A Wholistic Defense of Justice in The Republic

A Holistic Defense of Justice in the Republic 229
A Holistic Defense of Justice

in the Republic1
James Butler
Introduction
If one were to survey the diverse commentaries on the Republic, one

might think that Plato put the dialogue together as a piecemeal collage.
Famously, those who distinguish the philosophy of Plato from that of
Socrates usually siphon off Book I from the rest of the Republic, saying
the former is Socratic, while Books II-X are Platonic.2 This division can
be as simple as a switch from Socrates’ elenchus of Thrasymachus in
Book I to Plato’s positive doctrine in Books II-X. Some commentators,
however, suggest that the difference is more radical; Irwin believes that
1 I am indebted to Richard Cameron and his paper, ‘Defending Socrates’ Case

Against Thrasymachus’, APA Pacific Division Meeting, San Francisco, CA. March
26-30, 2003. Cameron’s paper and our subsequent discussions caused me to re-
think the assumptions that Socrates and Thrasymachus share in the Book I argu-
ment, and how these shared assumptions continue throughout the remainder of
the Republic. Cameron should not be assumed to endorse any of my views ex-
pressed here. I also thank Terry Penner for reading and offering comments on an
earlier draft of this paper during our many conversations on the Republic.
2 See Irwin, Terence, Plato’s Moral Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1977),
177-248 and Plato’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995), 169; Penner,
Terry, ‘Socrates and the early dialogues’, in Richard Kraut ed., The Cambridge Com-
panion to Plato (New York: Cambridge Press 1992)124; and Benson, Hugh, ‘Editors
Introduction’, in Hugh Benson, ed., Essays in the Philosophy of Socrates (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 1992), 13n19.
APEIRON a journal for ancient philosophy and science

Brought
003-6390/2008/4104 229-246 18.00 © Academic to you
Printing andbyPublishing
| ULB Bonn
Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:59 AM
230 James Butler
Plato actually abandons the defense of justice from Book I in favor of a

new theory beginning in Book II. 3
Even when we isolate the Platonic Books II-X, the collage gets no
clearer. Glaucon and Adimantus renew Thrasymachus’ argument in
favor of injustice over justice, but the manner in which they do so is
a matter of great debate. Sachs notably argues that Plato switches top-
ics with little or no warning to the reader: Socrates is asked a moral
question about just and unjust actions, but answers by referring to the
4
psychological state of the just person.
Other commentators suggest that Glaucon and Adimantus have
substantially expanded Thrasymachus’ challenge, and Socrates must
now answer two separate inquiries. One subset of these interpretations,
following Mabbott, suggests that Socrates must demonstrate the value
of justice as a good in itself without reference to any consequences, and
then show its value in terms of its consequences5 The other subset, no-
tably propounded by Irwin, claims that Socrates can appeal to conse-
quences of happiness throughout, though the first defense must appeal
to justice as a component of happiness, whereas the second can appeal to
justice as an instrumental means to happiness. Both subsets identify the
end of Book IV as pivotal between the two evaluations of justice.6
3 Irwin (1977) suggests that in Books II-X Plato is rejecting the Socratic defense of justice
in Book I in favor of a Platonic ‘component eudaimonism’, whereby justice is an essen-
tial component of happiness, rather than merely an instrumental means to happiness.
For different reasons, Nicholas White goes so far as to suggest that we ought
to skip Book I altogether since, ‘it is an introduction and is not intended by Plato
to be a complete, or even fully cogent, treatment of the issues which it broaches’.
White, Nicholas, A Companion to Plato’s Republic (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
1979), 8.
4 See Sachs, David, ‘A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic’, in Richard Kraut, ed., Plato’s Re-
public: Critical Essays (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing 1997).
5 Mabbott, J.D., ‘Is Plato’s Republic Utilitarian?’ Mind 46 (1937) 386-93; revised in
Gregory Vlastos, ed., Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, II: Ethics, Politics, and Phi-
losophy of Art and Religion (New York: Doubleday and Company 1971), 57-65. Other
advocates of this position include: Kirwan, C.A., ‘Glaucon’s Challenge’, Phronesis
10 (1965)162-73; Annas, Julia, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1982); and Devereux, D., ‘The Structure of Socrates’ Argument for
Justice in the Republic’ (APA Pacific Meeting, Berkeley, March 1999).
6 Mabbott states, ‘On my view Plato shows in Book IV that justice is good in itself
and in Book IX that it is good for its consequences’ (1971), 62. Irwin is less strin-
gent about the division in Book IV, ‘ It was agreed in Book II that an answer to this
Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Even if only a handful of these interpretations were correct, the Re-

