to which
Justice Malcolm belonged, opined that the court below erred in
not admitting Exh. 1 as the statement of a fact against penal
interest.
 the Toledo case cannot be applied in the instant case which is
remarkably different. Consider this factual scenario: the alleged declarant
Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accused-appellant, verbally admitted to the
latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo)
killed the victim because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One
striking feature that militates against the acceptance of such a
statement is its patent untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to
accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate (to speak or act in an
evasive way). The same can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle
Felicisimo. Secondly, we need not resort to legal rhetorics to find that the
admission of such a statement may likewise be, according to Wigmore,
“shocking to the sense of justice.” Let us assume that the trial court did
admit the statement of Zoilo and on that basis acquitted accused-
appellant. Let us assume further that Zoilo was subsequently captured
and upon being confronted with his admission of guilt readily repudiated
the same. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that can bind Zoilo legally
to that statement.
 But more importantly, the admission of Zoilo’s statement cannot be had
because Zoilo is not “unable to testify”. For it is incumbent upon the
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the
prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the
gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect
that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the
defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness.
Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of
evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real
culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial
statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the probability of its
fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and
falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable
to testify.
 Exclusion is the prudent recourse as explained in Toledo -The purpose of
all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that
the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best
method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of
the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth,
requires that the doors be closed to such evidence.
4. HEIRS OF MIGUEL FRANCO V. CA (KB)
G.R. No. 123924| December 11, 2003| Tinga, J.
Petitioner/s: HEIRS OF MIGUEL FRANCO, namely: MODESTA, LEONIDES
ROMULA, EMMA, JOHNNY, RAMON, BERNARDO, PACITA, all surnamed
FRANCORespondent/s: Court of Appeals, People of the Philippines—appellee
SUMMARY
Quintin died intestate. His brother Miguel became the administrator of his estate
and such was opposed on the ground of his conflicting interests rendering him
incapable of a true and faithful account of the estate. Intestate court granted
motion to remove him as administrator wherein Miguel filed an MR alleging for
the first time that one-half of the subject property was transferred to him by
virtue of a document entitled "General Power of Administration" and executed by
Quintin in 1967. Miguel also used this document to cancel the OCT in Quintin’s
name and caused a TCT to be issued on his name covering half of the subject
property. Heirs of Quintin now files a complaint seeking the cancellation of TCT
No. T-20203 in the name of Miguel, who had died in the meantime. Issue now is
whether or not Miguel has an interest over one-half of the property. Court held
that Miguel’s claim of ownership to half of the subject property is belied by his
statement in the Verified Petition for issuance of letters administration. While he
explicitly declared that the subject property belonged to Quintin, at the same
Page 23 of 50
time he was remarkably silent about his claim that he acquired one-half thereof
during the lifetime of Quintin. He asserted his claim to the subject property quite
belatedly, i.e., four years after he stated under oath and in a court pleading that it
belonged in its entirety to his brother.
Thus, the statement and the accompanying silence may be appreciated in more
than one context. It is a declaration against interest and a judicial admission
combined.
FACTS
 Quintin died intestate on 8 December 1967. His brother, Miguel Franco
("Miguel,"), filed a Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration on
17 October 1968, before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte ("intestate court"), praying that he be appointed as administrator
of Quintin’s estate.
 This Petition, was opposed by Faustina Franco Vda. De Cabading
("Faustina"), the sister of the decedent, on the ground that Miguel was
unfit to be the administrator. She prayed for her own appointment as
administratrix instead of Miguel.
 Upon motion of Miguel, the intestate court appointed him as special
administrator of the estate on 3 December 1969. However, on 23 July
1971, Faustina, then apparently joined by the other heirs of Quintin
except Miguel, moved for the latter’s removal as special administrator.
 On 27 August 1973, the intestate court issued an Order declaring inter
alia that, based on the evidence, Quintin was the absolute owner of the
subject property. This finding was subsequently used by the intestate
court as one of the grounds for granting the motion to remove Miguel as
special administrator, per the Order dated 1 September 1973.
 In the latter Order, the intestate court said that since Miguel was
claiming ownership over half of the subject property, his conflicting
interest rendered him incapable of rendering a true and faithful
account of the estate.
 Miguel filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 September 1973
Order, wherein he alleged for the first time that one-half of the subject
property was transferred to him by virtue of a document entitled
"General Power of Administration" and executed by Quintin in 1967.
 It was also discovered that on the basis of this "General Power of
Administration" Miguel had filed a Petition dated 2 January 1972 before
Branch 1 of the Dipolog Court of First Instance, seeking the cancellation
of OCT No. P-436.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
 This Petition was granted in the Order of 6 January 1973, wherein it was
directed that the new transfer certificates of title be issued, one in the
name of the heirs of Quintin and the other name of Miguel. Thus, Miguel
was able to obtain Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) T-20203,
covering half of the subject property, on 13 February 1973.
 The other heirs asked the intestate court to cancel TCT No. T-20203
shortly after learning about it through a Motion for Reconsideration filed
in the estate proceedings. On 4 May 1977, the intestate court issued an
order cancelling TCT No. T-20203 issued in the name of Miguel, on the
ground that Miguel’s acquisition of the title was fraudulent.
 CA reversed the Order in its Decision of 29 February 1984. According to
the appellate court, the intestate court had no jurisdiction to settle
questions of property ownership. This Court, in a Resolution dated 1
October 1984, affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
 Consequently, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed before the RTC a
complaint, seeking the cancellation of TCT No. T-20203 in the name of
Miguel, who had died in the meantime. (didn’t say how he died)
 After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The
RTC found that the "General Power of Administration" evinced an
existing trust relation between Quintin and his brother Miguel, with
Quintin as the signatory thereof acknowledging that he was holding
half of the property titled in his name in trust for Miguel. Applying
Article 1452 of the Civil Code, the RTC concluded that a trust had been
created by force of law in favor of Miguel to the extent of one-half of
the property.
 After their MR was denied by the CA, the petitioners brought forth the
present petition. While asserting that the transfer and registration of
one-half of the subject property in the name of Miguel was not done
through fraud or in bad faith, they point out that at no time did the
respondents question the execution or genuineness of the "General
Power of Administration" which purportedly admits of the existence of a
trust relation between Quintin and Miguel. They also claim that the Court
of Appeals failed to appreciate the recognition which Quintin had
accorded to the rights and interest of Miguel.
ISSUE: Whether or not Miguel has an interest over one-half of the property --- NO
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the above premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit and the decision of the Court of appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
Page 24 of 50
RATIO
 Miguel’s claim of ownership to half of the subject property is belied by
his statement in the Verified Petition for issuance of letters
administration that he filed on 17 October 1968. Therein, he stated:
o "7. — That said Quintin Franco left the following properties:
 a – A parcel of agricultural land located at Pinan,
Zamboanga del Norte known as Lot No. 5172, Dipolog
Cadastre-85 Ext., Cad. Case No. 9. LRC Cad. Rec. No.
769, (S.A. 7612), covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. P-436, under Tax Dec. No. 676, assessed
at P26,120.00, with an area of 706,381 sq. m. (citations
omitted)
 While he explicitly declared that the subject property belonged to
Quintin, at the same time he was remarkably silent about his claim that
he acquired one-half thereof during the lifetime of Quintin. He asserted
his claim to the subject property quite belatedly, i.e., four years after he
stated under oath and in a court pleading that it belonged in its entirety
to his brother.
 Thus, the statement and the accompanying silence may be appreciated
in more than one context. It is a declaration against interest and a
judicial admission combined.
 A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the
greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. In the same vein, a judicial
admission binds the person who makes the same, and absent any
showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of
rationalization can offset it.
 In the case at bar, there is no showing of palpable mistake on the part of
Miguel when he made the admission. In his Motion to Admit Amended
Petition, he merely alleged inadvertence in failing to state his claim of co-
ownership. Yet no evidence was adduced to prove the alleged
inadvertence. And even assuming there was indeed such a mistake,
Miguel had ample opportunity to make the rectification in the initial
stages of the intestate proceedings.
 Bearing on the weight of the combined declaration against interest and
judicial admission is the assumption, arising from his duty as special
administrator of the estate of Quintin, that he had full knowledge of the
status and extent of the property holdings of the decedent. The following
observation of the Court of Appeals is worth citing:
 "This tolerant silence militates against Miguel Franco’s claim of ‘co-
ownership.’ Juxtaposed with his previous judicial admission of Quintin
Franco’s absolute ownership of Lot No. 5172, it is not difficult to see that
the act of Miguel Franco in registering one-half of the property in his
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
name was an insidious and surreptitious, if not belated, maneuver to
deprive the legal heirs of Quintin Franco of their lawful share and
interest in the property. As a matter of fact, Miguel Franco may well be
charged with laches."
 The statement under oath of Miguel was made in the intestate
proceedings.1âwphi1 It was presented in evidence and utilized as such in
Civil Case No. 3847. Thus from the substantive and procedural
standpoints alike, the statement being both a declaration against
interest and judicial admission should be accorded the full evidentiary
value it deserves.
Provisional determination of the Intestate Court
 Another important point, albeit simply corollary. The intestate court in its
Order dated 27 August 1973 declared that Quintin was the absolute
owner of the property and accordingly denied Miguel’s claim of
ownership over half the subject property. The Order was apparently
issued for the purpose of determining which properties should be
included for the inventory of the estate of Miguel. While the intestate
court does not have the authority to rule with finality on questions of
ownership over the property of the decedent, it is not precluded from
making a provisional determination over such questions for purposes
relevant to the settlement of the estate, such as ruling whether or not to
include properties in the inventory of the estate. And yet, at no time did
Miguel file a motion for the reconsideration of the 27 August 1973
Order of the intestate court which denied Miguel’s claim of ownership.
 It was the 1 September 1973 Order of the intestate court, by virtue of
which Miguel was removed as special administrator, that he
contested. While the 27 August 1973 Order is a provisional
determination of ownership over the subject property, yet conformably
to ordinary experience any prudent claimant is expected to dispute such
an order which rejects his claim of ownership. Miguel’s inaction
unmistakably bolsters the unshakeable weight that should be accorded
the statement as a declaration against interest and a judicial admission.
Land Titles Perspective
 Now, the issue viewed from the perspective of the Torrens system of
registration. Under the Land Registration Act, title to the property
covered by a Torrens title becomes indefeasible after the expiration of
one year from the entry of the decree of registration. The decree is
incontrovertible and becomes binding on all persons whether or not they
were notified of, or participated in, the in rem registration process. OCT
No. P-436, covering the subject property in its entirety, was registered as
Page 25 of 50
early as 9 July 1954 in the name of Quintin. A Torrens title is the best
evidence of ownership of registered land. Whatever claim of ownership
Miguel had raised should have been weighed against Quintin’s title.
Unfortunately, the Dipolog RTC, Branch 1 apparently ignored this
fundamental principle when on 6 January 1973 it issued the Order
directing the registration of half of the subject property in the name of
Miguel.
 The undue haste which characterized Miguel’s success in obtaining
judicial registration of his ownership over half of the subject property is
noticeable. His petition seeking the issuance of a title over his purported
half of the property was dated 2 January 1973, and yet incredibly, it was
granted only four days later, or on 6 January 1973. As the Court of
Appeals correctly noted:
 "The order dated January 6, 1973 of Judge Rafael T. Mendoza in Misc. Sp.
Proc. No. 2993, directing the Register of Deeds to cancel OCT No. P-436
and to issue new separate transfer certificates of title for Lot No. 5172-A
and Lot No. 5172-B to the Heirs of Quintin Franco and Miguel Franco,
respectively, was therefore without factual basis. Besides, it would
appear that the order was based on Section 112 of the Land Registration
Act (Act No. 496) which contemplates summary proceeding for non-
controversial erasures, alterations, or amendments of entries in a
certificate of title. . . . "
 It is clear from reading Section 112 of the old Land Registration Act that
the same may be utilized only under limited circumstances. Proceedings
under Section 112 are summary in nature, contemplating corrections or
insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not
controversial issues. More importantly, resort to the procedure laid
down in Section 112 would be available only if there is a "unanimity
among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on
the part of any party in interest."
