1
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M.
CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law
Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition
filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas.1 As ground
therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license
was ever issued to them prior to the
solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas
failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was
declared in default. Trial proceeded in his
absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin
F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court
Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was
celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's
parents. Defendant Cardenas personally
attended to the processing of the documents
required for the celebration of the marriage,
including the procurement of the marriage,
license. In fact, the marriage contract itself
states that marriage license no. 3196182 was
issued in the name of the contracting parties on
June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as
husband and wife since the marriage was
unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only
in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was
pregnant, that the couple decided to live
together. However, their cohabitation lasted
only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple
parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave
birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother,
with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring
to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for the
States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty.
Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible
annulment of her marriage. Through her
lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was
no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to
the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a
certification from the Civil Register of Pasig,
Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F.
CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who
were allegedly married in the Pasay City Court
on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license no. 3196182
allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20,
1970 cannot be located as said license
no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil
registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in
order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign
any application therefor. She affixed her
signature only on the marriage contract on June
24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that
the above certification was inadequate to
establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage
license prior to the celebration of the marriage
between the parties. It ruled that the "inability
of the certifying official to locate the marriage
license is not conclusive to show that there was
no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed
to respondent appellate court. She insisted that
the certification from the local civil registrar
sufficiently established the absence of a
marriage license.

As stated earlier, respondent appellate court
reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It
declared the marriage between the contracting
parties null and void and directed the Civil
Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage
contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that
respondent appellate court erred when it ruled
that the certification issued by the civil registrar
that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in
their record adequately proved that no such
license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults
the respondent court for relying on the
self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of
private respondent Castro that she had no part
in the procurement of the subject marriage
license. Petitioner thus insists that the
certification and the uncorroborated testimony
of private respondent are insufficient to
overthrow the legal presumption regarding the
validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the
marriage between the parties as null and void,
respondent appellate court disregarded the
presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge
Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties
when he attested in the marriage contract that
marriage license no. 3196182 was duly
presented to him before the solemnization of
the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed
jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench
is whether or not the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent are sufficient to establish that no
marriage license was issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of
the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F.
Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was
solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing
marital relations was the New Civil Code. The
law 4 provides that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first
issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the
essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence
2
of a license would render the marriage void ab
initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the
local civil registrar of due search and inability to
find a record or entry to the effect that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the
parties is not adequate to prove its
non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such
certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written
statement signed by an officer having custody
of an official record or by his deputy, that after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or
entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of
documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in
his office or that a particular entry of a specified
tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars
are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they
are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to
find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due
search and inability to find" sufficiently proved
that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered
only her testimony in support of her petition is,
in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The
failure to offer any other witness to corroborate
her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. It will be
remembered that the subject marriage was a

civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city
court. The subject marriage is one of those
commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a
legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used
to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without
the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends
of either or both of the contracting parties. The
records show that the marriage between Castro
and Cardenas was initially unknown to the
parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent
Castro testified during the trial cannot be held
against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas,
was duly served with notice of the proceedings
and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt
thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure
to answer, he was properly declared in default.
Private respondent cannot be faulted for her
husband's lack of interest to participate in the
proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence
on record to show that there was collusion
between private respondent and her husband
Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of
the appellate court that the marriage between
the contracting parties is null and void for lack
of a marriage license does not discount the fact
that indeed, a spurious marriage license,
purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of
Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to
the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances
of the case, the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent
Castro sufficiently established the absence of
the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there
being no showing of any reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Marriages; Absence of a marriage license
renders the marriage void ab initio.—At the
time the subject marriage was solemnized on
June 24, 1970, the law governing marital
relations was the New Civil Code. The law
provides that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a marriage license first issued by a local
3
civil registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a
license would render the marriage void ab
initio.
Same; Evidence; Civil Registrars; The
certification of “due search and inability to find”
issued by the civil registrar enjoys probative
value and sufficiently proves that his office did
not issue a particular marriage license.—The
above Rule authorized the custodian of
documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in
his office or that a particular entry of a specified
tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars
are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they
are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data. The
certification of “due search and inability to find”
issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, a certificate of “due
search and inability to find” sufficiently proved
that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Secret
marriage” is a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the knowledge of the
relatives and/or friends of either or both of the
contracting parties.—The fact that private
respondent Castro offered only her testimony in
support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground
to deny her petition. The failure to offer any
other witness to corroborate her testimony is
mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the
case. It will be remembered that the subject
marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a
judge of a city court. The subject marriage is
one of those commonly known as a “secret
marriage”—a legally non-existent phrase but
ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the knowledge of the
relatives and/or friends of either or both of the
contracting parties. The records show that the
marriage between Castro and Cardenas was
initially unknown to the parents of the former.

G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and
FERNANDO SY, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 21, 1996
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144,
which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying
the petition3 for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and
Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent
Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November
15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in
Quezon City. 4 Both were then 22 years old.
Their union was blessed with two children,
Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on
July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978,
respectively.5
The spouses first established their residence in
Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga,
and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
They operated a lumber and hardware business
in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.6
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their
conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived
separately, and their two children were in the
custody of their mother. However, their son
Frederick transferred to his father's residence at
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988,
and from then on, lived with his father.7
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition
for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No.
7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of
petitioner, the action was later amended to a
petition for separation of property on the
grounds that her husband abandoned her
without just cause; that they have been living
separately for more than one year; and that
they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement dated September 29, 1983,
4
containing the rules that would govern the
dissolution of their conjugal
partnership.8 Judgment was rendered dissolving
their conjugal partnership of gains and
approving a regime of separation of properties
based on the Memorandum of Agreement
executed by the spouses.9 The trial court also
granted custody of the children to Filipina. 10
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for
attempted parricide against her husband,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina
testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988,
she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay,
Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but
operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and
bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While
she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her
and continued playing with the family computer.
Filipina got mad, took the computer away from
her son, and started spanking him. At that
instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from
their son, and punched her in the different parts
of her body. Filipina also claimed that her
husband started choking her when she fell on
the floor, and released her only when he
thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from
hematoma and contusions on different parts of
her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her
husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate
issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said
it was not the first time Fernando maltreated
her. 11
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in
its decision 12 dated April 26, 1990, convicted
Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal
separation against private respondent,
docketed as Civil Case No. 8273, on the
following grounds: (1) repeated physical
violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by
respondent against her life; and (4)
abandonment of her by her husband without
justifiable cause for more than one year. The
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga,
in its decision 13 dated December 4, 1991,
granted the petition on the grounds of repeated
physical violence and sexual infidelity, and
issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded
custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to
 5

petitioner, and their son Frederick to it found to be in accordance with law and the
respondent. evidence on record. 18

On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition 14 for Petitioner filed a motion for
the declaration of absolute nullity of her reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals
marriage to Fernando on the ground of denied in its resolution dated November 21,
psychological incapacity. She points out that the 1996.
final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial
Court in her favor, in her petitions for Hence, this appeal by certiorari 21 wherein
separation of property and legal separation, and petitioner now raises the following issues:
Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her
which led to the conviction of her husband for 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
slight physical injuries are symptoms of OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE
psychological incapacity. She also cites as FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION
manifestations of her husband's psychological OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15,
incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT
(2) refusal to live with her without fault on her FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE
part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; THERETO;
and (3) refusal to have sex with her,
performing the marital act only to satisfy
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such
OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION
psychological incapacity of her husband existed
OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS
from the time of the celebration of their
RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner]
marriage and became manifest thereafter. 15
DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein
Pampanga, in its decision dated December 9, respondent];
1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the
declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of
OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION
the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not
OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED
constitute psychological incapacity which may
TO SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE
warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of
ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR
their marriage.
WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE
WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May
OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of
DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS
petitioner concerning respondent's purported
RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A
psychological incapacity falls short of the
REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT
quantum of evidence required to nullify a
BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO
marriage celebrated with all the formal and
HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT
essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT
of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show
A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS;
that the alleged psychological incapacity of
AND
respondent had existed at the time of the
celebration of their marriage in 1973. It
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.
reiterated the finding of the trial court that the
COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS
couple's marital problems surfaced only in
APPLICABLE HERETO. 22
1983, or almost ten years from the date of the
celebration of their marriage. And prior to their
separation in 1983, they were living together In sum, two issues are to be resolved:
harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the lower court which 1. Whether or not the marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void from

the beginning for lack of a marriage license at
the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is
psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of
its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of
the marriage being void for lack of a valid
marriage license at the time of its celebration. It
appears that, according to her, the date of the
actual celebration of their marriage and the
date of issuance of their marriage certificate
and marriage license are different and
incongruous.
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants
cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal,
as this would contravene the basic rules of fair
play and justice, 23 in a number of instances, we
have relaxed observance of procedural rules,
noting that technicalities are not ends in
themselves but exist to protect and promote
substantive rights of litigants. We said that
certain rules ought not to be applied with
severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very
reason for their existence would be
defeated. 24 Hence, when substantial justice
plainly requires, exempting a particular case
from the operation of technicalities should not
be subject to cavil. 25 In our view, the case at
bar requires that we address the issue of the
validity of the marriage between Filipina and
Fernando which petitioner claims is void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in
order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply
seated and violent conflict between the parties.
Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are
not disputed; and what is required now is a
declaration of their effects according to existing
law.
Petitioner states that though she did not
categorically state in her petition for annulment
of marriage before the trial court that the
incongruity in the dates of the marriage license
and the celebration of the marriage itself would
lead to the conclusion that her marriage to
Fernando was void from the beginning, she
points out that these critical dates were
contained in the documents she submitted
before the court. The date of issue of the
marriage license and marriage certificate,
September 17, 1974, is contained in their
marriage contract which was attached as Annex
6
"A" in her petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before the trial court, and
thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course
of the trial. 26 The date of celebration of their
marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita
Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both
by petitioner and private respondent, as stated
in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for
the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court, and private respondent's
answer admitting it. 27 This fact was also
affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on
January 22, 1993, during her direct
examination, 28 as follows:
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that
you were married on November 15, 1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of
marriage of the parents in both their son's and
daughter's birth certificates, which are also
attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court, and thereafter marked as
Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the
trial. 29 These pieces of evidence on record
plainly and indubitably show that on the day of
the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage
license. A marriage license is a formal
requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
marriage contract shows that the marriage
license, numbered 6237519, was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor
private respondent ever resided in Carmona. 30
Carefully reviewing the documents and the
pleadings on record, we find that indeed
petitioner did not expressly state in her petition
before the trial court that there was incongruity
between the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage and the date of the issuance of
their marriage license. From the documents she
presented, the marriage license was issued on
September 17, 1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on November 15, 1973.
The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage
was indeed contracted without a marriage
license. Nowhere do we find private respondent
denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the
Civil Code 31 is clearly applicable in this case.
There being no claim of an exceptional
character, the purported marriage between
petitioner and private respondent could not be
 7

classified among those enumerated in Articles 3

Id. at 1-5.
72-79 32 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude
that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the 4
Exh. A; Id. at 6.
marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning. 5
Exhs. B & C; Id. at 7-8.

We note that their marriage certificate and 6

Id. at 136.
marriage license are only photocopies. So are
the birth certificates of their son Frederick and 7
Ibid.
daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these
documents were marked as Exhibits during the 8
Id. at 10-11.
course of the trial below, which shows that
these have been examined and admitted by the
trial court, with no objections having been
9
Exh. E, Id. at 10-18.
made as to their authenticity and due execution.
Likewise, no objection was interposed to 10
Id. at 18.
petitioner's testimony in open court when she
affirmed that the date of the actual celebration 11
Id. at 23-24.
of their marriage was on November 15, 1973.
We are of the view, therefore, that having been 12
Exh. G; Id. at 23-26.
admitted in evidence, with the adverse party
failing to timely object thereto, these 13
Exh, H; Id. at 27-46.
documents are deemed sufficient proof of the
facts contained therein. 33 14
Id. at 1-5.

The remaining issue on the psychological 15

Id. at 3.
incapacity of private respondent need no longer
detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that
the marriage of petitioner to respondent is
16
Id. at 136-143.
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at
the time their marriage was solemnized.
17
Supra, note 1.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

18
Id. at 59.
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9, 1993 19
Id. at 60-64.
as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21,
1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution 20
Id. at 76.
dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R. No. 44144
are set aside. The marriage celebrated on 21
Rollo, pp. 10-55.
November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina
Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is 22
Id. at 31.
hereby declared void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license at the time of celebration. No 23
Sumbad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106060,
pronouncement as to costs.
June 21, 1999, p. 23; Modina vs. CA, G.R. No.
109355, October 29, 1999, p. 13; citing Roman
SO ORDERED. Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of
Appeals, 269 SCRA 145 (1997).
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur. 24
Government Service Insurance System vs.
Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 187, 198 (1997);
Footnotes Mauna vs. Civil Service Commission, 232 SCRA
388, 398 (1994).
1
CA Records, at 51-59.
25
GSIS vs. CA, at 198, citing Aguilar vs. Court of
2
Records, at 136-143. Appeals, 250 SCRA 371 (1995).

26
Exhibit A, Records, p. 6; Rollo, p. 72.
27
Records, at 1 and 53.
28
TSN, 22 January 1993, p. 4.
29
Records pp. 7 & 8; Exh. A, Rollo, p. 72.
30
Rollo, at 20.
31
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license,
save marriages of exceptional character:
xxx xxx xxx
32
Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his
or her duties to the conjugal union or commits
acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or
injury to the other or to the family, the
aggrieved party; may apply to the court for
relief.
Art. 73. Either spouse may
exercise any legitimate
profession, occupation,
business or activity without
the consent of the other. The
latter may object only on valid,
serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide whether or
not.
(1) The objection is proper,
and
(2) Benefit has accrued to the
family prior to the objection
or thereafter. If the benefit
accrued prior to the objection,
the resulting obligation shall
be enforced against the
separate property of the
spouse who has not obtained
consent.
The foregoing provisions shall
not prejudice the rights of
8
creditors who acted in good
faith.
Art. 74. The property relations
between husband and wife
shall be governed in the
following order:
(1) By marriage settlements
executed before the marriage;
(2) By the provisions of this
Code; and
(3) By the local customs.
Art. 75. The future spouses
may, in the marriage
settlements, agree upon the
regime of absolute community,
conjugal partnership of gains,
complete separation of
property, or any other regime.
In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the
regime agreed upon is void,
the system of absolute
community of property as
established in this Code shall
govern.
Art. 76. In order that any
modification in the marriage
settlements may be valid, it
must be made before the
celebration of the marriage,
subject to the provisions of
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and
136.
Art. 77. The marriage
settlements and any
modification thereof shall be
in writing, signed by the
parties and executed before
the celebration of the
marriage. They shall not
prejudice third persons unless
they are registered in the local
civil registry where the
marriage contract is recorded
as well as in the proper
registries of property.

Art. 78. A minor who
according to law may contract
marriage may also enter into
marriage settlements, but
they shall be valid only if the
persons designated in Article
14 to give consent to the
marriage are made parties to
the agreement, subject to the
provisions of Title IX of this
Code.1âwphi1.nêt
Art. 79. For the validity of any
marriage settlements
executed by a person upon
whom a sentence of civil
interdiction has been
pronounced or who is subject
to any other disability, it shall
be indispensable for the
guardian appointed by a
competent court to be made a
party thereto.
33
See also Son vs. Son, 251 SCRA 556 (1995);
Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA 582 (1997); Quebral vs.
CA, 252 SCRA 353 (1996).
Husband and Wife; Marriage; Marriage License;
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its
absence renders the marriage void ab
initio.—November 15, 1973, also appears as the
date of marriage of the parents in both their
son’s and daughter’s birth certificates, which
are also attached as Annexes “B” and “C” in the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before the trial court, and thereafter
marked as Exhibits “B” and “C” in the course of
the trial. These pieces of evidence on record
plainly and indubitably show that on the day of
the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage
license. A marriage license is a formal
requirement; its absence renders the marriage
void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract
shows that the marriage license, numbered
6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet,
neither petitioner nor private respondent ever
resided in Carmona.
Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Although the
marriage certificate, the marriage license and
other pieces of documentary evidence were
9
only photocopies, the fact that these have been
examined and admitted by the trial court, with
no objections having been made as to their
authenticity and due execution, means that
these documents are deemed sufficient proof of
the facts contained therein.—We note that
their marriage certificate and marriage license
are only photocopies. So are the birth
certificates of their son Frederick and daughter
Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents
were marked as Exhibits during the course of
the trial below, which shows that these have
been examined and admitted by the trial court,
with no objections having been made as to their
authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no
objection was interposed to petitioner’s
testimony in open court when she affirmed that
the date of the actual celebration of their
marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of
the view, therefore, that having been admitted
in evidence, with the adverse party failing to
timely object thereto, these documents are
deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained
therein.
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the
reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December
2004 which set aside the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil
Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by
Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that
on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress
and intimidation employed upon him by
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father,
retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed
forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went
to the City Hall of Manila and they were
introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D.
Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel.
On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused
him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract

before the said Minister of the Gospel.
According to Jaime, he never applied for a
marriage license for his supposed marriage to
Carmelita and never did they obtain any
marriage license from any Civil Registry,
consequently, no marriage license was
presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations
of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were
married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church
ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the
Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City.
Both marriages were registered with the local
civil registry of Manila and the National
Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking
the lack of marriage license after having been
married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime]
testified that on May 19, 1969, he and
defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a
certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the
Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they
executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil
rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff
alleged, was an aide of defendant's father
accompanied them, and who, together with
another person, stood as witness to the civil
wedding. That although marriage license no.
2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on
May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage
contract, the same was fictitious for he never
applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11).
Upon verifications made by him through his
lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil
Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated
March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael
D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever
issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and
defendant were again wed, this time in church
rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the
Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton
Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another
marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same
marriage license no. 2770792 used and
indicated. Preparations and expenses for the
church wedding and reception were jointly
shared by his and defendant's parents. After the
church wedding, he and defendant resided in
his house at Brixton Hills until their first son,
Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his
parents continued to support him financially, he
10
and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for
his medical studies. Eventually, their marital
relationship turned bad because it became
difficult for him to be married he being a
medical student at that time. They started living
apart in 1976, but they underwent family
counseling before they eventually separated in
1978. It was during this time when defendant's
second son was born whose paternity plaintiff
questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree
against defendant in the United States in 1981
and later secured a judicial separation of their
conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the
plaintiff, himself manifested that when his
service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the
latter narrated to him the circumstances of his
marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of
Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed
marriage license was obtained and with the
Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish
where the religious wedding ceremony was
celebrated. His request letters dated March 3,
1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March
9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K")
were all sent to and received by the Civil
Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto,
issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh.
"I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and
September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued
by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy
Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified
copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and
defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of
Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"),
wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious
ceremony, having been civilly married on May
19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under
Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San
Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the
Local Registry of San Juan, identified the
Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11,
1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael
Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and
testified that their office failed to locate the
book wherein marriage license no. 2770792
may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she
and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship
after they met and were introduced to each
other in October 1968. A model, she was

compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng
Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was
afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with
him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she
turned back on her family and decided to follow
plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to
Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the
latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's
mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her
parents were hostile when they learned of the
elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them
that she will take care of everything, and
promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As
plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he
asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the
knowledge of her family, more so her father
(TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a
minister and where she was made to sign
documents. After the civil wedding, they had
lunch and later each went home separately. On
May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding,
which the Sevilla family alone prepared and
arranged, since defendant's mother just came
from hospital. Her family did not participate in
the wedding preparations. Defendant further
stated that there was no sexual consummation
during their honeymoon and that it was after
two months when they finally had sex. She
learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician
and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff
was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12
(TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic
problem compounded by his drug habit. She
found out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior
by his obsession over her knees of which he
would take endless pictures of. Moreover,
plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in
between the knees which she called
"intrafemural sex," while real sex between them
was far and between like 8 months, hence,
abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff
exhibited weird sexual behavior which
defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug
addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive
liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks
things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took
drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the
like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and
then would take barbiturates or downers, like
"mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep
plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has
become a habit to him. They had no fixed home
since they often moved and partly lived in Spain
for about four and a half years, and during all
those times, her mother-in-law would send
some financial support on and off, while
defendant worked as an English teacher.
11
Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did
nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as
plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and
this led to a break up in their marriage. Later,
she learned that plaintiff married one Angela
Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified
that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his
daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter
and grandson came to stay with him after they
returned home from Spain and have lived with
him and his wife ever since. His grandsons
practically grew up under his care and guidance,
and he has supported his daughter's expenses
for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs.
"9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister,
testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's
family that attended to all the preparations and
arrangements for the church wedding of her
sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know
that the couple wed in civil rites some time
prior to the church wedding. She also stated
that she and her parents were still civil with the
plaintiff inspite of the marital differences
between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff
testified that because of irreconcilable
differences with defendant and in order for
them to live their own lives, they agreed to
divorce each other; that when he applied for
and obtained a divorce decree in the United
States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with
the knowledge and consent of defendant who
in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to
represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his
adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent
certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE")
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same
marriage license appearing in the marriage
contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to
be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring
the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the
trial court made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for
the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence
of a license renders the marriage void ab initio.
It was shown under the various certifications
(Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the

office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent
one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no
marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued
by that office, hence, the marriage license no.
2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts
executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on
May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a
certification enjoys probative value under the
rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil
marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and
Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo
D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19,
1969 as well as their contract of marriage
solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B.
Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31,
1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite
marriage license. Let the marriage contract of
the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the
registry book of the Local Civil Registry of
Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in
the proper civil and property registries in
accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the
Office of the Solicitor General for its record and
information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004,
the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial
court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025,
February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita
Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan
testified that they "failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is
registered," for the reason that "the employee
handling is already retired." With said testimony
12
We cannot therefore just presume that the
marriage license specified in the parties'
marriage contract was not issued for in the end
the failure of the office of the local civil registrar
of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage
license was attributable not to the fact that no
such marriage license was issued but rather,
because it "failed to locate the book wherein
marriage license no. 2770792 is registered."
Simply put, if the pertinent book were available
for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it
would have contained an entry on marriage
license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the
parties' marriage on the basis of a mere
perception of plaintiff that his union with
defendant is defective with respect to an
essential requisite of a marriage contract, a
perception that ultimately was not
substantiated with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals
denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed
by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was
issued in accordance with law to the parties
herein prior to the celebration of the marriages
in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals
correctly applied and relied on the presumption
of regularity of officials acts, particularly the
issuance of a marriage license, arising solely
from the contents of the marriage contracts in
question which show on their face that a
marriage license was purportedly issued by the
Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila,
and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly
invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of
a marriage arising from the admitted "fact of
marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the
determination of whether or not the

certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan stating that no Marriage License No.
2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract
of the parties was issued, are sufficient to
declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in
the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was
the law in force at the time of the marriage of
the parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage
license is an essential requisite for the validity of
marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and
Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily
dismissed as one involving a marriage that is
null and void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license based on the certifications
issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As
ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v.
Cariño13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of
such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that such a certification
is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all
date relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the
burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the
required marriage license. Although she was
declared in default before the trial court,
petitioner could have squarely met the issue
and explained the absence of a marriage license
in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals
and this Court. But petitioner conveniently
avoided the issue and chose to refrain from
pursuing an argument that will put her case in
jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
marriage cannot stand.
13
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage
between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to
the certifications issued by the Local Civil
Registrar should be read in line with the
decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of
documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in
his office or that a particular entry of a specified
tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars
are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they
are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local
Civil Registrar must categorically state that the
document does not exist in his office or the
particular entry could not be found in the
register despite diligent search. Such
certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or
absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written
statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy
that after diligent search, no record or entry of
a specified tenor is found to exist in the records
of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain no such record
or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the
certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan in connection with Marriage License No.
2770792 complied with the foregoing
requirements and deserved to be accorded
probative value.

The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated
11 March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic)
ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to
Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert
all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot
give you our full force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20
September 1994 and provides:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that no marriage license
Number 2770792 were ever issued by this
Office with regards to Marriage License Number
2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find
the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot
give you our full force locating the above
problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000,
states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of
this office, no Marriage License Application was
filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792
14
allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS.
CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application
and license do not exist in our Local Civil
Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be
fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the
request of the interested party for whatever
legal intent it may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the
statement that "hope and understand our
loaded work cannot give you our full force
locating the above problem." It could be easily
implied from the said statement that the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its
best efforts to locate and determine the
existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due
to its "loaded work." Likewise, both
certifications failed to state with absolute
certainty whether or not such license was
issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of
the representative from the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader,
who stated that they cannot locate the logbook
due to the fact that the person in charge of the
said logbook had already retired. Further, the
testimony of the said person was not presented
in evidence. It does not appear on record that
the former custodian of the logbook was
deceased or missing, or that his testimony could
not be secured. This belies the claim that all
efforts to locate the logbook or prove the
material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were
required to bring to this Court among other
things the register of application of/or (sic) for
marriage licenses received by the Office of
the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of

Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did
you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3
of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of
marriage of marriage applications that your
office maintains as required by the manual of
the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by
the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether
marriage license 2880792 is the number issued
by their office while with respect to license no.
2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan is very definite about it it was never
issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if
the same was ever issued by their office. Did
you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the
record? But for the moment you cannot locate
the books? Which is which now, was this issued
or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired,
sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial
evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were
not exerted to locate the logbook where
Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been
entered, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official function by the Local
15
Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is
effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, the presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed is among the
disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a
species of evidence that may be accepted and
acted on where there is no other evidence to
uphold the contention for which it stands, or
one which may be overcome by other evidence.
One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is
that an official act or duty has been regularly
performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance
of official duty is disputable and can be
overcome by other evidence as in the case at
bar where the presumption has been effectively
defeated by the tenor of the first and second
certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not
conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we
believed true in the case at bar, that the
logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of
showing of diligent efforts to search for the said
logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence
of the same also means non-existence or falsity
of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment
of the law or fact leans toward the validity of
the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption
with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled;
on the contrary, the presumption is of great
weight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the validity of the marriage.25
 16

The parties have comported themselves as law nor society can provide the specific answers
husband and wife and lived together for several to every individual problem.
years producing two offsprings,26 now adults
themselves. It took Jaime several years before WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Admittedly, he married another individual Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the
sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED.
reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his Costs against the petitioner.
marriage and give him his freedom and in the
process allow him to profit from his own deceit SO ORDERED.
and perfidy.28
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago,
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.
strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy
that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the State is vitally
Footnotes
interested. The State can find no stronger
anchor than on good, solid and happy families.
1
The break-up of families weakens our social and Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74416, penned by
moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with
the concern of the family members alone.29 Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and
Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Rollo, pp.
20-31.
"The basis of human society throughout the
civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this
2
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a Rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.
new relation, an institution in the maintenance
3
of which the public is deeply interested. Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-4.
Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons 4
Id. at 5.
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any 5
Id. at 232.
counterpresumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that 6
Rollo, pp. 47-50.
such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold 7
Id. at 50-52.
themselves out as being, they would be living in
the constant violation of decency and of law. A 8
presumption established by our Code of Civil Id. at 29-31.
Procedure is `that a man and a woman
9
deporting themselves as husband and wife have Id. at 80-81.
entered into a lawful contract of
10
marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized
matrimonio – Always presume marriage."30 unless all these requisites are complied with:

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
based on the prima facie presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as (2) Their consent, freely given;
husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.31 (3) Authority of the person performing the
marriage; and
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime,
we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest (4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of
sentiments. As we have said exceptional character.
in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably,
there are situations like this one, where neither
 17

11 21
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, 9
character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, February 1994, 229 SCRA 795, 798-799.
but not those under Article 75, no marriage
shall be solemnized without a license first being 22
Mabsucang v. Judge Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224
issued by the local civil registrar of the (2003).
municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides. 23
Article 220 Civil Code, Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil.
648, 655 (2000).
12
ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning: 24
Ricardo J. Francisco, BASIC EVIDENCE (2nd ed.,
1999), p. 77.
xxxx
25
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No.
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, 149498, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 735, 740.
save marriages of exceptional charater.
26
Records, Vol. II, p. 413, TSN, 11 April 1996.
13
G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA
127, 133-134. 27
Id. at p. 414.
14
G.R. No. 103047, 2 September 1994, 236 28
Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 663
SCRA 257, 262. (2000).
15
Records, Vol. I, p. 103. 29
Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169,
180-181 (1996) cited in Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R.
16
Atty. Josa Ma. Abola, counsel for Jaime Sevilla No. 145370, 4 March 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 740.
testified before the trial court that in his letter
requesting for the issuance of a certification, 30
Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil.
addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San 693, 709 (1999).
Juan, he mistakenly read the Marriage License
No. as 2880792 instead of 2770792. (Records, 31
Id.
Vol. II, pp. 725-726.)
32
17
G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA
Id. at 228.
422, 439.
18
Records, Vol. II, p. 888.

19
Id. at 735-737.
Civil Law; Marriages; Marriage License; The
certification to be issued by the Local Civil
20
Rule 131. BURDEN OF PROOF AND Registrar must categorically state that the
PRESUMPTIONS document does not exist in his office or the
particular entry could not be found in the
xxxx register despite diligent search.—The
certification to be issued by the Local Civil
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The Registrar must categorically state that the
following presumptions are satisfactory if document does not exist in his office or the
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and particular entry could not be found in the
overcome by other evidence; register despite diligent search. Such
certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or
xxxx absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.
(m) That official duty has been regularly
performed;

Presumption of Regularity of Performance of
Official Duty; The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty.—Given the documentary and testimonial
evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were
not exerted to locate the logbook where
Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been
entered, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official function by the Local
Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is
effectively rebutted. According to Section 3(m),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed
is among the disputable presumptions. The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity
or failure to perform a duty. The presumption of
regularity of performance of official duty is
disputable and can be overcome by other
evidence as in the case at bar where the
presumption has been effectively defeated by
the tenor of the first and second certifications.
Marriages; The rule is settled that every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of
the marriage bonds; Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.—The rule is settled that every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of
the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be
lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight. The Court is
mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
Same; Our family law is based on the policy that
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally
interested.—Our Constitution is committed to
the policy of strengthening the family as a basic
social institution. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but
a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger
18
anchor than on good, solid and happy families.
The break-up of families weakens our social and
moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not
the concern of the family members alone.
Same; Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a
civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested; Every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony.—“The basis of human society
through-out the civilized world is x x x marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution
in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married.
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the
likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted
by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North
Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a
sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
came two human beings; one was a male and
the other was a female. Amihan named the man
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda"
(Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a
woman? In particular, does the law recognize
the changes made by a physician using scalpel,
drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s
sex? May a person successfully petition for a

change of name and sex appearing in the birth
certificate to reflect the result of a sex
reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No.
02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of
Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was
born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio"
in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate).
His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual,
that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and
acts as a female" and that he had always
identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he
consulted several doctors in the United States.
He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation.
His attempts to transform himself to a "woman"
culminated on January 27, 2001 when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in
Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined
by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and
was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was
published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of
the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional
requirements were established. No opposition
to the petition was made.
19
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He
also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a
decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant
portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to
evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for
the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner
is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting
the petition would be more in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. With his
sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has
always felt, thought and acted like a woman,
now possesses the physique of a female.
Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s
body is not his own doing and should not be in
any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm,
injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody
or the community in granting the petition. On
the contrary, granting the petition would bring
the much-awaited happiness on the part of the
petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of
their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any
cause or ground to deny the present petition
despite due notice and publication thereof.
Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen
fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Registrar of Manila to change the entries
appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
[p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first
name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It
alleged that there is no law allowing the change

of entries in the birth certificate by reason of
sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of
Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision
lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the
change of either name or sex in the certificate
of birth on the ground of sex reassignment
through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals
granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of
his name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil
Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On
the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the
ground for his petition for change of name and
sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to
evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for
the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired
the physical features of a female, he became
entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We
disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege,
not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection,
Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority.
20
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA
9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1
of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or
Typographical Error and Change of First Name
or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and
its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first
name.14 It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to
the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general concerned. Under the law, therefore,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first
name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules
103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise
lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change
of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for
which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or
Nickname. – The petition for change of first
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the
following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or
nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the community;
or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of
his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible
with the sex he thought he transformed himself
into through surgery. However, a change of
name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil
status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of
first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose
may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given
name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change.19 In addition, he must show that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a
result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as
it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first
name was not within that court’s primary
jurisdiction as the petition should have been
filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under
RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as
the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is
kept. More importantly, it had no merit since
the use of his true and official name does not
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of
his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth
Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing
in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes.21 In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this
provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved.
21
The correction or change of such matters can
now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial
order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical
or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this
Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a
mistake committed in the performance of
clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing
record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical
or typographical error. It is a substantial change
for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil
Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the
civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of

citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated
under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no
reasonable interpretation of the provision can
justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright;
to remove the faults or error from" while to
change means "to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute."26 The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error.
All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry
in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization), events (such as
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths)
and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity
of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or
recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
determination of filiation and changes of name).
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce
legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person.
Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the
laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by
any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting
the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view
of his age, nationality and his family
membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his
personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable
at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status… include such
matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general,
family relations, and its various aspects, such as
22
birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation,
marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage
and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status. In this connection,
Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the
registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
But there is no such special law in the
Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil
Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. –
The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof,
the declaration of either parent of the newborn
child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a
birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall
be exempt from documentary stamp tax and
shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later
than thirty days after the birth, by the physician
or midwife in attendance at the birth or by
either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above
mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of
infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of
the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e)
place where the infant was born; and (f) such
other data as may be required in the regulations
to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate
is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person
is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they
are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative
intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as
used in the Civil Register Law and laws
concerning the civil registry (and even all other
laws) should therefore be understood in their
common and ordinary usage, there being no
legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the
distinction between male and female."33 Female
is "the sex that produces ova or bears
young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus,
the words "male" and "female" in everyday
understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore,
"words that are employed in a statute which
had at the time a well-known meaning are
presumed to have been used in that sense
unless the context compels to the
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the
Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be
argued that the term "sex" as used then is
something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual to be included in
the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have
succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no
law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is
no legal basis for his petition for the correction
or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to
First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of
Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the
petition was in consonance with the principles
of justice and equity. It believed that allowing
the petition would cause no harm, injury or
prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have
serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself
found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male
fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
23
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is
the legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female.38 To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the
union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women
such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under
the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption
of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule
131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others.
These laws underscore the public policy in
relation to women which could be substantially
affected if petitioner’s petition were to be
granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code
mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline
to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However,
it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial
legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the
legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex reassignment.
The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the
claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file
petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil
registry, where they may be filed, what grounds
may be invoked, what proof must be presented
and what procedures shall be observed. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who
has undergone sex reassignment the privilege
to change his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying
down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court
to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his
sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything

else. The Court cannot enact a law where no
law exists. It can only apply or interpret the
written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are
also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment
and [the] realization of their dreams." No
argument about that. The Court recognizes that
there are people whose preferences and
orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
recognized parameters of social convention and
that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely
by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Petitioner went for his elementary and high
school, as well as his Bachelor of Science in
Statistics and Master of Arts, in the University of
the Philippines. He took up Population Studies
Program, Master of Arts in Sociology and Doctor
of Philosophy in Sociology at the University of
Hawaii, in Manoa, Hawaii, U.S.A. Rollo, p. 48.
2
This consisted of "penectomy [surgical
removal of penis] bilateral oschiectomy [or
orchiectomy which is the surgical excision of the
testes] penile skin inversion vaginoplasty
[plastic surgery of the vagina] clitoral hood
reconstruction and augmentation
mammoplasty [surgical enhancement of the size
and shape of the breasts]." Id.
3
On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and
February 6, 2003.
4
Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo,
pp. 51-53.
5
Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).
24
6
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.
7
Special Sixth Division.
8
Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M.
Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices Marina L.
Buzon and Aurora Santiago-Lagman
concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.
9
Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp.
45-46.
10
An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil
Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a
Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry
and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the
Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order,
Amending for the Purpose Articles 376 and 412
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
11
Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No.
159966, 30 March 2005, 454 SCRA 155.
12
Id.
13
K v. Health Division, Department of Human
Resources, 277 Or. 371, 560 P.2d 1070 (1977).
14
Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name"
refers to a name or nickname given to a person
which may consist of one or more names in
addition to the middle names and last names.
Thus, the term "first name" will be used here to
refer both to first name and nickname.
15
The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048
provides:
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil
Registrar General. – xxx xxx xxx
Where the petition is denied by the city or
municipal civil registrar or the consul general,
the petitioner may either appeal the decision to
the civil registrar general or file the appropriate
petition with the proper court.
16
SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and
Where. – Any person having direct and personal
interest in the correction of a clerical or
typographical error in an entry and/or change of
first name or nickname in the civil register may
file, in person, a verified petition with the local
civil registry office of the city or municipality

where the record being sought to be corrected
or changed is kept.
In case the petitioner has already migrated to
another place in the country and it would not
be practical for such party, in terms of
transportation expenses, time and effort to
appear in person before the local civil registrar
keeping the documents to be corrected or
changed, the petition may be filed, in person,
with the local civil registrar of the place where
the interested party is presently residing or
domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars
concerned will then communicate to facilitate
the processing of the petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently
residing or domiciled in foreign countries may
file their petition, in person, with the nearest
Philippine Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal
civil registrar or the consul general shall be
processed in accordance with this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical
errors and/or change of first names or
nicknames may be availed of only once.
17
SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the
Petition. – The petition shall be in the form of an
affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any
person authorized by the law to administer
oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts
necessary to establish the merits of the petition
and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner
is competent to testify to the matters stated.
The petitioner shall state the particular
erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to
be corrected and/or the change sought to be
made.
The petition shall be supported with the
following documents:
(1) A certified true machine copy of the
certificate or of the page of the registry book
containing the entry or entries sought to be
corrected or changed;
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents
showing the correct entry or entries upon which
the correction or change shall be based; and
25
(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the
city or municipal civil registrar or the consul
general may consider relevant and necessary for
the approval of the petition.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the
petition shall likewise be supported with the
documents mentioned in the immediately
preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition
shall be published at least once a week for two
(2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall
submit a certification from the appropriate law
enforcement agencies that he has no pending
case or no criminal record.
18
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906,
21 May 1992, 209 SCRA 189.
19
Supra note 11.
20
Id.
21
In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d
828 (1987).
22
Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001).
23
Id.
24
Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496,
23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 420.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Beduya v. Republic of the Philippines, 120 Phil.
114 (1964).
28
Salonga, Jovito, Private International Law,
1995 Edition, Rex Bookstore, p. 238.
29
This, of course, should be taken in
conjunction with Articles 407 and 412 of the
Civil Code which authorizes the recording of
acts, events and judicial decrees or the
correction or change of errors including those
that occur after birth. Nonetheless, in such
cases, the entries in the certificates of birth are
not be corrected or changed. The decision of
the court granting the petition shall be
annotated in the certificates of birth and shall
form part of the civil register in the Office of the

