1

1. Introduction

This project examines the problem of the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo Albanians. Although
many would say that this problem dates back to the end of last century, originally the problem is much
older. The attempt to find problem solutions will be focused on resolving the dispute between the two
sides by trying to explain the cultural and historical differences. The importance of the “cultural part”
of the conflict was emphasized by scientists in the “Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts”
that should start in August 2013 at the University of Copenhagen. They claim that “Dramatic
international conflicts are often recurring ones. They raise particular challenges, as layers of historical
memory, trauma and blame are entrenched. Such conflicts demand specific understandings of the role
of history and memory and are thus to be studied both as critical events and as critical continuity”. 1

This will be a study of a conflict that has been ongoing for a long time; there are two sides to the
conflict, both with their own truth, history, culture, religion and so on. Emphasis will be on stereotypes
and myths, together with history. Kosovo which geographically belongs to the Balkan Peninsula has for
century’s been the center of fierce fighting between Serbs and Albanians and place where the interests
of the big world powers influenced its history. Serbs speak about Kosovo and Metohija, Albanians
mention Kosova, and the international community speaks about Kosovo. Although there is a part of
Kosovo named Metohija according to Serbian sources, in order to make things simple, the word
“Kosovo” will be used in the project. Also, in order to differentiate between Albanians from Albania
and Albanians from Kosovo, the term “Kosovo Albanians” will be used.

The conflict in Kosovo came into the focus of foreign media after the death of Josip Broz. Until the
beginning of the next decade, the problem was more or less under control but disintegration of the
Yugoslavia lead to an even further escalation of the Kosovo problem. The decisive moment was the
bombardment in 1999 when the fight between Kosovo liberation army and Serbian police and army
forces provoked NATO’s reaction. Serbia strongly opposed Kosovo’s independence. The present
situation in the region is still full of turmoil and the positions among the international factors remain
unclear which, together with strong opposition from the Serbian side, could keep both Serbia and
Kosovo in a “stalemate” position. The development of the region is seriously jeopardized. The
economy has collapsed and all democratic political processes have been halted. Negotiations between
Serbia and Kosovo, under the patronage of the EU are well underway.

So, why is there no peace between Serbs and Kosovo Albanian when it is clear that any kind of
improvement in the development of the region that suffered for a long time is not possible until
problems have been resolved? Can the romanticism of Serbs and the “Kosovo myth” and Albanian
claims that they arrived in Kosovo a long time before the Serbs, clarify the problem? Is it possible that
there are things more important than the economic development and a stable political system and
democracy?

1
Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts, CRIC an abridged version of the final application from January
2013, pp.7 http://cric.ku.dk/news/news/assistant-professors-and-phds/CRIC.pdf
 2

2. Methodology

The methodology part of the project consists of how the topic was chosen, as well as sources that were
used. The quality of the sources will be discussed, and how they were used in the research. Also,
emphasis is placed on the question to what extent the information was appropriate and what are the
main limitations that emerged during research. A very important part is the theory that was used as
much as criticism of it.

2.1. Choosing the Topic

The development of a country or a region is not possible if there is an armed conflict. It is true that, at
this very moment, there is no armed conflict between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians but it is also true
that normal relations between them do not exist. The state of a “protracted conflict” has a great
influence on the level of development of both sides and it is inevitable that such a position has to be
changed. The reasonable thing to do is not to neglect the present problem but to think whether it is
possible to find a solution that would please both sides. It is observed that analyses about the conflict in
the Balkans are mostly describing the one or the other side. Analyses that treat both sides at the same
time are, one could probably tell, rare. Also, it has been observed that most people from western
countries, even some scientist, despite a large numbers of books and scientific articles about wars in ex-
Yugoslavia and particularly Kosovo, don’t know much about the past and current situation in the
region and many still form their opinion according to the news from the media. This should be
changed.

2.2. Research Methods and Research Approaches

As it was mentioned before, it will be a study of an ethnic conflict. The author of the project is aware
that the conflict between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians has multiple dimensions. Solving the problem of
the conflict between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians consists of the problem of nation building and the so
called “double nation state” problem, economic, political, mass misuse of media, religion, folklore and
many other aspects. But the facts that there were limitations due to the availability of information and
individual work on the project, as much as limitations in time, made it impossible to research all
aspects of the problem.

2.3. Data Collection

Since it was impossible to conduct any field research and obtain directly any first-hand information, it
was not possible to conduct any quantitative or qualitative research. A great effort was made to conduct
research in an equilibrium level in order to provide equal treatment of all data. There have been efforts
to acquire data directly from the scientists on both sides, which greatly contributes to the project.
Nevertheless, mostly secondary data was used, from reliable sources widely cited in many scientific
books and articles, but also from the sources directly recommended from both Serbian and Kosovo
Albanian scientists. Due to close connections to one side in the conflict, it is possible that there are
some weaknesses in the project but it is researches opinions that thanks to the high level of curiosity
and commitment to deeply investigate the reasons for the conflict, will hopefully make it possible to
 3

neglect the weaknesses. The author is also aware that the research project was greatly influenced by
personal education, values, and attitudes towards actual happenings.

2.4. Sources

Concerning troubles in collecting data Batakovic, a historian, expert for Serbian history in Kosovo, and
former ambassador of Serbia in several countries, was chosen as a primary source of historical facts.
Due to not speaking the Albanian language, it was convenient to use any possible sources in English.
Sometimes foreign sources and, when it was possible, sources of Albanian origin in English. Predrag J.
Markovic and Vedran Obucina are very important in attempting to uncover Balkans myths.

2.5. Historical Background

This section focuses on the history of both Serbia and Kosovo. In the case of Serbia, the focus is on the
development of the Serbian state from the medieval till modern times, with emphasis on the recent
occurrences. The same is applied for the Kosovo part. The researcher also tried to clarify the most
important misconceptions and myths in both histories. Historical approach is a fundamental base for
deeper insight into what is going on in the Balkans.

2.6. Structure

The project is divided into several parts: introduction, methodology, history, theories, analysis and
conclusion. Many researchers consider history as a basis point in conducting the research, and the
introduction part provides the necessary information for a pretext scheme of the project goal. All of the
above, together with the theories which were used, leads to the analysis and conclusion.

2.7. Theory

2.7.1. Why the Symbolic Politics Theory of Ethnic War

The symbolic politics theory presumes that behavior and attitudes are more strongly linked to personal
beliefs than to material interests. Stuart J. Kaufman in the essay “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice?
Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence” stresses that the symbolic politics theory asserts that
extreme ethnic violence is driven by hostile ethnic myths and an emotionally driven symbolic politics
based on those myths that popularizes predatory policies. 2 As David O. Sears, a man who offered
symbolic theory to the scientific audience, stressed “Human beings are intensely concerned about
remote and abstract political symbols, though the emotional costs they pay and benefit they receive
from such involvement are modest”. 3 Sears claims that that kind of emotions produce some of the most
violent and devastating ethnic conflicts in the world. It looks like the Balkans ethnic conflict is the
product of the same emotions.

2
Stuart J. Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence”,
International Security Volume 30, Number 4, spring 2006 pp. 45-86, https://muse.jhu.edu/login?
auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/international_security/v030/30.4kaufman.html
3
D.O.Sears, “Symbolic politics: A Socio-Psychological Theory, In S.Iyengar & W. J. McGuire (Eds.), Explorations in
political psychology (pp. 113-149). Durham N.C.: Duke University Press (1993)
 4

2.7. 2. Critics

The researcher is aware that it is possible to criticize which theory and method is chosen during
research. Not all scholars accept the symbolic politics theory as a way to explain ethnic conflict.
Kaufman claims that the most popular approach to explain ethnic hatred, besides the symbolic politics
theory, is the rational choice theory. The rational choice theory “incorporates some realist ideas of the
security dilemma into an explanation that insists on rationality even of such extreme behavior or
genocide”. 4 From the rational choice viewpoint, explained Kaufman, “predatory elites are the key
cause of ethnic war and genocide because they provoke violence as a way of maintaining power and
mislead their supporters into thinking the other side is to blame for the violence”. 5 Supporters of the
rational choice theory claim that symbolic politics is not capable of explaining the different outcomes
of ethnic politics simply by using myths and discourses. Nevertheless, concerning the level of
knowledge of the researcher about the topic and scientific and other literature, the author believes that
the symbolic politics theory is probably the best way to explain ethnic conflict between Serbs and
Kosovo Albanians.