 Such unanimity among the parties has been held to mean "the absence
of serious controversy between the parties in interest as to the title of
4
the party seeking relief under said section." Clearly, there was no such
unanimity among the parties in interest, namely, all the heirs of Quintin.
The surreptitious registration by Miguel of the property had worked to
the prejudice of the other heirs of Quintin.
 There is no document in existence whereby the ownership of any portion
of the subject property was conveyed by Quintin to Miguel. The "General
Power of Administration" does not suffice in that regard. Indeed, it does
not contain any language that operates as a conveyance of the subject
property.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
On the RTC Ruing
 The RTC ruling, from which petitioners draw heavy support, maintained
that Miguel owned half of the property because the document entitled
"General Power of Administration" states that it "admits of an existing
trust relation between the signatory Quintin Franco on the one hand,
and Miguel Franco on the other hand." The RTC cited Article 1452 of the
Civil Code which reads, thus:
o Art. 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase property
and by common consent the legal title is taken in the name of
one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of
law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each.
 Article 1452 presupposes the concurrence of two requisites before an
trust can be created, namely: that two or more persons agree to
purchase a property, and that they consent that one should take the title
in his name for everyone’s benefit. The aforementioned provision is not
applicable in this case, as it clearly speaks of an instance when the
property is acquired through a joint purchase by two or more persons.
That circumstance is not present in this case since the subject property
was acquired through Quintin’s application for a patent. There is no
proof that Miguel had joined Quintin in acquiring the property.
 Lastly, as noted by the Court of Appeals, while tax receipts and
declarations and receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not, in themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The subject property had been consistently declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Quintin, and this fact taken in
conjunction with the other circumstances inexorably lead to the
conclusion that Miguel’s claim of ownership cannot be sustained.
 Thus, even without having to inquire into the authenticity and due
execution of the "General Power of Administration," it is safe to conclude
that Miguel did not have any ownership rights over any portion of the
subject property and that the registration of half of the property in his
name was baseless and afflicted with fraud.
PEDIGREE (RULE 130, SECTION 39)
1. GRAVADOR V. MAMINGO (IE)
Petitioner-appellee : PEDRO GRAVADOR
Respondents-appellants: EUTIQUIO MAMIGO, THE DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OF
BAYAWAN-STA. CATALINA SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT
Page 26 of 50
OF SCHOOLS OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS and THE
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, (all sued in their official and personal capacities)
G.R. No. L-24989| July 21, 1967| CASTRO, J.
SUMMARY:
Pedro Gravador, principal of Sta. Catalina Elem. School was advised to retire
because according to his pre-war records he was already 66 years old. Petitioner
wrote the Dir. Of Public Schools protesting his forced retirement on the ground
that the date of his birth is not Nov. 26,1897 but Dec. 11,1901. He filed a suit for
quo warranto, mandamus and damages which the trial court decided in his favor
and concluded that he was born on Dec,1901. Defendants appealed the decision
of the lower court. SC held that that the lower court relied correctly on the post-
war records because established as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by
evidence of family tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam of a
deceased relative.
FACTS:
 The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina
Elementary School in Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental on August 15, 1964 when
he was advised by the then, Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., of
his separation from the service on the ground that he had reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65.
 The advice reads:
o According to your pre-war records as a teacher in the public schools,
including your Employee's Record Card, you were born on November
26, 1897. As of this date, therefore, you are now 66 years, 8 months,
and 22 days old. In view of the above, you are hereby advised of your
separation from the service effective immediately unless you can
show valid proof in the form of a baptismal or birth certificate that
you are below sixty-five years of age today.
 A few days later the respondent Eutiquio Mamigo was designated teacher-in-
charge of the said elementary school.
 August 31, 1964 the petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools,
protesting his forced retirement on the ground that the date of his birth is not
November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. He attached
o Affidavit, executed on July 26, 1962, of Lazaro Bandoquillo and
Pedro A. Sienes both of Amlan Negros Oriental, declaring that they
knew him to be born on December 11, 1901, because, they were the
neighbors of the late spouses, NEPOMUCENO GRAVADOR and
AGUEDA REGOROSA [petitioner's parents], and they were present
when said PEDRO GRAVADOR was born and were also invited during
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
the baptismal party
 On October 19, 1964 the petitioner wrote to the Division Superintendents of
Schools, reiterating his claim that he had not reached the age of 65 and
enclosing some papers in support thereof.
 On April 13, 1965 he filed this suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages
in the CFI of Negros Oriental. He asked the court to adjudge him entitled to
the office of principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School and to order
payment to him of not only his back salaries but also damages in the total
amount of P52,400.
 Named as respondents were Eutiquio Mamigo, the District Supervisor, the
Superintendent of Schools, the Director of Public Schools and the Secretary of
Education.
 DECISION OF TRIAL COURT: concluded that the petitioner was born on
December 11, 1901 accordingly granted his petition. The respondents
appealed directly to this Court.
 On July 6, 1967 the petitioner asked for the dismissal of the appeal on the
ground that the issues posed thereby had become moot with his retirement
from the service on December 11, 1966 and the payment to him of the
corresponding retirement benefits.
 SC deems it necessary, however, to review the trial court's decision on the
merits, considering that the computation of retirement annuities is based on
the number of years of service of a retiree, and that payment of benefits
already made to the petitioner on the basis of December 11, 1901 as the date
of his birth would not exempt him from the obligation to make a refund
should this Court ultimately rule that he was actually born November 26,
1897
ISSUE: W/N the post-war records and not the pre-war records should be used to
show the date of birth of the petitioner.
RATIO:
 The controversy arose because of the 2 conflicting records of the Division of
Schools of Negros Oriental.
o Pre-war records show his date of birth to be November 26, 1897.
These records consist of two Insular Teachers Cards and one
Employee's Record Card.
o Post-war records, consisting of an Elementary Teacher's Report Card,
an Employee's Record Card, and an Employee's Record of
Qualifications, state that the petitioner was born on Dec. 11, 1901.
 The problem is aggravated by two uncontroverted facts, namely, that the
Page 27 of 50
records of the church where the petitioner was baptized were destroyed by
fire, and that the municipal civil register contains no record of the petitioner's
birth.
 According to the trial court, the post-war records were intended to replace
the pre-war records and therefore the correct date of birth of the petitioner
is December 11, 1901. The court also took into account the verified answer in
a cadastral proceeding in the CFI of Negros Oriental, dated March 15, 1924,
filed by the petitioner's brother, Romulo Gravador, now deceased. It is
therein stated that the petitioner, said to be one of the co-owners of a piece
of land, was at the time 23 years old.
 That the findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts if
supported by substantial evidence, is a settled rule of administrative law, But
whether there is substantial evidence supporting the finding of the
Superintendent of Schools is precisely the issue in this case. The petitioner
did not take part in preparing pre-war records unlike the post-war records
which he personally accomplished to prove the date of his birth.
 It is our considered view that the lower court correctly relied upon the post-
war records, for three cogent reasons.
o First: as Moran states, although a person can have no personal
knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as
he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony
in such case is an assertion of a family tradition. Indeed, even in is
application for back pay which he filed with the Department of
Finance, through the Office of the Superintendent of Schools, on
October 7, 1948, the petitioner stated that the date of his birth is
December 11, 1901. He repeated the same assertion in 1956 and
again in 1960 when he asked the Government Service Insurance
System and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date of his
birth to December 11, 1901.
o Second: the import of the declaration of the petitioner's brother,
contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924,
to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, can not be
ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this
statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the
intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
o Third: the patties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother,
Constantino, who was born on June 10, 1898 and who retired on
June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner then could not
have been born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war
records indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than he.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
o Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of the
petitioner not only by evidence of family tradition but also by the
declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative.
 As to the exhaustion of administrative remedies the argument is w/o merit,
suit for quo warranto to recover a public office must be brought within one
year. Before filing this case the petitioner waited for eight months for the
school officials to act on his protest. To require him to tarry a little more
would obviously be unfair to him since on April 13, 1965, when this case was
filed, he had only four months left within which to bring the case to court.
There was neither manner nor form of assurance that the decision of the
Director of Public Schools would be forthcoming. The rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply where insistence on its observance
would result in the nullification of the claim being asserted.
 Accordingly, the judgment a quo is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
2. PEOPLE V. ALEGADO (MR)
GR 93030-31 | 08/21/1991 | GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Petitioner/s: People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee
Respondent/s: Alfredo Alegado y Delima, accused-appellant
SUMMARY: Accused stands charged and convicted in the LC with 2 counts of
statutory rape of Cristina Deang. The main contention in his appeal with the SC is
that it was not proven that the victim was below 12 years of age. Defense says the
evidence presented by the prosecution to establish age was hearsay. SC ruled that
we should just strangle this son of a gun. Kidding. SC said:
 Declarations in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted on
the principle that they are natural expressions of persons who must
know the truth. Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best
that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil might arise
from the rejection of such proof than from its admission.
 In the present case, sec. 39 Rule 130 is applicable. It requires 3 requisites
for its admissibility
(1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the
members of a family;
(2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person
concerned existed previous to the controversy; and
(3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding
the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said
person.
Page 28 of 50
 All these are obtaining here: the date of birth of the rape victim is being
put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to
tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching the age of seven)
existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness
testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape
victim.
FACTS
 Offended party herself filed 2 criminal complaints against accused for
rape: That on or about 7:00 p.m., April 20, 1988 at the Public Market,
San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court the above- named accused, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein
offended party, CRISTINA DEANG y VILLAROSA, a girl below twelve (12)
years of age, against her will and without her consent.
 The second complaint was exactly the same except it happened on or
about 6:00 p.m., April 14, 1988
 Pre-trial: both parties agreed to joint trial and stipulated on one fact—
that the accused, as watchman of San Carlos City Public Market, was
inside the premises on both occasions. They presented two common
issues: (1) WN offended party was actually below 12 y/o and (2) WN he
had carnal knowledge of her by means of force and intimidation
Fact as stated by Sol-Gen in the People’s brief:
April 14
 About 6:00 in the afternoon (yup), complainant was playing at Freedom
Square inside the public market when appellant, 170lb, 53y/o watchman,
held her hand and took her upstairs to the 2f of the public market bldg.,
which housed government offices, which was expectedly deserted
already by that time.
 Appellant ordered her to masturbate his penis and then to lie down. She
refused but he pushed her down and while lying on her back, he placed
himself on top of her while she was still wearing her pedal pusher shorts
and panty. He forced her to take them off and then tried to insert his
penis into her vagina but before he could fully penetrate (and fortunately
for our poor baby girl) he ejaculated.
 He then gave her Php 2.00 and left. Complainant stood up and went
down and never told anyone because she was afraid he’d kill her
April 20
 7:00 in the evening complainant was sitting at the Freedom Square when
appellant told her to go up with him again. She refused but appellant
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
shoved her toward the stairs and held her by the arm and brought to the
upper floor near the Civic center
 he ordered her to remove her shorts and panty which she refused. He
tried to take them off himself but she resisted and told him she would
not submit to his evil desires. Appellant threatened to kill her if she
wouldn’t take off her clothes. Then he tried to do it himself again and she
let him out of fear
 appellant was already without his pants and he forced her to lie down
and placed himself on top of her. He inserted his penis into her vagina
but it took some time to penetrate. When it did, she felt excruciating
pain and begged him to stop (). He ignored her and continued without
saying anything
 complainant felt liquid oozing from appellant’s organ and into her being.
After he’d withdrawn his organ, complainant discovered that her vagina
was bleeding. Appellant then stood up and told her not to tell anyone
and gave her Php 2.00
 As appellant was going down the stairs, patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro
(San Carlos INP assigned at precinct no.1, police outpost) saw him. She
knew him because he was the watchman. She then saw complainant
coming down the stairs looking pale, blood flowing thru her thighs and
legs, reeling as if feeling dizzy
 Alfaro asked her what happened and she answered that she was taken
upstairs and raped by appellant. Alfaro immediately brought her to the
city hospital for examination by Dr. Oscar Jagdon and he confirmed that
she was indeed raped. Alfaro reported the incident to the Station Guard
by phone then took the complainant to the police station. Appellant, who
was already in custody, was readily identified by complainant.
