B. Maimonides: connecting various topics.

Maimonides’ system of thought consists mainly in a harmonization of principles of

Jewish medieval faith with the Aristotelian natural sciences, adapting the former to the
specificities of the latter.

In his model, Aristoteles portrays a world in which substances have matter, that, in
every case, due to its composite nature tends to degrade (still being the matter, as a
whole, eternal); and form, that, in each case of every form of the substance, “leave” and
“enter” the substance, shaping it and causing it to move, under the premise that every
substance tends to fulfill its potential, thus requiring an external mind that explains this
tendency.

This motor is the superior level above the world, where some of the celestial bodies are
situated and move, following their own tendency to fulfill themselves. This level is also
the active intellect of the inferior one, being the source of all knowledge, in the sense
that knowledge is acquired by attaching oneself to this active intellect (i.e. thinking,
since this is the way through which the world goes from being perceived to being
known). The consequence of this process of getting to know an object is that the
knowing subject, the known object and the active intellect bind themselves intimately.2

Equally, the motor of the elements of this level is situated one level above itself, in a
manner that repeats itself to a total of ten spheres, whereas, after the last one, we find
the ultimate reason of all movement, which itself doesn’t move and is composed only of
form. This last motor corresponds with the common notion of “God”, nonetheless
differing with this notion in several aspects, like the fact that this is a purely logical
God, thus acting only in accordance to its perfect logic and not to a will and not being
an ethical being. One the implications of this idea in Maimonides’ thought is that, since

1
Since the sources for this paper consist mainly of class notes and adapted source texts, its structure will
be that of an essay, therefore, without systematic quotes – also, in a very Maimonidean way: ”Know that
the things about which we shall speak in these chapters [...]”. This been said, it is necessary noting that
this essay will be conducted under the premises of the radical interpretations of Maimonides’ thought
presented during the lessons. Explanations won’t be extensive nor clarifying, but merely expository, for
the sake of brevity.
2
The vagueness of the statement is intended, since the nature of this relationship in Aristotle’s thought is,
apparently, not completely clear. It has been suggested though, that, in this kind of bound, the
understanding thing becomes the acquired knowledge. Being as unsatisfactory as this explanation might
be, noting that individuals get bound to the active intellect by acquiring knowledge (in the sense that the
achieved thoughts remain in the active intellect) should suffice to present some implications of the
Aristotelian model in Maimonides’ thought.
God only acts according to rules of logic, miracles, however wonderful they might
seem, only apparently go against the natural order.

Maimonides then applies the Jewish conception of God’s unity to this model, implying
that God does not share any characteristics with any other beings, which means, by
extension, that none of its attributes can be known. Knowledge of God itself is,
therefore, unreachable. This idea of unity also excludes the possibility of multiple
characteristics, that would imply a composite character. God, therefore, exists – and
only exists; although not in the same manner anything else exists.

In a similar way, for him the whole Jewish set of beliefs is molded in accordance to
these ideas: in his view, knowledge replaces ethics as the core of Judaism, given that
transcendence is not reached through salvation but by attaching oneself to the active
intellect.

Knowledge also allows approaching God – and, thus, perfecting oneself – in double
way: by knowing its acts and, more importantly, by exclusion. Given that God doesn’t
share any features with the rest of the world or the spheres, by knowing them we get to
know what God is not. However, genuine knowledge of God can also intuitively be
acquired through imagination that, in the same manner that it allows to think what is not
real, provides insight otherwise inaccessible to humans, which also cannot be described
with regular language.

On the other pole of the spectrum, ethics are perceived by Maimonides as a practical
question on two levels: for the individual, ethics provide health to the soul (being
understood as part of the body), thus calming the spirit and allowing to devote oneself
to acquiring knowledge; and, on the collective level, they allow to stablish the social
order and peace that are again necessary to look for knowledge.

After this model, prophets play a double role. On one hand, they acquire knowledge,
about the world accessing the active intellect and about God using their imagination,
and translate3 this knowledge to the language of the people, so they can approach
themselves to God. On the other hand, they must guide the people in a way that allows
them to fulfill themselves to the most of their capabilities and also conduct them
ethically. In the end, prophets are not more than a sort of imaginative philosophers with
leadership abilities.

3
This translation is imperfect for the reasons exposed previously in this same paper.
C. In the wake of Maimonides:

‫מ ֹשֶׁ ה בֶׁן־נָחְמָ ן‬: diverges with Maimonides’ reasoning of the development of the halakha:
whereas Maimonides saw idol worshipping as a primitive, foolish practice; Ramban
considered it dangerous for being actually effective. In a similar manner, the
Maimonidean idea, that interpreted most of dubious practices in Leviticus as a
progressive, context dependent, pedagogical solution in the transition from paganism to
monotheism and rationality, clashes with Nachmanides’ more traditional approach
towards the Torah. Nonetheless, Ramban will defend Maimonides against the Tosafist
circles, presenting him as compromise safeguard for Judaism in front of Philosophy.

Benedito de Espinosa: takes the Maimonidean conception of the prophets as

imaginative leaders to an extreme point, by which their sole role was to stablish a
society around a series of commandments justified and supported by the monotheistic
religion. Therefore, he dismisses halakha as the constitution of a society no longer
extant.

Moses Mendelssohn: reviews Maimonides’ harmonization between science and

religion and the role of ethics: since science is an ongoing process, the unchanging
Torah cannot contain specific scientific truths. Instead, the Torah should be a reminder
of the place of God in metaphysics. Mendelssohn also adapts the Maimonidean
universalism based on reason, but places the stress on ethics as the core principle, and
interprets halakha as a particular trait of the Jewish people.

‫דער װילנער גאון‬: in spite of acting in many aspects in a way that resembled the ways of
Maimonides – like devoting himself completely to the study of Torah and other
disciplines to better understand this Teaching; this Gaon dismisses Philosophy as
methodology for contradicting some statements of the Talmud and interpreting them in
an allegorical way, such as the use of amulets, or giving them practical explanations,
thus denying the spiritual dimension of the text.