public would be so fragmented that any single, cohesive argument con-
cerning the value of justice is unlikely. In this paper, I give a plausible
reading of the Republic to show that Socrates’ argument in favor of jus-
tice remains singular and constant: There is no fundamental change in
the question about justice from Thrasymachus’ challenge, to Glaucon’s
restatement, to Socrates’ ultimate answer.7 The brothers’ expansion of
Thrasymachus’ Book I challenge simply clarifies those consequences
that are allowed to count in justice’s favor: No longer is Socrates al-
lowed to appeal to consequences stemming from a reputation for
justice. Socrates concurs, defending justice instead by appealing to al-
ternate consequences that the brothers allow.
Because of the broad nature of my project and its concern for how
the argument proceeds, I shall limit any formal exegesis of Socrates’
arguments, except when necessary. I think, nevertheless, that my ac-
count of Socrates’ conclusions stays well within the mainstream of Pla-
tonic scholarship. Furthermore, I set aside Sachs’ question of whether
Socrates is switching topics in the beginning of Book II, since Terry
Penner offers a comprehensive defense of Socrates’ response.8 I also
set aside problems associated with Book I being Socratic but the re-
mainder of the Republic being Platonic since, as will become clear, this
division does not effect the question put to Socrates or his defense of
justice per se.9
[original Book II] question ought to show that justice is a non-instrumental good
and whether the just person is always happier than the unjust. In Book IV Plato
claims to have given a preliminary (although still incomplete) answer … ’ (1995),
244. In Irwin, see also page 256.
7 It is on this point that I differ from Cameron. We primarily agree on the reading of
Book I, but whereas he finds (9) a shift to a new question in Book II, I do not.
8 Penner, Terry, ‘Platonic Justice and What We Mean by “Justice”’. Journal of the In-
ternational Plato Society 5 (2005) 1-76
9 I agree that Book I is Socratic while the rest is of the dialogue is Platonic primar-
ily because Books II-X contain a different theory of motivation than we find in
the Socratic dialogues. See Rowe, C. J., ‘The Uses and Disadvantages of Socrates’,
Histos 2 (1998).

232 James Butler
Book I
In Book I, Thrasymachus and Socrates disagree about the following

three positions:
(N) The nature of justice (338cff).

(P) The profitability of justice (344cff).
and
(V) Whether justice or injustice is a virtue (348cff).
In his argument, Thrasymachus combines the latter two positions,

maintaining that since injustice is profitable, injustice is a virtue. Jus-
tice, on the other hand, since it is not profitable, is not a virtue.
Soc: That is to say, you call justice a virtue and injustice a vice?
Thras: Is that likely, sweetest one, since I say that injustice is profitable
and justice is not?
Soc: Then what exactly do you say?
Thras: The opposite.
Soc: That justice is a vice?
Thras: No, just very noble naivete.
Soc: So you call injustice deviousness?
Thras: No, I call it being prudent. (348c-d)10
Given his positions on justice and injustice, Thrasymachus holds the

following strong relation between virtue and profitability:
(VP) X is a virtue if and only if X is profitable. 11
10 This translation and all that follow are based on Plato, Republic C.D.C. Reeve trans.
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 2004), with my occasional modifications.
11 Cameron (2) highlights this principle as central to Thrasymachus’ argument.

There is little doubt that that Socrates holds one half of the bicondi-
tional: if X is a virtue then X is profitable,12 but what of the other half?
Socrates, to his credit, recognizes that the other half of the conditional is
more controversial, for he tells Thrasymachus that, ‘if you had declared
that injustice is more profitable, but agreed that it is a vice or is shame-
ful, as some others do, we could be discussing the matter on the basis
of conventional views’ (348e). But being controversial is hardly a reason
for Socrates to reject any view. Indeed, Socrates demonstrates that he
accepts the other half of the biconditional: if something is profitable,
13
then it is a virtue. He proceeds to give first an argument that ‘the just
person has turned out to be good and wise, and the unjust one ignorant
and bad’ (350c), thereby undercutting injustice’s status as a virtue (V).
Socrates’ next establishes the necessity of justice for success in any en-
deavor. Drawing on the analogy of a just person to a just city — as will
become central to the argument in Book II — Socrates asks, ‘Will the
city that becomes stronger than another achieve this power without jus-
tice, or will it need the help of justice’ (351b). Thrasymachus responds:
‘if what you said a moment ago stands, and justice is wisdom, it will
need the help of justice; but if things are as I stated, it will need the help
of injustice’ (351c). Because injustice will not allow people to work to-
gether effectively (351d), but justice brings a common sense of purpose,
Socrates concludes that if one is to succeed in an activity (and assuming
that humans are social creatures) one will need justice:14
[Unjust people] would never have been able to keep their hands off
each other if they were completely unjust. But clearly there must have
been some sort of justice in them that at least prevented them from
doing injustice among themselves ... (352c)
The argument is almost finished, but Socrates notes:
12 For example, see Irwin (1995), 80, 100, and 177.