Local Civil Registrar. (Co v. Civil Register of
Manila, supra note 24)
30
The error pertains to one where the birth
attendant writes "male" or "female" but the
genitals of the child are that of the opposite sex.
31
Moreover, petitioner’s female anatomy is all
man-made. The body that he inhabits is a male
body in all aspects other than what the
physicians have supplied.
32
Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004),
p.1406.
33
Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent
Edition, p. 106.
34
In re Application for Marriage License for
Nash, 2003-Ohio-7221 (No. 2002-T-0149, slip
op., Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2003 WL 23097095
(Ohio App. 11 Dist., December 31, 2003), citing
Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1999).
35
Id.
36
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911), 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619.
37
Article 1, Family Code.
38
Article 2(1), Id.
39
These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor
Code which include nightwork prohibition,
facilities for women, prohibition on
discrimination and stipulation against marriage,
among others.
40
These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles
337 to 339 on qualified seduction, simple
seduction and acts of lasciviousness with the
consent of the offended party and Articles 342
and 343 on forcible and consented abduction,
among others.
41
Section 3(jj)(4).
Change of Name; The State has an interest in
the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification; A change of name is
a privilege, not a right.—The State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification. A change
of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for
26
change of name are controlled by statutes. In
this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides: ART. 376. No person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority.
Same; Clerical Error Law (RA 9048);
Administrative Law; Jurisdictions; RA 9048 now
governs the change of first name, and vests the
power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general concerned; The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules
103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied—in sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change
of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial.—RA 9048 now governs the
change of first name. It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of
first name to the city or municipal civil registrar
or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged
with the aforementioned administrative officers.
The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules
103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise
lays down the corresponding venue, form and
procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Sex Change; A
change of name does not alter one’s legal
capacity or civil status—RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment.— Petitioner’s basis in
praying for the change of his first name was his
sex reassignment. He intended to make his first
name compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one’s
legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for

his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public
interest. Before a person can legally change his
given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change. In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his
true and official name. In this case, he failed to
show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and
official name.
Same; Same; A petition in the trial court in so
far as it prays for change of first name is not
within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the
petition should be filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, namely, where the birth
certificate is kept.—The petition in the trial
court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioner’s first name was not within that
court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition
should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally
done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his
birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had
no merit since the use of his true and official
name does not prejudice him at all. For all these
reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the
change of his first name was concerned.
Same; Same; Sex Change; No law allows the
change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex
on the ground of sex reassignment; Under RA
9048, a correction in the civil registry involving
the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error—it is a substantial change
for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.—Section 2(c) of RA 9048
defines what a “clerical or typographical error”
is: SECTION 2. Definition of Terms.—As used in
this Act, the following terms shall mean: x x
x xxx x x x (3) “Clerical or typographical
error” refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil
register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or
27
the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious
to the understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing
record or records: Provided, however, That no
correction must involve the change of
nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied) Under RA 9048, a
correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in
Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;
Statutory Construction; No reasonable
interpretation of Art. 407 of the Civil Code can
justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment;
To correct simply means “to make or set aright;
to remove the faults or error from” while to
change means “to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute.”—The
acts, events or factual errors contemplated
under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth. However, no
reasonable interpretation of the provision can
justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means “to make or set aright;
to remove the faults or error from” while to
change means “to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute.” The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error.
All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Status” refers to the
circumstances affecting the legal situation (that
is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities)
of a person in view of his age, nationality and
his family membership.—“Status” refers to the
circumstances affecting the legal situation (that
is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities)
of a person in view of his age, nationality and

his family membership. The status of a person in
law includes all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as
his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term
status… include such matters as the beginning
and end of legal personality, capacity to have
rights in general, family relations, and its various
aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and
sometimes even succession. (emphasis
supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person’s sex is an
essential factor in marriage and family
relations—it is a part of a person’s legal capacity
and civil status; There is no such special law in
the Philippines governing sex reassignment and
its effects.—A person’s sex is an essential factor
in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a
person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this
connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides: ART. 413. All other matters pertaining
to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws. But there is no such
special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to
petitioner’s cause.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Register Law
(Act 3753); Under the Civil Register Law, a birth
certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth—thus, the sex
of a person is determined at birth, visually done
by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife)
by examining the genitals of the infant;
Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,
is immutable.—Under the Civil Register Law, a
birth certificate is a historical record of the facts
as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the
sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the
28
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,
is immutable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory
Construction; When words are not defined in a
statute they are to be given their common and
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent; The words “sex,” “male” and
“female” as used in the Civil Register Law and
laws concerning the civil registry (and even all
other laws) should therefore be understood in
their common and ordinary usage, there being
no legislative intent to the contrary; Sex is
defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure
and function that distinguish a male from a
female” or “the distinction between male and
female”; The words “male” and “female” in
everyday understanding do not include persons
who have undergone sex reassignment; While a
person may have succeeded in altering his body
and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason.— When words are not defined in a
statute they are to be given their common and
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male” and
“female” as used in the Civil Register Law and
laws concerning the civil registry (and even all
other laws) should therefore be understood in
their common and ordinary usage, there being
no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as “the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female” or “the
distinction between male and female.” Female
is “the sex that produces ova or bears young”
and male is “the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the
words “male” and “female” in everyday
understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore,
“words that are employed in a statute which
had at the time a well-known meaning are
presumed to have been used in that sense
unless the context compels to the contrary.”
Since the statutory language of the Civil Register
Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains
unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term
“sex” as used then is something alterable
through surgery or something that allows a
post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be
included in the category “female.” For these
reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded

in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no
legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Same; Same; Same; Marriage; To grant the
changes in name and sex sought by petitioner
will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations—it
will allow the union of a man with another man
who has undergone sex reassignment (a
male-to-female post-operative
transsexual).—The changes sought by petitioner
will have serious and wide-ranging legal and
public policy consequences. First, even the trial
court itself found that the petition was but
petitioner’s first step towards his eventual
marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage,
one of the most sacred social institutions, is a
special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman. One of its essential
requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a male and a female. To
grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will
allow the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a
male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions of
the Labor Code on employment of women,
certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code
and the presumption of survivorship in case of
calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition
were to be granted.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers;
Judicial Legislation; Article 9 of the Civil Code
which mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law” is
not a license for courts to engage in judicial
legislation; In our system of government, it is for
the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex
29
reassignment.—It is true that Article 9 of the
Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of
the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
law.” However, it is not a license for courts to
engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the
courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it. In our system of government,
it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so,
to determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex reassignment.
The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the
claims asserted are statutebased.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who
has undergone sex reassignment the privilege
to change his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying
down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege; The Supreme
Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists.—To reiterate, the statutes define who
may file petitions for change of first name and
for correction or change of entries in the civil
registry, where they may be filed, what grounds
may be invoked, what proof must be presented
and what procedures shall be observed. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who
has undergone sex reassignment the privilege
to change his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying
down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege. It might be
theoretically possible for this Court to write a
protocol on when a person may be recognized
as having successfully changed his sex. However,
this Court has no authority to fashion a law on
that matter, or on anything else. The Court
cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its
co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court recognizes
that there are people whose preferences and
orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
recognized parameters of social convention and
that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal,
but the remedies involve questions of public
policy to be addressed solely by the legislature,
not by the courts.—Petitioner pleads that “[t]he

unfortunates are also entitled to a life of
happiness, contentment and [the] realization of
their dreams.” No argument about that. The
Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly
into the commonly recognized parameters of
social convention and that, at least for them,
life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies
petitioner seeks involve questions of public
policy to be addressed solely by the legislature,
not by the courts.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA,
RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.
VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding
Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk
of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B.
Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora,
are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and
Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal
Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and
Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the
Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same
court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator on October 5,
1992, herein respondents were charged with
the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of
the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4)
non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received;
(5) infidelity in the custody of detained
prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing
fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court
respondents filed their respective
30
Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of
Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The
case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge
David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga
City, for investigation report and
recommendation. The case was however
transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge
Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited
himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of
respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties
regarding the factual antecedents of this
administrative matter, as culled from the
records thereof, are set out under each
particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge
solemnized marriages even without the
requisite marriage license. Thus, the following
couples were able to get married by the simple
expedient of paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a
marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and
Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido,
Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato
Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina
Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage
contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A,
respectively) did not reflect any marriage
license number. In addition, respondent judge
did not sign their marriage contracts and did not
indicate the date of solemnization, the reason
being that he allegedly had to wait for the
marriage license to be submitted by the parties
which was usually several days after the
ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts
were not filed with the local civil registrar.
Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the
marriage contracts, called the attention of
respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and
its effect on the marriages involved, but the
latter opted to proceed with the celebration of
said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she
was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees
of the court were already hostile to her,
especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told
her that he was filing a protest against her
appointment. She avers that it was only lately
when she discovered that the court had a
marriage Register which is in the custody of

Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish
the parties copies of the marriage contract and
to register these with the local civil registrar;
and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage
contracts in preparation for this administrative
case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that
all file copies of the marriage contracts were
kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists
that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the
submission by the contracting parties of their
marriage licenses as part of his duties but he
failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that
the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and
Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil
Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage
license requirement; that he gave strict
instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish
the couple a copy of the marriage contract and
to file the same with the civil registrar, but the
latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the
problem, the spouses subsequently formalized
their marriage by securing a marriage license
and executing their marriage contract, a copy of
which was filed with the civil registrar; that the
other five marriages alluded to in the
administrative complaint were not illegally
solemnized because the marriage contracts
were not signed by him and they did not
contain the date and place of marriage; that
copies of these marriage contracts are in the
custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged
marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido,
Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato
Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio
Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not
celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize
them in the absence of a marriage license; that
the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina
Bismonte was celebrated even without the
requisite license due to the insistence of the
parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their
guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their
marriage contract which remains unsigned up to
the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991
regarding the number of marriages solemnized
and the number of documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it
appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages
in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did
not do so or at most those marriages were null
and void; that respondents likewise made it
31
appear that they have notarized only six (6)
documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial
Register will show that there were one hundred
thirteen (113) documents which were notarized
during that month; and that respondents
reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each
document, although in fact they collected
P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the
difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the
marriage registry where all marriages
celebrated by respondent judge are entered is
under the exclusive control and custody of
complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the
only one who should be held responsible for the
entries made therein; that the reported
marriages are merely based on the payments
made as solemnization fees which are in the
custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers
that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of
the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held
accountable for whatever alleged difference
there is in the notarial fees because she is liable
only for those payments tendered to her by
Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she
collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the
P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to
the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary
Development Fund and P150 goes to the
general fund of the Supreme Court which is paid
to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the
discrepancies in the monthly report were
manipulated by complainant Sambo considering
that he is the one in charge of the preparation
of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the
erroneous number of marriages celebrated was
intentionally placed by complainant Sambo;
that the number of marriages solemnized
should not be based on solemnization fees paid
for that month since not all the marriages paid
for are solemnized in the same month. He
claims that there were actually only six (6)
documents notarized in the month of July, 1992
which tallied with the official receipts issued by
the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should
be held accountable for any unreceipted
payment for notarial fees because he is the one
in charge of the Notarial Register; and that this
case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in
retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the
clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge
contends that he is not the one supervising or

preparing the monthly report, and that he
merely has the ministerial duty to sign the
same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in
the court
Complainants allege that because of the
retirement of the clerk of court, respondent
judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the
applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo,
and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised
when respondent Baroy reported for duty as
clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later
found out that respondent Baroy was the one
appointed because she gave a brand-new
air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was
still in Naga City she purchased an
air-conditioning unit but when she was
appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to
Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the
air conditioner, she decided to sell the same to
respondent judge. The installation and use
thereof by the latter in his office was with the
consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed
all the applications for the position of clerk of
court to the Supreme Court which has the sole
authority over such appointments and that he
had no hand in the appointment of respondent
Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning
unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29,
1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been
appointed clerk of court. He claims that he
would not be that naive to exhibit to the public
as item which could not be defended as a
matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438,
entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al.,
"bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by
respondent judge to change her property bond
to cash bond; that she paid the amount of
P1,000.00 but was never issued a receipt
therefor nor was it made to appear in the
records that the bond has been paid; that
despite the lapse of two years, the money was
never returned to the bondswoman; and that it
has not been shown that the money was turned
over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
32
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond
was deposited with the former clerk of court,
then turned over to the acting clerk of court and,
later, given to her under a corresponding
receipt; that the cash bond is deposited with
the bank; and that should the bondswoman
desire to withdraw the same, she should follow
the proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case
No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the
bondsman to deliver the body of the accused in
court despite notice; and that he has nothing to
do with the payment of the cash bond as this is
the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge
usually got detention prisoners to work in his
house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who is
accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano
was in the custody of respondent judge, the
former escaped and was never recaptured; that
in order to conceal this fact, the case was
archived pursuant to an order issued by
respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and
claims that he never employed detention
prisoners and that he has adequate household
help; and that he had to order the case archived
because it had been pending for more than six
(6) months and the accused therein remained at
large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting
docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is
exempt by law from the payment of said fees,
and that while the corresponding receipt was
issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the
amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she
deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was
Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because
respondent judge was on sick leave) who
instructed her to demand payment of docket
fees from said rural bank; that the bank issued a
check for P800.00; that she was not allowed by
the Philippine National Bank to encash the
check and, instead, was instructed to deposit

the same in any bank account for clearing; that
respondent deposited the same in her account;
and that after the check was cleared, she
remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the
other P400.00 was paid to the Municipal
Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First
Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona
prepared and submitted to us his Report and
Recommendations dated May 20, 1994,
together with the administrative matter. We
have perspicaciously reviewed the same and we
are favorably impressed by the thorough and
exhaustive presentation and analysis of the
facts and evidence in said report. We commend
the investigating judge for his industry and
perspicacity reflected by his findings in said
report which, being amply substantiated by the
evidence and supported by logical illations, we
hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at
length the material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is
illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge
Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized
without a marriage license the marriage of
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A).
Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B),
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C),
Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D),
Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and
Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the
blank space in the marriage contracts to show
the number of the marriage was solemnized as
required by Article 22 of the Family Code were
not filled up. While the contracting parties and
their witnesses signed their marriage contracts,
Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in
the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano
and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their
marriage certificate as he claims that he
solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages
the contracting parties were not furnished a
copy of their marriage contract and the Local
Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of the
marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of
the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown
to have been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon
33
without a marriage license. The testimonies of
Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the
witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte, and the photographs taken when
Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage
(Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge
Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage.
Bocaya declared that they were advised by
Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days
after their marriage was solemnized and bring
with them their marriage license. In the
meantime, they already started living together
as husband and wife believing that the formal
requisites of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized
the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte because
the parties allegedly did not have a marriage
license. He declared that in fact he did not sign
the marriage certificate, there was no date
stated on it and both the parties and the Local
Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the
marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show
that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they
merely show as if he was solemnizing the
marriage. It was actually a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real one.
This happened because of the pleading of the
mother of one of the contracting parties that he
consent to be photographed to show that as if
he was solemnizing the marriage as he was told
that the food for the wedding reception was
already prepared, visitors were already invited
and the place of the parties where the reception
would be held was more than twenty (20)
kilometers away from the poblacion of
Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult
to believe. The fact alone that he did not sign
the marriage certificate or contract, the same
did not bear a date and the parties and the
Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy
of the marriage certificate, do not by
themselves show that he did not solemnize the
marriage. His uncorroborated testimony cannot
prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola
who also declared, among others, that Bocaya
and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon
to return after ten (10) days with their marriage
license and whose credibility had not been
impeached.

The pictures taken also from the start of the
wedding ceremony up to the signing of the
marriage certificate in front of Judge
Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a,
K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and
K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a
simulated solemnization of marriage. One or
two pictures may convince a person of the
explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all
those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe
that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself to
be photographed as if he was solemnizing a
marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom
he did not even know for the alleged reasons
given. It would be highly improper and
unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used
as an instrument of deceit by making it appear
that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him
when in truth and in fact he did not solemnize
their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and
Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that
he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that
it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a
marriage license was not required. The
contracting parties here executed a joint
affidavit that they have been living together as
husband and wife for almost six (6) years
already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear
any date either when it was solemnized, it was
stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18)
years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If
he and Edralin had been living together as
husband and wife for almost six (6) years
already before they got married as they stated
in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve)
been less than thirteen (13) years old when he
started living with Edralin as his wife and this is
hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve)
been aware of this when he solemnized their
marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the
qualification of the contracting parties who
might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in
order to have an instant marriage by avoiding
the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was
already filed, Judge Palaypayon married again
Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage
license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by
34
Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the
marriage of the same couple for the second
time is that he did not consider the first
marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of the
Family Code as (a) marriage at all because
complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his
instruction that the date should be placed in the
marriage certificate to show when he
solemnized the marriage and that the
contracting parties were not furnished a copy of
their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the
marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second
time with a marriage license already only gave
rise to the suspicion that the first time he
solemnized the marriage it was only made to
appear that it was solemnized under
exceptional character as there was not marriage
license and Judge Palaypayon had already
signed the marriage certificate. If it was true
that he solemnized the first marriage under
exceptional character where a marriage license
was not required, why did he already require
the parties to have a marriage license when he
solemnized their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the
first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not a
marriage at all as the marriage certificate did
not state the date when the marriage was
solemnized and that the contracting parties
were not furnished a copy of their marriage
certificate, is not well taken as they are not any
of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and
38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage
void from the beginning. Even if no one,
however, received a copy of the marriage
certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs.
H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge Palaypayon
cannot just absolve himself from responsibility
by blaming his personnel. They are not the
guardian(s) of his official function and under
Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to
furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their
marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo
and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater
and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and
Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint
affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not
solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1).
Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the
respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did
not solemnize their marriage as they did not

have a marriage license. On cross-examination,
however, both admitted that they did not know
who prepared their affidavits. They were just
told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon,
and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to
just go to the Municipal building and sign their
joint affidavits there which were already
prepared before the Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay
and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage
contract was signed by them and by their two (2)
witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent
Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other
aforementioned marriages, the solemnization
fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated
June 7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy
(Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having
solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga
allegedly because there was no marriage license.
On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied
that the marriage was solemnized. When she
was asked, however, why did she sign the
marriage contract as a witness she answered
that she thought the marriage was already
solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court
of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the marriage
contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two
principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the
impression that she did not even know that the
marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon.
This is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of
having solemnized also the marriage of
Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting
parties and their witnesses also signed the
marriage contract and paid the solemnization
fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not
solemnize their marriage due to lack of
marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted
the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of
Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh.
14). Medina, however, did not testify in this
case and so his affidavit has no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure
and practice have been that before the
contracting parties and their witnesses enter his
chamber in order to get married, he already
required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom
35
he assigned the task of preparing the marriage
contract, to already let the parties and their
witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what
happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias
and Gaor, among others. His purpose was to
save his precious time as he has been
solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to
four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is
highly improper and irregular, if not illegal,
because the contracting parties are supposed to
be first asked by the solemnizing officer and
declare that they take each other as husband
and wife before the solemnizing officer in the
presence of at least two (2) witnesses before
they are supposed to sign their marriage
contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of
Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and
procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not
true as shown by the picture taken during the
wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to
K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy
herself who declared that the practice of Judge
Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting
parties and their witnesses sign the marriage
contract only after Judge Palaypayon has
solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence
to show also that he was really solemnizing
three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday. On the
contrary his monthly report of cases for July,
1992 shows that his court had only
twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he
solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the
whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report of
cases for September, 1992 shows also that he
solemnized only four (4) marriages during the
whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized
marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon has
presented and marked in evidence several
marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits
of persons and certification issued by the Local
Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These
persons who executed affidavits, however, did
not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage
contracts and certification mentioned are
immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not charged
of having solemnized these marriages illegally

also. He is not charged that the marriages he
solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents,
that of having falsified the monthly report of
cases submitted to the Supreme Court and not
stating in the monthly report the actual number
of documents notarized and issuing the
corresponding receipts of the notarial fees,
have been sufficiently proven by the
complainants insofar as the monthly report of
cases for July and September, 1992 are
concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both
signed by the respondents, show that for said
month there were six (6) documents notarized
by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio
Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial
register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur,
however, shows that there were actually one
hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by
Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to
Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no
falsification of the monthly report of cases for
July, 1992 because there were only six (6)
notarized documents that were paid (for) as
shown by official receipts. He did not, however,
present evidence of the alleged official receipts
showing that the notarial fee for the six (6)
documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly
report of cases with respect to the number of
documents notarized should not be based on
how many notarized documents were paid of
the notarial fees, but the number of documents
placed or recorded in the notarial register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not
personally verifying and checking anymore the
correctness of the monthly reports because he
relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of
Court and whom he has assumed to have
checked and verified the records. He merely
signs the monthly report when it is already
signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well
taken because he is required to have close
supervision in the preparation of the monthly
report of cases of which he certifies as to their
correctness. As a judge he is personally
responsible for the proper discharge of his
functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs.
36
Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro,
174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot
take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the
blame of the falsification of the monthly report
of cases on complainant Sambo whom she
allegedly assigned to prepare not only the
monthly report of cases, but the preparation
and custody of marriage contracts, notarized
documents and the notarial register. By her own
admission she has assigned to complainant
Sambo duties she was supposed to perform, yet
according to her she never bother(ed) to check
the notarial register of the court to find out the
number of documents notarized in a month
(TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the
preparation of the monthly report of cases to
Sambo, which was denied by the latter as he
claims that he only typed the monthly report
based on the data given to him by her, still it is
her duty to verify and check whether the report
is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that
Sambo was the one in custody of marriage
contracts, notarized documents and notarial
register, among other things, is not acceptable
not only because as clerk of court she was
supposed to be in custody, control and
supervision of all court records including
documents and other properties of the court (p.
32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she herself
admitted that from January, 1992 she was
already in full control of all the records of the
court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in
connection with the charge of falsification,
however, also shows that respondent Baroy did
not account for what happened to the notarial
fees received for those documents notarized
during the month of July and September, 1992.
The evidence adduced in this case also
sufficiently show that she received cash bond
deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank
or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only
issued temporary receipts for said cash bond
deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents
reported to have been notarized by Judge
Palaypayon although the documents notarized

for said month were actually one hundred
thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial
register. For September, 1992, there were only
five (5) documents reported as notarized for
that month, though the notarial register show(s)
that there were fifty-six (56) documents actually
notarized. The fee for each document notarized
as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50.
Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that
what was actually being charged was P20.00.
Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to
the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned
over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence
to show that she really sent to the Supreme
Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for each
document notarized and to the Municipal
Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50.
This should be fully accounted for considering
that Baroy herself declared that some notarial
fees were allowed by her at her own discretion
to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization
fees have not been accounted for by Baroy
considering that she admitted that even (i)n
those instances where the marriages were not
solemnized due to lack of marriage license the
solemnization fees were not returned anymore,
unless the contracting parties made a demand
for their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that
he did not know of any instance when
solemnization fee was returned when the
marriage was not solemnized due to lack of
marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon
Sambo did not turn over to her some of the
notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was
not only because Sambo vehemently denied it,
but the minutes of the conference of the
personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated
January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy
informed the personnel of the court that she
was taking over the functions she assigned to
Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees
(Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo
did not turn over to her were for those
documents notarized (i)n July and September,
1992 already. Besides there never was any
demand she made for Sambo to turn over some
notarial fees supposedly in his possession.
Neither was there any memorandum she issued
on this matter, in spite of the fact that she has
been holding meetings and issuing memoranda
to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF,
37
FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8,
6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on
October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a
certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after
she assumed office and for this cash bond she
issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did
not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the
Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own
cash box on the alleged ground that the parties
in that case where the cash bond was deposited
informed her that they would settle the case
amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally
deposited the aforementioned cash bond of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993,
after this administrative case was already filed
(TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book,
however, shows that actually Baroy opened an
account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on
March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount
of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to
8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand
(P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the
cash bond of Dacara. If it were true, it was only
after keeping to herself the cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one
year and five months when she finally deposited
it because of the filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two
days after she finally deposited the One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of
Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without
any authority or order from the court. It was
only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3)
months after she withdrew it, when she
redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show
that on February 28, 1993 respondent Baroy
received also a cash bond of Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo
Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash
bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an
annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1).
Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did
not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the
Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that
the parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her
that they would settle the case amicably. It was

on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later
when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the
release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she
assumed office on October 21, 1991 she used to
issue temporary receipt only for cash bond
deposits and other payments and collections
she received. She further admitted that some of
these temporary receipts she issued she failed
to place the number of the receipts such as that
receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93).
Baroy claims that she did not know that she had
to use the official receipts of the Supreme Court.
It was only from February, 1993, after this case
was already filed, when she only started issuing
official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that
in order to be appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy
gave Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a
gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this
charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy
bought an air conditioner for the sum of
Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00)
Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly
in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When
the air conditioner was brought to court in
order to be installed in the chamber of Judge
Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box
when it was bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to
Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand
(P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a
down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00)
Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents
presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29,
1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both
respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as
witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not
beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at a
time when she was applying for the vacant
position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was
eventually appointed in October, 1991. From
the time she bought the air conditioner on
August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the
office of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet.
The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only
evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt dated
May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed.
The receipt could have been easily prepared.
The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed
38
in the receipt as a witness did not testify in this
case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and
the Judge of the same court. All these
circumstances give rise to suspicion of at least
impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as
would subject (them) to suspicion and (their)
conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA
27).
With respect to the charge that Judge
Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria
Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara
executed an affidavit regarding this charge that
Judge Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for
the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N).
Her affidavit, however, has no probative value
as she did not show that this cash bond of
P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of
respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary
receipt for it and this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the
getting of detention prisoners to work in his
house and one of them escaped while in his
custody and was never found again. To hide this
fact, the case against said accused was ordered
archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence
adduced with respect to this particular charge,
show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled
People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan
Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe
were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in
the municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur
(Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence
presented that Alex Alano was taken by Judge
Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said
accused was confined and that he escaped
while in custody of Judge Palaypayon is solely
testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a
former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not
sufficient. The complainants should have
presented records from the police of Tinambac
to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from
the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was
under detention and said accused escaped
while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated
April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving
said case appears to be without basis. The order
states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and
the records show that the warrant of arrest

(was) issued against the accused, but up to this
moment there is no return of service for the
warrant of arrest issued against said accused"
(Exh. 0-4). The records of said case, however,
show that in fact there was a return of the
service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12,
1991 showing that Alano and Adupe were
arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order
dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No.
5047 referred only to one of the accused who
remained at large. The explanation cannot be
accepted because the two other accused, Alano
and Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon
should have issued an order for the arrest of
Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano
was supposed to be confined in the municipal
jail if his claim is true that he did not take
custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why
he ordered the case archived was because he
heard from the police that Alano escaped. This
explanation is not acceptable either. He should
ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to
bring to court Alano, the former should have
been required to explain in writing why Alano
was not brought to court. If the explanation was
that Alano escaped from jail, he should have
issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on
when he could not be arrested when the case
should have been ordered archived. The order
archiving this case for the reason that he only
heard that Alano escaped is another
circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that
Alano might have really escaped while in his
custody only that the complainants could not
present records or other documentary evidence
to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that
they collected filing fees on collection cases
filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur which was supposed to be exempted in
paying filing fees under existing laws and that
the filing fees received was deposited by
respondent Baroy in her personal account in the
bank. The evidence presented show that on
February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac
filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against
farmers and it paid the total amount of Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing
fees. The complainants cited Section 14 of
Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts
Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on
39
collection of sums of money cases filed against
farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do
with the payment of the filing fees of the Rural
Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy
who received them and besides, on February 4,
1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy
claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing
fees. The records, however, shows that
respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager
of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect
that if the bank would not pay she would submit
all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6,
comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked
whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was really
exempt from the payment of filing fees
pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended,
instead of threatening the bank to have its cases
be submitted to the court in order to have them
dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees
was made on February 4, 1992, but the Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over
to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992.
Here, there is an undue delay again in
complying with her obligation as accountable
officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the
evidence presented by the complainants
sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages,
particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina
Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that
it having been shown that he did not comply
with his duty in closely supervising his clerk of
court in the preparation of the monthly report
of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court,
particularly for the months of July and
September, 1992 where it has been proven that
the reports for said two (2) months were
falsified with respect to the number of
documents notarized, it is respectfully
recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning
that the same or similar offenses will be more
severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the
marriage contracts or certificates of those
marriages he solemnized without a marriage
license, there were no dates placed in the
marriage contracts to show when they were
solemnized, the contracting parties were not

furnished their marriage contracts and the Local
Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of
the marriage contract, will not absolve him from
liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage
without a marriage license he as the
solemnizing officer is the one responsible for
the irregularity in not complying (with) the
formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under
Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines,
he shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his
negligence or failure to comply with his duty of
closely supervising his clerk of court in the
performance of the latter's duties and functions,
particularly the preparation of the monthly
report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16).
His explanation that he only signed the monthly
report of cases only when his clerk of court
already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It
is his duty to closely supervise her, to check and
verify the records if the monthly reports
prepared by his clerk of court do not contain
false statements. It was held that "A judge
cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs.
Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that
respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of
court of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified
the monthly report of cases for the months of
July and September, 1992 with respect to the
number of documents notarized, for having
failed to account (for) the notarial fees she
received for said two (2) months period; for
having failed to account (for) the solemnization
fees of those marriages allegedly not
solemnized, but the solemnization fees were
not returned; for unauthorized issuance of
temporary receipts, some of which were issued
unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of
Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the amount of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she
issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for
depositing it with the Land Bank of the
Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or after one
year and five months in her possession and
after this case was already filed; for
withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any
court order or authority and redepositing it only
on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of
Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo
40
Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC,
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she issued
only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X
and X-1) and for not depositing it with a bank or
with the Municipal Treasurer until it was
ordered released; and for requiring the Rural
Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing
fees on February 4, 1992 for collection cases
filed against farmers in the amount of Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said
amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on
March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended
that said respondent clerk of court Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits
shall be by the clerk of court who shall issue
official receipt to the provincial, city or
municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn.
Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by
order of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of
Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and
626; p. 127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A
circular also provides that the Clerks of Court
shall immediately issue an official receipt upon
receipt of deposits from party litigants and
thereafter deposit intact the collection with the
municipal, city or provincial treasurer and their
deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper
receipt and order of the Court (DOJ Circular No.
52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of
Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular
No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that
"all collections of funds of fiduciary character
including rental deposits, shall be deposited
immediately by the clerk of court concerned
upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or
Provincial Treasurer where his court is located"
and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits
shall be made except upon lawful order of the
court exercising jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply
with the foregoing circulars, or deliberately
disregarded, or even intentionally violated them.
By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous
unconcern for the obligations and responsibility
of her duties and functions as a clerk of court
and accountable officer. The gross neglect of
her duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious
misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from
office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma
Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas
City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was
held that "The clerk of court is not authorized to

keep funds in his/her custody; monies received
by him/her shall be deposited immediately
upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or
Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular
Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated
December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure
to remit the cash bail bonds and fine she
collected constitutes serious misconduct and
her misappropriation of said funds constitutes
dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was
found guilty of dishonesty and serious
misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and (the Court) ordered her
immediate dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration
that the conduct and behavior of everyone
connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge
to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. His
conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but,
above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every
employee should be an example of integrity,
uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial
office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It
applies, without qualification as to rank or
position, from the judge to the least of its
personnel, they being standard-bearers of the
exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed
upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the
Family Code pertinently provides that the
formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a
valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it
declares that the absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall generally render the
marriage void ab initio and that, while an
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage, the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting
parties and those affected by the illegal
marriages, and what we are providing for herein
pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their
criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code
provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any
religious denomination or sect, or civil
41
authorities who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Marriage
Law."9 This is of course, within the province of
the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the
administrative sanction to be imposed on
respondent judge should, therefore, be
modified. For one, with respect to the charge of
illegal solemnization of marriages, it does
appear that he had not taken to heart, but
actually trifled with, the law's concern for the
institution of marriage and the legal effects
flowing from civil status. This, and his
undeniable participation in the other offenses
charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail,
approximate such serious degree of misconduct
and of gross negligence in the performance of
judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher
penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE
of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any
repetition of the same or similar offenses in the
future will definitely be severely dealt with.
Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of
all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
employment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their
records and furnished to the Office of the
Ombudsman for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., took no part.
Bidin, J., is on leave.
#Footnotes
1 Original Record, 1.
2 Ibid., 9 and 23.

3 Ibid., 86.
4 Ibid., 134.
5 Annong vs. Vda. de Blas, A.M. No. P-91-602,
October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 635.
6 Capuno, et al. vs. Jaramillo, Jr., A.M. No.
RTJ-93-944, July 20, 1994.
7 Article 3(2), Executive Order No. 209, as
amended.
8 Article 4, id.
9 Article 352, Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Section 39, Act No. 3613.
Courts; Judges; Court Personnel; Integrity in a
judicial office is more than a virtue—it is a
necessity—and applies, without qualification as
to rank or position, from the judge to the least
of its personnel.—We here emphasize once
again our adjuration that the conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from
the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should
be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must
not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but, above all else, must be beyond
suspicion. Every employee should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.
Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue,
it is a necessity. It applies, without qualification
as to rank or position, from the judge to the
least of its personnel, they being
standard-bearers of the exacting norms of
ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of
justice.
Same; Same; Marriage; While an irregularity in
the formal requisites shall not affect the validity
of the marriage, the party or parties responsible
for the same shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.—On the charge
regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code
pertinently provides that the formal requisites
of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage
license except in the cases provided for therein.
Complementarily, it declares that the absence
42
of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
generally render the marriage void ab initio and
that, while an irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage, the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Same; Same; Same; The present proceedings
pertain only to the administrative liability of the
respondent judge and clerk of court, all without
prejudice to their criminal liability.—The civil
aspect is addressed to the contracting parties
and those affected by the illegal marriages,and
what we are providing for herein pertains to the
administrative liability of respondents, all
without prejudice to their criminal responsibility.
The Revised Penal Code provides that “(p)riests
or ministers of any religious denomination or
sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be
punished in accordance with the provisions of
the Marriage Law.” This is of course, within the
province of the prosecutorial agencies of the
Government.
Same; Same; Same; With respect to the charge
of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does
appear that the respondent judge had not taken
to heart, but actually trifled with, the law’s
concern for the institution of marriage and the
legal effects flowing from civil status.—The
recommendation with respect to the
administrative sanction to be imposed on
respondent judge should, therefore, be
modified. For one, with respect to the charge of
illegal solemnization of marriages, it does
appear that he had not taken to heart, but
actually trifled with, the law’s concern for the
institution of marriage and the legal effects
flowing from civil status. This, and his
undeniable participation in the other offenses
charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail,
approximate such serious degree of misconduct
and of gross negligence in the performance of
judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher
penalty.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)

MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges
respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May
2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to
her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without
the requisite marriage license and at Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the
strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was
a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast
properties" left by Orobia was not recognized.
She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the
Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed
against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly
caused her so much hardships, embarrassment
and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the
Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño for
appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office
of the Court Administrator required respondent
judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent
judge averred that he was requested by a
certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to
solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17
February 2000. Having been assured that all the
documents to the marriage were complete, he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at
the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo
informed him that Orobia had a difficulty
walking and could not stand the rigors of
travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25
kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo
then requested if respondent judge could
solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which
request he acceded.
43
Respondent judge further avers that before he
started the ceremony, he carefully examined
the documents submitted to him by petitioner.
When he discovered that the parties did not
possess the requisite marriage license, he
refused to solemnize the marriage and
suggested its resetting to another date.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties,
the influx of visitors, and the delivery of
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the
wedding, it might aggravate the physical
condition of Orobia who just suffered from a
stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated
the necessity for the marriage license and
admonished the parties that their failure to give
it would render the marriage void. Petitioner
and Orobia assured respondent judge that they
would give the license to him in the afternoon
of that same day. When they failed to comply,
respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but
the latter only gave him the same reassurance
that the marriage license would be delivered to
his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told
the contracting parties that their marriage is
valid despite the absence of a marriage license.
He attributes the hardships and embarrassment
suffered by the petitioner as due to her own
fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her
Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001
with the Office of the Court Administrator. She
attested that respondent judge initially refused
to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a
duly issued marriage license and that it was
because of her prodding and reassurances that
he eventually solemnized the same. She
confessed that she filed this administrative case
out of rage. However, after reading the
Comment filed by respondent judge, she
realized her own shortcomings and is now
bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears
that petitioner and Orobia filed their
Application for Marriage License on 5 January
2000. It was stamped in this Application that the
marriage license shall be issued on 17 January
2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia
claimed it.