Complainant was then investigated and she rendered her statement to
the police
 Dr. Jagdon, who examined her at 8:40pm, found secretion inside
complaint's vagina along the cervical wall which, upon laboratory
examination, turned out to be sperm cells and that complainant's vagina
was lacerated
Appellant’s version as summarized in his brief:
 Alfredo Alegado testified that on April 14, 1988 at about 6:00 p.m., he
was on duty, he being a watchman of the public market. His tour of duty
is from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. the following day. Before 7:00 p.m. of that
day, he and his co-watchman roamed around the area checking the
padlocks of the stores if they are in order.
 At about 8:30 p.m., they closed all the doors of the vegetables section,
meat section and the dried fish section. He knows Cristina Deang who
Page 29 of 50
used to sell calamansi in the area. On April 14, 1988, he did not meet
Cristina Deang as he and his companions were then busy roving around
the area. On April 20, 1988, at about 5:00 p.m., he was having snacks at
Valdevia Street, with Cpl. Allarce and Lito Alverez.
 They stayed there until about 7:30 p.m. when to his surprise, he was
arrested and brought to the station by Pat. Apuhin and companions
including Pfc. Evangeline Alfaro. From 5:00 p.m., to 7:30 p.m. on April 20,
1988, he never met and/or saw Cristina Deang.
 Pfc. Evangeline Alfaro has been harboring ill-feelings on him when on a
certain occasion, he turned down her request to ask the four (4) armed
men whom they saw in the market (what they wanted)
 Sgt. Roland Allarce testified—he knew accused because he is assigned at
the police precinct in the public market. At about 5:00 p.m. on April 20,
1988, he was invited by Alfredo Alegado to have a snack at Namie's
Lunch. They finished having snack at about 6:00 p.m. Thereafter, Alfredo
Alegado and Lito Alverez invited him to go to Valdevia Street for a
drinking spree. He accepted their invitation and went with them. He
went out at about 7:00 p.m., leaving behind Alfredo Alegado in the store
 Lower court  found him guilty of statutory rape: WHEREFORE, finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
punished under Article 335 paragraphs 1 & 3 of the Revised Penal Code,
said accused is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA on both
counts, the sentences to be served successively, to pay the offended party
the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), and to pay costs of suit.
 Appeal to SC
ISSUE
 WN court erred in convicting appellant of statutory rape for failure to
prove the actual age of offended—NO. Court allows PEDIGREE to be
used to establish it.
 WN guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt—YES
HELD:
 Unmeritorious.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the amount of civil indemnity which the accused shall pay to
the offended party in each of the two rape cases is hereby increased to
P50,000.00.
RATIO
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO Page 30 of 50
Q Why do you know her?
AGE (EVIDENCE TOPIC!!!) A She is my granddaughter.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and Q If she is in court, would you able to point her?
her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was A Yes, sir. (At this juncture the witness is pointing to a person sitting inside the
born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence, but rather fall courtroom who when asked answered by the name of Cristina Deang.)
under the exceptions. Q Who is the mother of Cristina Deang?
 See sec. 39-40, Rule 130—“ The reputation or tradition existing in a A Angelita.
Q Angelita Villarosa?
A Yes, sir.
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any of its Q Is she your daughter?
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon A Yes, sir.

be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. ...” xxx
 “pedigree” under Section 39 of the same Rule includes relationship, Q You said, Cristina Deang was the daughter of your daughter, Angelita. Do you
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places know how many children does Angelita have?
where these facts occurred and the names of the relatives. A She has five (5) children.

 In Lazatin v. Campos—Declarations in regard to pedigree, although Q With whom is this Cristina Deang living now?

hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions A In our residence.

of persons who must know the truth. Pedigree testimony is admitted Q How did it happen that Cristina Deang has been living with you.
because it is the best that the nature of the case admits and because A The mother left her to me.

greater evil might arise from the rejection of such proof than from its Q When was it that the mother left her to you.
admission. (Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1420) A In 1983.

 In the present case, sec. 39 Rule 130 is applicable. It requires 3 requisites Q How old was Cristina Deang at the time her mother left her to you?
for its admissibility A The mother of Cristina Deang told me that she was born in 1976 and please let
(4) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of the her go to school.
members of a family;
(5) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person ATTY. BRIONES:
concerned existed previous to the controversy; and I would like to make it of record that the information gathered by the mother,
(6) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding Angelita, is a hearsay your Honor.
the pedigree of the person must be a member of the family of said
person. PROSECUTOR FABROZ:
 All these are obtaining here: the date of birth of the rape victim is being I would like to prove the fact about the birth of the child.
put in issue; that the declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to
tradition (sending a child to school upon reaching the age of seven) COURT:
existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness Let it stay in record.
testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape
victim. PROSECUTOR FABROZ:
 Court then quotes pertinent portions of Cornelio Villarosa’s testimony. Q By the way, do you have a talk or conversation with your daughter, Angelita,
I’m only reproducing the important parts but you can go to full text if you the mother of the complainant Cristina Deang, when was Cristina Deang born?
wanna see everything: A We did not talk about the birth of Cristina, but she told me to let her daughter
Cristina go to school because she is already 7 years old.
PROSECUTOR FABROZ: (to witness)
 Q Did you ask her about the birth of Cristina Deang?
xxx ATTY. BRIONES:
I think that is misleading your Honor.

Q The complainant in this case is a certain Cristina Deang. Do you know her? COURT:
A Yes, sir.
 Witness may answer.

 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
WITNESS:
 contention that the LC erred in concluding there was force and
A That is what she told me, she was born on September 5, 1976.
Xxx
 Moreover, complainant herself categorically stated that she was born on
September 5, 1976
 It has long been settled that that the testimony of a person as to his age
is admissible although hearsay and though a person can have no personal
knowledge of the date of his birth as all the knowledge a person has of
his age is acquired from what he is told by his parents, he may testify as
to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his
testimony in such case is an assertion of family tradition
 Inasmuch as accused-appellant failed to present contrary evidence to
dispute the prosecution's claim that the victim in this case was below
twelve (12) years old at the time of the rape incidents, we affirm LC
FORCE AND INTIMIDATION (NOT IMPORTANT FROM THIS POINT FORWARD)
 The only elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such woman is under twelve (12)
years of age.
 It is not necessary to prove that the victim was intimidated or that force
was used against her because in statutory rape the law presumes that
the victim on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will
of her own.
 But force and intimidation also appear on the records. The offended
party's testimony regarding the abominable and wicked acts of the
accused-appellant against her chastity on the two occasions indicated in
the separate informations filed by the victim herself was given in a
straightforward manner without any indication that the same was
motivated by any ill- feeling toward the pinpointed perpetrator.
 The fact of rape on the said occasions related by the offended party was
corroborated by the examining physician whose medical finding revealed
the presence of sperm cells inside the victim's sexual organ due to partial
penetration of the male organ into it.
 The slightest penetration of the female’s private organ is sufficient to
consummate
 Trial court did not err in disregarding alibi and denial. We accord great
respect to the trial court's findings of fact in the absence of a showing
that certain facts of substance and value were erroneously overlooked
that, if considered, might affect the result of the case
 SC commended LC for making a finding of force and intimidation even
when it was unnecessary in this case. There is no meat in accused’s
Page 31 of 50
intimidation
 The absence of external signs of physical injuries and the failure of the
victim to shout for help at the first opportunity do not negate the
commission of rape contrary to the accused-appellant's propositions. The
force used in rape cases need not be absolutely overpowering or
irresistible. What is essential is simply that the force employed was
sufficient to allow the offender to consummate his lewd purpose
SC is absolutely appalled (IMPT. FOR ALL PEOPLE)
We further note with approval the trial court's observation that the accused-
appellant's act of giving the offended party the sum of P2.00 after each of the
aforestated "forcible copulation" apparently as "full atonement for his dastardly
act" smacks of "insult a hundred times compounded." The accused-appellant,
despite the trial court's strong words, even had the gall to reiterate before us his
claim that the acceptance of the said measly amount of P2.00 was tantamount to
a tacit consent on the part of his victim. We deplore such a highly offensive and
depraved argument for we cannot allow the innocent and helpless victims of
unsolicited and forcible defloration to be brutally insulted while yet nursing their
irreparably wounded sexual purity. Considering the age of the victim, the
depravity of the crimes, and the psychological trauma involved, we increase the
indemnity to P50,000.00 in accordance with recent rulings.
3. TISON V. CA (NO)
G.R. No. 121027|| July 31, 1997|| Regalado J.
Petitioner: CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO
SUMMARY:
This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment.
Teodora Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband
Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him and consequently sold it to
Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces, Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller
seek to inherit by right of representation, the property disputed. Petitioners
presented several documents and the testimony of Corazon to prove their filiation
with Teodora as their aunt (Their dad’s brother). Respondent contended that the
documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the
affiants were never presented for cross-examination. RTC and CA ruled in favor of
respondents.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation, having
presented several documents and the testimony of Corazon as evidence. YES.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the
parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically
declared that the former is Teodora’s niece, as an exception to the hearsay rule
under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the
declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is subject to inquiry; (3) that
such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration;; and (4) that
the declaration be made ante litem moam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but
before any controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute as to the first, second and fourth requirements. As to the
third, where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both
claimant and declarant - not from the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate -
the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by
the declaration itself, but this requirement does not apply where it is sought to
reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right
through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family.
Where a party claims a right to the part of the estate of the declarant, the
declaration of the latter that the former is her niece is admissible and constitutes
sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no
other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason that such declaration is rendered
competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure
of justice.
FACTS:
 Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew of Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of petitioners’ father, Hermogenes
Dezoller.
 Teodora died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and
was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and petitioners.
 Martin, executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial
Settlement, adjudicating unto himself, the land in dispute, as a consequence
TCT No. 358074 was issued in his name.
 On 1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to Teodora Domingo and thereafter,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter’s name.
Page 32 of 50
 Martin died on October 25, 1988. Thereafter petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance, of a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon
located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally
owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero,
claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question
by right of representation.
 During the hearing, Corazon was presented as the lone witness, with the
following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners’ filiation to their
father and their aunt:
o a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and
Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of birth
of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller;
o death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and
Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller;
o joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting
to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora
Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora
Guerrero.
 Respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that petitioners
failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero
in accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code.
 Respondent also avers that the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar
of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely proof of the alleged destruction
of the records referred to therein, and the joint affidavit executed by Pablo
Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar certifying to the date, place of birth and parentage
of herein petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were
never presented for cross-examination.
 RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case of petitioners.
 CA also dismissed the appeal and held that the baptismal certificates, family
picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and
establish filiation.
ISSUE:
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
Whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation, having presented
several documents and the testimony of Corazon as evidence. YES.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are
declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4)
and three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.
RATIO:
Legitimacy Issue (Related to the outline issue but not the main issue of the
syllabus)
 RTC and CA erred in allowing the issue of legitimacy to be collaterally
attacked.
o The documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and
independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy
nor even of pedigree.
o The rulings of both courts are basically premised on the erroneous
assumption that, first, the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted
in an action for reconveyance, and second, that petitioners have the onus
probandi to prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation.
o It seems that both courts have regrettably overlooked the universally
recognized presumption on legitimacy.
o There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded
on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption
that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
 Rationale behind the presumption.
o The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code x x x actually fixes a
civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in
a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and
within the period limited by law.
o The necessity of an independent action is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: ‘The contest of the legitimacy
of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint
before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.
o This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the
code confirm this view, because they refer to “the action to impugn the
Page 33 of 50
legitimacy.” This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs
and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
o After the expiration of the period under Art. 170, legitimacy can no
longer be impugned. The intention of the law is to prevent the status of a
child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long
time. It aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity
of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter may still be
easily available.