13 Glaucon seems to accept (VP) as well. For in Book I he remains unconvinced that
the unjust person possesses good things, but holds that ‘the life of a just person is
more profitable’ (347e-8a).
14 These same themes of the relation of virtue to profitability can be found at Euthyde-
mus 280c-2a and Meno 88c-d. In the latter passage, Socrates lays out both halves of
the biconditional: ‘all that the soul undertakes and endures, if directed by wisdom,
ends in happiness, but if directed by ignorance, it ends in the opposite … If then
virtue is something in the soul and it must be beneficial, it must be knowledge.’

234 James Butler
However, we must now examine the question as we proposed to do

before, of whether just people also live better and are happier than
unjust ones. I think it is clear even now from what we have said that
this is so, but we must consider it further. (352d)
Why does Socrates think that ‘it is clear’ that just people are happier
than unjust ones? Based on how the argument has progressed, Socrates
has accepted that virtue is both necessary and sufficient for profitabil-
ity (VP). Since, then, the just person has turned out to be virtuous and
capable benefiting him/herself, but the unjust person to be vicious and
incapable of producing benefit, Socrates thinks that the conclusion will
quite easily follow that the just person is happier than the unjust. At
this point, however, (VP) only establishes a general conclusion about
the profitability, but has not answered the question ‘profitable towards
what?’ Thus, he presents the function argument (352d-4a) to show
that the just life is more profitable in terms of producing a happy life.
Socrates’ conclusions of the function argument are as follows:
Now didn’t we agree that justice is a soul’s virtue and injustice its
vice? ... So a just soul and a just man will live well and an unjust one
badly? ... And surely anyone who lives well is blessed and happy, and
anyone who does not is the opposite. ... Therefore a just person is hap-
py and an unjust one wretched. ... But surely it is profitable not to be
wretched but to be happy ... So then, blessed Thrasymachus, injustice
is never more profitable than justice. (353e-4a)
Socrates seems to have resolved his three disagreements with Thrasy-

machus: having accepted Thrasymachus’ position that X is a virtue if
and only if X is profitable, the argument establishes that justice is wise
and good (N and V) , is necessary for one to succeed in any endeavor,
and is profitable towards one’s happiness (P).
Book II
At the outset of Book II, however, Glaucon remains unconvinced. He

‘renews the argument of Thrasymachus’ (358a) at first by introducing
the notorious three-fold division of goods at 357b:15
15 ‘Do you think that there is a sort of good we welcome, not because we desire its

A) Goods welcomed for their own sake.

B) Goods welcomed both for their own sake and for their
consequences.
C) Goods which are burdensome for their own sakes, but wel-
comed for their consequences.
Socrates claims that justice belongs to the best class (B) by ‘anyone who
is going to be blessed’ (358a2-3), but Glaucon claims that the many view
the matter differently:
They think [justice] is of the burdensome kind: the one that must be
practiced for the sake of the rewards and popularity that are the conse-
quences of a good reputation, but that is to be avoided as burdensome
in itself. (358a)
Glaucon lays out how his defense of Thrasymachus will proceed, re-
tracing positions on (N), (V), and (P):
(N) ‘First I will state what sort of thing people consider justice
to be, and what its origins are.’ (358b-c)
(V) ‘Second, I will argue that all who practice it do so unwill-
ingly, as something necessary, not as something good.’ (358c)
(P) ‘Third, I will argue that they have good reason to act as they
do. For the life of the unjust person is, they say, much better
than that of the just one.’ (358c)
Briefly, Glaucon explains that justice develops when those who can-
not do injustice with impunity enter into a semi- profitable agreement
neither to do nor to suffer injustice (358e-9a). Justice is choiceworthy
consequences, but because we welcome it for its own sake — enjoying for example
and all the harmless pleasures from which nothing results afterward beyond en-
joying having them ... And is there is a sort of good we love for its own sake, and
also for the sake of its consequences — knowing, for example, and seeing and
being healthy … And do you also recognize a third kind of good such as physical
training, medical treatment when sick, medicine itself, or ways of making money?
We would say that these are burdensome but beneficial to us, and we would not
choose them for their own sake, but for the sake of their rewards and other conse-
quences’ (357b-d).