It also appears that the Office of the Civil
Registrar General issued a Certification that it
has no record of such marriage that allegedly
took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur issued another Certification
dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true
copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties
since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance
of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the
issuance of her marriage license. Respondent
judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a
Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
respondent judge that their office cannot issue
the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia
to submit the Death Certificate of his previous
spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its
Report and Recommendation dated 15
November 2000, found the respondent judge
guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly
issued marriage license and for doing so outside
his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00
was recommended to be imposed on
respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to
solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent.
In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge
held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a
wedding at his residence in the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within
the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of
Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by
his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court
44
has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue,
as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where
a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative
liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge
for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We
further held that:
"The judiciary should be composed of persons
who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the
law they are sworn to apply, more than the
ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the
law. It is imperative that they be conversant
with basic legal principles like the ones involved
in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may
at times make mistakes in judgment, for which
they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the
status of married persons."3
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality
of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and
Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is
contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount
to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for
solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara,4 we held
that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot
render valid or even add an iota of validity to
the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it
is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a

marriage. Respondent judge did not possess
such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of
the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite
the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner.
This Court has consistently held in a catena of
cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does
not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.
Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration
of justice, as well as the discipline of court
personnel, would be undermined.5 Disciplinary
actions of this nature do not involve purely
private or personal matters. They can not be
made to depend upon the will of every
complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act. We cannot
be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant
in a matter which involves the Court's
constitutional power to discipline judges.
Otherwise, that power may be put to naught,
undermine the trust character of a public office
and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court
as a disciplining authority.6
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M.
Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined
P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
Administrative Law; Judges; The authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior
courts to solemnize marriages is confined to
their jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme
Court.—Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior
courts to solemnize marriages is confined to
their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court.
Same; Same; Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside the court’s jurisdiction, there
is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite
laid down in Article 3, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject
45
the officiating official to administrative
liability.—“A priest who is commissioned and
allowed by his local ordinance to marry the
faithful is authorized to do so only within the
area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop.
An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this
Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines
to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue,
as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.”
Same; Same; Except in cases provided by law, it
is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage.—In People vs. Lara, we held that a
marriage which preceded the issuance of the
marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot
render valid or even add an iota of validity to
the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it
is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess
such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of
the law.
Same; Same; The withdrawal of the complaint
does not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary
action.—Respondent judge cannot be
exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance
filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently
held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of
the complaint does not necessarily have the
legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and
fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined. Disciplinary actions of this nature
do not involve purely private or personal
matters. They can not be made to depend upon
the will of every complainant who may, for one
reason or another, condone a detestable act.
We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a
complainant in a matter which involves the
Court’s constitutional power to discipline judges.
Otherwise, that power may be put to naught,

undermine the trust character of a public office
and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court
as a disciplining authority.
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to
reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
which affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol,
Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial
court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y
Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of
seven (7) months of prision correccional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in
this petition is the resolution3 of the appellate
court, dated September 25, 2000, denying
Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a
quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period
of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and
Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a
card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The
former replied and after an exchange of letters,
they became sweethearts.
46
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but
left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant
communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they
were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to
her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio
behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario
Court (General Division) a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the
court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on
February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo
married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen
sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint
seek (sic) among others, the declaration of
nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually
took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged
with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the
arraignment on the ground that the civil case
for judicial nullification of his marriage with
Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case. His motion was granted, but subsequently
denied upon motion for reconsideration by the
prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688,
herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed
down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months
of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court
discounted petitioner’s claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio.
Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the
trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage
ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy.
The parties to a marriage should not be allowed
to assume that their marriage is void even if
such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia,
the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which
held that the court of a country in which neither
of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or
both spouses may resort merely for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
determine the matrimonial status of the parties.
As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking
Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the
second marriage, the trial court stressed that
following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is
presumed to know the law, and the fact that
one does not know that his act constitutes a
violation of the law does not exempt him from
the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the
marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab
initio since no marriage ceremony actually took
place. No appeal was taken from this decision,
which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court
decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
47
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed
decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction,
the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s
marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could
not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is
sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the
Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a
second marriage before the first marriage had
been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact
that the first marriage was void from the
beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy
case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the
divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in
the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the
Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary
to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article
1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public
policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a
judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
appellate court’s decision, contending that the
doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake
upon a difficult question of law (such as the
effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis
for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court
denied the motion for lack of merit.16 However,
the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of
the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria,
joined in the opinion prepared by Justice
Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed
that as the first marriage was validly declared
void ab initio, then there was no first marriage
to speak of. Since the date of the nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage and
since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the
law, never married, he cannot be convicted
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues
for our resolution:
A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN
CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE
REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF
CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN
PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE
TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT
EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING
THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be
whether or not petitioner committed bigamy
and if so, whether his defense of good faith is
valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be
faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He
highlights the fact that he contracted the
second marriage openly and publicly, which a
person intent upon bigamy would not be doing.
The petitioner further argues that his lack of
criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of
bigamy, just like other felonies punished under
the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence,
good faith and lack of criminal intent are
allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that
there is a difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate
the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow
that his intention to contract a second marriage
is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) submits that good faith in the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse.
The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that
bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided
all the elements concur, stressing that under
48
Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial
declaration of nullity is a must before a party
may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner
was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as
everyone is presumed to know the law. The
OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that
he was in good faith because he relied on the
divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated
by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a
judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of
good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must
first determine whether all the elements of
bigamy are present in this case.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the
elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been
valid had it not been for the existence of the
first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case,
we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed
down the following decision in Civil Case No.
6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of
the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio
Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in
Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the
cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between Lucio
and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what
transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held
that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance

with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As
the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
correctly puts it, "This simply means that there
was no marriage to begin with; and that such
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the
first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab
initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of
the law, never married."24 The records show
that no appeal was taken from the decision of
the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the
decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires
that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Under the principle of retroactivity of a
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two
were never married "from the beginning." The
contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was
not married to Lucia at the time he contracted
the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence
and the validity of the first marriage being an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is
but logical that a conviction for said offense
cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must,
perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be
distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already
celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is necessary before a subsequent one
can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the
first marriage was actually solemnized not just
once, but twice: first before a judge where a
marriage certificate was duly issued and then
again six months later before a priest in
religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first
49
marriage appeared to have transpired, although
later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage
ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract
on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration
of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot
be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is
mandated to liberally construe a penal statute
in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of
innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under
the circumstances of the present case, we held
that petitioner has not committed bigamy.
Further, we also find that we need not tarry on
the issue of the validity of his defense of good
faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now
moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
as well as the resolution of the appellate court
dated September 25, 2000, denying herein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio
Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge
of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not
been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr.,
and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice
Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by
Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo
P. Cruz.
2
Records, pp. 114-119.

3
Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo
P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia
and Marina L. Buzon, concurring and Eugenio S.
Labitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis, dissenting.
4
Her correct name is Maria
Jececha Limbago (Italics for emphasis). See Exh.
"B," the copy of their marriage contract.
Records, p. 10.
5
The accusatory portion of the charge sheet
found in Records, p. 1, reads:
"That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992,
in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused being previously united
in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete on August
23, 1990 and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Maria Jececha Limbago to
the damage and prejudice of Lucia Barrete in
the amount to be proved during trial.
"Acts committed contrary to the provisions of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code."
6
Rollo, pp. 38-40.
7
Records, p. 119.
8
G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226
SCRA 572.
9
42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918).
10
58 Phil. 817 (1933).
11
Rollo, p. 43.
12
ART. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
13
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
50
14
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before
the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country,
the solemnities established by Philippine laws
shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts
or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
15
G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA
85.
16
Rollo, p. 51.
17
Id. at 20-21.
18
G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747,
752-753.
19
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
20
Supra.
21
CA Rollo, p. 38.
22
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other
as husband and wife in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age.
 51

23
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or CARPIO, J.:
formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). The Case

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall
be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
24
Rollo, p. 54.
G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for
review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on
30 September 2009 as well as the
Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010
by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The appellate court
affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision4 of
Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal Case No.
Q-04-129031.

25
G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora,
122. Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to
26
Id. at 124. suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena
Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the
prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements; In
Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis, the elements of
bigamy were laid down.—In Marbella-Bobis v. The Facts
Bobis we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married; (2) The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
the first marriage has not been legally dissolved,
or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent On August 24, 2004, Assistant
spouse has not been judicially declared City Prosecutor Raymond
presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a Jonathan B. Lledo filed an
subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent Information against Atilano O.
marriage would have been valid had it not been Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and
for the existence of the first. Rowena P. Geraldino
("Geraldino") for the crime of
Same; Same; Same; Declaration of the first Bigamy. The accusatory
marriage as void ab initio retroacts to the date portion of the Information
of the celebration of the first marriage.—There reads:
was no marriage to begin with; and that such
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the "That on or about the 8th day
first marriage. In other words, for all intents and of December 2001 in Quezon
purposes, reckoned from the date of the City, Philippines, the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio above-named accused
to the date of the celebration of the first ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR.,
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of being then legally married to
the law, never married. one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA,
and as said marriage has not
been legally dissolved and still
G.R. No. 191425 September 7, subsisting, did then and there
2011 willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner, subsequent or second
vs. marriage with her [sic]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. co-accused ROWENA P.
GERALDINO, who knowingly
DECISION consented and agreed to be
married to her co-accused

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR.
knowing him to be a married
man, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended
party JESUSA PINAT
NOLLORA."
Upon his arraignment on April
18, 2005, accused Nollora
assisted by counsel, refused to
enter his plea. Hence, a plea
of not guilty was entered by
the Court for him. Accused
Geraldino, on the other hand,
entered a plea of not guilty
when arraigned on June 14,
2005. On even date, pre-trial
conference was held and both
the prosecution and defense
entered the following
stipulation of facts:
"1. the validity of the first
marriage between Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa Pinat
Nollora solemnized on April 6,
1999 at Sapang Palay, San
Jose del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
contracted the second
marriage with Rowena P.
Geraldino on December 8,
2001 in Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit
of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he
admitted that he contracted
the second marriage to
Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino
attached to her
Counter-Affidavit the
Certificate of Marriage with
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated
December 8, 2001;
5. the fact of marriage of
Rowena P. Geraldino with
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as
admitted in her
Counter-Affidavit."
The only issue thus proffered
by the prosecution for the
52
RTC’s resolution is whether or
not the second marriage is
bigamous. Afterwards,
pre-trial conference was
terminated and the case was
set for initial hearing.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
As culled from the herein
assailed Decision, the
respective testimonies of
prosecution witnesses were as
follows:
"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat
Nollora xxx testified that she
and accused Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi
Arabia while she was working
there as a Staff Midwife in
King Abdulah Naval Base
Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
courted her and on April 6,
1999, they got married at the
[IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in
Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit ‘A’).
While working in said hospital,
she heard rumors that her
husband has another wife and
because of anxiety and
emotional stress, she left
Saudi Arabia and returned to
the Philippines (TSN, October
4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival
in the Philippines, the private
complainant learned that
indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
contracted a second marriage
with co-accused Rowena P.
Geraldino on December 8,
2001 (Exhibit ‘B’) when she
secured a certification as to
the civil status of Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit ‘C’) from
the National Statistics Office
(NSO) sometime in November
2003.
Upon learning this
information, the private
complainant confronted
Rowena P. Geraldino at the
latter’s workplace in CBW, FTI,

Taguig and asked her if she
knew of the first marriage
between complainant and
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which
Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly
affirmed and despite this
knowledge, she allegedly still
married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
because she loves him so
much and because they were
neighbors and childhood
friends. Private complainant
also knew that Rowena P.
Geraldino knew of her
marriage with Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr., because when she
(private complainant) was
brought by Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. at the latter’s residence in
Taguig, Metro Manila and
introduced her to Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr.’s parents, Rowena
P. Geraldino was there in the
house together with a friend
and she heard everything that
they were talking about.
Because of this case, private
complainant was not able to
return to Saudi Arabia to work
as a Staff Midwife thereby
losing income opportunity in
the amount of ₱34,000.00 a
month, more or less. When
asked about the moral
damages she suffered, she
declared that what happened
to her was a tragedy and she
had entertained [thoughts] of
committing suicide. She added
that because of what
happened to her, her mother
died and she almost got raped
when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
left her alone in their
residence in Saudi Arabia.
However, she declared that
money is not enough to
assuage her sufferings.
Instead, she just asked for the
return of her money in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 (TSN,
July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth
Santos testified that she knew
53
of the marriage between the
private complainant and
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because
she was one of the sponsors in
said wedding. Sometime in
November 2003, she was
asked by the private
complainant to accompany
the latter to the workplace of
Rowena P. Geraldino in FTI,
Taguig, Metro Manila. She
declared that the private
complainant and Rowena P.
Geraldino had a confrontation
and she heard that Rowena P.
Geraldino admitted that she
(Rowena) knew of the first
marriage of Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. and the private
complainant but she still went
on to marry Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. because she loves him very
much (TSN, October 24, 2005,
pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defense’s version of facts,
as summarized in the herein
assailed Decision, is as follows:
"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
admitted having contracted
two (2) marriages, the first
with private complainant
Jesusa Pinat and the second
with Rowena P. Geraldino. He,
however, claimed that he was
a Muslim convert way back on
January 10, 1992, even before
he contracted the first
marriage with the private
complainant. As a [M]uslim
convert, he is allegedly
entitled to marry four (4)
wives as allowed under the
Muslim or Islam belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim
convert even prior to his
marriage to the private
complainant, Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. presented a
Certificate of Conversion
dated August 2, 2004 issued
by one Hadji Abdul Kajar

Madueño and approved by
one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin
wherein it is stated that
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly
converted as a Muslim since
January 19, 1992 (Exhibit ‘2,’
‘3’ and ‘4’). Aside from said
certificate, he also presented
a Pledge of Conversion dated
January 10, 1992 issued by the
same Hadji Abdul Kajar
Madueño and approved by
one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin
(Exhibit ‘7’).
He claimed that the private
complaint knew that he was a
Muslim convert prior to their
marriage because she [sic]
told this fact when he was
courting her in Saudi Arabia
and the reason why said
private complainant filed the
instant case was due to hatred
having learned of his second
marriage with Rowena P.
Geraldino. She [sic] further
testified that Rowena P.
Geraldino was not aware of
his first marriage with the
private complainant and he
did not tell her this fact
because Rowena P. Geraldino
is a Catholic and he does not
want to lose her if she learns
of his first marriage.
He explained that in his
Marriage Contract with Jesusa
Pinat, it is indicated that he
was a ‘Catholic Pentecostal’
but that he was not aware
why it was placed as such on
said contract. In his Marriage
Contract with Rowena P.
Geraldino, the religion
‘Catholic’ was also indicated
because he was keeping as a
secret his being a Muslim
since the society does not
approve of marrying a Muslim.
He also indicated that he was
‘single’ despite his first
marriage to keep said first
marriage a secret (TSN,
January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).
54
Defense witness Hadji Abdul
Qasar Madueño testified that
he is the founder and
president of Balik Islam
Tableegh Foundation of the
Philippines and as such
president, he has the power
and authority to convert any
applicant to the Muslim
religion. He alleged that
sometime in 1992, he met
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
in Mabini (Manila) who was
then going abroad. Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. applied to become
a Muslim (Exhibit ‘14’) and
after receiving the application,
said accused was
indoctrinated regarding his
obligations as a Muslim. On
January 10, 1992, Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. embraced the
Muslim faith. He was then
directed to report every
Sunday to monitor his
development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. visited him and
asked for a certification
because of the filing of the
instant case. On October 2,
2004, he issued a Certificate
of Conversion wherein it is
stated that Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. is a Muslim convert since
January 10, 1992. Apart from
the above-mentioned
document, their ‘Imam’ also
issued a Pledge of Conversion
(Exhibit ‘7’). He declared that
a Muslim convert could marry
more than one according to
the Holy Koran. However,
before marrying his second,
third and fourth wives, it is
required that the consent of
the first Muslim wife be
secured. Thus, if the first wife
is not a Muslim, there is no
necessity to secure her
consent (TSN, October 9, 2006,
pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations,
he declared that if a Muslim

convert gets married not in
accordance with the Muslim
faith, the same is contrary to
the teachings of the Muslim
faith. A Muslim also can marry
up to four times but he should
be able to treat them equally.
He claimed that he was not
aware of the first marriage but
was aware of the second.
Since his second marriage
with Rowena P. Geraldino was
not in accordance with the
Muslim faith, he advised
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to
re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino
in accordance with Muslim
marriage celebration,
otherwise, he will not be
considered as a true Muslim
(TSN, June 25, 2007, pages
3-7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino
alleged that she was only a
victim in this incident of
bigamous marriage. She
claimed that she does not
know the private complainant
Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only
came to know her when this
case was filed. She insists that
she is the one lawfully married
to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.,
having been married to the
latter since December 8, 2001.
Upon learning that Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. contracted a first
marriage with the private
complainant, she confronted
the former who admitted the
said marriage. Prior to their
marriage, she asked Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. if he was single
and the latter responded that
he was single. She also knew
that her husband was a
Catholic prior to their
marriage but after she learned
of the first marriage of her
husband, she learned that he
is a Muslim convert. She also
claimed that after learning
that her husband was a
Muslim convert, she and
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got
married in accordance with
55
the Muslim rites. She also
belied the allegations of the
private complainant that she
was sought by the private
complainant and that they
had a confrontation where
she admitted that she knew
that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was
married to the private
complainant and despite this
knowledge, she went on to
marry him because she loved
him very much. She insisted
that she only came to know
the private complainant when
she (private complainant) filed
this case (TSN, August 14,
2007, pages 2-8)."5
The Trial Court’s Ruling
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the
trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted
Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two
exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article
417 of the Family Code, or Executive Order No.
209, and Article 1808 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential
Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited
Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines, which provides the
qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have
more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim male can
have more than one wife unless he can deal
with them in equal companionship and just
treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only
in exceptional cases."
In convicting Nollora, the trial court’s Decision
further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that
monogamy is the general rule
and polygamy is allowed only
to meet urgent needs. Only
with the permission of the
court can a Muslim be
permitted to have a second
wife subject to certain
requirements. This is because
having plurality of wives is
merely tolerated, not
encouraged, under certain
circumstances (Muslim Law on

Personal Status in the
Philippines by Amer M.
Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J.
Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages
64-65). Arbitration is
necessary. Any Muslim
husband desiring to contract
subsequent marriages, before
so doing, shall notify the
Shari’a Circuit Court of the
place where his family resides.
The clerk of court shall serve a
copy thereof to the wife or
wives. Should any of them
objects [sic]; an Agama
Arbitration Council shall be
constituted. If said council
fails to secure the wife’s
consent to the proposed
marriage, the Court shall,
subject to Article 27, decide
whether on [sic] not to sustain
her objection (Art. 162,
Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in
marrying his second wife,
co-accused Rowena P.
Geraldino, did not comply
with the above-mentioned
provision of the law. In fact,
he did not even declare that
he was a Muslim convert in
both marriages, indicating his
criminal intent. In his
converting to the Muslim faith,
said accused entertained the
mistaken belief that he can
just marry anybody again after
marrying the private
complainant. What is clear,
therefore, is [that] a Muslim is
not given an unbridled right to
just marry anybody the
second, third or fourth time.
There are requirements that
the Shari’a law imposes, that
is, he should have notified the
Shari’a Court where his family
resides so that copy of said
notice should be furnished to
the first wife. The argument
that notice to the first wife is
not required since she is not a
Muslim is of no moment. This
obligation to notify the said
56
court rests upon accused
Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for
him to interpret the Shari’a
law. It is the Shari’a Court that
has this authority.
In an apparent attempt to
escape criminal liability, the
accused recelebrated their
marriage in accordance with
the Muslim rites. However,
this can no longer cure the
criminal liability that has
already been violated.
The Court, however, finds
criminal liability on the person
of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr.,
only. There is no sufficient
evidence that would pin
accused Rowena P. Geraldino
down. The evidence
presented by the prosecution
against her is the allegation
that she knew of the first
marriage between private
complainant and Atilano
Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,]
being open to several
interpretations. Private
complainant alleged that
when she was brought by
Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the
latter’s house in Taguig, Metro
Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino
was there standing near the
door and heard their
conversation. From this
incident, private complainant
concluded that said Rowena P.
Geraldino was aware that she
and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were
married. This conclusion is
obviously misplaced since it
could not be reasonably
presumed that Rowena P.
Geraldino understands what
was going on between her and
Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is
axiomatic that "(E)very
circumstance favoring
accused’s innocence must be
taken into account, proof
against him must survive the
test of reason and the
strongest suspicion must not

be permitted to sway
judgment" (People vs. Austria,
195 SCRA 700). This Court,
therefore, has to acquit
Rowena P. Geraldino for
failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is
hereby rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O.
NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime
of Bigamy punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. This court hereby
renders judgment imposing
upon him a prison term of two
(2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum of
his indeterminate sentence, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum,
plus accessory penalties
provided by law.
b) Acquitting accused
ROWENA P. GERALDINO of
the crime of Bigamy for failure
of the prosecution to prove
her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano
O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for
the allowance of his temporary liberty under
the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial
court granted Nollora’s motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and
assigned only one error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in
finding the accused-appellant
guilty of the crime charged
despite the prosecution’s
57
failure to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.10
The Appellate Court’s Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court
dismissed Nollora’s appeal and affirmed the trial
court’s decision.11
The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense
that his second marriage to Geraldino was in
lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was
allowed by the Qur’an. The appellate court
denied Nollora’s invocation of his religious
beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the
non-Muslim women who married him pursuant
to Philippine civil laws.1avvphi1 Nollora’s two
marriages were not conducted in accordance
with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence
the Family Code of the Philippines should apply.
Nollora’s claim of religious freedom will not
immobilize the State and render it impotent in
protecting the general welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the
appellate court denied Nollora’s motion for
reconsideration. The allegations in the motion
for reconsideration were a mere rehash of
Nollora’s earlier arguments, and there was no
reason for the appellate court to modify its 30
September 2009 Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review
before this Court on 6 April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy.
The Court’s Ruling
Nollora’s petition has no merit. We affirm the
rulings of the appellate court and of the trial
court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The
penalty of prision mayor shall
be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or

subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The elements of the crime of
bigamy are:
1. That the offender has
been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not
been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil
Code.
3. That he contracts
a second or subsequent marria
ge.
4. That the second or
subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for
validity.13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all
the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally
married to Pinat;14 (2) Nollora and Pinat’s
marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to
the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora
admitted the existence of his second marriage
to Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s
marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora
due to his prior marriage.16
The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinat’s
marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were
married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church,
Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6
April 1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of
the IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony.
The marriage certificate18 of Nollora and
Geraldino’s marriage states that Nollora and
Geraldino were married at Max’s Restaurant,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila on
8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos
officiated the ceremony.
58
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the
Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O.
NOLLORA who is alleged to
have been born on February
22, 1968 from ATILANO M.
NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA
OCLARIT, appears in our
National Indices of Marriage
for Groom for the years 1973
to 2002 with the following
information:
Date of Marriage Place of Marriage
a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN
a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora
put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense.
He alleged that his religion allows him to marry
more than once. Granting arguendo that
Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of
celebration of both marriages,20 Nollora cannot
deny that both marriage ceremonies were not
conducted in accordance with the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree
No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil
contract but a civil institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by
this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to
stipulation, except that the marriage
settlements to a certain extent fix the property
relations of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage
contract shall be perfected unless the following
essential requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly
witnessed by at least two competent persons
after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has
given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr)
duly witnessed by two competent persons.

Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any
Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and
any Muslim female of the age of puberty or
upwards and not suffering from any
impediment under the provisions of this Code
may contract marriage. A female is presumed to
have attained puberty upon reaching the age of
fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular
form of marriage ceremony is required but
the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be
declared publicly in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and the two
competent witnesses. The declaration shall be
set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or
marked by the contracting parties and said
witnesses, and attested by the person
solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be
given to the contracting parties and another
sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing
officer who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage.
- Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be
wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by
any person who is competent under Muslim law
to solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court
or Shari’a Circuit Court or any person
designated by the judge, should the
proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to
authorize the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall
be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of
the Shari’a judge, office of the Circuit Registrar,
residence of the bride or her wali, or at any
other suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or
value of dower may be fixed by the contracting
parties (mahr-musamma) before, during or
after the celebration of marriage. If the amount
or the value thereof has not been so fixed, a
proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition
of the wife, be determined by the court
according to the social standing of the parties.
59
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a
marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim,
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law
or this Code, the [Family Code of the
Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu
of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply."
Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here.
Neither is the claim that Nollora’s marriages
were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus,
regardless of his professed religion, Nollora
cannot claim exemption from liability for the
crime of bigamy.21
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with
Geraldino that his civil status is "single."
Moreover, both of Nollora’s marriage contracts
do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the
truth or falsehood of the declaration of one’s
religion in the marriage certificate is not an
essential requirement for marriage, such
omissions are sufficient proofs of Nollora’s
liability for bigamy. Nollora’s false declaration
about his civil status is thus further
compounded by these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with
Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion,
Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that
since January 10, 1992, you are already a
[M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that
you are already a [M]uslim convert since
January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage
contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication
here that you have indicated your religion. Will
you please go over your marriage contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there
Catholic but I didn’t know why they did not
place any Catholic there.
xxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your
attention with respect to your marriage
contract with your co-accused in this case,
Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us,
Mr. Witness, considering that you said that you
are already a [M]uslim convert on January 10,
1992, why in the marriage contract with
Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your
religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?

A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was
then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my
being my Balik-Islam, that’s why I placed there
Catholic since I know that the society doesn’t
approve a Catholic to marry another, that’s
why I placed there Catholic as my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, "civil status,"
why did you indicate there that you’re single,
Mr. Witness?
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married,
earlier married.22 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr.
Nollora?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why
did you allow that your faith be indicated as
Catholic when in fact you were already as you
alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage
contract?
xxx
[A:] I don’t think there is anything wrong with it,
I just signed it so we can get married under the
Catholic rights [sic] because after that we even
got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your
Honor.
xxx
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a
second wife, are you required under your faith
to secure the permission of your first wife to get
married?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your
first wife, Jesusa Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her
because she was very mad at me, at the start,
she was always very mad, ma’am.23
60
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts
doubt on the validity of his marriage to
Geraldino.1avvphi1 Nollora may not impugn his
marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate
himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we
would be opening the doors to allowing the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage
ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals:24
There is therefore a recognition written into the
law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise
would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract
be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape
the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31538 promulgated on 30 September 2009
and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February
2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment with a term of two years, four
months and one day of prision correccional as
minimum to eight years and one day of prision
mayor as maximum of his indeterminate
sentence, as well as the accessory penalties
provided by law.
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC).
declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer
(Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios)
as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American
citizen, and Albios were married before Judge
Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as
evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC
a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that
immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife
because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with
any of their essential marital obligations. She
described their marriage as one made in jest
and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not
file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to
admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant
Prosecutor complied and reported that she
could not make a determination for failure of
both parties to appear at the scheduled
investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the
prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the
schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the
merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared
the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
61
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the marriage of
Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void
from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner
shall cease using the surname of respondent as
she never acquired any right over it and so as to
avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife
of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties
married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated
that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American
citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that
after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated
with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him
the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that
when marriage was entered into for a purpose
other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7
dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for
want of merit. It explained that the marriage
was declared void because the parties failed to
freely give their consent to the marriage as they
had no intention to be legally bound by it and
used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal
before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29,
2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which
found that the essential requisite of consent
was lacking. The CA stated that the parties
clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married and that their
case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further

explained that the parties never intended to
enter into the marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family. It concluded that their purpose was
primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to
obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the
consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR
THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS
DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for
Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely
gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According
to the OSG, consent should be distinguished
from motive, the latter being inconsequential to
the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does
not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
The parties here intentionally consented to
enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it
were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to
acquire American citizenship would be rendered
futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her
Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand
that her marriage was similar to a marriage by
way of jest and, therefore, void from the
beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its
Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition
for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole
question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for
62
the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void
ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall
first examine the phenomenon of marriage
fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it
concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole
purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the
United States, marriages where a couple
marries only to achieve a particular purpose or
acquire specific benefits, have been referred to
as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common
limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another,
which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is
usually concerned with the intention of the
couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it
attempts to filter out those who use marriage
solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service,15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of
marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled
that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and
groom did not intend to establish a life together
at the time they were married. "This standard
was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of
1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to
instead demonstrate that the marriage was not
"entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States." The
focus, thus, shifted from determining the
intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading
immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however,
that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to
rule on the legal validity or existence of a
marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a
marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for
the limited purpose of immigration is also
legally void and in existent. The early cases on
limited purpose marriages in the United States

made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable
case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated,
wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but
not to live together and to obtain a divorce
within six months. The Court, through Judge
Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert
temporary into permanent permission to stay in
the country was not a marriage, there being no
consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were
never married at all. Mutual consent is
necessary to every contract; and no matter
what forms or ceremonies the parties may go
through indicating the contrary, they do not
contract if they do not in fact assent, which may
always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception
to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage
at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage
without subsequent consummation will be valid;
but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for
the sake of representing it as such to the
outside world and with the understanding that
they will put an end to it as soon as it has served
its purpose to deceive, they have never really
agreed to be married at all. They must assent to
enter into the relation as it is ordinarily
understood, and it is not ordinarily understood
as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive
others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969
case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which
declared as valid a marriage entered into solely
for the husband to gain entry to the United
States, stating that a valid marriage could not be
avoided "merely because the marriage was
entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further
recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage
was intrinsically different from a non subsisting
one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for
lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized
as problematic. The problem being that in order
to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal
marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United
States courts have generally denied annulments
involving" limited purpose" marriages where a
couple married only to achieve a particular
63
purpose, and have upheld such marriages as
valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the
RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment
of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
and should not be recognized from its inception.
In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain
that the marriage was declared void because
the parties failed to freely give their consent to
the marriage as they had no intention to be
legally bound by it and used it only as a means
for the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled
that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of
getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the
CA found the marriage to be similar to a
marriage in jest considering that the parties
only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange
of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into
a marriage contract and never intended to live
as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore,
grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of
consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code,
consent is an essential requisite of marriage.
Article 4 of the same Code provides that the
absence of any essential requisite shall render a
marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it
must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely
given" consent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense
that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and
46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent
must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the
parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their
act.25 Their understanding should not be

affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking
between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was
real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as
they understood the nature and the beneficial
and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do
so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. There was a clear intention to enter
into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application
for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise
legal tie which was necessary to accomplish
their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack
of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a
pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering
into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be
bound. The ceremony is not followed by any
conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such
a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not
intended to be real and with no intention to
create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the
absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in
jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective,
or unintelligent consent, but for a complete
absence of consent. There is no genuine
consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any
purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all
analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios
and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be
bound in order to create the very bond
necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to
be married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage
can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent
intention to enter into the actual marriage
64
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a
limited purpose. Genuine consent was,
therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1
of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that
the parties in a marriage might have no real
intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered
into in accordance with law. The same Article 1
provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus,
only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or
law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the
essential and formal requisites prescribed by
law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be
declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied
and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses
to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy
and would raise serious constitutional
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows
married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or
live apart, to have children or no children, to
love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus,
marriages entered into for other purposes,
limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title,
provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the
ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not
the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may
validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the
respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the
marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s
marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is
not void ab initio and continues to be valid and
subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered
voidable on the ground of fraud under Article
45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the
circumstances listed under Article 46 of the
same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1)
non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn
involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by
the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3)
concealment of a sexually transmitted disease;
and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute
fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole
purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or
innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both
conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred
institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only
further trivialize this inviolable institution. The
Court cannot declare such a marriage void in
the event the parties fail to qualify for
immigration benefits, after they have availed of
its benefits, or simply have no further use for it.
These unscrupulous individuals cannot be
allowed to use the courts as instruments in their
fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a
judicial institution to enter into a marriage of
convenience; she should not be allowed to
again abuse it to get herself out of an
inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that
marriage, as an in violable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the
impression that marriage may easily be entered
into when it suits the needs of the parties, and
just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED,
and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
65
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in
Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated
July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria
Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and
raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in
Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order
No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of
the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment
of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it
is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967,
issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993,
was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is
this information that is crucial to the resolution
of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen,
testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in
Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on
August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in
Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in
December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at
around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his
mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F.
Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his
mother-in-law arrived with two men. He

testified that he was told that he was going to
undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but
was not told of the nature of said ceremony.
During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not know
that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria
told him later. He further testified that he did
not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
marriage license, and that he had never resided
in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
to check on their marriage license, and was
asked to show a copy of their marriage contract
wherein the marriage license number could be
found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia
C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11,
2003 to the effect that the marriage license
number appearing in the marriage contract he
submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was
the number of another marriage license issued
to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per
Registry Records of Marriage
License filed in this office,
Marriage License No. 9969967
was issued in favor of MR.
ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS
MYRA MABILANGAN on
January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been
issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS
GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed
Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or
intents it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria
had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and
2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get
certification on whether or not there was a
marriage license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic
(Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared
under a letter of authority from the Municipal
66
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought
documents pertaining to Marriage License No.
9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial
numbers for marriage licenses and that the
numbers are issued chronologically.10 He
testified that the certification dated July 11,
2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina
Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of
Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19,
1993, and that their office had not issued any
other license of the same serial number, namely
9969967, to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf,
and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty.
Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann
Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that
he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize
marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified
that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the
bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty.
Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified
that he had been solemnizing marriages since
1982, and that he is familiar with the
requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that
Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the
day before the actual wedding, and that the
marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary.16 After the solemnization of the
marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted
the marriage contract and copy of the marriage
license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be
the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and
Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas
Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain
Qualin to secure the marriage license for the
couple, and that this Qualin secured the license
and gave the same to him on January 8,
1993.19 He further testified that he did not know
where the marriage license was obtained.20 He
attended the wedding ceremony on January 9,
1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor,
and witnessed the signing of the marriage

contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer
and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her
daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her
son-in-law, and that she was present at the
wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at
her house.22 She testified that she sought the
help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in
securing the marriage license, and that a week
before the marriage was to take place, a male
person went to their house with the application
for marriage license.23 Three days later, the
same person went back to their house, showed
her the marriage license before returning it to
Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that
she did not read all of the contents of the
marriage license, and that she was told that the
marriage license was obtained from
Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case
had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an
information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003,
pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the
counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she
is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria
Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she
was seen in the wedding photos and she could
identify all the persons depicted in said photos;
and (c) her testimony corroborates that of
Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her
husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her
mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in
securing a marriage license, and asked him to
be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to
their house and said that he will get the
marriage license for them, and after several
days returned with an application for marriage
license for them to sign, which she and Syed did.
After Qualin returned with the marriage license,
they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave
it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria
testified that she and Syed were married on
January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter
with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29
67
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case
against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of
the previous marriage, and that the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with
the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already
been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but
that she did not know if said marriage had been
celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one
who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and
those around them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City
RTC held that no valid marriage license was
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as
Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued
to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
had certified that no marriage license had been
issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into
account the fact that neither party was a
resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in
violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As
the marriage was not one of those exempt from
the license requirement, and that the lack of a
valid marriage license is an absence of a formal
requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the petitioner, and against the
respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property
relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was acquired
during their cohabitation by reason of the
nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the
Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office,
are hereby ordered to cancel from their

respective civil registries the marriage
contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9,
1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the
same, prompting her to appeal the questioned
decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the
following assignment of errors:
I and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE
ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS
ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID
MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK
PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE
CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE
SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL
DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER
AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF
NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL
AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON
THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE
PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY
RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments,
and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
failed to categorically state that a diligent
search for the marriage license of Gloria and
Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
certification could not be accorded probative
value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient
68
testimonial and documentary evidence that
Gloria and Syed had been validly married and
that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had
admitted to having signed the marriage contract.
The CA also considered that the parties had
comported themselves as husband and wife,
and that Syed only instituted his petition after
Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in
Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage
between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo
Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains
valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied
by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME
IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE,
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was
solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order
No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is
the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that
would apply to this particular case are Articles 3,
4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other
as husband and wife in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall
render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall
be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except
those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites
under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the
formal requisites of the authority of the
solemnizing officer and the conduct of the
marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one
that is exempt from the requirement of a valid
marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the
Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus,
hinges on whether or not a valid marriage
license had been issued for the couple. The RTC
held that no valid marriage license had been
69
issued. The CA held that there was a valid
marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual
marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied
on the marriage contract as well as the
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
existence of said license. To prove that no such
license was issued, Syed turned to the office of
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
which had allegedly issued said license. It was
there that he requested certification that no
such license was issued. In the case of Republic
v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was
allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written
statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy
that after diligent search, no record or entry of
a specified tenor is found to exist in the records
of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain no such record
or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the
certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license,
the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the
documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in
his office or that a particular entry of a specified
tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars
are public officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they
are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification
issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative
value, as his duty was to maintain records of
data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed
was allegedly issued, issued a certification to

the effect that no such marriage license for
Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial
number of the marriage license pertained to
another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of
Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented,
which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and
indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not
appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the
wording of the certification, stating that it did
not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the
words "despite diligent search" in the
certification, and since the certification used
stated that no marriage license appears to have
been issued, no diligent search had been
conducted and thus the certification could not
be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth
noting that in that particular case, the Court, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a
marriage license was lacking, relied on the
Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of
Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged
marriage license could not be located as the
same did not appear in their records. Nowhere
in the Certification was it categorically stated
that the officer involved conducted a diligent
search, nor is a categorical declaration
absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
it is a disputable presumption that an official
duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary.
We held, "The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax
in performing her duty of checking the records
of their office, thus the presumption must stand.
In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search
having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to
the court. The fact that the names in said
license do not correspond to those of Gloria and
Syed does not overturn the presumption that
70
the registrar conducted a diligent search of the
records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their
marriage license or a copy thereof to the court.
She failed to explain why the marriage license
was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location
where, admittedly, neither party resided. She
took no pains to apply for the license, so she is
not the best witness to testify to the validity
and existence of said license. Neither could the
other witnesses she presented prove the
existence of the marriage license, as none of
them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite.
Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify
as to the contents of the license, having
admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty.
Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and
Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in
securing the license, admitted not knowing
where the license came from. The task of
applying for the license was delegated to a
certain Qualin, who could have testified as to
how the license was secured and thus
impeached the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her
representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer
testified that the marriage contract and a copy
of the marriage license were submitted to the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of
the marriage license could have simply been
secured from that office and submitted to the
court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do
so, further weakening her claim that there was
a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the
case of Republic,48 it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their
office had no record of a marriage license was
adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license. The case of Cariño further held that the
presumed validity of the marriage of the parties
had been overcome, and that it became the
burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the
required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that
burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was
issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple
irregularity in the marriage license that would

not affect the validity of the marriage, as no
license was presented by the respondent. No
marriage license was proven to have been
issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce
a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence
to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed
were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence,
testimonial and documentary, that appellant
and appellee have been validly married and
there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law. Both parties are legally
capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal
capacity was even issued by the Embassy of
Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein
gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted
that the signature above his name in the
marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee,
before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses
and other members of appellant’s family, taken
during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the
restaurant where the lunch was held after the
marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit
"5-C" which shows appellee signing the
Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as
husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring,
Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15
June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10)
years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take
serious note that said Petition appears to have
been instituted by him only after an Information
for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003
was filed against him for contracting a second or
subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon
(Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to
reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the
process allow him to profit from his own deceit
and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a
wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate
to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.
71
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says,
"The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article
35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is void
from the beginning, except those exempt from
the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34,
Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this
marriage cannot be characterized as among the
exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized
without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.1âwphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his
marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure, that he seeks to
evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same
does not make up for the failure of the
respondent to prove that they had a valid
marriage license, given the weight of evidence
presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid
marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as
it was Gloria who took steps to procure the
same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution
dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5,
2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling
the marriage of petitioner with respondent on
January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for
review1 assailing the 17 August 2011
Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr.
(Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a
non-existent marriage and/or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401.
Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973,
he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in
Caloocan City. They had three children, namely,
Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic
relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who
was a customer in the auto parts and supplies
business owned by Benjamin’s family. In
December 1981, Azucena left for the United
States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin
and Sally lived together as husband and wife.
Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7
March 1982, in order to appease her father,
Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan,
Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s
marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two
children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period
of their cohabitation, they acquired the
following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 registered in the name of Benjamin,
married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of
Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the
name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
72
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 registered in the name of Sally as a
single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in
1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing
Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed
criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of
public documents against Benjamin, using their
simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration
of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the trial court on the
ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous
and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for
the partition of the properties he acquired with
Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the
Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the
pendency of the case, and for the declaration of
Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A
total of 44 registered properties became the
subject of the partition before the trial court.
Aside from the seven properties enumerated by
Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37
properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally
filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial
court denied. Sally filed a motion for
reconsideration which the trial court also
denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or
injunction which the Court of Appeals never
issued. Sally then refused to present any
evidence before the trial court citing the
pendency of her petition before the Court of
Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several
opportunities to present her evidence on 28
February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008,
11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23
October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite
repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still
refused to present her evidence, prompting the
trial court to consider the case submitted for
decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial
court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court
gave weight to the certification dated 21 July
2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which
was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage

License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were
issued for the month of February 1982 and the
purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was
not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial
court ruled that the marriage was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office because it could not be
registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting
marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial
court ruled that the second marriage was void
not because of the existence of the first
marriage but because of other causes,
particularly, the lack of a marriage license.
Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case.
The trial court did not rule on the issue of the
legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley
because they were not parties to the case. The
trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal
support because she was not married to
Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied
support for Bernice and Bentley who were both
of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled
that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she
named in her answer as part of her conjugal
properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled
that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin.
Further, the 37 properties that Sally was
claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents
who gave the properties to their children,
including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The
37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his
brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go"
was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status
in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found
that they were bought by Benjamin using his
own money and that Sally failed to prove any
actual contribution of money, property or
industry in their purchase. The trial court found
that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots
covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and
253681 as well as the two condominium units
under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the
trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No.
61722 and the two condominium units were
purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone.
The trial court ruled that the properties under
TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT
Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal
partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without
prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his
73
conjugal state with Azucena in a separate
proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in
bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was
married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the
Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s
share in the properties covered under TCT Nos.
N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and
Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his
conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s
decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN
BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7,
1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby
declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further
declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal
owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under
TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397,
RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos.
188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620,
194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625,
194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630,
194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635,
194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651,
206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered
owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr.,
Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and
Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the
exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the
Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila
are directed to delete the words "married to
Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and
190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties
acquired from petitioner’s money without
contribution from respondent, hence, these are
properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife.
Consequently, petitioner is appointed the
administrator of these five (5) properties.
Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting
of her collections of income from these five (5)
properties within thirty (30) days from notice
hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722,
respondent is further directed within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof to turn over and
surrender control and possession of these
properties including the documents of title to
the petitioner.

