RODOLFO V. JAO v. COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V.

JAO

G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002

Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died
intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his
parents. Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue.2 He argued
that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of
their deaths. The decedent’s actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother
used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed
in Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining
medical treatment and hospitalization. In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents
actually resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was
conclusively declared in their death certificates.

WON court erred in disregarding the ruling of this honorable court in the case of Eusebio vs. Eusebio,
100 Phils. 593, which clearly interpreted what is meant by residence in Sec. 1 of rule 73 of the Rules of
Court.

No. The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein, Andres
Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon
City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to purchase a
Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house in Quezon
City, Eusebio died even before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his
domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio changed
his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City was just temporary. In the
case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioner’s Quezon City
residence. Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were both residents
of Quezon City at the time of their demise.
VICENTE URIARTE v. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL

G.R. Nos. L-21938-39. May 29, 1970

On November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate
of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a
natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner
had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural
son. On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special
Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the
Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings,
and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate
proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for
Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss. On April 19, 1963, the Negros
Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No.
6344 pending before it.

WON (a) the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the
other, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396
notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.

No. We cannot accept petitioner’s contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to
consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor. However, it is well settled
in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has
waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches.
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER
FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR v. ERNESTO PALAGANAS

G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011

Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died
single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother,
Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and
in the U.S. On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor
designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. Petitioner
nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),3 arguing that an unprobated will
executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

WON a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been
previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same
have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be
given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the
law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country. The rules do
not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.
ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA v. COURT OF APPEALS

During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo
from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union, the couple begot two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto
Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
On 2 July 1992, private respondent filed with the RTC of Cotabato City a petition for declaration of
heirship, guardianship over the persons and properties of her minor children and issuance of letters of
administration. Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of
Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the
time of the decedent's death Davao City was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
is the proper forum.

WON the petition should be dismissed due to improper venue.

No. On the issue of the residence of the decedent at the time of his death, the decedent as a
businessman has many business residences from different parts of the country where he usually stays to
supervise and pursue his business ventures. Davao City is one of them. It cannot be denied that
Cotabato City is his actual residence where his alleged illegitimate children also reside. The place of
residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of
administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely
constitutive of venue (Fule vs. CA, L-40502, November 29, 1976). Even assuming that there is concurrent
venue among the Regional Trial Courts of the places where the decedent has residences, the Regional
Trial Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts (Section 1, Rule 73). It was this Court which first took
cognizance of the case when the petition was filed on July 2, 1992.
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON v. MA. LOURDES BELEN

G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed
by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by
herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married, claiming that the venue
of the petition was improperly laid. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and
Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer). The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo
was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death.

WON the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming that Eliseo Quiazon was a resident of Las Piñas and
therefore, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed with the RTC of Las Piñas.

No. This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of
venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor. "Resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions
and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the
context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Moreover, while the recitals in death
certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents
thereof, however, is not binding on the courts.
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

The CA rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of
the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, wherein Virginia Fule was granted her petition for letters
of administration, at the opposition of Precious B. Garcia based on the ground that venue was
improperly laid, among others. Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia
G. Fule elevated the matter to the SC on appeal by certiorari. However, even before Virginia G. Fule
could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed a petition for
letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch over the same
intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B.
Garcia as special administratrix.

WON the petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna.

Yes. We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at Quezon City, and
not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the
time of his death. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to
waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to
in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in
settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. In the case before Us
the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue
assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the
Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died. He was survived by his widow, the herein
petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, all residing in Quezon City, and by his children of the first
marriage, respondents herein, all of legal age and residing in Cebu. On 5 March 1964, respondent
Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu,
alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate and that he was a resident of Cebu at
the time of his death. In the meantime, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court
of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for
the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last
will and testament. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order deferring to the probate
proceedings in the Quezon City court, which was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be
reconsidered or set aside nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the
appellate courts. Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to
Dismiss in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court. Hence,
respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper
venue.

WON the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it.

No. It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. The Rule precisely and deliberately provides
that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." Hence, a court with whom the petition is first filed may
decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer
to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.