2.8. Limitation

Although the researcher is equipped with certain knowledge about the problem, beside the collected
secondary data, it remains unknown what exactly the ordinary people in Serbia and in Kosovo think
about the conflict and possible solution for it. Like in many other cases of ethnic conflict, there are two
histories. Not being at the exact location of the event means that there were no possibilities to produce
any field research. The fact that the author of the project does not speak the Albanian language was
also a problem to reach more sources for the project.

3. History

Since it is almost impossible to write about Serbian history without mentioning Kosovo, it is the same
in the reverse case. The Albanians history is inseparable from Kosovo’s destiny. Therefor it is often
vaguely unclear to comprehend whose history one is writing about.

3.1. The History of Kosovo According to the Serbs

For the Serbs, Kosovo is holy land, the cradle of the Serbian nation and the place of sacrifice. Serbs
consider the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, as a moment when the Serbian medieval state that, during that
period, recorded an impressive cultural and economic rise, faced the end of its prosperous years and the
coming of the Ottoman conquest which “cut it off from its European and Christian background”. 6
Kosovo “(kos meaning the blackbird, and Kosovo, a field of blackbirds) combined with name Metohija
(derived from the Greek word metochion, pl.metochia - monastic possessions), is the official name of
the southern province of Serbia”. (ibid) There are 1.300 churches and monasteries throughout the area.
4
Kaufman Op.cit, pp. 46
5
ibid
6
Dušan T. Bataković, Kosovo and Metohija, IDENTITY, RELIGIONS& IDEOLOGIES in the Kosovo and Metohija
Living in the Enclave, Institute for Balkan studies in Serbian academy of science and art, Belgrade 2007. pp. 9;
http://www.balkaninstitut.com/pdf/izdanja/posebno/Enklave.pdf
 5

Although its majority population is now Albanian, “Kosovo is seen as epitomizing both the national
and cultural identity of the whole Serbian nation”. 7 Many Serbs speak about sacred and ancient
Serbian land where Serbs were “systematically persecuted and expelled, for being Slavic and Christian
Orthodox, over the last three centuries, with the exception of recent periods of occasional repression
against the Albanians”.8

3. 1. 1. Medieval Times

Turks were proclaimed to be persecutors and Turkish allies – Muslim Albanians were seen as torturers.
Serbs believe that Albanians came to Kosovo during the Ottoman conquest. They are “legal and illegal
immigrants descending from the highlands of northern and central Albania and settling in the plains of
Metohija and Kosovo at various times”9. There was a lot of violence in the relations between Kosovo
Albanians and Serbs and “rivalry in Kosovo-Metohija has been marked by the combined effects of
social discontent and religious and ethnic strife, producing several waves of mass migrations during the
last three hundred years”. 10

Kosovo was a part of the Serbian medieval state during the Nemanjic dynasty. Among the most
prominent rulers of the Nemanjic house was Tsar Stefan Dusan. His son Uros, “the Weak” failed to
preserve the integrity of the Empire. Therefore, the empire rapidly disintegrated and Kosovo was
divided among noble families. Not until Lazar Hrebeljanovic who was capable of bringing rivalry lords
together, did Kosovo become, once again, a unified part of the Serbian state.

Kosovo polje, a place in central Kosovo, where the Battle of Kosovo occurred, on the 28th of June
1389, is the place of ultimate sacrifice. According to legend, Serbian prince Lazar Hrebeljanovic, just
like Jesus Christ, in the eve of the battle organized a supper for the knights and noble people, and
proclaimed who would be the “Judas”, and decided to adhere to the kingdom of heaven because it is an
honor to die as Christian soldiers for a noble cause in battle. It is a disgrace to run away from a threat,
and freedom must prevail instead of slavery. It is important to say that the legend of prince Lazar and
his knights, which was preserved thanks to the monks and epic folk poetry, is very important for the
creation of the Serbian nation being and “national consciousness”11

It is not clear whether there was victory or defeat in the Battle of Kosovo, but many Serbs believe that
this was the beginning of the end of the Serbian state.

According to “Serbian” history, Kosovo was part of the Roman and Byzantine empires where Illyrians
lived in the west and Thracians in the east and south. Slav tribes arrived in the seventh century A.D.
Kosovo became part of the Serbian medieval state in the early 12th century. The region became the
center of Serbian medieval, political and cultural institutions. “As an area rich in natural resources it
was suitable for cultivation, for exploiting silver and gold mines around which thrived mining towns,

7
ibid
8
ibid
9
ibid
10
ibid
11
Tim Judah “The Serbs. History, myth and destruction of Yugoslavia”, Yale university press, 2009. pp30
 6

building fortresses, palaces, churches and monasteries”. 12 Batakovic stressed also that it is possible to
find out who used to live in Kosovo not only according to the fact that personal names and most place-
names are predominantly Serbian, but also according to the charters issued by the Serbian rulers,
containing mass data. “Feudal obligations of serfs were known as the “Serbian Law”, while the
nomadic rural population was covered by the “Vlach Law”. Albanians are occasionally referred to as
nomads living in the borderland between Metohija and Albania.13

Up to the early twentieth century, the whole of Kosovo and Metohija was part of the Ottoman Empire.
Most of the nobility that had not perished in the wars emigrated to neighboring Hungary, where they
kept resisting the Ottomans until the Battle of Mohács.14 Under the Ottoman rule, Orthodox Serbs and
many other “people of the book” became second-class citizens. “They were, like other Christians, not
only obliged to dress differently, to pay additional tax in lieu of military service, but they were
deprived of such rights as riding a horse, possessing or carrying arms, and so on.”15 The most
prominent Christian Orthodox monastery during the Ottoman rule was The Patriarchate of Pec, in the
Metohija area, built in the 13 century and it was largely perceived, especially by the Serbs in Kosovo
and Metohija, as a “structural continuation of medieval Serbia that through its chancery, financial and
judicial functions became instrumental in preserving both religious and ethnic identity.”16

The decisive moment in the history of Serbia in Kosovo was a War of the Holy League against the
Ottoman Empire when Serbs joined the Habsburg troops. Batakovic notes that the majority of
Albanians who were Muslims, joined the Ottoman army and fought against Christians. When the
Christian army was defeated, “tens of thousands of Serb families, headed by the Patriarch of Pec
Arsenije III Crnojevic, withdrew from Kosovo and Metohija and neighboring areas in fear of
reprisals”.17 This was a turning point because the number of Serbs in Kosovo was drastically reduced.
But, this was not the only problem for Orthodox Serbs. According to Batakovic, the conversion of
Serbs to Islam took place in the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth centuries, “when Muslim
Albanians began to exert a stronger influence on political events in the region.”18

3. 1. 2. The end of the Ottoman Empire

In 1878 the Congress of Berlin brought independence to Serbia but Kosovo stayed separated until the
Balkan Wars in 1912. After defeat in the Balkan Wars, there were parts of Kosovo where Albanians
accepted demilitarization but, at the same time, some escaped into the mountains and continued
guerrilla war. It is important to mention that at the same time, Albania officially became a state, for the
first time in history. During the First World War, Albanians from Kosovo closely cooperated with the
Austro-Hungarian Empire19 and they got privileged status and Serbs were murdered and banished.