236 James Butler
only as a middle ground between doing injustice to others and suffer-

ing it oneself (359a). Because of its mid-grade status, justice is thought
not to be a good, only a necessity. The real good would be to have the
ability to do injustice to others, while not suffering injustice, as Gyges
does (359b-60d). Finally, to make the choice between the just and unjust
life perfectly clear, Glaucon suggests a comparison between the purely
unjust life, with the reputation for being just, and the purely just life
with a reputation for injustice. Obviously, most people would say, such
a purely unjust life is happier (361d). With Thrasymachus’ positions
on (N), (V), and (P) elaborated, Glaucon and Adimantus then press
Socrates to show that justice belongs in the best class, welcomed for its
own sakes and for its consequences.
Understanding the three-fold classification is the key to determining
how exactly Glaucon and Adimantus reformulate Thrasymachus’ ar-
gument as well as how Socrates is to respond. Interpreters like Mabbott
and Irwin believe that the three-fold classification introduces new, quite
radical criteria of intrinsic goodness. Mabbott comments as follows:
… the task of Socrates, on my theory, is to show that justice is in ‘the

best class’ good in itself and good for its consequences. In proving the
first half of the thesis all consequences must be eliminated ... In prov-
ing the second, the necessary and inevitable consequences must be
brought back in again. (1937, 471)
Irwin, while admitting that the best class of goods is intimately in-
volved with the consequences for happiness, suggests that Plato views
justice as ‘welcomed for its own sake’ apart from its causal consequenc-
es:
Plato wants to find out what justice is in itself, apart from its causal
consequences, because he believes that once we have found this, we
will have sufficient reason to choose justice without reference to its
causal consequences. (1995, 191)
The consequence which Irwin does allow is the intrinsic relationship

between justice and happiness: Justice makes one happy because justice
is a dominant component of the intrinsic good of happiness (1995, 193),
and as such, justice itself is an intrinsic good (1995, 254-6). According to
Irwin, Socrates eventually turns to the question of causal consequences
after Book IV (1995, 256).

I think that Mabbott’s and Irwin’s views are incorrect as I have ar-
gued more fully elsewhere.16 But briefly, in inquiring about justice itself
— contrary to how we might interpret that phrase — the brothers clearly
do not suggest that Socrates omit any reference to consequences, or even
causal consequences.17 Adimantus reports, ‘in order to clarify what
Glaucon has in mind,’ that people ‘do not praise justice, only the good
reputation it brings’ (363a). These rewards of reputation, the brothers
realize, need not flow from actually being just, but could be gained by
an unjust person who merely appears to be just. Thus, the brothers tell
Socrates that he is not allowed to appeal to consequences which flow from
a reputation for being just, as that would not bear on the value of ac-
tual justice itself, rather only on the appearance of justice (367a-d). This
limitation clearly does not preclude Socrates from appealing to other
causal consequences (such as enjoyment) since Glaucon himself ap-
peals to consequences in his descriptions of goods ‘welcomed for their
own sakes’ — ‘harmless pleasures from which nothing results after-
ward beyond enjoying having them’ (357b) — as well as other goods as
18
burdensome in themselves (358a).
Furthermore, under Mabbott and Irwin’s views, Plato would have
to forget that he promises (via Glaucon and Adimantus) to renew Thra-
symachus’ argument. Plato would instead be introducing new criteria
never mentioned by Thrasymachus, which is likely inconsistent with
Thrasymachus’ position (VP). It is rather implausible that Plato would
be so forgetful.
Given that an appeal to causal consequences is allowable, when we
apply the positions agreed upon in Book I, we find that Glaucon and
Adimantus’ reformulation is far more straightforward than interpreters
like Mabbott and Irwin believe. When the interlocutors accept (VP) in
Book I, they maintain the principle of profitability as the fundamental
criterion about justice and injustice’s value. Still, the brothers question
— as do the many — whether the profits attributed to justice should ac-
tually be so attributed. Since the supposedly profitable consequences of
16 Butler, James, ‘The Arguments for the Most Pleasant Life in Republic IX: A Note
Against the Common Interpretation’, Apeiron 32 (1999) 37-48
17 An additional rejection of Mabbott’s view can be found in Penner (2005), 51-2n14.
18 Indeed, Socrates goes on to show in Book IX (580-8) that justice in the soul results
in the best kinds of enjoyment.