 Only the husband may contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
o The husband is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule
which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether
to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic
interest involved.
o Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy;
Sabagay, how can you impugn matters which are obvious? For instance,
you cannot impugn the fact that JT’s tummy is full to bursting.
o When a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the
presumption exists does not have to introduce evidence to establish that
fact, and the party denying it must bear the burden of proof to
overthrow the presumption.
o Indubitably, when respondent opted not to present countervailing
evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to
evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact.
o Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that
presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the proponent
from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are
thereby considered as duly proved.
Pedigree Issue
 The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship
between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison
to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in
1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s niece.
o Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is
admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the
subject of inquiry;
(3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
(4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not
only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject
matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen
thereon.
o What remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not
the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding
the pedigree of petitioner Corazon.
o American Jurisprudence holds that:
One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through,
but not from, the declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration
regarding claimant’s pedigree, he may not do so by declarant’s own
statements as to declarant’s relationship to the particular family. The reason
is that declarant’s declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving
nature. Accordingly there must be precedent proof from other sources that
declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of the particular
family;.
But when the party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to claim
directly from the declarant or the declarant’s estate, the situation and the
policy of the law applicable are quite different. In such case the declaration
of the decedent, whose estate is in controversy, that he was related to the one
who claims his estate, is admissible without other proof of the fact of
relationship. While the nature of the declaration is then disserving, that is
not the real ground for its admission. Such declarations do not derive their
evidential value from that consideration, although it is a useful, if not an
artificial, aid in determining the class to which the declarations belong. The
distinction we have noted is sufficiently apparent; in the one case the
declarations are self-serving, in the other they are competent from reasons of
necessity.”
 The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a
relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant
himself or the declarant’s estate, the relationship of the declarant to the
common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself.
o As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the
declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where
it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to
establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other
member of the family.
Page 34 of 50
o We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one
instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be
relaxed.
o Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant
herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and
constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact
that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being
that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of
receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice.
o More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all
and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.
o From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the
sole basis of the decedent’s declaration and without need for further
proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero
o Where the subject of the declaration is the declarant’s own relationship
to another person, it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the
admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration
is offered to establish. (Hartman’s Estate, 107 P 105, cited in Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, 1980 ed., 322.)
 A protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made
at the proper time, otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived.
o Failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the
statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. That objection to a
question put to a witness must be made at the time the question is
asked. An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of
incompetency, taken after the testimony has been given, is too late
o The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private
respondent unreservedly cross-examined petitioners, as the lone witness,
on the documentary evidence that were offered. At no time was the
issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis for
objection thereto, ever raised.
FAMILY TRADITION (RULE 130, SECTION 40)
1. FERRER V. INCHAUSTI (HQ)
GR L-12993 | 10/28/1918 | TORRES, J.
Plaintiff-appellants: Rafael J. Ferrer, et al.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO Page 35 of 50
Defendant-appellees: Joaquin J. de Inchausti, et al.

SUMMARY:
Plaintiffs file a complaint praying for a declaration that Rosa Matilde Viademonte
(their mother) was a legitimate daughter of deceased Isabel with her first
husband. Thus, Rosa should have the right to succeed in the inheritance left by
Isabel, in the same proportion as the other four children (Ramon Jr, Rafael,
Joaquin and Clotilde). They allege that they are the legitimate children/heirs of
Rosa hence, are entitled to receive Rosa’s share (1/5 of Isabel’s estate). Plaintiffs
sought to establish that Rosa had been treated as Isabel’s daughter through 1.)
Isabel’s remarks that the father of Rosa is Ramon Sr.; 2.) Joaquin’s dedication (in a
picture) “To my dear and unforgettable sister Rosa” and 3.) College records of
Rosa. They were used to establish Rosa’s filiation with Isabel

Defendants, on the other hand, presented an entry in the notebook of Ramon Jr.
which showed the true name of Rosa Matilde was Rosa Matilde ROBLES, born of
unknown parents in September 1, 1952. Joaquin also testified that 1 day he was
assured by his half brother Ramon Jr. that Rosa was not his sister but a mere
protégée. Moreover, Joaquin said that Ramon Jr. showed him the certificate of
baptism which he took from the church (Exhibit 6 was presented as copy of
baptismal cert.). There are also other pieces of evidence which strengthen the
claim that Rosa was not really a legitimate daughter of Isabel. *Note:
Isabel’s heirs as distributed (1/4 each): Ramon Jr., Rafael, Joaquin, Clotilde
What plaintiffs want: (1/5 each): 4 heirs + Rosa Matilde (their mother)
W/N the testimony of Joaquin and the entry in Ramon Jr.’s diary were
admissible? YES. In view of the fact that Ramon Jr, is now dead, the testimony of FACTS
Joaquin Jose de Inchausti referring to the said deceased is admissible, for they are
 This appeal was taken through bill of exceptions from the judgment
members of the same family.
wherein it was held that Rosa Viademonte could not have been
On the diary of Ramon, evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and legitimate daughter of the deceased Isabel Gonzalez, who, on her death,
inscriptions in public places as evidence of common reputation; and entries in left some legitimate children.
family Bibles or other family books or charts; engravings on rings, family portraits  Hence, the plaintiffs should not be entitled to what they have demanded
and the like, as evidence of pedigree. Notably, the law does not require that the (share in the inheritance) and that they should pay the costs.
entries in the said booklet be made at the same time as the occurrence of those
events; hence, the written memorandum in the same is not subject to the defect  On May 12, 1916, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a complaint in the CFI Manila,
attributed to it. praying the rendition of a final judgment declaring that Rosa Matilde
had the right to succeed to the inheritance left by Isabel Gonzalez in the
same proportion and capacity as the other four children of the latter,
namely, Ramon, Rafael, Joaquin, and Clotilde.

 THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED THE FOLLOWING (pls. be guided by the chart

above)
o Plaintiffs are the only and legitimate heirs of the deceased Rosa
EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
Matilde and the only ones entitled to receive her share of the
inheritance left by Isabel Gonzalez (which 1/5 part of the Isabel’s
estate)
o Prayer: [RENDER AN ACCOUNTING] That the defendants should
render the plaintiffs an account of the fruits and
administration of all the property from the moment the said
community of property from the moment the said community of
property was constituted among them
o [DELIVERY] Thereafter, defendants should deliver to the
plaintiffs that part which corresponds to them, with all its
accession, fruits, and interests
o [PAY THE COSTS] the defendants should pay the costs
o That on her death, Isabel left a certain property in her marriage
with Jose de Joaquin de Inchausti, which would amount
approximately to P1,000,000 with its accessions, according to
present valuation
o On January 14, 1888, defendants received 1/4 of the estate left
by the deceased, excluding therefrom Rosa Matilde,
notwithstanding the fact that she had an equal rights to inherit
from Isabel
o Since January 1888 till his death, Ramon Jr. had been the
possessor and administrator of the 4th part of the inheritance
which he received
o Such portion of the property later came to the possession and
control of Rafael and on his death, this 4th part of the
inheritance came to the possession of Maria Consolacion Rico
(widow), in her capacity as guardian of her son Jose Rafael, and
part of it, to the possession of Maric Consolacion de Inchausti de
Ortigas
o A great part of the property which the defendants actual
possess, came from the young children, who received from
Isabel Gonzalez with the earnings and accessions thereof
o These children have been possessing it pro indiviso or in co-
ownership, in their lifetime, and in spite of the demands made
by the plaintiffs for the delivery to them by the defendants of
their corresponding share in the inheritance the latter have
always refused to do so
 CLOTILDE INCHAUSTI’S ANSWER:
o Admitted that the plaintiffs are the children of Rosa and
Benigno
o That Isabel was married first to Ramon Martinez, and
Page 36 of 50
afterwards to Jose Joaquin de Inchausti
o That on the death of her mother Isabel, on December 13, 1886,
her share in the conjugal partnership amounted to P191, 248.81
o On January 14, 1888, Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, as executor of
his wife, after paying the legacies mentioned in the testament,
paid to this defendant in cash the sum of P46,295.70 as her
hereditary portion in the liquidated property of her mother, and
likewise delivered to the other three sons of said Isabel similar
amounts
o After receiving her share of the inheritance from her mother,
she spent it all, and she no longer has any part of it, nor has
she left any portion of it during the last 30 years, and that
neither the plaintiffs nor their deceased mother had ever
possessed or enjoyed the said sum
o DENIED generally all the allegations of the complaint which are
not admitted, and DENIED specially the allegation that the
mother of the plaintiffs had ever married with their father
Benigno Ferrer
o DENIED that they (plaintiffs) and their mother (Rosa Matilde)
ever had the surname of Viademonte or Viademonte y
Gonzalez and that Rosa Matilde was a daughter of Isabel
 CLOTILDE’S DEFENSES:
o She alleged that her possession of the money derived from the
inheritance of her mother had been public, adverse, pacific,
continuous and under a claim of ownership, in good faith and
with just title, since January 14, 1888
o That never during the lifetime of the plaintiff's mother did she
make any claim or assert any right in the amount received by
this defendant (Clotilde) from the inheritance of her deceased
mother
o That more than 30 years had elapsed since she received the
inheritance of her deceased mother
o That the action for the plaintiffs has already prescribed in
accordance with the provisions of article 1955 of the Civil Code
and section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure
 MARIA DE LA CONSOLACION DE INCHAUSTI’S DEFENSES
o Similar to that of Clotilde
 MARIA’S ALLEGATIONS:
o That Ramon Jr., son of Isabel died on January 1, 1905, without
leaving any heirs, and bequeathed by will to his brother Rafael
(father of Maria dela Consolacion) all of his property, with the
EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
exception of some property of little importance which he had
bequeathed to others
o DENIED that any part of Ramon Jr.’s property had ever been
bequeathed to the children of said Rafael
o That, on the death of said Ramon Jr., his will was allowed to
probate, and all his remaining property delivered to Rafael,
that the title of the inherited land was registered by virtue of a
decree of the Court of Land Registration
o That said land was in turn inherited by this Maria from her
father upon the death of the latter, and that she appears in the
registry of property as owner of the same
o That upon the allowance of said will, the plaintiffs did not
present any claim to the commissioners appointed to appraise
the property, and that the period allowed for the presentation
of such claims expired on October 20, 1914, and that the action
now filed by the plaintiffs has prescribed
 MARIA DE LA CONSOLACION RICO Y MEDINA’S ANSWER (WIDOW):
o Admitted that Ramon Martinez Sr. and Isabel, both now
deceased, were in their lifetime husband and wife, and were
survived by a child named Ramon Martinez Jr.
o DENIED that Rosa Matilde was a daughter of that marriage or
of any of the said spouses
o Same admissions as to Ramon Jr. (no heirs, left properties to
Rafael)
o That Isabel (mother of her husband) executed a will wherein
she declared that she had a son with her first husband Ramon,
named Ramon Jr. and that with her second husband she had 3
children
o That Isabel instituted the said 4 children as the sole and
universal heirs to the remainder of her property in equal parts,
her property being the one half of the conjugal property had
during her marriage with her second husband Inchausti who had
survived her
o That no portion of the inheritance from the deceased Isabel
Gonzalez y Ferrer was adjudicated to the mother (Rosa
Matilde) of the plaintiffs
o That plaintiffs’ claims already prescribe.
 Plaintiffs’ REPLY:
o Denied generally and specifically each and all of the new facts
alleged in the answers of the defendants
o That the will of Isabel is null and void, inasmuch as it omitted
Page 37 of 50
Rosa Matilde
o That the defendants are estopped from denying that the
surname of Rosa Matilde was Viademonte and that she was a
daughter of Isabel with Ramon Sr. as the present defendants
have previously made declarations and formal affirmations,
written and oral, recognizing that the surname of Rosa Matilde
was Viademonte y Gonzalez
o That the plaintiffs are legitimate children of said Rosa Matilde
with Benigno Ferrer
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS AND DEFENSES
PLAINTIFFS DEFENSES
Isabel’s will is null and void Prescription
Defendants are estopped from Isabel instituted her 4 children
denying that Rosa was a legitimate (Ramon Jr, Rafael, Joaquin and
daughter of Isabel  defendants Clotilde) as sole and universal
made declarations and formal heirs; Rosa was omitted in the said
affirmations recognizing Rosa as their will (no portion was adjudicated to
sister her)
DENIED that Rosa Matilde was a
daughter of Isabel and Ramon Sr.