3.1.3. The First and the Second World War

12
Batakovic, op.cit. pp. 14
13
ibid pp.19
14
ibid pp.20
15
ibid
16
ibid pp.22
17
ibid. pp.26
18
ibid pp. 29
19
ibid. pp.47
 7

In 1918 Kosovo became a part of Serbia. In the new Kingdom of Serbs, Slovenes and Croats claims
Batakovic, the situation in Kosovo wasn’t that peaceful and many great powers continued to support
“Albanians outlaws”20 which meant support for the so called “Kosovo Committee”, an organization of
Albanian emigrants fighting for “Greater Albania”. 21 Although it was probably true that hostility
towards Serbs always existed, Batakovic mentioned that Serbia’s colonists in Kosovo after 1918 were
not so friendly towards Albanians in Kosovo and it happened that some Albanians “were deprived of
their former property, at least partially.” 22

During the Second World War, Kosovo was separated from Serbia again. The entire Yugoslavia was
divided in 1941 among the fascist regimes and “most of Kosovo-Metohija, western Slavic Macedonia
and Montenegrin border areas went to Fascist Albania, occupied by Italy.”23 A small part of Kosovo
became part of the Bulgarian state but Germany kept the northern part, where the Trepca mines exist.
“A decree of King Victor Emanuel III, dated 12th August 1941, solemnly proclaimed a “Greater
Albania”.24

3.1.4. Communist Times

It is possible that, due to the restoration of the country after the end of the war, the situation in Kosovo
was more or less peaceful. The first major disturbances were recorded during the 60’s. Batakovic
observes that “as concession to Kosovo Albanians, the Yugoslav communist leadership issued a decree
… forbidding the return to Kosovo-Metohija and Slavic Macedonia of all interwar Serb settlers”. 25
Batakovic claims that one of the most important reasons for making Kosovo a separate part of Serbia
was a plan to unify Kosovo with Albania and so make Albania the seventh republic of Yugoslavia, or
“to enter, united with Kosovo-Metohija, into a larger Balkan federation”.26 27

The big change happened in 1966 when Aleksandar Rankovic, a Serb who was Tito’s close fellow
worker, was removed from political life. Rankovic is important because he was the main figure in
UDBA (Yugoslav secret service) who persecuted both Serbs and Albanians as ideological enemies.28
The removal of Rankovic from public political life, according Dusan Batakovic, led to the
strengthening of Albanians in politics.

The biggest difference appeared following a new constitution in 1974 when the Kosovo province
received the prerogatives of a republic. Namely, Yugoslavia consisted of six republic and two
autonomous provinces. Albanians were a national minority and, as such, didn’t have a right to self-
determination and secession. But, everything changed in 1974.29

20
ibid. pp. 50
21
ibid
22
ibid pp. 51
23
ibid pp. 55
24
ibid
25
ibid pp. 59
26
ibid
27
The Balkan federation was supposed to include Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albanian and possibly Greece. The project
was dismissed because of the Tito and Stalin conflict.
28
Albania was a part of Soviet bloc and being that, strongly opposed the Yugoslav federation after 1948
 8

Although the new constitution could have led to the decentralization of the state, Batakovic claims that
Albanians from Kosovo used it “not as a fresh opportunity for intensified national and cultural
emancipation but rather as a long-awaited chance for historical revenge against the Serbs”.30 Batakovic
stated that after 1974 Serbs started to leave Kosovo and in the provincial administration, most of the
Serbs and Montenegrins were either replaced by Albanians or politically marginalized.

Another problem was immigration from Albania. “From 1945 until Tito’s death, the number of
Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija almost tripled, which gives a population increase of 164 percent
from 1948 to 1981”.31

3.1.5. The Milosevic Era

Although there were substantial investments in the province, Kosovo was far less developed than the
rest of SFRY. It is possible to believe that the lack of jobs and the predominant policy of nationalism
were the cause of dissatisfaction. The situation became even worse when Tito died. The demonstration
in 1981 was predominantly student oriented but was soon transformed into a nationalist movement. An
attempt to solve the problem by force, using police, and “parallel efforts to minimize the problem of
discrimination against the Serbs and of their forced migration from Kosovo and Metohija” was
unsuccessful.32 History also recorded Slobodan Milosevic’s visit to Kosovo in April 1987 and famous
quote: “No one is allowed to beat you”. As Batakovic mentioned “Most Serbs perceived him as a
genuine Serb patriot who pretended to be a hardline communist. Milosevic, however, turned out to be a
communist only pretending to be a Serb patriot”.33 One should mention that the decision to revoke the
Constitution from 1974 and suspend Kosovo’s autonomy most likely produced the tension and
violence.

Kosovo Albanians wanted to be a republic in the Yugoslavia federation, and Serbs suffered “supported
by Yugoslav officials in Belgrade, Albanian-organized ethnically motivated persecution, discrimination
and harassment”.34 Batakovic also pointed out that western press was focused only on the violation of
human rights of Kosovo Albanians and the conflict in Kosovo “was often presented as internal ethnic
strife, omitting the real ideological background of Albanian nationalism, fostered by the Albanian
regime in Tirana”.35 The decisive moment appeared in 1998 when, among other things, the KLA
appeared in Kosovo. “The Albanian clandestine paramilitary organization KLA announced armed
resistance in February 1998.”36 The armed conflict escalated in the summer of the same year.

The “Rambouillet Agreement”, according to Serbian press from that time, was a provocation and an
excuse to start an already prepared bombing campaign. According to the West, this was the final
29
The territory of SFRY could not change without the approval of the republics. The border of SFRY could change
only with the acceptance of all republics and provinces. The border between republics could change by an agreement
between the republics.
30
Batakovic op.cit. pp. 63
31
ibid pp. 66
32
ibid pp. 67
33
ibid pp.71
34
ibid
35
ibid
36
ibid pp. 77
 9

attempt to solve the conflict and bring peace to the region. Since the Serbian delegation refused to
accept NATO lead forces to secure the peace, negotiations were proclaimed unsuccessful and the
bombing campaign started in March, 1999. When the Kumanovo Agreement was signed in June of the
same year, the Serbian police and military forces pulled out from Kosovo and international peace
forces, which were led by NATO, were deployed in Kosovo. For many Serbs, this was the end of the
Serbian government in Kosovo.

3.1.6. After Milosevic

Milosevic was removed from power in October 2000 and soon delivered to The Hague Tribunal. The
revenge of Kosovo Albanians against the Serbs was terrifying. The same thing that happened to them
during the war happened to Kosovo Serbs after it. It is estimated that approximately 250.000 Serbs left
Kosovo in June 1999, and another wave of internally displaced persons occurred in March 2004.

Kosovo proclaimed independence in 2008. Nevertheless, international forces like KFOR (Kosovo
force) and EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) are still present there. Serbs live
in a couple of enclaves in central Kosovo and in the northern part. At this very moment negotiations
between Kosovo Albanians and present Serbian government are underway.

3.2. History according to Kosovo Albanians

3.2.1 Illyrians

Archeological evidences demonstrate that, a long time before Slav tribes came to the Balkan Peninsula,
Illyrian tribes lived there. Such claims are derived from John Wilkes book “Illyrians” and Miranda
Vickers book “The Albanians: The modern history”. But, as Miranda Vickers stated, from 1945
Albanians archeologist were trying to establish links between ancient Illyrians and Albanians and to
provide a continuity of Albanian settlements not only in Albania, but also in Kosovo and prove that
Kosovo is, basically, Albanian land. Miranda Vickers stated that it is now generally accepted that in the
seventh century BC certain Illyrian tribes had settled in the territory now known as Albania. “But
whether Greeks or Illyrians inhabited much of the southern region of present-day Albania, known as
Epirus, remains a highly controversial issue.”37

According to the information from R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of
Military History, New York, 1970, 95; Herman Kinder and Werner Hilgemann, The Anchor Atlas of
World History, 1, New York, 1974, 90, 94; and Encyclopedia Britannica, 15, New York, 1975, 109238,
there is a mystery about the real origin of Albanians. It is said that the name Albania is derived “from
the name of an Illyrian tribe called the Arber, or Arbereshë, and later Albanoi that lived near Durrës.”39

Constantine A. Chekrezi wrote about the Illyrian origin of Albanians, in the book from 1911 “Albanian
past and present40 He wrote that Albanians are the “most ancient race in southeastern Europe. All
37
Miranda Vickers, “The Albanians: The modern history”, I.B. Tauris &Co. Ltd, 2006. pp. 1
http://books.google.dk/books?id=IzI0uOZ2j6gC&pg=PA66&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false
38
http://countrystudies.us/albania/14.htm
39
ibid
40
http://www.scribd.com/doc/9771514/Albania-past-and-present-Constantine- Chekrezi-Kostandin-Cekrezi-1919
 10

indications point to the fact that they are the descendants of the earliest Aryan immigrants who were
represented in historical times by the kindred Illyrians, Macedonians, and Epirots”. 41 In the attempt to
prove that, Cherkrezi wrote that Albanian language is entirely different from most of the languages in
the Balkans. He claimed that it is “Thraco-Illyrian group of languages, which formed the primitive
speech of the inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula”.42

