G.R. No.

141529            June 6, 2001

FRANCISCO YAP, JR., aka EDWIN YAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Summary: 
Petitioner Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating
amounts equivalent to P5.5 Million. After the records of the case were transmitted to
the Court of Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the
motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5 Milion on condition that
he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence
that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is
rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to
the court and private complainant.” He sought the reduction of the bail but it was
denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA, by setting bail at a
prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He also contested the
condition imposed by the CA that he secure a certification/guaranty, claiming that
the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.
Facts:
1. Petitioner was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
a. sentenced to four years and two months of prision correctional,  as
minimum to eight years of prision mayor  as maximum, "in addition to one
(1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no
case shall it exceed twenty (20) years."
2. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty
under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings.
a. The motion was denied by the trial court
3. After records of the case were transmitted to CA, Petitioner filed (CA) a Motion
to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal
a. SolGen opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of
P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a certification/guaranty from the
Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that
he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private
complainant."
b. Petitioner filed a Reply, contending that the proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00
was violative of his right against excessive bail.
4. CA upheld SG’s recommendation: 5.5M bail and secure certification/guaranty +
a. Commission of Immigration and Deportation to issue a hold departure
order against accused (Petitioner);
b. Accused to surrender his passport to Division Clerk of Court for
 safekeeping (until court orders its return)
5. Petitioner filed MR, seeking reduction of the amount of bail but was denied.

Issues: 
1. Whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail in the
amount of P5.5 million based on the petitioner’s civil liability.
2. Whether or not CA unduly restricted petitioner’s constitutional liberty of abode
and travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail.
Petitioner’s contention:
 Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied
Petitioner his right to bail.
 Petitioner prays that bail be reduced to at least P40,000.00, citing the maximum
amount of bail that can be posted for the crime of estafa under the 1996 Bail
Bond Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the amount of bail he posted during
the trial of the case.
SG’s contention:
 No grave abuse of discretion considering the severity of the penalty imposed, the
weight of the evidence against petitioner, and the gravity of the offense of
which petitioner was convicted by the RTC.
 Furthermore, SG further pointed out the probability of flight in case petitioner is
released on bail
o Petitioner was in possession of a valid passport and visa and left the
country several times during the course of the proceedings in the lower
court
o Petitioner also used different names in his business transactions and had
several abodes in different parts of the country
 SG also contends that all CA requires is notice in case of change of address; it
does not in any way impair petitioner's right to change abode for as long as the
court is apprised of his change of residence during the pendency of the appeal.
Ruling: 
1. Right to Bail. YES – bail was excessive
The Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of the accused to be a
guideline or basis for determining the amount of bail. The amount should be high
enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfil this purpose.
In this case, to fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which
petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the
amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of;
which cannot be allowed because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a
satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of
the appellate court.

2. Liberty of abode and right to travel. No – did not restrict liberty of abode
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by
petitioner, are not absolute rights.  Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.  Neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
In this case, the CA order releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful
order as contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the A is
simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that
petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the  Court requires his
presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner
is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in
case he does so. 

Addt’l Notes:
 How much is the bail amount then?
SC cannot yield to petitioner's submission that bail in the instant case be set at
P40,000.00 based on the 1996 Bail Bond Guide. Courts are advised that they must not
only be aware but should also consider the Bail Bond Guide due to its significance in
the administration of criminal justice. This notwithstanding, the Court is not
precluded from imposing in petitioner's case an amount higher than P40,000 where it
perceives that an appropriate increase is dictated by the circumstances.
Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the
evidence against petitioner, SC believes that the amount of P200,000.00 is more
reasonable.
Petitioner: JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE
Respondent: THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 189122        March 17, 2010

DOCTRINE
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of
discretion

FACTS
 Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste
was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of
homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one
day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal
as maximum.

 He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an

urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age
and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight
on his part.

 The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the
bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to
extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised “with grave caution
and only for strong reasons.”

 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

 Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present.
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his
application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of
bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court
is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to
an appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant
sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years,
does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail
should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be
filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However,
if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with
and resolved by the appellate court.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar circumstances:
(a)That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification;
(c)That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e)That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review
the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either
case. (emphasis supplied)

RULING
NO. Absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 means that a less stringent approach in granting bail only subject
to the discretion of the court to grant bail.
Under Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the
following rules:
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of
 imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed,
and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of
the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is
present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court

The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the
penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six
years:
The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said
paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission
of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal
confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a
valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on
bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or
other similar circumstances) not present.
The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
circumstances.

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means
that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. In other
words, the appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said
circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny
or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending
appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Thus, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the appellate
court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on
the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are
prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those
circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that
none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of
bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound
discretion approach.
DISPOSITION:  Petition DISMISSED. 

ADDITIONAL NOTES: History and Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending Appeal

The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of
the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall
before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those
charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as
well as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the
following policies concerning theeffectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for
bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is
convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the
complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph
shall be applied;

Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94

dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as
follows:
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail. Denial
of bail pending appeal is “a matter of wise discretion.”
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates
and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail
is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must
be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
G.R. NO. 115407, AUGUST 28, 1995
MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, PETITIONER VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS

SUMMARY: Petitioner was implicated as the mastermind of a multiple murder. Then,

he was formally charged in an amended information promulgated by the prosecutor.
Petitioner assailed his inclusion in the case and before the warrant of arrest was
served, he filed a motion for admission to bail. The RTC granted the motion. The state
prosecutor argues that petitioner should not be granted bail because he was, at the
time of the filing, not yet brought to the custody of the law as it happened before the
warrant of arrest was served. The CA reversed the ruling.

Facts:
1. On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged as a co-conspirator in the
crime of multiple murder for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime
in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time. The
original information, filed had initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused
suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie
Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in the
indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son,
Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended,
tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have
remained at large up to the present.

2. Later, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an amended
information, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As petitioner was his former
employer, Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel. Ironically, during the
preliminary investigation, the accused, in a signed affidavit but which he later
retracted, implicated petitioner as the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of
the Bucag family.

3. Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the
case, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor, designated a
replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to
a resolution of the new prosecutor, petitioner was finally charged as a co-
conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information. Petitioner
assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this Court." In an en
banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the
second amended information against him.
4. The trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for
petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner through
counsel, filed a motion for admission to bail with the trial court. Petitioner duly
furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin
Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application
for bail.

5. As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital
due to "acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting
custody over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the
integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail
application, he considered being in the custody of the law. On that note, the trial
court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following day,
petitioner, apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then, managed to
personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the
amount thus fixed.

6. The new state prosecutor opposed the court’s ruling and filed a motion for
reconsideration but was then denied. Thus elevating the matter to the Court of
Appeals which sided to the arguments of the prosecutor, reversing the ruling of the
lower court.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can invoke his right to bail considering petitioner’s
contention that he already submitted himself to the custody of the law and
considering further respondent’s contention that he filed for bail before the warrant
of arrest was served on him.

Ruling:

Yes. Petitioner should be allowed to invoke his right to bail as he already

submitted himself to the custody of the law.

On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a)
when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section
6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section
7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the
proper authorities.17 in this light, the ruling, vis-a-vis the facts in Santiago vs.
Vasquez, etc., et al.,18 should be explained.
 In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his
motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under
arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be
considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise
peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail
court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily
submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of
the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made
either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of
the person making the arrest.19 The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called
"house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or
restricted to the military camp area.

It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically

made it known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail
that he could not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan
Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain
medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court,
notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner,
never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it
would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the physical custody of
the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital
bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him
under guard.

The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of
the law. Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point
since they never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers,
he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing
the application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information
of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the
jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a
warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced
any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the
authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission application for
bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.
Government of the US vs Purganan
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002

PETITIONER: GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

represented by the Philippine Department of Justice
RESPONDENTS: Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO
BATACAN CRESPO

SUMMARY OF FACTS: (FOR WRITING: ITALICIZED)

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the
extradition of Mark Jimenez, A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued in connection with the
following charges (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain
offenses (2) tax evasion (3) wire fraud (4) false statements, and (5) illegal campaign
contributions, but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional
liberty.
Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail
for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take
cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.

DETAILED FACTS (FOR RECIT)

1. The petition at bar sought to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23,
2001and July 3, 2001 issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed
Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for
the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez. The second challenged Order, on the
other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time granted bail
to Jimenez.
2. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying
for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD
1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the
petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion”
praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the
hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum.
Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be
allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance
of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in
cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
 3. Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best
to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the
extradition proceedings are pending.

CONTENTIONS: (BY THE PETITIONER)

Petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting
the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest
warrant.

1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that
provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and
Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied
upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings
leading to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear
showing by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public
respondent received no evidence of special circumstances which may justify release
on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will
engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure
compliance by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case
entitled Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17,
Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting bail,
had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders.

CONTENTIONS: (BY RESPONDENT)

Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that Sec. 13, Art. III of the Consitution
secures the right to bail of all persons, including those sought to be extradited.
Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to
the present case of Section 4of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as
practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall
also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069. l

RULING: No, Jimenez is not entitled to bail and provisional liberty.

As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail,
as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply
to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to
a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

SIDE NOTES:
The constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It
follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

Five Postulates Of Extradition:

• Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
• The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused.
• The Proceedings Are Sui Generis.
• Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
RODRIGUEZ V. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC MANILA BRANCH 17
GR. NO. 157977 
Feb. 27 2006

TOPIC: Notice and Hearing for Cancellation of Bail in Extradition

FACTS:
After the arrest of petitioners Eduardo Tolentino Rodriguez and Imelda Gener
Rodriguez, they applied for bail which the trial court granted on September 25, 2001. 
They posted cash bonds for the bail set for P1M for each. The US government moved
for reconsideration of the grant of bail which was denied.  The US government filed a
petition for certiorari entitled Gov’t of the USA v. Hon. Ponferrada where the court
directed the trial court to resolve the matter of bail guided by this court’s ruling on
Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan.  The lower court, without prior notice
and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. 

Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the reconsideration of the

cancellation of their bail which was denied.  Hence, this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition directed against the order for cancellation of cash bond and
issuance of a warrant of arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether or NOT there should be notice and hearing before the cancellation of
bail in an extradition case.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

1) Petitioners assert that their bail cannot be cancelled without due process of law.

By way of analogy, they point to Rule 114, Section 21 of the Rules of Court
where the surety or bonding company is required to be notified and allowed to
show cause why the bail bond should not be cancelled. They say that if the rules
grant this opportunity to surety and bonding companies, the more reason then
that in an extradition case the same should be afforded.

2) Petitioners also contend that this Court’s directive in G.R. No. 151456 did not in
any way authorize the respondent court to cancel their bail.

Petitioners aver that respondent court should have first determined the
facts to evaluate if petitioners were entitled to continuance of their
bail, e.g. their willingness to go on voluntary extradition, which respondent
 court should have considered a special circumstance

3) Petitioners claim that their bail should not have been cancelled since their
situation falls within the exception to the general rule of no-bail. They allege
that their continuous offer for voluntary extradition is a special circumstance
that should be considered in determining that their temporary liberty while on
bail be allowed to continue.