On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
N-253681, these properties are under
co-ownership of the parties shared by them
equally. However, the share of respondent is
declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go
Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share
of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal
ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation,
partition and distribution of these two (2)
properties shall be further processed pursuant
to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15,
2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later
proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No.
02-11-10.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children
support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the
status of the parties’ children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their
counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor
General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila,
Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for
Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In
its Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court
denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial
court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of
Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in
submitting the case for decision. The Court of
Appeals noted that there were six resettings of
the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for
the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was
duly warned to present her evidence on the
next hearing or the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. However, despite the
warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence.
She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was
not around and was not subpoenaed despite
the presence of her other witnesses.
74
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation
that Benjamin failed to prove his action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of
Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based
on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was
no evidence that the marriage was annulled or
dissolved before Benjamin contracted the
second marriage with Sally. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no
error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally
null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property
relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of
Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired
by the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contribution. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties
being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to
Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both
parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
registered in the name of Benjamin belong to
him exclusively because he was able to establish
that they were acquired by him solely. The
Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT
Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of
Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s
actual contribution in their purchase. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No.
61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and
Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be
shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin
shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under
his existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s
share shall accrue to her in the absence of a
clear and convincing proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally
failed to present clear and convincing evidence
that would show bias and prejudice on the part
of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition
from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and
August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No.
04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with
modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 to be exclusively owned by the
petitioner-appellee while the properties under
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT
Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by
the respondent-appellant. On the other hand,
TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and
common and to be shared equally but the share
of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the
conjugal partnership under his first marriage
while the share of respondent-appellant shall
accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court
of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her
motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this
Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming the trial court’s
ruling that Sally had waived her right to present
evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming the trial court’s
decision declaring the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and
non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming with modification
the trial court’s decision regarding the property
relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
75
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived
her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges
that in not allowing her to present evidence
that she and Benjamin were married, the trial
court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as
an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for
continuance or postponement is not a matter of
right but is addressed to the discretion of the
trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of
evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008.
Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case:
on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2
and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008.
They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before
the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008,
the trial court warned Sally that in case she still
failed to present her evidence, the case would
be submitted for decision. On the date of the
scheduled hearing, despite the presence of
other available witnesses, Sally insisted on
presenting Benjamin who was not even
subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted
that the trial court could not dictate on the
priority of witnesses to be presented,
disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due
to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally
could not complain that she had been deprived
of her right to present her evidence because all
the postponements were at her instance and
she was warned by the trial court that it would
submit the case for decision should she still fail
to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her
continued refusal to present her evidence, she
was deemed to have waived her right to
present them. As pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her
evidence despite the opportunities given by the
trial court showed her lack of interest to
proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that
Sally was delaying the case because she was
waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals
on her petition questioning the trial court’s
denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the
fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any
temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for.
Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to
protect marriage as an inviolable institution
because the trial court also has the duty to
ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate
delay and refusal to proceed by one of the
parties.10

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and
Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to
Benjamin because a marriage could not be
nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void
ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were
allowed to present her evidence, she would
have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To
prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this
Court to consider that in acquiring real
properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by
declaring he was "married to" her; that
Benjamin was the informant in their children’s
birth certificates where he stated that he was
their father; and that Benjamin introduced her
to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast,
Sally claims that there was no real property
registered in the names of Benjamin and
Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was
not the informant in the birth certificates of his
children with Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10
September 1973 was duly established before
the trial court, evidenced by a certified true
copy of their marriage contract. At the time
Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported
marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage
between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and
subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and
Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration
Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City,
testified that there was no valid marriage
license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros
confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos.
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month
of February 1982. Marriage License No.
N-07568 did not match the series issued for the
month. Oliveros further testified that the local
civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and
Sally. The certification from the local civil
registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of a marriage license and absent any suspicious
circumstance, the certification enjoys probative
value, being issued by the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if
indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a
marriage contract, the marriage was void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12
76
It was also established before the trial court
that the purported marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office. The
lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier,
Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives
Division of the Records Management and
Archives Office, National Commission for
Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana,
Director III, Civil Registration Department of the
National Statistics Office.15 The documentary
and testimonial evidence proved that there was
no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As
pointed out by the trial court, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in
jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the
instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from
expected social humiliation coming from
relatives, friends and the society especially from
her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In
short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the
birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not
a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the
informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which
stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on
8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in
Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March
1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly
married on 7 March 1982 which did not match
the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and, at the same time, non-existent.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In
this case, the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was solemnized without a license. It was
duly established that no marriage license was
issued to them and that Marriage License No.
N-07568 did not match the marriage license
numbers issued by the local civil registrar of
Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The
case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article
3520 which made their marriage void ab initio.
The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
also non-existent. Applying the general rules on
void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409

of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void
from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s
ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was null and void ab initio and
non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of
properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all
aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled that
"the rest of the decision stands."22 While the
Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous
marriages, it can be gleaned from the
dispositive portion of the decision declaring that
"the rest of the decision stands" that the Court
of Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion
that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is
not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is
bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not
bigamous. It is required that the first or former
marriage shall not be null and void. The
marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be
assumed as the one that is valid, there being no
evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of
invalidity or irregularity on the face of their
marriage contract. However, if the second
marriage was void not because of the existence
of the first marriage but for other causes such
as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G.,
4079], it was held that what was committed was
contracting marriage against the provisions of
laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of
the parties is therefore not bigamous because
there was no marriage license. The daring and
repeated stand of respondent that she is legally
married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be
sustained. Assuming that her marriage to
petitioner has the marriage license, yet the
same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as
it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid
marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites
for validity except for the existence of a prior
marriage.24 In this case, there was really no
subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just
signed a purported marriage contract without a
marriage license. The supposed marriage was
not recorded with the local civil registrar and
77
the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not
exist. They lived together and represented
themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the
property relations of Benjamin and Sally is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code
which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling
under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another,
his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community of conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If
the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise
apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the
benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions.
Thus, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties
being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamin’s father to his children as advance
inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition
before the trial court even admitted that
"Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a
number of properties to his children and their
respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we
rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is
more in accord with the evidence on record.
 78

Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 ANTONIO T. CARPIO

was registered in the names of Benjamin and Associate Justice
Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos.
61720 and 190860 were in the name of WE CONCUR:
Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to
Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 ARTURO D. BRION
and 8783 were registered in the name of Associate Justice
Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to
Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos.
N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the LUCAS P. MARIANO C. DEL
name of Sally as a single individual. We have BERSAMIN* CASTILLO
ruled that the words "married to" preceding the Associate Justice Associate Justice
name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the
civil status of the registered owner.29 Such JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
words do not prove co-ownership. Without Associate Justice
proof of actual contribution from either or both
spouses, there can be no co-ownership under ATTESTATION
Article 148 of the Family Code.30
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Inhibition of the Trial Judge Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself
from hearing the case. She cited the failure of ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Judge Gironella to accommodate her in Associate Justice
presenting her evidence. She further alleged Chairperson
that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an
opportunist in his decision, showing his CERTIFICATION
partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
and sound discretion on the part of the above Decision had been reached in
judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there consultation before the case was assigned to
must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to
palpable error which may be inferred from the MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have Chief Justice
sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did
not err in submitting the case for decision
because of Sally’s continued refusal to present
her evidence.
Footnotes
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and
*
while Judge Gironella may have used Designated additional member per Raffle
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, dated 8 October 2012.
they are not enough to prove his prejudice
1
against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
in deciding the case that would justify the call
2
for his voluntary inhibition. Rollo, pp. 29-40. Penned by Associate Justice
(now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Estela M.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 PerlasBernabe with Associate Justices
Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of Bienvenido L. Reyes (now also a Supreme Court
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226. Associate Justice) and Samuel H. Gaerlan,
concurring.
SO ORDERED.
 79

3
Id. at 52. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel (5) Those contracted through
H. Gaerlan with Associate Justices Amelita G. mistake of one contracting
Tolentino and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring. party as to the identity of the
other; and
4
Id. at 107-123. Penned by Presiding Judge Roy
G. Gironella. (6) Those subsequent
marriages that are void under
5
Records, Vol. 2, p. 461. Article 53.

13
6
Id. at 122-123. Records, Vol. 2, p. 458.

14
7
Id. at 124-128. Id. at 459.

15
8
Id. at 40. Id. at 460.

16
9
See Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. Rollo, p. 112.
157219, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 353.
17
Id.
10
Id.
18
Records, Vol. 1, p. 65.
11
Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, 403 Phil. 861
19
(2001). Id. at 66.

12 20
Article 35 of the Family Code states: Supra note 12.

21
Art. 35. The following Article 1409. The following contracts are
marriages shall be void from inexistent and void from the beginning:
the beginning:
xxxx
(1) Those contracted by any
party below eighteen years of (2) Those which are absolutely simulated or
age even with the consent of fictitious;
parents or guardians;
xxxx
(2) Those solemnized by any
person not legally authorized 22
Rollo, p. 40.
to perform marriages unless
such marriages were 23
Id. at 112-113.
contracted with either or both
parties believing in good faith 24
See Nollora, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 191425, 7
that the solemnizing officer
September 2011, 657 SCRA 330.
had the legal authority to do
so;
25
Records, Vol. 1, p. 50.
(3) Those solemnized without
26
a license, except those Id. at 23.
covered by the preceding
27
Chapter; Id. at 24-26.

28
(4) Those bigamous or Id. at 27-28.
polygamous marriages not
falling under Article 41; 29
Acre v. Yuttikki, 560 Phil. 495 (2007).

30
Id.

31
Kilosbayan Foundation v. Janolo, Jr., G.R. No.
180543, 27 July 2010, 625 SCRA 684.
32
Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos.
173057-74, 27 September 2010, 631 SCRA 312
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Postponements;
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for
continuance or postponement is not a matter of
right but is addressed to the discretion of the
trial court.―It is well-settled that a grant of a
motion for continuance or postponement is not
a matter of right but is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court. In this case, Sally’s
presentation of evidence was scheduled on 28
February 2008. Thereafter, there were six
resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11
September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and
28 November 2008. They were all made at
Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of
28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally
that in case she still failed to present her
evidence, the case would be submitted for
decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing,
despite the presence of other available
witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin
who was not even subpoenaed on that day.
Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could
not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be
presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior
warning due to the numerous resettings of the
case. Sally could not complain that she had
been deprived of her right to present her
evidence because all the postponements were
at her instance and she was warned by the trial
court that it would submit the case for decision
should she still fail to present her evidence on
28 November 2008.
Same; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; The
certification from the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license and absent any suspicious
circumstance, the certification enjoys probative
value, being issued by the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.―On the
purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally,
Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer
II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City,
testified that there was no valid marriage
license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros
confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos.
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month
of February 1982. Marriage License No.
N-07568 did not match the series issued for the
80
month. Oliveros further testified that the local
civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and
Sally. The certification from the local civil
registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of a marriage license and absent any suspicious
circumstance, the certification enjoys probative
value, being issued by the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license. Clearly, if
indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a
marriage contract, the marriage was void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license.
Civil Law; Marriages; Void Marriages; Marriage
License; Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a
marriage solemnized without a license, except
those covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, “shall be void from the
beginning.”―We see no inconsistency in finding
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null
and void ab initio and, at the same time,
non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no
license is necessary, “shall be void from the
beginning.” In this case, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage
license was issued to them and that Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the
marriage license numbers issued by the local
civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of
February 1982. The case clearly falls under
Section 3 of Article 35 which made their
marriage void ab initio. The marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.
Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
contracts which are absolutely simulated or
fictitious are “inexistent and void from the
beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null
and void ab initio and non-existent.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; For bigamy to exist, the
second or subsequent marriage must have all
the essential requisites for validity except for
the existence of a prior marriage.―For bigamy
to exist, the second or subsequent marriage
must have all the essential requisites for validity
except for the existence of a prior marriage. In
this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage
license. The supposed marriage was not

recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They
lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage.
Civil Law; Marriages; Property Relations; Void
Marriages; Benjamin and Sally cohabitated
without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective
contributions.―Benjamin and Sally cohabitated
without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions.
Thus, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties
being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamin’s father to his children as advance
inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition
before the trial court even admitted that
“Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a
number of properties to his children and their
respective spouses which included Sally.
Same; Same; Same; Land Registration; The
words “married to” preceding the name of a
spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status
of the registered owner. Such words do not
prove co-ownership.―As regards the seven
remaining properties, we rule that the decision
of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with
the evidence on record. Only the property
covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
were in the name of Benjamin with the
descriptive title “married to Sally.” The property
covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
registered in the name of Sally with the
descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while
the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 were registered in the name of Sally as
a single individual. We have ruled that the
words “married to” preceding the name of a
spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status
of the registered owner. Such words do not
prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there
can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the
Family Code.
81
Administrative Law; Judges; Inhibition of Judges;
The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a
matter of conscience and sound discretion on
the part of the judge.―We have ruled that the
issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a
matter of conscience and sound discretion on
the part of the judge. To justify the call for
inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to
establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt
purpose, in addition to palpable error which
may be inferred from the decision or order itself.
In this case, we have sufficiently explained that
Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the
case for decision because of Sally’s continued
refusal to present her evidence.
G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016
RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B.
KHO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in the present petition for review
on certiorari are the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu
City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009,
respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218. The
assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case
No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an
action he filed for declaration of nullity of his
marriage with private respondent, while the CA
Resolution denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein
petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar.
Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
3. Sometime in the afternoon
of May 31, 1972, petitioner's
parents summoned one
Eusebio Colongon, now
deceased, then clerk in the

office of the municipal
treasurer, instructing said
clerk to arrange and prepare
whatever necessary papers
were required for the
intended marriage between
petitioner and respondent
supposedly to take place at
around midnight of June 1,
1972 so as to exclude the
public from witnessing the
marriage ceremony;
4. Petitioner and Respondent
thereafter exchanged marital
vows in a marriage ceremony
which actually took place at
around 3:00 o'clock before
dawn of June 1, 1972, on
account that there was a
public dance held in the town
plaza which is just situated
adjacent to the church
whereas the venue of the
wedding, and the dance only
finished at around 2:00 o'clock
of same early morning of June
1, 1972;
5. Petitioner has never gone
to the office of the Local Civil
Registrar to apply for marriage
license and had not seen
much less signed any papers
or documents in connection
with the procurement of a
marriage license;
6. Considering the shortness
of period from the time the
aforenamed clerk of the
treasurer's office was told to
obtain the pertinent papers in
the afternoon of May 31, 1972
so required for the purpose of
the forthcoming marriage up
to the moment the actual
marriage was celebrated
before dawn of June 1, 1972,
no marriage license therefore
could have been validly issued,
thereby rendering the
marriage solemnized on even
date null and void for want of
the most essential requisite;
82
7. For all intents and purposes,
thus, Petitioner's and
Respondent's marriage
aforestated was solemnized
sans the required marriage
license, hence, null and void
from the beginning and
neither was it performed
under circumstances
exempting the requirement of
such marriage license;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, it is most
respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that after
due notice and hearing,
judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring the contract of
marriage between petitioner
and respondent held on June
1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern
Samar, null and void ab
initio and of no legal effect;
xxx
x4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Among the pieces of evidence presented by
petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar which attested to the fact that the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record
nor copy of a marriage license issued to
petitioner and respondent with respect to their
marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.
Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the
petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause
of action because there is no evidence to prove
petitioner's allegation that their marriage was
celebrated without the requisite marriage
license and that, on the contrary, both
petitioner and respondent personally appeared
before the local civil registrar and secured a
marriage license which they presented before
their marriage was solemnized.
Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the
action was subsequently transferred to the RTC
of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where
the parties submitted their respective pleadings
 83

as well as affidavits of witnesses.

On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its
Decision granting the petition. The dispositive
portion of the said Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Court hereby
declares the marriage
contracted between Raquel G.
Kho and Veronica Borata on
June 1, 1972 null and void ab
initio, pursuant to Article 80 of
the Civil Code and Articles 4
and 5 of the Family Code. The
foregoing is without prejudice
to the application of Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code.
SO
ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtual
awlibrary
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact,
solemnized between the contending parties,
there is a presumption that a marriage license
was issued for that purpose and that petitioner
failed to overcome such presumption. The CA
also ruled that the absence of any indication in
the marriage certificate that a marriage license
was issued is a mere defect in the formal
requisites of the law which does not invalidate
the parties' marriage.
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its
Resolution dated January 14, 2009.

Let a copy of this decision be

furnished the Municipal Civil Hence, the instant petition raising the following
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern issues, to wit:
Samar for proper registration chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
of this decree of nullity of 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE
marriage. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING
SO A SO-CALLED "ETHICAL
ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtual DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S
awlibrary CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence ALLEGED LIAISON WITH
sufficiently established the absence of the ANOTHER WOMAN AS A
requisite marriage license when the marriage FACTOR IN REVERSING THE
between petitioner and respondent was JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER
celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS
Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code of MARRIAGE IN QUESTION
the Philippines, the absence of the said WITH RESPONDENT;
marriage license rendered the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE
void ab initio. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN
APPRECIATING AGAINST
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in PETITIONER THE FACT THAT
Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25
promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO
thus: ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY,
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary HIS APPARENTLY VOID
WHEREFORE, in view of the MARRIAGE WITH
foregoing, the Decision dated RESPONDENT;
25 September 2000 of Branch
2 of the Regional Trial Court of 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE
Borongan, Eastern Samar, HONORABLE COURT OF
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. APPEALS ERRED IN
The marriage between the ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING
petitioner-appellee Raquel PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY
Kho and Veronica Kho is OVERWHELMING
declared valid and subsisting DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES
for all intents and purposes. OF LACK OF MARRIAGE

LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT
INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED
PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED
DECISION; and
4 WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING
ASIDE OR REVERSING THE
LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR
ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE
MARRIAGE
LICENSE.10ChanRoblesVirtuala
wlibrary
Petitioner's basic contention in the present
petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA
to give due credence to petitioner's evidence
which established the absence or lack of
marriage license at the time that petitioner and
respondent's marriage was solemnized.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding
the case not on the basis of law and evidence
but rather on the ground of what the appellate
court calls as ethical considerations as well as
on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
At the outset, the State, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural
question by arguing that the issues presented
by petitioner in the present petition are factual
in nature and it is not proper for this Court to
delve into these issues in a petition for review
on certiorari.
The Court does not agree.
The issues in the instant petition involve a
determination and application of existing law
and prevailing jurisprudence. However,
intertwined with these issues is the question of
the existence of the subject marriage license,
which is a question of fact and one which is not
appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This rule, nonetheless, is not without
exceptions, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on
84
speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave
abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is
based on a misapprehension
of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact
are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings arc
contrary to those of the trial
court;
(8) When the findings of fact
are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the
petitioners' main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence
on
record.11ChanRoblesVirtualawl
ibrary
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and
the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a
marriage license obtained by petitioner and
respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but
proper for this Court to review these findings.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was
celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil

Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ART 53. No marriage shall be
solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the
contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person
performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except
in a marriage of exceptional
character.13ChanRoblesVirtual
awlibrary
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that
no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code,
marriages of exceptional character are covered
by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72
to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages
in articulo mortis or at the point of death during
peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3)
consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital
cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil
marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages;
and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and
respondent's marriage does not fall under any
of these exceptions.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear
that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this
being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage
contract.15 The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the Civil
Code is that it is the authority granted by the
State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage.16 Stated
differently, the requirement and issuance of a
marriage license is the State's demonstration of
its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the
85
general public is interested.17
In the instant case, respondent claims that she
and petitioner were able to secure a marriage
license which they presented to the solemnizing
officer before the marriage was performed.
The OSG, on its part, contends that the
presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage and that any doubt should be resolved
to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is
mindful of this principle as well as of the
Constitutional policy which protects and
strengthens the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the
Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with the
testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is
sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the
subject marriage license.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no
doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly
in his favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee
Cariño.18 There, it was held that the certification
of the Local Civil Registrar, that their office had
no record of a marriage license, was adequate
to prove the non-issuance of said license.19 It
was further held that the presumed validity of
the marriage of the parties had been overcome,
and that it became the burden of the party
alleging a valid marriage to prove that the
marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured.20
As stated above, petitioner was able to present
a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has
no record nor copy of any marriage license ever
issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and
Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose
marriage was celebrated on June 1,
1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification,
the presumed validity of the marriage of
petitioner and respondent has been overcome
and it becomes the burden of respondent to
prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who
alleges such validity. As found by the RTC,
respondent was not able to discharge that
burden.

It is telling that respondent failed to present
their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof
to the court. In addition, the Certificate of
Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does
not contain any entry regarding the said
marriage license. Respondent could have
obtained a copy of their marriage contract from
the National Archives and Records Section,
where information regarding the marriage
license, i.e., date of issuance and license
number, could be obtained. However, she also
failed to do so. The Court also notes, with
approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's
observation that the statements of the
witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent
herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage
ceremony was conducted but neither one of
them testified that a marriage license was
issued in favor of petitioner and respondent.
Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim
that she and petitioner were able to obtain a
marriage license, she failed to present evidence
to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that
one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.23
Based on the Certification issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license
or of any evidence to show that such license
was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was, in
fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it
cannot be said that there was a simple defect,
not a total absence, in the requirements of the
law which would not affect the validity of the
marriage. The fact remains that respondent
failed to prove that the subject marriage license
was issued and the law is clear that a marriage
which is performed without the corresponding
marriage license is null and void.
As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence,
the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this
Court's ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas,24 the
certification issued by the local civil registrar,
which attests to the absence in its records of a
marriage license, must categorically state that
the document does not exist in the said office
despite diligent search.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals,25 this Court considered the
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar as
a certification of due search and inability to find
the record or entry sought by the parties
86
despite the absence of a categorical statement
that "such document does not exist in their
records despite diligent search." The Court,
citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, held that the certification of due search
and inability to find a record or entry as to the
purported marriage license, issued by the civil
registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Based on said certification, the Court
held that there is absence of a marriage license
that would render the marriage void ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case
of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,27 this Court
considered the marriage of the petitioner and
her deceased husband as void ab initio as the
records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the local civil
registrar, their office has no record of such
marriage license. The court held that the
certification issued by the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of the
marriage license. Their marriage having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage
license and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement,
the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased
is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was
reiterated in the more recent case
of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.28
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v.
Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic
v. CA30 that, in sustaining the finding of the
lower court that a marriage license was lacking,
this Court relied on the Certification issued by
the local civil registrar, which stated that the
alleged marriage license could not be located as
the same did not appear in their records.
Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, nowhere
in the Certification was it categorically stated
that the officer involved conducted a diligent
search. In this respect, this Court held that
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does
not require a categorical statement to this
effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court
ruled that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court, it is a
disputable presumption that
an official duty has been
regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other

evidence to the contrary. We
held, "The presumption of
regularity of official acts may
be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty." No
such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of
checking the records of their
office, thus the presumption
must stand. x x
31
x ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In all the abovementioned cases, there was
clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of
the subject marriage license which rendered the
marriage void.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be
considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties.32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show
that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate
to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license.33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the
Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except marriages of exceptional
character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same
Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and
respondent's marriage cannot be characterized
as among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to
annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be
that his motives are less than pure - that he
seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his
alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that
as it may, the same does not make up for the
failure of the respondent to prove that they had
a valid marriage license, given the weight of
evidence presented by petitioner. The law must
be applied. As the marriage license, an essential
requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent,
the marriage of petitioner and respondent is
void ab initio.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
87
Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and
January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25,
2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016
RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B.
KHO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in the present petition for review
on certiorari are the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu
City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009,
respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218. The
assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case
No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an
action he filed for declaration of nullity of his
marriage with private respondent, while the CA
Resolution denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein
petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar.
Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
3. Sometime in the afternoon
of May 31, 1972, petitioner's
parents summoned one
Eusebio Colongon, now
deceased, then clerk in the
office of the municipal
treasurer, instructing said
clerk to arrange and prepare
whatever necessary papers
were required for the
intended marriage between
petitioner and respondent
supposedly to take place at
around midnight of June 1,

1972 so as to exclude the
public from witnessing the
marriage ceremony;
4. Petitioner and Respondent
thereafter exchanged marital
vows in a marriage ceremony
which actually took place at
around 3:00 o'clock before
dawn of June 1, 1972, on
account that there was a
public dance held in the town
plaza which is just situated
adjacent to the church
whereas the venue of the
wedding, and the dance only
finished at around 2:00 o'clock
of same early morning of June
1, 1972;
5. Petitioner has never gone
to the office of the Local Civil
Registrar to apply for marriage
license and had not seen
much less signed any papers
or documents in connection
with the procurement of a
marriage license;
6. Considering the shortness
of period from the time the
aforenamed clerk of the
treasurer's office was told to
obtain the pertinent papers in
the afternoon of May 31, 1972
so required for the purpose of
the forthcoming marriage up
to the moment the actual
marriage was celebrated
before dawn of June 1, 1972,
no marriage license therefore
could have been validly issued,
thereby rendering the
marriage solemnized on even
date null and void for want of
the most essential requisite;
7. For all intents and purposes,
thus, Petitioner's and
Respondent's marriage
aforestated was solemnized
sans the required marriage
license, hence, null and void
from the beginning and
neither was it performed
88
under circumstances
exempting the requirement of
such marriage license;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, it is most
respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that after
due notice and hearing,
judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring the contract of
marriage between petitioner
and respondent held on June
1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern
Samar, null and void ab
initio and of no legal effect;
xxx
x4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Among the pieces of evidence presented by
petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar which attested to the fact that the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record
nor copy of a marriage license issued to
petitioner and respondent with respect to their
marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.
Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the
petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause
of action because there is no evidence to prove
petitioner's allegation that their marriage was
celebrated without the requisite marriage
license and that, on the contrary, both
petitioner and respondent personally appeared
before the local civil registrar and secured a
marriage license which they presented before
their marriage was solemnized.
Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the
action was subsequently transferred to the RTC
of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where
the parties submitted their respective pleadings
as well as affidavits of witnesses.
On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its
Decision granting the petition. The dispositive
portion of the said Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Court hereby
declares the marriage
contracted between Raquel G.
 89

Kho and Veronica Borata on
June 1, 1972 null and void ab
initio, pursuant to Article 80 of
the Civil Code and Articles 4
and 5 of the Family Code. The
foregoing is without prejudice
to the application of Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code.
the marriage certificate that a marriage license
was issued is a mere defect in the formal
requisites of the law which does not invalidate
the parties' marriage.
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its
Resolution dated January 14, 2009.

Let a copy of this decision be

furnished the Municipal Civil Hence, the instant petition raising the following
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern issues, to wit:
Samar for proper registration chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
of this decree of nullity of 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE
marriage. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING
SO A SO-CALLED "ETHICAL
ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtual DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S
awlibrary CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence ALLEGED LIAISON WITH
sufficiently established the absence of the ANOTHER WOMAN AS A
requisite marriage license when the marriage FACTOR IN REVERSING THE
between petitioner and respondent was JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER
celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS
Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code of MARRIAGE IN QUESTION
the Philippines, the absence of the said WITH RESPONDENT;
marriage license rendered the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE
void ab initio. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN
APPRECIATING AGAINST
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in PETITIONER THE FACT THAT
Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25
promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO
thus: ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY,
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary HIS APPARENTLY VOID
WHEREFORE, in view of the MARRIAGE WITH
foregoing, the Decision dated RESPONDENT;
25 September 2000 of Branch
2 of the Regional Trial Court of 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE
Borongan, Eastern Samar, HONORABLE COURT OF
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. APPEALS ERRED IN
The marriage between the ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING
petitioner-appellee Raquel PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY
Kho and Veronica Kho is OVERWHELMING
declared valid and subsisting DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES
for all intents and purposes. OF LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT
SO INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED
ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtual PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF
awlibrary RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, DECISION; and
solemnized between the contending parties,
there is a presumption that a marriage license 4 WHETHER OR NOT THE
was issued for that purpose and that petitioner HONORABLE COURT OF
failed to overcome such presumption. The CA APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING
also ruled that the absence of any indication in ASIDE OR REVERSING THE

LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR
ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE
MARRIAGE
LICENSE.10ChanRoblesVirtuala
wlibrary
Petitioner's basic contention in the present
petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA
to give due credence to petitioner's evidence
which established the absence or lack of
marriage license at the time that petitioner and
respondent's marriage was solemnized.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding
the case not on the basis of law and evidence
but rather on the ground of what the appellate
court calls as ethical considerations as well as
on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
At the outset, the State, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural
question by arguing that the issues presented
by petitioner in the present petition are factual
in nature and it is not proper for this Court to
delve into these issues in a petition for review
on certiorari.
The Court does not agree.
The issues in the instant petition involve a
determination and application of existing law
and prevailing jurisprudence. However,
intertwined with these issues is the question of
the existence of the subject marriage license,
which is a question of fact and one which is not
appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This rule, nonetheless, is not without
exceptions, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave
abuse of discretion;
90
(4) When the judgment is
based on a misapprehension
of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact
are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings arc
contrary to those of the trial
court;
(8) When the findings of fact
are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the
petitioners' main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence
on
record.11ChanRoblesVirtualawl
ibrary
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and
the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a
marriage license obtained by petitioner and
respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but
proper for this Court to review these findings.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was
celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil
Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ART 53. No marriage shall be
solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the
contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person
performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except
in a marriage of exceptional
character.13ChanRoblesVirtual
awlibrary
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that
no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code,
marriages of exceptional character are covered
by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72
to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages
in articulo mortis or at the point of death during
peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3)
consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital
cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil
marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages;
and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and
respondent's marriage does not fall under any
of these exceptions.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear
that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this
being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage
contract.15 The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the Civil
Code is that it is the authority granted by the
State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage.16 Stated
differently, the requirement and issuance of a
marriage license is the State's demonstration of
its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.17
In the instant case, respondent claims that she
and petitioner were able to secure a marriage
license which they presented to the solemnizing
officer before the marriage was performed.
The OSG, on its part, contends that the
presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage and that any doubt should be resolved
91
to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is
mindful of this principle as well as of the
Constitutional policy which protects and
strengthens the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the
Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with the
testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is
sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the
subject marriage license.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no
doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly
in his favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee
Cariño.18 There, it was held that the certification
of the Local Civil Registrar, that their office had
no record of a marriage license, was adequate
to prove the non-issuance of said license.19 It
was further held that the presumed validity of
the marriage of the parties had been overcome,
and that it became the burden of the party
alleging a valid marriage to prove that the
marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured.20
As stated above, petitioner was able to present
a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has
no record nor copy of any marriage license ever
issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and
Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose
marriage was celebrated on June 1,
1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification,
the presumed validity of the marriage of
petitioner and respondent has been overcome
and it becomes the burden of respondent to
prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who
alleges such validity. As found by the RTC,
respondent was not able to discharge that
burden.
It is telling that respondent failed to present
their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof
to the court. In addition, the Certificate of
Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does
not contain any entry regarding the said
marriage license. Respondent could have
obtained a copy of their marriage contract from
the National Archives and Records Section,
where information regarding the marriage
license, i.e., date of issuance and license

number, could be obtained. However, she also
failed to do so. The Court also notes, with
approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's
observation that the statements of the
witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent
herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage
ceremony was conducted but neither one of
them testified that a marriage license was
issued in favor of petitioner and respondent.
Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim
that she and petitioner were able to obtain a
marriage license, she failed to present evidence
to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that
one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.23
Based on the Certification issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license
or of any evidence to show that such license
was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was, in
fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it
cannot be said that there was a simple defect,
not a total absence, in the requirements of the
law which would not affect the validity of the
marriage. The fact remains that respondent
failed to prove that the subject marriage license
was issued and the law is clear that a marriage
which is performed without the corresponding
marriage license is null and void.
As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence,
the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this
Court's ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas,24 the
certification issued by the local civil registrar,
which attests to the absence in its records of a
marriage license, must categorically state that
the document does not exist in the said office
despite diligent search.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals,25 this Court considered the
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar as
a certification of due search and inability to find
the record or entry sought by the parties
despite the absence of a categorical statement
that "such document does not exist in their
records despite diligent search." The Court,
citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, held that the certification of due search
and inability to find a record or entry as to the
purported marriage license, issued by the civil
registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
92
license. Based on said certification, the Court
held that there is absence of a marriage license
that would render the marriage void ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case
of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,27 this Court
considered the marriage of the petitioner and
her deceased husband as void ab initio as the
records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the local civil
registrar, their office has no record of such
marriage license. The court held that the
certification issued by the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of the
marriage license. Their marriage having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage
license and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement,
the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased
is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was
reiterated in the more recent case
of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.28
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v.
Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic
v. CA30 that, in sustaining the finding of the
lower court that a marriage license was lacking,
this Court relied on the Certification issued by
the local civil registrar, which stated that the
alleged marriage license could not be located as
the same did not appear in their records.
Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, nowhere
in the Certification was it categorically stated
that the officer involved conducted a diligent
search. In this respect, this Court held that
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does
not require a categorical statement to this
effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court
ruled that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court, it is a
disputable presumption that
an official duty has been
regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other
evidence to the contrary. We
held, "The presumption of
regularity of official acts may
be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty." No
such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of

checking the records of their
office, thus the presumption
must stand. x x
x31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In all the abovementioned cases, there was
clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of
the subject marriage license which rendered the
marriage void.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be
considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties.32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show
that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate
to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license.33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the
Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except marriages of exceptional
character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same
Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and
respondent's marriage cannot be characterized
as among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to
annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be
that his motives are less than pure - that he
seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his
alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that
as it may, the same does not make up for the
failure of the respondent to prove that they had
a valid marriage license, given the weight of
evidence presented by petitioner. The law must
be applied. As the marriage license, an essential
requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent,
the marriage of petitioner and respondent is
void ab initio.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and
January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25,
2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
93
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J.
GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of
the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse
who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both
the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien must be alleged and proven according to
our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24,
1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No.
3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage
between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan
City as dissolved and both parties can now
remarry under existing and applicable laws to
any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of
the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to
Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. On
May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an
Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian
government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and

respondent were married on January 12, 1994
in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a
marriage license, respondent was declared as
"single" and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and
respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the
two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets
were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance
with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy –
respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on January
12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in
November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far
back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution.11 He contended that his first
marriage to an Australian citizen had been
validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the
couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending – respondent
was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the
"marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the
Complained be dismissed on the ground that it
stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the
Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The
court marked and admitted the documentary
evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted
their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
94
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved
on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but
not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondent's
alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather,
it based its Decision on the divorce decree
obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce
had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our
consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the
divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first
marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating
him to contract a second marriage with the
petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a
naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a
substantial requisite voiding the petitioner'
marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application
of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in
disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53
of the Family Code as the applicable provisions
in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that
the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that
the divorce decree obtained by the respondent
in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of

the judgment granting the divorce decree
before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes
of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and
(2) whether respondent was proven to be
legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because
of our ruling on these two, there is no more
necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and
Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of
the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng
Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree,
like any other foreign judgment, may be given
recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof
of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing
absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce
decree itself. She adds that respondent
miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by
the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect,
the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the
marriage in question to the legal requirements
of the place where the marriage was
performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal
principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained
abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the
Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the
Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
95
capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as
far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that
"aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national
law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation solely of
the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree
can be admitted in evidence, it must first
comply with the registration requirements
under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code.
These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required,
each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license
with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and
where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting
parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of
the birth of baptismal certificate required in the
last preceding article, the death certificate of
the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of
annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of
absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate

civil registry and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not affect their
persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the
Australian divorce decree is a public document
– a written official act of an Australian family
court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of
its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before
a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an act
of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign
country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the
other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2)
a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having
legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and
Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court.35 However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the
divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted
in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not
to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it
had not been registered in the Local Civil
Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court
ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification.37 Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by
the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object
properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court
of Sydney, Australia.38
96
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and
52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal
act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance
to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that
had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove
Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity
of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the
divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and
worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly
known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the
exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies
with "the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are
denied by the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in
their answer when they introduce new
matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense
raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are
not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.44 The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative.
Second Issue:

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the
insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent
was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was
void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce
decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to
marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its
strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising
after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind
terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar
which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an
interlocutory decree – a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect
the same as a separation from bed and board,
although an absolute divorce may follow after
the lapse of the prescribed period during which
no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the
court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some
other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited
by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce
which was granted on the ground of adultery
may be prohibited from remarrying again. The
court may allow a remarriage only after proof of
good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree
contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again
before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence
of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the
divorce obtained by respondent may have been
97
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his
legal capacity to remarry according to his
national law. Hence, we find no basis for the
ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso
facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the
divorce decree raises a disputable presumption
or presumptive evidence as to his civil status
based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of
Court, for the simple reason that no proof has
been presented on the legal effects of the
divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal
capacity required by Article 21 of the Family
Code was not submitted together with the
application for a marriage license. According to
her, its absence is proof that respondent did not
have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to
contract marriage is determined by the national
law of the party concerned. The certificate
mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code
would have been sufficient to establish the legal
capacity of respondent, had he duly presented
it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien
applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no
evidence that proves respondent's legal
capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the
records before this Court shows that only the
following exhibits were presented before the
lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" –
Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino)
on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha
D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in
Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" –
Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment
between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D.
Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" –
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick
A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" –

Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law
Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage
in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3"
– Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi
of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" –
Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation
Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia
Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot
conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioner's contention
that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent
with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
show the Australian personal law governing his
status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to
declare her marriage to respondent null and
void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may
turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result
of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that
the most judicious course is to remand this case
to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry
petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties'
marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being
already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila
dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly
procedure and substantial justice,
we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the
purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to
marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring
the parties' marriage void on the ground of
bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
98
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July
2001,1 affirming the Judgment of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil
Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October
1998,2 declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced
with the filing of a Complaint3 for declaration of
nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25
March 1997. According to the said Complaint,
respondent Crasus married Fely on 16
December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church,
Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their
union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr.,
Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are
now all of legal ages. After the celebration of
their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered
that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines
for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children, the youngest
then being only six years old, to the care of
respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left
for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a
letter from her requesting that he sign the
enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the
said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent
Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely
to their children, that Fely got married to an
American, with whom she eventually had a child.
In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with
her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel
in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother
to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might
not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she
had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines
several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of
their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the
brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert;
and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely

continued to live with her American family in
New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using
the surname of her American husband in the
Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in
which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada
Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it
had been 13 years since Fely left and
abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was
no more possibility of reconciliation between
them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his
Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and
dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,
constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles
68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with
the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein
that she was already an American citizen since
1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus.
While she admitted being previously married to
respondent Crasus and having five children with
him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by
respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She
explained that she was no more hot-tempered
than any normal person, and she may had been
indignant at respondent Crasus on certain
occasions but it was because of the latter’s
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere
effort to find employment and to contribute to
the maintenance of their household. She could
not have been extravagant since the family
hardly had enough money for basic needs.
Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons
as respondent Crasus had no job and what she
was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the
Philippines was insufficient to support their
family. Although she left all of her children with
respondent Crasus, she continued to provide
financial support to them, as well as, to
respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able
to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for
one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for
medical reasons. While she did file for divorce
from respondent Crasus, she denied having
herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus
requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce
papers. After securing a divorce from
respondent Crasus, Fely married her American
husband and acquired American citizenship. She
argued that her marriage to her American
husband was legal because now being an
99
American citizen, her status shall be governed
by the law of her present nationality. Fely also
pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was
presently living with another woman who bore
him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus
of misusing the amount of ₱90,000.00 which
she advanced to him to finance the brain
operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of
the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC
declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null
and void; and that respondent Crasus be
ordered to pay to Fely the ₱90,000.00 she
advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their
respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded
both parties the opportunity to present their
evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the
trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following
pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint:
(1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in
which he essentially reiterated the allegations in
his Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13
April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu
City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract
between respondent Crasus and Fely in the
Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration
taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her
American husband’s surname, Micklus.9
Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a
Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses,
namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and
Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before
the consular officers of the Philippines in New
York and California, U.S.A, where the said
witnesses reside. Despite the Orders12 and
Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the
Philippine Consuls of New York and California,
U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses
upon written interrogatories, not a single
deposition was ever submitted to the RTC.
Taking into account that it had been over a year
since respondent Crasus had presented his
evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to
have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order,
dated 05 October 1998,14 considering Fely to
have waived her right to present her evidence.
The case was thus deemed submitted for
decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC
promulgated its Judgment declaring the
marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and
void ab initio, on the basis of the following
findings –
The ground bearing defendant’s psychological
incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration.
As observed, plaintiff’s testimony is decidedly
credible. The Court finds that defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of
psychological incapacity to comply with her
marital duties such as striving for family unity,
observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help
and support. From the evidence presented,
plaintiff adequately established that the
defendant practically abandoned him. She
obtained a divorce decree in the United States
of America and married another man and has
establish [sic] another family of her own.
Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein
he is married to a wife who is already married
to another man in another country.
Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have
been apparent or manifest before the marriage,
the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the
annulment of the marriage provided that these
were eventually manifested after the wedding.
It appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendant’s posture being an
irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low
regard for that sacred and inviolable institution
of marriage which is the foundation of human
society throughout the civilized world. It is quite
evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind,
will and heart to comply with her marital
obligations, such incapacity was already there at
the time of the marriage in question is shown by
defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage
to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is
defendant’s psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations which
already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The
evidence in herein case establishes the
irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy,
firmly.
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is
decidedly credible, the Court finds that the
defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable
signs of such psychological incapacity to comply
100
with her marital obligations. These are her
excessive disposition to material things over and
above the marital stability. That such incapacity
was already there at the time of the marriage in
question is shown by defendant’s own attitude
towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these
reasons there is a legal ground to declare the
marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and
defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab
initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the
afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary
to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though,
in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the
appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no
reversible error therein. It even offered
additional ratiocination for declaring the
marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely
null and void, to wit –
Defendant secured a divorce from
plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is
now permanently residing in the United States.
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one
of his reasons for seeking the declaration of
nullity of their marriage…
…
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO
CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL
LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of
the above-quoted provision is to avoid the
absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen
still being married to his or her alien spouse,
although the latter is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained
a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the
 101

defendant has undoubtedly acquired her
American husband’s citizenship and thus has
become an alien as well. This Court cannot see
why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not
be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse
eventually embraces another citizenship and
thus becomes herself an alien.
the State, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case
and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this
Court finds the instant Petition to be
meritorious.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under I

these circumstances, plaintiff would still be
considered as married to defendant, given her The totality of evidence presented during trial is
total incapacity to honor her marital covenants insufficient to support the finding of
to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain psychological incapacity of Fely.
shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact
does not exist and to remain married to a
Article 36, concededly one of the more
spouse who is incapacitated to discharge
controversial provisions of the Family Code of
essential marital covenants, is verily to
the Philippines, reads –
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage
which this Court finds abhorrent and will not
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be
who, at the time of the celebration, was
given relief by affirming the trial court’s
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the
parties.16 the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution,
dated 08 March 2002,17 denied its Motion for
Issues most commonly arise as to what
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the
constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series
instant Petition before this Court, based on the
of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for
following arguments/grounds –
determining its existence.
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term
respondent’s wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity was defined, thus –
psychological incapacity.

". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to

II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
of substance not in accord with law and
that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the
jurisprudence considering that the Court of
basic marital covenants that concomitantly
Appeals committed serious errors of law in
must be assumed and discharged by the parties
ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.18 to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent
love, respect and fidelity and render help and
Crasus maintained that Fely’s psychological
support. There is hardly any doubt that the
incapacity was clearly established after a
intendment of the law has been to confine the
full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was
most serious cases of personality disorders
indeed applicable to the marriage of
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter
inability to give meaning and significance to the
had already become an American citizen. He
marriage. This psychological condition must
further questioned the personality of petitioner
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated…21
Republic, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, to institute the instant
The psychological incapacity must be
Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code
characterized by –
of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not
the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of

(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines were handed down by this
Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,23 which, although quite lengthy, by its
significance, deserves to be reproduced below –
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by
the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict
on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
102
nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I
do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job…
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts…

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further
clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Such psychological
incapacity, however, must be established by the
totality of the evidence presented during the
trial.
Using the guidelines established by the
afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds
that the totality of evidence presented by
respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish
the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife
Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring
their marriage null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by
respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question
for being self-serving, in the absence of any
other corroborating evidence. He submitted
only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the
Certification on the recording with the Register
of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage
being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2)
the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
eldest son, in which Fely used her American
husband’s surname. Even considering the
admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer
to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the
RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this
Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness
that prevented her from assuming the essential
obligations of marriage.
103
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in
previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely
committed acts that hurt and embarrassed
respondent Crasus and the rest of the family.
Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her
abandonment of respondent Crasus; her
marriage to an American; and even her
flaunting of her American family and her
American surname, may indeed be
manifestations of her alleged incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations;
nonetheless, the root cause for such was not
identified. If the root cause of the incapacity
was not identified, then it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological or
mental defect that is serious or grave; neither
could it be proven to be in existence at the time
of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is
incurable. While the personal examination of
Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no
longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s
ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus
must still have complied with the requirement
laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina30 that the root cause of the incapacity
be identified as a psychological illness and that
its incapacitating nature be fully explained.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor
of the validity of the marriage.31 No less than
the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic
social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.32
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code of the Philippines –
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to
a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the
other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and
his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
Although the exact date was not established,
Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before
the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for
the United States in 1984, after which she
married her American husband in 1985. In the
same Answer, she alleged that she had been an
American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen,
and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine
laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition, and legal capacity, even when she
was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then
and even until now, do not allow and recognize
divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely
could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene,
on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for
104
annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to
the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the
Solicitor General had no personality to file the
instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48
provides –
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the
Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office
from intervening in proceedings for annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the
Solicitor General as the principal law officer and
legal defender of the Government.33 His Office
is tasked to represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of lawyers. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office
of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of
the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of
the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing collusion
between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind
that the Solicitor General is the principal law
officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only
serve and contribute to the realization of such
intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the
Solicitor General is authorized to bring or
defend actions on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is
brought before this Court or the Court of

Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of
the State, in a proceeding for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
the Office of the Solicitor General takes over
when the case is elevated to the Court of
Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be
eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand,
then it is only reasonable and practical that
even while the proceeding is still being held
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General can already exercise supervision and
control over the conduct of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee
the protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and
affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in
several cases for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages that were appealed before
it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta
v. Ancheta36 –
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268
SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at
213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v.
Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State…37
105
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,38 which became effective on 15
March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of
respondent Crasus as to the authority of the
Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on
behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the
authority of the Solicitor General to intervene
and take part in the proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages before
the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The
pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below –
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –
…
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner
shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office
of the Solicitor General and the Office of the
City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days
from the date of its filing and submit to the
court proof of such service within the same
period.
…
Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require
the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file their respective memoranda in
support of their claims within fifteen days from
the date the trial is terminated. It may require
the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or
papers may be submitted without leave of court.
After the lapse of the period herein provided,
the case will be considered submitted for
decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision. –
…
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General
and the public prosecutor, shall be served with
copies of the decision personally or by
registered mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action, the
dispositive part of the decision shall be
published once in a newspaper of general
circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the
expiration of fifteen days from notice to the
parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or
appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public
prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
… most commonly arise as to what constitutes
Sec. 20. Appeal. –
…
(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the
Solicitor General may appeal from the decision
by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days
from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall
serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the
adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a
conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and
existence of the marriage between respondent
Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment,
sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent
Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
but not for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the same Code. While this
Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for
being continuously shackled to what is now a
hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of
those situations where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answer to every
individual problem.39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,
affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated
30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and
Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
subsisting.
SO ORDERED.
Marriages; Annulment and Declaration of
Nullity; Psychological Incapacity; Guidelines;
Characteristics; Words and Phrases;
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less
106
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support.—Issues
psychological incapacity. In a series of cases,
this Court laid down guidelines for determining
its existence. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the
term psychological incapacity was defined,
thus—“. . . [P]sychological incapacity” should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the
most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated…
The psychological incapacity must be
characterized by—(a) Gravity—It must be grave
or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage; (b) Juridical
Antecedence—It must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after
the marriage; and (c) Incurability—It must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
Same; Same; Same; While it is no longer
necessary to allege expert opinion in a petition
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, such psychological incapacity must
be established by the totality of the evidence
presented during the trial.—A later case,
Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is
no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua
non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly,
it is no longer necessary to allege expert opinion
in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines. Such psychological incapacity,

however, must be established by the totality of
the evidence presented during the trial.
Same; Same; Same; Divorce; Article 36 of the
Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the material bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves—it refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of
marriage.—It is worthy to emphasize that
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
contemplates downright incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under the said Article. As has already been
stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article
36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.”
Same; Same; Same; Even when the rules have
been relaxed and the personal examination of a
spouse by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no
longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage, the totality of evidence
presented during trial by the spouse seeking the
declaration of nullity of marriage must still
prove the gravity, judicial antecedence, and
incurability of the alleged psychological
incapacity.—Fely’s hot-temper, nagging, and
extravagance; her abandonment of respondent
Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even
her flaunting of her American family and her
American surname, may have hurt and
embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of
the family. Nonetheless, the afore-described
characteristics, behavior, and acts of Fely do not
satisfactorily establish a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave, and which has
been in existence at the time of celebration of
the marriage and is incurable. Even when the
rules have been relaxed and the personal
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the
107
declaration of nullity of their marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
the totality of evidence presented during trial
by respondent Crasus, as the spouse seeking the
declaration of nullity of marriage, must still
prove the gravity, judicial antecedence, and
incurability of the alleged psychological
incapacity; which, it failed to do so herein.
Same; Same; Divorce; Article 26, paragraph 2 of
the Family Code, by its plain and literal
interpretation, cannot be applied to the case of
a Filipino couple where one spouse obtained a
divorce while still a Filipino citizen.—As it is
worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a
special situation wherein one of the married
couple is a foreigner who divorces his or her
Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and
his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
Although the exact date was not established,
Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before
the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for
the United States in 1984, after which she
married her American husband in 1985. In the
same Answer, she alleged that she had been an
American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen,
and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine
laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition, and legal capacity, even when she
was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then
and even until now, do not allow and recognize
divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely
could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.
Same; Same; Solicitor General; That Article 48 of
the Family Code does not expressly mention the
Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office
from intervening in proceedings for annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriages.—That
Article 48 does not expressly mention the
Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office
from intervening in proceedings for annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the
Solicitor General as the principal law officer and
legal defender of the Government. His Office is
tasked to represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities

and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of lawyers. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office
of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of lawyers. The
intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the
Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the
State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing collusion
between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind
that the Solicitor General is the principal law
officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only
serve and contribute to the realization of such
intent, rather than thwart it.
Same; Same; Same; While it is the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on
behalf of the State, in a proceeding for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court, the Office of the
Solicitor General takes over when the case is
elevated to the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court.—The general rule is that only
the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or
defend actions on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is
brought before this Court or the Court of
Appeals. While it is the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the
State, in a proceeding for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC,
the Office of the Solicitor General takes over
when the case is elevated to the Court of
Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be
eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand,
then it is only reasonable and practical that
even while the proceeding is still being held
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General can already exercise supervision and
control over the conduct of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee
the protection of the interests of the State.
Same; Same; Same; The issuance of the
Supreme Court of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which
became effective on 15 March 2003, should
dispel any other doubts as to the authority of
the Solicitor General to file the instant petition
for review on behalf of the State.—The issuance
of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of
108
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which
became effective on 15 March 2003, should
dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as
to the authority of the Solicitor General to file
the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The
Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor
General to intervene and take part in the
proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages before the RTC and on
appeal to higher courts.
Same; Same; In the instant case, at most, the
wife’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and
bigamy, give the husband grounds to file for
legal separation, but not for declaration of
nullity of marriage—while the Court
commiserates with the latter for being
continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless
and loveless marriage, this is one of those
situations where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answer to every individual
problem.—This Court arrives at a conclusion
contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence
of the marriage between respondent Crasus and
Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual
infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus
grounds to file for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not
for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court
commiserates with respondent Crasus for being
continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless
and loveless marriage, this is one of those
situations where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answer to every individual
problem.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino
citizens, where one party is later naturalized as
a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce
decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can
the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under
Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that
behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on
this apparently novel question, presented as a
pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General
assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del
Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4,
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated
to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the
second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code
and by reason of the divorce decree obtained
against him by his American wife, the petitioner
is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial
court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married
Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis
City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and
a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido
and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United
States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his
son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
She, Stanley and her child by him currently live
at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
109
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question
of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY
UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid
mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The
proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there
is no law that governs respondent’s situation.
The OSG posits that this is a matter of
legislation and not of judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is
not directly applicable to his case but insists
that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a
divorce decree which capacitated her to
remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation
of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for
authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory
relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court
to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief
are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the

controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien
citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of
the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to
protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest
in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe
for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and
puts into question the validity of his second
marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily,
we must dwell on how this provision had come
about in the first place, and what was the intent
of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino
signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which
took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the
original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles
26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
110
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not
appear to govern the situation presented by the
case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases
where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the
time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried
an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public
Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP)
registered the following objections to Paragraph
2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates
against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are
divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them
abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the
validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce
them abroad will also be considered to be
validly divorced here and can re-marry. We
propose that this be deleted and made into law
only after more widespread consultation.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge
Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.

Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where
at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the
1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this
case, Filipino citizens when they got married.
The wife became a naturalized American citizen
in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year.
The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter
dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married
under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative
intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms,
so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative
intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the
instant case must be deemed as coming within
the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
111
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin
elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it,
the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory
that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is
to file either a petition for annulment or a
petition for legal separation. Annulment would
be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering
that the marriage of the parties appears to have
all the badges of validity. On the other hand,
legal separation would not be a sufficient
remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie;
hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse
would still remain married to the naturalized
alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of
competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and
the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent
herein must prove his allegation that his wife
was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise,
before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party

pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise,
there would be no evidence sufficient to declare
that he is capacitated to enter into another
marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried,
also to remarry. However, considering that in
the present petition there is no sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as
an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent’s submission of the aforecited
evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of
the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Family Code; Marriages; Divorce; The Supreme
Court holds that paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree.—This case
concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien
citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of
the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to
112
protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest
in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe
for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and
puts into question the validity of his second
marriage. x x x We hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms,
so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is
unanimous in holding that paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry.—We are unanimous in our holding
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried,
also to remarry.
Same; Same; Same; The reckoning point is not
the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.—We state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the

celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it,
the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
“divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
Civil Procedure; Declaratory Relief; Requisites of
a Petition for Declaratory Relief.—The requisites
of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking
the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the
decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for
review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former
Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November
29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for
Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to
the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover
that his wife was having an affair with another
man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The
113
Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario,
Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce
on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took
effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved
on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in
the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable,
the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition)
with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did
not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the
trial court. She offered no opposition to
Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her
desire to file a similar case herself but was
prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar
prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC
denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded
that Gerbert was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of
the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to
remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the
Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is

thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent
with the legislative intent behind the enactment
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, as determined by the Court in
Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was
enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the
present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC
is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to
that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for
a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Taking into account the rationale behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, he contends that the provision applies as
well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He
claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the
doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to
file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an
interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code. He considers himself as a
proper party, vested with sufficient legal
interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for
bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates,
involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor
General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of
whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
114
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in
favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of
the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of
defective marriages – void15 and
16
voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at
the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a
possibility in marriages between a Filipino and
an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers under the
Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive
Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the
Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused
to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of
marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce
decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce
had already severed the marital bond between
the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the
Filipino spouse] has to be considered still

married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to
a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country
if the ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was
included in the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or
her marital status, settling the doubts created
by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right
to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her
to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for
that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize
divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that
the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a
foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and
serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of
the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however,
can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by
the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the
enactment, and the purpose of the second
115
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of
the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse
can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no
right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive
evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in
this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with
the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition
of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law have
been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of
right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for
the effect of foreign judgments. This Section
states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final
orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order
of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the
subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to

clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a
divorce situation, we have declared, no less,
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another
country."28 This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with
the alien’s applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.29 The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2)
copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of
official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal
of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his
petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its
authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation,
we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition
for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless
we deem it more appropriate to remand the
case to the RTC to determine whether the
divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian
divorce law.
116
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter
course of action, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wife’s
(Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the
petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow
other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioner’s
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution must be
taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is
served by the practice of reciprocal recognition
of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of
divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending
judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as
discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we
note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert
and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the
mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider
the recording to be legally improper; hence, the
need to draw attention of the bench and the
bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person’s legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his
personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable
at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree,
although a foreign one, affecting a person’s

legal capacity and status that must be recorded.
In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of
Civil Status specifically requires the registration
of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is
established for recording the civil status of
persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local
registrars shall keep and preserve in their
offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning
the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered
not only the marriages solemnized but also
divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,
change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the
divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
the submission of the decree by themselves do
not ipso facto authorize the decree’s
registration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of
the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present
117
case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing
the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength
alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was
aware of the requirement of a court recognition,
as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No.
181, series of 198237 – both of which required a
final order from a competent Philippine court
before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry,
but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of
the decree. For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is
that the recognition that the RTC may extend to
the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the
civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no
entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of
Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code
by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule
108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that
must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may
be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires,
among others, that the verified petition must be
filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;39 and that the time and place for
hearing must be published in a newspaper of
general circulation.40 As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met
in the present case, we cannot consider the

petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this
ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a
foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one
for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review
on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case
to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI
MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND
CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
118
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon
City, through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
on a pure question of law. The petition assails
the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution
dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed
the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the
lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki,
to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese
national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on
23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese,
Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara
were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were
able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void
on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki
prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3)
for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the
RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its
active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the
Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing
for at least six months prior to the date of filing,
or in the case of a non-resident respondent,
where he may be found in the Philippines, at
the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that
the petition was in "gross violation" of the
above provisions. The trial court based its
dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
comply with any of the preceding requirements
may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view
that only "the husband or the wife," in this case
either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition
to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He
argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity
and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for
recognition of foreign judgment is a special
proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a
right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action
which is "for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the
RTC sought to establish (1) the status and
concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the
rendition of the Japanese Family Court
judgment declaring the marriage between
119
Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of
bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article
35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on
bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides
that "a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a)
in bigamy would be absurd because only the
guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the
words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to
realize that the party interested in having a
bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be
the husband in the prior, pre-existing
marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and
therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous
marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the
"procedural implementation" of the Civil
Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to
Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register
Law imposes a duty on the "successful
petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage
to send a copy of the final decree of the court to
the local registrar of the municipality where the
dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides
that entries in the civil registry relating to
"marriages," "judgments of annulments of
marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning" are subject to
cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the
RTC sought (among others) to annotate the
judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC
also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred"
when, on its own, it dismissed the petition
based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the
RTC may be confusing the concept of venue
with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is
lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to
dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy
v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held

that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the
defendant’s prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio
dismissing the case."20 Moreover, petitioner
alleged that the trial court should not have
"immediately dismissed" the petition under
Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he
substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to
sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a)
and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in
the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be
judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand,
the RTC did not explain its ground of
impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x
as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should
be taken together with the other ground cited
by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio
dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The
City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n
a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x
x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, and not through a
collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral
attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that
this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and
certification against forum shopping of the
petition was not authenticated as required
under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, this also warranted the "immediate
dismissal" of the petition under the same
provision.
120
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Letters of
Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required
respondents to file their comment on the
petition for review.30 The public respondents,
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
NSO, participated through the Office of the
Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and
Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition.
He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that
the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the
case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an
injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void. The Solicitor General
cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this
Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected
to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage
was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal
bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the
bigamous marriage, it would not be expected
that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance,
the "injured spouse" who should be given a
legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous
marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but
most of all, it causes an emotional burden to
the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
always be a reminder of the infidelity of the
spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage
which sanctity is protected by the
Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the
petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this
Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign

divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign
divorce decree, in the present case the
Japanese Family Court judgment also affected
the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay,
who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court is the procedure to record
"[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In
other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the
civil registry of judicial decrees that produce
legal consequences upon a person’s legal
capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family
Court judgment directly bears on the civil status
of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be
proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that
there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a
void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v.
De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which
declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage
may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters
to the Court to comply with the directive for
them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara
wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact
that she was previously married to
Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted
any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other
hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition.45 She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything she
say might cause misunderstanding between her
and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is
applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
121
marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can
recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the
Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife
can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage "does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of
Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of
the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an
official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification
may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service
in Japan and authenticated by the seal of
office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a
petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties
should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition,51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the
trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This

is absurd because it will litigate the case anew.
It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation
on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on
the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign
court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
original cause of action, rendering immaterial
the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage affects the civil status, condition and
legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect
of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if
the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
"[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is
the rule of lex nationalii in private international
law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting
its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and
legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment
declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case
as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which
the foreign judgment was rendered. They
cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize
the foreign judgment as a fact according to the
rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent
title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court states that "the judgment or final order
may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
122
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review
on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to
delve into the merits of a foreign judgment.
Once a foreign judgment is admitted and
proven in a Philippine court, it can only be
repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. ,
"want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
The rule on limited review embodies the policy
of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations,61 as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng
Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves
the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not
involve the extended procedure under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While
the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his
or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to
simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy.
While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code.
Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b)
of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only
requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3
of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks

to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts
of a person’s life which are recorded by the
State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act
No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence
such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the
State has an interest in recording. As noted by
the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any
person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry
is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of
the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a
personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is
also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage
in the civil registry, which compromises the
public record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the spouse
not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances68) his most intimate human relation,
but also to protect his property interests that
arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage.69 These property interests
in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the
123
family"70 and preserving the property regime of
the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights
protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s
right in a marriage extends further to relational
rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the
Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
"diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive
right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of
his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right
by limiting the personality to sue to the
husband or the wife of the union recognized by
law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage
on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of
the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void
from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor
the wife under the law. The husband or the wife
of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who
has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares
bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is
the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is
a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has
an interest in the prosecution and prevention of
crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to
confer personality to sue on the husband or the
wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse
does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect
of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his
marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the
judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that

the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party
as the bigamous marriage not only threatens
the financial and the property ownership aspect
of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes
an emotional burden to the prior
spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the
prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to
declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous
marriage and judicially declare as a fact that
such judgment is effective in the Philippines.
Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous
marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court
held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of
marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a
direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC
relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for
recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral
attack on the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not
involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other
related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for
the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente
lite of the spouses and children,84 the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses,85 and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to
determine collusion.86 A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
is also necessary to prevent circumvention of
the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or
124
correction of entries in the civil registry may be
filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located."87 In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve
his marriage by the mere expedient of changing
his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for
correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment
annulling a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family
Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a
foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law.
The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine
the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this
Court recognized the legislative intent of the
second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws
of his or her country. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a
corrective measure to address the anomaly that
results from a marriage between a Filipino,
whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign
citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly
consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to
marry under the laws of his or her country. The
correction is made by extending in the
Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce
decree, which is already effective in the country
where it was rendered. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this
Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which
declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code
applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy.
The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to
declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to
remarry under the laws of his or her country. If
the foreign judgment is not recognized in the
Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry
while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse
is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public
policy. A critical difference between the case of
a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy,
as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy as
expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code
and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full
trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but
this is not the only remedy available to him or
her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
125
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments,
Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
their judgment on how a case was decided
under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
"family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity" of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country,
Philippine courts only decide whether to extend
its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule
of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the
Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only
determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in
the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the
comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment
is already "presumptive evidence of a right
between the parties." Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive
and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil
registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new status,
right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the
civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the
public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89

and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code,
"[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of
bigamy] shall not run when the offender is
absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the
Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form
of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The
Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil
Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for
further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.
2
In Pasay City, Metro Manila.
3
See rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No.
15 of 2009, Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage between Maria Paz Galela Marinay
and Shinichi Maekara dated 18 August 2010.
Translated by Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu
Gyoseishoshi Lawyer’s Office (see rollo, p. 89).
4
Id.
5 community or conjugal property, and other
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No.
209 as amended):
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages
not falling under Article 41;
126
xxxx
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person
during subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration
of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In
case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
6
Rollo, pp. 79-80.
7
The dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED and WITHDRAWN from the active
civil docket of this Court. The RTC-OCC, Quezon
City is directed to refund to the petitioner the
amount of One Thousand Pesos (₱1,000) to be
taken from the Sheriff’s Trust Fund.
8
Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) provides:
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. – (1) The
petition shall allege the complete facts
constituting the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the
common children of the parties and specify the
regime governing their property relations, as
well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written
agreement between the parties, the petitioner
may apply for a provisional order for spousal
support, custody and support of common
children, visitation rights, administration of
matters similarly requiring urgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a
certification against forum shopping. The
verification and certification must be signed
personally by the petitioner. No petition may be
filed solely by counsel or through an
attorney-in-fact.

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the
verification and certification against forum
shopping shall be authenticated by the duly
authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or
legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul
or consular agent in said country.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner
shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office
of the Solicitor General and the Office of the
City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days
from the date of its filing and submit to the
court proof of such service within the same
period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition.
9
RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c). See rollo,
pp. 55-56 (Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration).
10
RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(a).
11
FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art.
35. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
xxxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages
not falling under Article 41;
xxxx
12
Rollo, p. 56.
13
FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted
by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
14
Rollo, p. 68.
15
Enacted 26 November 1930.
16
CIVIL CODE, Art. 413. All other matters
pertaining to the registration of civil status shall
be governed by special laws.
127
17
Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage.
- All civil officers and priests or ministers
authorized to solemnize marriages shall send a
copy of each marriage contract solemnized by
them to the local civil registrar within the time
limit specified in the existing Marriage Law.
In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage,
it shall be the duty of the successful petitioner
for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a
copy of the final decree of the court to the local
civil registrar of the municipality where the
dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized.
In the marriage register there shall be entered
the full name and address of each of the
contracting parties, their ages, the place and
date of the solemnization of the marriage, the
names and addresses of the witnesses, the full
name, address, and relationship of the minor
contracting party or parties or the person or
persons who gave their consent to the marriage,
and the full name, title, and address of the
person who solemnized the marriage.
In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages,
there shall be recorded the names of the parties
divorced or whose marriage was annulled, the
date of the decree of the court, and such other
details as the regulations to be issued may
require.
18
RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries
subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon
good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected:
(a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
19
273 Phil. 1 (1991).
20
Id. at 7. See rollo, pp. 65 and 67.
21
Rollo, p. 47.
22
Id. at 46.
 128

23
Id. at 48. Q-11-68582 be reinstated for further
proceedings.
24
Id.
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the
25
G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA premises are likewise prayed for.
638.
33
G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA
26
Id. at 641. 637.

34
27
Id. at 643. Id. at 656. Quoted in the Manifestation and
Motion of the Solicitor General, pp. 8-9. See
28
See rollo, p. 49. rollo, pp. 132-133.

29
Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in
35
Rollo, p. 133.
part:
36
G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA
Contents and form of petition. – x x x 266.

37
xxxx Id. at 287.

(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a

38
Rollo, p. 133.
certification against forum shopping. The
39
verification and certification must be signed G.R. No. 160172, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA
personally by the petitioner. No petition may be 162.
filed solely by counsel or through an
40
attorney-in-fact. 384 Phil. 661 (2000).

