G.R. NO.

115407, AUGUST 28, 1995

MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, PETITIONER

VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS

SUMMARY: Petitioner was implicated as the mastermind of a multiple murder. Then, he

was formally charged in an amended information promulgated by the prosecutor.
Petitioner assailed his inclusion in the case and before the warrant of arrest was served,
he filed a motion for admission to bail. The RTC granted the motion. The state
prosecutor argues that petitioner should not be granted bail because he was, at the time
of the filing, not yet brought to the custody of the law as it happened before the warrant
of arrest was served. The CA reversed the ruling.

Facts:

On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged as a co-conspirator in the crime
of multiple murder for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in
Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed
had initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion,
Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And
Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses
Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused,
Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later
escaped from prison. The others have remained at large up to the present.

Later, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an amended
information, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As petitioner was his former
employer, Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel. Ironically, during the
preliminary investigation, the accused, in a signed affidavit but which he later retracted,
implicated petitioner as the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag
family.

Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case,
the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor, designated a replacement,
State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation
and prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new
prosecutor, petitioner was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a
second amended information. Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused
all the way to this Court." In an en banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the
Court sustained the filing of the second amended information against him.

the trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for
petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner through
counsel, filed a motion for admission to bail with the trial court. Petitioner duly furnished
copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State
 Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November
5, 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application for bail.

As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to
"acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over
the person of their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the
Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered
being in the custody of the law. On that note, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in
the amount of P200,000.00. The following day, , petitioner, apparently still weak but well
enough to travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the
trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed.

The new state prosecutor opposed the court’s ruling and filed a motion for
reconsideration but was then denied. Thus elevating the matter to the Court of Appeals
which sided to the arguments of the prosecutor, reversing the ruling of the lower court.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner can invoke his right to bail considering petitioner’s contention that he
already submitted himself to the custody of the law and considering further respondent’s
contention that he filed for bail before the warrant of arrest was served on him.

Ruling:

Yes. Petitioner should be allowed to invoke his right to bail as he already submitted
himself to the custody of the law.

On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is
arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or
by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the
revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities.17 in this light, the
ruling, vis-a-vis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al.,18 should be explained.

In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion
for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may,
however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being
constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance
which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the
hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the
custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter
granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the
arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.19
The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military
offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted to the military camp area.

It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it
known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could
not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College
General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance
to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit
knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the
arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest
effort to place petitioner in the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then
incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by
simply ordering his confinement or placing him under guard.

The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never
attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly
submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for
bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual
whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the
said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had
been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the
clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he
was charged in court, up to the submission application for bail, and until the day of the
hearing thereof.
G.R. NO. L-5256, NOVEMBER 27, 1953

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

VS.
LEE DIET, ACCUSED AND RIZAL SURETY AND INSURANCE COMPANY, BONDSMAN-
APPELLEE.

Syllabus:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; BAILBOND CONTINUES IN FORCE UNTIL DISCHARGED

BY THE COURT; SURETY’S DUTY TO INFORM THE COURT OF PERTINENT EVENTS SO
THAT IT MAY BE DISCHARGED. — When the surety put up a bond for the provisional liberty of
the accused it became his jailer and as such was at all times charged with the duty to keep him
under its surveillance. This duty continues until the bond is cancelled, or the surety is
discharged. The procedure for the discharge of a surety is clear in section 16 of Rule 110. A
surety may also be discharged from the non-performance of the bond when its performance "is
rendered impossible by the act of God, the act of the obligee, or the act of the law" (U. S. v.
Sunico, 40 Phil., 826-832), but even in these cases there still remains the duty of the surety to
inform the court of the happening of the event so that it may take appropriate action and decree
the discharge of the surety (sec. 16, Rule 110). Where no such step was taken by the surety
when the accused was re-arrested by the constabulary authorities, but only gave notice to the
court of that fact when the court ordered the appearance of the accused either for arraignment
or for trial, it must be presumed that the surety chose to continue with its liability under the bond
and should be held accountable for what may later happen to the accused (6 C. J., p. 1026).

Summary: Lee Diet was charged of a crime uttering false US gold coins in connivance with
some counterfeiters. He bailed with a surety bond then escaped. Later, he was rearrested by
the constabulary officers and in his detention he again escaped. Due to his escape and non-
appearance to trial, his surety bond was confiscated.

Facts:

Lee Diet was charged of a crime in uttering false gold coins. He bailed with a surety bond by
Rizal Surety and Insurance company. He was released and escaped thereafter.