Plaintiffs are legitimate children of
(note: this will be determined by
Rosa
several pieces of evidence adduced
during the trial)
 TRIAL COURT  Rendered a judgment declaring that the plaintiffs
receive NOTHING in this action and pay the costs.
ISSUE:
 W/N Joaquin de Inchausti’s testimony and the diary accounts of Ramon
Jr. are admissible to prove the filiation (or the lack of) of Rosa Matilde
to Isabel? YES
 W/N plaintiffs are entitled to their share in the estate of Isabel? NO
(This is the main issue of the case)
HELD:
Affirmed. For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment
appealed from are deemed to have been refuted, the said judgment should be, as
it hereby is, affirmed and the defendants absolved from the complaint, with the
costs against the appellants.
RATIO:
ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PLAINTIFFS (W/N plaintiffs are legitimate children
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
of Rosa and Benigno) Note: Rosa made different/contradicting statements
regarding this
 While it appears that Rosa Matilde has, on various occasions, stated
that she was unmarried and never contracted a marriage, she has made
entirely different statements on other occasions.
 In the proceedings (Exhibit 8) instituted by Rosa Matilde against Rafael, it
was disclosed that she had never been married and that if her children
with Benigno Ferrer were baptized as legitimate children, it was so done
in order to conceal her dishonor
 On page 159 of the records of the said proceedings (Exhibit 8) it appears
that said Rosa Matilde stated under oath before a judge that she had
never married, and the same declaration was made by her on April 15th
of the same year in another case.
 In a document found on page 166 of said Exhibit 8, executed in 1890,
Rosa Matilde stated that she was a widow; but, in a document executed
in 1893, in a document executed in 1894, she made the statement that
she was unmarried.
 Rosa Matilde might have made these contradictions due perhaps to her
extreme poverty, which had prompted her to tell a lie before the courts
of justice, with the sole purpose of recovering the amount claimed by her
as her legacy, while, on the hand, it is undeniable that she could not duly
justify the marriage contracted by her with Benigno Ferrer.
ASSUMING THE PLAINTIFFS WERE LEGITIMATE CHILDREN OF ROSA, THEIR CLAIM
(SHARE IN THE ESTATE) SHOULD FAIL SINCE ROSA WAS NOT A LEGITIMATE
DAUGHTER OF ISABEL
 The evidence adduced at the trial to prove Rosa’s filiation, leaves no
room for doubt that Rosa Matilde was not a legitimate daughter of
Isabel Gonzalez, and it follows that her children as well as her privies
have no right to a part of the hereditary property of said Isabel Gonzalez.
Counsel for plaintiffs  Pretend to establish that Rosa Matilde had been treated
and considered as a daughter by Isabel
 That, on one occasion, said Gonzalez remarked that the father of Rosa
Matilde was Ramon Martinez de Viademonte
 That Joaquin dedicated a picture to Rosa Matilde in the following
manner: "To my dear and unforgettable sister Rosa.”
 That when Rosa Matilde entered the College de la Compania de Jesus,
her name as recorded in the registry of that college was Rosa Matilde
Viademonte, and her expenses were defrayed by Rafael and in the same
registry said Rafael appears as brother of Rosa
Page 38 of 50
 That Clotilde called Rosa Matilde her sister in her letters to Rafael Ripol
(first time mentioned in the case, don’t know who he is)
 That Joaquin himself in the codicil of his testament designates Rosa
Matilde with the surname of Viademonte.
From all the evidence adduced, it cannot be inferred that Rosa Matilde was born
during the marriage of Ramon Sr., with Isabel or within the 300 days after the
dissolution of their marriage by the death of the husband, nor has the said Ramon
Martinez de Viademonte, Sr., in his lifetime recognized said Rosa Matilde as his
daughter. (Note: Rosa was born way after the death of Ramon Sr.)
 If Rosa Matilde is a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzalez, it follows that
she was also a daughter of Isabel's husband, Ramon Sr, under the
assumption that she was born in the marriage of both or at a time prior
or subsequent to that of the celebration of the marriage, as fixed by law.
 At the trial, the death certificate of Ramon Sr., first husband of Isabel
Gonzalez, was not presented in evidence  but it is uncontroverted that
he died on September 30, 1836 (corroborated by the accountant of the
naval division of Puerto Galera in charge of the Leiutenant of the Spanish
Navy – payroll; and further by Isabel when she applied to the
Government for a pension sufficient to cover her widowhood expenses;
entry in the notebook of Ramon Jr.)
 Notwithstanding the fact that the death certificate of said Ramon Sr.
first husband of Isabel Gonzalez was not presented in evidence, still the
documentary and circumstantial evidence of record, especially the fact
of the marriage of his widow Isabel Gonzalez with Jose Joaquin de
Inchausti, some years after the death of Viademonte died before that
marriage or on September 30. 1836.
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANTS:
1. BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE (EXHIBIT 6)
 It appears in the certificate that on September 1, 1852, a child three days
old, born of unknown parents, was baptized in the Cathedral Church of
this city, and given the name of Rosa Matilde Robles.
 In view of the fact that the plaintiffs have not shown that such baptismal
certificate was not that of their mother Rosa Matilde, it remains proven
therefore that said certificate was presented as exhibit by Rafael in a
case concerning the delivery of a legacy instituted against Rosa Matilde,
who, instead of denying that such a baptismal certificate referred to her,
admitted that such certificate might have been hers.
2. DIARY/DAY BOOK OF RAMON JR.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
 On Page 9 of the day-book which Ramon Jr., kept during his lifetime,
appears a memorandum which says: On September 1, 1862, seven
o'clock in the evening a children three days old named Rosa Matilde
Robles, according to the baptismal certificate issued by the acting rector
Don Ramon Fernandez of the Cathedral Church of Manila, was delivered
to my mother; this child was baptized by the priest Don Remegio
Rodriguez with the authority of said rector, and according to the
baptismal certificate, it was a child of unknown parents."
 This memorandum agrees with the above-mentioned baptismal
certificate of Rosa Matilde Robles.
3. TESTIMONY OF JOAQUIN DE INCHAUSTI
 Notwithstanding the argument of plaintiff’s counsel, Joaquin stated that
one day he was assured by his half-brother Ramon Martinez
Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was not his sister, but that she was only
a mere protégée and that her true name was Rosa Matilde Robles, and
that on that occasion the said brother showed him the certificate of birth
of which Exhibit 6 is a copy, which he took from the parochial church.
SUPREME COURT: DOCTRINE ALERT!!!
Re: Testimony of Joaquin
 In view of the fact that Ramon Jr, is now dead, THE TESTIMONY OF
JOAQUIN JOSE DE INCHAUSTI REFERRING TO THE SAID DECEASED IS
ADMISSIBLE, FOR THEY ARE MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY, in
accordance with the provisions of section 281 of Act No. 190
 The conclusion is that Rosa Matilde is the same Rosa Matilde Robles
(mentioned in Exhibit 6) and because she was born in 1852, in no
manner could her be legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte and
Isabel Gonzalez whose marriage was dissolved in 1836 by the death of
the Ramon Sr.
 Notwithstanding the attempt of the plaintiffs to impugn the testimony of
said witness, said testimony is admissible according to section 263 of
the Code of civil Procedure which provides that when part of an act,
declaration conservation, or writing is given in evidence by one party,
the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other.
 Note: There were other pieces of evidence presented by the defense
stating that on the basis of Rosa’s age (as testified by witnesses,
declaration by Rosa to the notary public, document executed by Rosa
etc.), it was impossible for her to have been conceived during the
marriage or before the death of Ramon Sr. Hence, it bolsters the fact that
Rosa was NOT a legitimate daughter of Isabel with Ramon Sr.
Page 39 of 50
Re: Diary/Day Book of Ramon Jr.
 Counsel for plaintiffs objected to the admission in evidence of the day-
book kept by Ramon , Jr., during his lifetime, alleging that it has not been
proven that the entries in said book were made at the same time that
those events occurred
 That the witness who identified it did not see Ramon Jr., in the act of
making the said entries
 That, even if it were so, still the writing contained in the book, being a
mere memorandum of an interested party, cannot be admitted at the
trial.
 SUPREME COURT  The above objection can be met and disposed of by
the provisions of section 298, No. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (NOW
RULE 130, SEC. 40) which provides that evidence may be given upon trial
of monuments and inscriptions in public places as evidence of common
reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts;
engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, as evidence of
pedigree.
 DOCTRINE!!! THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE ENTRIES IN THE
SAID BOOKLET BE MADE AT THE SAME TIME AS THE OCCURRENCE OF
THOSE EVENTS; HENCE, THE WRITTEN MEMORANDUM IN THE SAME IS
NOT SUBJECT TO THE DEFECT ATTRIBUTED TO IT
 Witness Joaquin declared affirmatively that the memorandum under
consideration has been written in the handwriting of his brother Ramon
Jr., whose handwriting he was familiar with, and the testimony of this
witness contains some reference to a member of the family, now dead,
and concerning the family genealogy of the same.
In Sum: Rosa Matilde (and also her children – plaintiffs) is not entitled to her
share in Isabel’s estate:
Why?
1. She is not a legitimate daughter of Isabel
Plaintiffs: She is Isabel’s legitimate daughter  Isabel treated her as her
daughter, Joaquin’s picture dedication calling her sister and college
records showing her surname as “Viademonte”
Defendants: NO! She is not a legitimate daugher but a mere protegee 
Joaquin’s testimony, Ramon Jr.’s diary, copy of baptismal certificate and
lots of other pieces of evidence proving her lack of filiation to Isabel.
SC: In favor of defendants, Evidence admissible!
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
2. Even assuming Rosa was a natural daughter (not a protegee), she still cannot
inherit because, under the law on succession at time of Isabel’s death, natural
children cannot succeed their natural mother when the latter leaves legitimate
children on her death.
OTHER MATTERS:
W/N Rosa was a natural daughter of the deceased Isabel or was a mere protegee
cared for and maintained in the house of Isabel?
 The record does not furnish satisfactory proof that Rosa Matilde was a
daughter or at least a natural daughter of Isabel Gonzalez
 On the other hand, it is shown in the records of the case that she was a
protegee in the house of said Isabel, for, in a conciliation proceeding had
on April 15, 1893, between Rosa Matilde and Joaquin F. de Inchausti, it
appears in the record thereof that, although in some of the documents
presented to justify the accounts, Rosa Matilde called Rafael de Inchausti
her brother, this manner of calling him was due to the intimacy in which
both have been brought up from childhood in the same house, she being
a mere protegee of the latter's parents, and of because they were really
brother and sister.
 Ramon Jr., while yet living, told his brother Joaquinthat Rosa Matilde was
not their sister but only a protegee of their parents, whose name was
Rosa Matilde Robles. It is thus fully proven in the records of the case that
Rosa Matilde, the mother of the plaintiffs, was not a daughter of Isabel
Gonzalez.
Even supposing that Rosa Matilde was in fact a natural child of the deceased
Isabel Gonzalez, it cannot be disputed that the said Rosa Matilde could not inherit
from her supposed natural mother, Isabel (Note: Law on Succession was different
before)
 Since Isabel died in 1886, or some years before the Civil Code became
operative in these Islands, and therefore, the hereditary rights of the
successors of the said deceased should be determined in accordance
with the prior laws or the Law of Toro, which provides, among other
things, THAT NATURAL CHILDREN HAVE NO RIGHT TO SUCCEED TO
THEIR NATURAL MOTHER WHEN, ON HER DEATH, THE LATTER LEAVES
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN (so di rin sIla makaka-inherit kahit natural
daughter si Rosa)
 As in the present case, and for this reason it is useless to inquire as to
whether Rosa Viademonte or Robles was a natural or even an
Page 40 of 50
acknowledged natural child of Isabel Gonzalez
PLAINTIFFS CLAIM ALREADY PRESCRIBED
 Plaintiff’s action must be brought within ten years.