If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the 41

De Castro v. De Castro, supra note 39 at 169.
verification and certification against forum
shopping shall be authenticated by the duly 42
Supra note 30.
authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or
legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul 43
See rollo, p. 120.
or consular agent in said country.
44
Id.
xxxx
45
See rollo, p. 146.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate 46
Id.
dismissal of the petition.
47
Supra note 33.
30
Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105.
48
31
Supra note 33 at 655.
Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz.
49
RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of
32
Rollo, p. 137. The "Conclusion and Prayer" of
official record. — The record of public
the "Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Comment)" of the Solicitor General stated:
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication
In fine, the court a quo’s pronouncement that thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
the petitioner failed to comply with the having the legal custody of the record, or by his
requirements provided in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
should accordingly be set aside. It is, thus, kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
respectfully prayed that Civil Case No. such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country,

the certificate may be made by a secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
his office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. —
Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.
Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or
final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order, is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
50
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec.
24-25. See also Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, supra
note 36 at 282.
51
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5.
52
Id., Sec. 6.
53
Id., Sec. 9.
54
Id., Sec. 11-15.
55
Id., Sec. 17-18.
56
Id., Sec. 19 and 22-23.
129
57
Mijares v. Rañada, 495 Phil. 372, 386 (2005)
citing Eugene Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of
Laws 916 (2nd ed., 1982).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 386.
60
Civil Code, Art. 17. x x x
xxxx
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts
or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
61
Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 386.
"Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it
seeks to protect party expectations resulting
from previous litigation, to safeguard against
the harassment of defendants, to insure that
the task of courts not be increased by
never-ending litigation of the same disputes,
and – in a larger sense – to promote what Lord
Coke in the Ferrer’s Case of 1599 stated to be
the goal of all law: ‘rest and quietness.’"
(Citations omitted)
62
Mijares v. Rañada, supra note 57 at 382. "The
rules of comity, utility and convenience of
nations have established a usage among
civilized states by which final judgments of
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are
reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious
under certain conditions that may vary in
different countries." (Citations omitted)
63
43 Phil. 43 (1922).
64
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11
August 2010, 628 SCRA 266, 280; Garcia v. Recio,
418 Phil. 723 (2001); Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
supra.
65
FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the

Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
66
Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil
register is established for recording the civil
status of persons, in which shall be entered: (a)
births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments
of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g)
adoptions; (h) acknowledgment of natural
children; (i) naturalization; and (j) changes of
name.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries
subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon
good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected:
(a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
67
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at 287.
68
FAMILY CODE, Art. 35-67.
69
FAMILY CODE, Art. 74-148.
70
FAMILY CODE, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194.
71
See supra note 69.
72
CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law x x x."
73
FAMILY CODE, Art. 68-73.
74
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). The
Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
130
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
xxx
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
75
Emphasis supplied.
76
Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815, as
amended), Art. 349. Bigamy. - The penalty of
prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
77
See III RAMON AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL
CODE (1997), 518.
78
RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution
of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
xxxx
79
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in
interest. — A real party in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized
by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.
80
Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supra note 33.
81
Supra note 25.
82
Supra note 25.
83
See supra note 68.
84
FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency
of the action and in the absence of adequate
provisions in a written agreement between the
spouses, the Court shall provide for the support

of the spouses and the custody and support of
their common children. The Court shall give
paramount consideration to the moral and
material welfare of said children and their
choice of the parent with whom they wish to
remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the
other parent.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.
85
FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided
for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article
43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the
proper cases to marriages which are
declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide
for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the
delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless
such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership
shall be notified of the proceedings for
liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the
lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated
in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102
and 129.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision.— (1) If
the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree
of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall
be issued by the court only after compliance
with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
xxxx
86
FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
131
In the cases referred to in the preceding
paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation
report of public prosecutor. — (1) Within one
month after receipt of the court order
mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above,
the public prosecutor shall submit a report to
the court stating whether the parties are in
collusion and serve copies thereof on the
parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion
exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his
report. The parties shall file their respective
comments on the finding of collusion within ten
days from receipt of a copy of the report The
court shall set the report for hearing and if
convinced that the parties are in collusion, it
shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no
collusion exists, the court shall set the case for
pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public
prosecutor to appear for the State at the
pre-trial.
87
RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 1.
88
509 Phil. 108 (2005).
89
Id. at 114.
90
223 Phil. 357 (1985).
91
Id. at 363.
92
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3(c).
93
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec.
2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Rule 111, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is
suspended. — x x x
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil
action has already been instituted, the latter
shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found before judgment on the merits. The
suspension shall last until final judgment is
rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless,

before judgment on the merits is rendered in
the civil action, the same may, upon motion of
the offended party, be consolidated with the
criminal action in the court trying the criminal
action. In case of consolidation, the evidence
already adduced in the civil action shall be
deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of
the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal
case and of the parties to present additional
evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil
actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the
running of the period of prescription of the civil
action which cannot be instituted separately or
whose proceeding has been suspended shall be
tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall
be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the criminal action that the act
or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist.
G.R. No. 215723
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a.
"DOREEN GRACE MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner
vs.
MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, and THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,
Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review
on certiorari1are the Decision2 dated July 31,
2014 and the Resolution3 dated November 28,
2014, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 106 (RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692,
denying petitioner's petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the
Family Code.
The Facts
132
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a
Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike
(Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married
on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City,
Philippines.4 Their union bore two children,
Masato Koike, who was born on January 23,
2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4,
2007.5
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki,
pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for
divorce6 before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City,
Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on
even date as appearing in the Divorce
Certificate7 and the same was duly recorded in
the Official Family Register ofMichiyuki Koike.8
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate
annotated on her Certificate of Marriage9 on file
with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City,
Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition10 for
judicial recognition of ioreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code11 before the RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
Q-13-72692.
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the
petition.12 On the other hand, Doreen
presented several foreign documents, namely,
"Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of
Acceptance of Divorce"13 and "Family Register
of Michiyuki Koike"14 both issued by the Mayor
of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by
the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for
Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified
machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce
Certificate" issued by the Consul for the
Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was
authenticated by the Department of the Foreign
Affairs, as well as a Certification15 issued by the
City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the
original of said divorce certificate was filed and
recorded in the said Office. In addition,
photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their
corresponding English translation, as well as
two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan
2000" 16 and "The Civil Code of Japan
2009"17 were likewise submitted as proof of the
existence of Japan's law on divorce.18
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC
denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an
action for recognition of foreign divorce decree
 133

pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the Art. 26. All marriages
foreign divorce decree and the national law of solemnized outside the
the alien recognizing his or her capacity to Philippines in accordance with
obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance the laws in force in the
with Sections 2420 and 2521 of Rule 132 of the country where they were
Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled that solemnized, and valid there as
while the divorce documents presented by such, shall also be valid in this
Doreen were successfully proven to be public or country, except those
official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell prohibited under Articles
short of proving the national law of her husband, 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
particularly the existence of the law on divorce. and 38.
The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of
Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009," Where a marriage between a
presented were not duly authenticated by the Filipino citizen and a
Philippine Consul in Japan as required by foreigner is validly celebrated
Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too and a divorce is
that the testimony of Doreen relative to the thereafter validly obtained
applicable provisions found therein and its abroad by the alien
effect on the matrimonial relations was spouse capacitating him or
insufficient since she was not presented as a her to remarry, the Filipino
qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, spouse shall likewise have
at the very least, a working knowledge of the capacity to remarry under
laws of Japan, particularly those on family Philippine law. (Emphasis
relations and divorce. It likewise did not supplied)
consider the said books as learned treatises
pursuant to Section 46,22 Rule 130 of the Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law
Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
witness on the subject matter was presented extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to
and considering further that Philippine courts a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
cannot take judicial notice of foreignjudgments determine the validity of the dissolution of the
and law.23 marriage.26

Doreen's motion for reconsideration24 was
denied in a Resolution25 dated November 28,
2014; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not the RTC erred in denying the
petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce.1âwphi1
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine
law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it. However,
Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses
foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving
a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino
spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The provision reads:
In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas,27the Court had the
occasion to rule that:
The starting point in any
recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign judgments
and laws.1âwphi1 Justice
Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion
to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another
country." This means that the
foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven
as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the
alien's applicable national
law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself
or herself. The recognition

may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or
defense.28 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied;
citation omitted)
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out
that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by
the alien spouse to be recognized in our
jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce
decree is valid according to the national law of
the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven.30 Since
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and judgment, our law on evidence
requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven like any other fact.31
Considering that the validity of the divorce
decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well
as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on
the matter are essentially factual that calls for a
re-evaluation of the evidence presented before
the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is
obviously a question of fact that is beyond the
ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not
a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is
the function of the lower courts, whose findings
on these matters are received with respect and
are in fact binding subject to certain
exceptions.32 In this regard, it is settled that
appeals taken from judgments or final orders
rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law should be brought to
the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.33
Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions
on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the
Court may refer the case to the CA under
paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper
appeal. -x x x
134
An appeal by certiorari taken
to the Supreme Court from
the Regional Trial Court
submitting issues of fact may
be referred to the Court of
Appeals for decision or
appropriate action. The
determination of the Supreme
Court on whether or not
issues of fact are involved
shall be final.
This, notwithstanding the express provision
under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal
likewise "may" be dismissed when there is error
irr the choice or mode of appeal.34
Since the said Rules denote discretion on the
part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal or
refer the case to the CA, the question of fact
involved in the instant appeal and substantial
ends of justice warrant that the case be referred
to the CA for further appropriate proceedings. It
bears to stress that procedural rules were
intended to ensure proper administration of law
and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to
be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for
they are adopted to help secure, not override,
substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid
enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its
prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of
justice is the core reason for the existence of
the courts.35
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly
procedure and substantial justice, the case is
hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate action including the reception of
evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the
pertinent factual issues in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
LEONARDO-DE Associate Justice
 135

CASTRO
16
Id. at 111-115.
Associate Justice
17
Id. at 116-119.
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
18
Associate Justice See id. at 62.

CERTIFICATION
19
Id. at 58-65.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the

20
SECTION 24. Proof of official record. - The
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the record of public documents referred to in
above Decision had been reached in paragraph (a) of section 19, when admissible for
consultation before the case was assigned to any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is
Chief Justice not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country,
the certificate may be made by a secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul-general, consul,
Footnotes vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines
1
Rollo, pp. 3-54. stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
2
Id. at 58-65. Penned by Judge Angelene Mary his office.
W. Quimpo-Sale.
21
SECTION 25. What attestation of copy must
3
Id. at 66-70. state.- Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of evidence,
4
Id. at 80. the attestation must state, in substance, that
the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
5
Id. at 59. specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the
6
See Certificate of Receiving; id. at 109. attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
7 such court.
Id.at81.

8
22
SECTION 46. Learned treatises. -A published
See id.
treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of
history, law, science, or art is admissible as
9
Id. at 97. tending to prove the truth of a matter stated
therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a
10
Id.at71-79. witness expert in the subject testifies, that the
writer of the statement in the treatise,
11
Executive Order No. 209, as amended, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his
entitled "THE FAMILY CODE OF THE profession or calling as expert in the subject.
PHILIPPINES," August 4, 1988.
23
Rollo, pp. 63-64.
12
Rollo, p. 58.
24
Id. at 169-193.
13
Id. at 109-110.
25
Id. at 66-70.
14
Id. at 101-107.
26
Fujiki v. Marinay, 712 Phil. 524, 555 (2013).
15
Id. at 83.
 136

27
642 Phil. 420 (2010). Let a copy of this Decision be
served on the Local Civil
28
Id. at 432-433. Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
29
418 Phil. 723 (2001).
SO ORDERED.3
30
Id. at 725.
The facts are undisputed.
31
Id. at 735.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn
32
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Sarabia Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
Manor Hotel Corporation, 715 Phil. 420, cancellation of
433-435 (2013).
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San
33
See Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of
v. People, 721 Phil. 760, 766-767 (2013). divorce Japanese court.

34
CGP Transportation and Services Corporation Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
v. PC! Leasing and Finance, Inc., 548 Phil. 242, in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial
253-254 (2007). Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for
initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition
and the notice of initial hearing were published
35
Spouses Agbulos v. Gutierrez, 607 Phil. 288,
once a week for three consecutive weeks in
295 (2009).
newspaper of general circulation. During the
initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the
documentary evidence (consisting of the trial
courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit
G.R. No. 221029 of publication, and issues of the Northern
Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for
vs purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent requirements.

RESOLUTION The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)

PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse
and set aside the September 18, 2014
Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, the instant
appeal
is GRANTED. The Decision dat
ed 15 October 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City, First Judicial
Region, Branch 43, in SPEC.
PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
entered its appearance for petitioner Republic
of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its
behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion
was filed questioning the title and/or caption of
the petition considering that based on the
allegations therein, the proper action should be
a petition for recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an
Amended Petition, which the court granted. The
Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is
also a petition for recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously
married in the Philippines to a
Japanese national named
YOSHINO MINORO as shown

by their Marriage Contract
xxx;
3. That recently, a case for
divorce was filed by herein
[petitioner] in Japan and after
die proceedings, a divorce
decree dated December 6,
2011 was rendered by the
Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of
the said divorce decree,
petitioner and her divorce
Japanese husband are no
longer living together and in
fact, petitioner and her
daughter are living separately
from said Japanese former
husband;
5. That there is an imperative
need to have the entry of
marriage in Civil Registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila
cancelled, where the
petitioner and the former
Japanese husband's marriage
was previously registered, in
order that it would not appear
anymore that petitioner is still
married to the said Japanese
national who is no longer her
husband or is no longer
married to her, she shall not
be bothered and disturbed by
aid entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed
principally for the purpose of
causing the cancellation of
entry of the marriage between
the petitioner and the said
Japanese national, pursuant to
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which marriage was
already dissolved by virtue of
the aforesaid divorce decree;
[and]
7. That petitioner prays,
among others, that together
with the cancellation of the
said entry of her marriage,
that she be allowed to return
137
and use her maiden surname,
MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she
was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
employment. Among the documents that were
offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January
25, 2012, finding the petition
and its attachments to be
sufficient in form and in
substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern
Journal dated February 21-27,
2012, February 28 - March 5,
2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage
between Manalo and her
former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese
court;
6. Authentication/Certificate
issued by the Philippine
Consulate General in Osaka,
Japan of the Notification of
Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of
Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting
evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the
petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the
divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not
be recognized, it opined that, based on Article
15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law
"does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a
divorce whether they are in the country or living
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to
foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage
in the Philippines or in another country" and
that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens
of another country, Philippine laws shall have
control over issues related to Filipinos' family
rights and duties, together with the
determination of their condition and legal
 138

capacity to enter into contracts and civil their respective national

relations, inclusing marriages."6 laws.14

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. 4. In mixed marriages

It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the involving a Filipino and a
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it foreigner, the former is
was Manalo who filed for divorce against her allowed to contract a
Japanese husband because the decree may subsequent marriage in case
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the absolute divorce is validly
the former, capacitating him to remarry. obtained abroad by the alien
Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. spouse capacitating him or her
Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning to remarry.15
of the law should be based on the intent of the
lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent On July 6, 1987, then
behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice President Corazon C. Aquino
to consider Manalo as still married to the signed into law Executive
Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer Order (E.O.) No. 209,
married to her. For the appellate court, the fact otherwise known as the
that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is Family Code of the Philippines,
inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case which took effect on August 3,
was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the 1988.16 Shortly thereafter ,
mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was E.O. No. 227 was issued on
dissolved filed abroad by the latter. July 17, 1987.17 Aside from
amending Articles 36 and 39
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but of the Family Code, a second
it was denied; hence, this petition. paragraph was added to
Article 26.18 This provision was
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA originally deleted by the Civil
decision. Code Revision Committee
(Committee),but it was
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union presented and approved at a
for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two Cabinet meeting after Pres.
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo Aquino signed E.O. No.
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and 209.19 As modified, Article 26
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which now states:
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In
this jurisdiction, the following rules exist: Art. 26. All marriages
solemnized outside the
1. Philippine law does not Philippines, in accordance
provide for absolute divorce; with the laws in force in the
hence, our courts cannot where country where they
grant it.10 were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except
2. Consistent with Articles
those prohibited under
1511 and 1712 of the New Civil
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
Code, the marital bond
36, 37 and 38.
between two Filipinos cannot
be dissolved even by an
absolute divorce obtained Where a marriage between
abroad.13 Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly
3. An absolute divorce
obtained abroad by the alien
obtained abroad by a couple,
spouse capacitating him her to
who both aliens, may be
remarry under Philippine law.
recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with
 139

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on no longer married under

Philippine courts to extend the effect of a Philippine law and can thus
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse remarry.
without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It Thus, taking into
authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a consideration the legislative
foreign divorce decree precisely because the intent and applying the rule of
Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine reason, we hold that
courts cannot try the case on the merits Paragraph 2 of Article 26
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce should be interpreted to
case.22 Under the principles of comity, our include cases involving parties
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained who, at the time of the
by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the celebration of the marriage
legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and were Filipino citizens, but later
support of the children or property relations of on, one of them becomes
the spouses, must still be determined by our naturalized as foreign citizen
courts.23 and obtains divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member likewise be allowed to
of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is remarry as if the other party
to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still were foreigner at the time of
being married to his or her alien spouse, the solemnization of the
although the latter is no longer married to the marriage. To rule otherwise
former because he or she had obtained a would be to sanction
divorce abroad that is recognized by his or absurdity and injustice. x x x
national law.24 The aim was that it would solved
the problem of many Filipino women who, If we are to give meaning to
under the New Civil Code, are still considered the legislative intent to avoid
married to their alien husbands even after the the absurd situation where
latter have already validly divorced them under the Filipino spouse remains
their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps married to the alien spouse
have already married again.25 who after obtaining a divorce
is no longer married to the
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 Filipino spouse, then the
of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time instant case must be deemed
of the celebration of the marriage, the parties as coming within the
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them contemplation of Paragraph 2
acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, of Article 26.
initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree. We held in Republic of the In view of the foregoing, we
Phils. v. Orbecido III:26 state the twin elements for
the application of Paragraph 2
The jurisprudential answer lies of Article 26 as follows:
latent in the 1998 case
of Quita v. Court of 1. There is a
Appeals. In Quita, the parties valid
were, as in this case, Filipino marriage
citizens when they got that has
married. The wife became been
naturalized American citizen n celebrated
1954 and obtained a divorce between a
in the same year. The court Filipino
therein hinted, by the way citizen and a
of obiter dictum, that a foreigner;
Filipino divorced by his and
naturalized foreign spouse is

2. A valid
divorce is
obtained
abroad by
the alien
spouse
capacitating
him or her
to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of
marriage, but their
citizenship at the time valid
divorced obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether,
under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has
the capacity to remarry under Philippine law
after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or
her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition
of enforcement of the divorced decree
rendered by the Japanese court and for the
cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local
civil registry " in order that it would not appear
anymore that she is still married to the said
Japanese national who is no longer her husband
or is no longer married to her; [and], in the
event that [she] decides to be remarried, she
shall not be bothered and disturbed by said
entry of marriage," and to use her maiden
surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van
Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce
decree that was initiated and obtained by the
Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on
the issues of child custody and property
relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses
executed an Agreement for the joint custody of
their minor daughter. Later on, the husband
who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife
enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only
the latter who exercised sole custody of their
child. The trial court dismissed the action for
lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among
others, that the divorce decree is binding
140
following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this
jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider,
arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his
former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling
that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain
the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which
is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the
divorce decree's alleged
invalidity - not because the
Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the
divorced decree violated
Illinois law, but because the
divorce was obtained by his
Filipino spouse - to support
the Agreement's
enforceability . The argument
that foreigners in this
jurisdiction are not bound by
foreign divorce decrees is
hardly novel. Van Dron v.
Romillo settled the matter by
holding that an alien spouse of
a Filipino is bound by a
divorce decree obtained
abroad. There, we dismissed
the alien divorcee's Philippine
suit for accounting of alleged
post-divorce conjugal
property and rejected his
submission that the foreign
divorce (obtained by the
Filipino spouse) is not valid in
this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code
took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by
the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his
Filipino wife to render an accounting of a
business that was alleged to be a conjugal
property and to be declared with right to
manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss
the case on the ground that the cause of action
was barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings that she initiated, but the trial
court denied the motion. On his part, her
ex-husband averred that the divorce decree
issued by the Nevada court could not prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and
its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially
if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the
 141

case filed by the alien spouse, the Court domestic

discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on relation of
the parties and their conjugal property in the husband and
Philippines. Thus: wife, and to
free them
There can be no question as both from
to the validity of that Nevada the bond.
divorce in any of the States of The
the United States. The decree marriage tie,
is binding on private when thus
respondent as an American severed as
citizen. For instance, private stone party,
respondent cannot sue ceases to
petitioner, as her husband, in bind either.
any State of the Union. What A husband
he is contending in this case is without a
that the divorce is not valid wife, or a
and binding in this jurisdiction, wife without
the same being contrary to a husband, is
local law and public policy. unknown to
the law.
Is it true that owing to the When the
nationality principle embodied law provides
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, in the nature
only Philippine nationals are of penalty,
covered by the policy and that the
morality. However, aliens may guilty party
obtain divorce abroad, which shall not
may be recognized in the marry again,
Philippines, provided they are that party,
valid according to their as well as
national law. In this case, the the other, is
divorce in Nevada released still
private respondent from the absolutely
marriage from standards of feed from
American law, under the bond of
which divorce dissolves the the former
marriage. As stated by the marriage."
Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Thus, pursuant to his national
Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799: law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of
"The petitioner. He would have no
purpose and standing to sue in the case
effect of a below as petitioner's husband
decree of entitled to exercise control
divorce from over conjugal assets. As he is
the bond of estopped by his own
matrimony representation before said
by a court of court from asserting his right
competent over the alleged conjugal
jurisdiction property.
are to
change the To maintain, as private
existing respondent does, that under
status or our laws, petitioner has to be

considered still married to
private respondent and still
subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to private
respondent. The latter should
not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained
foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse
can be recognized and given legal effects in the
Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v.
Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her
husband, who is a Japanese national, was able
to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court.
Which declared the marriage between her and
her second husband, who is a Japanese national,
void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the
issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to
file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as
married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the
personality to file a petition
under Rule 108 to cancel the
entry of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara in the
civil registry on the basis of
the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the
prior spouse has a personal
and material interest in
142
maintaining the integrity of
the marriage he contracted
and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in
the cancellation of an entry of
a bigamous marriage in the
civil registry, which
compromises the public
record of his marriage. The
interest derives from the
substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve
(or dissolve, in limited
instances) his most intimate
human relation, but also to
protect his property interests
that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts
marriage. These property
interests in marriage included
the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial
capacity of the family" and
preserving the property
regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already
substantive rights protected
by the Constitution, but a
spouse's right in a marriage
extends further to relational
rights recognized under Title
III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife")
of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife
and her Japanese husband jointly filed for
divorce, which was
granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a
petition before the RTC for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
The RTC denied the petition on the ground that
the foreign divorce decree and the national law
of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to
obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance
with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed
and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien spouse
must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case,
We referred it to the CA for appropriate action
including the reception of evidence to

determine and resolve the pertinent factual
issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from
the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse
and extended its legal effects on the issues of
child custody and property relation, it should
not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that
one of the usual and necessary consequences of
absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed,
there is no longer a mutual obligation to live
together and observe fidelity. When the
marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the
civil status and the domestic relation of the
former spouses change as both of them are
freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the
nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is
subject to Philippine law, which prohibits
absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree
which she obtained under Japanese law cannot
be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a
national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is
said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not
only the intention of the framers of the law, but
also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in
the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound
to respect the prohibition until the legislature
deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x
x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a
clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. It does not distinguish
whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or
the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of
the statute; neither can We put words in the
mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words to
have used words advisely and to have expressed
its intent by the use of such words as are found
in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words if a statute
there should be departure."38
143
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean
that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will
not follow the letter of the statute when to do
so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the
act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to
carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held
in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC
et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at
all times accurately reflected
in the manner in which the
resulting law is couched. Thus,
applying a verba legis or
strictly literal interpretation of
a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to
inconvience, an absurd
situation or injustice. To
obviate this aberration, and
bearing in mind the principle
that the intent or the spirit of
the law is the law itself, resort
should be to the rule that the
spirit of the law control its
letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that
is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is
free to marry under the laws of his or her
countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated
the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond
and capacitating his or her alien spouse to
remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not
make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual
effect of the foreign divorce decree on a
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operations of their alien

spouses are severed by operation on the latter's
national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle
is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article
15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and
unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the
State may provide for an exception thereto.
Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause
unjust discrimination and oppression to certain
classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by law. The courts have the duty to
enforce the laws of divorce as written by the
Legislature only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification and that its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by
the court of justice, such classification may be
subjected to judicial review.44 The deference
stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons
accorded special protection by the
Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this
Court must discharge its primary role as the
vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
require a stricter and more exacting adherence
to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative
classification impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to
the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is
presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is
upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads
to strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause are those basic liberties explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It
includes the right to free speech, political
expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right
to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other
hand, what constitutes compelling state interest
is measured by the scale rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by
history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of
the state for which some individual liberties
must give way, such as the promotion of public
interest, public safety or the general
welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or
interest that, because of its primacy, overrides
144
individual rights, and allows the former to take
precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by
the Congress, the same principle applies with
respect to the acts of the President which have
the force and effect of law unless declared
otherwise by the court. In this case, We find
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of
the essential requisites53 of the equal protection
clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the
provision only to a foreign divorce decree
initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as
it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and
whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is
not similarly situated with a Filipino who is
married to a foreign citizen. There are real,
material and substantial differences between
them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political,
economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities
as well as varying legal systems and procedures,
all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is
married to an alien spouse has to contend with.
More importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against another
Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree
obtained by an alien against his her Filipino
spouse is recognized if made in accordance with
the national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial
difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of
his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the
Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered
as Filipinos who have the same rights and
obligations in a alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Were it not for
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married
to their foreigner spouses who are no longer
their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a
distinction between them based merely on the
superficial difference of whether they initiated
the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair.
Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one
and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2
Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in
treatment because a foreign divorce decree that
was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen

against his or her alien spouse would not be
recognized even if based on grounds similar to
Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family
Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these
grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused
of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to
insisting that he or she should be governed with
whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's
comment that Manalo should be "reminded
that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the
severance of her martial ties before the RTC in
accordance with the mechanism now existing
under the Family Code" is anything but
comforting. For the guidance of the bench and
the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are
and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case
as well as those who are similarly situated. If the
dissent refers to a petition for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is
that there is no assurance that our courts will
automatically grant the same. Besides, such
proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted.
All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal
interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26
encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners,
opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate
practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals
or initiating divorce proceedings against their
alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization
as no data whatsoever was sworn to support
what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to
the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction.
Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable
presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted
and overcome by other evidence) that a person
is innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that
acquiescence resulted from a belief that the
thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law
and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that
the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to
easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral
conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he
or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a
fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial
unions are entered into out of genuine love and
affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or
145
profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact
that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and
conservative in nature and that they are more
often the victims or losing end of mixed
marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to
prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision
to marry an alien national. In one case, it was
said:
Motive for entering into a
marriage are varied and
complex. The State does not
and cannot dictated on the
kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt
to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of
their right to privacy and
would raise serious
constitutional questions. The
right marital privacy allows
married couples to structure
their marriages in almost any
way they see it fit, to live
together or live apart, to have
children or no children, to love
one another or not, and so on.
Thus, marriages entered into
for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title,
provided that they comply
with all the legal requisites,
are equally valid. Love, though
the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the
only valid cause for marriage.
Other considerations, not
precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage,
as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant
to be a general prohibition on divorce because
Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in
response to a question by Father Joaquin G.
Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was categorical
about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as
follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding
Officer, may I ask that

Commissioner Bernas be
recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
Colayco). Commissioner
Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question,
and I am not sure if it has
been categorically answered. I
refer specifically to the
proposal of Commissioner
Gascon. Is this be understood
as a prohibition of a general
law on divorce? His intention
is to make this a prohibition so
that the legislature cannot
pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding
Officer, that was not primarily
my intention. My intention
was primarily to encourage
the social institution of
marriage, but not necessarily
discourage divorce. But now
that the mentioned the issue
of divorce, my personal
opinion is to discourage it. Mr.
Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is
more categorical. Does this
carry the meaning of
prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr.
Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in
our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917,
Philippine courts could grant an absolute
divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of
the wife or concubinage on the part of the
husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943,
pursuant to the authority conferred upon him
by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial
Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the
approval of the latter, the Chairman of the
Philippine Executive Commission promulgated
an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which
repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven
ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional
146
or unjustified desertion continuously for at least
one year prior to the filing of the action, slander
by deed or gross insult by one spouse against
the other to such an extent as to make further
living together impracticable, and a spouse's
incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was
liberated and the Commonwealth Government
was restored, it ceased to have force and effect
and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From
August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an
absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens,
whether here or abroad, is no longer
recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant
clamor from various sectors of the Philippine
society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a
matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress,
House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and
602774 were filed in the House of
representatives. In substitution of these bills,
H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting
Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in
the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of
2018 was submitted by the House Committee
on Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was
approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading -
with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2
absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a
judicial decree of absolute divorce are as
follows:
1. The grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code, modified or
amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly
abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of
the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral
pressure to compel the
petitioner to change religious
or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to
corrupt or induce the
petitioner, a common child, or
a child of a petitioner, to
engage in prostitution, or
 147

connivance in such corruption annulled was eighteen (18)

or inducement; years of age or over but below
twety-one (21), and the
d. Final judgment sentencing marriage was solemnized
the respondent to without the consent of the
imprisonment of more than parents guradian or personl
six (6) years, even if pardoned; having substitute parental
authority over the party, in
e. Drug addiction or habitual that order, unless after
alchoholism ro chronic attaining the age of
gambling of respondent; twenty-one (21) such party
freely cohabited with the
other and both lived together
f. Homosexuality of the
as husband and wife;
respondent;

b. either party was of unsound

g. Contracting by the
mind, unless such party after
respondent of a subsequent
coming to reason, freely
bigamous marriage, whether
cohabited with the other as
in the Philippines or abroad;
husband and wife;
h. Marital infidelity or
c. The consent of either party
perversion or having a child
was obtained by fraud, unless
with another person other
such party afterwards with full
than one's spouse during the
knowledge of the facts
marriage, except when upon
constituting the fraud, freely
the mutual agreement of the
cohabited with the other
spouses, a child is born to
husband and wife;
them by in vitro or a similar
procedure or when the wife
bears a child after being a d. consent of either party was
victim of rape; obtained by force,
intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same
i. attempt by the respondent
having disappeared or ceased,
against the life of the
such party thereafter freely
petitioner, a common child or
cohabited with the other as
a child of a petitioner; and
husband and wife;
j. Abandonment of petitioner
e. Either party was physically
by respondent without
incapable of consummating
justifiable cause for more than
the marriage with the other
one (1) year.
and such incapacity continues
or appears to be incurable;
When the spouses are legally separated by
and
judicial decree for more thath two (2) years,
either or both spouses can petition the proper
f. Either part was afflicted
court for an absolute divorce based on said
with the sexually transmissible
judicial decree of legal separation.
infection found to be serious
or appears to be incurable.
1. Grounds for annulment of
marriage under Article 45 of
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e
the Family Code restated as
and f existed either at the time of the marriage
follows:
or supervening after the marriage.
a. The party in whose behalf it
1. When the spouses have
is sought to have the marriage
been separated in fact for at

least five (5) years at the time
the petition for absolute
divorce is filed, and the
reconciliation is highly
improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of
either spouse as provided for
in Article 36 of the Family
Code, whether or not the
incapacity was present at the
time of the celebration of the
marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses
undergoes a gender
reassignment surgery or
transition from one sex to
another, the other spouse is
entitled to petition for
absolute divorce with the
transgender or transsexual as
respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital
differences and conflicts
which have resulted in the
total breakdown of the
marriage beyond repair,
despite earnest and repeated
efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by
the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to
any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce,
viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals,
and traditions that has looked upon marriage
and family as an institution and their nature of
permanence,
In the same breath that the
establishment clause restricts
what the government can do
with religion, it also limits
what religious sects can or
cannot do. They can neither
cause the government to
adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they cause
the government to restrict
other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the
State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus establish a
state religion.76
148
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose
its beliefs and convictions on the State and the
rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the
nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely
believes that they are good for country.77 While
marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil
and legal consequences which are governed by
the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of
any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a
legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is a foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State,
should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provision.
Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to
actively promote its total development.79 It is
also obligated to defend, among others, the
right of children to special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot
effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit
the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only
those foreign divorce initiated by the alien
spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women
and children are almost always the helpless
victims of all forms of domestic abuse and
violence. In fact, among the notable legislation
passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate,
the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of
Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in
Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No.
10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act
of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and
strengthening the Filipino family as a basic
autonomous social institution, the Court must
not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to
value the dignity of every human person,
guarantee full respect for human rights, and
ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
would do more harm than good. If We disallow
a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a
foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph
2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first
avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the
Family Code, any subsequent relationship that
 149

he or she would enter in the meantime shall be
considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine
law. Worse, any child born out such
"extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of
being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are
just but a few of the adverse consequences, not
only to the parent but also to the child, if We
are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the
subject provision. The irony is that the principle
of inviolability of marriage under Section 2,
Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be
tilted in favor of marriage and against unions
not formalized by marriage, but without
denying State protection and assistance to
live-in arrangements or to families formed
according to indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the
realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and
information technology, as well as the
improvement of the transportation system that
almost instantly connect people from all over
the world, mixed marriages have become not
too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that
not all marriages are made in heaven and that
imperfect humans more often than not create
imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the
unfortunate reality for some is that the
attainment of the individual's full human
potential and self fulfillment is not found and
achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is
hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing
marriages and, at the same time, brush aside
the truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a
mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any
good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other
remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his or her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served, San Luis v. San
Luis85 quoted:
the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably,
the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never
within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that
intent, in fact, for we presume
the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply
the law not independently of
but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may
seem arbitrary when applied
in a particular case because
only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience
to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance
between the sord and the will,
that justice may be done even
as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not
automatons. We do not and
must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are
apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of law,"
so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes agaian, "where these
words import a policy that
goes beyond them."

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate xxxx

Applellate Court, the Court
stated:
But as has also been aptly
observed, we test a law by its
results: and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking
More that twenty centuries
ago, Justinian defined justice
"as the constant and
perpetual wish to render
every one of his due." That
wish continues to motivate
this Court when it assesses the

facts and the law in ever case
brought to it for decisions.
Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions.
Thus when the facts warrant,
we interpret the law in a way
that will render justice,
presuming that it was the
intention if the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms,
so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet
write finis to this controversy by granting
Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the
divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court
and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the
Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of foreign country.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree will
not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first
be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign
judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be
presented and admitted in
evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. The
decree purports to be written
act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of
foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132, on the other hand, a
150
writing or document may be
proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which
the record is kept and
(b)authenticated by the seal
of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was
able to submit before the
court a quo the 1) Decision of
the Japanese Court allowing
the divorce; 2)
the Authentication/Certificate
issued by the Philippines
Consulate General in Osaka,
Japan of the Decree of
Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of
Certificate of Divorce byu the
Petitioner and the Japanese
national. Under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of
the Rules of Court, these
documents sufficiently prove
the subject Divorce Decree as
a fact. Thus, We are
constrained to recognize the
Japanese Court's judgment
decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as
in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible a a written act of the foreign
court.94 As it appears, the existence of the
divorce decree was not denied by the OSG;
neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court
impeached nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an
opportunity to do so.95
 151

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must Chief Justice

still be proved. Chairperson

x x x The burden of proof lies

with the "party who alleges ANTONIO T. PRESBITERO J.
the existence of a fact or thing CARPIO VELASCO, JR.
necessary in the prosecution Acting Chief Justice Associate Justice
or defense of an action." In
civil cases, plaintiffs have the TERESITA J.
LUCAS P.
burden of proving the LEONARDO DE
BERSAMIN
material defendants have the CASTRO
Associate Justice
burden of proving the Associate Justice
material allegations in their
answer when they introduce
I join the dissent of I join the dissent of
new matters. x x x
J. Caguioa J. Caguioa
MARIANO C. DEL ESTELA M.
It is well-settled in our CASTILLO PERLAS-BERNABE
jurisdiction that our courts Associate Justice Associate Justice
cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other
facts, they must alleged and I concur, See
No part
proved. x x x The power of Separate Opinion
FRANCIS H.
judicial notice must be MARVIC M.V.F.
JARDELEZA***
exercise d with caution, and LEONEN
Associate Justice
every reasonable doubt upon Associate Justice
the subject should be resolved
in the negative.96 See dissenting
Opinion.
SAMUEL R.
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the ALFREDO
MARTIRES
burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law BENJAMIN S.
Associate Justice
validating it, as well as her former husband's CAGUIOA
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Associate Justice
Japanese laws on persons and family relations
are not among those matters that Filipino ANDRES B. REYES,
judges are supposed to know by reason of their NOEL G. TIJAM
JR.
judicial function. Associate Justice
Associate Justice

WHEREFORE, the petition for review

on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014
Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are
AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to
the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

On leave
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO* Footnotes
 152

*
On leave object public order, public
policy and good customs shall
**
Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. not be rendered ineffective by
2539 dated February 28, 2018. laws or judgements
promulgated, or by
***
No part determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a
1 foreign country.(11a)
Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C.
Lantion, with Associate Justices Vicente S.E.
Veloso and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela
13
Techaves v. Escano, et al., 122 Phil. 752,
concurring; rollo, pp. 23-21. 759-760 (1965), as cited in Cang v. Court of
Appeals, 357 Phil. 129, 162 (1998); Llorente v.
Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 342, 356 (2000);
2
Rollo, pp. 32-33.
and Perez v. Court of Appeals, 516 Phil. 204, 211
(2006). See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at
3
Id. at 30. (emphasis in the original)
730; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485, 504 (2005);
and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, 739 Phil.
4
Id. at 42-43. 331, 341-342 (2014).
5
Id. at 25, 37-38. 14
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 730-731.
6
Id. at 40-41. 15
FAMILY CODE, Article 26, Paragraph 2. See
also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at
7
663 Phil. 546 (2011). 730 and Medina v. Koike , supra Note 10.

8
223 Phil. 357 (1985). 16
Republic of the Phils. V. Orbecido III, 509 Phil.
108, 112 (2005), as cited in San Luis v. San Luis,
9
Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 543 Phil. 275, 291 (2007).
568, 575 (2007), citing Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil.
723, 735-736 (2001). 17
Id. at 112-113, as cited in San Luis v. San Luis,
supra.
10
Garcia v. Recio, supra, at 730 and Medina v.
Koike, G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA 18
Id. at 113, as cited in San Luis v. San Luis,
733, 739. supra.

11
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
12
Art 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed.
When the acts referred to are
executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials
of the Republic of the
Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution.
Prohobited laws concerning
persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their
19
Sempio-Diy, Alicia V., HANDBOOK ON THE
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1988, PP.
26-27.
Medina v. Koike, supra note 10 and Fujiki v.
20
Marinay 712 Phil. 524, 555 (2013).
21
Fujiki v. Marinay, supra.
22
Id.
23
See Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, 681 Phil.
493, 498 (2012); Roehr v. Rodriguez, 452 Phil.
608, 717-618 (2003); and 2003); and Llorenre v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 13.
24
Supra note 19, at 27, See also Republic of the
Phils. V. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at 114, as
cited in Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20, at 555
and San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 292.
 153

25
Supra note 19, at 27 43
See Barreto Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67,
72 (1933), as cited in Techavez v. Escaño, et al.
26
Supra note 16. supra note 13, at 762.

27
Id. at 114-115 (Citations omitted).
44
See Assn. of Small Landowners in the Phils.,
Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform , 256
28
625 Phil. 494 (2010). Phil. 777, 808 (1989) and Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, 740 Phil. 403,
436 (2014).
29
Supra note 8.
45
Central Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v. Bangko
30
Dacasin v. Dacasin, supra, at 507. (Citations
Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 597 (2004) as
omitted; underscoring ours)
cited in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services,
Inc. 601 Phil. 245, 436 (2009). See also Puno C.J.,
31
Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr. supra note 8, at
Separate Concurring Opinion, Ang Ladlad LGBT
361-363 (Citations omitted).
Party v. COMELEC, 632 Phil. 32, 100 (2010);
Brion J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v. Phil. Truth
32
Supra note 20. Commission of 2010, 651. 374, 550 (2010); and
Leonardo-De Castro, Jr., Concurring
33
Supra note 10. Opinion, Garcia v. Judge Drillon, et al., 712 Phil
44, 125 (2013).
34
Fujiki v. Marinay et al. supra note 20, at
549-550. (Citations omitted). 46
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra.
35
642 Phil. 420 (2010).
47
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. et al.
36
Supra note 9. 601 Phil. 245, 282 (2009) and Mosqueda Pilipino
Banana Growers & Exporters Association , Inc.
37
Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Star Ferry, G.R. Nos, 189185 & 189305, August 16, 2016,
Inc. 298 Phil. 79, 86 (1993). 800 SCRA 313, 360. See also Brion, J., Separate
Opinion, Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission
38
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. of 2010, supra Velasco, Jr., J. Concurring
NLRC, 283 Phil. 649, 660 (1992), as cited Opinion, International Service for the
in Victoria v. Commission on Elections, 299 Phil. Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc., v.
263, 268 (1994); Enjay Inc. v. NLRC, 315 Phil. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Phils.) , et al., 774
648, 656 (1995); and Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. Phil. 508, 706 (2015); and Jardeleza, J., March 8,
NLRC, 345 Phil. 1057, 1073 (1997). See 2016, 786 SCRA 1, 904.
also National Food Authority v. Masada Security
48
Agency, Inc. 493 Phil. 241, 251 (2005); Rural Brion, J., Separate Opinion, Biraogo v.
Bank of the San Miguel, Inc. v. Monetary Philippines Truith Commission of 2010, supra
Board, 545 Phil. 62, 72 (2007); Rep. of the Phils. note 45, at 553.
v. Lacap, 546 Phil. 87, 100 (2007); and Phil.
Amusement and Gaming Corp. (PAGCOR) v. Phil. 49
See Morales, J., Dissenting Opinion, Central
Gaming Jurisdiction Inc. (PEJI), et al., 604 Phil. Bank Employees Assn., Inc. v. Bangko Senral ng
547, 553 (2009). Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 697-698 (2004) as cited
by Brion, J. Separate Opinion, Biraogo v.
39
Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 312 Phil. 259, 268 Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, supra
(1995). note 45, at 533, and Leonen, J., Separate
Opinion, Samahan ng mga Progresibong
40
Id. Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442
August 8, 2017.
41
623 Phil. 531, 564-565 (2009) 50
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. , et
al., 601 Phil. 245, 298 (2009).
42
Fujiki v. Marinay supra note 20, at 555.
 154

51
Id. age even with the consent of
parents or guardians;
52
Brion J., Separate Concurring Opinion, Sps.
Imbong v. Hon. Ochoa, Jr., et al., 732 Phil. 1, (2) Those solemnized by any
326-327 (2014). person not legally authorized
to perform marriages unless
53
To be valid, the classification must conform to such marriages were
the following requirements: contracted with either or both
parties believing in good faith
1.) It must rest on substantial distinctions. that the solemnizing officer
had the leagl authority to do
so;
2.) It must be germane to the purpose of the
law.
(3) Those solemnized without
a license, except covered by
3.) It must not be limited to existing conditions
preceding Chapter;
only.

(4) Those bigamous or

4.) It must apply to all members of the same
polygamous marriage not
class. (See PAGCOR v. Bureau of Internal
falling under article 41;
Revenue, 660 Phil. 636, 648 [2011]; Maj. Gen.
Garcia v. The Executive Secretary et. al. 692 Phil.
114, 141-142 [2012]; Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. (5) Those contracted through
353, 405 [2014]; Ferrer, Jr. v. Mayor mistake of one contracting
Bautista, 762 Phil. 233, 277 (2015); Drugstores party as to the identity of the
Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. National other; and
Council on Disability Affairs, G.R. No. 194561,
September 14, 2016, 803 SCRA 25, 22; Ocampo (6) those subsequent
v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, marriages that are void under
226116, 226120 & 226294, November 8, 2016; Article 53.
and Mindanao Shopping Destination Corp. v.
Duterte, G.R. No. 211093, June 6, 2017). Art. 36. A marriage contracted
by any party who, at the time
54
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, to comply with the essential
liberty, or property without due process of law, marital obligations of
nor shall any person be denied the equal marriage, shall likewise be
protection of the laws. void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after
solemnization. (As amended
55
Tenchavez v. Escano, et al., supra note 13, as
by E.O. 227)
cited in Cang v. Court of Appeals, supra note
13;; Llorente v. Court of Appeals supra note 13;
and Perez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13. Art 37. Marriages between the
See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at following are incestuous and
730; Republic v. Iyoy, supra, note 13; void from the beginning,
and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, whether the relationship
supra note 13. FAMILY CODE, Article 26 between the parties be
Pragraph 2. See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note legitimate or illegitimate:
9, at 730 and Medina v. Koike, supra note 10.
(1) Between ascendants and
56
Art. 35 The following marriages shall be void descendants of any degree;
from the beginning: and

(1) Those contracted by any

party below eighteen years of

(2) Between brothers and
sisters, whether of full or half
blood.
Art. 38. The following
marriages shall be void from
the beginning for reasons of
public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood
relatives, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, up to the
fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and
step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law
and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting
parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving
spouse of the adopting parent
and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving
spouse of the adopted child
and the adopter;
(7) Between the adopted child
and a legitimate child of the
adopter;
(8) Between the adopted
children of the same adopter;
and
(9) Between parties where
one, with the intention to
marry the other, killed that
other person's spouse or his
her own spouse. (82)
Art. 41. A marriage contracted
by any person during the
subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration
of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present
has well founded belief that
155
the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of
disappearance where there is
danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting
the subsequent marriage
under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance
of the absent spouse. (83a)
Art. 52. The judgment of
annulment or of absolute
nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses,
and he delivery of the
children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property;
otherwise, the same shall not
affect third persons.(n)
Art. 53 Either of the former
spouses may marry again after
complying with the
requirements of the
immediately preceding Article;
otherwise, the subsequent
marriage shall be null and
void.
57
REL 131, Section 3(a).
58
Id., Section 3(c).
59
Id., Section 3(d).
60
Id., Section 3(x)..
61
Id., Section 3(aa).
62
Id., Section 3(ff).

63
Rep. of the Phils. v. Albios, 719 Phil. 622, 636
(2013).
64
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Section 2.
This echoed the Family Code provision, which
provides:
Art. 1. Marriage is a special
contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment
of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social
institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.
65
Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., THE INTENT OF THE
1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS, 1995 Edition , pp.
1132 citing V. RECORD 41.
66
Reconrd of the Constitutional Commission:
Proceedings and Debates, Volume V September
24, 1986, p. 41.
67
See Garcia Valdez v. Soteraña Tuason, 40 Phil.
943, 944 (1920); Francisco v. Tayao, 50 Phil. 42
(1927); People v. Bitdu, 58 Phil. 817 (1933); Sikat
v. Cason, 67 Phil. 207 (1939); and Arca, et al. v.
Javier, 95. Phil. 579 (1954)
68
See Baptista v. Castañeda, 76 Phil. 461
(1946); Luz v. Court of First Instance of
Tacloban, 77 Phil. 679 (1946); Antonio v. Reyes,
519 Phil. 337 (2006).
69
Baptista v. Castañeda supra at 463.
70
Tenchavez v. Escano, et. al., supra note 13;
and Perez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13.
See also Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at
730; Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 13;
and Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, 739 Phil,
331, 341-342 (2014).
71
Entitled "Instituting Absolute Divorce in the
Philippines, Amending for the Purpose,' with
156
Representative Edcel C. Lagman as Principal
Author.
72
Entitled "An Act Amending Title I, Chapter 3 of
Executive No. 209, Otherwise known as the
Family Code of the Philippines, Prescribing
Additional Ground for Annulment," with
Representative Robert Ace Barbers as Principal
Author.
73
Entitled "An Act Introducing Divorce in the
Philippines, Amending foe the Purpose Articles
26, 55 to 66 and Repealing Article 36 Under Title
II of Executive Order No. 209, As Amended,
Otherwise Known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, and For Other Purposes," with
Gabriela Women's Party Representatives Emmi
A. De Jesus and Arlene D. Brosas as principal
authors.
74
Entitled "An Act Providing for Grounds for the
Dissolution of Marriage," with Representatives
Teddy B. Baguilat, Jr. Rodel M. Batocabe, Arlene
D. Brosas, Ariel B. Casilao, France L. Castro,
Nancy A. Catamco, Pia S. Cayetano, Emmi A. De
Jesus, Sarah Jane I. Elago, Gwedolyn F. Garcia,
Ana Cristina Siquian Go. Edcel C. Lagman,
Pantaleon D. Alvarez, Antonio L. Tinio, and
Carlos Isagani T. Zarate as Principal Authors.
75
See Leone, J. dissenting in Matudan v.
Republic, G.R. No 203284, November 14, 2016.
76
Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, A.M. No.
10-4-19-SC (Resolution), March 7, 2017.
77
See Sps. Imbong , et al. v. Hon. Ochoa , Jr. et
al., 732 Phil. 1, 167 (2014).
78
Tilar v. Tilar G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017.
79
Article XV, Section 1.
80
Article XV, Section 3(2).
81
Article II, Sectioons 11, 12 and 14. See also
Republic Act Nos. 7192 ("Women in
Development and Nation Building Act") and
9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women").
82
Bernas, Joaquin G. S.J., THE INTENT OF THE
1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS, 1995 Edition, pp.
1132, citing V. RECORD 40, 44.
83
See Paras v. Paras, 555 Phil.786, 804 (2007)

84
San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at
292-293.
85
Supra note 16.
86
San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at
293-294.
87
Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III,
supra note 16, at 115.
88
Id.
89
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 731, as cited
in Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note 23,
at 501.
90
Fujiki v. Marinay, supra note 20, at 544
and Vda. de Catalan v. Catalan-Lee, supra note
23, at 499.
91
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 731, as cited
in Medina v. Koike, supra note 10 and Republic
of the Phils. v. Orbecido III, supra note 16, at 116.
See also Bayot v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et
al. 591 Phil. 45, 470 (2008).
92
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 732-733.
(Citations omitted). See also Vda. de Catalan v.
Catalan-Lee, supra note 23, at 499 and 501-502
and San Luis v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 294.
93
Rollo, pp. 29-30.
94
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9, at 733-734.
95
See Bayot v. Hoen Coutrt of Appeals, et al.,
supra note 75, at 470-471; and Roehr v.
Rodriguez, supra note 23, at 617.
96
Garcia v. Recio, supra note 9 at 735. (Citations
omitted). See also Vda. de Catalan v.
Catalan-Lee, supra note 23, at 500-501; San Luis
v. San Luis, supra note 16, at 295; Republic of
the Phils. v. Orbecido, III, supra note 16, at
116; Llorente v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13,
354.
G.R. No. 212860, March 14, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. FLORIE GRACE M.
COTE, Respondent.
157
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse and
set aside the Decision1 dated January 21, 2014
and Resolution2 dated June 11, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122313.
The Facts
As culled from the records, the antecedent facts
are as follows:
On July 31, 1995, Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel)
and respondent Florie Grace Manongdo-Cote
(Florie) were married in Quezon City. At the
time of their marriage, the spouses were both
Filipinos and were already blessed with a son,
Christian Gabriel Manongdo who was born in
Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America
(USA).3
On August 23, 2002, Rhomel filed a Petition for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First
Circuit of Hawaii on the ground that their
marriage was irretrievably broken. This was
granted on August 23, 2002 by the issuance of a
decree that states among others:
A decree of absolute divorce is
hereby granted to [Rhomel],
the bonds of matrimony
between [Rhomel] and [Florie]
are hereby dissolved and the
parties hereto are restored to
the status of single persons,
and either party is permitted
to marry from and after the
effective date of this decree.4
Seven years later, Florie commenced a petition
for recognition of foreign judgment granting the
divorce before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Florie also prayed for the cancellation of her
marriage contract, hence, she also impleaded
the Civil Registry of Quezon City and the
National Statistics Office (NSO). The Office of
the Solicitor General, representing Republic of
the Philippines (petitioner), deputized the Office
of the City Prosecutor to appear on behalf of
the State during the trial.5
On April 7, 2011, the RTC granted the petition
and declared Florie to be capacitated to remarry
after the RTC's decision attained finality and a

decree of absolute nullity has been issued. The
RTC ruled, inter alia, that Rhomel was already
an American citizen when he obtained the
divorce decree,6viz.:
[Florie] has sufficiently
established that she is a
Filipino citizen and married to
an American citizen. Her
husband obtained a Divorce
Decree on 22 August 2002 and
was authenticated and
registered by the Consulate
General to the Philippines in
Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A.
[Florie] being a Filipino citizen
and is governed by Philippine
laws, she is placed in an
absurd, if not awkward
situation where she is married
to somebody who is no longer
married to her. This is
precisely the circumstances
contemplated under Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family
Code which provides a
remedy for Filipino spouses
like [Florie].
Under the above-cited
provision, [Florie] is allowed
to contract a subsequent
marriage since the divorce
had been validly obtained
abroad by her American
husband, capacitating her to
remarry. In this line, the court
holds that this petition be, as
it is, hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring [Florie]
capacitated to remarry
pursuant to Article 26
paragraph 2 of the Family
Code, in view of the Divorce
Decree which had been validly
obtained abroad by her
American spouse, dissolving
their marriage solemnized on
31 July 1995 in Quezon City,
Philippines.7
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on May 17,
2011. However, the RTC, believing that the
petition was covered by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
158
Marriages, applied Section 20 of said Rule and
denied the appeal because the notice was not
preceded by a motion for reconsideration.8
Petitioner then filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA claiming that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
In a Decision9 dated January 21, 2014, the CA
denied the petition. The pertinent portions read
as follows:
The fact that even the Solicitor
General and private
respondent were confused as
to the true nature of the
petition and the procedure
that must be followed only
shows that We cannot
attribute a whimsical and
capricious exercise of
judgment to the RTC.
xxxx
Besides, petitioner's omission,
by itself, is a ground for
dismissing the petition. The
last paragraph of Section 3,
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court
allows the dismissal of a
petition for certiorari if the
material parts of the records
were not attached to the
petition. "Certiorari, being an
extraordinary remedy, the
party seeking it must strictly
observe the requirements for
its issuance." Although it has
been ruled that the better
policy is for petitioner to be
accorded, in the interest of
substantial justice, "a chance
to submit the same instead of
dismissing the petition" We
cannot allow petitioner to
benefit from this rule because
the need to submit the
transcript of stenographic
notes and all other pieces of
evidence is quite obvious for
petitioner which is
questioning the sufficiency of
the evidence presented.
Hence, it would be bending
the rules too far if We still
allow petitioner to be excused
from this lapse.10
 159

Hence, this present petition. TRIAL COURT'S

DECISION DATED
The Issues APRIL 7, 2011
GRANTING FLORIE'S
1. THE CA ERRED IN PETITION FOR
FINDING THAT THE RECOGNITION OF
TRIAL COURT JUDGE FOREIGN DECREE OF
DID NOT COMMIT DIVORCE DESPITE
GRAVE ABUSE OF LACK OF SHOWING
DISCRETION IN THAT HER FORMER
APPLYING THE FILIPINO HUSBAND
PROCEDURAL RULES WAS ALREADY AN
FOR NULLITY OF AMERICAN CITIZEN
MARRIAGE AT THE TIME HE
PROCEEDINGS PROCURED THE
UNDER A.M. NO. DECREE OF
02-11-10-SC IN A DIVORCE.11
PROCEEDING FOR
RECOGNITION OF Ruling of the Court
FOREIGN DECREE OF
DIVORCE; The core issue for the Court's resolution is
whether or not the provisions of A.M. No.
2. THE CA GRAVELY 02-11-10-SC12 applies in a case involving
ERRED IN RULING recognition of a foreign decree of divorce.
THAT THE STATE HAS
NO PERSONALITY TO It bears stressing that as of present, our family
INTERVENE IN laws do not recognize absolute divorce between
PROCEEDINGS FOR Filipino husbands and wives. Such fact, however,
RECOGNITION OF do not prevent our family courts from
FOREIGN DECREE OF recognizing divorce decrees procured abroad by
DIVORCE; an alien spouse who is married to a Filipino
citizen.
3. THE CA ERRED IN
Article 26 of the Family Code states:
FINDING THAT THE
Art. 26. All marriages
FAILURE OF THE
solemnized outside the
PETITIONER TO
Philippines, in accordance
APPEND COPIES OF
with the laws in force in the
THE TRANSCRIPT OF
country where they were
STENOGRAPHIC
solemnized, and valid there as
NOTES OF FLORIE'S
such, shall also be valid in this
DIRECT
country, except those
EXAMINATION AND
prohibited under Articles
HER JUDICIAL
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
AFFIDAVIT IS FATAL,
and 38.
NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT THE VERY
Where a marriage between a
SAME DOCUMENTS
Filipino citizen and a
WERE
foreigner is validly celebrated
INCORPORATED AND
and a divorce is thereafter
QUOTED BY FLORIE
validly obtained abroad by
IN HER COMMENT;
the alien spouse capacitating
and
him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry
4. THE CA ERRED IN under Philippine law.
AFFIRMING THE
 160

The wordings of the second paragraph of Article register shall be changed or

26 initially spawned confusion as to whether or corrected, without judicial
not it covers even those marriages wherein order. The Rules of Court
both of the spouses were Filipinos at the time of supplements Article 412 of the
marriage and then one of them eventually Civil Code by specifically
becomes a naturalized citizen of another providing for a special
country. remedial proceeding by which
entries in the civil registry may
In the landmark case of Republic v. Orbecido be judicially cancelled or
III,13 the Court ruled that the reckoning point is corrected. Rule 108 of the
not the citizenship of the parties at the time of Rules of Court sets in detail
the celebration of the marriage, but their the jurisdictional and
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is procedural requirements that
obtained abroad by the alien spouse must be complied with before
capacitating the latter to remarry.14 a judgment, authorizing the
cancellation or correction,
Although the Court has already laid down the may be annotated in the civil
rule regarding foreign divorce involving Filipino registry. It also requires,
citizens, the Filipino spouse who likewise among others, that the
benefits from the effects of the divorce cannot verified petition must be filed
automatically remarry. Before the divorced with the RTC of the province
Filipino spouse can remarry, he or she must file where the corresponding civil
a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign registry is located; that the
divorce. civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign interest must be made parties
divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that to the proceedings; and that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign the time and place for hearing
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained must be published in a
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give newspaper of general
effect within its dominion to a judgment circulation. x x x.
rendered by a tribunal of another country." This
means that the foreign judgment and its We hasten to point out,
authenticity must be proven as facts under our however, that this ruling
rules on evidence, together with the alien's should not be construed as
applicable national law to show the effect of the requiring two separate
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The proceedings for the
recognition may be made in an action instituted registration of a foreign
specifically for the purpose or in another action divorce decree in the civil
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an registry one for recognition of
integral aspect of his claim or defense.15 the foreign decree and
another specifically for
To clarify, respondent filed with the RTC a cancellation of the entry
petition to recognize the foreign divorce decree under Rule 108 of the Rules of
procured by her naturalized (originally Filipino) Court. The recognition of the
husband in Hawaii, USA. By impleading the Civil foreign divorce decree may be
Registry of Quezon City and the NSO, the end made in a Rule 108
sought to be achieved was the cancellation and proceeding itself, as the object
or correction of entries involving her marriage of special proceedings (such
status. as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.,16 the Court establish the status or right of
briefly explained the nature of recognition a party or a particular fact.
proceedings vis-a-vis cancellation of entries Moreover, Rule 108 of the
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, viz.: Rules of Court can serve as the
Article 412 of the Civil Code appropriate adversarial
declares that no entry in a civil proceeding by which the

applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured
and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want
of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.17
The RTC, in its Decision18 dated January 21,
2014 ruled that Florie had sufficiently
established that she is married to an American
citizen and having proven compliance with the
legal requirements, is declared capacitated to
remarry.
The confusion arose when the RTC denied
petitioner's appeal on the ground that no prior
motion for reconsideration was filed as required
under Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Petitioner posits that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC do
not cover cases involving recognition of foreign
divorce because the wording of Section 1
thereof clearly states that it shall only apply to
petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages, viz.:
Section 1. Scope - This Rule
shall govern petitions
for declaration of absolute
nullity of void
marriages and annulment of
voidable marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines.
[Underscoring Ours]
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court applies; Motion
for Reconsideration not a condition precedent
to the filing of an appeal
The CA is correct when it ruled that the trial
court misapplied Section 20 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.
A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is
different from annulment as defined by our
family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only covers
void19and voidable20marriages that are
specifically cited and enumerated in the Family
Code of the Philippines. Void and voidable
mmTiages contemplate a situation wherein the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists
before or at the time of the marriage. It treats
the marriage as if it never existed. Divorce, on
the other hand, ends a legally valid marriage
and is usually due to circumstances arising after
the marriage.
It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial
161
of petitioner's appeal Section 20 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC. Since Florie followed the
procedure for cancellation of entry in the civil
registry, a special proceeding governed by Rule
108 of the Rules of Court, an appeal from the
RTC decision should be governed by Section
321 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and not A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC.
As culled from the records, petitioner received a
copy of the RTC Decision on May 5, 2011. It filed
a Notice of Appeal22 on May 17, 2011, thus
complying with the 15-day reglementary period
for filing an appeal.
An appeal is a statutory right that must be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law. Having satisfactorily
shown that they have complied with the rules
on appeal, petitioners are entitled to the proper
and just disposition of their cause.23
This now brings the Court to the issue whether
or not the RTC's denial of petitioner's appeal is
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. The
Court rules in the negative.
No grave abuse of discretion
Although the Court agrees with petitioner that
the RTC erroneously misapplied A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, such error does not automatically
equate to grave abuse of discretion. The Court
has ruled time and again that not all errors
attributed to a lower court or tribunal fall under
the scope of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in this wise:
Grave abuse of discretion is
defined as capricious or
whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse
of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.24
After a careful consideration of the evidence
presented and Florie having sufficiently
 162

complied with the jurisdictional requirements,

9
judgment was rendered by the lower court Id. at 65-72.
recognizing the decree of foreign divorce. It
10
likewise declared Florie legally capacitated to Id. at 13-15.
remarry citing the second paragraph of Article
11
26 of the Family Code. Thus, the CA is correct in Id. at 36-37.
denying the Rule 65 petition for certiorari,
12
notwithstanding the RTC's dismissal of Rule on Declaration of
petitioner's appeaL The dismissal, albeit Absolute Nullity of Void
erroneous, is not tainted with grave abuse of Mariages and Annulment of
discretion. Voidable Marriages.

13
The Court finds no indication from the records 509 Phil. 108 (2005).
that the RTC acted arbitrarily, capriciously and
14
whimsically in arriving at its decision. A petition Id. at 115.
for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of
discretion is alleged and proved to exist. The Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.,
15

burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove 642 Phil. 420, 432-433 (2010).
not merely reversible error on the part of
16
private respondent, but grave abuse of 642 Phil. 420 (2010).
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
17
jurisdiction. Id. at 436-437.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition 18

Rollo, pp. 65-72.
is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated January
19
21, 2014 and Resolution dated June 11, 2014 of The void marriages are
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122313 those enumerated under
are hereby AFFIRMED. Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41,
44, and 53 in relation to
SO ORDERED. Article 52 of the Family Code.

Carpio,*(Chairperson), Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, 20

The voidable marriages are
and Caguioa, JJ., concur. those enumerated under
Article 45 of the Family Code.
Endnotes:
21
Section 3. Period of ordinary
appeal. - The appeal shall be
*
Designated as Acting Chief taken within fifteen (15) days
Justice per Special Order No. from notice of the judgment
2539 dated February 28, 2018. or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is
1
Rollo, pp. 65-72. required, the appellant shall
file a notice of appeal and a
2
Id. at 73. record on appeal within thirty
(30) days from notice of the
3
Id. at 65. judgment or final order.

4
Id. The period of appeal shall be
interrupted by a timely
5
Id. motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion
6
Id. for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or
7
Id. at 115. reconsideration shall be
allowed.
8
Id. at 65.
22
Rollo, p. 116.

23
Republic of the Phils. (rep. by
the Phil. Orthopedic Center) v.
Spouses Luriz, 542 Phil. 137,
137 (2007).
24
Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon.
CA, et al., 665 Phil. 261, 267
(2011).
G.R. No. 226013, July 02, 2018
LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ
MORISONO, Petitioner, v. RYOJI* MORISONO
AND LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105
(RTC), through a petition for review
on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated July
18, 2016 of the RTC in SP. PROC. NO.
Q-12-71830 which denied petitioner Luzviminda
Dela Cruz Morisono's (Luzviminda) petition
before it.
The Facts
Luzviminda was married to private respondent
Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon City on
December 8, 2009.3 Thereafter, they lived
together in Japan for one (1) year and three (3)
months but were not blessed with a
child. During their married life, they would
constantly quarrel mainly due to Ryoji's
philandering ways, in addition to the fact that
he was much older than Luzviminda.4 As such,
she and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by
Agreement" before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku,
Nagoya City, Japan, which was eventually
approved on January 17, 2012 and duly
recorded with the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya
City, Japan on July 1, 2012.5 In view of the
foregoing, she filed a petition for recognition of
the foreign divorce decree obtained by her and
Ryoji6 before the RTC so that she could cancel
the surname of her former husband in her
passport and for her to be able to marry again.7
After complying with the jurisdictional
requirements, the RTC set the case for hearing.
163
Since nobody appeared to oppose her petition
except the government, Luzviminda was
allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. After
the presentation and absent any objection from
the Public Prosecutor, Luzviminda's formal offer
of evidence was admitted as proof of
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements,
and as part of the testimony of the witnesses.8
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision9 dated July 18, 2016, the RTC
denied Luzviminda's petition. It held that while
a divorce obtained abroad by an alien spouse
may be recognized in the Philippines – provided
that such decree is valid according to the
national law of the alien – the same does not
find application when it was the Filipino
spouse, i.e., petitioner, who procured the same.
Invoking the nationality principle provided
under Article 15 of the Civil Code, in relation to
Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, the RTC
opined that since petitioner is a Filipino citizen
whose national laws do not allow divorce, the
foreign divorce decree she herself obtained in
Japan is not binding in the Philippines;10 hence,
this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether
or not the RTC correctly denied Luzviminda's
petition for recognition of the foreign divorce
decree she procured with Ryoji.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The rules on divorce prevailing in this
jurisdiction can be summed up as
follows: first, Philippine laws do not provide for
absolute divorce, and hence, the courts cannot
grant the same; second, consistent with Articles
1511 and 1712 of the Civil Code, the marital bond
between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained
abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws;
and fourth, in mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed
to contract a subsequent marriage in case the

absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.13
The fourth rule, which has been invoked by
Luzviminda in this case, is encapsulated in
Article 26 (2) of the Family Code which reads:
Article 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise. have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing
trial to determine the validity of the dissolution
of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to
adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on
the merits because it is tantamount to trying a
divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained
by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal
effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and
support of the children or property relations of
the spouses, must still be determined by our
courts. The rationale for this rule is to avoid the
absurd situation of a Filipino as still being
married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the former
because he or she had obtained a divorce
abroad that is recognized by his or her national
law.14 In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,15 the Court held:
As the RTC correctly stated,
the provision was included in
the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino
spouse." The legislative intent
is for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse, by clarifying
his or her marital status,
164
settling the doubts created by
the divorce decree. Essentially,
the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his
or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or
her to remarry. Without the
second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, the
judicial recognition of the
foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that
purpose or as a related issue
in another proceeding, would
be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws
do not recognize divorce as a
mode of severing the marital
bond; Article 17 of the Civil
Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces
cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a
foreign country. The inclusion
of the second paragraph in
Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception
to this rule and serves as basis
for recognizing the dissolution
of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her
alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based
on the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code
is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign
divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse
to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated
to contract another
marriage. No court in this
jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than
that already established by
the decree), whose status and
legal capacity are generally
governed by his national

law.16 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
According to Republic v. Orbecido III,17 the
following elements must concur in order for
Article 26 (2) to apply, namely: (a) that there is a
valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and (b) that a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.18 In the
same case, the Court also initially clarified that
Article 26 (2) applies not only to cases where a
foreigner was the one who procured a divorce
of his/her marriage to a Filipino spouse, but also
to instances where, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization,
initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree.19
However, in the recent case of Republic v.
Manalo (Manalo),20 the Court En Banc extended
the application of Article 26 (2) of the Family
Code to further cover mixed marriages where it
was the Filipino citizen who divorced his/her
foreign spouse. Pertinent portions of the ruling
read:
Now, the Court is tasked to
resolve whether, under the
same provision, a Filipino
citizen has the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law
after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable
judgment against his or her
alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry. x x x.
We rule in the affirmative.
xxxx
When this Court recognized a
foreign divorce decree that
was initiated and obtained by
the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on
the issues of child custody
and property relation, it
should not stop short in
likewise acknowledging that
one of the usual and
necessary consequences of
165
absolute divorce is the right
to remarry. Indeed, there is
no longer a mutual obligation
to live together and observe
fidelity. When the marriage tie
is severed and ceased to exist,
the civil status and the
domestic relation of the
former spouses change as
both of them are freed from
the marital bond.
xxxx
Paragraph 2 of Article 26
speaks of "a divorce x x x
validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry." Based on a
clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter
of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should
be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the
divorce decree was granted.
It does not distinguish
whether the Filipino spouse is
the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign
divorce proceeding. The Court
is bound by the words of the
statute; neither can We put
words in the mouths of the
lawmakers. "The legislature is
presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have
used words advisedly, and to
have expressed its intent by
the use of such words as are
found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or
from the words of a statute
there should be no
departure."
Assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the
word "obtained" should be
interpreted to mean that the
divorce proceeding must be
actually initiated by the alien
spouse, still, the Court will not
follow the letter of the statute
when to do so would depart

from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise
yield conclusions inconsistent
with the general purpose of
the act. Laws have ends to
achieve, and statutes should
be so construed as not to
defeat but to carry out such
ends and purposes. x x x.
xxxx
To reiterate, the purpose of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to
avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien
spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is
effective in the country where
it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
The provision is a corrective
measure to address an
anomaly where the Filipino
spouse is tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is
free to marry under the laws
of his or her country. Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated
the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a real
favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have
the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be
without a husband or wife. A
Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is
in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino
who is at the receiving end of
an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance,
it is extended as a means to
recognize the residual effect
of the foreign divorce decree
on Filipinos whose marital
ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the
latter's national law.
xxxx
166
A Filipino who is married to
another Filipino is not
similarly situated with a
Filipino who is married to a
foreign citizen. There are real,
material and substantial
differences between
them. Ergo, they should not
be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt,
there are political, economic,
cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as
varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar,
that a Filipino national who is
married to an alien spouse has
to contend with. More
importantly, while a divorce
decree obtained abroad by a
Filipino against another
Filipino is null and void, a
divorce decree obtained by an
alien against his or her Filipino
spouse is recognized if made
in accordance with the
national law of the foreigner.
On the contrary, there is no
and substantial
difference between a Filipino
who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings and a
Filipino who obtained a
divorce decree upon the
instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the
Philippine and foreign laws,
both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same
rights and obligations in an
alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike.
Were it not for Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, both are still
married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer
their wives/husbands. Hence,
to make a distinction
between them based merely
on the superficial difference
of whether they initiated the
divorce proceedings or not is
utterly unfair. Indeed, the
treatment gives undue favor

to one and unjustly
discriminate against the other.
xxxx
The declared State policy that
marriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the
foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State,
should not be read in total
isolation but must be
harmonized with other
constitutional provisions.
Aside from strengthening the
solidarity of the Filipino family,
the State is equally mandated
to actively promote its total
development. It is also
obligated to defend, among
others, the right of children to
special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to
their development. To our
mind, the State cannot
effectively enforce these
obligations if We limit the
application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 only to those
foreign divorce initiated by
the alien spouse. x x x.
A prohibitive view of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26
would do more harm than
good. If We disallow a Filipino
citizen who initiated and
obtained a foreign divorce
from the coverage of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and
still require him or her to first
avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the
Family Code, any subsequent
relationship that he or she
would enter in the meantime
shall be considered as illicit in
the eyes of the Philippine law.
Worse, any child born out of
such "extra-marital" affair has
to suffer the stigma of being
branded as illegitimate. Surely,
these are just but a few of the
adverse consequences, not
only to the parent but also to
167
the child, if We are to hold a
restrictive interpretation of
the subject provision. The
irony is that the principle of
inviolability of marriage under
Section 2, Article XV of the
Constitution is meant to be
tilted in favor of marriage and.
against unions not formalized
by marriage, but without
denying State protection and
assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families
formed according to
indigenous customs.
This Court should not turn a
blind eye to the realities of the
present time. With the
advancement of
communication and
information technology, as
well as the improvement of
the transportation system that
almost instantly connect
people from all over the world,
mixed marriages have become
not too uncommon. Likewise,
it is recognized that not all
marriages are made in heaven
and that imperfect humans
more often than not create
imperfect unions. Living in a
flawed world, the unfortunate
reality for some is that the
attainment of the individual's
full human potential and
self-fulfillment is not found
and achieved in the context of
a marriage. Thus, it is
hypocritical to safeguard the
quantity of existing marriages
and, at the same time, brush
aside the truth that some of
them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold
that marriage, being mutual
and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any
good to the society where
one is considered released
from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to
it. x x x.21 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
 168

2
Id. at 26-29. Penned by
Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce Presiding Judge Rosa M.
decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Samson.
Filipino and an alien citizen may already be
3
recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who Id. at 26 and 30.
between the spouses initiated the divorce;
4
provided, of course, that the party petitioning Id. at 27.
for the recognition of such foreign divorce
5
decree – presumably the Filipino citizen – must See Divorce Notification; id.
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its at 37-38.
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.22
6
Dated August 24, 2012. Id. at
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling 30-33.
shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition
7
to have her foreign divorce decree recognized in See id. at 27.
this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole
8
ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce See id. at 27-28.
proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was
9
not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid Id. at 26-29.
down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by
10
the RTC had been rendered nugatory. However, See id. at 28-29.
the Court cannot just order the grant of
11
Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the Article 15 of the Civil Code
foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to reads:
prove the fact of her. "Divorce by Agreement" Article 15.
obtained, in Nagoya City, Japan and its Laws
conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on relating to
divorce. Notably, the RTC did not rule on such family rights
issues. Since these are questions which require and duties,
an examination of various factual matters, a or to the
remand to the court a quo is warranted. status,
condition
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY and legal
GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2016 of capacity of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch persons are
105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 is binding
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, upon
the instant case is REMANDED to the court a citizens of
quo for further proceedings, as directed in this the
Decision. Philippines,
even though
SO ORDERED. living
abroad.
12
Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, and Reyes, Jr., Article 17 of the Civil Code
JJ., concur. reads:
Caguioa, J., maintains dissent in RP vs. Manalo. Article 17.
See separate concurring opinion. The forms
and
Endnotes: solemnities
of contracts,
wills, and
*
"Kyoji" in some parts of other public
the rollo. instruments
shall be
1
Rollo, pp. 9-25. governed by
the laws of
 169

the country situation that results when a foreign national

in which obtains a divorce decree against a Filipino
they are citizen, leaving the latter stuck in a marriage
executed. without a spouse.

13
See Republic v. Manalo, G.R As stated in my Dissenting Opinion in Manalo:
No. 221029, April 24, 2018;
citations omitted. x x x [R]ather than serving as
bases for the blanket
14
See id.; citations omitted recognition of foreign divorce
decrees in the Philippines, I
15
642 Phil. 420 (2010). believe that the Court's rulings
in [Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo,
16
Id. at 430; citations omitted. Jr.2], [Republic of the
Philippines v. Orbecido III3]
17
509 Phil. 108 (2005). and [Dacasin v. Dacasin4]
merely clarify the parameters
18
Id. at 115. for the application of the
nationality principle found in
19
See supra note 13. Article 15 of the Civil Code,
and the exception thereto
20
Id. found in Article 26(2) [of] the
Family Code. These
21
See id.; citations omitted. parameters may be
summarized as follows:
22
See id.; citing Garcia v.
Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 731 1. Owing to the
(2001). See also Medina v. nationality principle,
Koike, 791 Phil. 645 all Filipino citizens
(2016); Corpuz v. Sto. are covered by the
Tomas, supra note 15; Bayot prohibition against
v. CA, 591 Phil. 452 (2008); absolute divorce. As a
and San Luis v. San Luis, 543 consequence of such
Phil. 275 (2007). prohibition, a divorce
decree obtained
abroad by a Filipino
citizen cannot be
enforced in the
Philippines. To allow
otherwise would be
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION to permit a Filipino
citizen to invoke
foreign law to evade
an express
CAGUIOA, J.: prohibition under
Philippine law.

2. Nevertheless, the
I concur in the result. effects of a divorce
decree obtained by a
I submit, as I did in the case of Republic v. foreign national may
Manalo1(Manalo), that Article 26(2) of the be extended to the
Family Code had been crafted to serve as an Filipino spouse,
exception to the nationality principle embodied provided the latter is
in Article 15 of the Civil Code. Such exception is able to prove (i) the
narrow, and intended only to address the unfair issuance of the
 170

divorce decree, and April 24, 2018, p. 6.

(ii) the personal law
6
of the foreign spouse Republic v. Orbecido III,supra
allowing such divorce. note 3.
This exception, found
under Article 26(2) of G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018
the Family Code,
respects the binding STEPHEN I.
effect of the divorce JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
decree on the foreign PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
national, and merely
recognizes the
DECISION
residual effect of
such decree on the
Filipino spouse.5 PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review

Petitioner herein is a Filipino citizen, seeking
recognition of a divorce decree obtained in
accordance with Japanese law.
Unlike the divorce decree in question
in Manalo, the divorce decree herein had been
obtained not by petitioner alone, but jointly, by
petitioner and her then husband, who, in turn,
is a Japanese national. Hence, the twin
requisites for the application of the exception
under Article 26(2) are present — there is a
valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.6
Based on these premises, I vote to GRANT the
Petition.
Endnotes:
1
G.R. No. 221029, April 24,
2018.
2
223 Phil. 357 (1985) [Per J.
Melencio-Herrera, First
Division].
3
509 Phil. 108 (2005) [Per J.
Quisumbing, First Division].
4
625 Phil. 494 (2010) [Per J.
Carpio, Second Division].
5
J. Caguioa, Dissenting
Opinion in Republic v.
Manalo, G.R. No. 221029,
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Amended
Decision1 dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 that set
aside its former Decision dated November 25,
2015, which in turn, affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet,
Camarines Norte, granting petitioner's Petition
for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu
Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan
pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two
(2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a
divorce decree in said country dissolving their
marriage.2 Thereafter, on April 5, 2013,
petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40,
Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October
9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and
recognized the divorce between the parties as
valid and effective under Philippine Laws.3 On
November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
In an Amended Decision4 dated March 3, 2016,
however, the CA revisited its findings and
recalled and set aside its previous decision.
According to the appellate court, the second of
the following requisites under Article 26 of the
Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.5 This is
because the divorce herein was consensual in
nature, obtained by agreement of the parties,
 171

and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF

Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, [THE] CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN
said divorce cannot be recognized in the RELATIVE TO DIVORCE AS
Philippines. In addition, the CA ruled that REQUIRED BY THE RULES.7
petitioner's failure to present authenticated Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained
copies of the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to her with her husband, designated as Divorce by
cause.6 Agreement in Japan, as opposed to Judicial
Divorce, is the more practical and common type
On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant of divorce in Japan. She insists that it is to her
petition invoking the following arguments: great disadvantage if said divorce is not
recognized and instead, Judicial Divorce is
I. required in order for her to avail of the benefit
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
WHETHER Family Code, since their divorce had already
OR NOT THE been granted abroad.8 Moreover, petitioner
HONORABLE asserts that the mere fact that she consented to
[COURT OF the divorce does not prevent the application of
APPEALS] Article 26 for said provision does not state that
GRAVELY where the consent of the Filipino spouse was
ERRED obtained in the divorce, the same no longer
UNDER LAW finds application. In support of her contentions,
WHEN IT petitioner cites the ruling in Republic of the
HELD THAT Philippines v. Orbecido III wherein the Court
THE SECOND held that a Filipino spouse is allowed to remarry
REQUISITE in the event that he or she is divorced by a
FOR THE Filipino spouse who had acquired foreign
APPLICATIO citizenship.9 As to the issue of evidence
N OF THE presented, petitioner explains that the reason
SECOND why she was unable to present authenticated
PARAGRAPH copies of the provisions of the Civil Code of
OF ARTICLE Japan relative to divorce is because she was
26 OF THE unable to go to Japan due to the fact that she
FAMILY was pregnant. Also, none of her friends could
CODE IS NOT obtain a copy of the same for her. Instead, she
PRESENT went to the library of the Japanese Embassy to
BECAUSE photocopy the Civil Code. There, she was issued
THE a document which states that diplomatic
PETITIONER missions of Japan overseas do not issue certified
GAVE true copies of Japanese Law nor process
CONSENT TO translation certificates of Japanese Law due to
THE the potential problem in the legal interpretation
DIVORCE thereof. Thus, petitioner maintains that this
OBTAINED constitutes substantial compliance with the
BY HER Rules on Evidence.10
JAPANESE
HUSBAND. We grant the petition.

II. The issue before Us has already been resolved

in the landmark ruling of Republic v.
WHETHER OR NOT THE Manalo,11 the facts of which fall squarely on
HONORABLE [COURT OF point with the facts herein. In Manalo,
APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED respondent Marelyn Manalo, a Filipino, was
UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD married to a Japanese national named Yoshino
THAT THERE IS NO Minoro. She, however, filed a case for divorce
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE before a Japanese Court, which granted the
WITH REQUIREMENT ON THE same and consequently issued a divorce decree
SUBMISSION OF dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, she

sought to have said decree recognized in the
Philippines and to have the entry of her
marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San
Juan, Metro Manila, cancelled, so that said
entry shall not become a hindrance if and when
she decides to remarry. The trial court, however,
denied Manalo's petition and ruled that
Philippine law does not afford Filipinos the right
to file for a divorce, whether they are in the
country or abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated
their marriage in the Philippines or in another
country.
On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected
the trial court's view and affirmed, instead, the
ruling of the CA. There, the Court held that the
fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated
the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted should not affect the application nor
remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code which states
that "where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law." We
observed that to interpret the word "obtained"
to mean that the divorce proceeding must
actually be initiated by the alien spouse would
depart from the true intent of the legislature
and would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically,
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
subject provision, therefore, should not make a
distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in
like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.12
Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the
case at hand, the Court similarly rules that
despite the fact that petitioner participated in
the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it
is assumed that she initiated the same, she
must still be allowed to benefit from the
exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article
26. Consequently, since her marriage to
Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by
virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in
Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu to
172
remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We
cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet
to comply with certain guidelines before our
courts may recognize the subject divorce decree
and the effects thereof. Time and again, the
Court has held that the starting point in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws.13 This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien's applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.14 Since both the foreign divorce decree
and the national law of the alien, recognizing his
or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to
be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section
2415 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
applies.16 Thus, what is required is proof, either
by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested
by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are
not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.17
In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor
General does not dispute the existence of the
divorce decree, rendering the same admissible.
What remains to be proven, therefore, is the
pertinent Japanese Law on divorce considering
that Japanese laws on persons and family
relations are not among those matters that
Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason
of their judicial function.18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended
Decision dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the
relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
 173

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), Philippines, with a certificate

J., I concur in result. See Separate Opinion. that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which
Endnotes: the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of
1
Penned by Associate Justice the embassy or legation,
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, consul-general, consul,
with Associate Justices vice-consul, or consular agent
Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and or by any officer in the foreign
Socorro B. Inting, service of the Philippines
concurring; rollo, pp. 18-21. stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is
2
Rollo, pp. 5 and 33. kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office.
3
Id. at 33-34.
16
Id.
4
Supra note 1.
17
Id.
5
Rollo, p. 19.
18
Republic v. Manalo,
6
Id. at 20. supra note 11.
[ G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018 ]
7
Id. at 7. RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO, A.K.A. "RHODORA
8
RACHO TANAKA," PETITIONER, VS. SEIICHI
Id. at 9. TANAKA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS
9
CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
Id. at 10. REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
10
STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
Id. at 13-14.

11
DECISION
G.R. No. 221029, April 24,
2018. LEONEN, J.:

12
Id.
13
Corpus v. Sto. Tomas, 642
Phil. 420, 432 (2010).
14
Id.
15
Section 24 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SECTION 24. Proof of official
record. - The record of public
documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of section 19,
when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by
his deputy, and accompanied,
if the record is not kept in the
Judicial recognition of a foreign divorce requires
that the national law of the foreign spouse and
the divorce decree be pleaded and proved as a
fact before the Regional Trial Court. The Filipino
spouse may be granted the capacity to remarry
once our courts find that the foreign divorce
was validly obtained by the foreign spouse
according to his or her national law, and that
the foreign spouse's national law considers the
dissolution of the marital relationship to be
absolute.
This is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari[1] assailing the June 2, 2011
Decision[2] and October 3, 2011 Order[3] of
Branch 254, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City,
which denied Rhodora Ilumin Racho's (Racho)
Petition for Judicial Determination and
Declaration of Capacity to Marry.[4] The denial
was on the ground that a Certificate of Divorce
issued by the Japanese Embassy was insufficient
to prove the existence of a divorce decree.

Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married
on April 20, 2001 in Las Piñas City, Metro Manila.
They lived together for nine (9) years in Saitama
Prefecture, Japan and did not have any
children.[5]
Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009,
Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce was
granted. She secured a Divorce
Certificate[6] issued by Consul Kenichiro
Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the Japanese
Consulate in the Philippines and had it
authenticated[7] by an authentication officer of
the Department of Foreign Affairs.[8]
She filed the Divorce Certificate with the
Philippine Consulate General in Tokyo, Japan,
where she was informed that by reason of
certain administrative changes, she was
required to return to the Philippines to report
the documents for registration and to file the
appropriate case for judicial recognition of
divorce.[9]
She tried to have the Divorce Certificate
registered with the Civil Registry of Manila but
was refused by the City Registrar since there
was no court order recognizing it. When she
went to the Department of Foreign Affairs to
renew her passport, she was likewise told that
she needed the proper court order. She was
also informed by the National Statistics Office
that her divorce could only be annotated in the
Certificate of Marriage if there was a court
order capacitating her to remarry.[10]
She went to the Japanese Embassy, as advised
by her lawyer, and secured a Japanese Law
English Version of the Civil Code of Japan, 2000
Edition.[11]
On May 19, 2010, she filed a Petition for Judicial
Determination and Declaration of Capacity to
Marry[12] with the Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas
City.
On June 2, 2011, Branch 254, Regional Trial
Court, Las Piñas City rendered a Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of
Decision,[13] finding that Racho failed to prove
that Tanaka legally obtained a divorce. It stated
that while she was able to prove Tanaka's
national law, the Divorce Certificate was not
competent evidence since it was not the divorce
decree itself.[14]
Racho filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[15] arguing that under Japanese
174
law, a divorce by agreement becomes effective
by oral notification, or by a document signed by
both parties and by two (2) or more
witnesses.[16]
In an Order[17] dated October 3, 2011, the
Regional Trial Court denied the Motion, finding
that Racho failed to present the notification of
divorce and its acceptance.[18]
On December 19, 2011, Racho filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari[19] with this Court. In its
January 18, 2012 Resolution, this Court deferred
action on her Petition pending her submission
of a duly authenticated acceptance certificate of
the notification of divorce.[20]
Petitioner initially submitted a
Manifestation,[21] stating that a
duly-authenticated acceptance certificate was
not among the documents presented at the
Regional Trial Court because of its unavailability
to petitioner during trial. She also pointed out
that the Divorce Certificate issued by ,the
Consulate General of the Japanese Embassy was
sufficient proof of the fact of divorce.[22] She
also manifested that Tanaka had secured a
marriage license on the basis of the same
Divorce Certificate and had already remarried
another Filipino. Nevertheless, she has
endeavored to secure the document as directed
by this Court.[23]
On March 16, 2012, petitioner submitted her
Compliance,[24] attaching a duly authenticated
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce that she obtained in Japan.[25] The
Office of the Solicitor General thereafter
submitted its Comment[26] on the Petition, to
which petitioner submitted her Reply.[27]
Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of
Japan, a divorce by agreement becomes
effective upon notification, whether oral or
written, by both parties and by two (2) or more
witnesses. She contends that the Divorce
Certificate stating "Acceptance Certification of
Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan on December
16, 2009" is sufficient to prove that she and her
husband have divorced by agreement and have
already effected notification of the divorce.[28]
She avers further that under Japanese law, the
manner of proving a divorce by agreement is by
record of its notification and by the fact of its
acceptance, both of which were stated in the

Divorce Certificate. She maintains that the
Divorce Certificate is signed by Consul
Takayama, whom the Department of Foreign
Affairs certified as duly appointed and qualified
to sign the document. She also states that the
Divorce Certificate has already been filed and
recorded with the Civil Registry Office of
Manila.[29]
She insists that she is now legally capacitated to
marry since Article 728 of the Civil Code of
Japan states that a matrimonial relationship is
terminated by divorce.[30]
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General posits that the Certificate of Divorce
has no probative value since it was not properly
authenticated under Rule 132, Section 24[31] of
the Rules of Court. However, it states that it has
no objection to the admission of the Certificate
of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce
submitted by petitioner in compliance with this
Court's January 18, 2012 Resolution.[32]
It likewise points out that petitioner never
mentioned that she and her husband obtained a
divorce by agreement and only mentioned it in
her motion for reconsideration before the
Regional Trial Court. Thus, petitioner failed to
prove that she is now capacitated to marry
since her divorce was not obtained by the alien
spouse. She also failed to point to a specific
provision in the Civil Code of Japan that allows
persons who obtained a divorce by agreement
the capacity to remarry. In any case, a divorce
by agreement is not the divorce contemplated
in Article 26 of the Family Code.[33]
In rebuttal, petitioner insists that all her
evidence, including the Divorce Certificate, was
formally offered and held to be admissible as
evidence by the Regional Trial Court.[34] She also
argues that the Office of the Solicitor General
should not have concluded that the law does
not contemplate divorce by agreement or
consensual divorce since a discriminatory
situation will arise if this type of divorce is not
recognized.[35]
The issue in this case, initially, was whether or
not the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing
the Petition for Declaration of Capacity to Marry
for insufficiency of evidence. After the
submission of Comment, however, the issue has
evolved to whether or not the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is sufficient
to prove the fact that a divorce between
175
petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho and
respondent Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained
by the latter according to his national law.
I
Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce
between a foreigner and a Filipino may be
recognized in the Philippines as long as it was
validly obtained according to the foreign
spouse's national law, thus:
Article 26. All marriages
solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the
country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35
(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine
law.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
The second paragraph was included to avoid an
absurd situation where a Filipino spouse
remains married to the foreign spouse even
after a validly obtained divorce abroad.[37] The
addition of the second paragraph gives the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have the
marriage considered as dissolved, and
ultimately, to grant him or her the capacity to
remarry.[38]
Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable only
in issues on the validity of remarriage. It cannot
be the basis for any other liability, whether civil
or criminal, that the Filipino spouse may incur
due to remarriage.
Mere presentation of the divorce decree before
a trial court is insufficient.[39] In Garcia v.
Recio,[40] this Court established the principle
that before a foreign divorce decree is
recognized in this jurisdiction, a separate action
must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
foreign judgments; thus, our laws require that

the divorce decree and the national law of the
foreign spouse must be pleaded and proved like
any other fact before trial courts.[41] Hence,
in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas:[42]
The starting point in any
recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no
sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country."
This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity
must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence,
together with the alien's
applicable national law to
show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself
or herself. The recognition
may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or
defense.[43]
II
Respondent's national law was duly admitted by
the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner presented "a
copy [of] the English Version of the Civil Code of
Japan (Exh. "K") translated under the
authorization of the Ministry of Justice and the
Code of Translation Committee."[44] Article
728(1) of the Civil Code of Japan reads:
Article 728. 1. The
matrimonial relationship is
terminated by divorce.[45]
To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner
presented the Divorce Certificate issued by
Consul Takayama of Japan on January 18, 2010,
which stated in part:
This is to certify that the
above statement has been
made on the basis of the
Acceptance Certification of
Notification of Divorce issued
by the Mayor of Fukaya City,
Saitama Pref., Japan on
December 16, 2009.[46]
176
This Certificate only certified that the divorce
decree, or the Acceptance Certification of
Notification of Divorce, exists. It is not the
divorce decree itself. The Regional Trial Court
further clarified:
[T]he Civil Law of Japan
recognizes two (2) types of
divorce, namely: (1) judicial
divorce and (2) divorce by
agreement.
Under the same law, the
divorce by agreement
becomes effective by
notification, orally or in a
document signed by both
parties and two or more
witnesses of full age, in
accordance with the
provisions of Family
Registration Law of Japan.[47]
Thus, while respondent's national law was duly
admitted, petitioner failed to present sufficient
evidence before the Regional Trial Court that a
divorce was validly obtained according to the
national law of her foreign spouse. The Regional
Trial Court would not have erred in dismissing
her Petition.
III
Upon appeal to this Court, however, petitioner
submitted a Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce,[48] certifying that the divorce
issued by Susumu Kojima, Mayor of Fukaya City,
Saitama Prefecture, has been accepted on
December 16, 2009. The seal on the document
was authenticated by Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular
Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Japan.[49]
The probative value of the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is a
question of fact that would not ordinarily be
within this Court's ambit to resolve. Issues in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court[50] are limited to questions
of law.
In Garcia and Corpuz, this Court remanded the
cases to the Regional Trial Courts for the
reception of evidence and for further
proceedings.[51] More recently in Medina v.
Koike,[52] this Court remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine the national law
of the foreign spouse:
 177

Well entrenched is the rule involved

that this Court is not a trier of shall be
facts. The resolution of factual final.[53]
issues is the function of the The court records, however, are already
lower courts, whose findings sufficient to fully resolve the factual
on these matters are received issues.[54] Additionally, the Office of the Solicitor
with respect and are in fact General neither posed any objection to the
binding subject to certain admission of the Certificate of Acceptance of
exceptions. In this regard, it is the Report of Divorce[55] nor argued that the
settled that appeals taken Petition presented questions of fact. In the
from judgments or final orders interest of judicial economy and efficiency, this
rendered by RTC in the Court shall resolve this case on its merits.
exercise of its original
jurisdiction raising questions IV
of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law should be Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court,
brought to the Court of the admissibility of official records that are kept
Appeals (CA) in accordance in a foreign country requires that it must be
with Rule 41 of the Rules of accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of
Court. an embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the
Nonetheless, despite the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
procedural restrictions on that foreign country:
Rule 45 appeals as Section 24. Proof of official
above-adverted, the Court record. - The record of public
may refer the case to the CA documents referred to in
under paragraph 2, Section 6 paragraph (a) of Section 19,
of Rule 56 of the Rules of when admissible for any
Court, which provides: purpose, may be evidenced by
SEC. 6. an official publication thereof
Disposition or by a copy attested by the
of improper officer having the legal
appeal. - . . . custody of the record, or by
his deputy, and accompanied,
An appeal by if the record is not kept in the
certiorari Philippines, with a certificate
taken to the that such officer has the
Supreme custody. If the office in which
Court from the record is kept is in a
the Regional foreign country, the certificate
Trial Court may be made by a secretary of
submitting the embassy or legation,
issues of fact consul general, consul, vice
may be consul, or consular agent or by
referred to any officer in the foreign
the Court of service of the Philippines
Appeals for stationed in the foreign
decision or country in which the record is
appropriate kept, and authenticated by
action. The the seal of his office.
determinati The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
on of the Divorce was accompanied by an
Supreme Authentication[56] issued by Consul Bryan Dexter
Court on B. Lao of the Embassy of the Philippines in
whether or Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe,
not issues of Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign
fact are Affairs, Japan was an official in and for Japan.

The Authentication further certified that he was
authorized to sign the Certificate of Acceptance
of the Report of Divorce and that his signature
in it was genuine. Applying Rule 132, Section 24,
the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of
divorce between petitioner and respondent.
The Regional Trial Court established that
according to the national law of Japan, a divorce
by agreement "becomes effective by
notification."[57] Considering that the Certificate
of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was duly
authenticated, the divorce between petitioner
and respondent was validly obtained according
to respondent's national law.
V interpretation, which may be unconstitutional.
The Office of the Solicitor General, however,
posits that divorce by agreement is not the
divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Family
Code, which provides:
Article 26. All marriages
solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the
country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35
(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine
law.[58] (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that Article 26 states that divorce
must be "validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse," the Office of the Solicitor General
posits that only the foreign spouse may initiate
divorce proceedings.
In a study on foreign marriages in 2007
conducted by the Philippine Statistics Authority,
it was found that "marriages between Filipino
brides and foreign grooms comprised 5,537 or
66.7 percent while those between Filipino
grooms and foreign brides numbered 152 or 1.8
178
percent of the total marriages outside the
country."[59] It also found that "[a]bout four in
every ten interracial marriages (2,916 or 35.1%)
were between Filipino brides and Japanese
grooms." Statistics for foreign marriages in 2016
shows that there were 1,129 marriages
between Filipino men and foreign women but
8,314 marriages between Filipina women and
foreign men.[60] Thus, empirical data
demonstrates that Filipino women are more
likely to enter into mixed marriages than
Filipino men. Under Philippine laws relating to
mixed marriages, Filipino women are twice
marginalized.
In this particular instance, it is the Filipina
spouse who bears the burden of this narrow
Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution
provides:
Section 14. The State
recognizes the role of women
in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of
women and men.
This constitutional provision provides a more
active application than the passive orientation
of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution does,
which simply states that no person shall "be
denied the equal protection of the laws." Equal
protection, within the context of Article III,
Section 1 only provides that any legal burden or
benefit that is given to men must also be given
to women. It does not require the State to
actively pursue "affirmative ways and means to
battle the patriarchy-that complex of political,
cultural, and economic factors that ensure
women's disempowerment."[61]
In 1980, our country became a signatory to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW).[62] Under Articles 2(f) and S(a) of the
treaty, the Philippines as a state party, is
required:
Article 2
....
(f) to take all appropriate
measures, including legislation,
to modify or abolish existing
laws, regulations, customs and
practices which constitute
discrimination against women;

....
Article 5
....
(a) To modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of
men and women, with a view
to achieving the elimination of
prejudices and customary and
all other practices which are
based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and
women[.]
By enacting the Constitution and signing on the
CEDAW, the State has committed to ensure and
to promote gender equality.
In 2009, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
9710 or the Magna Carta for Women, which
provides that the State "shall take all
appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family
relations."[63] This necessarily includes the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to
mean that it is irrelevant for courts to
determine if it is the foreign spouse that
procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce
decree is issued, the divorce becomes "validly
obtained" and capacitates the foreign spouse to
marry. The same status should be given to the
Filipino spouse.
The national law of Japan does not prohibit the
Filipino spouse from initiating or participating in
the divorce proceedings. It would be inherently
unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by
her own national laws from something that a
foreign law may allow. Parenthetically, the
prohibition on Filipinos from participating in
divorce proceedings will not be protecting our
own nationals.
The Solicitor General's narrow interpretation of
Article 26 disregards any agency on the part of
the Filipino spouse. It presumes that the Filipino
spouse is incapable of agreeing to the
dissolution of the marital bond. It perpetuates
the notion that all divorce proceedings are
protracted litigations fraught with bitterness
and drama. Some marriages can end amicably,
without the parties harboring any ill will against
179
each other. The parties could forgo costly court
proceedings and opt for, if the national law of
the foreign spouse allows it, a more convenient
out-of-court divorce process. This ensures amity
between the former spouses, a friendly
atmosphere for the children and extended
families, and less financial burden for the family.
Absolute divorce was prohibited in our
jurisdiction only in the mid-20th century. The
Philippines had divorce laws in the past. In 1917,
Act No. 2710[64] was enacted which allowed a
wife to file for divorce in cases of concubinage
or a husband to file in cases of adultery.[65]
Executive Order No. 141, or the New Divorce
Law, which was enacted during the Japanese
occupation, provided for 11 grounds for divorce,
including "intentional or unjustified desertion
continuously for at least one year prior to the
filing of [a petition for divorce]" and "slander by
deed or gross insult by one spouse against the
other to such an extent as to make further living
together impracticable."[66]
At the end of World War II, Executive Order No.
141 was declared void and Act No. 2710 again
took effect.[67] It was only until the enactment of
the Civil Code in 1950 that absolute divorce was
prohibited in our jurisdiction.
It is unfortunate that legislation from the past
appears to be more progressive than current
enactments. Our laws should never be intended
to put Filipinos at a disadvantage. Considering
that the Constitution guarantees fundamental
equality, this Court should not tolerate an
unfeeling and callous interpretation of laws. To
rule that the foreign spouse may remarry, while
the Filipino may not, only contributes to the
patriarchy. This interpretation encourages
unequal partnerships and perpetuates abuse m
intimate relationships.[68]
In any case, the Solicitor General's argument
has already been resolved in Republic v.
Manalo,[69] where this Court held:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26
speaks of "a divorce . . . validly
obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry." Based on a clear
and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that
there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of
the law does not demand that
 180

the alien spouse should be the legis or

one who initiated the strictly
proceeding wherein the literal
divorce decree was granted. It interpretatio
does not distinguish whether n of a
the Filipino spouse is the statute may
petitioner or the respondent render it
in the foreign divorce meaningless
proceeding. The Court is and lead to
bound by the words of the inconvenien
statute; neither can We put ce, an
words in the mouths of the absurd
lawmakers. "The legislature is situation or
presumed to know the injustice. To
meaning of the words, to have obviate this
used words advisedly, and to aberration,
have expressed its intent by and bearing
the use of such words as are in mind the
found in the statute. Verba principle
legis non est recedendum, or that the
from the words of a statute intent or the
there should be no spirit of the
departure." law is the
law itself,
Assuming, for the sake of resort
argument, that the word should be to
"obtained" should be the rule that
interpreted to mean that the the spirit of
divorce proceeding must be the law
actually initiated by the alien controls its
spouse, still, the Court will not letter.
follow the letter of the statute To reiterate, the purpose of
when to do so would depart Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to
from the true intent of the avoid the absurd situation
legislature or would otherwise where the Filipino spouse
yield conclusions inconsistent remains married to the alien
with the general purpose of spouse who, after a foreign
the act. Laws have ends to divorce decree that is
achieve, and statutes should effective in the country where
be so construed as not to it was rendered, is no longer
defeat but to carry out such married to the Filipino spouse.
ends and purposes. As held The provision is a corrective
in League of Cities of the Phils., measure to address an
et al. v. COMELEC, et al.: anomaly where the Filipino
The spouse is tied to the marriage
legislative while the foreign spouse is
intent is not free to marry under the laws
at all times of his or her country. Whether
accurately the Filipino spouse initiated
reflected in the foreign divorce
the manner proceeding or not, a favorable
in which the decree dissolving the marriage
resulting law bond and capacitating his or
is couched. her alien spouse to remarry
Thus, will have the same result: the
applying Filipino spouse will effectively
a verba be without a husband or wife.

A Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is
in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who
is at the receiving end of an
alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it
is extended as a means to
recognize the residual effect
of the foreign divorce decree
on Filipinos whose marital ties
to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the
latter's national
law.[70] (Emphasis in the
original)
Recent jurisprudence, therefore, holds that a
foreign divorce may be recognized in this
jurisdiction as long as it is validly
obtained, regardless of who among the spouses
initiated the divorce proceedings.
The question in this case, therefore, is not who
among the spouses initiated the proceedings
but rather if the divorce obtained by petitioner
and respondent was valid.
The Regional Trial Court found that there were
two (2) kinds of divorce in Japan: judicial divorce
and divorce by agreement. Petitioner and
respondent's divorce was considered as a
divorce by agreement, which is a valid divorce
according to Japan's national law.[71]
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise
posits that while petitioner was able to prove
that the national law of Japan allows absolute
divorce, she was unable to "point to a specific
provision of the Japan[ese] Civil Code which
states that both judicial divorce and divorce by
agreement will allow the spouses to remarry."[72]
To prove its argument, the Office of the Solicitor
General cites Republic v. Orbecido III,[73] where
this Court stated:
[R]espondent must also show
that the divorce decree allows
his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article
26. Otherwise, there would be
no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated
to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are
181
unanimous in our holding that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code (E.O. No. 209,
as amended by E.O. No. 227),
should be interpreted to allow
a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse
who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also
to remarry. However,
considering that in the
present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted
and on record, we are unable
to declare, based on
respondent's bare allegations
that his wife, who was
naturalized as an American
citizen, had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be
made properly upon
respondent's submission of
the aforecited evidence in his
favor.[74]
The Office of the Solicitor General pointedly
ignores that in Orbecido III, the respondent in
that case neither pleaded and proved that his
wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen, nor presented any evidence of the
national law of his alleged foreign spouse that
would allow absolute divorce.
In this case, respondent's nationality was not
questioned. The Regional Trial Court duly
admitted petitioner's presentation of
respondent's national law. Article 728 of the
Civil Code of Japan as quoted by the Office of
the Solicitor General states:
Article 728 of the Japan Civil
Code reads:
1. The matrimonial
relationship is terminated by
divorce.
2. The same shall apply also if
after the death of either
husband or wife, the surviving
spouse declares his or her
intention to terminate the
matrimonial relationship.[75]
The wording of the provision is absolute. The
provision contains no other qualifications that
could limit either spouse's capacity to remarry.

In Garcia v. Recio,[76] this Court reversed the
Regional Trial Court's finding of the Filipino
spouse's capacity to remarry since the national
law of the foreign spouse stated certain
conditions before the divorce could be
considered absolute:
In its strict legal sense, divorce
means the legal dissolution of
a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types.
The two basic ones are (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro.
The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force. There is no
showing in the case at bar
which type of divorce was
procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a that the Australian
decree nisi or an interlocutory
decree - a conditional or
provisional judgment of
divorce. It is in effect the same
as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the
lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation
is effected.
Even after the divorce
becomes absolute, the court
may under some foreign
statutes and practices, still
restrict remarriage. Under
some other jurisdictions,
remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party
in a divorce which was
granted on the ground of
adultery may be prohibited
from marrying again. The
court may allow a remarriage
only after proof of good
behavior.
On its face, the herein
Australian divorce decree
contains a restriction that
reads:
182
"1. A party
to a
marriage
who marries
again before
this decree
becomes
absolute
(unless the
other party
has died)
commits the
offence of
bigamy."
This quotation bolsters our
contention that the divorce
obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did
not absolutely establish his
legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law.
Hence, we find no basis for
the ruling of the trial court,
which erroneously assumed
divorce ipso facto restored
respondent's capacity to
remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.[77]
Here, the national law of the foreign spouse
states that the matrimonial relationship is
terminated by divorce. The Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not
state any qualifications that would restrict the
remarriage of any of the parties. There can be
no other interpretation than that the divorce
procured by petitioner and respondent is
absolute and completely terminates their
marital tie.
Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute
dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both
parties the legal capacity to remarry. Thus,
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Article 40. The absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void.
Petitioner alleges that respondent has since
remarried, the National Statistics Office having
found no impediment to the registration of his
Marriage Certificate.[78] The validity of
respondent's subsequent marriage is irrelevant
for the resolution of the issues in this case. The
existence of respondent's Marriage Certificate,

however, only serves to highlight the absurd
situation sought to be prevented in the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:[79]
It is true that owing to the
nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the
marriage from the standards
of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the
marriage. . . .
....
Thus, pursuant to his national
law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his
own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction
over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own
representation before said
Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private
respondent does, that, under
our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to
private respondent and still
subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to private
183
respondent. The latter should
not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served.[80]
The ruling in Van Dorn was eventually codified
in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code through the issuance of Executive
Order No. 227 in 1987. The grant of substantive
equal rights to the Filipino spouse was broad
enough that this Court, in the 1985 case
of Quita v. Court of Appeals,[81] "hinted, by way
of obiter dictum"[82] that it could be applied to
Filipinos who have since been naturalized as
foreign citizens.
In Republic v. Orbecido III,[83] this Court noted
the obiter in Quita and stated outright that
Filipino citizens who later become naturalized
as foreign citizens may validly obtain a divorce
from their Filipino spouses:
Thus, taking into
consideration the legislative
intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. Where
the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and
literal import would lead to
mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose
of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary the letter
of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to
cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long

as they come within its spirit
or intent.[84]
To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General
does, that under our laws, petitioner is still
married to respondent despite the latter's
newfound companionship with another cannot
be just.[85] Justice is better served if she is not
discriminated against in her own country.[86] As
much as petitioner is free to seek fulfillment in
the love and devotion of another, so should she
be free to pledge her commitment within the
institution of marriage.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Regional Trial Court June 2, 2011 Decision and
October 3, 2011 Order in SP. Proc. No. 10-0032
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. By virtue of
Article 26, second paragraph of the Family Code
and the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report
of Divorce dated December 16, 2009, petitioner
Rhodora Ilumin Racho is declared capacitated to
remarry.
SO ORDERED.
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Divorce;
Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce
between a foreigner and a Filipino may be
recognized in the Philippines as long as it was
validly obtained according to the foreign
spouse’s national law.—Under Article 26 of the
Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and
a Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines
as long as it was validly obtained according to
the foreign spouse’s national law, thus:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. x x x The second
paragraph was included to avoid an absurd
situation where a Filipino spouse remains
married to the foreign spouse even after a
validly obtained divorce abroad. The addition of
the second paragraph gives the Filipino spouse
a substantive right to have the marriage
considered as dissolved, and ultimately, to grant
him or her the capacity to remarry. Article 26 of
the Family Code is applicable only in issues on
the validity of remarriage. It cannot be the basis
for any other liability, whether civil or criminal,
184
that the Filipino spouse may incur due to
remarriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and foreign
judgments; thus, our laws require that the
divorce decree and the national law of the
foreign spouse must be pleaded and proved like
any other fact before trial courts.—Mere
presentation of the divorce decree before a trial
court is insufficient. In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA
437 (2001), this Court established the principle
that before a foreign divorce decree is
recognized in this jurisdiction, a separate action
must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
foreign judgments; thus, our laws require that
the divorce decree and the national law of the
foreign spouse must be pleaded and proved like
any other fact before trial courts. Hence, in
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 (2010): The
starting point in any recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This
means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien’s
applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
Supreme Court; Question of Fact; Petition for
Review on Certiorari; The probative value of the
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce is a question of fact that would not
ordinarily be within the Supreme Court’s (SC’s)
ambit to resolve. Issues in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
are limited to questions of law.—Upon appeal
to this Court, however, petitioner submitted a
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce, certifying that the divorce issued by
Susumu Kojima, Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama
Prefecture, has been accepted on December 16,
2009. The seal on the document was
authenticated by Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular
Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Japan. The probative value of the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is a
question of fact that would not ordinarily be

within this Court’s ambit to resolve. Issues in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court are limited to questions of
law.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Admissibility of
Evidence; Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the
Rules of Court, the admissibility of official
records that are kept in a foreign country
requires that it must be accompanied by a
certificate from a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
consular agent or any officer of the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in that
foreign country.—Under Rule 132, Section 24 of
the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official
records that are kept in a foreign country
requires that it must be accompanied by a
certificate from a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
consular agent or any officer of the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in that
foreign country: Section 24. Proof of official
record.—The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer
has the custody. If the office in which the record
is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. The
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce was accompanied by an Authentication
issued by Consul Bryan Dexter B. Lao of the
Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan,
certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular
Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Japan was an official in and for Japan. The
Authentication further certified that he was
authorized to sign the Certificate of Acceptance
of the Report of Divorce and that his signature
in it was genuine. Applying Rule 132, Section 24,
the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of
divorce between petitioner and respondent.
The Regional Trial Court established that
according to the national law of Japan, a divorce
by agreement “becomes effective by
notification.” Considering that the Certificate of
185
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was duly
authenticated, the divorce between petitioner
and respondent was validly obtained according
to respondent’s national law.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws;
Equal protection, within the context of Article III,
Section 1 only provides that any legal burden or
benefit that is given to men must also be given
to women.—In this particular instance, it is the
Filipina spouse who bears the burden of this
narrow interpretation, which may be
unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our
Constitution provides: Section 14. The State
recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men. This
constitutional provision provides a more active
application than the passive orientation of
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution does,
which simply states that no person shall “be
denied the equal protection of the laws.” Equal
protection, within the context of Article III,
Section 1 only provides that any legal burden or
benefit that is given to men must also be given
to women. It does not require the State to
actively pursue “affirmative ways and means to
battle the patriarchy — that complex of political,
cultural, and economic factors that ensure
women’s disempowerment.”
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Divorce; Once
a divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes
“validly obtained” and capacitates the foreign
spouse to marry. The same status should be
given to the Filipino spouse.—In 2009, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna
Carta for Women, which provides that the State
“shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all
matters relating to marriage and family
relations.” This necessarily includes the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Thus,
Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it
is irrelevant for courts to determine if it is the
foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad.
Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce
becomes “validly obtained” and capacitates the
foreign spouse to marry. The same status
should be given to the Filipino spouse.
Same; Conflict of Laws; Divorce; It would be
inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be
prohibited by her own national laws from
something that a foreign law may allow.
Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos
from participating in divorce proceedings will
 186

not be protecting our own nationals.—The
national law of Japan does not prohibit the
Filipino spouse from initiating or participating in
the divorce proceedings. It would be inherently
unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by
her own national laws from something that a
foreign law may allow. Parenthetically, the
prohibition on Filipinos from participating in
divorce proceedings will not be protecting our
own nationals. The Solicitor General’s narrow
interpretation of Article 26 disregards any
agency on the part of the Filipino spouse. It
presumes that the Filipino spouse is incapable
of agreeing to the dissolution of the marital
bond. It perpetuates the notion that all divorce
proceedings are protracted litigations fraught
with bitterness and drama. Some marriages can
end amicably, without the parties harboring any
ill will against each other. The parties could
forgo costly court proceedings and opt for, if
the national law of the foreign spouse allows it,
a more convenient out-of-court divorce process.
This ensures amity between the former spouses,
a friendly atmosphere for the children and
extended families, and less financial burden for
the family.
Same; Family Law; Marriages; Divorce;
Patriarchy; To rule that the foreign spouse may
remarry, while the Filipino may not, only
contributes to the patriarchy.—It is unfortunate
that legislation from the past appears to be
more progressive than current enactments. Our
laws should never be intended to put Filipinos
at a disadvantage. Considering that the
Constitution guarantees fundamental equality,
this Court should not tolerate an unfeeling and
callous interpretation of laws. To rule that the
foreign spouse may remarry, while the Filipino
may not, only contributes to the patriarchy. This
interpretation encourages unequal partnerships
and perpetuates abuse m intimate
relationships.
was valid. The Regional Trial Court found that
there were two (2) kinds of divorce in Japan:
judicial divorce and divorce by agreement.
Petitioner and respondent’s divorce was
considered as a divorce by agreement, which is
a valid divorce according to Japan’s national
law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Capacity to Remarry;
Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute
dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both
parties the legal capacity to remarry.—Here, the
national law of the foreign spouse states that
the matrimonial relationship is terminated by
divorce. The Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce does not state any
qualifications that would restrict the remarriage
of any of the parties. There can be no other
interpretation than that the divorce procured by
petitioner and respondent is absolute and
completely terminates their marital tie. Even
under our laws, the effect of the absolute
dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both
parties the legal capacity to remarry. Thus,
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Recent jurisprudence

holds that a foreign divorce may be recognized
in this jurisdiction as long as it is validly
obtained, regardless of who among the spouses
initiated the divorce proceedings.—Recent
jurisprudence, therefore, holds that a foreign
divorce may be recognized in this jurisdiction as
long as it is validly obtained, regardless of who
among the spouses initiated the divorce
proceedings. The question in this case,
therefore, is not who among the spouses
initiated the proceedings but rather if the
divorce obtained by petitioner and respondent