238 James Butler
justice — fame, good reputation, and friends19 — may actually accrue to

one who merely appears to be just, those consequences cannot reliably
be applied to justice itself.20 Thus, justice must be defended on the basis
of only those benefits that accrue to justice itself.21
On the reading I suggest, we can see that Glaucon and Adimantus
posit a rather simple modification of Thrasymachus’ position: Having
all accepted (VP) from Book I, they believe that Socrates counted to-
ward justice certain consequences (i.e., reputation) that he ought not
have, namely those consequences cannot reliably be attributed to jus-
tice itself. The brothers reset the parameters within the debate, asking
Socrates to set aside the rewards from reputation and again defend jus-
tice in terms of its profitability.
19 Recall that Socrates’ argument against Thrasymachus appeals to the necessity of

justice in order to get along with others (351dff).
20 See 361a-d, 363a, 365b, 366dff, 367b-c.
21 To understand the simplicity of the brothers’ reformulation of Thrasymachus’
challenge let’s look at an analogous case of modifying a debate: Imagine a per-
son G asks another person S, ‘Who was more important to the Beatles’ success,
George or Paul?’ G and S might initially agree — akin to Socrates and Glaucon’s
acceptance of (VP) — that the greater member is the one who composed the most
successful songs. S initially argues that Paul wrote most of the hit songs that
directly lead to the Beatles’ success. G responds however, that this criterion of
success, while correct, is difficult to apply to McCartney’s repertoire, because
Paul appears as composer on many hit songs actually written by John Lennon
(under the label ‘Lennon/McCartney’). Thus, Paul is gaining credit in the con-
test for songs that do not necessarily apply to him as composer. Accordingly, G
changes the parameters within the question in such a way as to omit consider-
ation of any songs listed as ‘by Lennon/McCartney’ unless it is clear that they
apply to Paul himself and only Paul. So G asks, ‘Regarding only the songs that
we can accurately ascribe to Paul, are they still more successful than George’s?’
If we were to accept Mabbott’s view and apply it to the above analogy, G would
have to introduce new means of assessing the worth of a member like instrumen-
tal virtuosity or chastity while on tour. But in an important way, Mabbott would
radically change the debate. A much simpler tack is for G to notice that S is unable
to trace the usual consequences back accurately to Paul, and therefore to ask for a
re-evaluation based on only those consequences that accurately apply to Paul.

Book IV
All those deciphering the Republic’s defense of justice recognize that

Book IV — specifically the end of Book IV — contains an important step
in the argument. Socrates concludes, ‘Virtue then, so it seems, is a sort
of health, a fine and good state of the soul, whereas vice seems to be a
shameful disease and weakness’ (444d-e). He then indicates how they
should proceed, ‘So it now remains, it seems, for us to consider whether
it is more profitable to do just actions … ’ (444e-5a).
These two passages frequently mislead commentators who posit a
new manner of assessing justice. Mabbott believes that Socrates moves
from considering justice as good in itself regardless of consequences to
considering the beneficial (i.e., happy) consequences of justice. 22 Irwin,
for his part, believes that Socrates has drawn the preliminary conclu-
sion that, ‘ In Book IV [Plato] claims to have shown that justice is an
intrinsic good and that it is dominant in happiness’ (1995, 244), but
that ‘[in] Books VIII and IX … he defends the answer in Book IV by
describing the nature and effects of psychic injustice more fully’ (1995,
256).
The remainder of the Book IV text, however, poses problems for both
Mabbott and Irwin’s views. For if Socrates were here shifting from the
intrinsic worth of justice to its consequence upon happiness, as Mab-
bott holds, we would expect him to keep the arguments separate and
happiness would come into play only after the Book IV shift. Yet, prior
to the end of Book IV, Socrates twice mentions the centrality of happi-
ness to his argument:
... we aren’t looking to make any one group in it outstandingly happy,

but to make the whole city so, as far as possible. For we thought that we
would be most likely to find justice in such a city and injustice, by
contrast, in the one that is governed worst. And we thought that by
observing both cities, we’d be able to judge the question we’ve been
inquiring into for so long. (420b)
So then, son of Ariston, your city would now seem to be founded. ...
look inside it … to see where the justice and the injustice might be
in it, how they differ from one another and which of the two must
be possessed by the person who is going to be happy should possess,
22 See note 6.