Moreover, it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a
court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the
latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to
the executor subsequently appointed.
PURITA ALIPIO v. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING

G.R. No. 134100. September 29, 2000

Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond. He subleased the fishpond to the
spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The first
installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof,
leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with
their obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses
for the collection of the said amount. Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that her husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.

WON a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal
partnership of gains.

No. As held in Calma v. Tañedo, after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint for the collection
of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be brought against the surviving
spouse. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the
surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction
over the settlement of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de facto
administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property belonging to the partnership prior to
the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership property is void.

Under the law, the Alipios’ obligation is one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership.
When petitioner’s husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and debts
chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73,
which states:

Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. — When the marriage is dissolved by the death of
the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and
the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. xx

His remedy, then, is to file a claim against the Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of petitioner’s husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition either for the issuance of
letters of administration 18 or for the allowance of will, depending on whether petitioner’s husband
died intestate or testate.
LEO C. ROMERO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012

Petitioners allege that upon their father’s death in 1974, their mother, Aurora Romero, was appointed
as legal guardian who held several real and personal properties in trust for her children. Since that year
until the present, she continues to be the administrator of the estate of her late husband. Petitioners
claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother Vittorio – through fraud, misrepresentation and
duress – succeeded in registering some of the above-mentioned properties in his name through of
Deeds of Sale executed by their mother, Aurora. Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title (Amended) against private respondents Aurora C. Romero
and Vittorio C. Romero. The RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint contending that the issues therein
must be taken up and established in the still-ongoing intestate proceedings. On appeal from the CA
judgment which affirmed the RTC judgment, petitioners argue that, as heirs, they are purportedly
allowed to exercise their option of filing a separate civil action in order to protect their interests.

WON petitioners may file a separate civil action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title, despite
the pendency of the settlement proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero.

No. That petitioners have the prerogative of choosing where to file their action for nullification –
whether with the probate court or the regular court – is erroneous. The court's jurisdiction, once
invoked, and made effective, cannot be treated with indifference nor should it be ignored with impunity
by the very parties invoking its authority.

The probate court has jurisdiction to determine the issues in the present case. It has been held that it is
within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication.

As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the testate or
intestate proceeding. However, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. Although generally, a probate court may not
decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one
of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership.
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 129242, January 16, 2001

Troadio Manalo died intestate and was survived by by his wife and his eleven children. Eight of the
surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the respondent RTC of Manila for the
judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo
Manalo, as administrator thereof. The trial court upon motion of herein petitioners set its order of
general default aside. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, culminating in the
filling of an Omnibus Motion seeking, among others, to declare that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors because of the failure of respondents to aver that earnest
efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling
of the petition and that SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of
the same family. The trial court ruled against petitioners herein.

WON the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial
court.

No. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of
estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as
well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The petition also contains an
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the
deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings.

It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction
and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in
an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court,
as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not
by the defenses contained in the answer.
TERESITA N. DE LEON v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 128781, August 6, 2002

Teresita N. de Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of Rafael C. Nicolas. Ramon G. Nicolas, an
oppositor-applicant in the intestate proceedings, filed a "Motion for Collation," claiming that deceased,
during his lifetime, had given various real properties to his children by gratuitous title and that
administratrix Teresita failed to include the same in the inventory of the estate of the decedent. Acting
on said Motion, the RTC ordered for some lots included therein to be included for collation. The Court of
Appeals found the petition devoid of merit, ruling that the Order directing the inclusion of the properties
therein enumerated in the estate of the deceased Rafael Nicolas had already become final for failure of
petitioners to appeal from the order of collation.

WON said Order is interlocutory, hence not final.

Yes. The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of
the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said
power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it
contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his
inventory. In compliance with this duty the court has also inherent power to determine what properties,
rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir
or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the court’s attention to the fact
that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court’s duty
to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not
and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination
is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties.