3.2.2. Ottoman Turks in Kosovo

The Ottoman Turks expanded their empire to the Balkans in the fourteenth century. “They crossed the
Bosporus in 1352, and in 1389 they crushed a Serb-led army that included Albanian forces at Kosovo
Polje, in Kosovo.”43 It is said that the conquest of the territory of present day Albania and Kosovo was
easy because Albanians lived in small groups ruled by feudal lords and tribal chiefs. “In 1385 the
Albanian ruler of Durrës, Karl Thopia, appealed to the sultan for support against his rivals, the Balsha
family. An Ottoman force quickly marched into Albania along the Via Egnatia and routed the
Balshas.”44 Soon after that Albanians swore to obey Ottoman rule. “The Turks allowed conquered
Albanian clan chiefs to maintain their positions and property, but they had to pay tribute, send their
sons to the Turkish court as hostages, and provide the Ottoman army with auxiliary troops.” 45

3.2.3. Skanderbeg

According to the article from the Congress library, Gjon Kastrioti of Krujë was one of the Albanian
clan leaders who were submitted to Ottoman rule. He was obliged to send his sons into Ottoman
military service. “The youngest, Gjergj Kastrioti, who would become the Albanians' greatest national
hero, captured the sultan's attention”. 46 He was converted to Islam and got the name Iskander. History
says that Iskander was sent to the Balkans to be an administrator where he became known as
Skanderbeg. He converted himself to Roman Catholicism and became the legendary leader in the fight
against the Ottomans. After his death, many Albanians converted to Islam. Many new Muslims actually
were “devshirme”47 what was a practice throughout the Balkans during the Ottoman rule. “Devshirme”
were “Janissaries” – a kind of army that consisted of the boys from Christian’s families who were
abducted from their parents in order to serve in the Ottoman army.

Although it is said that the Ottoman Empire did not insist on conversion into Islam, “In the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, however, economic pressures and coercion produced the conversion of about
two-thirds of the empire's Albanians.”48 Considering what Dusan Batakovic wrote about conversion of
Serbs into Islam49, almost the same thing happened with Albanians. Nevertheless, it was hard for
Ottomans to control Albanians. As the report from the Congress library stressed, they lived in the
41
ibid pp. 4
42
ibid pp.5
43
http://countrystudies.us/albania/14.htm
44
ibid
45
ibid
46
ibid
47
V.L. Menage “Some notes on the devshirme” – a tribute of blood, http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/611094?
uid=3737880&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21102144758507
48
http://countrystudies.us/albania/14.htm
49
Bataković, Op.cit. pp.24
 11

isolated, mountain area and the leader of the tribe “recognized no law but the Code of Lek, a collection
of tribal laws transcribed in the fourteenth century by a Roman Catholic priest”. 50 The code was used
to regulate many things including “blood vengeance”.

3.2.4. Albanians in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century; Making of a State

As it was explained in the report of the Congress library, Albanians were the last who developed
national consciousness. The main reasons were Islam and internal social division. Following other
states in the Balkans, Albanians also started the fight for independence. The most important
organization was the Prizren League. A claim for independence came after other Balkan countries
claimed Albanian land. Albania got independence, for the first time in its history, after two Balkan
Wars were over – in 1913. During the Balkan Wars, according to some historians (Albania’s Golgotha
Indictment of the Exterminators of the Albanian People (1913) Leo Freundlich) Serbs and
Montenegrins wanted to divide Albania and get access to the Adriatic Sea. Italy and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire were strongly opposed to that mainly because they feared the reaction of Russia.

Gloomy days were over in the summer of 1913. It is said that Serbia refused to withdraw from northern
Albanian and Serbs were accused that they committed atrocities against the Albanian population.

3.2.5. World War I and Albanians

Shots in Sarajevo in 1914 marked the end of an era. It is stated that parts of Albania were occupied
again and it remained like this until the end of the war. “When the war ended, Italy's army had
occupied most of Albania; Serbia held much of the country's northern mountains; Greece occupied a
sliver of land within Albania's 1913 borders; and French forces occupied Korçë and Shkodër as well as
other with sizable Albanian populations, regions such as Kosovo, which were later handed over to
Serbia.”51

3.2.6. Between Two Wars

After World War I, Albania became a state but Kosovo became a part of a new Kingdom of the Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes which would subsequently be transformed into Yugoslavia. In 1924, in Albania,
“Ahmed Bey Zogu… emerged victorious from an internal political power”52 According to history, he
urged the parliament to declare Albania a kingdom while he himself became the king. “King Zogu
remained a hidebound conservative and Albania was the only Balkan state where the government did
not see fit to introduce a comprehensive land reform between the two world wars”53

3.2.7. Second World war and Post-War Settlement in the Balkans

The fascist regime of the Axis ruled Albania, now united with Kosovo, until the end of the war and
Serbs were forced to leave. Germans, who occupied Albania after Italy capitulated, also formed a
50
http://countrystudies.us/albania/14.htm
51
A Country Study: Albania, Library of Congress, World War I and Its Effects on Albania, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+al0023%29
52
ibid
53
ibid
 12

fascist regime and ruled with the help of organization Balli Kombetar.54 As a nationalist and anti-
communist fighter, Bali was the perfect for cooperation with the Germans. “Albanian collaborators,
especially the Skanderbeg SS Division, also expelled and killed Serbs living in Kosovo”.55

From 1941 communists started to play a major role in the area and “Albania's partisans defeated the
nationalists in a civil war fought between Italy's capitulation in 1943 and the withdrawal of German
forces from Albania in late 1944”.56 Like in Yugoslavia, the victory over fascism provided Albanian
communists and their leader Enver Hoxha, the leading role in political life. However, while many
exaggerated the communist’s success, “they often neglected to mention that the communist forces in
Albania were organized by the Yugoslavs and armed by the West…”57

It was obvious that Tito and his communists would play a major role in any settlement concerning
territories. In this regard, Kosovo became a part of Yugoslavia and soon Serbian’s province. The first
constitution of the first post-war Yugoslavia recognized nations and national minorities. Albanians
were proclaimed to be the latter.

3.2.8. Modern Times

After 1948, although it was not recommended to speak openly, almost everybody knew someone who
was arrested as a “Stalinist”. Albanians were no exception. Tito’s regime took good care to stop them
and a devastated island in the Adriatic Sea was a prison for everyone who did not renounce Stalin.
Another big problem for Kosovo Albanians was Aleksandar Rankovic. (See 3.1.4.) According to
Albanian sources “At this time, the Yugoslav authorities forced tens of thousands of Albanians in
Yugoslavia to move to Turkey, using a range of forms of pressure, such as the weapons gathering
campaign”.58

The year 1981, just one year after Tito’s death, many mark as a beginning of the crisis in Yugoslavia.
According to Albanians, “demonstrations... initially organized by the students of the University of
Prishtina (UP) for improved conditions, and later by a range of political and illegal groups of Kosovar
Albanians, with the demand for ‘Kosova a Republic”.59 Albanians also stated that “this is a time when
Serbia started to plan to revoke Kosova’s autonomy, starting propaganda campaigns in the media
against what the Serbian textbooks describe as “...pressure against Serbs, rapes, destruction of property,
and even killings, due to national hatred”. 60 The beginning of the withdrawal of Serbs from Kosovo,
for Albanians, happened because of a deteriorating economy. The decision of Slobodan Milosevic to
delimitate Kosovo’s autonomy, caused mass demonstration and after that a “state of emergency was
established … and hundreds of intellectuals, professors and leaders of social enterprises were
arrested”.61 Albanian sources recorded, the appearance of Ibrahim Rugova and his party the Democratic
54
See more in “Historical Dictionary of Albania” by Robert Elsie
55
A Country Study: Albania op.cit.
56
ibid
57
ibid
58
Shkëlzen Gashi, Kosova 1912-2000 in the history textbooks of Kosova, Albania and Serbia, KAHCR and KEC,
printing press Prishtina 2012 pp.29
59
ibid pp.31
60
ibid
61
ibid pp. 32
 13

League of Kosova (LDK); a mass poisoning of Albanian children and even mention evidence of “sarin
and tabun agents”62 ; declaring Kosovo a republic within Yugoslavia when Serbia “suspended all
legislative, executive and judicial organs in Kosova; the vast majority of Albanians in employment
were sent home from work; television, radio, newspapers, hospitals and factories were closed and
Albanian students and teachers were stopped from using the University of Prishtina campus”.63 In
September 1991 Kosovo Albanians organized a referendum “for the recognition of Kosova as a
sovereign and independent state with the right to join Yugoslavia.” 64 The collapse of Yugoslavia
commenced in 1991. The resolution to the Kosovo problem waited till 1999.

3.2.9. Independence

Support for independent Kosovo was universal.65 Ibrahim Rugova’s politics of passive resistance was,
to a large extent, unsuccessful due to, as Albanians sources emphasized, Serbian repression.66 That,
claims the same author, inspired the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The Kosovo Albanian
source claimed that during the NATO bombing of Serbia, which ensued after negotiations failed,
Serbian forces continued with persecution and murders. NATO military intervention was “to stop the
wave of crimes committed by Serbia against Albanians.”67 When the war was over, Kosovo was
liberated from Serbia “...after the successful liberation struggle of the KLA and the entry of NATO
troops in June1999.”68 Up 2008, when Kosovo Albanians declared independence, Kosovo was ruled by
the UN, and NATO troops. Approximately 100 countries recognized Kosovo as an independent state.
Although the USA and most of the EU countries (except Slovakia, Romania, Cyprus, Spain and
Greece) recognize Kosovo as an independent state, on the other hand many BRIC countries don’t
(China, Russia, Brazil…). Today there are KFOR troops that are still in charge of security and the EU
is represented by EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) that “supports Kosovo on
its path to a greater European integration in the rule of law area.”69 As mentioned before, negotiations
between the Serbian and the government of Kosovo are underway.

4. Theory

4.1. Why symbolic politics theory

David O. Sears, the most prominent representative of Symbolic politics theory wrote: "Intense
emotions have energized many of history’s most devastating social, political, and religious conflicts."70

62
ibid
63
ibid pp. 33
64
ibid
65
Ivo H. Daalder, Winning Ugly: Nato's War to Save Kosovo, pp.8 http://books.google.dk/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=DYh9Hltwp1cC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=kosovo&ots=yPgjsXlgK-
&sig=GGfAfbTDdM524wbjxeo5VARIDAk&redir_esc=y
66
ibid pp.38
67
ibid pp. 44
68
ibid
69
http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/info/whatisEulex.php
70
D.O.Sears, “Symbolic Politics: A Socio-Psychological Theory.” In S. Iyengar & W.J. McGuire (Eds.), Explorations
In Political Psychology (pp. 113 -149). Durham N.C.: Duke University Press 1993
http://www.issr.ucla.edu/sears/pubs/A107.pdf
 14

Since it is obvious that, in modern world, the most common type of conflicts is ethnic conflict, it is
normal scientist’s inclination to explain this phenomenon. Symbolic politics theory, as individual
psychology, “occupies a constructivist stream of conscience that justly alleges that intangible variables
—narratives, identities, and primal emotions—facilitate the hostile environment amongst competing
ethnic groups.”71 Sears claims that political symbols often stimulate emotions. In the situations like
ethnic conflict, according to this theory, there is no place for ratio and the focus is on emotions.
Emotions and symbols are closely related and symbols are all around us. Symbol can be anything:
picture, event, people … According to him, the best know use of term “symbolic politics” belong to
Murray Edelman. Sears stated his assumption that mass public consist “largely of spectators
acquiescent to the abstract and remote passing parade of political symbols but who are anxious about a
threatening, a complex world”.72 Edelman claims that ordinary citizens have only “unstable and
inconsistent political preferences, not firm ideological commitments that would resist the blandishment
of elites. Political myth and ritual provide them with symbolic reassurance.”73 But, Edelman stated also
that elites use myth and ritual to manipulate public in order to get benefits.

Sears symbolic politics theory “holds that people acquire stable effective responses to particular
symbols through a process of classical conditioning, which occurs more crucially at a relative early
age”.74 This doesn’t mean that those symbols follow man through whole life, but Sears claims that the
strongest – “symbolic predispositions” – stay. “Symbolic predispositions” people acquired very early in
the life. Sears claimed that it is recorded that children very early respond on symbols like flag,
president, stigmatized group in society, political party. The point is – people just add effects of one
symbol to another, if the meaning of two symbols is close. In that process, the role of ratio is
negligible. Sears also stated the possibility of changing the symbol. This is possible to happen thanks to
media. Besides, there is possibility of changing the symbol itself. Sears explained that by using the
symbol of abortion - it can be symbol of woman freedom, but also the symbol of a murder. He also
mentioned that framing some issue in the different ways can also “activate different predispositions” -
bilingual education as a remedy to preserve minority culture and remedy to promote English
language.75 People, according to Sears, don’t form political attitude according to personal experiences.
The evidence lay in the certainty that self-interest does not influence political attitude.

Roger D. Petersen in his book “Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in
Twentieth Century Eastern Europe”, stated the words of Richard Holbrooke, former American special
envoy to the Balkans, who spoke about “evil” happening in Bosnia and emphasized that modern age
should destroy that “retrograde causes of ethnic conflict”. 76 Peterson claims that we are all capable to
commit ethnic violence and that is necessary to accept that as a fact. The sooner we confess that, the
71
Katherine Green, The Symbolic Politics Theory of Ethnic War, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/13/the-symbolic-
politics-theory-of-ethnic-war/
72
D.O.Sears, Op. cit.
73
ibid
74
ibid
75
ibid
76
Roger D. Petersen, “Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth Century Eastern
Europe”,pp.1http://books.google.dk/books?
hl=en&lr=&id=sW8o6xIeHOwC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=emotion+based+theory+of+ethnic+conflict&ots=q3IkH_xivs&sig=9f
5Gimd8Hyy-BfNOLx8rgfBIlzA&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=emotion%20based%20theory%20of%20ethnic
%20conflict&f=false
 15

more successful will be the fight against it. Furthermore, people will not be constantly surprised with
the level of violence that marks everyday life. Peterson further defines four emotions that, according to
him, lead to ethnic violence: fear, hatred, resentment and rage. He noted also that these emotions are
not the only emotions that influence ethnic conflict and he admits that there are other factors.
Explaining the role of emotions in ethnic conflict, Peterson alleges that emotions help explain how
some concerns become capital and sometimes “all consuming”.77 Emotions also can explain identities
and many violent conflicts, allegedly spontaneous, especially in Eastern Europe. “Ethnically diverse
societies carry various degrees of conflict potential”, says Bojana Blagojevic, in her text “Causes of
ethnic conflict: a conceptual framework.78 She emphasized that emotions about ethnicity that are rooted
in “historical memories of grievances”79, are at the core of conflict. She believes that in the situation
when the whole order is changing (fall of communism, for example) the system is collapsed too. This
means that the old order is dead and the new is not functioning. This is the period of political and
economic transition that can be, and sometimes is, very violent.

5. Analyses

5.1. Analyses – history

Historia est magistra vitae, said Cicero in his famous ”De Oratore”. Not in the Balkans. Here, only an
alternation of cycles of the same history exists. In the Balkans everyone has his own history and there
is no sign that it will be any different. Today Serbia and Kosovo publish their own history school books
and both sides systematically neglect the other side. If they do not neglect it, then the other side is
presented as an aggressor, violent and genocidal whose only goal is to destroy everyone who does not
belong there. If it was up to history, Serbs and Kosovo Albanians would never negotiate. That is why a
third party has always been included.

The fact that Albanians stubbornly claim that their ancestors are Illyrians and that Slav tribes came later
to the Balkans is not beneficial, for a feasible solution of the Kosovo problem. The same goes for the
Serbian claim that Albanians came with the Ottoman Empire and that, actually, Slav tribe was there
first. Serbian historian Predrag J. Markovic claims that “these theories about ethnic origin, claiming
that some group has more territorial rights due to its older origin is essentially racist, and I do not see
particular reasons to approach "in an objective manner” such chauvinistic myths. All recorded history
of medieval Kosovo mentions Slavic names, including almost all place names, except in the south-
western corner”.80

Real historical facts often lie in the shade of the myth. It depends very much on who interprets it and
for what causes. Falsifying historical facts is also very common, even today. While Serbs claim that
Albanians were Christians before the Ottoman Empire came to the Balkans, Albanians claim that
Orthodox monasteries and churches are part of Albanian cultural heritage.81 Serbs claim that Albanians

77
ibid
78
Journal of Global Change and Governance• Volume III, Number 1• Winter 2009•ISSN: 1941-8760
http://www.globalaffairsjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/CausesofEthnicConflict.pdf
79
ibid
80
Personal mail - Annex I
81
http://www.zeriyt.com/orthodox-monasteries-in-kosova-are-albanian-heritage-t87593.0.html
 16

had to flee from Enver Hoxha’s Albania, that their lives were much better off in Serbian Kosovo and
that they, later, showed ingratitude by rebelling against their host country. Albanians claim that Kosovo
has always been their own country.

Once, someone said that Serbs hate Albanians because Serbs always consider them as “pastry cooks”
and those who know how to make the best “burek” in the Balkans. 82 Now, people whose greatest
virtue is to make a good “burek” conquered Kosovo and made it their own, independent state. For
Serbs – that is outrageous. For Albanians, Serbs are ruthless conquers who used to kill and exterminate
Albanians for centuries and plunder their land. Since different data exists about killed and deported
Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, before and during NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, it is only possible to
state that the number varies from a couple of hundred to two million. Both sides in the conflict are
silent about their own crimes.

5.2. Symbolic politics analyses of myths, prejudices and stereotypes

The end of the 20th century has been marked by returning “to political mythology, history and old-
fashioned national and ethnic identity.”83 In the Balkans all nations, no matter how much they try to
deny it, share the same mentality; all are convinced that they live under threat; they suffer and they try
to persuade the world that they are tragic victims; they are alone in their suffering; they do not
cooperate with neighbors and all of them have prejudices.84 The appearance of the “myth ideology”
Obucina explains with the assistance of Ernst Cassirer 85 who said that myth is filled with the most
violent emotions. But, in myth man begins to learn a new and strange art: the art of expressing, and that
means organizing, his most rooted instincts, his hopes and fears.86

5.2.1. The Kosovo myth

“The Kosovo myth itself is a complex construct comprising ideas, images, interpretations and purposes
centered on a single event – the battle on June 28 1389”.87 There are attempts to determine exactly
when the Kosovo myth became a tool for starting the campaign of war and the destruction of
Yugoslavia, as is generally accepted. It is possible that one can determine the exact date (celebration
600 years of Kosovo battle in 1989); an institution (Serbian Science Academy and the famous

82
“Burek” is a pie; a type of baked or fried filled pastry made of thin flaky dough. It can be filled with cheese, minced meat,
or vegetables
83
Vedran Obucina, A War of Myths: Creation of the Founding Myth of Kosovo Albanians, Politea: Association for
Promotion of Social Sciences and New Media, Zagreb, CONTEMPORARY issues, 2011, Vol. 4, No. 1
84
ibid
85
The myth of the state, http://www.scribd.com/doc/58755474/Cassirer-The-Myth-of-the-State
86
Obucina op.cit.
87
Florian Bieber, Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering, The Kosovo myth from its 600th anniversary to the
present, Rethinking History 6:1 (2002), pp. 95–110, , European Centre for Minority Issues, Belgrade
 17

Memorandum) or a man (Slobodan Milosevic). Apparently, it looks like the myth was always there.
Even in the time of “brotherhood and unity”, the classical mantra that served Tito in an attempt to keep
Yugoslavia together. If one asks some Serb today why Kosovo is so important to them, there are
several answers: the first being – it’s the cradle of the Serbs. The last answer, if it exists at all, will be –
natural resources which are important for the improvement of the economy. This could be proof that
symbolic political theory is accurate in the case of Serbs and their relations to Kosovo. The theory
states that people would choose one more or less abstract political myth despite the costs – no benefit,
just emotional loss. The fact that the myth is a center of the Serbian national being also confirms that
thesis. It is important to mention that myth is very valuable for political structures that became aware of
the possibilities to acquire political power and keep it for a long period of time just by properly using
the myth and transcending it to the realm of nationalism.

Many times throughout history myth was used to unite Serbs during hard times but also to convince
them, just like during the time of ancient warriors in the Kosovo battle, to “sacrifice” something. It can
be freedom, spirit, home, life… It is important to say that the Kosovo myth is a source of many other
myths, stereotypes and prejudices. Serbs believe that they are “heavenly people” – chosen ones, just
like Jews; Kosovo is their Jerusalem. The ultimate sacrifice of Prince Lazar in the Kosovo Battle, for
many centuries and with the help of many politicians and the church, convinced Serbs that they are
something special – a superior nation. For that reason, if they have to choose: better life or Kosovo – it
is Kosovo, even in this contemporary moment. The Kosovo myth is the source of many contemporary
myths: the conspiracy theory – the whole world is against the Serbs and all suffering happened due to
some imaginary virtues of Serbian people that others are envious of, or because of something that Serbs
possess. That is why many in Serbia believe that Kosovo is lost because “evil Americans” want to
conquer the world and seize valuable Serbian property. Very typical for Serbs is the belief that they are
sinless and that the guilty one is always someone else. They glorify their leaders and often “equate
current leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic with previous Serbian rulers and group current enemies
together with past ones”.88 Although some believe (Florian Bieber) that the myth became established at
the time of the Serbian national movement, it is likely that, through epic poems, and with the assistance
of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the myth existed throughout many centuries. On the other hand, there
are Serbian historians (Miodrag Jankovic) who claim that the decisive moment for the appearance of
the myth is the withdrawal of the Serbs from Kosovo after the War of the Holy. The contemporary
moment, from the point of view of scientists nowadays, holds the ultimate significance for the reuse of
the myth: Milosevic’s speech in 1989, the Memorandum of the Serbian Science Academy, literature,
history, the church…

It is likely that the position of Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo was not favorable at all so it is possible that
Serbs saw Milosevic as a savior. A communist, who turned into a nationalist overnight, knew how to
use their feelings and the Kosovo myth. Also, Serbs “rediscovered” religion after Tito’s death and
linking the myth with the church also strengthened the myth. NATO’s bombardment in 1999 led to
revoking the “victim” myth.

5.2.2. Ethnic stereotypes and national myths

88
ibid
 18

Significant parts of every national culture consist of stereotypes and myths. “They are commonly, but
not necessarily, accompanied by a prejudice, i.e. a favorable or unfavorable predisposition towards any
member of the category in question”.89 The term stereotype “derives from the Greek words stereos,
meaning solid, and typos, meaning the mark of a blow, impression, or model”. 90 Prejudice can be
defined as an “adverse or hostile attitude toward a group or its individual members, generally without
just grounds or before sufficient evidence. It is characterized by irrational, stereotyped beliefs.”91

The main purpose of research in the Belgrade Center for Peace Studies was to examine the roles of
ethnic stereotypes and national myths as “obstacles to reconciliation and forms of (cultural or
symbolic) violence”. 92 Researchers found out that in history books both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians
reproduce stereotypes and myths and, in that way, contribute to the violence. They established five
categories: four national myths and one ethnic stereotype. There are myths of ethnogenesis, heroism,
historical injustice and national regeneration. Researchers established also heterostereotypes and
autotereotypes.93 Both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians say that the opposite group is violent.