The Justice of the Peace set the preliminary investigation of the case for June 14, 1951. On this
date the accused failed to appear. Counsel for the surety however appeared and informed the
court that the whereabouts of the accused was not known due to the fact that he escaped three
days before while under the custody of the Philippine constabulary. It appears that the accused
while out on bail was re- arrested on June 8, 1951, by some agents of the constabulary for
questioning regarding his alleged subversive activities, but during his detention he escaped. For
his failure to appear, the Justice of the Peace declared the bond forfeited and required the
surety to produce the body of the accused within 30 days from notice and to show cause why
judgment should not be rendered against it for the amount of the bond. Two days later,
however, the justice of the peace reconsidered his order and remanded the case to the Court of
First Instance of Cotabato.

On July 2, 1951, the Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding information against the accused.
The arraignment and trial of the accused were set for August 2, 1951, but on said date the
accused again failed to appear, whereupon the Provincial Fiscal moved for the confiscation of
the bond posted by him for his provisional liberty. Counsel for the surety objected giving as
reason for the non- appearance of the accused the same reason given by him before the
Justice of the Peace Court of Cotabato. The court denied the motion holding in substance that
the reason given by counsel for the surety for the non-appearance of the accused was
satisfactory and had the effect of relieving it from its liability under the bond. Hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether the escape of the accused excuses the surety bond for the non-performance of its
obligation on bail.

Ruling.

It is a well-settled doctrine that a surety is the jailer of the accused. "He takes charge of, and
absolutely becomes responsible for the latter’s custody, and under such circumstance, it is
incumbent upon him, or rather, it is his inevitable obligation, not merely a right, to keep the
accused at all times under his surveillance inasmuch as the authority emanating from his
character as surety is no more nor less than the Government’s authority to hold the said
accused under preventive imprisonment." (People v. Tuising, 61 Phil., 404.)

When the surety in this case put up the bond for the provisional liberty of the accused it became
his jailer and gas such was at all times charged with the duty to keep him under its surveillance.
This duty continues until the bond is cancelled, or the surety is discharged. The procedure for
the discharge of a surety is clear in the Rules of Court. Thus, it is there provided that the bail
bond shall be cancelled and the sureties discharged of liability (a) where the sureties so request
upon surrender of the defendant to the court; (b) where the defendant is re-arrested or ordered
into custody on the same charge or for the same offense; (c) where the defendant is discharged
by the court at any stage of the proceedings, or acquitted, or is convicted and surrendered to
serve the sentence; and (d) where the defendant dies during the pendency of the action.
(Section 16, Rule 110.)

It is true that a surety may also be discharged from the non- performance of the bond when its
performance "is rendered impossible by the act of God, the act of the obligee, or the act of the
law" (U. S. v. Sunico, 40 Phil., 826-832), but even in these cases there still remains the duty of
the surety to inform the court of the happening of the event so that it may take appropriate
action and decree the discharge of the surety (section 16, Rule 110). Here no such step was
taken by the surety when the accused was re-arrested by the constabulary authorities. The
surety kept silent since it did not take any of the steps pointed out by law if it wanted to be
relieved from its liability under the bond. It only gave notice to the court of that fact when the
court ordered the appearance of the accused either for arraignment or for trial. It was only then
that it informed the court that the accused was re-arrested and that while he was detained, he
made good his escape. Since at that time his bond was still valid and binding, and
notwithstanding the re-arrest of the accused the surety kept silent, it must be presumed that the
surety chose to continue with its liability under the bond and should be held accountable for
what may later happen to the accused. It has been held that "The subsequent arrest of the
principal on another charge, or in other proceedings, while he is out on bail does not operate
ipso facto as a discharge of his bail . . . Thus if, while in custody on another charge, he escapes,
or is again discharged on bail, and is a free man when called upon his recognizance to appear,
his bail are bound to produce him." (6 C. J., p. 1026.)
This case should be distinguished from the recent case of People v. Mamerto de la Cruz, 93
Phil., 487, wherein this Court said: "It has been seen that if the sureties did not bring the person
of the accused to court, which they were powerless to do due to causes brought about by the
Government itself, they did the next best thing by informing the court of the prisoner’s arrest and
confinement in another province and impliedly asking that they be discharged. On its part, the
court, by keeping quiet, and, indeed, issuing notices of the hearings direct to the prisoner
through the sheriff of Camarines Norte and ignoring the sureties, impliedly acquiesced in the
latter’s request and appeared to have regarded the accused surrendered." No such step was
taken by the surety in this particular case for it failed even to inform the court of the
apprehension made of the accused by the constabulary authorities.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed without pronouncement as to costs.