 He who brings an action for the partition or division of hereditary estates
or property in common is supposed to by a coheir and to have an
undisputed right to the property claimed or to be co-owner of the same
property possessed in common. He who claims a right to a part of an
inheritance of a deceased person, and who alleges that he is a relative of
the latter and has a right of testate or intestate succession thereto, has
for his principal object the recognition of his right to the inheritance
claimed by him and the delivery to him of his share as fixed by law.
SC also reprimanded plaintiff’s counsel for stating in their brief an affirmation to
the effect that the judge has established the fact that Rosa was born of Isabel,
when such affirmation does not appear in any part of the decision rendered by
the said judge.
COMMON REPUTATION (RULE 130, SECTION 41)
1. CITY OF MANILA V. DEL ROSARIO (APG)
G.R. No. 1284. November 10, 1905
Summary: This involves an action to recover the possession of 2 lots in Tondo. City
of Manila alleged ownership and possession over the land. But SC rendered a
decision in favor of Del Rosario. (In relation to our topic)Juan Villegas 3rd witness
said that the land in question was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and
that all the land included in it belonged to the city. His testimony is at variance
with that of Reyes. Villega’s testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he
had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city. His
testimony was introduced by the City of Manila apparently for the purpose of
proving that the city was generally considered the owner of the land. It does not
constitute the "common reputation" referred to in the section mentioned.
"Common reputation" is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of this
witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption referred to.
Facts:
 This is an action to recover the possession of the two lots describe in the
complaint, located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, at
present occupied by Del Rosario.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
 LC - in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for possession and
damages in the sum of $2,500.
Issue: WON City of Manila is entitled to the ownership and possession of the land
– NO. failed to prove ownership
 City of Manila introduced both documentary and oral evidence.
 Oral evidence consisted of the testimony of the following:
o John R. Lorenzo del Rosario 1st witness - he did not know of his
own knowledge if the land in question belonged to the city.
o Modesto Reyes (city attorney) 2nd witness - the land included in
Calles Clavel and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria,
which belonged to the Central Government (not the city), and
that he did not know to whom it now belongs. Note: referred to
the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, and not to the
lots described in the complaint. These lots abut upon the streets
referred to, but do not form a part of either. According to the
complaint, they are building lots.
o Juan Villegas 3rd witness - the land in question was formerly
included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it
belonged to the city.
 His testimony is at variance with that of Reyes. Villega’s
testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he
had learned from some of the oldest residents in that
section of the city.
 His testimony was introduced by the City of Manila
apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was
generally considered the owner of the land, drawing
from this fact the presumption of actual ownership
under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
 It does not constitute the "common reputation"
referred to in the section mentioned. "Common
reputation" is equivalent to universal reputation. The
testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish
the presumption referred to.
 He also stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga had been
partitioned between the municipality and the Central
Government, share and share alike, and that the
Central Government (not the city) retained Calles
Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely
the streets on which the property abuts.
Page 41 of 50
th
o Sotera Roco 4 witness - Lorenzo del Rosario had paid 100 pesos
to her brother Cipriano Roco for the purpose of instituting a
possessory information as to the property abutting on Calle
Clavel. Lorenzo del Rosario acquired the land from Cipriano
Roco and sold it to his brother Jacinto del Rosario, the
defendant in this case.
o Notwithstanding this, and assuming that the hearsay
testimony of Sotera Roco is admissible, we do not see
how it can be inferred from her testimony that the
plaintiff is the real owner of the property.
 Modesto Reyes and Lorenzo del Rosario said nothing as to the ownership
of the land. They simply testified as to the authenticity of some of the
documentary evidence introduced by the plaintiff.
o Most important document - petition presented by Lorenzo del
Rosario to the "mayor of the city of manila" on the 26th of
September, 1891, and the letter written by him on the 9th of
October, 1901, to the Municipal Board of Manila.
o Lorenzo del Rosario admitted:
 Authenticity of both documents which contain an offer
to the municipality of Manila to purchase the land on
Calle Clavel.
 He signed the first document under the
misapprehension that the land belonged to the city,
but that he had been subsequently informed by some
of the city officials that the land did not belong to the
municipality, but to Cipriano Roco y Vera.
 he signed the second document because the President
of the Municipal Board, Señor Herrera, advised him to
do so in order to avoid litigation with the city. -
contradicted.
 An offer of compromise is not admissible in evidence.
 Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document before he acquired from
Cipriano Roco y Vera the ownership of the land referred to therein, the
second document being signed after he had transferred the land to the
defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of the same and had
it registered, as the plaintiff admits, on the 23d of February, 1893.
 If this is so, whatever statements Lorenzo del Rosario might have made
in the documents mentioned, they are not binding upon the defendant,
because, under section 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "where one
derives title to real property from another, the declaration, act, or
omission of the latter, in relation to the property, is evidence against
the former only when made while the latter holds the title."
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
 The plaintiff also introduced in evidence a map of the city of Manila. In
order to show that it has no value as evidence, that the reliability of the
map was not proven at the trial. The only witness examined with regard
to it was the city attorney.
o He was unable to say who made it or who caused it to be made,
or when it was made.
o He said only that he believed the map had been drawn in the
month of July, 1880, or prior to May, 1893.
o Neither this nor his statement that the map was found among
the archives of the city of Manila is of itself sufficient to show
that the map is authentic.
o No one appears to certify as to its correctness.
 The map identified by the witness John R. Wilson was introduced by the
plaintiff for the sole purpose of showing the location of the land in
question. - no value in establishing the right of possession
 The two public instruments executed on March 7, 1900, between the
defendant and Telesfora Apostol y Perea, also introduced in evidence by
the plaintiff, show that the defendant was in possession of the land
under a good title and with the status of owner of the land.
o Defendant is the owner in fee simple of the land, he having
repurchased it from Liberio de Aurteneche y Menchacatorre,
whose title had been recorded in the property register.
 The documents presented tended to support the contentions of the
defendant rather than those of the plaintiff.
 Plaintiff itself admits in the complaint that the defendant’s possession of
the land in Calle Barcelona was recorded since March, 1901, and his
possession of that in Calle Clavel since February, 1893.
o This shows that the defendant had been in the adverse
possession of the land.
o According to article 448 of the Civil Code he must be presumed
to hold under a just title, unless the contrary is shown.
RES GESTAE (RULE 130, SECTION 42)
1. PEOPLE V. LUNGAYAN (AJG)
GR L-64556 | 06/10/1988 | GANCAYCO, J.
Plaintiff: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Ceferino Lungayan
Page 42 of 50
SUMMARY
This is a case of rape against Ceferino, the barangay captain, allegedly committed
against a widow previously married 3 times, Agripina. Agripina was sleeping on
her room when Ceferino went by their house, waking her up, and told her to go
with him to observe certain violators of a barangay ordinance prohibiting liquor
after 10pm in the canteen near their house. Agripina went with him, but wihout
wearing a panty/brassiere. While observing the people from the outside, Ceferino
grabbed her, pointed her gun and threatened to kill if she resisted. They went to
the banana grove and consummated the sexual act there. Agripina went home
12am (after 2 hours). When asked what happened by her daughter, she told her
that Ceferino abused her, and for the details, she told her daughter that she
would tell her the next day. (1) WN accused is guilty – NO, because while there
are circumstances evidencing the comsummation of the act, the environmental
circumstances tells them that there was no involuntariness involved (look at the
reasons of the SC nakakatawa). (2) WN the statement of Agripina to her daughter
constitutes part of the res gestae – NO, because the statement must not only be
spontaneous, but must also be made at a time when there was no opportunity for
her to develop her own story. Agripina had enough time to make a decision on
what will be the nature of her story while going home.
FACTS
 This is a prosecution for a crime of rape. The parties to the case are:
o The victim is Agripina Juan vda. De Garzota, 52 years old, a
widow, 3 times married, resident of Bgy. Oscariz, in Ramon,
Isabela.
o The accused is Ceferino Lungayan, Barangay Captain of Oscariz.
 Agripina was asleep inside the room at their market stall in the public
market of Bgy. Oscariz. Her two married daughters are with him, Silveria
and Leticia. (Letica’s husband is a certain Berting Garcia, irrelevant).
 At about 10pm, Silveria heard someone knock at their door, and she saw
Ceferino there. Ceferino asked if her mother was in, and Silveria
answered yes, but she is asleep. Nevertheless, Ceferino still entered the
room and woke up Agripina (naks close sila ha, papasok nalang ng
ganun!), inviting her to join him to observe the persons drinking wine in
the market stall identified as Linda’s canteen in violation of the barangay
ordinance prohibiting the same after 10pm.
 Agripina joined him to the canteen, which is only one market stall away.
They stood about 2 meters away from the open door of the canteen for
10 minutes, standing side by side without talking to each other while
observing the people.
EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
 Suddenly, Ceferino grabbed both hands of Agripina, and Agripina reacted
by shouting very loud only once. Her cries could not be heard by the
people inside the canteen because of the loud stereo player.
 The accused slapped her and brought out his gun which he pointed at her
breast threatening to kill her if she creates any noise. He then pulled her,
so she fell on the ground hitting her head on the pavement. She lost
consciousness, and sustained injuries on the palms of her hands.
 After regaining consciousness after a short while, she was dragged by the
accused towards the banana grove near the market. She managed to
stand and walk while being dragged.
 The accused then carried her body across the canal and dropped her on
the ground, flat on her belly, fingers again injured by the broken glasses
on the ground.
 While pressing her down, Ceferino proceeded to remove her skirt and
shorts, and thereafter her blouse, leaving her naked with her back to the
ground. She was not wearing any panty or brassiere then (Landi ni ateng.
Pwede naman magsuot nun before pumunta sa canteen).
 The accused stepped on her thigh with his left foot as he went on top of
her naked body, warning not to make any noise, repeating the threat to
kill her is she insisted.
 Then Ceferino started mashing her breast and succeeded in having sexual
congress with Agripina. She felt his penis penetrating her vagina followed
by a push and pull movement for less than an hour, until she felt semen
emitting from his penis and entering her body.
 After a while, he stood up, put on his pants and warned her not to tell
her children about what he had just done to her or ask for help for he will
kill her. He left her in tears. After the accused had gone, complainant put
on her shorts and shirt which were muddy as it previously rained that day
and went home still crying.
 When she reached about 12:00 midnight (wow 2 hours kang nawala),
Silveria asked her mom what happened. She revealed that the accused
abuse her. When pressed for details, Agripina replied that she will tell her
the following morning, which she did.
 Agripina proceeded to Santiago town the next morning and reported the
incident to Mr. Segundo Maylem (post commander and Executive Vice
Chapter commander of VFP (nagresearch ako sabi Veterans Foundation
of the Philippines, not sure if police to or something) Isabela.
 She was investigated and examined by Dr. Villarico, chief of the Cagayan
Valley Sanitarium Hospital.
 After due investigation by the Philippine Constabulary, a complaint for
rape was filed.
Page 43 of 50
 Trial court convicted Ceferino.
ISSUE
 WN Ceferino is guilty – NO.
 For our purposes, WN the statement given by Agripina to her daughter 2
hours after she left home (12am) may be considered part of the res
gestae, hence admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule – NO.
HELD:
 Meritorious.
 Judgment appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accused is
ACQUITTED.
RATIO
 Basically, the SC attacked the involuntariness of what happened. They
said that it may be inferred from the facts presented that the sexual
congress was voluntary.
 There is no question that there was sexual congress between the
complainant and the appellant on that fateful evening. The medical
findings and the analysis of the court a quo to this effect is well- founded.
o However, the environmental circumstances of the case militates
against the claim of employment of force or intimidation in the
perpetration of the act.
 Being married 3 times, Agripina was not that innocent about the world.
When appellant invited her at 10:00 P.M. to step out of her house, she
should have declined. Going out alone with a man late in the evening is
not in good taste nor safe even if the one who invited her was the barrio
captain. Instead, she should have suggested that the appellant invite
some other person for the purpose
 But obviously, the appellant was quite intimate with the complainant.