5.2.3 Why stereotypes?

Markovic claims that, from the Serbian point of view, there are three „candidates” to fill the place on
the negative pole of stereotype: Muslims (Bosnians), Gypsies, and Albanians. 94 Muslims, although
non-Westerners, as Markovic explain, were not „primitive” enough. Moreover, there exists a close
connection between Serbs and Muslims thanks to ethnic and linguistic liaisons. Gypsies have been, for
centuries, although ethnically different, a part of society. It is likely that Albanians became the perfect
candidate for consolidation of stereotypes thanks to the fact that, during Ottoman times, Albanians
became Muslims en masse. Being Muslims, they started to acquire better positions in the Ottoman
Empire, paid fewer taxes and became elite. The position of the Serbs and other non-Muslims worsened.
Then after 1878, it was the other way around. Serbia received its independence and many Muslims
were driven out. But, the situation for Serbs in Kosovo, in that period was, presumably, intolerable.
Many Serbs consider Albanians as barbarians and it has been like that since95 “the most outstanding
Serbian author of the Enlightenment period, Dositej Obradović, in 1788 … mentioned the vendetta as
the main reason for the barbarity and wildness of the (Albanian) temper”. 96 Stereotype about Albanians
as a “race which breeds the fastest”97 came from the 18 century as much as a myth about Serbians who
defend the “Christian European culture and civilization from Asian barbarism”.98 Typical denial of a
neighbor’s existence, which is very common in the Balkans, according to Markovic, in the Serbian-
Albanian case, was very suitable in order to explain why, in the Serbia heartland the majority are
89
Research Report, University of Belgrade Faculty of Political Science – Center for Peace Studies, www.csm-fpn.org;
researcher mladja_stojadinovic@yahoo.com
90
Predrag J. Markovic, Ethnic Stereotypes: ubiquitous, local, or migrating phenomena? -The Serbian-Albanian Case,
(Bonn:Michael Zikic Stiftung, 2003) 95 -second edition 2004
91
Encyclopedia Britannica, http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/474816/prejudice
92
Research Report, op.cit.
93
Annex II
94
Predrag J. Markovic, op.cit. pp. 45
95
read more about the blood feud on http://www.unicef.org/albania/reallives_765.html
96
Predrag J. Markovic op.cit. pp.53
97
ibid
98
ibid
 19

Albanians. Serbs used to claim that, especially in northern Albania, live “Albanized Serbians”.99 The
same applies to Kosovo. This trend continues even today all over the Balkans. Stereotypes during
communist Yugoslavia didn’t disappear.

On the other side of the same story, Albanians have been playing the “victim role” for centuries. The
true realization of their mythologies appeared to happen recently – in 1999.100 They have a new flag,
according to the Ahtisaari plan101 but, in most cases, it uses the official flag of the Republic of Albania.
Like Serbs have Kosovo polje, Albanians have Prekaz valley. According to Obucina, Prekaz is a small
village in north-western Kosovo with martyr symbolism. It is a place where Serbian police killed
members of the famous Jasari family. The Jasari family house in Prekaz was a place where the KLA
was formed. Prekaz is well known also because “Albanian families came for a ritual of reconciliation
and ending of blood feuds and blood vengeance.102 It is important to mention Skenderbeg – the famous
national hero who fought against Turks. But, it seems that the biggest myth both in the old days and
nowadays is the myth about Greater Albania. Greater Albania would consist of Albania, Kosovo,
southern Serbia, western Macedonia, part of Montenegro and Greece – parts of Europe where
Albanians live.103 In the Albanian case, myths can be created about Bill Clinton, Wesley Clark,
William Walker, and Tony Blair as much as about Ibrahim Rugova.104

6. Conclusion

Throughout history, Serbs and Kosovo Albanians hated each other and it is possible that the biggest
problem lies in the mentality. Both nations, for a long time, used to live in some kind of tribal
community, assimilation was rare as much as acceptance of some other society standards. Maybe
because of the history Kosovo Albanians used to be displaced. As it may be, as a result of the same
reason, Serbs migrated very often. In those circumstances, it can be very hard to form a nation,
sovereign, Westphalian state. And it is likely that when a nation state is missing, questions of identity
arise. It seems as though the question of identity in the Balkans was formed by a denial of “others” or
simply identifying “others” with the worst character features. That’s why Kosovo Albanians, for some
Serbs are primitive, savage, and disloyal; Serbs are, for Kosovo Albanians violent, discriminatory,
genocidal, and chauvinist… to state just some of the negative traits.

There are some mutual characteristics among certain nations in the Balkans, but Kosovo Albanians are
something quite different. It appears that Serbs perceive Kosovo Albanians as a foreign nation from a
dark medieval century, whose purpose is, throughout history, to steal Serbian land while at the same
time, they have nothing in common: values, language, culture, or family ties. On the other hand,
Kosovo Albanians perceive themselves as second class citizens who have suffered for a long time due
to their origin, but mostly because of the kind of jobs they used to carry out. (Albanians in Belgrade,
during Yugoslavia, very often performed the worst paid jobs)

99
ibid
100
Vedran Obucina, op.cit.
101
more on http://www.ahtisaariplan.info/en/
102
Obucina op.cit.
103
http://www.dw.de/dream-of-greater-albania-alive-at-centennial/a-16409739
104
Matteo Albertini, Kosovo: An Identity between Local and Global, PhD in Semiotics University of Bologna, Italy,
http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics-papers/EPP015.pdf
 20

On the other hand, Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries from medieval days are proclaimed to
be part of Albanian cultural heritage. Besides, some kind of cultural violence is persecuted with the
assistance of history books. Again, every side presents its own vision of historical facts and children
today learn history from those kinds of books. For preserving the myths in the Serbian case, the Serbian
Orthodox Church has played the most prominent role. In the Kosovo Albanians case, religion is not
that important. Even Sunni Muslims, Kosovo Albanians very often claim that they have only one
religion – Albanism.

Serbia is often blamed for using the Kosovo myth in order to restore the Serbian Empire from the
medieval age, when the state covered the largest area. It is also often said that the battle for Greater
Serbia never stopped. Well, the same could be said for Greater Albania. The problem is that the myth
still affects some parts of the population in Serbia which is not aberrant concerning the fact that almost
half of the present population has only basic education, that 1.3 million are half literate, and only 6.5
percent graduated from university. 105 As for Kosovo, UNDP in the Millennium development goals
stated that “The literacy rate among 15-24 years-olds is not fully universal. Around 4.6% of youth
remain illiterate, with rural areas and women more disadvantaged.”106

That’s why, as Julie A. Mertus say in the book “Kosovo – how myths and truths started a war” it is
easy for political elites to “exploit the disturbance that already existed in the general populace and,
when desirable and feasible, they create new disturbances”.107 The process of “debalkanization of
Balkan” and pacification are the most important things that have to be done in order to return normal
life to the region. In order to do that, it is necessary to execute a reform of education and destroy the
sources of indoctrination (which is common in the media for example). That could be done through EU
mechanisms.

Annex I

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Subject: Moja mala knjiga

From: Predrag Markovic (predragjmarkovic@yahoo.com)

To: apribakovich@yahoo.com;

105
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:396043-Nepismenih-13-miliona
106
http://www.kosovo.undp.org/en/Progress-by-Goal-for-Kosovo
107
Julie A. Mertus, “Kosovo – how myths and truths started a war”, University California press 1999, pp. 232
 21

Date: Sunday, March 17, 2013 12:06 PM

Look at the following books:

Ulf Brunbauuer (RE)WRITING HISTORY HISTORIOGRAPHY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

Pal Kolsto, THE MEDIA DISCOURSE AND THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT

Jasna Dragović Soso- Lennard Cohen STATE COLLAPSE IN THE SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

Look the Bataković books in English on this "Ilyric origin" theory. Dimitrije Bogdanović KNJIGA O
KOSOVU, too. It is probably translated in English.