They cite that petitioner Eduardo is in fact already in the United States
attending the trial. They also have not taken flight as fugitives. Besides,
according to petitioners, the State is more than assured they would not flee
because their passports were already confiscated and there is an existing hold-
departure order against them. Moreover, petitioners assert, they are not a danger
to the community.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

1) Respondents, for their part, argue that prior notice and hearing are not required
to cancel petitioners’ bail, and the issuance of a warrant of arrest ex parte against
an extraditee is not a violation of the due process clause.
Further, respondents maintain that prior notice and hearing would defeat
the purpose of the arrest warrant since it could give warning that respondents
would be arrested and even encourage them to flee.

2) Even granting that prior notice and hearing are indeed required, respondents
contend that petitioners had been effectively given prior notice and opportunity
to be heard, because the trial court’s order clearly stated that the matter of bail
shall be subject to whatever ruling the Supreme Court may render in the similar
extradition case of Government of the United States of America v. Purganan.

3) Respondents counter that petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez did not show her
good faith by her continued refusal to appear before the respondent court.
Further, the reasons of petitioners do not qualify as compelling or special
circumstances. Moreover, the special circumstance of voluntary surrender of
petitioner Eduardo is separate and distinct from petitioner Imelda’s.

HELD: YES, there should be notice and hearing before the cancellation of bail in an
extradition case.

In Purganan, we said that a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and

hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, because notifying him before his
arrest only tips him of his pending arrest. But this is for cases pending the issuance of
a warrant of arrest, not in a cancellation of a bail that had been issued after
determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk. The policy is that a prospective
extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from justice. On the extraditee
lies the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is granted. 16If after his arrest
and if the trial court finds that he is no flight risk, it grants him bail. The grant of the
bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her
right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised
its sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and laws
in force, co-petitioner is entitled to provisional release.

In our view, the cancellation of co-petitioner’s bail, without prior notice and
hearing, could be considered a violation of co-petitioner’s right to due process
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.

In Purganan, we held also that the grounds used by the highest court in the
requesting state for the grant of bail may be considered, under the principle of
reciprocity.

Considering that she has not been shown to be a flight risk nor a danger to the
community, she is entitled to notice and hearing before her bail could be cancelled.
Based on the record, we find that, absent prior notice and hearing, the bail’s
cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs. HON.
FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.

Facts:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of
arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest
was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the
extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by
the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law
granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the
respondent judge subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby
undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and
processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in
this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of
filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in
extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this
case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week;
and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the
assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the
condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the
respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue
Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail;
that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that
extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States
of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch
42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that
the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the
same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the
following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human
rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is

given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court
departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to
post bail.
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
Juan Ponce Enrile, Petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan ( 3rd division ) and People of the
Philippines, Respondents.
 
Facts:
On June 5, 2014 Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder before the
Sandiganbayan for their alleged involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriation under the PDAF. When his warrant was issued, Sen. Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to the CIDG and was later confined and detained at the PNP General
Hospital, he then filed a motion to fix bail where he argued that:

1. He should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right for failure of the

prosecution to show clearly that the evidence of guilt is strong;
2. Although charged with plunder his penalty would only be reclusion temporal
considering that there are two mitigating circumstances, his voluntary surrender
and that he is already at the age of 90;
3. That he is not a flight risk and his medical condition must be seriously
considered.

The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the grounds that:

1. He is charged with a capital offense;

2. That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his bail because the
prosecution have not yet presented its evidences.

Senator Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:  
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for denying his motion to fix bail?

Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the
objective of bail and unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s fragile health and
advanced age.

Bail is a matter right and is safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to

ensure the personal appearance of the accused during trial or whenever the court
requires and at the same time recognizing the guarantee of due process which is the
presumption of his innocence until proven guilty.

The Supreme Court further explained that Bail for the provisional liberty of the
accused, regardless of the crime charged should be allowed independently of the
merits charged, provided his continued incarceration is injurious to his health and
endanger his life. Hence, the Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile be
granted the right to bail it will enable him to have his medical condition be properly
addressed and attended, which will then enable him to attend trial therefore
achieving the true purpose of bail.

In addition, the case discusses the following points:

1. Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed
innocent.

2. Bail may be granted as a matter of right or discretion.

Bail is a matter of right, the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or

restrained by the officers of the law unless he is charged with a capital offense or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the
evidence of guilt is strong. In relation to Rule 114, Sec. 4, all criminal cases
within MeTC, MuTc, MTCC or MCTC are bailable as a matter of right because
this courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses. Also prior to conviction
by the RTC for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment or offense by punishable death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when evidence of when evidence of guilt is not strong.

Bail is a matter of discretion: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment or (2) if the RTC
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under par. 3 of Sec. 5 Rule 114 is present.

3. Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or

reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial discretion.

This judicial discretion for bail for the above offenses may be exercised only
after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for purpose
of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. It is axiomatic,
therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on
the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the
Prosecution.
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,
 to wit:
a. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended);
b. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
c. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;

If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval
of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
ALBINA BORINAGA, complainant, vs. JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, respondent.
September 10, 1993 | AM No. RTJ-93-926 | REGALADO, J.

FACTS:
 Judge Camilo E. Tamin of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del
Sur, Branch 23, was charged with grave incompetence and ignorance of the law
in connection with Criminal Case No. 92-10-300 for murder, entitled "People vs.
Antonio Ruaya, et al.,
 An amended criminal complaint for murder dated March 4, 1992, for the killing
of herein complainant's husband, Regino Borinaga, was filed by the Chief of
Police of Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur against Antonio Ruaya, alias Tony
Ruaya; Roberto J. Rada, alias Totoy; Edwin Rada, alias Negger; and Jojo
Valenzuela before the 27th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dumingag-
Mahayag, Zamboanga del Sur, for preliminary investigation.
 Ruaya averred that no bail was fixed by the investigating judge who issued a
warrant of arrest against him; that he had waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation, with a reservation to challenge the criminal action
against him; and that the evidence of guilt against him was not strong, hence he
was entitled to bail as a matter of right.
 Accused Ruaya prayed that the bail be fixed at P20,000.00.
 Public prosecutor failed to attend hearing, judge (Tamin) fixed bail at P20,
000.00 in accordance with Art. III Sec. 13 of the Constitution due to failure to
present evidence that the guilt of the accused is strong.

ISSUE: Whether the judge erred in granting the petition for admission to bail.

RULING: Yes.
The court ruled that as now revised in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure and
provided in Rule 114 thereof, the rules on availability of bail to an accused may be
restated as follows:
1. Admission to bail is a matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge
is not for a capital offense or is not punishable by reclusion perpetua;
2. Regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, no bail shall be allowed if
the accused is charged with a capital offense or of an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong;
3. Even if a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, the
accused may still be admitted to bail in the discretion of the court if there are
strong grounds to apprehend that his continued confinement will endanger his
 life or result in permanent impairment of health, but only before judgment in
the regional trial court; and
4. No bail shall be allowed after final judgment, unless the accused has applied for
probation and has not commenced to serve sentence, the penalty and offense
being within the purview of the probation law.

Even assuming arguendo that respondent judge had jurisdiction to hear the
petition for bail, under the circumstances attendant to the case he should nonetheless
be held liable for granting the same without benefit of a hearing. This requirement is
so basic and fundamental that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of
the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof.

It is true that at the hearing of an application for admission to bail, where

admission to bail is a matter of discretion, the prosecution has the burden of showing
that evidence of guilt is strong. However, we have held that admission to bail as a
matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and
guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an
opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications
for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in
determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion
must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process,
that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order
issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim
and caprice and outright arbitrariness.

In the case at bar, the petition for bail was granted by respondent judge on the
simple reason that the prosecution failed to appear and present evidence despite due
notice. Forthwith, he concludes that by reason of the failure of the prosecution to
appear at the scheduled hearing, the applicant is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
He aggravated this flagrant error when in his aforequoted comment, he justified his
subsequent denial of the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of the bail bond
and the arrest of the accused on the incredible theory that the prosecution's failure to
appear was a "waiver on its part . . . and it is legally already in estoppel" to challenge
the grant of bail since that right to bail "became irrevocably vested" in the accused
who had thereby acquired "a vested constitutional right beyond the power and
authority of the respondent to recall."

In the first place, respondent judge did not have the authority to set the petition
for bail for hearing in view of the fact that he had not even acquired jurisdiction over
the criminal case since the information therefor had not yet been filed in the trial
court. In doing so, he acted with grave abuse of discretion and in wanton disregard of
established rules and jurisprudence. Secondly, it has been held that even where the
prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix
bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength
of the state's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. Here, the non-
appearance of the prosecution at the hearing scheduled by respondent judge on
March 30, 1992 was obviously justified since, to repeat, respondent had no authority
to schedule and/or conduct the same.
FLAVIANO B. CORTES, complainant, vs. JUDGE SEGUNDO B. CATRAL, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 7, Aparri, Cagayan, respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387 | September 10, 1997
FACTS:
A sworn letter complaint was filed by Flaviano Cortes charging Judge Segundo
B. Catral of the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan with Gross Ignorance of the Law committed
as follows:
1. He granted bail in murder cases without hearing: People v. Duerme (Criminal Case
No. 07-893) and People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag both cases of murder.
These two cases are like the case of Teresita Q. Tucay v. Judge Roger Domagas, 242
SCRA 110 being classified as heinous crimes there (sic) are supposedly unbailable;
2. On May 3, 1995, Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castanedas Criminal Case for Illegal
Possession of Firearm was raffled and assigned to his sala. The provincial prosecutor
granted a bailbond of P180,000.00 but it was reduced by Judge Segundo Catral for
only P30,000.00. The worst part of it no hearing has been made from 1995 to the
present because according to his clerks, he is holding it in abeyance. This Barangay
Captain Rodolfo Castaneda is one of the goons of Julio Bong Decierto his nephew who
has a pending murder case;
3. Another Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide case was granted with a
bailbond of P14,800.00 by Judge Segundo Catral. The amount is too low. It is because
this Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio Bong Decierto;

Respondent’s Contention:
1. Respondent judge, in his comment, clarified that Criminal Case No. 07-893 is the
case of People v. Willie Bumanglag y Magno for frustrated homicide pending in
Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri where the presiding judge is Hon.
Virgilio Alameda. However, if the complainant is referring Ahmed Duerme y
Paypon, et al. for murder pending in Branch 7 of the RTC where respondent was then
designated as presiding judge, respondent stresses that the provincial prosecutor
recommended P 200,000.00 as bailbond for each of the accused. Subsequently, in a
motion for reduction of bailbond, the resolution of the motion was submitted to the
sound discretion of the court. The court, mindful of the fact that the prosecution is
banking on weak circumstantial evidence issued an order for reduction of the
bailbond from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00.
In the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag the inquest judge issued a warrant of
arrest for the accused with no bail recommended. When the case was elevated to the
Regional Trial Court upon information filed by the provincial prosecutor, the
information made no mention of a bailbond. In the hearing of the petition to
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, the fiscal opted not to
introduce evidence and recommended bail in the sum of P200,000.00
instead. Respondent judge acting on the said approved the recommendation of
Prosecutor Apolinar Carrao. Accused through counsel filed a motion to reduce bail. 
In the course of the hearing of the petition, the public prosecutor manifested that he
had no objection to the sum of P50,000.00 as bail for the accused. Respondent judge,
then "guided by the factual setting and the supporting evidence extant on
record" reduced the bail bond from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00 as recommended by
the prosecutor. Once again, the order granting the bail of P200,000.00, as well as the
reduced bail bond of P50,000.00, did not contain a summary of the evidence
presented by the prosecution.

