RES JUDICATA

IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

FINAL TERM PAPER

IN

LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC

SUBMITTED BY:

WENDY T. JAMERO
JD I – M5

TO:

ATTY. JOE VINSON EMPACES

PROFESSOR
UC SCHOOL OF LAW
Preliminary: Decision Making in Courts of Law
The definitiveness of the resolution of a court of law involves four
distinguishable legal concepts to wit: the authority of a court to negate its own
resolution, direct attack, collateral attack, and res judicata. Frequent confusion in
administrative law of the principles applicable to these concepts makes essential a
delineation of those to be differentiated as well as that to be examined.1
Some related concepts are double jeopardy, direct attack and collateral
estoppel. When do courts of law invoke such concepts? How do these help in the
decision making process? These questions represent process values that may
trump substantive justice. Let’s start defining each.

Double jeopardy is a criminal law doctrine that prevents a defendant from

being tried for the same crime twice. Often arguments end this way: “we already
decided it,” “don’t open it up again.” Where this claim has the power to stick, its
force comes from the same kinds of concerns as in the legal system: avoiding
spending excessive time rehashing the arguments and repose.

Now, when do we know that a certain proceeding is a direct attack or a

collateral attack? It is a direct attack against the order or judgment if it is not
incidental to, but is the main object of, a proceeding. Meanwhile, it is a collateral
attack if the purpose of the proceedings is to obtain some relief, other than the
vacation or setting aside of the judgment, and the attack is only an incident.

On the other hand, collateral estoppel means that if, on the way to a final
judgment, there was a sub-issue that was definitively decided, then that sub-issue
cannot be litigated again.2

Lastly, res judicata means that once a case is finally decided (after appeals
are exhausted), it cannot be heard again. You had your chance and now it is
definitively decided.

There are many questions that must be answered when applying these
doctrines. When is the decision final? Between what parties? On what issues?
Precluding what?

A very important question is, “what precisely did we decide on?” Which leads
to “did we have all of the evidence and arguments before us? Were there any other
defects in the process?” From a usual standpoint, if you got it wrong the first time,
you want the chance to get it right the next time and all the succeeding instances.

1
Gregory (1941). Administrative Law: Administrative Decisions as Res Judicata Vol. 29 No. 6 pp. 741.
2
G.R. No. L-5549, February 26, 1954, IN RE: TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 14123. TIRSO
T. REYES, as guardian of the minors. AZUCENA, FLOR-DE-LIS and TIRSO, JR. all surnamed REYES Y
BARRETTO, petitioners-appellants, vs. MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, oppositor-appellant.
But you don’t want to be constantly re-litigating old arguments. 3

Res judicata: Rationale

The doctrine of res judicata is a way of preventing unjustness to the parties

of a case assumed to be over, but perhaps also or mostly a way of avoiding
needless waste of resources in the court system. Res judicata does not merely
forestall future judgments from contradicting earlier ones, but also obviates
litigants from multiplying judgments and discombobulating. It is sometimes
referred to as “claim preclusion.”4
“Res judicata pro veritate accipture” is the full maxim but through the years
it has shortened to mere res judicata,5 which means a matter already adjudged. 6
A fundamental reason for the doctrine is the desire to prevent a double
recovery by any party. If a party succeeds in his first action against a defendant,
the availability of a second proceeding on the same matter necessarily makes a
duplicate or overlapping possible recovery. It is highly improbable that any court
would consciously allow a double recovery on the same cause of action.
Nonetheless, a court's application of what seems to be a logical concept of cause
of action in one situation might well serve as a precedent for a double recovery in
other situations.7

Origin
The doctrine of res judicata is purported not to have been definitely formulated
until 1776.8 However, in essence, it is of much earlier origin and application.
Primarily, the rule is one of public policy, and, secondarily, of private benefit to
individual litigants. The primary principle early found expression in the maxims,
"Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium," which means “[t]he public interest of a matter
3
Trachtman, (2013). The Tools of Argument: How the Best Lawyers Think, Argue, and Win
4
Larson, Aaron (2017). Issue Preclusion and Claim Preclusion: How Prior Litigation Can Block Your
Claim.
5
Deva Ram v. Ishwar Chand AIR1996SC378; Kunjan Nair Shivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair, AIR 2004
SC 1761.
6
See Banerjee, A.(2016, August 20). Res Judicata Under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Retrieved from
racolblegal.com/res-judicata-under-code-of-civil-procedure-1908/
The doctrine of res judicata is based on three maxims:
1. Nemo debet bis vaxari pro eadem causa i.e. no man should be vexed twice for the
same cause;
2. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium, i.e. that it is interest of the State that there
should be end to a litigation; and
3. Res judicata pro veritate occipitur, i.e. a judicial decision must be accepted as
correct.
7
Benson v. Wanda Petroleum, 468 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1971); see Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined,
57 YALE L.J. 339, 346 (1948); Note, Problems of Res Judicata Created by Expanding "Cause of Action"
Under Code Pleading, 104 U. PA. L. Rev. 955, 962 (1956), p.344-45.
8
Duchess of Kingston's Case, 3 Singh, Landing Cases (9th ed. 1776) 1998.
 so that a litigation should end” and the secondary or subordinate one in the form
"Nemo debet bis vaxari pro unct et eadem causa" which means “[n]o one shall be
twice vexed for the same cause.” The whole doctrine bears a close resemblance to
the exceptio rei judicatae9 of the Roman law.10 Despite the fact that the doctrine of
res judicata is invoked frequently, yet difficulties tend to be crossed in its application,
particularly where either court or counsel fails to see that, of the two principles which
it was based on, the protection from the annoyance of repeated litigation, which the
individual suitor is afforded, is, after all, only an incident of the first principle, that the
best interests of society demand that litigation be concluded. The inclusive idea is set
forth in an early Pennsylvania case.11
Administrative Proceedings: Application
When dealing with determinations of administrative bodies, it must always be
remembered that these tribunals are purely statutory and their powers and functions
limited in each instance to the legislative grant; in this connection, it will be found that,
where the orders of such bodies have been refused the force of res judicata, it has
generally been because of some statutory obstacle. 12
In Encinas v Agustin,13 Jr., the CA was correct when it ruled that the
doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to the exercise of administrative powers
but only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings instead. One must distinguish
administrative powers from administrative proceedings, the latter being those that
are purely administrative in nature while the former being those that take on a
quasi-judicial character.14 The non-adherence to the doctrine of res judicata
9
The name of a plea by which the defendant alleges that the matter in dispute between the parties 
has been before adjudged
10
Broom, LEGAL Maxims,* 327 et scq.
11
Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawle 273, 288 (Pa. 1833). For modern exprc2cions of the same principles see State
Hospital v. Consolidated Water Co., 2G7 Pa. 29, 37, 110 At. 281, 283 (1920); Commonwealth v. Kelly,
2S7 Pa. 19, 144, 134 Atl. 514, 516 (1926).
"The maxim, zemo debet bis vexari, si eonstct euriac quod sit pro unai et eadem causa,
being... established for the protection and benefit of the party,... he may... waive it, and
unquestionably, so far as he is individually concerned, there can be no rational objection to
his doing so. But then it [must] be recollected, that the community has also an equal interest
and concern in the matter, on account of its peace and quiet, which ought not to be disturbed
at the will and pleasure of every individual, in order to gratify vindictive and litigious feelings.
Hence, it would seem to follow that wherever, on the trial of a cause, from the state of the
pleadings in it, the record of a judgment rendered by a competent tribunal upon the merits in
a former action for the same cause, between the same parties or those claiming under them,
is properly given in evidence to the jury, it ought to be considered conclusively binding on
both court and jury, and to preclude all further inquiry in the cause; otherwise the rule or
maxim, expedit rcipublicae ut sit finis litium, which is as old as the law itself, and a part of it,
will be exploded and entirely disregarded."
12
Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 253 U. S. 117, 40 Sup. Ct. 466 (1920) ; First Nat. Bank v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 45 Conn. 22 (1877) ; Board of Comm'rs v. Cypert, 65 Okla. 168, 166 Pac. 195 (1917); Custer
County v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 62 Neb. 657, 87 N. W. 341 (1901).
13
G.R. NO. 187317 : April 11, 2013
CARLITO C. ENCINAS, Petitioner, v. PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR., and PO1 JOEL S.
CAUBANG,** Respondents.
14
See Ligtas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015:
 warrants tribunals to be more adaptable in effectively controlling the
undercurrents and subtleties among the parties to the dispute.15
The elements of res judicata, which must altogether exist for the doctrine
to apply, are as follows:16
(1) The former judgment or order must be final.
Final judgment must pertain to the actual facts giving rise to the
claim. This means that there is no final judgment when the case is settled
by the parties on their own, nor when the judge decides a motion or come
up with a decision that does not resolve the dispute based on the facts and
evidence of the case;
(2) The judgment or order must be on the merits.
Most courts use the "transaction or occurrence" test for this. 17 If the
two claims are based on the same transaction or occurrence, they must be
brought in the same action;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties;
(4) There must be, between the first and the second action, identity of
parties, of subject matter and cause of action. The parties do not have to
be exactly identical. It is enough that the party to the second action is in
privity with the party in the first action.18 An agent and the principal are in
privity with each other. This is apparent in insurance and employment
cases.

The doctrine embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment19; and (2)
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves
(a) taking and evaluating evidence;
(b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and,
(c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved.
15
Blake, S. (2011). Administrative Law in Canada. Markham: LexisNexis.
16
Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 516 [1999]
17
See Brockman v. Wyoming Dept. of Family Services, 342 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2003):
‘Dismissal of a case because the venue was improper or because a necessary party has not been
joined, for example, are not judgments on the merits.’
1816
See Webster’s New World Law Dictionary’s definition of Transaction or Occurrence Test: “test used
under federal law to determine whether a particular claim should have been filed as a counterclaim and
will be barred from future filing as a separate claim. The four separate suggested tests are:
1) Are factual and legal claims raised by claim and counterclaim really the same?
2) Would a later suit be barred by res judicata if it weren’t for the compulsory counterclaim
rule?
3) Will essentially the same evidence support or refute both the plaintiffs’ claim and the
counterclaim?
4) Are claim and counterclaim largely related?”
See Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of ‘privity’:
“the term ‘privity’ means mutual or successive relationship to the same rights or property.
The executor is in privity with the testator, the heir with the ancestor, the assignee with the
assignor, the donee with the donor, and the lessee with the lessor.”
19
See Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
 conclusiveness of judgment.20 The fourth aforementioned element constitutes to
a "bar by prior judgment." But when between the first and the second action
there is only identity of parties, but no identity of causes of action, the first
judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly disputed
and decided and not as to matters merely involved therein.

The doctrine of res judicata is not conventionally raised by motion. It must

be raised by affirmative defense under the federal rules. In most cases, it is
waived if the accused does not raise the defense of res judicata.21

Case results in res judicata situations can barely be illustrated by

reference to fundamental statutes. A statutory provision of finality has been
frequently used as grounds for holding an administrative proceeding immune
from review by the very body which made it,22 or from collateral attack.23
Nonetheless, same results have been attained in the lack of such provision. 24
And despite a legislative stipulation that the decision be final, there may even be
instances in which a determination has been dealt with as open to amendment.
The extent to which an administrative agency may control its own orders and
decisions is a problem apparent in numerous cases which legislators themselves
have given no consideration. Still, courts have accorded it far from conscientious
observance even when a legislative intention has been signified.

Beyond the Four Walls of Court

Analogous arguments are constantly made outside the courtroom in everyday

life. Children do this all the time whenever they seek permission from their parents or
just any favor. They may select the parent to ask based on expectations about that
parent’s relative permissiveness compared to the other. If turned down by that
parent, they consequently even ask the second parent for a re-validation maybe. The
second parent may respond with the procedural rule at home that Dad is not
permitted to contradict Mom, thus, denying the child’s request. In this case, parents
also apply a rule of res judicata: once a decision is made, it is final.

20
See Rule 39, Section 47(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
21
See Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 348 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003):
“Claim preclusion is an affirmative defense which may be deemed waived if not raised in the
pleadings. Moreover, the failure of the defendant to object to the prosecution of dual
proceedings while both proceedings are pending also constitutes waiver.”
22
Conley v. Upson Co., 197 App. Div. 815, 189 N. Y. Supp. 473 (3d Dep't 1921); Ford Motor Co. v. State,
178 Okla. 193, 62 P. (2d) 48 (1936).
23
Harrington v. Glidden, 179 Mass. 486, 61 N. E. 54 (1901).
24
Wright v. Edwards Hotel & C. Ry., 101 Miss. 470, 58 So. 332 (1912); Chapel