When he knocked at her door and was allowed entry, he proceeded into
the bedroom of complainant and woke her up himself.
 Complainant went with the appellant in her shorts. She took no
precaution as any discreet woman would do by at least putting on her
panty and a brassiere instead of stepping out with the appellant in her
shorts.
 If she could not be heard as her voice was drowned by the blaring stereo
player, she should have shouted louder again and again. Better still, she
should have ran towards the canteen which was just two meters away or
to her residence which was one market stall away. After allegedly
shouting once, she kept her peace.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
 She was allegedly dragged although she admits she willingly walked
along. She was allegedly carried across the canal by the appellant
although she was taller and definitely bigger than appellant.
 The appellant removed her shorts and skirt without difficulty. She
offered no resistance. Even as he stood up to remove his pants she did
not attempt to stand up to escape nor to shout for help. There was no
sign of struggle or resistance. They had sexual intercourse for almost one
hour.
 Her claim that she was afraid due to the gun must fail because she did
not even describe the type of gun used to threaten her, nor had the
prosecution shown Ceferino ever had a gun.
 She went home after 2 hours. Apparently, she still moved around or
spent sometime alone for about one hour. She must have contemplated
what to do with her clothes all muddy.
 When she reached home she was confronted by her daughter as to what
happened. She had no choice but to tell her that she was abused by
appellant but she was not prepared to reveal everything. She promised
to tell all the details to her daughter the following day. She thought
about her predicament the whole night. She had no choice. She must
have to tell everything the following day (So guys beware of what you
think. SC is the ultimate mind reader)
 Such mutual and passionate lovemaking can certainly not be
characterized as involuntary. It was free and without any compulsion.
 The appellant was 48 years old when the incident happened. To think
that a younger man would rape an elderly woman of 52 years, widow,
three times married, would be quite unusual. It is more probable that it
was consensual.
FINALLY RES GESTAE PART ETO NA
 The trial court considered the revelation of the complainant to her
daughter Silveria of what happened to her when she returned home as
part of the res gestae. This is wrong.
 It is important to stress that her statement must not only be (1)
spontaneous, but also (2) made at a time when there was no
opportunity for her to concoct or develop her own story.
 Why not part of res gestae? I’ll give you the reason, a little bit’s enough:
o As the Court observed, the complainant did not immediately go
home after the sexual encounter. She took a walk. She spent
sometime thinking of what to do. Her clothes were muddy. She
had some bruises on her body and back because she was lying
down on the ground during the sexual intercourse and their
passionate interlude. She had enough time to make a decision
Page 44 of 50
on what will be the nature of her story. Her revelation cannot
thus be categorized as part of the res gestae.
TO SUM: Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds
that if there was any sexual congress between appellant and complainant, it was
upon their mutual consent. There was no compulsion or force. The version of the
complainant is far from credible. A verdict of acquittal is in order.
2. PEOPLE V. PUTIAN (JT)
GR L -33049 | 11/29/1976 | AQUINO, J.
Accused: Guillermo Putian, alias Guirmo
Deceased: Teodulo Panimdim alias Doling [21 years old]
Patrolman: Arturo Yap
Witness of Defense: Anacleto Taporco, assistance provincial board secretary
SUMMARY
Accused Guirmo stabbed Panimdim at a dance hall. Yap happened to pass by so
arrested Guirmo, who he suspected was the suspect in killing Panimdim. In the
hospital, and after the incident, Panimdim made a dying declaration, with Yap
taking it down. Basically Panimdim imputed the crime to someone named
Guirmo. Since Guirmo Putian was the only Guirmo in the community, Yap had him
arrested. Guirmo was convicted of murder by treachery by the CFI. On appeal to
the SC, the SC said that the dying declaration made by Guirmo is not admissible,
because at the time of making it, Guirmo was not under consciousness of an
impending death. However, if such declaration was made at the time of, or
immediately after, the commission of the crime, or at a time when the exciting
influence of the startling occurrence still continued in the declarant's mind, it is
admissible as a part of the res gestae.
FACTS
This is an appeal from the decision of Misamis Occidental CFI, convicting
Guillermo Putian alias Guirmo, of the murder by treachery of Teodulo Panimdim,
the deceased.
On 22 November 1969, Panimdim was attending a dance at Barrio Tabo-o in
Jimenez, Misamis Occidentel. There, Panimdim was stabbed at his left groin.
During that time, as alleged by prosecution, Patrolman Arturo Yap was passing by
when he noticed a commotion at the barrio dance hall. He was informed that
someone had been stabbed. He found the accused Guirmo behind the municipal
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
building, with a dagger and a scabbard in his possession. [If you don’t know what
a scabbard is, google it. Sobrang cool lang.] When asked, Guirmo denied stabbing
Panimdim. Yap arrested Guirmo and surrendered him to the guard at the
municipal hall.
Yap thereafter went to the clinic of Doctor Saceda, where Panimdim was brought
for treatment. There, Yap wrote on a piece of paper Panimdim’s dying declaration,
reproduced in full below:
ANTI-MORTEM Nov. 22,1969
Name of Victim — Teodolo Padimdim (should be Panimdim)
Age — 21 single
Place — Palilan, Jimenez
Who stabbed you? — Guirmo Putian
Where? — Outside the dancing hall of Tabo-o
Why? None
What time? — 11:30 P.M.
Do you think you can suffer your wound? — Yes
Who is your companion? — Miguel Quilo, Victorino Padimdim
Who is the companion of Guirmo? — I don't know their names because
they are plenty
Can you sign your name in this anti-mortem? — Yes
Statement taken by Pat. Yap.
Sgd. Teodulo Panimdim
TEODULO PANIMDIM
Sign in the presence of
1. Victorino Panimdim
2. Ben Ybalane [sounds like Ruben Balane!]
3. Miguel Quilo
Witnesses
When the statement was taken, Panimdim was in a sitting position. After Yap
advised him to go to a hospital [take note nasa clinic lang them], Panimdim stood
up and flexed his muscles. He said not to worry because the wound was small. He
got dressed, left the clinic, and went back to his house without any assistance
whatsoever.
NOTE, however, that when filling up the “dying” declaration above, Panimdim did
not know the accused Guirmo’s surname. He only knew of a Guirmo, but not the
Page 45 of 50
last name. It was Yap that filled in the last name of Guirmo, which is Putian. Yap
clarified that he wrote the surname down because he knew of only one Guirmo in
the community, and that Guirmo is Guirmo Putian.
The next day, Panimdim was brought to the hospital. Despite having an operation,
he died on 27 November [five days after the assault, which rhymes with a salt].
The attending physician stated that the wound, caused by a two-bladed dagger
[“punyal”], in the left groin actually penetrated his large intestine. The actual
cause of death was toxemia secondary to general peritonitis.
Defense presented only one witness: Anacleto Taporco, who is the current
assistant provincial board secretary and former candidate for mayor. Taporco
claimed to be a friend of Panimdim, and a close friend of Guirmo.
Taporco said Panimdim asked Taporco’s permission to box Rogelio Opos, but
Taporco said not to, because he does not want a trouble. Panimdim obeyed
initially but then came back and asked if he could punch Opos. Taporco dissuaded
him and led him out the dance hall. Thereafter, Taporco learned that a
commotion ensued, but the entire time, Guirmo was inside the dance hall.
The trial court, in convicting Guirmo, regarded Panimdim’s antemortem statement
as part of the res gestae. The court admitted such statement as a spontaneous
statement made after the commission of a felony. However, it did not give it any
probative value as a dying declaration because at the time Guirmo made it, he
was not under consciousness of an impending death.
ISSUE/HELD—WN the antemortem statement of Panimdim formed part of the res
gestae—YES.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION—The trial court's decision is modified. Appellant Putian is
convicted of homicide. As the commission of the crime was not attended by any
modifying circumstances, he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years of prision mayor as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal
medium as maximum. The indemnity of P12,000 fixed by the trial court is
affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
RATIO
What is the res gestae?
 Rule 130 Section 36 of the RoC [back then] states: “Statements made by
a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior
or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as a part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as a part of the res gestae.”
 The res gestae rule embraces—
a. Spontaneous exclamations, and
b. Verbal acts
Contentions of the parties
 Guirmo says that Panimdim’s statement was not spontaneous because it
was made several hours after the incident
o The requisite that the deceased gave the statement before he
had time to devise or contrive was not present
o And, since the statement was in narrative form, it was not in the
form as contemplated in the rule
 SolGen says that Panimdim’s answers were spontaneous, candid,
straightforward
o The statement was devoid of any design or deliberation
o The statement was in question-and-answer form
o He argues that the fact that Yap placed Guirmo’s surname in the
statement did not destroy the probative value
o He says that, in many cases, a declaration made by a person
immediately after being wounded, pointing out or naming his
assailant, may be considered as part of res gestae and is
admissible in evidence
The trial court did not err in considering the statement as part of res gestae—
IMPT!
 Although a declaration does not appear to have been made by Panimdim
under the expectation of a sure and impending death, and, for the
reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, yet if such declaration
was made at the time of, or immediately after, the commission of the
crime, or at a time when the exciting influence of the startling occurrence
still continued in the declarant's mind, it is admissible as a part of the res
gestae [copied in full cause this is the main doctrine of the case]
o Panimdim's statement was given sometime after the stabbing
while he was undergoing treatment at a medical clinic.
o He had no time to concoct a falsehood or to fabricate a
malicious charge against Guirmo
o No motive has been shown as to why he would frame up
Guirmo
Conviction
 Treachery was not proven
Page 46 of 50
o The prosecution failed to show the manner in which the wound
was inflicted
 Thus, the proper crime imputable to Guirmo is homicide
 The trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime.
o Nocturnity is not aggravating in this case because it was not
purposely sought by the offender to facilitate the commission of
the crime.
 Thus, Guirmo is guilty of homicide.
3. PEOPLE V. TOLENTINO (AD)
G.R. No. 87085 February 2, 1993
People of The Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,
Manolito Tolentino @ "Bong", Carlito Tala @ "Boy", Rodolfo Matawaran and @
John Doe, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellants.
SUMMARY: Adelaida Lingad left her niece, Grace Paule AND her three (3)
children: Geraldine (Irene), Glenly and Enrique, all minors, at home to attend the
wake of her uncle in a house 200 meters away from her place. The children were
the only ones left at home. At around 1am or 2am of Nov. 8, the 3 accused and
an unknown person whose face was covered entered the house of Adelaida
Lingad by forcibly breaking the window grill of the comfort room and demanded
to know from the children where their mother hid her money. After Tolentino
took the P4,000 he stabbed Grace Paule and the three other children were then
stabbed one after the other. Adelaida immediately rushed to her house. Upon
reaching GERALDINE, who was lying at the porch, she asked her the identities of
the person responsible for stabbing them with the latter answering "Bong-Bong"
and also mentioning the names of Boy and Matawaran. Defendants argue that the
statement of Geraldine, naming her assailant soon after she was stabbed is
inadmissible as part of res gestae. The SC held that trial court had correctly
applied the principle of res gestae, namely:
1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;
2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and
3) that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
FACTS:
 This is an appeal by accused Carlito Tala alias "Boy" from the decision of
the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga, in Criminal Case No. G-1627, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
o Finding that the evidence has reached a degree of moral
certainty that all the elements of the crime of robbery with
homicide were adequately proven the three accused Tolentino,
Matawaran and Tala should be found guilty of the crime
charged. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused Manolito Tolentino alias "Bong", Carlito Tala alias "Boy"
and Rodolfo Matawaran guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals by direct participation of the crime of Robbery with
Multiple Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries as charged in
the Amended Information, with the attendance of the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of
superior strength and there were more than one victim, without
modifying circumstance with respect to accused Carlito Tala
alias "Boy" and Rodolfo Matawaran to offset the same, but with
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty with respect
to Manolito Tolentino, and hereby sentences each of said
accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the
accessory penalties of the law,
 On January 24, 1984, accused-appellant "Boy" together with "Bong",
Rodolfo Matawaran and one John Doe were charged for the crime of
ROBBERY WITH MULTIPLE HOMICIDE AND SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES in
an Amended Information committed as follows:
o That on or about the 8th of November, 1983, in the municipality
of Lubao, province of Pampanga, Philippines, accused "Bong",
"Boy", RODOLFO MATAWARAN and alias JOHN DOE, conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another with grave
abuse of confidence, nighttime purposely sought to facilitate the
commission of the offense, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner and by the use of force
upon things, to wit: by forcibly breaking a wooden window grill
of the comfort room to effect entrance into the said house and
once inside, did then and there take, steal and carry away with
them cash money amounting to P4,000, belonging to Domingo
Lingad Jr., to the damage and prejudice of said owner; that on
the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling
Page 47 of 50
them to take, steal and carry away the amount above-
mentioned, herein accused in pursuance of their conspiracy, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with
evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior in
number and strength and with deliberate intent to kill, armed
with a scythe, treacherously attack, assault and stab GLENLY
LINGAD, 10 years of age, ENRIQUE LINGAD, 8 years of
age, IRENE LINGAD, 11 years of age, inflicting upon them serious
and fatal injuries which directly caused the death of Glenly
Lingad, Enrique Lingad and Irene Lingad and likewise causing
Serious Physical Injuries upon GRACE PAULE, 13 years of age,
which injuries have required and will require medical
attendance for a period of more than thirty (30) days and will
incapacitate said Grace Paule from performing her customary
labor for the same period of time.