Furthermore, these theories about ethnic origin, claiming that some group has more territorial rights
because older origin is essentially racist, and I do not see particular reasons to approach "in objective
way" to such chauvinist myths.All recorded history of medieval Kosovo, mentions Slavic names,
including almost all place names, except in the south-western corner

Sincerely

Predrag

--- On Sun, 2/3/13, Predrag Markovic <predragjmarkovic@yahoo.com> wrote:

From: Predrag Markovic <predragjmarkovic@yahoo.com>

Subject: I jesi blago

To: marinablago@gmail.comostlz

Date: Sunday, February 3, 2013, 11:19 AM

Naslov publikacije je: Ethnic Stereotypes: ubiquitous, local, or migrating phenomena? -The Serbian-
Albanian Case, (Bonn:Michael Zikic Stiftung, 2003) 95 (second edition 2004)

Annex II

University of Belgrade
 22

Faculty of Political Science – Center for Peace Studies

Jove Ilića 165, 11 040 Belgrade

Tel: +381 11 30 92 851 Fax: +381 11 24 91 501

Email: csm@fpn.bg.ac.rs

www.csm-fpn.org / http://nationalmyths.com/

National Myths

Serbian history Albanian history

1. myths of ethnogenesis

origin myth - Slavs (indigenous people Direct descendants of

of Carpathian Ruthenia,
settlers in the Balkans )
- Illyrians largely
assimilated
- Illyrians / Arbanasi /
Albanians
the Illyrians and
Pelasgians, indigenous
Balkan peoples
- Slavs - settlers and
usurpers

survived only in highlands

founding - Continuity of the Serbian - Continuity of Illyrian

myth identity through history and Albanian Identity
(national (from the ancient times)
identity) - Courageous,
- Freedom-loving, hospitable,
hospitable, democratic,
disobedient(unsubmissive), generous, hardworking,
persistent, primitive, traditional, united,
savage, disloyal, divided backward

- Dardania (Kosovo -
 23

- The Nemanjić dynasty IV centuryBC)

- Christianity, Serbian - Albanian nobles

Orthodox Church (Balšići)

- The Battle of Kosovo - Skenderbeg

- Ottoman slavery - Resistance to Serbian

occupation
- Serbian revolution
- Albanianism as a
- Religious divisions religion

- Western values
(democracy, human
rights, etc.).

ideational - Non-Christians - Slavs / Serbs /

formulation of Yugoslavs
the enemy - Ottomans / Turks
- United Balkan
- "Poturice" nations

- Albanians - Ottomans

- Germans, Croats - Greeks

- Italians (invaders-
liberators)

2. heroic myths

myths based - Stefan Nemanja, Sv. - Conversion of

on historical Sava, emperor Dušan famous historical
figures figures (Alexander the
- Prince Lazar, Miloš Great,etc.)
Obilić
- Progon, Dimitar,
- Marko Kraljević Balša, Topija

- Skenderbeg - Miloš Obilić


- uskoci i hajduci (outlaws)
- Karađorđe, Miloš
Obrenović
- Garašanin, Ristić
- Mehmed-paša Sokolović,
Omerpaša
Latas
- Anti-heroes: emperor
Uroš, Vuk
Branković
myth of - Struggle against the
courage and injustice, slavery, for
self-sacrifice national liberation
- Struggle against the
Ottomans
- Hajduci i uskoci (outlaws)
as a role models of heroism
myth of the - Martyrs ("the Holy
chosen people Cross")
- A bastion against Islam
(defenders
24
- Skenderbeg
- Dukađini
- Ali-paša Tepeljena
- Azem i Šota Galica
(anti-Serb struggle
heroes)
- Anti-fascism heroes
- Adem Jašari
- Ibrahim Rugova
- Anti-heroes (traitors,
collaborators with
Serbs)
- Struggle for freedom,
against slavery and
occupation, for
national unity and
democracy
- Struggle against the
Ottoman slavery
- Anti-fascist struggle
- Struggle against the
Serbian slavery
- KLA as a model
- A bastion against
Islam and the
Ottomans (defenders
of the West)
- Freedom fighters,
 25

of Europe) militancy,
disobedience, unity
- Freedom fighters,
militancy, - Commitment to the
values of democracy,
courageous anti-Ottoman peace and human
resistance rights

- Destroyers of the two - Struggle against

empires fascism and Serbian
dictatorship
/occupation

3. myths of historical injustice

myth of - Ottoman slavery and - Ottoman slavery

slavery and tyranny
tyranny
- Albanian tyranny
(Albanian gangs and
troops' violence in Kosovo)
- Austrians, Hungarians
and the Venetians
- Serbian / Yugoslav
slavery: terror,
terrorism, chauvinism,
genocide, ethnic
cleansing, systematic
violence, oppression,
exploitation, etc.

“a victim of - Victim of its geopolitical - Victim of its

historical position geopolitical position
circumstances
” myth - Victim of the Ottoman - Victim of the
conquest Ottoman conquest

- Victim of the great - Victim of the great

powers interests (Serbs as powers (Congress of
frontiersmen) Berlin, London
Conference, World
War I and II)

- Victim of the Balkan

neighbors ("chauvinist
Balkan aggressors")
 26

myth of unity - Division and discord as an - National Unity

and division "evil fate" of Serbian (albanianism,
identity / history Skenderbeg, etc..)

- The myth of Vuk - The struggle for

Brankovic liberation, national
independence
- Intra-Serbian religious (Albania) and
and linguistic division unification (Kosovo)

- Montenegrins divide - "Domestic traitors"

"Serbian national being" in (collaborators of
two parts Serbian / Yugoslav
government)

4. myths of national regeneration

myth of the - Serbian revolution - League of Prizren

and Peć, Albanian
“golden age” - State and territorial independence
continuity with the Serbian
restoration medieval state of the - Greater Albania,
Nemanjić dynasty World War II

- An independent
Kosovo

myth of the - Serbian national - Albanian national

promised land territories: contemporary
Serbia, parts of
Montenegro, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia and Albania
- Territory of Kosovo as a
part of the first state, as a
venue of heroic battle and
as a "holy Serbian land"
territories: present-day
Albania, Kosovo and
southern Serbia, parts
of Macedonia,
Montenegro and
Greece
- Territory of Kosovo
as the center of first
Illyrian / Albanian
state, territory where
the Illyrians /
 27

Arbanasi / Albanians
were always majority,
territory of the heroic
resistance

myth of the - Serbs were majority of the - Illyrian majority in

ethnic population in Kosovo Dardania (Kosovo)
majority
- Ottomans displaced Serbs - Historical
from Kosovo and dominance of ethnic
populated it with Albanians Albanians in Kosovo
(from 70% to 90%)
- Serbs are the majority in
Bosnia and Herzegovina - A centuries of
assimilation,
persecution and
colonization of
Kosovo by the
Serbian / Yugoslav
authorities

Ethnic stereotypes

Serbian positive Albanian positive

autostereotypes autostereotypes

martial 41 unsubmissive 66

brave 28 martial 24

freedom-loving 18 patriotic 23

unsubmissive 16 freedom-loving 22

patriotic 8 brave 21

devoted 7 devoted 15
 28

persistent 6 erudite 13

traditional 6 persistent 12

dignified 5 triumphal 11

progressive 5 glorious 9

Serbian negative Albanian negative

autostereotypes autostereotypes

divided 27 displaced 16

displaced 21 discriminated 9

victimized 17 victimized 9

subordinated 17 subordinated 8

anarchic 10 backward 7

savage 6 opportunistic 6

dominant 5 divided 5

deprived 4 deprived 4

naive 3 fearful 3

violent 3 authoritarian 2

Serbian stereotypes about Albanian stereotypes about

Albanians Serbs

violent 8 violent 44

bandits 8 terrorizing 42

opportunists 5 oppressing 30

brutal 5 chauvinists 18

disobedient 4 discriminating 17
 29

vindictive 3 brutal 13

subordinated 3 militant 12

displaced 3 conquerors 12

oppressing 3 genocidal 10

anarchic 2 assimilating 8

Abbreviation

CRIC - Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts

EU – European Union

EULEX - European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

KFOR- Kosovo force

KLA - Kosovo liberation army

LDK - Democratic League of Kosovo

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SFRY - Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

UDBA- Uprava državne bezbednosti; Secret service of former Yugoslavia

UNDP – United Nation development program

UP – University of Prishtina

USA - United States of America

 30

Bibliography

Albertini Matteo, Kosovo: An Identity between Local and Global, PhD in Semiotics University of
Bologna, Italy, http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics-papers/EPP015.pdf

Bataković T. Dušan, Kosovo and Metohija, IDENTITY, RELIGIONS& IDEOLOGIES in the Kosovo
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Belgrade 2007. pp. 9; http://www.balkaninstitut.com/pdf/izdanja/posebno/Enklave.pdf

Bieber Florian, Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering, The Kosovo myth from its
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Encyclopedia Britannica, http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/474816/prejudice

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 32

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http://www.kosovo.undp.org/en/Progress-by-Goal-for-Kosovo

http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:396043-Nepismenih-13-miliona

http://www.scribd.com/doc/9771514/Albania-past-and-present-Constantine- Chekrezi-Kostandin-
Cekrezi-1919

http://www.unicef.org/albania/reallives_765.html

http://www.zeriyt.com/orthodox-monasteries-in-kosova-are-albanian-heritage-t87593.0.html