2. As regards the third charge concerning the illegal possession of firearm against
Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda, the bailbond recommended by the prosecutor
was P180,000.00.Accused, through counsel Atty. Bulseco, filed a motion for reduction
of the bailbond to P30,000.00. Counsel even vouched and guaranteed the appearance
of the accused in court, whenever required. The motion for reduction of bailbond was
submitted without serious opposition and the prosecutor mindful perhaps that there
is no corpus of the crime as no firearm was caught or taken from the possession of the
accused merely submitted the same to the discretion of the court.
3. In Criminal Case concerning a homicide case against Barangay Captain Nilo de
Rivero, respondent judge says that the bailbond of P14,800.00 was recommended by
the acting Officer-In-Charge (OIC) as contained in his manifestation accompanying
the information. Respondent judge then acting on the recommendation of the OIC
provincial prosecutor and mindful of the guidelines in fixing a reasonable amount of
bailbond coupled by the fact that the evidence on record is merely circumstantial and
there was no eyewitness to the commission of crime granted bailbond in the sum
of P14,800.00.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the
complaint saying that there is nothing in the allegations of the complainant that
would warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against respondent judge.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of law for his acts of
granting bail on the abovementioned criminal cases.
Held:
Yes.
CONCEPT OF BAIL:
Bail is the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure that
the accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer
the charges brought against him or her. It is awarded to the accused to honor the
presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to
enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to
conviction.
Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The amount
fixed should be sufficient to ensure the case presence of the accused at the trial yet
reasonable enough to comply with the constitutional provision that bail should not be
excessive.14 Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable
notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must
be asked for his recommendation because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is
required to take into account a number of factors such as the applicant's character and
reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a fugitive from justice.

When a person is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment, bail is a matter of discretion. Rule 114, Section 7 of the
Rules of Court states: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Consequently, when the accused is charged with an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, not only to
take into account the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
but primarily to determine the existence of strong evidence of guilt or lack of it,
against the accused.

A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail.

Application:
1. Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an accused charged with
murder, without having conducted any hearing as to whether the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong.
The judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution
chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the sound discretion
of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. The importance of a
hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if
the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the
motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask
searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or
the lack of it against the accused. We need only remind him that he is not bound by
the recommendation of the prosecutor and the affidavits and sworn statements of the
witnesses are mere hearsay statements which could hardly be the basis for
determining whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
The case against respondent for the first allegation was even aggravated when in
the case of People v. Duerme, the accused was still at large yet a bail was already
fixed. There is a need to reiterate the basic principle that the right to bail can only be
availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty  and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail
for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed. (emphasis)

2. In the case of illegal possession of fire arms, the complainant failed to show that
there was bad faith in respondents decision in reducing the bail bond. No firearm was
taken from the possession of the accused, as well as the fact that counsel for the
accused vouched and guaranteed the appearance of the accused in court whenever
required.

3. In the case of Homicide against Nilo de Rivera, with respondents comment that the
fixing of bail was in accordance with the guidelines set for in Section 9 of Admin.
Circular 12-94.  As long as in fixing the amount of bail, the court is guided by the
purpose for which bail is required, that is, to secure the appearance of the accused to
answer charges brought against him, the decision of the court to grant bail in the sum
it deems appropriate will not be interfered with.

SUMMARY OF RULING:

The Supreme Court find respondent Judge Segundo B. Catral guilty of gross ignorance
of the law for having granted bail to the accused in the cases of Duerme and
Bumanglag without having conducted the requisite hearing. It is indeed suprising, not
to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged with a number of administrative
cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of
jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court
itself, through its Philippine Judicial Academy, has been including lectures on the
subject in the regular seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate
the following duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the

prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application

for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Sections 7 and
8, supra).

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied. 39

With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial
judges are enjoined to study them well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges
cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith, but this
defense is much too frequently cited even if not applicable.

Respondent judge is to pay a fine of P20,000 with warning that similar acts in the
future will be dealt more severly.
People vs Abner et. al.

Summary of Facts:
1. In a complaint signed by Lt. Regino, Mamerto Abner, among others, was
charged with robbery in band with rape committed in the municipality of
Tinambac, in Camarines Sur.

2. However, Tinambac’s justice of the peace, to whom the complaint was filed, was
absent. The municipal mayor also refused to receive the complaint. As such, the
assistant provincial fiscal of Camarines Sur filed a motion before the CFI –
Camarines Sur on Sept. 6, 1946 to act upon the complaint.

3. Thereafter, the trial court ordered the Justice of the Peace of Naga, the capital, to
conduct the necessary preliminary investigation.

4. Defendant Abner then was admitted to bail, while appellants Soler and Abella
executed the necessary bail bond for Php 15,000 on Oct. 4, 1946. The Justice of
the Peace of Naga approved said bail on the same date. However, on March 26,
1947, which was set as the date of the preliminary investigation, Abner and the
appellants failed to appear.

5. Then on April 2, 1947, Abner, through counsel, waived his right to a

preliminary investigation.

6. On Apr. 5, 1947, the Justice of the Peace of Naga forwarded Abner’s case to CFI
– Camarines Sur.

7. On May 8 1947, the provincial fiscal the corresponding information in CFI –

Camarines Sur, which originally set the trial for Nov. 25, 1947 but was
postponed to Jan. 16, 1948. Appellants motioned the postponement for a later
date; the trial was set on March 2, 1948. By February 28, 1948, appellants filed
another motion for another extension of 30 days to produce the body of Abner,
who was still at large. When the granted trial date on March 29, 1948 came,
Abner at the appellants, again, failed to appear.

8. Accordingly, the provincial fiscal filed a petition for the confiscation of the bail
bond of appellants. The said petition was granted by CFI – Camarines Sur on
March 31, 1948. From this order, the two appellants made an appeal.

Contentions:
Appellants argue that CFI – Camarines Sur did not acquire jurisdiction because
no complaint was filed in the Justice of Peace Court in Tinambac. The trial court
merely relied on the allegations of the assistant provincial prosecutor on Sept. 6, 1946
that the justice of the peace then was absent and the munical mayor refused to receive
the complaint.
Second, appellants cited Section 1, Rule 110 (Section 1 Rule 114 today) of the
Rules of Court that “bail is the security required and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.” From
this, appellants alleged that the bail bond is void as Abner, the principal, never signed
it; therefore, it can be said that he is not bound by said bail bond.
Finally, the government’s campaign for the capture of Abner, dead or alive, was
faulted by the appellants for their inability to bring him, who was forced to remain in
hiding, before the court.

Ruling:
The petition is not meritorious.

On to the first argument, the Court held that such stand by the appellants is
inconsistent to the bail bond they themselves executed containing the statement “A
complaint having been filed on September 17, 1946 in the justice of the Peace Court
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur….” Moreover, Section 2 Rule 108 (Section 2 Rule 112
today) of Rules of Court authorizes the justice of the peace of the provincial capital,
when, as in this case, authorized by the trial court to conduct preliminary
investigation including all crimes within the territorial jurisdiction of said court.

Second, the Court, held that taking a bail may be made through a bail bond or
recognizance. A bail bond is an obligation given by the accused with one or more
sureties, with the condition to be void upon the performance by the accused of such
acts as he may legally be required to perform. A recognizance is an obligation of
record, entered into before some court or magistrate duly authorized to take it, with
the condition to do some particular act, the most usual condition in criminal cases
being the appearance of the accused for trial. Furthermore, in US vs Sunico et. al., it
held that a recognizance is “a contract between the sureties and the State for the
production of the principal at the required time." Although the method by the
appellants made can be termed as a bail bond, it is essentially a recognizance as it was
a contract between the State and the appellants; the signature of Abner is thus
required for the validity of the bond.

Finally, the government cannot be faulted for appellants’ failure to present

Abner before the court as it was Abner and his followers that threatened to disturb
the peace and tranquility in that part of Camarines Sur. If anything, the campaign was
motivated by his own voluntary act.
Cruz v. Yaneza, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1175. March 9, 1999

Facts:
Raffy Tulfo of DZXL furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a
copy of unsworn letter-complaint of a certain Victorino Cruz against JUDGE
REYNOLD Q. YANEZA of MeTC-Br. 54, Navotas, Metro Manila, for alleged irregular
approval of bail bonds and issuance of release orders by Judge Yaneza. Thus, OCA
forwarded the said letter-complaint to Executive Judge Benjamin M. Aquino Jr. of
RTC-Br. 72, Malabon, Metro Manila, with instructions to conduct a discreet
investigation. In his report, Judge Aquino confirmed that Judge Yaneza had been
improperly approving bail bonds and irregularly issuing release orders for accused
whose cases were pending outside of his jurisdiction, which include those criminal
cases pending before RTCs and MeTCs in Quezon City, Cabanatuan City, La Union,
Bulacan, Batangas, Puerto Princesa Palawan, Pasay City, Malabon, and Caloocan City.
Some of which were issued on a Saturday, or after office hours, during nighttime,
despite no bail was recommended, even some were convicted, and despite non-
payments of corresponding JDF fees.

In his Answer, Judge Yaneza admitted the allegations and avers that:

1. He approved the bail bonds and issued the release orders in good faith and not
for any pecuniary consideration;
2. There is nothing irregular in his conduct as it did not in any way prejudice the
rights of the other litigants;
3. It is for personal fulfillment and spiritual satisfaction in extending expeditious
assistance to the hapless and pitiful detention prisoners;
4. He condemns the filing of the instant letter-complaint, with complainant hiding
behind the anonymity of a fictitious name and intended merely to embarrass
and malign respondent’s integrity;
5. he is constrained to work overtime, sometimes even Saturdays and Sundays,
because he has lost trust and confidence in his clerk of court who is allegedly
incompetent and lacks dedication to his work;
6. It is during his overtime work that requests for action on bail bonds are
normally presented; and
7. He was almost overwhelmed with pity as the accused were usually poor,
oppressed and beleaguered, hence, he approved their bail bonds.

Notwithstanding the letter-complaint against him, and in defiance of the Court’s

directive for him to explain, Judge Yaneza continued with his conduct and
wrongdoing. He still approved bail bonds and issued release orders for cases pending
before MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan and MCTC of Nabua, Camarines Sur.

He even issued Office Order No. 04-98 authorizing four (4) of his court
personnel, aside from the clerk of court and cash clerk, to receive payments and issue
official receipts relative to docket and other fees paid by litigants.

Because the personnel thus designated by respondent Judge were not bonded,
hence not authorized by law to receive payments, the OCA directed respondent Judge
to desist and refrain from implementing his Office Order.

But Judge Yaneza again approved bail bonds and issued release orders pending
before MTC Angeles City, RTC Marikina, and RTC Puerto Princesa Palawan.

Issue:
Whether or not the acts of Judge Yaneza in approving the bail bonds and
issuance of release orders for cases outside his court’s jurisdiction is justified under the
law and Rules of Court.

Ruling:
No, his acts are not justified and therefore unlawful.

Section 17, par. (a), of Rule 114, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-
94, provides:

“(a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is
pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another
branch of the same court within the province or city. If the accused is arrested in a
province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed
also with any regional trial court of said place, or, if no judge thereof is available, with
any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge
therein.”