A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, 22 can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally.
BETTY T. CHUA v. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 144881, October 16, 2003

Betty T. Chua was appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased Jose L. Chua.
Thereafter, she submitted to the trial court an inventory of all the real and personal properties of the
deceased. One of the creditors of the deceased, Absolute Management Corporation, filed a claim over
the estate in the amount of P63,699,437.74. In the interim, Absolute noticed that the deceased’s shares
of stocks with Ayala Sales Corporation and Ayala Construction Supply, Inc. were not included in the
inventory of assets. As a consequence, it filed a motion to require Betty T. Chua to explain why she did
not report these shares of stocks in the inventory. Through a reply, Betty T. Chua alleged that these
shares had already been assigned and transferred to other parties prior to the death of her husband,
Jose L. Chua. She attached to her reply the deeds of assignment which allegedly constituted proofs of
transfer. Absolute Management Corporation, suspecting that the documents attached to Betty T. Chua’s
reply were spurious and simulated, filed a motion for the examination of the supposed transferees
which the RTC denied.

WON the probate court should have given due course to the Motion for Examination.

Yes. The trial court has the inherent duty to see to it that the inventory of the administrator lists all the
properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to include in his inventory. An
heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased may call the court’s attention that certain
properties, rights or credits are left out from the inventory. In such a case, it is likewise the court’s duty
to hear the observations of such party. The court has the power to determine if such observations
deserve attention and if such properties belong prima facie to the estate.

However, in such proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide whether the properties, real or
personal, belong to the estate or to the persons examined. If after such examination there is good
reason to believe that the person examined is keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the
administrator should file an ordinary action in court to recover the same. Inclusion of certain shares of
stock by the administrator in the inventory does not automatically deprive the assignees of their shares.
They have a right to be heard on the question of ownership, when that property is properly presented to
the court.
HENRY LITAM, ETC., ET AL. v. REMEDIOS R. ESPIRITU

G.R. No. L-7644, November 27, 1956

Gregorio Dy Tam instituted Special Proceeding No. 1537, entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Estate
of the Deceased Rafael Litam” which states that petitioner is the son of Rafael Litam, who died in Manila
on January 10, 1951; that the deceased was survived by eight of his children by a marriage celebrated in
China with Sia Khin. The surviving spouse of the decedent, Marcosa Rivera filed a counter- petition,
denying the alleged marriage of the decedent to Sia Khin, as well as the alleged filiation of the persons
named in the petition and asserting that the properties described herein are her paraphernal properties.
Meanwhile, Remedios R. Espiritu was appointed, in Special Proceeding No. 1709 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, guardian of Marcosa Rivera, who had been declared incompetent. Thereafter, Gregorio
Dy Tam and his alleged brothers and sisters, filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 2071 of the same court,
against Remedios R. Espiritu. The court rendered a decision dismissing Civil Case No. 2071 the plaintiffs
are not the children of the deceased Rafael Litam, and that his only heir is his surviving wife, Marcosa
Rivera.

WON the lower court erred in declaring Marcosa Rivera as the sole heir of the decedent.

Yes. The lower court should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa Rivera is the
only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the
exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceeding No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and,
will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.
JUANA PIMENTEL v. ENGRACIO PALANCA

G.R. No. 2108, December 19, 1905

Margarita Jose, a native and citizen of the Philippine Islands, died in the city of Amoy, China, in 1902. Her
last will was duly proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance of Manila and Engracio Palanca was
duly appointed administrator of the state of the deceased. By her said will Margarita Jose left all her
property to her two children, Vicente Barreto and Benito Carlos. Juana Pimentel and the mother of said
Margarita Jose, commenced this, an ordinary action, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging
that the two children of Margarita Jose were illegitimate, and that she was the heir at law and entitled
to the whole state. Judgment was entered in favor of the defendants. The court held that Vicente
Barreto was the legitimate son of Margarita Jose; that Benito Carlos was an illegitimate son, the plaintiff,
not having appealed from the probate of the will, could not maintain this action.

WON an ordinary action be maintained by a person claiming to be an heir of the deceased against other
persons, also claiming to be such heirs, for the purpose of having their rights in the estate determined.

No. While the estate is being settled in the Court of First Instance in a special proceeding, no ordinary
action can be maintained in that court, or in any other court, by a person claiming to be the heir, against
the executor or against the executor or against other persons claiming to be heirs, for the purpose of
having the rights of the plaintiff in the estate determined. The plaintiff not having appealed from the
order admitting the will to probate, as she had a right to do, that order is final and conclusive. It does
not, however, as the court below held, determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the
estate.