240 James Butler
whether that fact is hidden from all gods and humans or not. (427d)
[my emphasis]
So unless we are willing to convict Socrates of hopelessly intermingling

the two separate evaluations of his argument, we should look for a sim-
pler explanation of Book IV.
The latter two passages in Book IV also work against Irwin’s view:
For as Socrates lays out how the argument will proceed, he does not
mention any of the distinctions crucial to Irwin’s view. He never says
that happiness has parts — of which justice is the dominant part — nor
does he explain that justice can make the city (or the person) happy in
two distinct ways, either as a component or as an instrumental means.
If Socrates were making the two-tiered argument as Irwin suggests, we
would expect Socrates to show more care to disambiguate the argu-
ment.
The simpler explanation is to read all of these Book IV passages in
light of Socrates’ response to Glaucon (on behalf of Thrasymachus).
420b clearly points to the original question and method from Book II.
427d foretells how Socrates will answer the three disputes with Thrasy-
machus: They should ‘look inside it and see where the justice and the
injustice might be in it’ presumably to find out the nature of justice and
injustice (N). He further wants to discover ‘what the difference between
them is’, presumably which one is a virtue and which one a vice (V).
And finally, he seeks to determine each trait’s profitability: ‘which of
the two [justice or injustice] the person who is to be happy should pos-
sess’ (P).
As the interlocutors arrive the end of Book IV, Socrates has answered
two of the three disputes with Thrasymachus:
(N*) Doesn’t it follow, then, that to produce justice is to establish

the elements in the soul in a natural relation of mastering and
being mastered by one another, while to produce injustice is to
establish a relation of ruling and being ruled by one another
that is contrary to nature? (444d)
(V*) Virtue then, so it seems, is a sort of health, a fine and good state
of the soul, whereas vice seems to be a shameful disease and
weakness ... (444d-e)
All that remains is to answer Thrasymachus’ third position:

(P*) So it now remains, it seems, for us to consider whether it is

more profitable to do just actions, engage in fine practices, and
be just, whether one is known to be so or not…(444e-5a)
Glaucon thinks, however, that the third dispute is already answered

and need no longer be considered:
But Socrates, that question [of profitability] seems to me, at least to

have become ridiculous, now that the two have been shown to be as
we described. Life does not seem worth living when the body’s natu-
ral constitution is ruined…. So how … could it be worth living when
the natural constitution of the very thing by which we live is ruined
and is in turmoil? (445a-b)
Socrates responds: 23
Yes, it is ridiculous. All the same, since in fact we have reached a point
from which we can see with the utmost clarity, as it were, that these
things are so, we must not give up. (445b)
On the view that I am proposing, it is clear why Glaucon thinks that

the contest is over and Socrates agrees: Having already accepted (VP)
and given Socrates’ argument (culminating at 444d-e) that justice is a
virtue and injustice is a vice, it follows that justice is profitable and in-
justice is not. But Socrates, even though he too endorses (VP), realizes
that the interlocutors have been merely assuming the truth of (VP) and
so the argument must continue. They must now confirm that justice it-
self is profitable and injustice is not, and they set out to prove as much
in Books V-IX.
23 Notice how Socrates response is similar to what he said towards the end of Book
I, ‘However, we must now examine the question as we proposed to do before, of
whether just people also live better and are happier than unjust ones. I think it is
clear even now from what we have said that this is so, but we must consider it further’
(352d).