Here, the foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations. First, the accused is
arrested in the same province, city or municipality where his case is pending. Second,
the accused is arrested in the province, city or municipality other than where his case
is pending. In the first situation, the accused may file bail in the court where his case
is pending or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another
branch of the same court within the province or city. In the second situation, the
accused has two (2) options. First, he may file bail in the court where his case is
pending or, second, he may file bail with any regional trial court in the province, city
or muncipality where he was arrested. When no regional trial court judge is available,
he may file bail with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal
circuit trial judge therein.

Interestingly, almost all the cases wherein respondent Judge approved bail bonds
and issued release orders were not pending before his sala. To complicate matters, the
accused were neither arrested nor detained within the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent Judges court.

ISSUES REGARDING JUDGE YANEZA’s OTHER CONTENTIONS

Issue No. 2:
Whether or not his acts were not irregular and may be excused considering that
he approved the bail bonds mainly in good faith interpretation and application of
Section 17 in relation to Section 19, Rule114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure , and
that it was never his intention to disregard the right accorded to the State and the
private complainant to be given the opportunity to oppose the grant of bail to the
accused in some instances.

Ruling No. 2
No.
Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct provides: “As a judge, respondent must have
the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is expected to maintain professional
competence at all times.”
Here, Since Judge Yaneza presides over MeTC-Br. 54 in Navotas, Metro Manila,
his territorial jurisdiction is confined therein. Therefore, to approve bail applications
and issue corresponding release orders in cases pending in courts outside his
territorial jurisdiction, some even in courts as far as Nueva Ecija and Palawan,
particularly so where the accused are detained thereat and not in his jurisdiction and
therefore cannot personally appear before him as required, constitute ignorance of the
law so gross as to amount to incompetence and even corruption.

Judge Yaneza cannot shield himself from the consequences of his persistent
deviant activities by the simple invocation of good faith and the supplication that he
was only moved by pity for the poor and forsaken accused. The numerous cases and
series of events previously adverted to manifest without any modicum of doubt the
gravity of his incompetence and arbitrariness.
Issue No. 3

Whether or not his single-sala MeTC in Navotas, being part of the Metropolitan
Trial Court salas spread out in Metro Manila, has the lawful authority to act on bail
bonds posted by accused in criminal cases lodged in other courts salas, within Metro
Manila or otherwise detained within Metro Manila which he honestly deems a
contiguous area, in situations or occasions that the handling trial court judge is absent
or not available.

Ruling No. 3

No.

Sec. 18 of BP Blg. 129 it is stated:

“Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The Supreme
Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall
exercise its authority. x x x x, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over which the said
branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction…”

Here, such prerogative was exercised by the Supreme Court when it issued
Administrative Order No. 3 defining the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts in the National Capital Region, thus, Branches CLXIX to CLXX, inclusive, with
seats at Malabon over the municipalities of Malabon and Navotas. It is thus clear that
the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts stationed in Malabon is limited
to the municipalities of Malabon and Navotas. By necessity, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts with seats in Malabon and Navotas have, likewise, limited jurisdiction therein.

Section 35 of BP Blg. 129 and Secs. 17 and 19 of Rule 114 are to be construed
and applied in conjunction with each other. The above-cited rules do not give the
Metropolitan Trial Judge blanket authority to grant applications for bail. There are
prerequisites to be complied with. First, the application for bail must be filed in the
court where the case is pending. In the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof,
the application for bail may be filed with another branch of the same court within the
province or city. Second, if the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality
other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed with any regional trial court of
the place. If no judge thereof is available, then with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

Issue No. 4

Whether or not Judge Yaneza may be excused of his unlawful acts considering
that in all instances that he was asked to approve bail, he conscientiously and
carefully examined the documents thus presented for prior evaluation to ascertain
compliance with Rule 114.

Ruling No. 4

No.

Section 14, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court states: “The accuse or any person
acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal
revenue, or provincial, city or municipal treasurer the amount fixed by the court or
recommended by the fiscal who investigated or filed the case, and upon submission of
a proper certificate of deposit and of a written undertaking showing compliance with
the requirements of Section 2 hereof, the accused shall be discharged from custody.
Money thus deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of any
fine and costs and the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever
made the deposit.”

Here, if this were true, he would not have succumbed to his apparent
predilection to approve bail bonds and issue release orders considering that a mere
passing glance by a seasoned and conscientious judge of the documents thus presented
before him would reveal his lack of authority to act on them. He would have been
basically guided by the wordings of a warrant of arrest. The above-cited rule is
uniformly embodied in every warrant of arrest which respondent, as a trial judge,
should be familiar with. Unfortunately, he blatantly disregarded this basic and
elementary rule.

In Paz v. Tiong, A.M. No. MTJ-94-998, 9 February 1996, it was held that,
“Respondent had absolutely no authority to approve the bailbond and issue the orders
of release. He totally ignored and disregarded Section 14 of Rule 114 x x x x As afore-
stated, Criminal Case No. 2859-A was pending before Branch 54 of the Regional Trial
Court stationed in Alaminos, Pangasinan, and only said Regional Trial Court may
approve the bailbond and issue the release order. The record is devoid of any showing
that no RTC judge was available to act on the bail bond. Neither does the record show
that the accused was arrested in another province, city, or municipality. Respondent
judge, therefore, had no reason or authority to act as he did.”

In Adapon v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1112, 27 December 1996, it was held

that: “But even assuming that bail could be granted in this case, it was not within the
jurisdiction of the respondent judge to grant the same. Bail may be granted by the
court in which it is properly filed.”

In Almeron v. Sardido, A.M. No. MTJ-97-1142, 6 November 1997, the Court

held: “In exercising such judicial discretion, however, a judge is required to conduct a
hearing wherein both the prosecution and the defense present evidence that would
point to the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt. The discretion of the judge
lies solely in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the evidence presented
during the hearing and not in the determination of whether or not the hearing and
itself should be held for such a hearing is considered mandatory and absolutely
indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be in a position to determine
whether the evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong.”

Here, Respondent Judge aggravated his improperties and misconduct when he

summarily granted bail to accused Consolacion F. dela Cruz charged with illegal
recruitment in large scale punishable with life imprisonment and a fine of
P100,000.00. In such case, bail is not a matter of right and the grant of bails falls
within the sound discretion of the judge. And in order for the judge to properly
exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong.

Issue No. 5

Whether or not Judge Yaneza may be excused considering that nobody is

injured by his acts.

Ruling No. 5

No.

In Basco v. Rapatalo, it was held: “Since the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt of the accused is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is
mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just
file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the court.”
 Here, Judge Yaneza, in granting bail to accused dela Cruz without any hearing,
deprived the prosecution of the opportunity to contest her application for bail, thus
denying the People due process. Worse, the case was pending not in respondents sala
in Navotas but in RTC-Br. 86, Cabanatuan City. Neither was dela Cruz detained in
Navotas which is the limit of respondent judges territorial jurisdiction but at the
PNP-CIG Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City. We cannot therefore
concede to respondents argument that he had not injured anybody, neither the
handling trial court judge, the government, the private complainant nor the accused.

JUDGE YANEZA WAS DISMISSED effective immediately with forfeiture of

retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
G.R. No. 134504             March 17, 2000
JOSELITO V. NARCISO, petitioner, vs. FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-
CRUZ, respondent.
Doctrine:
When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, a hearing must be conducted by the trial judge before bail can be
granted to the accused. Absent such hearing, the order granting bail is void for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion. In parricide, the accused cannot be
considered an offended party just because he was married to the deceased. In the
interest of justice and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the sister of
the victim may be deemed to be an "offended party"; hence, she has the legal
personality to challenge the void order of the trial court.
Summary:
An information for parricide was filed against Petitioner for the death of his
wife Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso. After his review asked (DOJ) and motion for
reconsideration (DOJ) were both denied, he asked for reinvestigation of his warrant
of arrest. Prosecutor found no reason to disturb and the case was remanded for
arraignment and trial. Thereafter, Petitioner filed an ‘Urgent Ex-Parte’ to allow him
to Post Bail’. The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was
granted on the same day. It was opposed by Respondent. Not obtaining any resolution
on her ‘Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail’, Respondent filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA. CA granted the petition. Petitioner averred that
CA erred when it reversed and set aside the RTC order which granted the petitioner
his constitutional right to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of
his guilt, and more especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of
the proceedings and after assessment of the evidence, have themselves recommended
the grant of bail.
Facts:
1. After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon Sta.
Romana-Narciso, wife of Joselito Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna
Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City recommended and thereafter filed, the
information for parricide against Joselito Narciso on November 13, 1991, with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
2. Joselito Narciso thereafter asked for a review of the prosecutors resolution
[before] the Department of Justice (DOJ) which was however denied. Joselito
Narciso moved for reconsideration, which was still denied by the DOJ.
3. Failing before DOJ, the accused filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation
and to Lift the Warrant of Arrest". The Motion was granted and the case was set
for reinvestigation by another prosecutor.
 4. Assistant Prosecutor Lydia A. Navarro, to whom the case was assigned for
reinvestigation, found no reason to disturb the findings of the previous
prosecutor and recommended the remand of the case to the court for
arraignment and trial.
5. The accused filed an “Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused
Joselito Narciso to Post Bail”.
a. The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted
on the same day, allowing accused to post bail at P150,000.00.
6. The private prosecutor representing private complainant (Respondent) Flor
Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, a sister of accused's deceased wife, filed an "Urgent
Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused To Post Bail"
a. Accused objected to the aforesaid urgent motion by filing a "Motion to
Expunge 1) Notice of Appearance of the Private Prosecutor and the 2)
Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail".
b. Arraignment was conducted
c. Respondent through counsel filed her opposition to the motion to expunge
filed by accused.
7. Prosecution moved for postponement because no prosecution witness was
available. [granted]
8. Private prosecutor again moved for postponement because of the pendency of
his "Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail"
a. Not obtaining any resolution on her "Motion To Lift Order Allowing
Accused to Post Bail", private complainant filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA.
9. CA granted the petition for certiorari and the order for granting bail is annulled
and set aside. Petitoner’s MR was denied.

Petitioner’s contention:
 Petitioner averred that CA erred when it reversed and set aside the RTC order
which granted Petitioner his constitutional right to bail, considering the absence
of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more especially when the public
prosecutors, who have direct control of the proceedings and after assessment of
the evidence, have themselves recommended the grant of bail.
 Petitioner also attacks respondents legal standing to file the Petition for
Certiorari before the appellate court, maintaining that only the public
prosecutor or the solicitor general may challenge the assailed Order.

Respondent’s contention:
 The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding,
 since no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail — summary or
otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between
the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of
time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and
evaluate any evidence.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the bail granted was valid.
2. Whether or not Respondent has a legal standing to file the petition.

Ruling:
First Issue: Validity of the Grant of Bail. NO – not valid
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required."
Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also
provides: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the
required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a
capital offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the
grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor
knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is
tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to
determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain
of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The
mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor.
In this case, although Petitioner was charged with parricide which is punishable
with reclusion perpetua, he argued before the CA that he was entitled to bail because
the evidence of his guilt was not strong. However, that there was no basis for such
finding, since no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail -- summary
or otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between
the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time
that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any
evidence. Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave
abuse of discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him.
Addt’l jurisprudence for 1st issue:
Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several cases that emphasized the mandatory
character of a hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the
following duties of the trial judge in such petition.
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him
to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion
(Sections 7 and 8, supra);
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be
denied.
The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room
for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and
fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the
proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary
to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof."