The plaintiff in her amended complaint asks also that the appointment of Engracio Palanca be annulled.
This relief cannot be granted in an ordinary action. The plaintiff had a right to appeal from the order of
the court appointing the administrator in this case, and not having exercised that right such order is final
and conclusive against her.

Lastly, the plaintiff also asks that the administrator be required to render an account to her of his
administration, and deposit in court the money which he has in his possession. To grant this relief in an
ordinary action between parties would be to take away from the court having in charge the settlement
of the estate the express powers conferred upon it by law.
FLORANTE C. TIMBOL v. JOSE CANO

G.R. No. L-15445, April 29, 1961

Mercedes Cano died leaving as her only heir her son Florante C. Timbol then only 11 years old. Jose
Cano, brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator. Jose Cano filed a petition proposing that
the agricultural lands of the intestate be leased to the administrator Jose Cano for an annual rental of
P4,000, this rental to be used for the maintenance of the minor and the payment of land taxes and dues
to the government. Judge Edilberto Barot, then presiding the court, approved the motion. On January
14, 1956 the court, upon motion of the administrator and the conformity of the minor heir, approved
the reduction of the annual rental of the agricultural lands of the intestate leased to the administrator
from P4,000 to P2,400 and the conversion of 30 hectares of the agricultural lands into a subdivision. On
June 6, 1957 Florante C. Timbol was appointed administrator in place of Jose Cano. Subsequently, he
presented a motion alleging among other things (a) that the area destined for the projected subdivision
be increased from 30 hectares to 41.9233 hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be approved. Cano
objected on the grounds that (1) the enlargement of the subdivision would reduce the land leased to
him and would deprive his tenants of their landholdings, and (b) that he is in possession under express
authority of the court, under a valid contract, and may not be deprived of his leasehold summarily upon
a simple petition.

WON the court, as a probate court, has jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his rights under the lease,
because these rights may be annulled or modified only by a court of general jurisdiction.

Yes. It has been held that the court acts as a trustee, and as such trustee, should zealously guard the
estate and see that it is wisely and economically administered, not dissipated. Even the contract of lease
under which the appellant holds the agricultural lands of the intestate and which he now seeks to
protect, was obtained with the court's approval. If the probate court has the right to approve the lease,
so may it order its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease. The matter of giving the
property to a lessee is an act of administration, also subject to the approval of the court. Of course, if
the court abuses its discretion in the approval of the contracts or acts of the administrator, its orders
may be subject to appeal and may be reversed on appeal; but not because the court may make an error
may it be said that it lacks jurisdiction to control acts of administration of the administrator.
PAZ E. SIGUION v. GO TECSON

G.R. No. L-3430, May 23, 1951

Paulino P. Gochecho mortgaged to Paz E. Siguion a piece of registered real property in the City of Manila
to secure a debt. Some ten years later, he constituted a second mortgage on the same property in favor
of Paz E. Siguion’s son to secure another debt. Gochecho died in 1943 without having discharged either
mortgage. The following year, proceedings for the settlement of his estate were instituted in the Court
of First Instance of Manila, and Go Tecson was appointed judicial administrator. On February 3, 1949,
the present actions were filed against the administrator Go Tecson for the foreclosure of the two
mortgages, and judgment having been rendered against him in both, he has elevated the cases here by
way of appeal.

WON he could no longer be sued as administrator because the administration proceedings had already
been closed and that the matter in controversy is already res judicata.

No, as the order for the distribution of the estate among the heirs has not as yet been complied with,
hence, the administration proceedings are "still pending. The record neither discloses facts sufficient to
support the claim of res judicata. The administrator has made an overture to pay the mortgage debt and
the mortgagees (or one of them) have signified willingness to accept payment. But there is nothing in
the order to show that the offer of payment has been preceded by the formal filing of a claim. Without
that formality, the mortgagees cannot be deemed to have waived their mortgage so as to be estopped
from bringing a foreclosure suit. In order that the mortgage creditor may be said to have waived his
mortgage lien, he must appear to have filed formally his claim in the testate or intestate proceeding.
LEONIDA MARI and CARIDAD EVANGELISTA v. ISAAC BONILLA