242 James Butler
Book V
Before moving to Socrates’ ultimate defense of justice in Book IX, we

must take a moment to examine a passage in Book V which might seem
to be in conflict with my thesis. At 505e-6a Socrates says about the form
of the good:
Every soul pursues the good and does whatever it does for its sake.
It divines that the good is something but it is perplexed and cannot
adequately grasp what it is or acquire the sort of stable beliefs it has
about other things, and so it misses the benefit, if any, that even those
other things might give. Will we allow the best people in the city, to
whom we entrust everything, to be so in the dark about something of
this kind and of this importance?
Since Vlastos’ 1965 ‘Degrees of Reality’ article,24 forms have come to

be thought of as unqualified bearers of their predicates: the form of F is
unqualifiedly F. 25 The form of the good, then, must be good without any
reference to anything else, including anyone’s benefit.26 Accordingly,
actions taken for the sake of the form of the good cannot have reference
to anyone’s advantage, but must be far more neutral and unqualified.27
Interpreters therefore suggest that Plato’s just person, the philosopher-
ruler who knows the form of the good, no longer has interest in how
justice is profitable to her or anyone else in the city; profitability to the
just person — along with (VP) — is strictly irrelevant.28
24 Vlastos, Gregory, ‘Degrees of Reality in Plato’, in Platonic Studies, 2nd ed. (Princ-
eton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1981), 58-75
25 I myself reject Vlastos’ interpretation of forms, but to defend such a rejection here
would take me too far afield.
26 See White, ‘The notable feature of this absence of qualifications is the fact that
the Good is good apart from any reference to any particular person’s tastes, likes
desires, or beliefs about what is good, and it is not a notion of what is good or
beneficial to or for someone or other’ (1979), 35.
27 For instance, as Cooper suggests, ‘to advance the reign of rational order in the
world as a whole’ (1997), 24.
28 See Cooper 1997, 27.

Socrates’ account of knowing the form of the good, however, begins

at 505a and explicitly focuses on the advantageous consequences of
having such knowledge:
… you’ve often heard it said that the form of the good is the most im-
portant thing to learn about and that it’s by their relation to it that just
things and the others become useful and beneficial. … And you also
know that if we don’t know it, even the fullest possible knowledge of
other things is of no benefit to us, any more than if we acquire any pos-
session without the good of it. Or do you think that it is any advantage
to have every kind of possession without the good of it? (505a)
Given the order of the text, surely it would be odd for Plato to speak of
the advantageous consequences first (at 505a), before introducing the
alleged primary, unqualified goodness of the form of the good (at 505e).
It would be equally odd for Plato to reiterate that knowing the form of
the good is beneficial at 505e4 above without explicitly separating these
beneficial results from the other (allegedly more important) reasons to
act according to the form of the good. Since Plato does not make such a
distinction, I think that we ought to conclude that Plato is not diminish-
ing his focus on the beneficial consequences of justice when he intro-
duces the form of the good.
Book IX
In Book IX, we come to Socrates’ ultimate conclusion that justice is to

be welcomed for its own sake apart from any of the rewards which
come from a good reputation. Socrates presents three arguments show-
ing that the just life is happiest by means of showing that the just life is
most pleasant and the unjust life least pleasant.29 He concludes the first
proof stating, ‘… The son of Ariston has given as his verdict that the
best and most just is the most happy … whereas the worst and the most
unjust is the most wretched’ (580b9-c3).
29 See Butler 1999.

244 James Butler
Perhaps most importantly, Socrates introduces the third proof30 as

follows:
Well, then, that makes two in a row. And twice the just person has
been victorious over the unjust one. And now comes the third, which
is dedicated in the Olympic fashion to our savior, Olympian Zeus. Ob-
serve, then, that the other pleasures — apart from those of the intel-
ligent person — are neither entirely true nor pure. On the contrary,
they are like a sort of illusionist painting, as I think I have heard some
wise person say. Yet, this would be the greatest and most decisive of
the overthrows. (583b1-7)
Taking Socrates at his word, this third proof is Socrates’ final answer to
Glaucon and Adimantus. And as we would expect on my interpreta-
tion, Socrates shows that justice is more profitable than injustice be-
cause justice produces more pleasant results. He concludes:
So, when the entire soul follows the philosophic element and does not
engage in faction, the result is that each element does its own work
and is just; and in particular, each enjoys its own pleasures, the best
pleasures and — to the degree possible — the truest. ...
So, when one of the other parts gains mastery, the result is that it can-
not discover its own pleasure and compels the other parts to pursue
an alien, and not a true pleasure. (586e-7a)
After the completion of this third proof, Socrates harkens all the way
back to Glaucon and Adimantus’ restatement in Book II:31
Since we’ve reached this point in the argument, let us return to the
first things we mentioned that since they are what led us here. I think
someone said that doing injustice profits a completely unjust person
who is believed to be just. Wasn’t that the claim? ... Now let us discuss
it with its proponent, then, since we’ve now agreed on the respective
powers that doing justice and injustice have. (588b)
30 I skip the second proof as well as a defense of the third; for I have defended them
elsewhere. See Butler 1999 and 2002.
31 Reeve 2004 also notes how this passage harkens back to Books I and II.