Second Issue: Respondent's Standing to File the Petition. YES – has legal standing
In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), the Supreme Court ruled that the
offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s)
aggrieved" to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 65.

In this case, it should be remembered that the crime charged against Petitioner
is parricide; hence, he cannot be regarded as an offended party. That would be a
contradiction in terms and an absurdity in fact. Nor can one expect the minor child to
think and to act for himself. Hence, it was ruled that in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the sister of the deceased is a proper party-litigant who is
akin to the "offended party," she being a closer relative of the deceased. There is no
closer kin who may be expected to take up the cudgels of justice for the deceased.
Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot confer any
right or be the source of any relief. The Supreme Court is not merely a court of law; it
is likewise a court of justice.
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent: HON. IRENEO GAKO, JR. (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
7th Judicial Region, Branch 5, Cebu City) and VICENTE GO
G.R. No. 135045 December 15, 2000

BRIEF SUMMARY
Private respondent was accused as co-conspirator in the crime of murder. Due to
an illness, he was confined in a hospital by virtue of a motion for confinement. A
clinical summary of his illness was filed alongside with a petition for bail. The case
was then reraffled and was assigned to the respondent Judge which granted the bail
relying on the medical records and the records of the original case without having to
go on further hearing. The prosecution sought to inhibit respondent Judge for pre-
judging the evidence without carefully evaluating why it cannot sustain a conviction
of life imprisonment.

FACTS
 Rafael Galan, Sr. was shot dead on 25 June 1991.
 On 3 July 1991, Leopoldo de la Peña executed an Extra-judicial Confession
implicating therein Sonny Herodias and Vicente Go in the conspiracy to kill and
murder Galan.
 On 9 July 1991, an Information was filed against the three accused namely, de la
Peña, Herodias and Go, charging them with the murder of Galan, Sr. (Criminal
Case CBU-22474). Judge Godardo Jacinto, then the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, issued a Warrant of Arrest against the
accused.
 On 22 July 1991 an Urgent Motion to Confine Go in a hospital was filed.
 On 2 August 1991, the hearing on said motion was conducted with the
prosecution reserving its right to cross-examine Dr. Gonzales.
 On 6 August 1991 an Order was issued to confine Go in a hospital without the
prosecution having crossexamined Dr. Gonzales on his medical report.
 On 15 July 1992, a hearing was conducted where de la Peña was presented as a
witness for the prosecution. Presiding Judge Agana sustained the objections of
the defense counsels each time that the prosecution attempted to establish the
conspiracy to kill the victim. The prosecution filed a motion to inhibit Judge
Agana, which motion was denied.
 On 20 November 1992, the Information against Go and Herodias was dismissed
with prejudice on the ground that their right to a speedy trial had been violated,
leaving de la Peña to face trial. The prosecution then challenged the Order of
Dismissal with Prejudice before the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 32954).
 In its Decision dated 18 April 1994, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside
the Order of Dismissal, ordered the inhibition of Judge Agana, and ordered the
raffle of the case to another branch. With the dismissal of the appeal of Go and
 Herodias by the Supreme Court in a Minute Resolution dated 26 June 1995, the
criminal case was set anew for trial.
 The case was re-raffled to RTC-17 and on 28 October 1996, an Alias Warrant of
Arrest was issued against Go and Herodias. On 2 February 1997, Dr. Matig-a, the
physician of Go, filed a Clinical Summary on the illness of Go and, on 13
February 1997, Go filed a Petition for Bail.
 On 7 March 1997 and 10 March 1997, the prosecution presented de la Peña who
was acquitted in 1993. De la Peña testified on matters which he was not allowed
by then presiding Judge Agana to testify on.
 On 21 March 1997, a Manifestation on the Confinement of Go was filed urging
his arrest because he was out of the intensive care unit. The motion of the
prosecution to transfer the criminal case to a Special Heinous Crimes Court was
denied by then presiding Judge Jesus de la Peña. The case was finally assigned to
Branch 5 with Judge Gako, Jr. as presiding judge. Hearing resumed.
 On 26 September 1997, an Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of
Arrest was filed praying for the arrest of Go first before his Clinical Summary
Report could be heard.
 On 10 November 1997, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order granting the Petition for
Bail of Go.
 On 11 November 1997, the prosecution filed a Vehement Motion to Inhibit
Judge Gako, Jr. due to his alleged delay in resolving the incidents in connection
with the arrest of Go.
 On 12 November 1992, the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the
Order of the court dated 10 November 1997, the order which granted bail to Go.
On 14 November 1997, a Supplemental Motion to Inhibit Judge Gako, Jr. was
filed by the counsel of the offended party because Judge Gako, Jr. allegedly pre-
judged the evidence of the prosecution without carefully evaluating why it is
short of the requirement to sustain a verdict of life imprisonment.
 On 15 November 1997, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was filed
from the Order dated 10 November 1997 because the transcripts were allegedly
not read. On 1 December 1997, a Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum to produce the records of Dr. Matig-a was filed to determine if the
medical findings on Go were not exaggerated to prevent his arrest. On 11
December 1997, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order in which he denied the
prosecution’s Manifestation dated 21 March 1997 on the confinement of Go, and
the Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest dated 26 September
1997 against Go. On 20 January 1998, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order denying
the: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 10 November 1997; (2)
Motion to Inhibit; and (3) Supplemental Motion to Inhibit the Presiding Judge.
 The Court of Appeals also reasoned that “the fact that the OSG joined Galan in
her petition did not cure the above deficiency”. The OSG received copy of the
resolution on 29 June 1998. On 3 August 1998, the OSG filed a petition for
 certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 47142). On 12 August 1998, said
petition of the OSG was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on the ground that
the petition was practically a reproduction of the petition earlier filed by
Guadalupe Galan, which was dismissed on 26 March 1998. Hence, the appeal by
certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appreciation of the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt
may be based on the “voluminous records” of the case, without necessarily hearing
the prosecution.

RULING:
No. The assailed Order dated 10 November 1997 granting bail is legally infirm
for failing to conform with the requirement that in cases when the granting of bail is
not a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose must first be conducted.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides the instances when bail is a
matter of right or discretionary, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, reiterates that "no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”
Based on the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with respect to persons
charged with a crime the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment,
or death, when the evidence of guilt is strong. Go, accused in the criminal case, was
charged with murder in 1991, before the passage of RA 7659, the law that re-imposed
the death penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus,
accused Go’s right to bail is merely discretionary.
When bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong
evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. It is inconceivable how Judge
Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt of
the accused when he did not even bother to hear the prosecution. The reliance of
Judge Gako, Jr. on the “voluminous records” of the case simply does not suffice. As
judge, he was mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail of the accused
since he knew that the crime charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and in that hearing, the prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is
worth stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process. Another
compelling reason why a hearing of a petition for bail is necessary is to determine the
amount of bail based on the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. Without the required hearing, the bail granted to accused Go in the amount of
P 50,000.00 is undoubtedly arbitrary and without basis.
 Further, the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr. merely made a
conclusion without a summary of the evidence, a substantive and formal defect that
voids the grant of bail. Well settled is the rule that after the hearing, whether the bail
is granted or denied, the presiding judge is mandated to prepare a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution. The irregularity in the grant of bail, however, is not
attenuated since the judge’s findings were based on the summary clinical report of Dr.
Matiga dated 4 February 1997 while the order granting bail was issued on 10
November 1997. It could not therefore be reasonably assumed that the actual state of
health of Go could still be accurately reflected by the said medical report when 9 had
already passed from the time that said medical report was prepared. It was therefore
clear error for Judge Gako, Jr. to depend solely on the dated medical report in
granting bail when the defense failed to present a more recent one that would
convincingly raise strong grounds to apprehend that the imprisonment of the accused
would endanger his life.

DISPOSITION
The order dated November 10, 1997 of the Trial Court is SET ASIDE for being void in
so far as it grants bail to the accused and the accused is ordered recommitted to jail
pending the hearing on the bail application.
G.R. NO. L-5256, NOVEMBER 27, 1953
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. LEE DIET,
ACCUSED AND RIZAL SURETY AND INSURANCE COMPANY, BONDSMAN-
APPELLEE.

Syllabus:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; BAILBOND CONTINUES IN FORCE UNTIL

DISCHARGED BY THE COURT; SURETY’S DUTY TO INFORM THE COURT OF
PERTINENT EVENTS SO THAT IT MAY BE DISCHARGED. — When the surety
put up a bond for the provisional liberty of the accused it became his jailer and as
such was at all times charged with the duty to keep him under its surveillance. This
duty continues until the bond is cancelled, or the surety is discharged. The procedure
for the discharge of a surety is clear in section 16 of Rule 110. A surety may also be
discharged from the non-performance of the bond when its performance "is rendered
impossible by the act of God, the act of the obligee, or the act of the law" (U. S. v.
Sunico, 40 Phil., 826-832), but even in these cases there still remains the duty of the
surety to inform the court of the happening of the event so that it may take
appropriate action and decree the discharge of the surety (sec. 16, Rule 110). Where
no such step was taken by the surety when the accused was re-arrested by the
constabulary authorities, but only gave notice to the court of that fact when the court
ordered the appearance of the accused either for arraignment or for trial, it must be
presumed that the surety chose to continue with its liability under the bond and
should be held accountable for what may later happen to the accused (6 C. J., p.
1026).

Summary: Lee Diet was charged of a crime uttering false US gold coins in connivance
with some counterfeiters. He bailed with a surety bond then escaped. Later, he was
rearrested by the constabulary officers and in his detention he again escaped. Due to
his escape and non-appearance to trial, his surety bond was confiscated.

Facts:

1. Lee Diet was charged of a crime in uttering false gold coins. He bailed with a
surety bond by Rizal Surety and Insurance company. He was released and
escaped thereafter.

2. The Justice of the Peace set the preliminary investigation of the case for June 14,
1951.
a. On this date the accused failed to appear. Counsel for the surety however
appeared and informed the court that the whereabouts of the accused was
not known due to the fact that he escaped three days before while under
 the custody of the Philippine constabulary.
b. It appears that the accused while out on bail was re- arrested on June 8,
1951, by some agents of the constabulary for questioning regarding his
alleged subversive activities, but during his detention he escaped.
c. For his failure to appear, the Justice of the Peace declared the bond
forfeited and required the surety to produce the body of the accused
within 30 days from notice and to show cause why judgment should not be
rendered against it for the amount of the bond.
d. Two days later, however, the justice of the peace reconsidered his order
and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Cotabato.

3. On July 2, 1951, the Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding information

against the accused. The arraignment and trial of the accused were set for
August 2, 1951, but on said date the accused again failed to appear, whereupon
the Provincial Fiscal moved for the confiscation of the bond posted by him for
his provisional liberty.
a. Counsel for the surety objected giving as reason for the non- appearance of
the accused the same reason given by him before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Cotabato.
b. The court denied the motion holding in substance that the reason given by
counsel for the surety for the non-appearance of the accused was
satisfactory and had the effect of relieving it from its liability under the
bond.

4. Hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether the escape of the accused excuses the surety bond for the non-
performance of its obligation on bail.

Ruling:
It is a well-settled doctrine that a surety is the jailer of the accused. "He takes
charge of, and absolutely becomes responsible for the latter’s custody, and under such
circumstance, it is incumbent upon him, or rather, it is his inevitable obligation, not
merely a right, to keep the accused at all times under his surveillance inasmuch as the
authority emanating from his character as surety is no more nor less than the
Government’s authority to hold the said accused under preventive imprisonment."
(People v. Tuising, 61 Phil., 404.)

When the surety in this case put up the bond for the provisional liberty of the
accused it became his jailer and gas such was at all times charged with the duty to
keep him under its surveillance. This duty continues until the bond is cancelled, or
the surety is discharged. The procedure for the discharge of a surety is clear in the
Rules of Court. Thus, it is there provided that the bail bond shall be cancelled and the
sureties discharged of liability (a) where the sureties so request upon surrender of the
defendant to the court; (b) where the defendant is re-arrested or ordered into custody
on the same charge or for the same offense; (c) where the defendant is discharged by
the court at any stage of the proceedings, or acquitted, or is convicted and
surrendered to serve the sentence; and (d) where the defendant dies during the
pendency of the action. (Section 16, Rule 110.)

It is true that a surety may also be discharged from the non- performance of the
bond when its performance "is rendered impossible by the act of God, the act of the
obligee, or the act of the law" (U. S. v. Sunico, 40 Phil., 826-832), but even in these
cases there still remains the duty of the surety to inform the court of the happening of
the event so that it may take appropriate action and decree the discharge of the surety
(section 16, Rule 110). Here no such step was taken by the surety when the accused
was re-arrested by the constabulary authorities. The surety kept silent since it did not
take any of the steps pointed out by law if it wanted to be relieved from its liability
under the bond. It only gave notice to the court of that fact when the court ordered
the appearance of the accused either for arraignment or for trial. It was only then that
it informed the court that the accused was re-arrested and that while he was detained,
he made good his escape. Since at that time his bond was still valid and binding, and
notwithstanding the re-arrest of the accused the surety kept silent, it must be
presumed that the surety chose to continue with its liability under the bond and
should be held accountable for what may later happen to the accused. It has been
held that "The subsequent arrest of the principal on another charge, or in other
proceedings, while he is out on bail does not operate ipso facto as a discharge of his
bail . . . Thus if, while in custody on another charge, he escapes, or is again discharged
on bail, and is a free man when called upon his recognizance to appear, his bail are
bound to produce him." (6 C. J., p. 1026.)

This case should be distinguished from the recent case of People v. Mamerto de
la Cruz, 93 Phil., 487, wherein this Court said: "It has been seen that if the sureties did
not bring the person of the accused to court, which they were powerless to do due to
causes brought about by the Government itself, they did the next best thing by
informing the court of the prisoner’s arrest and confinement in another province and
impliedly asking that they be discharged. On its part, the court, by keeping quiet, and,
indeed, issuing notices of the hearings direct to the prisoner through the sheriff of
Camarines Norte and ignoring the sureties, impliedly acquiesced in the latter’s request
and appeared to have regarded the accused surrendered." No such step was taken by
the surety in this particular case for it failed even to inform the court of the
apprehension made of the accused by the constabulary authorities.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed without pronouncement as to costs.
PP vs TUISING
61 Phil 404

PETITIONER-APPELLANT: The People of the Philippine Islands

RESPONDENT-APPELLEE: Luzon Surety Company, Inc.
DEFENDANT: Eugenio Uy Tuising

SUMMARY OF FACTS: (FOR WRITING: ITALICIZED)

Accused Eugenio Uy Tuising, appealed the sentences imposed upon him by the CFI of
Cebu in three cases filed against him. He was apparently required to file a bail-bond
for his provisional release. Hence, herein appellee undertook to bail him out.
However, while the said cases were pending in the court, accused withdrew his
appeal, for which reason his three appeals were dismissed.

The clerk of the CFI of Cebu, sent to the herein appellee the corresponding notice
requiring it to produce the person of Tuising so that the latter would be informed of
the sentences rendered against him in the said three cases; however, appellee failed to
produce and never produced said Tuising, despite being notified. Hence, the
provincial fiscal of Cebu filed in the lower court his motion, praying for the
confiscation of the bonds filed by the said appellee in favor of the accused. The court
granted the confiscation prayed for and the surrender in due time of the person of
Eugenio Uy Tuising by herein appellee, within the period of thirty days.

Upon expiration of the said period, appellee filed a motion praying that it be relieved
from the obligation to produce the person of Eugenio Uy Tuising and that the order
of confiscation be vacated, on the ground that the said accused had died in Inchong,
Amoy, China.

DETAILED FACTS (FOR RECIT)

1. The question raised by the appeal of "The People of the Philippines Islands"
from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April 25, 1934, in
three criminal cases, is whether or not the said order should be reversed and the
appellee Luzon Surety Company, Inc., compelled, as surety of Eugenio Uy
Tuising who was the accused in the said three cases, to comply with the
conditions of the bail-bonds filed by it in favor of the said accused, by satisfying
the value thereof, notwithstanding the reason, which the said Court of First
Instance took into consideration, that said Eugenio Uy Tuising died in Inchong,
Amoy, China, on January 27, 1932.
 2. Accused Eugenio Uy Tuising, appealed the sentences imposed upon him by the
CFI of Cebu in three cases filed against him. He was apparently required to file a
bail-bond for his provisional release. Hence, herein appellee undertook to bail
him out. However, while the said cases were pending in the court, accused
withdrew his appeal, for which reason his three appeals were dismissed and the
three cases were remanded to the court a quo on January 5, 1932.

3. On the 12th of the same month and year, the clerk of the CFI of Cebu, by order
of the presiding judge, sent to the herein appellee the corresponding notice
requiring it to produce the person of Tuising so that the latter would be
informed of the sentences rendered against him in the said three cases; however,
appellee failed to produce and never produced said Tuising, despite being
notified. Hence, on January 22, 1932, the provincial fiscal of Cebu filed in the
lower court his motion, praying for the confiscation of the bonds filed by the
said appellee in favor of the accused. The court granted, on February 27, 1932,
the confiscation prayed for and the surrender in due time of the person of
Eugenio Uy Tuising by herein appellee, within the period of thirty days which,
upon petition of the appellee, was later extended to May 3, 1932.

4. Upon expiration of the said period, appellee filed a motion praying that it be
relieved from the obligation to produce the person of Eugenio Uy Tuising and
that the order of confiscation be vacated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellee can be relieved from his obligation to produce accused-
appellant Eugenio Uy Tuisiing.

CONTENTIONS: (BY THE PETITIONER)

Appellee contended that his motion was granted by the lower court which declared,
after having received evidence relative thereto, that in fact said Eugenio Uy Tuising
died in Inchong, Amoy, China.

RULING:
No.

Sec. 21, of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court states that “when the presence of the
accused is required by the court, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him
before the court on a given date and time…”

Sec. 22 of the same rule, further states in part that “upon application of the
bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon
surrender of the accused or proof of his death.”

In this case, appellee cannot relieve himself from his obligation as he clearly violates
the terms of its bail-bonds. Accordingly, the mere fact that a person binds himself as
surety for the accused, he takes charge of, and absolutely becomes responsible for the
latter’s custody, and under such circumstances it is incumbent upon him, or rather, it
is his inevitable obligation, not merely a right, to keep the accused at all times under
his surveillance, inasmuch as the authority emanating from his character as surety is
no more nor less than the Government’s authority to hold the said accused Eugenio
Uy Tuising to leave he jurisdiction of the Philippines, the appellee necessarily ran the
risk of violating, and in fact it clearly violated the terms of its bail-bonds because it
failed to produce the said accused when it was required to do so.

SIDE NOTES:
Undoubtedly, the result of the obligation assumed by the appellee to hold the said
accused amenable at all times to the orders or processes of the lower court, was to
prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines because,
otherwise, such orders or processes would be nugatory; and inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of the court from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the
Philippines, they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.
DEATH OF THE PERSON ON BAIL. — Whether or not E. U. T. actually died in
China on January 27, 1932, his death cannot at all events change the effects of this
decision. When the alleged death of the said accused took place, the conditions of the
bail-bonds filed in his favor by the appellee had already been violated inasmuch as
from January 15, 1932, the date on which the appellee received the notice requiring it
to produce and surrender to the court the person of E. U. T., to the 27th of the same
month and year, on which the death of the accused is said to have taken place, more
than sufficient time had elapsed to give the appellee opportunity to comply with the
requirement, had it so desired.
VICENTE v. MAJADUCON
AM No. RTJ-02-1698 | June 23, 2005

FACTS
This is an administrative case against Judge Jose Majaducon of RTC Branch 23 of
General Santos City for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and
manifest partiality.
RTC Branch 23 found Evelyn Te guilty of four counts of violation of BP 22 and
sentenced her to imprisonment for 2 months per count. Te filed several motions to
remove or reduce her sentence of imprisonment. Relying on Vaca v. CA, where a
party found guilty of violating BP 22 whose sentence of imprisonment was reduced to
a fine double the amount of the check involved, she sought modification of her
sentence using a motion for reconsideration coupled with a petition for habeas
corpus.
The trial court rendered judgment denying her petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that she was detained by virtue of a final judgment.
After serving the 3 months minimum of her total sentence, she filed an omnibus
motion for her release invoking the Indeterminate Sentence Law. She also filed a
motion for reconsideration for the denial of her petition for habeas corpus, adding a
prayer that she be allowed to post bail.
The trial court allowed her to post bail, relying on Section 14 of Rule 102, and
directed the clerk of court to certify the habeas corpus proceedings to the Supreme
Court as it had concurrent jurisdiction over such proceedings. The Assistant City
Prosecutor sought a reconsideration of this last resolution, but was denied by the trial
court.
In the present case, Dante Vicente, complainant, station manager of Radyo
Bombo, alleges that while Te was in prison, Judge Majaducon allowed her to be
released and confined at a local hospital in the guise that she was suffering from
certain illnesses. He further alleged that respondent judge approved Te’s application
for bail as part of habeas corpus proceedings even though no petition for habeas
corpus in favor of Te was filed and docketed.
As a result of the said order, the local media in General Santos City made an
uproar and criticized the judge for his action on the said case. In retaliation, the said
judge cited for indirect contempt a group of mediamen who published a critical
article against him. Complainant contends that respondent judge will not hesitate to
use his clout and power to stifle criticism and dissent, and thus prayed that the judge
be investigated and if warranted, be terminated and removed from service.
Relying on the provisions of Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, the
Court administrator, in its report, found the judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and recommended that he be fined in the amount of P20,000.
COMPLAINANT’S CONTENTION:
1) Complainant contends that respondent judge will not hesitate to use his clout
and power to stifle criticism and dissent. In addition, complainant alleges that in
a separate case, respondent judge allowed the release of the accused without the
posting of the necessary bail.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
1) Respondent judge contends that under Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, he has the discretion to allow Te to be released on bail.

ISSUE
WON the judge acted properly in granting bail

HELD
NO.
Rule 102, §14 provides: When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and
when let to bail. – If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is
plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense
punishable by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully
imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so
punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the
discretion of the court or judge. If he be admitted to bail, he shall forthwith file a
bond in such sum as the court or judge deems reasonable, considering the
circumstances of the prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for
his appearance before the court where the offense is properly cognizable to abide its
order or judgment; and the court or judge shall certify the proceedings, together with
the bond, forthwith to the proper court. If such bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall
be recommitted to confinement.
The foregoing provision, however, applies to cases where the applicant for the
writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him, not
where, as here, he is serving sentence by reason of a final judgment. Indeed, Rule 102,
§4 disallows issuance of the writ where the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is ‘suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.’
The certification of a case under Rule 102, §14, moreover, refers to cases where
the habeas corpus court finds that the applicant is charged with the noncapital offense
in another court. Thus, the certification of the case to the Supreme Court was
erroneous.
In accordance with Section 24, Rule 114 (Criminal Procedure), the grant of bail
is prohibited after conviction by final judgment and after the convict has started to
serve sentence. The only exception is when the convict has applied for probation
under the Probation Law before he commences to serve sentence. This exception does
not apply here as Te did not apply for probation and at the time the judge granted her
bail she was already serving her sentence.
The contention of Judge Majaducon that under Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court, he has the discretion to allow Te to be released on bail is shallow and
unjustified. To reiterate, Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court applies only to
cases where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a
criminal charge against him and not in an instance, as in the case involved in the
present controversy, where the applicant is serving sentence by reason of a final
judgment.
G.R. No. 210610, January 11, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARILOU HILARIO Y
DIANA AND LALAINE GUADAYO Y ROYO, ACCUSED. MARILOU HILARIO Y
DIANA, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:
1. The Information in Crim. Case No. 10-2008 accused Hilario of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.
a) Hilario was also charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under
the Information in Crim. Case No. 11-2008.
b) The Information in Crim. Case No. 13-2008 was similarly worded to that in
Crim. Case No. 11-2008, except that it incriminated Guadayo for illegal
possession of “one (1) small heat -sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as ‘shabu,’
weighing 0.04 gram, a dangerous drug.”

2. When arraigned on April 29, 2008, Hilario and Guadayo pleaded not guilty to
the charges against them.

3. The RTC promulgated its Decision, finding Hilario and Guadayo guilty of all the
charges against them.
a. The RTC highlighted that this was a case of a buy-bust operation and
adjudged that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the
offenses charged, to wit,
i. the prosecution witness, PO1 de Sagun, testified on how the buy-bust
transaction took place and properly identified the poseur-buyer and
seller,
ii. plus the illegal drug was presented as evidence in court.

4. The Court of Appeals partially granted the appeal.

a. The CA affirmed the conviction of Hilario for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs in Crim. Case No. 102008, finding PO1 de Sagun’s testimony on the
completed buy- bust operation credible. It was amply proven by PO1 de
Sagun’s testimony that a sale of shabu transpired between Hilario as the
seller and PO1 de Sagun as the poseur-buyer.
b. The appellate court also cited the presumption of regularity in PO1 de
Sagun’s performance of his official duties;
i. the absence of proof of ill motive on PO1 de Sagun’s part to falsely
impute a serious crime against Hilario;
 ii. and substantial compliance with the procedure on custody of
evidence in drug cases since PO1 de Sagun took custody of the sachet
of shabu seized from Hilario and personally delivered the same to the
crime laboratory for examination, wherein it was tested positive for
shabu.
c. The Court of Appeals though, in the same Decision, acquitted Hilario in
Crim. Case No. 11-2008 and Guadayo in Crim. Case No. 13-2008.

Issue:
Whether or not Hilario should be acquitted.

Ruling:
Yes, Hilario should be acquitted. The appeal is meritorious.
The identity and integrity of the sachet of shabu allegedly seized by PO1 de
Sagun from Hilario were not preserved, despite PO1 de Sagun’s assertion that he had
been in possession of the said sachet from its seizure from Hilario until its turnover to
the crime laboratory. The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus
delicti, much less, the identity of the corpus delicti with moral certainty. When there
are doubts on whether the seized substance was the same substance examined and
established to be the prohibited drug, there can be no crime of illegal possession or
illegal sale of a prohibited drug. The prosecution’s failure to prove that the specimen
allegedly seized from Hilario was the same one presented in court is fatal to its case.
It is fundamental in the Constitution and basic in the Rules of Court that the
accused in a criminal case enjoys the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.
Likewise, it is well-established in jurisprudence that the prosecution bears the burden
to overcome such presumption. If the prosecution fails to discharge this burden, the
accused deserves a judgment of acquittal.
On the other hand, if the existence of proof beyond reasonable doubt is
established by the prosecution, the accused gets a guilty verdict. In order to merit
conviction, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on
the weakness of evidence presented by the defense. The evidence for the prosecution
were insufficient in material details and fraught with discrepancies and
contradictions.
PO1 de Sagun himself, who claimed to have seized, marked, and kept custody of
the sachet of shabu seized from Hilario, could not positively identity which between
the two sachets of shabu he was presented with at the trial, marked as “NBS - 1” and
“NBS - 2,” was the one he actually seized from Hilario. Absent proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court cannot merely rely on the presumption that PO1 de
Sagun regularly performed his official duties.
G.R. No. 175842 March 18, 2015
NILO MACAYAN, JR. y MALANA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

Facts:
1. Macayan was charged with robbery.

2. During trial, one of the witnesses of the prosecution was Annie Uy Jao, the
private complainant, who is the owner of Lanero Garments Ext where Macayan
worked as a sample cutter.

3. In her testimony, Jao testified that when her business was doing poorly, she
allowed her employees to accept engagements elsewhere. It came to her
attention that Macayan accepted work for a rival company thus, a confrontation
ensued where Macayan allegedly responded,   "Kung gusto mo, bayaran mo na
lang ako at aalis ako." 

4. Following this, Jao was surprised to find out that a Complaint for illegal
dismissal was filed. A total of 11 conferences were made but Jao never attended
any one of them.

5. On February 12, 2001, Macayan allegedly threatened Jao that her family would
be harmed and/or kidnapped if she did not give him P200,000.00. The following
day, Macayan allegedly called Jao to reiterate his threat and to specify the time
and place — February 16, 2001, sometime between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. at
McDonald's Banawe Branch — in which the P200,000.00 should be handed to
him. Jao claimed that she was sure it was Macayan speaking to her, as the person
on the phone addressed her as "Madam," which was how he customarily called
her.

6. With the assistance of the NBI, Macayan was arrested during an entrapment
operation.

7. RTC, found him guilty and Macayang filed an appeal to the CA. The OSG,
representing the People of the Philippines at the appellate stage, did not file an
appellee’s brief. Instead, it filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee’s
Brief recommending that Macayan be acquitted. It asserted that his guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG asserted that the fourth requisite
of the offense of robbery (i.e., violence against or intimidation of a person) could
not have been made by Macayan on the occasion of a conference for the illegal
dismissal case. It added that the other occasion when Macayan was supposed to
have threatened Jao was equally dubious since Jao’s sole reason for claiming that
 it was Macayan speaking to her (i.e., her having been addressed as "Madam")
was insufficient to ascertain that person’s identity.

8. The CA affirmed Macayan’s conviction and increasing the duration of the

penalty imposed. It reasoned that Jao’s sole, uncorroborated testimony was
nevertheless positive and credible. As regards Jao’s having been threatened after
the postponement of the February 12, 2001 conference in the illegal dismissal
case, the CA reasoned that constancias are "not the best evidence of attendance"
and that, in any case, Jao was threatened after and not during the conference.
Hence, petition for petition for review on certiorari was filed.

ISSUE: WON Macayan’s guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING:
No, Macayan’s guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Consistent with the rule on burden of proof, the requisite quantum of evidence
in criminal cases, is proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the burden was not met as it was not established that Jao was indeed
threatened and/or intimidated by Macayan into giving him money, that is, whether
he extorted money from Jao.

As per Jao's own testimony, there were two (2) instances in which she was
threatened and/or intimidated: first, immediately after  the postponement of the
February 12, 2001 conference in the illegal dismissal case; and second, when Macayan
called her on February 13, 2001 and set a rendezvous for handing over the extorted
money.

This being a criminal case, is for the prosecution to establish the guilt of an
accused on the strength of its own evidence. Its case must rise on its own merits. The
prosecution carries the burden of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt; it
cannot merely rest on the relative likelihood of its claims. Any lacunae in its case
gives rise to doubt as regards the "fact[s] necessary to constitute the crime with which
[an accused] is charged."

Here, there is serious doubt on whether Jao was actually threatened or

intimidated at the time she specified as the records are bereft of any indication that
Jao was present in any of the 11 conferences held or set. Thus, there is serious doubt
on the existence of the fourth requisite for robbery — violence against or
intimidation of a person — in relation to the alleged February 12, 2001 incident.
 As to the second supposed instance of intimidation: the phone call made by
Macayan to Jao on February 13, 2001, during which he not only reiterated his threats
but also set a rendezvous for the handover of the extorted money.

The prosecution itself acknowledged that there is no basis for ascertaining the
identity of Macayan as the caller other than the caller's use of "Madam" in addressing
Jao.

The prosecution should have offered more convincing proof of the identity of
the supposed caller. Even if it were true that Macayan customarily addressed Jao as
"Madam," merely being called this way by a caller does not ascertain that he is the
alleged caller. The prosecution never made an effort to establish how addressing Jao as
"Madam" is a unique trait of Macayan's and Jao's relationship. Other persons may be
equally accustomed to calling her as such; for instance, "Madam" may be Jao's
preferred manner of being addressed by her subordinates or employees. Likewise, it
was established that Macayan and Jao have known each other since 1995. Their
relation was more than that of employer and employee, as Jao was Macayan's
godmother in his wedding.

Certainly, Jao could have offered other, more reliable means of ascertaining that
it was, indeed, Macayan with whom she was conversing.

All told, the prosecution failed to established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE VS. FLORES EN BANC G. R. No. 128823-24, December 27, 2002 PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACCUSED-APPELLEE,
VS.
PEDRO FLORES, JR., Y FLORES ALIAS "PESIONG", ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS:
1. For automatic review before this Court is the Joint Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan finding accused-appellant Pedro
Flores Jr. y Flores alias "Pesiong" guilty of two counts of rape of his then 11 year
old daughter and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death in each.

2. The complaints against accused-appellant filed on February 3, 1997 was

Criminal Case No. U-9184, That on the 9th day of December 1996, in the
morning at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran West, Municipality of Urdaneta,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and
feloniously  sexually abuse  the herein complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES Y
LAZO, 11 years old, all against her will.

3. Criminal Case No. U-9185: That on the 28th day of December 1996, in the
evening at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran West, Municipality of Urdaneta,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
criminally and feloniously  sexually abuse  the herein complaining witness
FILIPINA FLORES, an 11 years old and daughter of the herein accused with the
use of sharp pointed bladed weapon and all against her will.

4. Arraigned on February 10, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both

charges.

Accused-Appellant’s Contention
5. Denying the accusations, accused-appellant claimed as follows:
a. Filipina, whom he whipped in the afternoon of December 9, 1996 for not
attending school on the 6th, 7th and 8th of December that year and for
having received money from her classmate, was not in their house on the
night of December 9, 1996 because she was in the house of Norielyn.
Neither was she in their house on the night of December 28, 1996 as she
was at the house of his mother Margarita Flores in Cafloresan.
b. Accused-appellant's testimony was corroborated by his mother Margarita,
and his teenaged children Benito and Baby Jean Flores who were staying in
 his mother's house. It was also corroborated by another teenaged child,
Jocelyn Flores, who was staying in the house of accused-appellant's
mother-in-law, Lourdes Lazo, also in Barangay Nancamaliran
West. Jocelyn added that Filipina had intimated to her that she fabricated
the rape charges because their maternal grandmother Lourdes wanted their
father, accused-appellant, jailed as he begrudged him for having eloped
with their mother, and that Lourdes threatened her with abandonment or
detention in jail in case she defied, and promised to give her jewelry, shoes
and dress if she agreed to carry out her desire.

6. After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of Statutory Rape and
sentenced her to death in both cases in its April 7, 1997 Joint Decision…

7. In view of the penalty of death imposed by the court a quo, the case is now
before this Court on automatic review.

Accused-Appellant’s Contention
Denying the accusations, accused-appellant claimed as follows:
1. Filipina, whom he whipped in the afternoon of December 9, 1996 for not
attending school on the 6th, 7th and 8th of December that year and for having
received money from her classmate,[21] was not in their house on the night of
December 9, 1996 because she was in the house of Norielyn. Neither was she in
their house on the night of December 28, 1996 as she was at the house of his
mother Margarita Flores[22] in Cafloresan.
2. Accused-appellant's testimony was corroborated by his mother Margarita, and
his teenaged children Benito and Baby Jean Flores who were staying in his
mother's house. It was also corroborated by another teenaged child, Jocelyn
Flores, who was staying in the house of accused-appellant's mother-in-law,
Lourdes Lazo, also in Barangay Nancamaliran West. [23] Jocelyn added that
Filipina had intimated to her that she fabricated the rape charges because their
maternal grandmother Lourdes wanted their father, accused-appellant, jailed as
he begrudged him for having eloped with their mother, [24] and that Lourdes
threatened her with abandonment or detention in jail in case she defied, and
promised to give her jewelry, shoes and dress if she agreed to carry out her
desire.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of Statutory Rape and
sentenced her to death in both cases in its April 7, 1997 Joint Decision…
In view of the penalty of death imposed by the court a quo, the case is now before
this Court on automatic review.
Issue: Whether or not the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against accused-appellant was violated.
Whether or not the court erred in its decision. YES.
Note: It is settled that in a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case open for
review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may
be found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are made the subject of
assignment of errors or not.
Ruling: Yes.
It is at once apparent, from a reading of the above-quoted complaints, that accused-
appellant was denied the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. This right has the following objectives:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make the defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further
prosecution for the same cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had.
The right cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that
the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet its
objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific
offense alleged to have been committed. For an accused cannot be convicted of an
offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the
complaint or information.
Constitutional Law; Right to be Informed; Accused-appellant was denied the
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him; An indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to
have been committed.—It is at once apparent, from a reading of the above-quoted
complaints, that accused-appellant was denied the constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This right has the following
objectives: 1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him
as will enable him to make the defense; 2. To avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against further prosecution for the same cause; 3. To inform
the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law
to support a conviction if one should be had. The right cannot be waived for reasons
of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information filed
against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must
fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed. For an
accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or
necessarily included in the complaint or information.
What characterizes the charge is the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information; The complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.—Neither can accused-
appellant be convicted of acts of lasciviousness or of any offense for that matter under
our penal laws. It is settled that what characterizes the charge is the actual recital of
facts in the complaint or information. For every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent which must be set forth in the complaint or information with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In
other words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged, the accused being presumed
to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
Criminal Law; Appeals; In a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case open for
review.—It is settled that in a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case open for
review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may
be found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are made the subject of
assignment of errors or not.
Same; Rape; Evidence; To sustain a conviction, the complaint or information must
allege that the accused had carnal knowledge of or sexual intercourse with the private
complainant.—The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse between a man and a woman under the circumstances enumerated in the
penal code. Thus, to sustain a conviction, the complaint or information must allege
that the accused had carnal knowledge of or sexual intercourse with the private
complainant. In the criminal complaints at bar, however, no such allegation was
made.
Same; Same; Same; Sexual abuse cannot be equated with carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse.—The allegation that accused-appellant did “sexually abuse” Filipina does
not suffice. In the recent case of People v. Lito Egan alias Akiao, this Court ruled that
“although the prosecution has proved that [the therein private complainant] Lenie
was sexually abused, the evidence proffered is inadequate to establish carnal
knowledge.” Hence, sexual abuse cannot be equated with carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse. The allegation in the instant criminal complaints that accused-appellant
“sexually abuse[d]” the private complainant cannot thus be read to mean that
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse with the private
complainant.
This Court thus takes this occasion to remind public prosecutors of their crucial role
in crafting criminal complaints and information. For all efforts may be rendered futile
and justice may be denied by a failure to state "the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense" as exemplified by the present case.
WHEREFORE, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. U-9184 and U-9185 are
hereby declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional right of
accused-appellant Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias "Pesiong," for Rape to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, the cases against him are
hereby DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 153166 December 16, 2005
TERESITA L. VERTUDES,1 Petitioner,
vs.
JULIE BUENAFLOR and BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.

Facts: Before us is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, seeking to review and set aside the decision[2] and resolution[3] of the Court
of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and dismissing her from government
service.

Private respondent Buenaflor complained of having been convinced by petitioner into

paying the total amount of P79,000.00 in exchange for the processing of her visa,
passport and other travel documents for Japan. Private respondent delivered to
petitioner Security Bank (SB) Check Nos. 0014797 and 0014798 in the amounts
of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively, and cash worth P29,000.00. However, no
visa was delivered. Private respondent insisted that petitioner return her money, to
no avail.

Special Prosecutor dela Cruz found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and
recommended her dismissal from the service.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Re-open with the BI, wherein Commissioner Rodriguez
issued an order, adopting the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz.
Subsequently, the assailed order of dismissal was affirmed by then Department of
Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas.
Petitioner appealed to the CSC,[32] raising the issues of lack of due process and lack of
substantial evidence, which dismissed the petitioner’s appeal.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA, raising the issue:
whether or not the BI and CSC violated petitioner's right to due process. the CA
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was accorded due process

Held: The petition is denied. She contends that she was denied of her right to a full
hearing when she was not accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against her. The argument is unmeritorious.

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial

litigation is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a
personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the
opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily
forfeits the right to cross-examine.

The right to cross-examination being a personal right, petitioner must be

deemed to have waived this right by agreeing to submit the case for resolution and
not questioning the lack of it in the proceedings before the BI.
More importantly, it is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. This was clearly satisfied in t
he case at bar.

In the case at bar, petitioner cannot downplay the charges against her. Whether the
charges against petitioner satisfy the elements of illegal recruitment to make her
criminally liable for such crime is not the issue at bar.

At the very least, petitioner was found to have taken advantage of her position as an
employee of the BI to falsely promise, for pecuniary gain, the facilitation of private
respondent's travel to Japan, including the processing of her passport, visa and other
travel documents. Worse, she was found to have refused to reimburse the amounts
paid to her by private respondent even when the promised passport, visa, and travel
documents did not materialize. Undoubtedly, these acts involve "corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule." Under Section
23(c), Rule XIV the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, these acts
constitute a grave offense for which petitioner must suffer the penalty of dismissal.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
February 12, 2002 and Resolution dated April 16, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58766
are AFFIRMED.
Fulgado vs Court of Appeals

Summary of Facts:
On Sept. 9, 1967, Ruperto Fulgado, despite his old age resolved to file an action
before the CFI Rizal – Pasig against the private respondents for the annulment of
certain contracts of sale and partition with accounting. The private respondents, who
are the defendants in such action, filed their answer to the complaint with special and
affirmative defenses and a counterclaim.
After several delays, pre-trial conference was finally set on Feb. 1, 1968.
However, private respondents still failed to appear. As such Fulgado was allowed to
present his evidence ex parte, with Jose Fulgado and Ruperto himself as witnesses.
Upon learning of the presentation of evidence ex parte, the private respondents
filed a motion to life the said order; the trial court denied said motion on Feb. 16,
1972. The private respondents then filed a petition for relief from said relief from said
order; the trial court also denied it.
On April 24, 1972, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Fulgado. On
appeal however, the appellate court held that private respondents were unjustly
denied of opportunity to present their evidence in court; thus, the trial court’s
decision was set aside and the case was remanded back to the trial court on June 27,
1974.
Only acting upon a little over a year (July 3, 1975) after the CA’s decision,
private respondents moved that the case be set at any date of August or September;
case was set on Sept. 16, 1975. Unfortunately, the presiding judge was on leave, and
the hearing was then again postponed to Jan. 15 and further to Feb. 15, 1976. By then,
Fulgado was already dead; he died on Nov. 25, 1975.
When the case was heard on May 4, 1976, private respondents moved to cross-
examine the witnesses, Ruperto and Jose. However, Ruperto was already dead and
Jose already migrated to US. As such, private respondents moved to strike out the
testimonies of Ruperto and Jose Fulgado on the ground that the former were deprived
of the right to cross-examine them. The trial court granted private respondents’
motion, to the appeal of Ruperto’s children, who substituted him as party plaintiffs
and now petitioners to the appeal.

Contentions:
The petitioners argued that while the right to cross-examination is an essential
part of due process, the same may however be waived as the private respondent have
done when they allowed an unreasonable length of time to lapse from the inception
of the opportunity to cross-examine before availing themselves of such right and
likewise when they failed to exhaust other remedies to secure the exercise of such
right.
Ruling:
The petition is well-taken.
The Court, citing Savory Luncheonette vs Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino,
held that “The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a
judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is
part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived
expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-
examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness
but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and
the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed
to remain in the record.”
From the records, private respondents had enough opportunity to cross-examine
Ruperto and Jose yet they failed to do so. Worse, they only acted a little over a year
from the CA’s decision. Even then, the private respondents asked, to set the much-
delayed hearing a month or two after their motion. By the time the case was heard,
Ruperto was already dead and Jose has already migrated to US. It can only be said that
the right of cross-examination has been waived by private respondents.
CORPUZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Date: November 11, 2004
Where Filed: Office of the Ombudsman
Crime Charged: Volation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (tax credit scam)
Doctrine: In criminal cases, the accused is entitled to a speedy disposition of the cases
against him.
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against
petitioners Antonio H. Roman, Sr. and Marialen C. Corpuz, the President and Vice-
President of FILSYN Corporation, respectively, and several others.
The petitioners, the Undersecretary of Finance Antonio P. Belicena, and the
officers of the Petron Corporation, were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, involving the so-called tax credit scam.
Aside from the aforestated case, sixty-one (61) similar Informations were filed
by the Office of the Ombudsman against some fifty (50) public officials and private
individuals relating to the issuance of tax credit certificates.
Ruling:
The petition is denied due course.
No less than Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. The judicial bodies envisaged in the said
provision include the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.
Rule 115, Section 1(h) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure further
provides that the accused has the right to have a speedy, impartial and public trial.
The said rule requires that the arraignment of the accused should be held within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, unless a shorter period is provided by special law or unless excusable delays
as provided in Rule 119, Section 10 of the Rules are attendant.
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case
against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch
in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a
case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such
right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is
a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length
of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; and (d)
prejudice to the defendant.
There can be no denying the fact that the petitioners, as well as the other
accused, was prejudiced by the delay in the reinvestigation of the cases and the
submission by the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor of his report thereon. So was the
State. The People has yet to prove the guilt of the petitioners of the crimes charged
beyond reasonable doubt. We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that before
resorting to the extreme sanction of depriving the petitioner a chance to prove its case
by dismissing the cases, the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor should be ordered by the
Sandiganbayan under pain of contempt, to explain the delay in the submission of his
report on his reinvestigation.