 Upon arraignment, accused Tala, Tolentino and Matawaran pleaded "Not
Guilty" while their co-accused named only John Doe in the Amended
Information pleaded “Guilty”… lol joke was never identified by the
prosecution nor arrested. However, during the initial hearing of this case,
accused Manolito “Bong” Tolentino change his plea from "Not Guilty" to
"Guilty" in open court.
 The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
 At around 7 p.m. of November 7, 1983, Adelaida Lingad left her niece,
Grace Paule AND her three (3) children namely: Geraldine (Irene),
Glenly and Enrique, all minors, at home to attend the wake of her uncle
in a house 200 meters away from her place. The children were the only
ones left at home. Her husband was then working abroad. At that time,
Adelaida had P4,000 in cash which was wrapped in newspaper and kept
hidden under her bed. Before leaving the house, Adelaida instructed the
kids to go to bed (maaga pa po..).
 At around 1am or 2am of Nov. 8, the 3 accused and an unknown person
whose face was covered entered the house of Adelaida Lingad by
forcibly breaking the window grill of the comfort room and demanded
to know from the children where their mother hid her money. Grace
Paule knew Manolito “Bong” Tolentino because he is both an uncle and a
barriomate. She also knew Carlito “Boy” Tala who is a relative of her
mother and Rodolfo Matawaran who is a "barkada" of “Boy”. She
recognized all the accused for the lights were on. When the man whose
EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
face was covered threatened to stab the kids, Geraldine got so frightened
that she revealed to the accused where her mother hid the money.
 After Tolentino took the P4,000 he stabbed Grace Paule (omg) with a
scythe while the other three accused held the three other children who
were then stabbed one after the other by Bong (grabe). During the
stabbing incident, Grace Paule lost consciousness but was able to regain
it back after about 5 minutes and shouted for help. Her mother and
grandmother, who lived nearby, heard her and immediately proceeded
to said house but the four accused had already left.
 When Bong's brother informed Adelaida about the stabbing incident that
took place in her house, Adelaida immediately rushed to her house and
saw all the children with stab wounds. Glenly was lying on the bed
already dead (shocks) while her bloodied niece Grace was sitting down
near the door looking pale and holding her heart. Upon reaching
GERALDINE, who was lying at the porch, she asked her the identities of
the person responsible for stabbing them with the latter answering
"Bong-Bong" and also mentioning the names of Boy and
Matawaran. However, when she asked her son Enrique the later was not
able to answer but merely made a sign with his 3 fingers (ala 3-finger
salute of Catniss, Hunger Games lol). Thereafter, Adelaida lost
consciousness and was brought to the house of her mother.
 Upon reporting said incident to the authorities, Adelaida together with 3
policemen went back to her house and investigation was conducted
where it was discovered that the accused entered into the house by
destroying the middle portion of the wooden bars of the comfort room.
 Meanwhile, the children were brought to the Central Luzon General
Hospital where Glenly was pronounced dead on arrival and Enrique
eventually died (cue boom of the canon, a tribute has fallen) after
undergoing an unsuccessful surgery. Geraldine who was operated twice
at the Makabali Hospital also succumbed to her untimely death.
 Grace Paule was the only surviving victim of this horrible and harrowing
experience and testified that she was awaken by the 4 accused who
entered the house of her aunt in the early morning of November 8, 1983
and subsequently stabbed her and her three 3 cousins. She positively
identified the three (3) accused because accused Manolito “Bong”
Tolentino is her uncle as well as her barriomate and accused-appellant
Page 48 of 50
Carlito “Boy” Tala is a relative of her mother while accused Rodolfo
Matawaran is the “barkada” of Boy.
DEFENSE Argument #1:
 Accused-appellant Boy denied having been in the house of Adelaida
Lingad on that fateful morning and maintained that at around 11 p.m. of
November 7, 1983, he and accused Matawaran were delivering
watermelons at Saging, Dinalupihan, Bataan. Thereafter, they went to
Samal to return the trailer where the watermelons were loaded and
proceeded to his house in Lourdes, Lubao, Pampanga. On their way
home, they passed the house of Adelaida Lingad and noticed nothing
unusual. They arrived at his house at around 3 a.m. of November 8, 1983
and slept there.
 In rejecting the defense of alibi, the trial court correctly stated as follows:
o Inasmuch as the two accused, Boy and Matawaran, were riding
in a jeep and the scene of occurence is only a 30 minutes drive
from their place of destination, which is Dinalupihan, Bataan, it
is [still] possible for them to reach their alleged destination
and come back to Lourdes, Lubao, Pampanga in time to
participate in the commission of the offense. Their painful and
laborious effort to extend the period of time especially the three
hours to load the watermelons is pitiful in its incredibility. The
indubitable fact remains that despite all allegations alleging alibi
the accused Boy and Matawaran slept in Lourdes, Lubao and
were in fact apprehended there.
o It must be noted that the alibi in order to be given full faith and
credit must be clearly established and must not leave any room
for doubt as to its plausibility and verity.
o In order that alibi as a defense may prosper, the evidence to
support it must be clear and convincing as to preclude the
possibility of the accused's presence at the scene of the crime
while the evidence as to his identification must be weak and
insufficient.
o Foremost and above all, it is essential that the defense of alibi
cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness who
clearly identified them as two of the cohorts of Manolito “Bong”
Tolentino.
o It is clear that in this case that the accused Tala and Matawaran
failed to establish the credibility of their defense of alibi, first, as
the facts narrated by them were not clear and convincing,
second, there exist a wide room for doubt as to the plausity and
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO
verity of their testimonies, and finally, their defense of alibi is
belied by the positive identification made by Grace Paule.
DEFENSE Argument #2:
 Boy argues that no probative value should be given to the extrajudicial
statement of Grace Paule while she was still staying at the Makabili
Hospital, since his name and that of accused Matawaran were not
mentioned by her as the unnamed companion of Bong, thereby
indicating that the witness really had no inkling as to his participation in
said crime until Mang Medrano supplied her their names.
o However, this does not convince us of the want of probative
value of said statement of Grace Paule.
o True that Grace failed to mention the names of Boy and accused
Matawaran in her extrajudicial statement, but considering the
fact that at the time her statement was taken she was then
groggy and delirious from the stab wound she sustained but
was nevertheless, able to positively identify accused-appellant
on the witness stand as one of the persons who stabbed her
and the children. We find Grace's testimony credible. There is
no evidence on record to show why said witness would falsely
implicate Boy who is a relative of her mother unless it is the
truth. There being no improper motive on her part to point to
accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime
charged, Grace's testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit. Moreover, her testimony was corroborated by
prosecution witness Adelaida Lingad when the latter testified
that her deceased daughter Geraldine mentioned the names of
the Boy and Matawaran as the persons who stabbed her before
10
she died.
DEFENSE Argument #3: (DOCTRINE ALERT)
 As to accused-appellant's contention that the statement of Geraldine,
naming her assailant soon after she was stabbed is inadmissible as part
of res gestae, we find said contention fallacious. The testimony of
Adelaida Lingad, as mother of the victims belied the accused-appellant's
allegation:
o Fiscal Abiog: May I make it of record that all these three accused
were properly or positively identified by the witness. Now, Mrs.
Witness, when we initially hear this case, you testified that you
asked Geraldine who was then at the porch, you asked her as
to who stabbed or caused those stabbed wounds and you
testified that she told you she was stabbed by a certain Bong-
Page 49 of 50
Bong. Now, in the courtroom, you pointed out to a certain
person which you recognized or you know to be Manolito
Tolentino, do you know the nickname of that Manolito
Tolentino who is residing in your barrio?
o A Yes, sir.
o Q What is the nickname of that Manolito Tolentino?
o A Bong-Bong, sir.
o Q And you also mentioned that before you asked Geraldine as
to who accused those stabbed wounds, Geraldine made a sign
with her three fingers, did you not ask her what she meant with
that sign with her three fingers? (3-finger salute nga! Lol
Actually mali yung lawyer kasi si Enrique yung nag 3-finger
salute hindi si Geraldine)
o Atty. Sampang: The question was already answered during the
previous trial as appearing on page 26 of the transcript of
stenographic notes dated February 22, 1984.
o Fiscal Abiog: Alright, I will withdraw that question.
o Court: Next question.
o Fiscal Abiog: Q Now, according to you when you rushed home
because you were called by the brother of Manolito Tolentino
informing you that your children whom you left at home were
stabbed and when you arrived home, you reached Glenly
already dead, and then Geraldine on the porch wounded, and
Enrique on the sala, also wounded, and Grace Paule near the
door, will you please tell us what happened to you when you
saw or witnessed this incident when you observed your children
and you niece in this condition?
o A I asked my youngest child, sir.
o Fiscal Abiog: Q And the youngest child you are referring to or
what is the name of your youngest child?
o A Enrique, sir.
o Q And what did you ask Enrique?
o A I shouted and asked him and he responded by showing or
raising his hand with three fingers, sir.
o Q Alright, after you asked Enrique shouting, what happened and
he did not answer and instead he made a sign with his three
fingers, will you please tell us what else happened after that?
o A I lost consciousness, sir.
o Q And when you regained consciousness or where did you
regain your consciousness?
o A At the house of my mother, sir.
 EVIDENCE 3A 2013-2014 – ATTY. ARROYO Page 50 of 50
o Q Will you please tell us how far is that house of your mother
from the place of you residence?
o Witness: A From here up to that corner, sir.
o Court: Which corner?
o A Up to there, sir. (Witness pointing to Joan's Refreshment).
o Fiscal Abiog: Which is about two hundred meters, more or less.
o Atty. Sampang: We agree, your Honor. (T.S.N., October 29,
1984, pp. 6-10).
 The trial court had correctly applied the principle of res gestae, namely:
1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;
2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time
to contrive or devise; and
3) that the statements made must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances
o which are all present in the case at bar as Geraldine had named
accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators in the commission
of the crime immediately after the occurrence of the stabbing
incident.

DEFENSE Argument #4:

 Accused-appellant Carlito “Boy” Tala also contends that the trial court
erred in considering the extrajudicial confession of accused Manolito
“Bong” Tolentino implicating him in the crime charged in the face of the
subsequent admission by Bong that he was alone when he committed
said crime.
 We agree with the appellant on this point. The extrajudicial confession of
Tolentino cannot be used against appellant under the principle of res
inter alios acta unless accused is discharge from the information and
made a state witness.
 At any rate, the evidence on record, by itself is sufficient in proving
accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the sole
modification that the indemnity to be paid by the accused-appellant Carlito Tala
to the heirs of each victim is increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with the
recent jurisprudence of this Court.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.