By returning to the Book II challenge after recently concluding the third

proof, Socrates clearly takes himself to have completed — and deci-
sively so — the defense of justice.32 But given that these three proofs,
particularly the third, focus on the profitability of justice in terms of
pleasure, we see that the profitable results of justice have always been
at the forefront of the Republic’s defense of justice, from Thrasymachus’
Book I challenge to Socrates ultimate answer in Book IX.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that Socrates’ Book I argument with Thra-
symachus is not as isolated from the rest of the Republic’s defense of
justice as we might think. Rather than merely being an incomplete in-
troduction (White) or an appendage of Socratic philosophy made irrel-
evant after Glaucon’s reformulation (Irwin), it is more plausible to read
Book I as introducing pivotal principles — most notably (VP) — which
set the parameters for the rest the dialogue. So, even though there are
some compelling reasons to think that Republic I is an early, Socratic
dialogue, we ought not therefore overreach and entirely disconnect the
philosophy contained therein from the remainder of the Republic.
CPO 1914
Berea College
Berea, KY 40404
U.S.A.
jim_butler@berea.edu
32 Jowett and Campbell seem to agree: ‘Socrates, not without the air of triumph re-
turns to the source of the discussion, which is finally disposed of — the old argu-
ment of Thrasymachus … ’. Jowett, B. and Campbell, L. Plato’s Republic (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 1894), 434.

246 James Butler


A Wholistic Defense of Justice in The Republic

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

A Wholistic Defense of Justice in The Republic

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

A Holistic Defense of Justice in the Republic 229

A Holistic Defense of Justice

If one were to survey the diverse commentaries on the Republic, one

1 I am indebted to Richard Cameron and his paper, ‘Defending Socrates’ Case

APEIRON a journal for ancient philosophy and science

Plato actually abandons the defense of justice from Book I in favor of a

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Even if only a handful of these interpretations were correct, the Re-

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

In Book I, Thrasymachus and Socrates disagree about the following

(N) The nature of justice (338cff).

(V) Whether justice or injustice is a virtue (348cff).

In his argument, Thrasymachus combines the latter two positions,

Soc: Then what exactly do you say?

Thras: The opposite.

Soc: That justice is a vice?

Thras: No, just very noble naivete.

Soc: So you call injustice deviousness?

Thras: No, I call it being prudent. (348c-d)10

Given his positions on justice and injustice, Thrasymachus holds the

(VP) X is a virtue if and only if X is profitable. 11

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

The argument is almost finished, but Socrates notes:

12 For example, see Irwin (1995), 80, 100, and 177.

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

However, we must now examine the question as we proposed to do

Socrates seems to have resolved his three disagreements with Thrasy-

At the outset of Book II, however, Glaucon remains unconvinced. He

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

A) Goods welcomed for their own sake.

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

only as a middle ground between doing injustice to others and suffer-

… the task of Socrates, on my theory, is to show that justice is in ‘the

The consequence which Irwin does allow is the intrinsic relationship

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

justice — fame, good reputation, and friends19 — may actually accrue to

19 Recall that Socrates’ argument against Thrasymachus appeals to the necessity of

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

All those deciphering the Republic’s defense of justice recognize that

... we aren’t looking to make any one group in it outstandingly happy,

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

So unless we are willing to convict Socrates of hopelessly intermingling

(N*) Doesn’t it follow, then, that to produce justice is to establish

All that remains is to answer Thrasymachus’ third position:

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

(P*) So it now remains, it seems, for us to consider whether it is

Glaucon thinks, however, that the third dispute is already answered

But Socrates, that question [of profitability] seems to me, at least to

On the view that I am proposing, it is clear why Glaucon thinks that

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Before moving to Socrates’ ultimate defense of justice in Book IX, we

Since Vlastos’ 1965 ‘Degrees of Reality’ article,24 forms have come to

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Socrates’ account of knowing the form of the good, however, begins

In Book IX, we come to Socrates’ ultimate conclusion that justice is to

29 See Butler 1999.

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Perhaps most importantly, Socrates introduces the third proof30 as

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

By returning to the Book II challenge after recently concluding the third

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn