KANT'S

ANTINOMIES
OF REASON
Their Origin and
Their Resolution
Victoria S. Wike

UNIVERSITY
PRESS OF
AMERICA
 Copyright © 1982 by
University Press of America, Inc.
P.O. Box 19101, Washington, DC. 20036

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America
ISBN (Perfect): 0-8191-2346-3
ISBN (Cloth): 0-8191-2345-5

m
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 81-43867
To my mother, father, and Ed

iii
iv
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION vii

Chapter

I. KANT'S USE OF THE TERM "ANTINOMY"

IN THE THREE CRITIQUES 1
1. The Transcendental Framework of
the Antinomies 4
2. The Logical Framework of the
Antinomies 14

II. THE ORIGIN AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE

FOUR THEORETICAL ANTINOMIES 43
1. The Historical Origin of the
Antinomies 44
2. The Conceptual Origin of the
Antinomies 47
3. The Structure of the Antinomies:
Some Structural Problems Raised
by the Fourth Antinomy . . . . 53
4. The Structure of the Antinomies
in Al-Azm's Terms 62
5. The So-Called Identity of the
Third and Fourth Antinomies . . 69

III. THE RESOLUTION OF THE FOUR THEORETICAL

ANTINOMIES 79
1. The Resolution in Terms of
Reason's General Mistake . . . 81
\ 2. The Resolution in Terms of
Reason's Conformity to the
Understanding 87
3. The Resolution in Terms of the
Mathematical/Dynamical
Distinction 93

IV. THE ORIGIN AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE

PRACTICAL ANTINOMY Ill
1. The Conceptual Origin of the
Antinomy 112
2. The Structure of the Antinomy . . 122

v
 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Chapter Page
V. THE RESOLUTION OF THE PRACTICAL
ANTINOMY 139
1. The Structural Resolution of the
Practical Antinomy 140
2. The Resolution of the Practical
Antinomy as It Relates to the
Resolution of the Theoretical
Antinomies 149

VI. CONCLUSION 161

BIBLIOGRAPHY 169

vx
 INTRODUCTION
Kant says in the Preface to the second edition of
the Critique of Pure Reason that the critique to follow
has both a negative and a positive value.1 The nega-
tive value of the critique is the warning that theo-
retical reason must never venture beyond the limits
of experience. The positive value of the critique is
that it makes possible the employment of practical
reason by restricting the employment of theoretical
reason to one part of the real.2 if theoretical
reason is restricted to the sensible world and if the
sensible world is not coextensive with the real, then
practical reason may function in that part of the real
order outside the sensible world. Theoretical reason
is limited to the sensible world, and this sensible
world is said to be one part of the real. The first
Critique thus has the positive task of revealing how
theoretical reason employs its negative idea of this
realm outside the sensible. If the employment of
theoretical reason is restricted to the sensible world
which is only a part of the real, then it follows that
theoretical reason may postulate an idea concerning
the nature of this nonsensible part of the real.

It is to this positive value of the Critique that

this investigation will turn. The positive result of
the first Critique is the designation of the realms
of theoretical and practical reason and the suggestion
that the sensible and the supersensible realms can be
bridged. This investigation focuses on revealing the
positive functions of the first Critique insofar as
they become evident in the comparison of the antin-
omies of reason. The investigation proceeds to an-
alyze and compare the antinomies of theoretical and
practical reason with the aim of revealing, in addi-
tion to their similarities and differences, the posi-
tive way in which the theoretical antinomies serve to
ground the origin and the resolution of the practical
antinomy. A preliminary attempt is made in Chapter
One to develop a definition for the Kantian "antinomy"
in light of the antinomies present in the first three
Critiques. However, in Chapters Two through Five,
discussion centers strictly on the antinomies of theo-
retical and practical reason, and little attention is
paid to other sections of the Critiques which may or
may not prove to be relevant to the antinomy sections.
For example, the section on the Ideal is virtually ig-
nored although its subject matter certainly links it
to the fourth antinomy of theoretical reason.

vii
 Two specific factors lend an element of necessity
to the investigation of the origin and the resolution
of the antinomies of reason. First, there are indica-
tions that Kant himself considers the antinomy of pure
reason to be the cornerstone of his critical project.
Kant emphasizes in the following two passages (the
first from the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
and the second from a letter to Christian Garve in
1798) that the antinomy of pure reason plays a central
role in leading both Kant and future readers to a
critique of reason. Kant says:
I therefore would be pleased to have
the critical reader to devote to this
antinomy of pure reason his chief atten-
tion, because nature itself seems to
have established it with a view to
stagger reason in its daring pretensions
and to force it to self-examination.3
It was not the investigation of the ex-
istence of God, immortality, and so on,
but rather the antinomy of pure reason
—"the world has a beginning; it has no
beginning, and so on," right up to the
4th . . . —that is what first aroused
me from my dogmatic slumber and drove
me to the critique of reason itself, in
order to resolve the scandal of osten-
sible 4contradiction of reason with it-
self.
Thus, Kant directs attention toward the antinomy of
pure reason, and it is because of the prominence he
accords to the antinomy that this investigation is
made necessary and important.
This investigation is not the first to have
specified the prominent place accorded to the antin-
omy in the critique of reason. Commentators as di-
verse as Frederick Van de Pitte, Justus Hartnack,
Gottfried Martin, and H. J. de Vleeschauwer have
agreed on the centrality and the importance of the
antinomy in Kant's critical project.5 Yet, the fol-
lowing investigation intends not only to acknowledge
the importance of the antinomy of reason but also to
discover what justifies the prominent role accorded to
the antinomy in the critique of reason. In light of
what Kant and his commentators say about the prom-
inence of the antinomy of reason, it is crucial to
compare this antinomy of theoretical reason to that
viii
of practical reason and to determine whether or not the
former plays a role in the development of the latter.
Second, a recent book on the origin of the antin-
omies by Sadik Al-Azm has given to the present investi-
gation an element of necessity. Al-Azm contends that
the four theoretical antinomies owe their origin to
the Leibniz-Clarke debate.6 Al-Azm claims that the
theses of the antinomies represent Clarke's Newtonian
position while the antitheses represent Leibniz's
position. Al-Azm documents the similarities between
the arguments present in the antinomies and those in
the Leibniz-Clarke debate in order to support his con-
clusion which is that the origin of the arguments in
the antinomies is the historical Leibniz-Clarke cor-
respondence. In short, Al-Azm locates the origin of
the antinomies in an historical debate, and he implies
that the antinomies are best understood as restate-
ments of this historical debate.
This work by Al-Azm makes necessary an investiga-
tion of the kind offered here for two reasons. In the
first place, Al-Azm's discussion focuses on only one
aspect of the antinomies and on only one type of an-
tinomy. He considers the origin of the antinomies of
theoretical reason. This investigation has a wider
task, and hence it is more complete. It will consider
the origin and the resolution of the antinomies of
theoretical and practical reason. In the second place,
Al-Azm gives an historical account of the antinomies.
The investigation to follow will offer a systematic
account of the antinomies. This project differs from
Al-Azm's in that it attempts to account for the origin
and the resolution of the antinomies within Kant's
systematic critique. There is no reason to assume that
an historical account of the antinomies invalidates or
excludes a systematic account. In fact, just the op-
posite is true. It is because Al-Azm has indicated
that the antinomies have an historical origin that an
investigation of this kind is required to determine
whether they also have a systematic origin.

The danger in Al-Azm's position lies in his im-

plicit claim that the antinomies are best understood
in light of their historical predecessors. On the
contrary, the following chapters suggest that a per-
fectly consistent and perhaps a more complete analysis
of the antinomies can be given in terms of Kant's sys-
tematic. Several other commentators, namely Martin G.
Kalin and Jonathan Bennett, refer explicitly to Al-Azm
and to the danger which is inherent in his account that
IX
removes the antinomies from the context of Kant's crit-
ical project.7
In sum, this investigation will explore the rela-
tionship between the antinomies of theoretical and
practical reason with a view toward revealing how theo-
retical reason functions in a positive way to ground
practical reason. At least the following six points
will be argued for in the subsequent chapters. First,
it will be shown that the theoretical and practical
antinomies share a common point of origin. The origin
of both the theoretical and practical antinomies is
located in an ambiguity characteristic of their high-
est objects. Second, the ambiguity typical of the ob-
jects of theoretical and practical reason is eliminated
prior to the practical antinomy. Thus, even though the
objects of the theoretical and practical antinomies
have a similar ambiguity, this ambiguity does not serve
to structure the theoretical and practical antinomies
in analogous ways. Third, the structures of the theo-
retical and the practical antinomies are decidedly un-
similar. The theoretical antinomies involve contra-
dictory assertions and apagogical proofs supporting the
assertions. The practical antinomy involves neither
contradictory assertions nor apagogical proofs. Fourth,
the fourth theoretical antinomy is shown to be unique
in several ways. Its assertions are not strict con-
tradictories, it raises the possibility of a highest
object "outside" the world, and in its resolution the
too large/too small designations are reversed. Fifth,
the resolution of the practical antinomy requires two
steps, and this implies that the practical antinomy
can be treated as an antinomy within an antinomy.
Finally, the discussion concerning the origin and the
resolution of the antinomies of reason points to the
following conclusion: The practical antinomy builds
on, advances from, and is facilitated by the concerns
raised in the theoretical antinomies. Theoretical
reason accounts for the origin of the practical an-
tinomy, proposes a task for practical reason, and
makes possible the resolution of the practical an-
tinomy .

x
 ENDNOTES

Bxxiv; translation by Norman Kemp Smith, Critique

of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965).
2
Bxxiv-v; translation by Kemp Smith.
3Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Königlich Preus-
sische Akademie der Wissenschaften; hereafter referred
to as KGS), IV (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1911), 341; a
revision of the Carus translation by Lewis White Beck,
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (New York: The
Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1950), p. 88.
4
KGS, XII (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter,
1922), 257-8; translation by Arnulf Zweig, Kant.
Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99 (Chicago: The
university of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 252.
5
See Frederick Van de Pitte, Kant as Philosophical
Anthropologist (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971),
pp. 46-7; Justus Hartnack, Immanuel Kant. An Explana-
tion of His Theory of Knowledge and Moral Philosophy
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1974),
pp. 14-6; Gottfried Martin, Kant's Metaphysics and
Theory of Science, trans. P. G. Lucas (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1961), p. 42; and H. J.
de Vleeschauwer, "Les antinomies kantiennes et la
Clavis universalis d'Arthur Collier," Mind, 47 (1938),
303-5.

Sadik J. Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Argu-

ments in the Antinomies (London: Oxford University
Press, 1972), pp. 3, 53, 86, 119.
7
See Martin G. K a l m , "Idealism against Realism
in Kant's Third Antinomy," Kant-Studien, 69 (1978),
162; and Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 6, 119.

XI
 CHAPTER I
KANT'S USE OF THE TERM "ANTINOMY" IN
THE THREE CRITIQUES
The first issue concerns what can be said in gen-
eral about Kant's use of the term "antinomy." It was
suggested in the Introduction that the antinomies
played a significant role in the development of crit-
ical philosophy. Kant believed that by means of the
antinomies, the critical reader would be led to in-
vestigate the ultimate foundation of all knowledge.1
It is clear then that Kant intended the antinomies to
be a focal point around which other problems relating
to the proper employment of pure reason could be raised.
In spite of the importance that Kant accords to
the antinomies, the serious reader will discover that
Kant has left no systematic analysis of the antin-
omies. That is, there seems to be no precise defini-
tion determinative for all the antinomies discussed
by Kant. The antinomies may represent a crucial
juncture in the development of the Kantian system,
but there is no "theory of the antinomy" just as there
is no "formula" characteristic of all antinomies.
The fact that Kant gives no precise definition of
"antinomy" seems to indicate one of two things. First,
Kant's treatment of antinomies may be vague and defy
definition because it is used merely as an organizing
device in his architectonic plan. Perhaps Kant dis-
covered some natural antinomies inherent in the theo-
retical employment of reason and then molded other
problems (i.e., in the second and third Critiques) into
the pattern of antinomies in order to satisfy his de-
sire for systematization. This possibility is dis-
cussed by Alexis Philonenko with regard to the antinomy
of teleological judgment.^ Philonenko says that some
people (one of whom is Hegel)3 consider the teleolog-
ical antinomy to be superfluous due to its similarity
to the third antinomy of theoretical reason. Lewis
White Beck holds a similar position with regard to the
practical antinomy. He claims that the practical an-
tinomy is "devised and artificial".and that it is not
an antinomy "in any strict sense." The problem of
course is to discover what an antinomy in a strict
sense might be and what characterizes it.

Second, Kant's treatment of antinomies may be

1
vague because antinomies have to do with man's attempt
to comprehend the nature of totality and this attempt
is grounded in dialectical illusion. It may be that
a definition of "antinomy" is elusive precisely because
man's faculties of reason and judgment (in the third
Critique) are constantly subject to dialectical il-
lusions. Perhaps there is no one paradigm antinomy due
to the fact that reason and judgment are susceptible
to dialectical errors which result in various types of
apparent conflicts. Again, in this case, the problem
is to discover what is meant by "totality" and to
determine why the attempt to comprehend totality is
characterized by dialectical illusion.
Various attempts have been made to formulate a
definition of "antinomy" from the evidence present in
one or all of the three Critiques. Four such proposed
definitions will be cited here. First is Kuno
Fischer's definition of a Kantian antinomy.
An antinomy consists of two judgments,
which predicate the same thing of a con-
cept, and so are similar in content but
related as affirmative and negative con-
tradictories. The affirmation is the
the thesis, the contradictory negation
the antithesis, of the antinomy. And
in order that these two propositions
should constitute a real antinomy, they
must not only be asserted, but proved,
and indeed with equal clearness and
upon equally strong grounds. If the
proofs are either omitted, or not per-
fectly equivalent, we have no antinomy
in the strict sense.5

Fischer suggests that two features characterize an

antinomy: strict contradiction between its proposi-
tions and equally strong proofs for each proposition.
A second early Kant commentator says the follow-
ing about the antinomies. Edward Caird in his discus-
sion of the antinomy of aesthetical judgment states
that here
as in the case of the theoretical an-
tinomies solved in the Critique of
Pure Reason, and the practical antin-
omies solved in the Critique of Prac-
tical Reason, the apparent contradic-

2
 tion has a value as making us "look
beyond the sensible and seek in the
supersensible the point of union for
all our faculties of a priori deter-
mination. "6

Caird emphasizes two features of the Kantian antin-

omies : their nature as apparent contradictions and
their effect of making man look beyond the sensible
to the supersensible.

The more recent Kant commentators also point to

characteristics of the Kantian antinomies. One of
them, Alexis Philonenko, says the following about
what defines an antinomy.

An antinomy is a contradiction and not

only a divergence of opinions. In
order for there to be an antinomy
there must be two propositions and,
in addition, each proposition must be
supported by the proof of the absurdity
of the opposite proposition.7

Heinz Heimsoeth also offers a relatively recent

interpretation of the Kantian antinomies. Heimsoeth
points to three features of the antinomies. First,
he says:

"Antinomy" appears throughout the

Critique in the singular. It is a
question of a condition . . . of our
reason in its syllogisms (plural)
directed at the world.8

Heimsoeth observes that in the first Critique antin-

omy is treated as a singular since it has to do with
a "condition" of reason in its attempt at cosmological
knowledge. According to Heimsoeth, there is an im-
portant sense in which the antinomies are in fact one
antinomy. Secondly, Heimsoeth refers to "the antinomy
in its fourfold conflict (Widerstreit)."9 Heimsoeth
states that the antinomy reveals itself as four con-
flicts. It is of significance that Heimsoeth calls
the antinomies "conflicts" whereas Fischer, Caird,
and Philonenko all state that the antinomies must
manifest contradictions. Finally, Heimsoeth points to
the apagogical character of the proofs in the antin-
omies. He says: "Again, the proofs of both parts of
the assertion are of apagogical character."10 The

3
proofs of both sides of the antinomies are apagogical
by nature, and therefore Heimsoeth, like Fischer and
Philonenko, recognizes that one of the criteria for an
antinomy lies in the nature of its proof.
Thus, Fischer, Caird, and Philonenko center their
proposed definitions of the Kantian "antinomy" on the
contradiction between propositions. Fischer, Philo-
nenko, and Heimsoeth call attention to the nature of
the proofs employed by the propositions of an antinomy.
In the course of this chapter it will be shown that
neither of these two factors operates as a universal
criterion for the antinomies in Kant's three Critiques.
Yet, these two characteristics, as well as several
others, play a part in the definition of "antinomy,"
however indeterminable that part.
The point here is not to discover why Kant left
no determinative definiton of antinomy. Rather, at-
tention must be focused on what Kant says about the
antinomies. In spite of the differences that exist
among the antinomies, there are also similarities, and
it is to these similarities that this investigation
turns in order to understand the place of the antinomy
in Kant's critical writings.
In the following sections, the discussion about
the nature of antinomy will be limited to Kant's three
Critiques. It is true that antinomies appear in other
places in Kant's work (in Religion Within the Limits
of Reason Alone), but my claims about the general
nature of antinomies are grounded only in the three
Critiques. Also, many of the points that are raised
in this chapter will be dealt with in greater detail
and with specific reference to the first two Critiques
in later chapters. The discussion on the nature of
antinomy will be divided into two sections. The first
will deal with transcendental aspects of the antin-
omies and the second will deal with logical aspects of
the antinomies.

The Transcendental Framework of

the Antinomies"
The transcendental framework of the antinomies
refers to those aspects of the antinomies concerned
with the possibility and the employment of a priori
knowledge. The antinomies play a part in the cri-
tique of reason because they concern themselves with
the transcendental employment of reason. The

4
antinomies deal not with empirical objects or rules of
experience but with transcendental ideas and concepts
which characterize reason and reflective judgment.
Thus, those aspects of antinomies which will be dis-
cussed here are those which locate the antinomies
within the transcendental domain of Kant's critical
philosophy.
The first point of similarity among the antin-
omies from a transcendental perspective is that all
antinomies are grounded in dialectical illusion. Even
a superficial view of the antinomies reveals that the
antinomies in the three Critiques appear in sections
entitled "Dialectic." Kant defines dialectic as the
"logic of illusion."H The antinomies thus have in
common this illusion which characterizes the trans-
cendental dialectic.
Kant defines transcendental illusion as follows:
there are fundamental rules and maxims
for the employment of our reason . . .
and . . . these have all the appearance
of being objective principles. We
therefore take the subjective necessity
of a connection of our concepts . . .
for an objective necessity in the deter-
mination of things in themselves. This
is an illusion.12

In other words, the antinomies, which appear in sec-

tions entitled "Dialectic," are characterized by this
confusion between subjective principles and objective
principles. The antinomies are grounded in an illusion
which means that they have to' do with a confusion
between the subjective necessity of a connection of
concepts and the objective necessity of the determina-
tion of things in themselves. Kant further states that
the transcendental illusion is "a natural and inevit-
able illusion, "13 an<ä thus the antinomies resting on
this illusion can never expect to be finally resolved
and eliminated.

Insofar as the antinomies exhibit this illusion

it will be unclear whether their assertions are pro-
viding subjective rules or whether they are determining
objects. Kant seems to suggest in the Critique of Pure
Reason that it is the transcendental illusion which
grounds or explains the possibility of antinomies. In
the Critique of Practical Reason, there is a slightly

5
different interpretation of the relationship between
transcendental illusion and antinomies. Kant says:
But the illusion would never be
noticed as deceptive if it were not
betrayed by a conflict of reason with
itself in applying to appearances its
principle of presupposing the uncon-
ditioned for every conditioned thing.
In this passage, it is stated that the conflict of
reason with itself is what leads to the recognition of
the deceptiveness of the illusion. Until the antin-
omies exhibit the conflicts which result from the
transcendental illusion, the real deceptive nature of
the illusion is not evident. Thus, the task of the
transcendental dialectic becomes clear only after the
antinomies have revealed the types of conflict caused
by the illusion.
According to this passage, the antinomies re-
vealed the nature of the transcendental illusion. The
Critique of Practical Reason implies that it is the
conflict of reason with itself that makes evident the
dialectical illusion. On the other hand, the Critique
of Pure Reason seems to indicate that the antinomies
are merely one result or one manifestation of the
transcendental illusion. A graphic indication of the
difference of perspective in the two Critiques can be
seen in the content of their sections on "Dialectic."
The first Critique, in its section on "Dialectic,"
deals with three types of dialectical inferences: the
Paralogisms, the Antinomies, and the Ideal. It is
clear from the structure of the first Critique's
"Dialectic" that the antinomies illustrate one type of
transcendental illusion. However, in the correspond-
ing section on "Dialectic" in the second Critique, there
is an antinomy, but there are no analogous references
to the paralogisms or the Ideal. Apparently, the
dialectic of practical reason has neither paralogisms
nor an Ideal. (It does of course have postulates, and
the question remains as to what relation the postulates
may have to the paralogisms and to the Ideal.) Con-
sequently, the dialectic of the second Critique does
not refer to its antinomy as one example of transcen-
dental illusion but rather as that which first uncov-
ered or illuminated transcendental illusion. In any
case, the point is not to discover whether the antin-
omies or the transcendental illusion came first. The
close connection between the antinomies and the

6
transcendental illusion is sufficient to establish a
common ground for the antinomies in Kant's three
Critiques.
A further similarity among the antinomies follows
from this close connection between the antinomies and
the transcendental illusion. Because the antinomies
are characterized by illusion, they involve a confusion
between subjective and objective principles. This
means that the transcendental illusion and the antin-
omies in turn make necessary a division between the
realm of experience (in which subjective principles
apply) and the realm outside experience (in which ob-
jective principles apply). That is, the attempt to
avoid the transcendental illusion by distinguishing
between subjective and objective principles (as happens
in the solutions to the antinomies) brings with it an
attempt to distinguish between the realm of experience
and the realm outside experience. Thus, the antinomies
also share the common trait of attempting to disting-
uish between a realm of experience and a realm out-
side experience.

A second and related point of comparison among

the antinomies has to do with the nature of their as-
sertions. From a transcendental perspective, the
nature of the assertions in the antinomies can be in-
vestigated with a view toward discovering whether they
have a regulative or a constitutive employment. Again,
the hope is to find some ground of similarity which is
common to and typical of all antinomies in the three
Critiques.
Kant refers to the claims made by the assertions
in the theoretical antinomies as "cosmical concepts"
(Weltbegriffe).15 These cosmical concepts are con-
cerned with the world of appearances, yet they "carry
the synthesis to a degree which transcends all pos-
sible experience."16 As such, the claims of the cosmo-
logical ideas do not involve a determination of ob-
jects in the world of sense. Kant says that trans-
cendental assertions, including those made in the
theoretical antinomies, "lay claim to insight into
what is beyond the field of all possible experiences."!
Thus, the assertions made in the theoretical antin-
omies have regulative and not constitutive import.
Kant further describes these assertions as "pseudo-
rational "18 because they extend the principles of
understanding beyond the limits of experience. As
such, their task is to postulate a rule for the

7
synthesis of experience. They can never formulate a
principle constitutive for the synthesis of experience
into a whole. Thus, the claims made in the theoretical
antinomies function only as regulative ideas (postu-
lating a rule for the synthesis of experience) and
never as constitutive principles (enabling the concept
of the sensible world to extend beyond all possible
experience).19

The nature of the assertions in the antinomy of

practical reason seems to contrast with the regulative
nature of the assertions in the theoretical antinomies.
The assertions in the practical antinomy intend to be
more than regulative maxims or subjective principles.
Indeed, the claims made in the practical antinomy are
meant to function as the determining ground of the will.
This contrast between the nature of the assertions in
the first two Critiques is further elaborated by
Stephan Körner. Korner points out that for Kant,
transcendental ideas have a non-regulative employment
only in practical reason.20 Thus, it is crucial to
observe that the assertions in the theoretical antin-
omies have regulative import and that those in the
practical antinomy have a non-regulative import.

The purpose of the antinomy in the second Critique

is to establish the practical possibility of the high-
est good. Kant states that the maxims of virtue and
the maxims of happiness jointly make possible the
highest good.21 The point of the antinomy is to dis-
cover what relationship between these maxims provides
a principle for practical reason and insures the con-
cept of the highest good. Kant states that

in practical principles a natural and

necessary connection between the con-
sciousness of morality and the expecta-
tion of proportionate happiness as its
consequence may be thought at least
possible.22

Therefore, the assertions of the practical antinomy

contain principles about the relationship between
maxims. These assertions intend to be objective or
constitutive in a way unlike the assertions of the
theoretical antinomies. The principles that propose a
relationship between the maxims of virtue and happiness
have the express purpose of revealing how the maxim of
virtue has objective reality, and consequently how a
practical principle can be constitutive of experience.

8
 The nature of the assertions in the antinomies
of judgment again appears to have regulative rather
than constitutive import. That is, the assertions made
in the antinomies of judgment function as subjective
rules for the employment of judgment and not as con-
stitutive principles that are determinative of experi-
ence. In the solution to the antinomy of aesthetical
judgment Kant says:
It is absolutely impossible to give a
definite objective principle of taste
in accordance with which its judgments
could be derived, examined, and estab-
lished, for then the judgment would not
be one of taste at all. The subjective
principle, viz. the indefinite idea of
the supersensible in us, can only be
put forward as the sole key to the
puzzle of this faculty whose sources are
hidden from us.2 3
Thus, the assertions made in the antinomy of aesthet-
ical judgment are properly subjective principles. Or,
as Kant later refers to the claims of the aesthetical
antinomy, they are merely reflective aesthetical
judgments.24
Similarly, the assertions in the antinomy of
teleological judgment are considered to be maxims
rather than constitutive principles.25 The reflective
judgment has its own maxims and they serve as subjec-
tive principles for reflecting upon objects. These
maxims that reflective judgment employs are not ob-
jective and can provide no ground for the cognition of
objects. The assertions in the teleological antinomy
clearly function as subjective rules for the employ-
ment of judgment, and insofar as they are subjective,
they are more analogous to regulative than to con-
stitutive principles. This conclusion is challenged
however by Leroy Loemker who claims that reflective
judgment is more constitutive than regulative in its
employment.26 On the contrary, it is maintained here
that reflective judgment is more correctly compared to
regulative principles in that it provides subjective
rules for reflecting on objects and nowhere provides
a constitutive determination of objects.

Thus, no criteria for "antinomy" can be found by

considering the nature of the assertions in the an-
tinomies. The assertions of the antinomies in
9
theoretical reason, aesthetical judgment, and teleo-
logical judgment function as subjective principles or
as regulative maxims for the employment of reason or
judgment. However, the assertions of the practical
antinomy intend to be objective or constitutive in a
way unlike the assertions of other antinomies.
A third and final possible point of similarity
among transcendental aspects of the antinomies con-
cerns the subject matter around which the antinomies
develop. The subject matter of the antinomies seems to
be the nature of totality. If it can be shown that the
antinomies in the three Critiques arise from some am-
biguity which lies in the concept of totality, then it
may be possible to establish this ambiguity as a cri-
terion for all antinomies. The nature of the subject
matter which gives rise to the antinomies will be con-
sidered only briefly here since it will be discussed
in greater detail with regard to the theoretical and
practical antinomies in later chapters.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states that
transcendental ideas "will determine according to
principles how understanding is to be employed in
dealing with experience in its totality."27 The func-
tion of the ideas of reason is to establish how the
understanding is to deal with the totality of experi-
ence which is beyond the grasp of its concepts. Kant
says that the business of reason is "to ascend from the
conditioned synthesis, to which understanding always
remains restricted, to the unconditioned, which under-
standing can never reach."2° H. W. Cassirer sums up
this aspect of the nature of reason in his commentary
on Kant's first Critique. He states that the nature
of reason is characterized by its search for totality
which "never ends except at the absolutely uncon-
ditioned."29

The assertions in the theoretical antinomies are

transcendental ideas, and as such, their task is to
effect a transition from the conditioned to the uncon-
ditioned. The ideas of reason have as their main ob-
ject the unconditioned which lies beyond the concepts
of the understanding. The theoretical antinomies thus
have as their subject matter the unconditioned or the
totality of experience. As Kant says:
All these questions [i.e., antinomies]
refer to an object which can be found
nowhere save in our thoughts, namely,

10
 to the absolutely unconditioned totality
of the synthesis of appearances.30
Thus, the theoretical antinomies have to do with the
nature of totality which seems to involve some kind of
relationship between the sensible realm and the super-
sensible realm.
The subject matter of theoretical reason in the
section called "Transcendental Dialectic" is the
nature of the unconditioned. jSince practical reason
represents only another possible employment of pure
reason,' it probably follows that practical reason too
in its~dialectic has the unconditioned as its subject
matter. It was shown that the object of practical
reason in its antinomy is to make possible the concept
of the highest good.31 it remains only to discover
what similarities exist between the subject matter of
the theoretical antinomies (i.e., the unconditioned)
and the subject matter of the practical antinomy (i.e.,
the highest good).
Kant provides a clear comparison between the ob-
jects of theoretical and practical reason in the fol-
lowing passage.
How to solve that natural dialectic and
to avoid the error arising from an other-
wise natural illusion in the speculative
use of pure reason can be found in de-
tail in the critical examination of that
faculty. But reason in its practical
use is not a bit better off. As pure
practical reason it likewise seeks the
unconditioned for the practically con-
ditioned . . . and this unconditioned
is not only sought as the determining
ground of the will but . . . is also
sought as the unconditioned totality
of the object of the pure practical
reason, under the name of the highest
good.32

Therefore, both theoretical and practical reason in

their dialectical employments have as their subject
matter unconditioned totality. Consequently, the
theoretical and practical antinomies have in common
this transcendental object known as unconditioned
totality.
Finally, the last question to consider is whether
11
the antinomies of judgment also have as their trans-
cendental subject matter the nature of totality. The
antinomy of aesthetical judgment rests on an ambiguity
in the definition of the term "concept."33 The an-
tinomy is resolved when it is pointed out that the con-
cept to which judgments of taste refer is a trans-
cendental concept of the supersensible which cannot
be theoretically determined. Judgments of taste are
grounded in this transcendental concept, and by means
of it they claim universal validity. That is, because
of the concept on which judgments of taste are based,
these judgments claim to be universally valid. This
concept which accords to judgments of taste their
universality is defined as follows: "Such a concept
is the mere pure rational concept of the supersensible
which underlies the object (and also the subject
judging it)."34 Thus, judgments of taste depend on a
transcendental concept of the supersensible. More
specifically, it follows that the subject matter of the
antinomy of aesthetical judgment is the concept of the
supersensible as a ground for objects. The antinomy
has to do with totality insofar as its concept makes
claims about "the subjective purposiveness of nature
for the judgment" and "the supersensible substrate of
humanity."35 Central to the antinomy of aesthetical
judgment is this transcendental concept of the super-
sensible nature of objects. Thus, the aesthetical
antinomy too has as its subject matter the nature of
totality.

The antinomy of teleological judgment involves a

conflict between maxims of the reflective judgment.
This is significant because the reflective judgment
can reflect upon objects but it has no law to which it
can subsume objects. 36 so, the conflict in the an-
tinomy reveals the two attempts of reflective judgment
to provide maxims for reflection upon objects. It is
clear from the beginning that these maxims of reflec-
tive judgment are not objective laws for the cognition
of objects but rather are attempts to guide reflection
upon a class of objects. The teleological antinomy
thus concerns the attempts of reflective judgment to
provide maxims for the comprehension and ordering of
objects.37 The teleological antinomy has to do with
rules for the subjective ordering of nature. Reflec-
tive judgment must provide maxims by means of which the
whole of experience and of nature can be dealt with.
Kant says that reflective judgment must "serve as its
own principle in order to investigate and search into
the phenomena of nature in accordance with a law."38

12
In sum, the teleological antinomy also has as its
transcendental object the nature of totality. The
antinomy involves the attempts of reflective judgment
to account for nature in its totality, and this it does
by searching for an unconditioned by means of which the
conditioned may be comprehended. So, the antinomy of
teleological judgment, like the other antinomies, con-
centrates its real efforts on dealing with the uncon-
ditioned or totality.
With regard to the three transcendental aspects of
the antinomies just discussed, the following conclu-
sions can be drawn. All the antinomies in the three
Critiques are characterized by dialectical illusion.
This means that they involve a confusion between what
is subjective and what is objective. As a result of
the attempt made in the antinomies to distinguish sub-
jective principles from objective principles, a further
distinction is drawn between the realm of experience
and the realm outside experience. Antinomy, as Kant
uses it, involves dialectical illusion and the conse-
quent dichotomies between subjective and objective,
and between the sensible realm and the supersensible
realm.
However, no such similarity is found among the
nature of the assertions in the three Critiques. The
claims made by theoretical reason, aesthetical judgment,
and teleological judgment in their antinomies are ap-
parently more regulative in nature than constitutive.
None of the assertions made in the antinomies of theo-
retical reason, aesthetical judgment, or teleological
judgment claim to be constitutive of objects or ex-
perience. On the other hand, the assertions in the
practical antinomy do intend to have a kind of con-
stitutive employment in the determination of the will.
Finally, a further point of similarity among the
antinomies is found in the nature of their tran-
scendental subject matter. The antinomies in the three
Critiques develop as ways of attempting to account for
totality. At issue in all of the antinomies is the
problem of how reason or reflective judgment can deal
with the unconditioned or totality.
The next section will be a consideration of other
possible points of similarity among the antinomies.
The three points dealt with so far refer to tran-
scendental aspects of the antinomies. The three points

13
to be considered now refer to logical aspects of the
antinomies.
The Logical Framework of the Antinomies
The logical framework of the antinomies refers to
the logical or structural nature of the antinomies.
There are three such structural characteristics which
although are not definitive of antinomies are at least
typical of antinomies.
The first structural point of comparison among the
antinomies has to do with the formulation of the as-
sertions in the antinomies. That is, there seems to
be at least some similarity among the ways in which the
statements of the antinomies confront one another.
Kant states in the first Critique that:
antithetic may be taken as meaning . . .
the conflict of the doctrines of seem-
ingly dogmatic knowledge (thesis cum
antithesi) in which no one assertion
can establish superiority over an-
other. 39

So, the antithetic of pure reason and its consequent

antinomies refer to conflicts between doctrines of
reason. Kant in fact entitles the sections on the
antinomies of theoretical reason "First Conflict of
the Transcendental Ideas," "Second Conflict of the
Transcendental Ideas," etc.
The term "antinomy" thus specifies a conflict be-
tween two assertions which appear to be equally tenable.
It is important to consider in more detail the logical
nature of the conflict between the assertions of the
antinomies. If, as Kant says, antithetic refers to a
conflict between apparently dogmatic assertions, then
all the antinomies in the three Critiques may be ex-
pected to exhibit this conflict.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, the four antin-
omies are stated as follows:
One (A426-7/B454-5)
Thesis: The world has a beginning in time, and is also
limited as regards space.
Antithesis: The world has no beginning, and no limits
in space; it is infinite as regards both
time and space.
14
Two (A434-5/B462-3)
Thesis: Every composite substance in the world is made
up of simple parts and nothing anywhere exists
save the simple or what is composed of the
simple.
Antithesis: No composite thing in-the world is made
up of simple parts, and there nowhere
exists in the world anything simple.
Three (A444-5/B472-3)
Thesis: Causality in accordance with laws of nature
is not the only causality from which the
appearances of the world can one and all be
derived. To explain these appearances it is
necessary to assume that there is also an-
other causality, that of freedom.
Antithesis: There is no freedom; everything in the
world takes place solely in accordance
with laws of nature.
Four (A452-3/B480-1)
Thesis: There belongs to the world, either as its
part or as its cause, a being that is ab-
solutely necessary.
Antithesis: An absolutely necessary being nowhere ex-
ists in the world, nor does it exist out-
side the world as its cause.
It is evident that these four theoretical antinomies
reflect the antithetic defined by Kant because the
assertions in the antinomies stand in clear conflict
with one another. However, even more can be said about
the nature of the conflict revealed in these four an-
tinomies of theoretical reason. In symbolic terms,
the antinomies of theoretical reason seem to illus-
trate a contradiction between X and not-X, rather than
a mere conflict. The theses and antitheses of the
antinomies not only represent conflicting assertions
but contradictory assertions. The antitheses function
as the explicit denials of the theses. If the thesis
of any one of the four antinomies were labeled "X"
then the antithesis of that same antinomy would be
labeled "not-X."40

The conclusion of this consideration of the log-

ical structure of the assertions in the theoretical
antinomies seems to be that in this case "antinomy"

15
refers to a strict type of conflict, i.e., a contra-
diction. At one point Kant does use the term "contra-
diction" 41(Widerspruch) rather than "conflict" (Wider-
streit). He says:
however it [reason] may endeavour to
establish its principle of uncondi-
tioned unity, and though it indeed does
so with great though illusory appear-
ance of success, it soon falls into
such contradictions that it is con-
strained, in this cosmological field,
to desist from any such pretensions.42
As a rule though, Kant uses the term "conflict" to
apply to the relationship that exists between the as-
sertions of an antinomy.
In the second Critique, reason is again burdened
with an antinomy. Since practical and theoretical
reason refer to two employments of pure reason, it
follows that practical reason like theoretical reason
will be characterized by an antinomy. Kant speaks
again of the "conflict of reason with itself."43
However, the assertions in the antinomy of practical
reason are not labeled "thesis" and "antithesis" as
they were in the theoretical antinomies. Instead,
Kant calls the conflicting assertions in the practical
antinomy "propositions." These names for the asser-
tions reveal a significant difference between the log-
ical formulations of the assertions in the theoretical
and practical antinomies.
The antinomy of practical reason is stated as
follows: "the desire for happiness must be the motive
to maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be
the efficient cause of happiness."44 it becomes im-
mediately clear that Kant is justified in calling the
assertions of the theoretical antinomies "thesis" and
"antithesis" and the assertions of the practical an-
tinomy "propositions." The practical antinomy con-
cerns a conflict between two propositions each of
which asserts a causal relation. This type of con-
flict stands in stark contrast to the conflict evi-
denced in the theoretical antinomies. The assertions
of the practical antinomy state a causal connection
(ex., striving for happiness produces a ground for a
virtuous disposition). The assertions of the theo-
retical antinomies make a statement of fact (ex., the
world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as

16
regards space). Two assertions of causal connection
do not stand in the same type of conflict with one an-
other as do two statements of fact which contradict
each other. The propositions of the practical an-
tinomy do not stand to each other in a logical rela-
tionship of X and not-X. The assertions of the prac-
tical antinomy in no way illustrate the contradic-
toriness revealed by the assertions in the theoretical
antinomies.
Furthermore, the assertions in the practical an-
tinomy do not even refer to the same type of causality.
The first proposition states that "the desire for
happiness must be the motive (Bewegursache) to maxims
of virtue." The second states that "the maxim of
virtue must be the efficient cause (wirkende Ursache)
of happiness." Kant is talking about two different
types of causal connection. No real conflict is
present between two propositions'one of which asserts
that the desire for happiness is the moving cause
(Bewegursache) of virtue and the other of which as-
serts that virtue is the efficient cause (wirkende
Ursache) of happiness. No contradiction exists be-
tween two propositions each of which asserts a dif-
ferent type of causality.

These types of causality will be considered in

more detail in Chapter Four. For now, it is indeed
questionable whether there is any conflict at all be-
tween the propositions of the practical antinomy but
at least it can be concluded that the type of conflict
evidenced in the practical antinomy is essentially
different from that found in the theoretical antin-
omies.
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant formulates and
discusses two antinomies. These antinomies of the
faculty of judgment also exhibit in their logical
framework the conflict between assertions which is
typical of antinomies. The antinomy of taste in the
"Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgment" is stated as
follows:
Thesis: The judgment of taste is not based upon
concepts. . . .
Antithesis: The judgment of taste is based on con-
cepts. . . .45
The first point to be noticed in the logical

17
formulation of the assertions in the antinomy is that
they are referred to as "thesis" and "antithesis."
This would suggest that the antinomy of taste bears an
affinity to the theoretical antinomies, whose asser-
tions are also designated as theses and antitheses.
The affinity between the antinomy of taste and the
theoretical antinomies is further strengthened by the
type of conflict apparent in both kinds of antinomies.
As suggested earlier, the theoretical antinomies are
characterized by assertions which not only conflict
but in fact contradict each other. The same is true
of the antinomy of taste. Like the assertions in the
theoretical antinomies, the assertions in the antinomy
of taste can be logically symbolized by X and not-X.
Apparently then, the conflict present in the antinomy
of taste is not only the type of conflict which is
required by the nature of "antinomy" in general, but
it is a contradiction between statements of fact.

The second point of significance with regard to

the type of conflict present in the antinomy of taste
has to do with how Kant himself talks about the an-
tinomy. In the section on the solution to the an- (
tinomy, Kant refers to the dilemma posed by the an-
tinomy of taste as both a conflict and a contradiction.
He states: "We can do nothing more than remove this
conflict (Widerstreit) between the claims and counter-
claims of taste."46 Furthermore, he says:
But all contradiction (Widerspruch) dis-
appears if I say: the judgment of
taste is based on a concept . . . from
which, however, nothing can be known and
proved in respect of the object.47
It is of interest that the antinomy of taste, like
the theoretical antinomies, involves a logical con-
tradiction between assertions and not a mere conflict.
Finally, the antinomy of reflective judgment,
in "The Dialectic of Teleological Judgment," is stated
in the following way:
Proposition: All production of material
things and their forms must
be judged to be possible ac-
cording to merely mechanical
laws.
Counterproposition: Some products of material

18
 nature cannot be judged to be possible
according to merely mechanical laws.48
This antinomy is described as a conflict between maxims
of the reflective judgment. Reflective judgment pro-
ceeds on the basis of these two maxims which as Kant
says, "seem not to be capable of existing together."49
Again, it is evident that this antinomy is character-
ized by a conflict between its assertions which is
typical of antinomies. The issue becomes more com-
plicated if the question is whether the type of opposi-
tion between the assertions in the antinomy is a strict
contradiction or not.
Kant claims that as maxims _for the reflective ,..
judgment these propositions involve no contradiction.
He states that the propositions would contradict each
other only if they were considered to be objective
principles for the determinant judgment. HOwever, it
seems that this discussion of Kant's leads already to
the solution to the antinomy and away from the formula-
tion of the conflict between assertions. Kant's claim
that the maxims involve no contradiction is certainly
true in light of the resolution of the antinomy which
finds the maxims to be compatible. But that does not
preclude the possibility that the propositions of the
antinomy may originally stand in a relationship of
apparent contradiction. In fact, the propositions in
the antinomy do appear to contradict each other. The
maxims of the reflective judgment not only oppose or
conflict with one another but contradict one another.
They are contradictories of the logical form "All S is
P" and "Some S is not P" ("Not [All S is P]"). This
logical contradiction between the assertions in the
teleological antinomy is attested to by Alexis
Philonenko and by D. J. Siewert in their analyses of
the teleological antinomy.51

Thus, this first point of comparison among the

antinomies in Kant's three Critiques has shown that
antinomies are characterized by a conflict between
assertions. The two propositions in an antinomy stand
in some type of conflict with one another. In addi-
tion, certain antinomies (i.e., those in the first and
third Critiques) exhibit a strict type of conflict, a
contradiction, between their assertions.
A second possible structural point of similarity
among the antinomies in the three Critiques concerns
the type of proof employed by the assertions in the
19
antinomies. Kant describes in "The Discipline of Pure
Reason" a certain proof procedure which may be typical
of the proofs employed by the propositions in the an-
tinomies . It can be shown that to a certain extent,
all antinomies are alike insofar as their propositions
rely on the apagogic mode of proof. Before discussing
the antinomies, it will be helpful to consider how
Kant defines an apagogic proof.
The third rule peculiar to pure reason,
in so far as it is to be subjected to a
discipline in respect of transcendental
proofs, is that its proofs must never
be apagogical, but always ostensive.52
The reason why apagogical proofs should not be employed
in transcendental enterprises is because in those
enterprises the subjective presents itself as objec-
tive. Apagogical proofs are acceptable "only in those
sciences where it is impossible mistakenly to sub-
stitute what is subjective in our representations for
what is objective."* Kant further distinguishes
apagogic from ostensive proofs in his Logic. He says:
The first mode of conclusion according
to which the consequence can only be
a negative and indirectly sufficient
criterion of the truth of a cognition,
is called in logic, the apagogic mode
(modus t o l l e n s ) . . . . With the other,
the positive and direct mode of con-
clusion (modus ponens), the difficulty
enters that the totality of conse-
quences cannot be cognized apodeictic-
ally.54
Apagogic proof is thus linked to modus tollens and the
ostensive or direct proof method is linked to modus
ponens. For the purposes of this investigation, all
discussion of the ostensive type of proof will be
ignored.
Kant de'fines modus tollens or the apagogical
proof method as a type of reasoning that advances from
consequences to their grounds. He states:
For if even a single false consequence
can be drawn from a proposition, the
proposition is itself false. Instead,
then, as in an ostensive proof, of re-

20
 viewing the whole series of grounds
that can lead us to the truth of a
proposition, by means of a complete in-
sight into its possibility, we require
only to show that a single one of the
consequences resulting from its oppo-
site is false, in order to prove that
this opposite is itself false, and that
the proposition which we had to prove
is therefore true.55
In other words, in an apagogical proof, the truth of
an assertion is shown by assuming the opposite asser-
tion to be true, showing that a false consequence re-
sults from this opposite assertion and that therefore
it must be false, and thus concluding that the original
proposition must be true.
One observation must be made concerning Kant's
use of the term modus tollens to refer to the
apagogical or indirect form of proof. Kant's iden-
tification of modus tollens with apagogical proofs
raises a certain problem for present-day students of
logic. The identification of modus tollens with
apagogical proofs does reinforce the logical nature of
the proofs. That is, the proofs arrive at the truth
of a proposition by showing that the opposite proposi-
tion must be false since a false consequence follows
from it. However, Kant does not restrict apagogical
proofs to what are presently called "modus tollens
proofs." Another type of proof which is presumably
apagogical but is not a modus tollens proof is the
reductio ad absurdum proof. A reductio ad absurdum
proof is apagogical because the truth of a proposition
is shown by revealing that the opposite proposition is
false since a false (here, a contradictory) consequence
results from it. It is crucial to recognize that by
apagogical proof Kant means a negative and indirect
proof and thus that the proofs in the antinomies may
be shown to be apagogical whether or not they are
modus tollens proofs.

Several of Kant's commentators have claimed that

the apagogical form of proof is typical of the four
theoretical antinomies. Justus Hartnack56 and A. C.
Ewing5 7 both refer to the indirect method of proof as
typical of the theoretical antinomies without however
labeling the proof procedure apagogical. Edward Caird
also remarks on the method of proof in the theoretical
antinomies, and he specifically states that each of

21
the antinomies is "demonstrated apagogically on both
sides."58 on the other hand, Jonathan Bennett
acknowledges the indirect proof procedure in the antin-
omies (by referring to the reductio ad absurdum proofs
in the antinomies) but he fails to recognize the im-
portance of these proofs as a criterion for "antin-
omy."59 Bennett refers to the "useless and confusing
reductio ad absurdum form"60 of the argument in the
second antinomy as if the form of the proof were some-
how distinct from the sense of the antinomy. This
investigation suggests however that the real sense or
intent of the antinomies is revealed in the apagogical
form of their proofs rather than in the validity or
invalidity of the arguments in the proofs. It is
crucial to see, contrary to Bennett's claim, that the
indirect, apagogical form of proof utilized in the
theoretical antinomies is central to the classification
of these conflicts as antinomies.

The antinomies in Kant's three Critiques must be

considered in order to discover if this apagogical
form of proof does indeed characterize the proofs of
the assertions in the antinomies. In the first
Critique, the theses and antitheses of the four antin-
omies 61
do employ apagogical proofs with one qualifica-
tion. In the first three antinomies, the truth of
the thesis is proved by assuming the antithesis to be
true and discovering that a false or impossible con-
sequence follows from it (and similarly for proving
the antithesis, the thesis is assumed to be true but
found to have a false or impossible consequence). From
the falsity of the antithesis it is concluded that the
thesis must be true (and similarly, the falsity of the
thesis proves the truth of the antithesis). For ex-
ample, in the first antinomy, the thesis states: "The
world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as
regards space." The proof of this thesis proceeds in
two parts. The first part begins with the assumption:
"If we assume that the world has no beginning in time"
and the second part begins: "let us again assume the
opposite, namely, that the world is an infinite given
whole of coexisting things."62 The proof of the thesis
is carried out by assuming the truth of the antithesis
and finding it to lead to impossible consequences.

The qualification arises due to the proof patterns

in the fourth theoretical antinomy. The antithesis of
the fourth antinomy clearly employs an apagogical
proof, but the thesis of the antinomy seems to depend
not on an apagogical proof but on the cosmological

22
argument.bJ The proof of the existence of a necessary
being is carried out as a direct and not as an apagogi-
cal proof. Kuno Fischer states that the64proof of the
thesis of the fourth antinomy is direct and I. S.
Narski, who is interested in the antinomies as predeces-
sors of Hegelian and Marxist dialectics, also recog-
nizes that the 6proof of the thesis of the fourth antin-
omy is direct. ^ Yet, contrary to these claims, it can
be shown that an apagogical proof plays a part in the
proof of the fourth antinomy's thesis.
Fischer seems to be correct in maintaining that
the proof of the thesis of the fourth antinomy proceeds
in a fashion unlike the proofs in the other theses and
antitheses. The attempt made in the thesis to prove
"there belongs to the world, either as its part
or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary"
does not begin with the assumption of the opposite
proposition. Fischer concludes that the proof of the
thesis is therefore direct.66 It is true that the
proof of the existence of an absolutely necessary being
is accomplished by the use of the cosmological argu-
ment, i.e., a direct proof. But the thesis must also
prove that this absolutely necessary being belongs to
the sensible world. This proof is carried out in an
apagogical fashion. To show that the necessary being
exists in the sensible world, the thesis begins by
assuming the opposite: "For if it existed outside that
world."6' From this opposite proposition an impossible
consequence follows, and therefore the truth of the
original proposition is proven apagogically. Thus, the
thesis of the fourth antinomy is distinguished from the
theses and antitheses of the other antinomies because
it uses a direct proof. But, it is like the other
theses and antitheses insofar as it too employs an
apagogical proof. The uniqueness of the fourth an-
tinomy will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter
Two.

Two different types of logical proofs which both

classify as apagogical proofs can be illustrated by
diagramming the proofs of the first and third theo-
retical antinomies. The first and third antinomies are
chosen here as representatives of the two types of
cosmological ideas Kant calls mathematical and dynamical.
The following diagrams are to be treated as merely use-
ful exercises which suggest what Kant means by apagogi-
cal proofs.
In the proof of the first antinomy, both thesis

23
and antithesis seem to illustrate what is today called
a modus to11ens proof. Both thesis and antithesis pro-
ceed in two parts as follows:
Antinomy 1; Thesis (A426,8/B454,6)
1. ^ There is a beginning in time -t- There has been
an infinite
series.
2. <v< There has been an infinite series.
.'.3. There is a beginning in time. (MT) (DN)
TT The world is an infinite whole-»- Infinite time
has elapsed.
2. "v Infinite time has elapsed.
.".3. ^ The world is an infinite whole. (MT)
Antinomy 1: Antithesis (A427,9/B455,7)
XT There is a beginning in time -»• There has been
an empty time.
2. i< There has been an empty time. ["No coming to
be is possible
in an empty
time."]
.'.3. >\i There is a beginning in time. (MT)
1. The world is finite and The world ex-
limited ists in an
empty space.
2. °» The world exists in an ["The relation
empty space. of the world
to empty space
is nothing."]
.".3. ^ The world is finite and
limited (MT)
Note: Bracketed statements are literal statements
of steps in the proofs.
The proof structure of the third antinomy reveals
a slightly different pattern. The thesis of the third
antinomy arrives at its conclusion by showing that a
false consequent results from assuming the antithesis
to be true. Yet, it exhibits not a modus toliens
proof pattern, but rather what is today called a
reductio ad absurdum or a proof by contradiction. The
false consequent that follows from the antithesis is a
logical contradiction. The thesis of the third an-
tinomy shows that in apagogical proofs, an assumption
is proved false when either a false consequent or a
logical contradiction follows from it. The antithesis
of the third antinomy however seems to exhibit a strict

24
modus tollens proof pattern. The third antinomy can be
diagrammed as follows:
Antinomy 3: Thesis (A444,6/B472,4)
T~. ^ There is freedom -*• ^ P (P=Things have first
beginnings.)
2. "u There is freedom -»• P
3. ^ There is freedom -»• % P & P
.'.4. There is freedom. (reductio ad absurdum)
Antinomy 3: Antithesis (A445,7/B473,5)
1. There is freedom -»• Freedom has an absolute
beginning.
2. Every beginning presupposes a not yet acting
cause. [Law of Causality]
. ' . 3 . "v» There i s freedom. ["Freedom i s an empty thought
entity."] (modus tollens)
Note: Bracketed statements are literal statements
of steps in the proofs.
(
These diagrams of the proofs of the first and
third antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason serve
two functions. First, they add additional evidence to
support the claim that the theses and antitheses of
the theoretical antinomies employ apagogical proofs.
The diagrams reveal how a proposition in an antinomy
proves itself to be true by showing that the opposite
proposition has a false consequence. Second, the
diagrams support the earlier claim that there may be
more than one type of apagogical proof. The diagrams
indicate that there are at least two ways in which a
proposition is proved true by showing its opposite to
result in a false consequence. This difference be-
tween types of apagogical proofs may or may not be
significant, but for present purposes, it is enough
to have noted the potential problem arising from
Kant's identification of modus tollens and apagogical
proofs.
In the second Critique, it is more difficult to
specify where an apagogical proof characterizes the
antinomy. The difficulty arises because of a differ-
ence in structure between the practical and the theo-
retical antinomies. The theoretical antinomies in-
volve a straightforward conflict between two proposi-
tions both of which are supported by apagogical proofs.
The practical antinomy apparently concerns a similar
conflict between two propositions, but in fact it con-
cerns the establishment of the concept of the highest

25
good. The practical antinomy proposes that if there
is a concept of the highest good then virtue and happi-
ness must be combined in one of two ways. These two
possible ways of combining virtue and happiness are
manifested in the two propositions of the practical
antinomy.
If it is remembered that the real goal of the
practical antinomy is to discover whether there is or
is not a concept of the highest good which is possible
in a practical way, then there will be no temptation
to look for the apagogical proof in a place where it is
not. That is, the modus tollens proof which is em-
ployed in the practical antinomy does not appear in
the proofs for the two propositions "the desire for
happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue" and
"the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of
happiness." If the practical antinomy followed the
pattern set by the theoretical antinomies, one would
expect to find that each of the two propositions proves
itself to be true on the basis of an apagogical proof.
Instead, both of the propositions in the practical
antinomy are said to be impossible for reasons clearly
stated. A modus tollens proof appears only if it is
recognized that the antinomy concerns the conditional:
"If there is a concept of the highest good, then either
striving for happiness produces a ground for virtue or
virtue produces happiness." Both sides of the dis-
junction are said to be impossible, and thus by modus
tollens, the conclusion is reached that there is no
concept of the highest good. Or, as Kant says, from
the fact that no necessary connection between happi-
ness and virtue can be expected, we can conclude to
the "impossibility of the highest good."68

Obviously, the practical antinomy is not left with

the impossibility of the highest good as its final
conclusion. Yet, this seems to be the step where the
modus tollens proof procedure is utilized. Again, the
question can be raised: In what way is this proof an
apagogical proof? Insofar as a modus tollens proof is
apagogical, this proof in the practical antinomy is
apagogical. However, according to Kant's definition
of apagogical proof, the modus tollens in the prac-
tical antinomy does not qualify as an apagogical proof.
An apagogical proof involves proving a proposition to
be true by showing that the opposite proposition is
false. In this case, the modus tollens does not be-
gin by assuming the opposite proposition to be true,
nor does it go on to show the falsity of the opposite

26
proposition, nor does it conclude to the truth of the
original proposition. In light of these facts, it would
seem that the modus tollens proof employed in the prac-
tical antinomy is not analogous to the apagogical
proofs evident in the theoretical antinomies.
The antinomies in the Critique of Judgment must
now be considered with regard to the form of their
proofs. The first antinomy, that of aesthetical judg-
ment, seems to contain an abbreviated form of apagogical
proof right in the statement of the antinomy. The
statement of the antinomy of taste reads in full:
Thesis. The judgment of taste is not based
upon concepts, for otherwise it
would admit of controversy (would
be determinable by proofs).
Antithesis. The judgment of taste is based on
concepts, for otherwise, despite
its diversity, we could not quarrel
about it (we could not claim for
our judgment the- necessary assent
of others).69
Both thesis and antithesis seem to employ an indirect
apagogical proof. The proof of both proceeds from a
negative assumption introduced by the word "otherwise."
For example, the reason why the judgment of taste is
not based upon concepts is because if_ it were based
upon concepts, it would be determinable by proofs. The
argument is completed by the unspoken but understood
statement "The judgment of taste is not determinable
by proofs." Hence, the conclusion by modus tollens:
"The judgment of taste is not based upon concepts."
Here, there is a modus tollens proof which is employed
apagogically. That is, the truth of the thesis is
proven by assuming the antithesis and showing it to
have a false consequence. The same method is also em-
ployed in the antithesis. The apagogical form of
proof is thus illustrated in the antinomy of taste
whose propositions are proved by disproving their op-
posites.

In the antinomy of teleological judgment, there

seems to be one indication of an apagogical proof that
gives evidence for the first maxim. The first maxim
states: "All production of material things and their
forms must be judged to be possible according to
merely mechanical laws."70 Kant says this means that

27
men must always reflect on material things according to
the principle of mechanism "because unless this lies at
the basis of investigation, there can be no proper
knowledge of nature at all."73- in other words, the
first maxim is true for reflective judgment because if_
this maxim were not true for reflective judgment, then
there would be no proper knowledge of nature. This
represents, it seems, another abbreviated type of
apagogical proof. "Unless" functions here as "other-
wise" functioned in the antinomy of taste. This first
maxim in the teleological antinomy must be true be-
cause the opposite maxim would result in a false con-
sequence. There is no analogous apagogical proof in
the justification for the second maxim of teleological
judgment.
Alexis Philonenko claims that the teleological
antinomy does not employ apagogical proofs.72 He
acknowledges that it is possible to imagine or design
an apagogical proof for the first maxim of the teleo-
logical antinomy. But he says there can be no apagog-
ical proof of the second maxim because it would re-
quire a refutation of the transcendental analytic.73
This accords fairly well with the previously stated
claim that an abbreviated apagogical proof is present
in the proof of the first maxim but that no such proof
is found for the second maxim.
This analysis of the role that apagogical proofs
play in the antinomies has shown that although the
proofs are typical of many antinomies, they do not
provide a universal criterion for antinomies. Apa-
gogical proofs are clearly employed by the proposi-
tions in the theoretical antinomies, and they are less
clearly employed by the propositions in the antinomies
of judgment. The practical antinomy seems not to in-
volve an apagogical proof as Kant strictly defines it.
(However, there is a modus tollens proof that proceeds
from "the concept of the highest good is possible" to
the conclusion "the concept of the highest good is
impossible.") Thus, apagogical proofs may be charac-
teristic of most antinomies but they are in no way
determinative of antinomies.

A third and final structural point of comparison

among the antinomies in the three Critiques has to do
with their types of resolutions. By considering the
ways in which the conflict between propositions is
resolved in the antinomies, it is possible to dis-
cover another characteristic typical of antinomies.

28
Specifically, Kant indicates that the apagogical form
of proof has a direct bearing on the types of resolu-
tions possible to the antinomies. The fact that the
antinomies (most of the antinomies) have incorrectly
employed apagogical proofs as evidence for their
propositions indicates that their resolutions will
also be characterized by this transcendental error.
To reiterate, Kant states that apagogical proofs
should never be employed to justify synthetic proposi-
tions, nor should they be employed in transcendental
enterprises.74 i n realms where the subjective and
objective are easily confused, it is never proper to
use an apagogical proof. Kant says that within the
domain of dialectical illusion where the subjective
presents itself as objective,
it can never be permissable, so far as
synthetic propositions are concerned, to
justify assertions by disproving their
opposite. For either this refutation
is nothing but the mere representation
of the conflict of the opposite opinion
with the subjective conditions under which
alone anything can be conceived by our
reason, which does not in the least con-
tribute to the disproof of the thing it-
self . . . or else both parties, those
who adopt the affirmative no less than
those who adopt the negative position,
have been deceived by transcendental
illusion, and base their assertions
upon an impossible concept of the ob-
ject. 75

This passage serves to specifically link the an-

tinomies with the apagogical form of proof. Kant in-
dicates that two types of resolutions are possible
in a conflict which employs apagogical proofs. Either,
due to a confusion between subjective and objective,
no disproof of the thing itself is achieved; or, due
to transcendental illusion, the conflict rests on an
impossible concept of the object. As an example of
the former case, Kant states that although the proof
of a necessary supreme being is impossible on sub-
jective grounds, the possibility of such a being in
itself cannot be denied.76 (This refers to the fourth
theoretical antinomy.) As an example of the latter
case, Kant states that if one assumes the sensible
world is given in itself, then it is false that it

29
must be either infinite in space or finite and lim-
ited. 11 (This refers to the first theoretical antin-
omy.) In other words, where apagogical proofs char-
acterize a conflict (in transcendental enterprises),
two types of resolutions are possible: either, both
sides of the conflict are true (since the conflict is
based on a subjective/objective confusion and no dis-
proof of the object is achieved); or, both sides of
the conflict are false (since the conflict is based on
an impossible concept of the object at issue).
Now, the next task is to consider briefly how the
resolutions to the antinomies relate to the two types
of resolutions possible to conflicts involving apagog-
ical proofs, iKant already indicates that the resolu-
tion to the fourth theoretical antinomy is of the
type where no disproof of the object is achieved, and
thus both sides of the conflict are true. In addi-
tion, the first theoretical antinomy rests on an im-
possible concept of the object, and thus both sides
of the conflict are false. The resolutions of the
antinomies must be systematically considered with the
express purpose of relating them to the following two
resolutions typical of conflicts involving apagogical
proofs.

1. No disproof of the object is achieved due to

a confusion between subjective and objec-
tive (i.e., both assertions in the conflict
are true).
2. The conflict is based on an impossible con-
cept of the object (i.e., both assertions
in the conflict are false).
The solutions to the antinomies of theoretical
reason can best be discussed here with reference to
the nature of their assertions as mathematical or
dynamical ideas.78 Kant indicates that the first two
antinomies of theoretical reason have to do with
mathematical ideas since their only object is the ob-
ject as appearance.79 The last two antinomies of
theoretical reason involve dynamical ideas which allow
for a condition of appearances outside the series of
the appearances.80 Kant says that with the dynamical
ideas

we arrive at a conclusion altogether

different from any that was possible

30
 in the case of the mathematical antin-
omy. In it we were obliged to denounce
both the opposed dialectical assertions
as false. In the dynamical series . . .
[we are] able to obtain satisfaction
for understanding on the one hand and
for reason on the other.81
Kant goes on to conclude that for the dynamical ideas,
both the conflicting propositions of reason can be
true.82
In short, this means that the mathematical an-
tinomies (Antinomies 1 and 2) are resolved when both
their conflicting assertions are seen to be false
whereas the dynamical antinomies (Antinomies 3 and
4) are resolved when both their assertions are seen to
be true. The theoretical antinomies thus illustrate
clearly the two types of resolutions typical of con-
flicts involving apagogical proofs. Antinomies 1 and
2 are solved by the second type of resolution and
Antinomies 3 and 4 manifest the first type of resolu-
tion.
The solution to the antinomy of practical reason
states that the proposition "striving for happiness
produces a ground for a virtuous disposition" is ab-
solutely false but that the proposition "a virtuous
disposition necessarily produces happiness" is only
conditionally false.83 The only point of interest
here in the resolution of the practical antinomy is
whether or not it illustrates one of the types of
resolutions typical of conflicts involving apagogical
proofs. Since the practical antinomy is resolved when
one proposition is found to be absolutely false while
the other proposition is conditionally false, it might
be claimed that the antinomy manifests the second type
of resolution (wherein both assertions in the conflict
are false since they rest on an impossible concept).
Yet, this identification of the resolution of the
practical antinomy with the second type of resolution
possible to conflicts involving apagogical proofs
would be mistaken for two reasons. First, strictly
speaking, the solution of the practical antinomy does
not manifest the type of resolution in which both as-
sertions are seen to be false. The assertions in the
practical antinomy are found to be absolutely false
and conditionally false. The latter is then made
true for practical purposes by additional considera-
tions in order to insure the concept of the highest

31
good. Second, there is no reason to expect the resolu-
tion of the practical antinomy to be molded to one of
the types suggested by the apagogical form of proof.
As stated earlier, the assertions of the practical
antinomy, unlike the assertions of the other antin-
omies, do not seem to employ apagogical proofs. There-
fore, what sets the practical antinomy apart from the
other antinomies is the absence of apagogical proofs
which in turn necessitates a different type of resolu-
tion to the antinomy.
Finally, the solutions to the antinomies of
judgment exhibit one of the types of resolutions pos-
sible to conflicts involving apagogical proofs. In
the antinomy of aesthetical judgment, the conflict is
resolved when "the two apparently contradictory prin-
ciples are reconciled—both can be true, which is
sufficient."85 The solution to the antinomy of taste
thus illustrates the first type of resolution typical
of conflicts involving apagogical proofs. Nothing can
be known about the object due to the confusion be-
tween subjective and objective conditions, and so both
assertions can be true with regard to different realms.
The antinomy of teleological judgment is resolved
in a similar way. If it is remembered that the two
maxims (all production of material things and their
forms must be judged to be possible according to
merely mechanical laws; some products of material
nature cannot be judged to be possible according to
merely mechanical laws) are reflective and not deter-
minative, then there is no contradiction at all. The
antinomy is solved when it is seen that both asser-
tions in the conflict can be true. Thus, the antin-
omy of teleological judgment corresponds to the first
type of resolution typical of conflicts involving apa-
gogical proofs. The first type of resolution charac-
terizes those antinomies where a confusion between
subjective and objective is present. This confusion
is revealed in the teleological antinomy in the fol-
lowing way:

All appearance of an antinomy between

the maxims of the proper physical (mech-
anical) and the teleological (technical)
methods of explanation rests therefore on
this that we confuse a fundamental prop-
osition of the reflective with one of
the determinant j udgment.8 6

32
 In sum, the purpose of this section on the resolu-
tions of the antinomies has been to suggest another
possible point of similarity among the antinomies. In-
deed, the apagogical nature of the proofs in the antin-
omies indicates two types of resolutions: both as-
sertions were seen to be true, or both assertions were
seen to be false. As could be expected, those antin-
omies employing apagogical proofs (the theoretical an-
tinomies and the antinomies of judgment) manifest one
of the two types of resolutions. The practical antin-
omy which apparently does not employ apagogical proofs
also fails to exhibit a resolution corresponding to
one of the two types given. Consequently, although
similarities exist between the resolutions to the an-
tinomies, again there appears to be no criterion de-
terminative of antinomies.
This brings to a close the consideration of Kant's
use of the term "antinomy" in the three Critiques.
The discussion centered on six characteristics of the
antinomies that appear in the three Critiques. A
short summary may prove helpful.
First, three transcendental aspects of the an-
tinomies were discussed in order to discover what role
they play in the defining of antinomies. One tran-
scendental aspect of the antinomies that was found to
be typical of all the antinomies is that they manifest
dialectical illusion. All the antinomies are grounded
in a dialectical confusion between subjective and ob-
jective principles. All the antinomies reveal what
Kant calls a natural and unavoidable illusion.87 A
further aspect typical of the antinomies is their at-
tempt to distinguish the sensible from the supersen-
sible. The resolutions of the antinomies aim at the
distinguishing of subjective and objective principles,
and this implies a further but related distinguishing
in the antinomies between the sensible and the super-
sensible realms.

The second transcendental aspect of the antin-

omies that was discussed had to do with the nature of
the claims made in the antinomies. It was found that
no general statement can be made about the nature of
the assertions in the antinomies. The assertions in
the antinomies of theoretical reason, aesthetical
judgment, and teleological judgment function as regu-
lative principles whereas the assertions in the an-
tinomy of practical reason are meant to have a type
of constitutive employment.

33
 The third transcendental aspect of the antin-
omies considered here had to do with their subject
matter. It was shown that all the antinomies have as
their transcendental subject matter the unconditioned
or totality. The antinomies in the three Critiques
have in common and can be defined by the object of
their concern which is the unconditioned totality of
appearances.
Second, three logical or structural aspects of
the antinomies were considered in order to discover
their roles in the defining of antinomies. One logical
aspect common to and typical of all antinomies is a
conflict between assertions. The two assertions in-
volved in an antinomy stand to one another in some
type of conflict. The second logical aspect of an
antinomy was not found to be universally character-
istic of all the antinomies. The antinomies of theo-
retical reason, aesthetical judgment, and teleological
judgment employ apagogical proofs to some degree. The
antinomy of practical reason does not in a strict sense
employ apagogical proofs. Thus, the appearance of an
apagogical proof cannot be said to be a logical cri-
terion for antinomies.

The third logical aspect of antinomies involved

a consideration of the type of resolution possible to
the antinomies. It was shown that the apagogical form
of proof has a direct bearing on the types of resolu-
tions possible in the antinomies. Those antinomies
employing apagogical proofs are resolved in one of two
ways: both assertions are seen to be true, or both
assertions are seen to be false. The practical an-
tinomy, which was found not to employ apagogical proofs,
also does not conform to one of these two types of
resolutions. In short, the attempt to discover a
logical criterion for "antinomy" in the types of reso-
lutions utilized in the antinomies was unsuccessful.

One conclusion that may be reached from this

analysis of the antinomies is that the practical an-
tinomy occupies a rather unique position. In every
case where dissimilarity was found, the dissimilarity
arose in the practical antinomy. Those three aspects
which were not found to be characteristics typical of
all antinomies failed to be universal characteristics
because of the uniqueness of the practical antinomy.88
The purposes of this chapter have been the fol-
lowing : to provide an introduction to Kant's

34
antinomies, to suggest by means of an analysis of the
antinomies that Kant offers no simple definition of
"antinomy," and finally, to consider similarities be-
tween the antinomies which may point to possible cri-
teria of antinomies. Ultimately, an attempt has been
made to follow up Kant's discussion of the antinomies
and to formulate in general terms that to which "an-
tinomy" refers.

35
 ENDNOTES

Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Königlich Preus-

sische Akademie der Wissenschaften; hereafter referred
to as KGS), IV (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1911), 341;
a revision of the Carus translation by Lewis White
Beck, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (New York:
The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1950), p. 88.
2
Alexis Philonenko, "L'antmomie du jugement
teleologique chez Kant," Revue de Mätaphysique et de
Morale, 82 (1977), 13-37.
3
Philonenko, p. 13.
4
Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's
Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 247.
5
Kuno Fischer, A Commentary on Kant's Critick of
the Pure Reason, trans. Kuno Fischer (1866; rpt. New
York: Garland Publishers, 1976), p. 206.
Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Im-
manuel Kant (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1889),
II, 447.
7
Philonenko, p. 20. My translation from the
French.
Q
Heinz Heimsoeth, Transzendentale Dialektik. Ein
Kommentar zu Kants Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, II
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967), 199. My transla-
tion from the German.
g
Heimsoeth, p. 215. My translation from the
German.

Heimsoeth, p. 223. My translation from the

German.

A293/B349; translation by Norman Kemp Smith,

Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1965). Kant's use of the term "dialectic" is a peculiar
one and it is to be clearly distinguished from other
meanings of "dialectic." Plato, for instance, refers
to dialectic as the method of the philosopher or as
logic or philosophy itself (The Republic). Dialectic
for Hegel refers primarily to "negative dialectic,"

36
that is, to the internal movement of sublation (auf-
hebung) which characterizes every moment of the Absolute
(Preface, The Phenomenology of Mind).
12
A297/B353; translation by Kemp Smith.
13
A298/B354; translation by Kemp Smith.
14
K G S , V (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1913), 107;
translation by Lewis White Beck, Critique of Practical
Reason (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956),
p. 111.
15
A420/B447; translation by Kemp Smith.
16
A420/B447; translation by Kemp Smith.
17
A425/B453; translation by Kemp Smith.
18
A422/B450; translation by Kemp Smith.
19
See the section entitled "The Regulative Prin-
ciple of Pure Reason in its Application to the Cos-
mological Ideas." A508/B536; translation by Kemp
Smith.
20
Stephan Korner, "Kant's Conception of Freedom,"
Proceedings of the British Academy, 53 (1967), 212.
21
K G S , V, 112; Beck, Critique of Practical
Reason, p. 117.
22
KGS, V, 119; translation by Beck, Critique of
Practical Reason, p. 123.
23
K G S , V, 341; translation by J. H. Bernard,
Critique of Judgment (New York: Hafner, 1968), p. 186.
24
K G S , V, 341; Bernard, p. 186.
25
K G S , V, 385; Bernard, p. 232.

Leroy E. Loemker, "The Metaphysical Status of

Regulative Maxims in Leibniz and Kant," Southern
Journal of Philosophy, 11 (1973), 143.
27
A321/B378; translation by Kemp Smith.

A333/B390; translation by Kemp Smith.

37
 29
Heinrich Walter Cassirer, Kant's First Critique.
An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason (1954; rpt. London: G. Allen
and Unwin, 1968), p. 240.
30
A481/B509; translation by Kemp Smith. The
bracketed material is mine.

KGS, V, 114; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason,

p. 118.
3?
KGS, V, 10 8; translation by Beck, Critique of
Practical Reason, p. 112.
33
KGS, V, 339; Bernard, p. 184.
34
KGS, V, 340; translation by Bernard, p. 185.

KGS, V, 340; translation by Bernard, p. 185.

36
K G S , V, 385; Bernard, p. 232.
37
The teleological antinomy does not aim at a
theoretical comprehension or a determinant ordering
but at a reflective and principled ordering of nature.
KGS, V, 386; translation by Bernard, p. 233.
39
A420/B448; translation by Kemp Smith.
40
A problem arises in the fourth antinomy which
will be discussed later on pages 53-6 2 . Briefly, the
antithesis apparently denies more than is claimed by
the thesis.
41
"Widerspruch" as opposed by "Widerstreit";
A407/B433 as opposed to A420/B448.
42
A407/B433; translation by Kemp Smith.

KGS, V, 107; translation by Beck, Critique of

Practical Reason, p. 111.
44
KGS, V, 113; translation by Beck, Critique of
Practical Reason, pp. 117-8.

KGS, V, 338; translation by Bernard, pp. 183-4.

KGS, V, 341; translation by Bernard, p. 186.

38
 47
KGS, V, 340; translation by Bernard, p. 185.

KGS, V, 387; translation by Bernard, p. 234.

KGS, V, 387; translation by Bernard, p. 233.

50
K G S , V, 387; Bernard, p. 234.
See Philonenko, p. 2 3 and Donald J. Siewert,
"Dialectic of Teleological Judgment," Akten des 4.
Internationalen Kant-Kongresses Mainz 6-10 April 1974,
Teil II.1, ed. Gerhard Funke (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter and Co., 1974), 454.
52
A789/B817; translation by Kemp Smith.
53
A791/B819; translation by Kemp Smith.
54
KGS, IX (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de
Gruyter and Co., 1923), 52; translation by Robert S.
Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz, Logic (New York: The
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1974), p. 58.
55
A791/B819; translation by Kemp Smith.

Justus Hartnack, Immanuel Kant. An Explanation

of His Theory of Knowledge and Moral Philosophy
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1974),
p. 21.
57
A. C. Swing, A Short Commentary on Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason (Chicago: university of
Chicago Press, 1967), p. 209.
58
Caird, p. 45.
59
Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 163-4, 184.
60
Bennett, p. 163.

This point is developed by Kuno Fischer in A

Commentary on Kant's Critick of the Pure Reason, pp.
209-18. Fischer states that all of the proofs of the
contradictory propositions in the antinomies are
apagogical with one exception. The proof of the
thesis of the fourth antinomy is direct.

A426/B454; translation by Kemp Smith.

39
 63
A456/B484; translation by Kemp Smith.
64
Fischer, p. 218.
65
I. S. Narski, "Kants Antinomien und die Logik
der Erkenntnis," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie,
22 (1974), 333.
66
Fischer, p. 218.
57
A452/B480; translation by Kemp Smith.
68
K G S , V, 114; translation by Beck, Critique of
Practical Reason, p. 118.
69
KGS, V, 338-9; translation by Bernard, pp.
183-4.

KGS, V, 387; translation by Bernard, p. 234.

KGS, V, 387; translation by Bernard, p. 234.

72
Philonenko, p. 23.
73
Philonenko, p. 21.

A792/B820; translation by Kemp Smith.

75
A792/B820; translation by Kemp Smith.
76
A792/B820; translation by Kemp Smith.
77
A793/B821; translation by Kemp Smith.
78
The resolutions will be discussed more fully in
Chapter Three.
79
A529/B557; translation by Kemp Smith.
80
A531/B559; translation by Kemp Smith.
81
A5 31/B559; translation by Kemp Smith.

A532/B560; translation by Kemp Smith.

83
K G S , V, 114; Beck, Critique of Practical
Reason, p. 119.
84
These considerations will be discussed in
Chapter Five. See KGS, V, 114-5; Beck, Critique of
Practical Reason, p. 119.
40
 °KGS, V, 341; translation by Bernard, p. 186.
86
KGS, V, 389; translation by Bernard, p. 236.
87
A298/B354; translation by Kemp Smith.
88
This apparent uniqueness of the practical antin-
omy will be considered in more detail in Chapters
Four and Five.

41
42
 CHAPTER II
THE ORIGIN AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE
FOUR THEORETICAL ANTINOMIES
The discussion will now center on a consideration
of the origin of the four antinomies in the Critique
of Pure Reason. The consideration of that which gives
rise to the theoretical antinomies is crucial for sev-
eral reasons. First, it is of importance to establish
that there is some one problem or difficulty at the
heart of the four antinomies. If indeed the four
theoretical antinomies share a common origin, then
some justification can be accorded to Kant's reference
to the four antinomies as "The Antinomy of Pure
Reason."^ ipne f o u r antinomies can legitimately be re-
ferred to as "the antinomy of pure reason" if there is
found to be one antithetic that grounds them all. If
a common origin or ground for the antinomies can be
found then it would also provide the basis for an ob-
jection to Jonathan Bennett's claim that Kant was un-
justified in titling the chapter "The Antinomy" rather
than "The Antinomies" of pure reason. Bennett claims
that "this alleged 'conflict or antinomy of the laws
of pure reason' is a mirage."3 This chapter will at-
tempt to dispel Bennett's objection by elaborating the
common origin of the four antinomies of theoretical
reason.

Second, it is of interest to locate the origin of

the theoretical antinomies because it is possible that
the origin may provide help in understanding the
structure of the antinomies. That is, the structure
of the antinomies should be explicable in terms of the
antithetic or the problem which gives rise to the an-
tinomies. Even if each of the four antinomies has a
different point of origin, the structure of each an-
tinomy should be illuminated by knowledge of its ori-
gin. This chapter will point out that the theoretical
antinomies in fact share a common origin which in turn
makes comprehensible the structure of the antinomies.

Third, it is crucial to locate the origin of the

theoretical antinomies because of what this origin may
imply about the nature of reason in general. In other
words, if this chapter can successfully discover the
common origin of the theoretical antinomies, then a
larger question about the nature of reason may be
raised. Specifically, if the antinomies of theoretical
reason arise from a single point of origin, does this
43
illuminate in any way the origin of the antinomy of
practical reason? Does the locating of the origin of
the theoretical antinomies in a single problem have
any application to the practical antinomy? These ques-
tions will be dealt with in Chapter IV, but for now,
the point is that the origin of the theoretical antin-
omies is of interest because of what it may imply
about antinomies of reason in general.
This chapter will proceed to discuss the origin
and the structure of the four theoretical antinomies
in the following five Sections. Section One will pre-
sent the views of two of Kant's commentators who claim
that the origin of the theoretical antinomies is lo-
cated in an historical debate. Section Two will es-
tablish that the origin of the theoretical antinomies
can be found in the idea of the unconditioned. Sec-
tion Three will discuss a further problem raised by
the idea of the unconditioned that is not explicitly
dealt with by Kant. Section Four will illustrate the
problem raised in Section Three by means of the par-
ticular terminological conventions employed by Sadik
Al-Azm. Finally, Section Five will attempt to respond
to several of Kant's commentators who contend that the
third and the fourth theoretical antinomies are iden-
tical.

The Historical Origin of the Antinomies

The /claim that the origin of the antinomies of
theoretical reason is found in an historical problem
has been put forth most recently by Sadik Al-Azm in
his book entitled The Origin of Kant's Arguments in
the Antinomies.4 The thesis of Al-Azm's book is that
the origin of the arguments in the antinomies can be
traced to the historical debate between Leibniz and
Clarke. Al-Azm believes and carefully elaborates his
claim that the theses of the four theoretical antino-
mies reflect the Newtonian position espoused by Clarke
and the antitheses reflect the position advanced by
Leibniz.5 This is essentially the same claim that Al-
Azm earlier proposed in an article that dealt with the
first antinomy of theoretical reason.6

In the course of his book, Al-Azm attempts to

trace the arguments in the antinomies back to the spe-
cific problems and issues that were discussed in the
historical Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. Some of Al-
Azm' s statements about the origins of the antinomies
will be cited here in order to indicate the thoroughly
historical grounding that he wishes to accord to the
44
antinomies. He claims with regard to the thesis of
the second theoretical antinomy that "the idea of this
argument comes directly from the Leibniz-Clarke cor-
respondence. "7 Considering the third antinomy, Al-Azm
states that the thesis is a "restatement" of the posi-
tion expounded by Clarke." Similarly, the antithesis
of the third antinomy is said by Al-Azm to be "identi-
cal" with Leibniz's doctrine of universal determinism.9
Again, later on, when Al-Azm is discussing the third
antinomy, he speaks of the thesis in which Kant "re-
formulates "10 Clarke's position and of the antithesis
which "espouses"11 Leibniz's interpretation of the law
of sufficient reason. As a final example of Al-Azm's
orientation toward the problem of the origin of the
antinomies, there is his claim that the thesis of the
fourth antinomy is a "restatement" of an idea implicit
in Newtonian cosmology.12

The first point to be made with regard to Al-

Azm' s attempt to historically ground the antinomies is
that this attempt is not an original one. His book is
not the first to have claimed that the arguments in
the antinomies owe their origin to specific historical
problems. At least one previous Kant commentator
(Gottfried Martin) has also located the origin of the
antinomies in historical problems and specifically in
the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. However, Martin's
thesis iL in several senses more limited than that of
Al-Azm.
First, Martin speaks directly about the histori-
cal foundations of only the first two antinomies of
theoretical reason. He says with regard to the second
antinomy that "Kant's actual starting-point was prob-
ably again the correspondence between Leibniz and
Clarke in the first instance."13 Speaking of the
first two antinomies, Martin says:
The Antinomies are a systematic formu-
lation of this long historical develop-
ment, in which the particular reference
to the controversy between Leibniz and
Newton should not be overlooked.14
Second, Martin's approach to the apparent histor-
ical origin of the arguments in the antinomies is es-
sentially different than that of Al-Azm. Al-Azm's
thesis seems to be that Kant's antinomies are mere re-
statements of the historic Leibniz-Clarke dialogue.
Al-Azm maintains not only that the antinomies may be
understood from this reference to their historical
45
roots, but, in addition, that the antinomies are best
understood as re-presentations of these historical de-
bates. Apparently, Al-Azm wishes to assert the
strongest thesis possible: The antinomies have their
origin in an historical debate and the proper way to
understand the antinomies is to see them as restate-
ments of this historical debate. On the other hand,
Martin develops a weaker thesis from his historical
grounding of the antinomies. Martin recognizes the
historical roots of the antinomies, but he does not
consider the antinomies to be merely a duplication of
the historical Leibniz-Clarke debate. He claims:
We can see therefore in the first An-
tinomy how the Kantian proofs rest on
elevating the trains of thought that
were historically present into a pure
systematic form. If we were to con-
sider the other three Antinomies from
the same point of view we should be
able to continue to bring out the
same connection between the systematic
and the historical aspects.15
Martin seems to assert that although the antinomies
have clear historical roots, they have somehow been
systematized in Kant's critique of reason.
Al-Azm and Martin suggest two different ways of
considering the historical roots of the Kantian antin-
omies. Al-Azm implies that the antinomies can be best
understood by reference to their historical origins
while Martin claims only that the historical origins
of the antinomies are relevant to the comprehension of
the antinomies. It is not one of the purposes of this
investigation to deny or refute these attempts to his-
torically locate the origins of the antinomies. Yet,
it is not out of order to raise an objection against
the strongest form (Al-Azm) of this historical argu-
ment.

Indeed, W. H. Walsh echoes Martin's position and

in so doing, he offers an alternative to Al-Azm's
merely historical grounding of the antinomies. Walsh,
like Martin, recognizes the historical roots of the
Kantian antinomies without however identifying those
historical predecessors with the statements in the an-
tinomies. Walsh states:

46

/
 Mr. Sadik Al-Azm, has argued not only
that the antinomies were suggested to
Kant by reflection on the Leibniz-
Clarke correspondence, but further
that the positions represented in the
formal statement of the antinomy in
section 2 of Kant's chapter are those
taken in the correspondence by Newton
. . . and Leibniz respectively. . . .
It could be, however, that what began
as an argument between Newton and
Leibniz was later seen by Kant in a
very different light, as a result of de-
velopments which were not envisaged when
the original conflict was set out. My
own inclination is to say that this is
indeed so. 16

Neither Martin nor Walsh attempt to disprove the his-

torical grounding of the antinomies offered by Al-Azm.
Yet, both point to the narrowness of this historical
perspective, and consequently, both lend support to
the aim of this chapter which is to locate an origin
for the antinomies intrinsic to Kant's own systematic.
It reamins to be seen if an origin for the antin-
omies can be found intrinsic to the systematic of
Kant's critique. It is this intrinsic origin of the
antinomies that the following section will discuss.
In sum, it may be that the debate between thesis and
antithesis in the antinomies reflects the historical
Clarke-Leibniz controversy, but the fact remains that
the origin of the debate may be better explained in
terms intrinsic to Kant's system.
The Conceptual Origin of the Antinomies
The task of this section is to show that the ori-
gin of the four theoretical antinomies can be located
in a problem intrinsic to Kant's systematic, namely,
in the problem of the unconditioned.17 one of the
positions advanced here is that it is more correct and
more helpful for an understanding of Kant to search
for the ground of the antinomies within the systematic
critique in which the antinomies develop. Indeed,
Kant is primarily interested in the theoretical antin-
omies not as historical problems but as conflicts typ-
ical of reason in general. The theoretical antinomies
play a part in the critique of reason because they il-
lustrate characteristic conflicts of reason caused by
dialectical error. The origin of these antinomies
47
thus cannot be merely historical. It must be possible
to discover something about the nature of reason itself
which gives rise to these antinomial conflicts. The
theoretical antinomies must be grounded in an ambiguity
or a conflict typical of theoretical reason itself.
The position defended here is that Kant clearly
locates the origin of the theoretical antinomies in
the transcendental idea of "the unconditioned."18
Kant appears sometimes to use the term "the uncondi-
tioned" side by side with the term "absolute totality."
In fact, Nathan Rotenstreich claims that "Kant intro-
duced his most significant innovation: he identified
the unconditioned with totality, or to put it more
cautiously, with totalities."19 Lothar Schäfer also
suggests that in the antinomies totality refers to the
unconditioned whole of appearances.20 But Kant himself
says :

reason demands on the side of the con-

ditions . . . absolute totality, and
in so doing converts the category into
a transcendental idea. For only by
carrying the empirical synthesis as
far as the unconditioned is it enabled
to render it absolutely complete.21
Reason apparently seeks absolute totality (a category)
but in the process of its search it is satisfied only
with the unconditioned (a transcendental idea) . Reason
desires to find in the world absolute totality, but it
can discover only the idea of the unconditioned.
Kant further distinguishes between the terms in
the following way:
the unconditioned is necessarily con-
tained in the absolute totality of
the regressive synthesis of the mani-
fold in the (field of) appearance.22
Reason, says Kant, starts from the idea of absolute
totality although what it really has in view is the
unconditioned. Thus, the object or the goal toward
which reason aims is the unconditioned. Kant states
again at A416/B443 that what reason is really seeking
is the unconditioned. Nevertheless, it may be that
the difficulty reason has in distinguishing between
the category of absolute totality and the idea of the
unconditioned is responsible for or gives rise to the
ambiguity present in the definition of the
48
unconditioned.23 That is, the two definitions of the
unconditioned that Kant specifies may reflect reason's
difficulty in distinguishing between the category of
totality and the idea of the unconditioned.
The object of theoretical reason is said to be
the unconditioned. The question still remains how
this object of reason functions as the ground or the
origin of the antinomies. The claim here is that the
antinomies of theoretical reason have their origin in
an ambiguity present in the definition of the uncon-
ditioned. The antinomies arise because there is an
ambiguity in the object or goal of reason. That is,
there are antinomies because reason employs two dif-
ferent definitions of its object, the unconditioned.
Kant does not refer to these two definitions of the
unconditioned as an "ambiguity" in reason's object.
But since the unconditioned can have two definitions
between which reason is unable to decide, it can be
said that the idea of the unconditioned is ambiguous.
The antinomies owe their origin to this ambiguity in
the definition of the object of reason.

Kant specifies the problem involved in defining

the object of reason as follows:
This unconditioned may be conceived in
either of two ways. It may be viewed
as consisting of the entire series in
which all the members without exception
are conditioned and only the totality
of them is absolutely unconditioned.
This regress is to be entitled infinite.
Or alternatively, the absolutely uncon-
ditioned is only a part of the series—
a part to which the other members are
subordinated, and which does not 2 itself
stand under any other condition. ^

Kant suggests that the unconditioned may be defined

either as the sum total of all conditions or as a part
to which all other parts are subordinated.25 More
concisely, the unconditioned refers either to the in-
finite series of conditions or to a highest condition.
Thus, the object of reason is characterized by two
meanings: the unconditioned is either an infinite,
complete series, or a part of the series to which all
other parts are subordinated.
Still, it has not been shown that these two defi-
nitions of the unconditioned function as the ground
49
for the antinomies. Before considering the antinomies
and their relation to the meanings of the uncondi-
tioned, it must be pointed out that Kant himself links
these two senses of the unconditioned to the problems
in the antinomies. Shortly after Kant distinguishes
the two meanings of the unconditioned, he refers to
the problems yet to arise. He says:
On the second view [that the uncondi-
tioned is a part of the series], there
is a first member of the series which
in respect of past time is entitled,
the beginning of the world, in respect
of space, the limit of the world, in
respect of the parts of a given limited
whole, the simple, in respect of causes,
absolute self-activity (freedom), in
respect of the existence of alterable
things, natural necessity.26
Clearly, Kant has identified the second meaning of the
unconditioned with the theses of the four theoretical
antinomies. If reason considers the unconditioned in
its sense as a highest condition, then reason asserts
the theses of the antinomies. Completing the compari-
son, it would seem to follow that if reason considers
the first sense of the unconditioned (as an infinite,
complete series), it would be led to assert the an-
titheses of the four antinomies.
The theoretical antinomies were stated on pages
14-15 just as they appear in Kant's first Critique.
The following summary of the antinomies may help reveal
how the origin of the antinomies can be accounted for
by referring to the two definitions of the uncondi-
tioned.
One
Thesis: The world has a beginning in time, and a
limit in space.
Antithesis: The world has no beginning in time, and
no limits in space.
Two
Thesis: Every composite substance in the world is made
up of simple parts.
Antithesis: No composite thing in the world is made
up of simple parts.

50
I
Three
Thesis: There is freedom.
Antithesis: There is no freedom.
Four
Thesis: There belongs to the world an absolutely
necessary being.
Antithesis: An absolutely necessary being exists
neither in the world nor outside the world.
Reason's object, the unconditioned, has as its two
meanings: an infinite, completed series, or a part of
the series to which all other parts are subordinated.
The theses of the antinomies maintain that there is a
part of the series to which all other parts are sub-
ordinated. For the theses, the series of conditions
is not an infinite series because the world has a be-
ginning in time and is limited in space, there are
simple parts, there is freedom, and there is a neces-
sary being. The antitheses of the antinomies assert
that the series of conditions is given and infinite.
Thus, for the antitheses, there is no highest part of
the series because the world is infinite in time and
space, there are no simple parts, there is no freedom,
and there is no necessary being.

Therefore, there is a close connection between

the ambiguity present in the definition of reason's
object and the arguments in the antinomies. Stated
more strongly, the claim here is that within the
Kantian system it can be said that the two definitions
of the unconditioned give rise to the conflicts present
in the theoretical antinomies. At the bottom of the
four theoretical antinomies rests the question: Is the
unconditioned the totality of an infinite series or is
it a part of the series to which all other parts are
subordinated? The origin of these theoretical con-
flicts can be traced back to a confusion between the
two different meanings of the object of reason.

Several of Kant's commentators have referred to

the connection between the idea of the unconditioned
and the antinomies. Allen Wood gives an account of
the relationship between the unconditioned and the an-
tinomies that best accords with the account given here.
He specifies the two senses of the unconditioned as a
thing beginning the series and as the infinite series
itself, and he further claims that the first sense of
the unconditioned favors the thesis of each antinomy
51
while the second sense favors each antithesis.27
Edward Caird also points to the two senses of the un-
conditioned when he states: "The 'unconditioned total-
ity of phenomenal synthesis' must consist either in a
finite or infinite series, in a series which has, or
one which has not, a beginning."28 As an example of
the former case, Caird refers to the theses of the
four theoretical antinomies.29
Two other commentators connect the problem of the
unconditioned to certain of the four antinomies with-
out however generalizing the relationship to apply to
all the antinomies. F. E. England says with regard to
the third and fourth antinomies that the thesis in
each case requires a first cause or necessary being
whereas the antithesis in each case claims that since
the series is infinite, no first cause can be reached. 30
Similarly, L. W. Beck applies the two definitions of
the unconditioned to the thesis and antithesis of the
third antinomy as a way of explaining the conflict at
issue.31
Finally, Jonathan Bennett suggests a relationship
between the idea of the unconditioned and the antino-
mies which seems to be essentially mistaken. Bennett
refers to the principle of reason that requires the
series of conditions to extend to the unconditioned,
and he goes on to comment that:
[It seems to be the] principle that
every series of conditions terminates
in something unconditioned. . . . Fur-
thermore it relates to the antinomies
in a most peculiar way; for instead of
being the source of each antinomal im-
passe, the principle is surely at most
the source of the thesis in each antinomy
—i.e., of the view that the relevant
series terminates.3 2
If Bennett were right that the unconditioned refers to
something that terminates the series, then he would be
correct that reason's search for the unconditioned
grounds only the theses of the antinomies. Bennett is
apparently not aware of the ambiguity that character-
izes the definition of the unconditioned. Conse-
quently, he has mistakenly concluded that the problem
of the unconditioned grounds only the theses of the
antinomies. The exposition previously given in this
section facilitates a correction of Bennett's error.
The unconditioned does not refer univocally to a
52
highest part that terminates the series. It also re-
fers to an infinite, completed series. Therefore, the
problem of the unconditioned gives rise not only to
the theses of the antinomies but also to the antith-
eses. The origin of the antinomies can be traced to
the problem of the unconditioned in the first Critique.
The Structure of the Antinomies: Some
Structural Problems Raised by
the Fourth Antinomy
The structure of the four theoretical antinomies
must be considered in light of their origin in the
idea of the unconditioned. It was established in the
last section that the arguments in the antinomies can
be seen to arise from the ambiguity present in the
idea of the unconditioned. The positions asserted by
the theses and the antitheses can be understood as re-
flections of the two definitions of the unconditioned.
The structure of the antinomies can be at least ini-
tially explained as a conflict between two conceptions
of the unconditioned.
In this section, further discussion will be added
to the consideration of the structure of the antino-
mies. It is not sufficient to conclude that the struc-
ture of the antinomies reflects the conflict between
two senses of the unconditioned. Already in the first
chapter it was noticed that the fourth antinomy dif-
fers in a significant way from the other antinomies.33
An allusion was made to a problem that arises in the
labeling of the logical structure of the antinomies.
In Chapter I, the logical structure of the theoretical
antinomies was said to be adequately represented by
"X" and "not-X."34 It was noted, however, that this
relationship between the thesis and the antithesis of
the fourth antinomy is strained due to the fact that
the antithesis seems to deny more than what is claimed
by the thesis. Attention must now be focused on this
problem regarding the structure of the fourth antinomy.

If there is this point of uniqueness about the

structure of the fourth antinomy, a question arises
concerning its relation to the idea of the uncondi-
tioned. That is, assuming that the structure of the
fourth antinomy differs in some respect from the struc-
ture of the other antinomies, how does that difference
affect what was seen to be the common origin of the
antinomies? If the structure of the fourth antinomy
is unique, can the antinomy still be said to arise
from the idea of the unconditioned? This investigation
53
finds the answer to be "yes." It will be shown here
that the uniqueness of the fourth antinomy indicates
not a unique point of origin but a problem in the idea
of the unconditioned that Kant does not consider. In
other words, the structural uniqueness of the fourth
antinomy points to a complexity in the idea of the un-
conditioned not treated by Kant.
Earlier sections have explicated the two senses
of the unconditioned as: the complete, infinite
series and a part of the series to which all other
parts are subordinated.35 The theses of the antin-
omies were seen to be reflections of the latter defi-
nition while the antitheses were illustrations of the
former definition. 36 This explanation would be per-
fectly adequate to the structure of the fourth antin-
omy i_f_ the antinomy stated:
Thesis: There is an absolutely necessary
being.
Antithesis: There is no absolutely necessary
being (but only an infinite series).
In fact, however, the structure of the fourth antinomy
is considerably more complex. The fourth antinomy
states:
Thesis: There belongs to the world, either as
its part or as its cause, a being
that is absolutely necessary.
Antithesis: An absolutely necessary being nowhere
exists in the world, nor does it
exist outside the world as its cause.
(A452-3/B480-1)
Two major problems arise in the structure of this
antinomy. The first has to do with Kant's use of the
term "cause" (Ursache) in both thesis and antithesis.
"Cause" seems to be used in different ways by the
thesis and the antithesis, and thus this term serves
to hide the real conflict at issue. In the thesis, it
is asserted that there belongs to the world, either as
its part or its cause, an absolutely necessary being.
The possibility arises that Kant is using "part" and
"cause" interchangeably to refer to a member of the
series to which all other members are subordinated
(i.e., to refer to the second definition of the uncon-
ditioned) . If so, then the thesis of the fourth an-
tinomy is analogous to the theses of the other
54
antinomies in that its object is the unconditioned in
its sense as a part of the series to which all other
parts are subordinated. However, the proof of the
thesis restates the thesis in the following way:
Something absolutely necessary is there-
fore contained in the world itself,
whether this something be the whole
series of alterations in the world or
a part of the series. '
It seems therefore that "part" and "cause" are not
synonymous in the thesis but in fact refer to the two
definitions of the unconditioned. "Part" and "cause"
are employed in the thesis to refer respectively to a
member of the series to which all other members are
subordinated and to the completed, infinite series it-
self.
The antithesis of the fourth antinomy states that
an absolutely necessary being does not exist in the
world, nor does it exist outside the world as its
cause. Here, "cause" refers clearly to a member of the
series to which all other members are subordinated
(i.e., to the second definition of the unconditioned).
In the proof of the antithesis, "cause" is described
as "the highest member in the series of the causes of
changes in the world."38 In the antithesis, "cause"
is used specifically to refer to the highest member
(outside the world) of the series of causes of changes
(in the world).

Thus, the term "cause" that appears in the thesis

and antithesis of the fourth antinomy is employed in
different senses. In the thesis, "cause" refers to
the completed, infinite series. In the antithesis,
it refers to a highest member outside the world of the
series of changes in the world.
The second problem that arises in the structure
of the fourth antinomy has to do with the phrases "in
the world" and "outside the world." In Kant's treat-
ment of the idea of the unconditioned, no mention is
made of the distinction between "in the world" and
"outside the world." The first three antinomies con-
cern a straightforward conflict between the senses of
the unconditioned.39 in the fourth antinomy, the
senses of the unconditioned seem to be further compli-
cated by the distinction between what is "in the
world" and what is "outside the world." The issue
here is to discover what effect this distinction

I
between what is "in the world" and what is "outside
the world" has on the ambiguity between senses of the
unconditioned which gives rise to the antinomies.
The fourth antinomy, in its new formulation,
seems to be:
Thesis: There is in the world, as a part of
the series to which all other parts
are subordinated or as the infinite
series itself, an absolutely neces-
sary being.
Antithesis: There is no absolutely necessary
being in the world, nor does it exist
outside the world as a part of the
series to which all other parts are
subordinated.
It is evident that one earlier observation is correct.
The antithesis of the fourth antinomy differs from the
previous three antitheses in that it denies more than
the thesis claims.40 The fourth antinomy is not per-
fectly symbolized by the logical terms "X" and "not-X"
because the antithesis ("not-X") also denies Y (where
Y = there is an absolutely necessary being which
exists outside the world as a part of the series to
which all other parts are subordinated) .
Stated more clearly, a difficulty arises in the
fourth antinomy due to the use of the phrases "in the
world" and "outside the world." The conflict in the
antinomies is no longer a simple conflict between the
two senses of the unconditioned. The addition of the
phrases "in the world" and "outside the world" creates
further ways of defining the unconditioned, and conse-
quently makes possible a distinction between three
senses of the unconditioned. The first three antino-
mies concern the debate whether the unconditioned is a
part of the series to which all other parts are sub-
ordinated (theses) or the complete, infinite series
itself (antitheses). In the fourth antinomy, three
possibilities are raised. The unconditioned (in the
form of an absolutely necessary being) may be: a part
of the series to which all other parts are subordinated
in the world, a part of the series to which all other
parts are subordinated outside the world, or the in-
finite series itself in the world. (The fourth logi-
cal possibility, i.e., the infinite series outside the
world, is presumably ignored because it is a logical
contradiction. The infinite series refers to the
56
world of appearances, and as such, it cannot be out-
side the world.)
Thus, the addition of the phrases "in the world"
and "outside the world" to the fourth antinomy results
in the developing of three definitions of the uncondi-
tioned. The fourth antinomy makes explicit the differ-
ences between two types of highest members of the
series: one in the world and one outside the world.
The question arises now as to whether the first three
antinomies can be interpreted in a way to take account
of these three definitions of the unconditioned. Can
it be presumed that the distinction that is explicit
in the fourth antinomy is implicit in the first three
antinomies? The answer appears to be a qualified "no."
Certainly, it would be a misrepresentation to suggest
that Kant intended for the theses of the first three
antinomies to implicitly raise the possibility of a
highest member of the series outside the world. The
idea of a highest member of the series outside the
world is a transcendental idea, and if reason in the
antinomies made claims about this idea, the antinomies
would lose their cosmological character.

The subject matter of the antinomies themselves

reveals that the distinciton between a part of the
series in the world and a part of the series outside
the world is probably not present in the first three
antinomies. Especially with regard to the first two
antinomies (which are mathematical antinomies), it is in-
correct to suggest that the theses may implicitly re-
fer to a part of the series outside the world. The
theses of the first two antinomies state essentially:
One
Thesis: The world has a beginning and a limit.
Two
Thesis: There are simple parts.
These two theses are mathematical in nature, that is,
they refer to objects of intuition and do not allow
the appearance of heterogeneous conditions. Clearly,
the first two theses, which do refer to the uncondi-
tioned as a part of the series, do not and cannot have
in mind a part of the series outside the world. There-
fore, the distinction between a part of the series in
the world and a part of the series outside the world
is not implicitly present in the first two antinomies,
since they cannot have as their object a part of the
series outside the world.
57
 A qualified "no" was given above because of the
possibility that the distinction raised in the fourth
antinomy may be implicit in the third antinomy. In
fact, the distinction between what is in the world and
what is outside the world is first 41
mentioned in the
Observation on the Third Antinomy. The antithesis
asserts that Lf_ a transcendental power of freedom were
allowed, it would 42
have to be outside the world and not
inside the world. The antithesis thus claims that
the thesis ought properly to refer to a part of the
series outside the world.
This mention of the distinction between a part in
the world and a part outside the world suggests that
the third antinomy implicitly involves the distinction
that is developed in the fourth antinomy. The third
antinomy like the fourth is dynamical in nature, and
thus both allow the possibility of heterogeneous con-
ditions (conditions outside the world). To an extent,
it is possible to interpret the third antinomy as im-
plicitly containing the problems of the fourth in
light of its reference to the distinction between a
part in the world and a part outside the world. Con-
sequently, the three definitions of the unconditioned
that are raised in the fourth antinomy do not appear
in the first two antinomies and are only hinted at in
the third antinomy.

If the possibility of a part of the series out-

side the world is ignored in the first three antino-
mies , then the modal character of the fourth antinomy
is clearly evident. Kant claims that the fourth an-
tinomy is related to the fourth category, i.e., modal-
ity. 4 ^ One thing this means is that the fourth antin-
omy adds no new information to the content of our ideas
but determines the relation of these ideas to our
faculties of knowledge.44 The category of modality,
and consequently the fourth antinomy, determines what
is possible, what is real, and what is necessary with
regard to the world as a whole. The object of a modal
category or principle is the world as a whole and the
relationship that our faculties of knowledge may have
to the world. With this in mind, the antinomies can
be interpreted in the following way. The theses of
the first three antinomies assert there is an uncondi-
tioned as a part of the series to which all other parts
are subordinated. The antitheses of the first three
antinomies assert there is an unconditioned as the
whole, infinite series. The thesis of the fourth an-
tinomy sums up that the unconditioned as a necessary
being is either a part of the series or the whole,
58
infinite series. The antithesis denies that there is
an unconditioned as a necessary being in any of its
senses.
Kant says that principles of modality "restrict
all categories to their merely empirical employment,
and do not approve or allow their transcendental em-
ployment. "45 The same is true of the fourth antinomy
in its role as a modal category. The thesis of the
fourth antinomy must restrict the idea of the necessary
being to its empirical employment. Thus, the thesis
of the fourth antinomy is prevented from raising the
possibility of a part of the series outside the world
because of its modal character. The thesis asserts
that the idea of the necessary being can be related to
our faculties of knowledge only as a necessary being
in the world. The antithesis however denies that a
necessary being in any of its senses can be related to
our faculties of knowledge. (Still, the symmetry of
the fourth antinomy is shattered by the denial made in
the antithesis that does not correspond to any claim
made in the thesis.)

One reason can be suggested for why the antithesis

raises the possibility of a part of the series outside
the world. Speaking within the limits of Kant's archi-
tectonic, the possibility of a necessary being outside
the world facilitates the transition from the Antino-
mies to the Ideal. Kant says, in the Observation on
the Fourth Antinomy, that the thesis must leave unde-
cided whether the necessary being is a thing distinct
from the world, for to establish the necessary being
as a thing distinct from the world would be transcen-
dent philosophy.46 The antinomies are cosmological
precisely because they do not seek to establish an un-
conditioned outside the world. Yet, they provide a
transition to the Ideal which does treat this tran-
scendent concept of a necessary being outside the
world.47 The antinomies direct attention toward the
Ideal in that they raise the possibility of a neces-
sary being outside the world, and they point toward a
transcendent philosophy. Thus, one reason why the an-
tithesis explicitly mentions a necessary being outside
the world is to provide a transition to the Ideal.
(Admittedly, this justification for the denial in the
antithesis that does not correspond to any claim in
the thesis is at best a limited account of the antin-
omy because this account treats the antinomy only in
terms of its position within Kant's architectonic
plan.)

59
 Briefly, the goal of this section has been to con-
sider what effect the ambiguity of the idea of the un-
conditioned has on the structure of the antinomies.
The claim was made that the structure of the antin-
omies can be understood in terms of the ambiguities
present in the idea of the unconditioned. Specifically,
the structure of the fourth antinomy reveals three
senses of the unconditioned which in turn function as
a framework in which the structure of the antinomies
can be interpreted.
Finally, two of Kant's commentators discuss the
fourth antinomy without, however, recognizing its
uniqueness or its significance. Justus Hartnack sum-
marizes the fourth theoretical antinomy in the follow-
ing way:
The thesis maintains that there is a
being that necessarily exists either
as a part of the world or as its cause.
The antithesis denies that such a being
can exist.4 8
In light of the previous discussion of the fourth
antinomy, Hartnack's summary of the antinomy is seen
to be a vast oversimplification. Hartnack has ef-
fectively omitted the difficult aspects of the an-
tinomy. He has ignored the fact that the antithesis
is not merely the logical contradiction of the thesis
but that it adds a denial ("nor does it exist outside
the world as its cause") which corresponds to no claim
made by the thesis. In the thesis, Hartnack ap-
parently applies the phrase "in the world" only to the
necessary being as "part" while Kant clearly means "in
the world" to refer to both the necessary being as
"part" and as "cause."

Hartnack's later discussion of the fourth antinomy

is certainly subject to this error of ignoring what the
antithesis claims about a necessary being "outside the
world." He says that since the antithesis
holds only for the empirical world, it
is only of that world that we can affirm
with certainty that there can be no neces-
sary existence. This does not exclude
(but neither does it prove or make prob-
able) that there exists a nonempirical
and necessary condition of the uncompleted
and uncompletable series of the empiric-
ally conditioned.^
60
In fact, the antithesis of the fourth antinomy does
mention and exclude the possibility of a necessary
being "outside" the world. The antithesis considers
and rejects the idea that the necessary being might be
a part of the series to which all other parts are sub-
ordinated "outside" the world. Thus, Hartnack has mis-
understood the structure of the fourth antinomy. He
has failed to see that in the fourth antinomy the idea
of the unconditioned explicitly refers to two types of
parts: a part of the series "in" the world and a part
of the series "outside" the world.
Edward Caird recognizes the uniqueness of the
fourth antinomy but fails to realize its significance.
Caird says of the fourth antinomy:
The parallelism between thesis and
antithesis would have been more com-
plete, if Kant had not introduced under
the former the proof that the necessary
being must be in the world. Overlook-
ing this irregularity, the sum of the
argument for the thesis is, that there
must be a necessary being iri or out of
the world . . . and the sum of the argu-
ment for the antithesis is, that there
can be a necessary being neither iii
nor out of the world.50
Caird notices the lack of symmetry between thesis and
antithesis, and he attempts to correct it by adding
to the thesis the claim that the necessary being may
be "outside" the world. This addition to the thesis
of the antinomy violates the sense of the antinomy.
The "irregularity" in the structure of the fourth
antinomy cannot be "corrected" without changing the
sense of the original antinomy.
Several points of significance are raised by the
thesis' failure to include the possibility of a neces-
sary being "outside" the world. First, the structure
of the four antinomies cannot be adequately under-
stood as a simple conflict between two senses of the
unconditioned. As the fourth antinomy shows, there
are in fact three definitions of the unconditioned
which play a part in the origin and development of
the antinomies. Second, it was suggested in Chapter
One that the thesis of the fourth antinomy is the only
thesis or antithesis to employ a direct proof. In a
sense then, it is the only argument which is operating

61
correctly, i.e., avoiding the use of apagogical proofs.
Third, it is of significance to recall that the fourth
antinomy is patterned on the category of modality within
Kant's systematic. As such, the fourth antinomy is to
provide no new content for the idea of the uncondi-
tioned. It is to consider the relation of this idea
to our faculties of knowledge. The thesis of the
fourth antinomy does not and cannot make claims about
a necessary being "outside" the world for that would
be to surpass its modal function and to advance to
transcendent philosophy. Thus, Caird's rewriting of
the fourth antinomy cannot be textually supported. It
would perhaps be more helpful for understanding the
structure of the antinomies to rewrite the fourth
antinomy by leaving out the denial in the antithesis
of a necessary being "outside" the world, but that
would be to destroy the link between the Antinomies
and the Ideal in Kant's architectonic. Either re-
writing of the antinomy violates the structure of the
antinomy as Kant presents it.

The Structure of the Antinomies

in Al-Azm's Terms
The last section dealt with the structure of the
four theoretical antinomies and their relation to the
idea of the unconditioned. It was shown that con-
trary to Kant's claim, the idea of the unconditioned
has three distinct senses. All three senses of the
unconditioned appear in the arguments of the antin-
omies, although the three senses are only explicitly
defined in the fourth antinomy. The origin of the
antinomies can be located in the idea of the uncon-
ditioned, even though the uniqueness of the fourth
antinomy raises a question about the type of conflict
implicitly present in the other antinomies. The at-
tempt was made in the last section to explain the
uniqueness of the fourth antinomy in the following two
ways. First, it may be that the three senses of the
unconditioned that are explicit in the fourth antinomy
are implicit in the third antinomy. In this case,
the fourth antinomy does not raise a new problem but
only makes explicit an implicit problem. Second, it
may be that the modal character of the fourth antin-
omy is responsible for the lack of symmetry in that
antinomy. Perhaps the peculiar structure of the
fourth antinomy is necessitated by its function as a
modal conflict between cosmological ideas. In this
section, Sadik Al-Azm's discussion of the fourth an-
tinomy will be brought forward as a further illustra-

62
tion of the uniqueness and significance of the fourth
theoretical antinomy.
The consideration will center on Al-Azm's account
of the fourth antinomy as it appears in his book The
Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies. Al-
Azm's discussion of the fourth antinomy will be de-
veloped in the following three steps. First, it will
be seen that Al-Azm notes the lack of symmetry between
the thesis and the antithesis of the fourth antinomy
and that he enumerates the three senses of the uncon-
ditioned that are raised by the fourth antinomy.
Second, the structure of the fourth antinomy will be
discussed using Al-Azm's terms as a "cosmological" and
not a "theological" argument. Third, Al-Azm's
distinction between cosmological arguments and theo-
logical arguments will be used to suggest yet another
way of describing the structure of the four theoretical
antinomies.
It is clear in Al-Azm's discussion of the fourth
antinomy that he recognizes three meanings of "a neces-
sary being" that occur in the fourth antinomy. Al-
Azm does not specifically relate these three defini-
tions of "a necessary being" to the idea of the un-
conditioned, because Al-Azm has not located the origin
of the antinomies in this idea. For Al-Azm, it is not
crucial to relate the structure of the fourth antinomy
(its three senses of "a necessary being") to the origin
of the fourth antinomy (in the Leibniz-Clarke debate).
For the present investigation, it is crucial to ob-
serve that the structure of the fourth antinomy (its
three senses of "a necessary being") is due entirely
to the origin of the fourth antinomy (in the three
senses of the unconditioned). The advantage of this
method as opposed to Al-Azm's is that the structure of
all four antinomies can be graphically explained as
resulting from a single ambiguity (in the idea of the
unconditioned).

Al-Azm summarizes the proof of the thesis of the

fourth antinomy as follows:
Some analysis of the final conclusion is
needed here. It seems to be saying that
'something absolutely necessary is con-
tained in the world' and that this can
have two senses: (a) that the series
of alterations forming the world is
'necessary' as a whole; (b) that at

63
 least one item of the series is neces-
sary and the remaining items are causally
dependent on it.51
Clearly, the two senses of "a necessary being" in the
thesis correspond to the two definitions of the uncon-
ditioned that Kant gives at A417/B445 (except for the
addition in the thesis of the phrase "in the world").
What Al-Azm specifies as two senses of "a necessary
being" function also as two senses of the idea of the
unconditioned.
Al-Azm states that the proof of the antithesis of
the fourth antinomy proceeds in two parts:
The first part demonstrates that "an
absolutely necessary being nowhere ex-
ists in the world.' I shall call this
part (P3). The second part demonstrates
that an absolutely necessary being no-
where exists 'outside the world as its
cause.' This I shall call (P4).52
Thus, Al-Azm observes that the antithesis denies both
that an absolutely necessary being exists "in the
world" and that it exists "outside the world as its
cause." From this, Al-Azm concludes:
Now P4 in the proof of the antithesis
is a refutation of the claim of those
Newtonians who want to hold (as good
Christians) that the necessary being
exists outside the world. P4 is not
immediately directed to any explicit
claim made by the thesis itself, for
the thesis insists that the necessary
being is in the world.53
Al-Azm notes that the antithesis includes a denial
that does not correspond to any claim made by the
thesis. The antithesis raises the possibility (and
rejects it) of a necessary being outside the world.
Thus, three senses of "a necessary being" become ex-
plicit in the fourth antinomy and that means similarly
that three senses of the unconditioned are suggested.
Al-Azm confirms the description of the conflict and
the structural uniqueness of the fourth antinomy that
was offered in the last section.
The second part of Al-Azm's discussion of the

64
fourth antinomy has to do with its nature as a
"cosmological" argument. Al-Azm states that "Kant's
concern in the fourth antinomy is with a cosmological
and not a theological problem."54 Consequently, the
"main concern, then, is with a cosmological and not a
theological unconditioned."55 it is here that Al-Azm
implies that what is at issue in the fourth antinomy
is not solely the absolutely necessary being but the
unconditioned. This justifies the previous identifi-
cation of the three senses of the necessary being with
the three senses of the unconditioned.
Al-Azm defines theological arguments as arguments
which deal with an unconditioned which is not a part
of the phenomenal world but is separate from it.56 i n
contrast, the arguments of the fourth antinomy (which
are cosmological, according to Al-Azm) treat the un-
conditioned under consideration as a part of the phe-
nomenal world and not separate from it.57 Al-Azm
further distinguishes between "pure" and "impure" forms
of the cosmological argument. He says, "The pure form
does not settle, strictly speaking,the question of
whether the necessary being is a part of the world or
distinct from it."58 Presumably then, the impure form
of the cosmological argument does settle the question
whether the necessary being is a part of the world or
distinct from it. Al-Azm claims that the thesis of
the fourth antinomy utilizes the impure form of the
cosmological argument, which leads to the conclusion
that the necessary being is a part of the world and
not distinct from it.59

The issue now is: Of what significance are these

distinctions made by Al-Azm? It would appear that they
are of most significance if they can function as names
for the different senses of the unconditioned. That
is, these types of arguments (theological, pure cos-
mological, and impure cosmological) deal with different
senses of the unconditioned. The object of a theolog-
ical argument is an unconditioned which is outside the
world. The object of a pure form of the cosmological
argument is an unconditioned which is either in the
world or outside the world. Finally, the object of an
impure form of the cosmological argument is an uncon-
ditioned which is in the world.

This distinction between three types of arguments

does enable Al-Azm to reveal the cosmological nature
of the fourth antinomy. He states that the thesis of
the fourth antinomy is an impure form of the cosmo-

65
logical argument (for it, the unconditioned is in the
world). The antithesis can be described as a pure form
of the cosmological argument in that it makes no attempt
to decide whether the unconditioned is in the world or
outside the world. The antithesis denies the existence
of both types of unconditioned. A positive result of
distinguishing between these types of arguments is that
Al-Azm is capable of explaining the cosmological nature
of the fourth antinomy. Al-Azm indicates, by means of
these types of arguments, how the fourth antinomy
(which raises the possibility of an unconditioned out-
side the world) remains cosmological in the sense Kant
intends the antinomies to be cosmological.
However, the introduction of these types of argu-
ments serves in a way to mask the real conflict in the
fourth antinomy. Part of the difficulty is due to the
overlapping definitions of the three types of argu-
ments. That is, a theological unconditioned is an
unconditioned outside the world, a cosmological uncon-
ditioned in its pure form is an unconditioned that is
either in the world or outside the world, and a cosmo-
logical unconditioned in its impure form is an uncon-
ditioned in the world. The cosmological unconditioned
in its pure form seems to be merely a disjunction be-
tween the cosmological unconditioned in its impure
form and the theological unconditioned. In other
words, the pure form of the cosmological argument
leaves open the question whether the unconditioned is
a cosmological unconditioned in its impure form or a
theological unconditioned. The problem still confront-
ing Al-Azm is why an argument is called cosmological
in its pure form when it concerns an unconditioned
which may be either cosmological in its impure form or
theological (i.e., when the unconditioned may be either
in the world or outside the world).

Finally, these types of arguments distinguished

by Al-Azm facilitate a description of the structure
of all four of the theoretical antinomies. Since
Al-Azm does at one point refer to the object of a
theological argument as a theological unconditioned,
it seems legitimate to apply his distinction of the
types of arguments to the unconditioned objects of the
theoretical antinomies. In short, since this distinc-
tion between types of cosmological and theological
arguments aids in understanding the fourth antinomy,
then perhaps it can also aid in understanding the first
three antinomies.

66
 Al-Azm himself does not apply this framework con-
cerning types of arguments to the arguments in the
first three antinomies. If this framework is applied
to the arguments in the antinomies, it becomes clear
that the arguments in the antitheses are the most dif-
ficult to explain. The easiest representation of the
structure of the four antinomies would be:
One
Thesis: Pure cosmological argument
Antithesis: Pure cosmological argument
Two
Thesis: Pure cosmological argument
Antithesis: Pure cosmological argument
Three
Thesis: Pure cosmological argument
Antithesis: Pure cosmological argument
Four
Thesis: Impure cosmological argument
Antithesis: Pure cosmological argument
Presumably, Al-Azm would structure the types of argu-
ments in the antinomies in this way if he had carried
his distinction through to all the antinomies. This rep-
resentation is certainly helpful in revealing the
cosmological nature of the antinomies. It also re-
veals to some extent the uniqueness of the fourth
antinomy. With regard to the first three antinomies,
the diagram seems to correctly show that the question
whether the unconditioned is in the world or outside
the world has not been decided or even raised.
Yet, at least two problems appear to be covered
over by this diagram of the arguments in the antin-
omies. First, as previously mentioned, the antithesis
of the fourth antinomy specifies that no necessary
being exists in the world or outside the world as its
cause. It is peculiar that the argument in the fourth
antithesis is a pure form of the cosmological argument,
even though what it denies is the existence of both a
cosmological unconditioned (in its impure form) and a
theological unconditioned. It would seem that the
uniqueness of the fourth antithesis in raising ex-
plicit mention of a theological unconditioned is over-
looked by calling it a pure form of the cosmological
argument.

67
 Second, it seems probably mistaken to refer to
the antitheses of the first three antinomies as pure
forms of the cosmological argument. A pure form of
the cosmological argument is one in which it is left
undecided whether the unconditioned is in the world
or outside the world. Technically, it is true that the
antitheses leave it undecided whether the unconditioned
is in the world or outside the world. In fact, the
antitheses do not even consider the question relating
to the location of the unconditioned. However, the
unconditioned referred to in the first three antitheses
is the idea of a completed, infinite series. As pre-
viously discussed, the unconditioned in this sense as
the infinite series cannot be outside the world be-
cause that would involve a logical contradiction.60
For all practical purposes, the unconditioned as a
completed, infinite series (i.e., the unconditioned of
the first three antitheses) is an unconditioned in the
world. While it is true that the arguments in the
antitheses leave open the question of the location of
the unconditioned, it is also the case that the un-
conditioned they refer to can only be in the world.
(The same is essentially true of the theses of the
first three antinomies. Technically, the first three
theses leave it undecided whether the unconditioned is
in the world or outside the world, but practically
speaking the theses can only refer to an unconditioned
in the world, with the possible exception of the third
antinomy's thesis. )*>1 in a sense then, the first three
antitheses (and theses) may more adequately be called
impure forms of the cosmological argument.

Thus, Al-Azm's attempt to describe the structure

of the fourth antinomy in terms of the type of argu-
ment it uses has mixed results. Certainly, Al-Azm's
reference to cosmological and theological arguments
may prove helpful in defining the nature of the object
around which the conflict in the antinomies develops.
Al-Azm has at least noted the significance of the
phrases "in the world" and "outside the world" and he
has alluded to the structural uniqueness of the fourth
antinomy. Beyond that, his distinction of the three
types of arguments proves to be not very illuminating
with regard to the four theoretical antinomies as a
whole. The distinction appears to create difficulties
of its own without resolving the difficulties already
present in the antinomies. Consequently, Al-Azm's dis-
cussion of the fourth antinomy is most helpful in its
statement of the conflict and least helpful in its
creation of new terminology to explain the conflict.

68
 The So-Called Identity of the
Third and Fourth Antinomies
In this final section of Chapter Two, discussion
will center on the third and fourth theoretical antin-
omies. So far, the object of this chapter has been to
suggest a framework for understanding the origin and
the structure of the theoretical antinomies. With
this end in mind, discussion centered on the idea of
the unconditioned and the problems raised by the
peculiar structure of the fourth antinomy. This sec-
tion will attempt to respond to a complaint often
raised against the Kantian antinomies, namely, that
the third and fourth antinomies are identical. This
objection that the third and fourth antinomies are
identical is voiced by Norman Kemp Smith and Jonathan
Bennett and it is to their claims that this section
will respond.
Norman Kemp Smith says:
That the proofs of the fourth antinomy
are identical with those of the third is
due to the fact that Kant, under the
stress of his architectonic, is striving
to construct four antinomies while only
three are really distinguishable. The
third and fourth antinomies coincide as
formulations of the problem whether or
not the conditioned implies, and orig-
inates in, the unconditioned. The pre-
cise determination of this unconditioned,
whether as free causality or as a neces-
sary being, or in any other way, is a
further problem, and does not properly
fall within the scope of the cosmological
inquiries, which are alone in place in
this dividion of the Critique.°2

One way of responding to Kemp Smith's charge that the

third and fourth antinomies are identical formula-
tions of the same problem is to acknowledge that there
is some truth to his claim. The problem that the
third and fourth antinomies formulate, as Kemp Smith
sees it, seems to be whether or not the conditioned
implies the unconditioned. Kemp Smith maintains that
the determination of this unconditioned is outside the
scope of the antinomies, but the problem for the an-
tinomies is the debate whether there is an uncondi-
tioned. If this is a correct assessment of Kemp

69
Smith's definition of the problem, then Kemp Smith is
right that the third and fourth antinomies coincide as
statements of the same problem. In fact, he would be
correct in concluding that all four antinomies are
formulations of the issue whether or not there is an
unconditioned. Kemp Smith is correct insofar as all
the antinomies are formulations of this search for the
unconditioned.
However, an objection can be made to Kemp Smith's
claim that the determination of the unconditioned lies
outside the scope of the antinomies. By this, he im-
plies that the problem at the heart of the antinomies
is not the definition of the unconditioned but only the
question whether or not the conditioned requires the
unconditioned. Kemp Smith is essentially correct thafT
the determination of the unconditioned lies beyond the
scope of reason in the antinomies. But, he is wrong
in inferring that because the definition of the uncon-
ditioned lies beyond the scope of the antinomies that
the antinomies cannot have as their object this defini-
tion. The antinomies are characterized by dialectical
illusion, and thus there is nothing to prevent the
antinomies from treating a problem that lies beyond
their scope. In other words, Kemp Smith's statement
of the problem grounding the third and fourth antin-
omies does not go far enough. In fact, as Kant points
out, the problem in the antinomies arises from an am-
biguity in the definition of the unconditioned. Since
the antinomies concern not just whether there is an
unconditioned but also what defines the unconditioned,
the third and fourth antinomies can be distinguished by
their attempts to define the unconditioned.

Jonathan Bennett reiterates Kemp Smith's basic

claim that the third and fourth antinomies are iden-
tical. Bennett says about the fourth antinomy that
"what seems to emerge is virtually a re-run of the
third antinomy."63 He claims that "the fourth an-
tinomy adds nothing useful to the third."^4 In fact,
however, several points can be raised which suggest
a clear distinction between the third and fourth
antinomies. These points will be discussed here in
order to reveal the error in Kemp Smith's and Bennett's
positions.
First, a specific difference between the third and
fourth antinomies has already been indicated in their
definitions of the unconditioned. Briefly, it was
shown that the fourth antinomy raised the possibility
of three types of unconditioned whereas the first three
70
antinomies made explicit only two types of uncon-
ditioned. The fourth antinomy is unique in that it
distinguishes between a highest member of the series
outside the world and a highest member of the series
in the world. This distinction is not present in the
third antinomy. In addition, Friedrich Grimmlinger
apparently alludes to this difference between the third
and the fourth antinomies when he distinguishes be-
tween the ontological problem of the third antinomy and
the theological problem of the fourth antinomy.65
In a sense, however, the Observation on the Third
Antinomy alludes to this distinction between a part of
the series in the world and a part of the series out-
side the world. Insofar as this distinction is im-
plicit in the third antinomy, it can be said that the
third and fourth antinomies are similar but not iden-
tical. The Observation on the antithesis of the third
antinomy states that if_ a transcendental power of
freedom were allowed, it would have to exist outside '
the world and not in the world.66 Thus, the antithesis
attempts to locate the force of the thesis' claim in
a highest member of the series outside the world. It
seems clear that the thesis intends to refer indirectly
to both a highest member of the series in the world and
a highest member outside the world.67 This similarity
between the third and fourth antinomies (in raising
the idea of a highest member of the series outside the
world) can apparently be explained by the nature of
the antinomies themselves. The third and fourth an-
tinomies are dynamical, and as such, they allow the
appearance of heterogeneous conditions. ° The signif-
icance of the dynamical nature of the third and fourth
antinomies will be fully discussed in Chapter Three.
For the moment, the dynamical character of the third
and fourth antinomies is sufficient to explain the sim-
ilarity of the antinomies. This similarity between the
antinomies does not negate the previously mentioned dif-
ference between them. The structure of the fourth an-
tinomy is unique and not identical to the third antinomy
in that it explicitly discusses the possibility of a
highest member of the series outside the world.

Second, an important reason for distinguishing

between the third and fourth antinomies will become
evident in Chapter Five. That is, the resolution of
the antinomy of practical reason requires both the
third and fourth antinomies. The establishment of the
concept of the highest good that is achieved by the
resolution of the practical antinomy depends on both

71
the possibility of transcendental freedom and the pos-
sibility of a necessary being. The third and fourth
antinomies cannot be said to be identical because both
are required for the resolution of the practical an-
tinomy.
Thus, the claims made by Kemp Smith and Bennett
that the third and fourth antinomies are identical seem
to result from an oversimplification of the problems
at issue. It is true that the third and fourth an-
tinomies are similar in that both are dynamical in
nature. It does not however follow that these antin-
omies are identical. At least two reasons justify the
attempt to distinguish between the third and the fourth
antinomies. One reason is the uniqueness of the struc-
ture of the fourth antinomy and the second reason is
that both the third and the fourth antinomies play a
crucial role in the resolution of the practical an-
tinomy.
This concludes Chapter Two and the discussion of
the origin and the structure of the theoretical an-
tinomies. The most significant point made by this
chapter, with regard to what is yet to come, is that
the origin of the theoretical antinomies can be lo-
cated in the idea of the unconditioned.

72
 ENDNOTES
A408/B4 35; translation by Norman Kemp Smith,
Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1965).
2
Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 115.

Bennett, p. 115.
4
Sadik J. Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Argu-
ments in the Antinomies (London: Oxford University
Press, 1972).

Al-Azm, p. 3.

Sadik J. Al-Azm, "Absolute Space and Kant's

First Antinomy of Pure Reason," Kant-Studien, 59
(1968), 151-2.
7
Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the
Antinomies, p. 53.
o
Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the
Antinomies, p. 94.
g
Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the
Antinomies, p. 87.

Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the

Antinomies, p. 96.

Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the

Antinomies, p. 108.
12
Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the
Antinomies, p. 119.
13
Gottfried Martin, Kant's Metaphysics and Theory
of Science, trans. P. G. Lucas (Manchester: Man-
chester University Press, 1961), p. 47.
14
Martin, p. 48.
15
Martin, p. 50.
16
W . H. Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1975), pp.
197-8.
73
 17
Heinz Heimsoeth, Transzendentale Dialektik.
Ein Kommentar zu Kants Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, II
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967), 215. He claims:
"The cause of' the antinomy entanglement is . . .
that the claim for unity in the mere idea (for ex-
ample, the size of the world) ends in the uncondi-
tioned." My translation from the German.
18
Walsh, p. 205. Walsh says: "The true source
of the contradictions lies in a premise to which both
parties to the conflict make continuous appeal, a
premise which contains latent contradictions. . . .
The principle of Sufficient Reason is just such a
premise."
19
Nathan Rotenstreich, Experience and Its Sys-
tematization: Studies in Kant (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1972), p. 53.
20
Lothar Schafer, "Zur 'regulativen Funktion1 der
Kantischen Antinomien," Synthese, 23 (1971-2), 108.
21
A409/B436; translation by Kemp Smith.
22
A417/B444; translation by Kemp Smith.
23
See A417/B445; translation by Kemp Smith and the
discussion in subsequent paragraphs.
A417/B445; translation by Kemp Smith.
25
See Rotenstreich's claim on page 61 that the
unconditioned is identified with totality and that
"totality, within the realm of the cosmological ideas, '
because of its very partiality, has the meaning of the
sum of a series."
A418/B446; translation by Kemp Smith. I sup-
plied the bracketed material.
27
Allen W. Wood, "Kant's dialectic," Canadien
Journal of Philosophy, 5 (1975), 611.
28
Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Im-
manuel Kant (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons,
1889), II, 40.
29
Caird, p. 42.

Frederick Ernest England, Kant's Conception of

God (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1929), p. 129.
74
 31
Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique
of Practical Reason (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 183-4.
32
Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 280. The
bracketed material is mine.
33
See Chapter One, footnote 40.
34
See pages 14-5.

See pages 47-53.

36
See pages 49-51.
37
A454/B4 82; translation by Kemp Smith.
38
A453-5/B481-3; translation by Kemp Smith.
39
See, however, P. F. Strawson's claim that the
theses of the third and fourth antinomies have to do
with an unconditioned which is either the whole series
or a part to which all other parts are subordinated.
Their antitheses then deny that there is an uncondi-
tioned. P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An
Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (New York:
Barnes and Noble, 1966), p. 210.
40
See Chapter One, footnote 40.
41
A448-51/B476-9; translation by Kemp Smith.
42
A451/B479; translation by Kemp Smith.
44
43
A219/B266,
A74/B99-100; translation by Kemp
Smith. A415/B442-3; translation by Kemp Smith.
45
A219/B266-7; translation by Kemp Smith.
AC
A456/B484; translation by Kemp Smith.
47
A571/B599; translation by Kemp Smith.
48
Justus Hartnack, Kant's Theory of Knowledge (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967), p. 118.
49
Hartnack, p. 130.
75
 50
Caird, p. 49.

Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the

Antinomies, p. 126.
52
Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the
Antinomies, p. 131.
Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the
Antinomies, p. 136.

Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the

Antinomies, p. 113.

Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the

Antinomies, p. 113.

Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the

Antinomies, p. 113.
57
Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the
Antinomies, p. 113.
58
Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the
Antinomies, p. 114.
59
Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the
Antinomies, p. 114.

See pages 56-7.

See pages 58-9.

r j
Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's
"Critique of Pure Reason" (New York: Humanities Press,
1962), pp. 496-7.
63
Bennett, p. 241.
64
Bennett, p. 241.

Friedrich Grimmlinger, "Die ontologische

Bedeutung der 3. und 4. Antinomie in Kants Kritik der
reinen Vernunft," Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie, 4
(1971), 99, 125.

A451/B479; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique

of Pure Reason

76
 A448-50/B476-8; translation by Kemp Smith,
Critique of Pure Reason.
68
A530/B558; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique
of Pure Reason.

77
78
 CHAPTER III
THE RESOLUTION OF THE FOUR
THEORETICAL ANTINOMIES
In this chapter the discussion will center on
Kant's explanation of the resolution of the four theo-
retical antinomies. The analysis of the resolution of
the antinomies is significant for two reasons. First,
it is crucial to the aims of this investigation that
this second aspect of the antinomies (i.e., their
resolution) be considered. The project of this in-
quiry is to analyze the antinomies of theoretical and
practical reason with the goal of illuminating their
relationship. The two central features of the antin-
omies are their origin and their resolution, and con-
sequently, the discussion of the solution to the theo-
retical antinomies plays a major role in enabling a
comparison between the theoretical and the practical
antinomies to be made. Second, the analysis of the
resolution of the theoretical antinomies is signifi-
cant because it has not been previously treated in
Sadik Al-Azm's work on the antinomies.

Kant states clearly that it is necessary to dis-

cover a solution to the transcendental problems of
reason. He claims that:
transcendental philosophy is unique . . .
in that no question which concerns an
object given to pure reason can be in-
soluble for this same human reason.
Furthermore, Kant says that "the only questions to
which we have the right to demand a sufficient answer
bearing on the constitution of the object . . . are
the cosmological."2 That is, the questions raised in
the antinomies pertaining to the object of reason
(i.e., the unconditioned) are cosmological ideas, and
as such, they must be capable of being resolved.
Kant's claim is that the cosmological questions or an-
tinomies must be resolved since the object of these
questions is an object in idea and is neither an ob-
ject in itself nor an object of a possible experience.

The answer to the cosmological questions must

therefore lie in the idea itself.^ In other words,
since the object of the antinomies is merely an object
in idea, it must be that the resolution to the antin-
omies can be accomplished in the idea. Kant says:
79
 All these questions (antinomies) refer
to an object which can be found nowhere
save in our thoughts, namely, to the
absolutely unconditioned totality of
the synthesis of appearances. . . .
Since such an object is nowhere to be
met with outside our idea, it is not
possible for it to be given. The cause
of failure we must seek in our idea
itself.4

The conflicts present in the antinomies are thus to be

blamed on the idea of the absolutely unconditioned
totality.5 The failure of the cosmological questions
is due to the nature of their object. The object of
the cosmological questions can never be given in a
possible experience, and consequently, the conflicts
that result from treating the idea of the absolutely
unconditioned totality as an object must be resolved
in the idea of this object.
Kant concludes that the resolution of the antin-
omies cannot be accomplished in experience but only in
the idea.^ The resolution of the theoretical antino-
mies is thus closely connected with the origin of the
theoretical antinomies in the idea of the uncondi-
tioned. The origin and the resolution of the antin-
omies do not require separate considerations but are
in fact part of the same problem. The peculiar unity
and the cohesiveness of the antinomies is revealed
when it is shown that both their origin and their
resolution are tied to the idea of the unconditioned.
In accordance with Kant's claim that the resolu-
tion of the antinomies must be found in the idea of
the unconditioned, this chapter will consider how the
resolution can be accomplished in the idea. The three
sections will discuss the resolution of the antinomies
from different perspectives. In essence, each of the
three sections to follow reflects a way of talking
about the problem in the idea of the unconditioned
which gives rise to the conflicts in the antinomies.
Section One reveals how the antinomies are resolved by
pointing to reason's general mistake in the idea of
the unconditioned. Reason mistakenly treats the idea
of the unconditioned as an object in itself and by re-
moving this false assumption the antinomies can be re-
solved. Section Two shows that the conflict of reason
can be resolved by considering the relationship of
reason's idea to the understanding. By recalling the
true relationship between reason and the understanding.
80
the antinomies can be solved. Section Three considers
Kant's distinction between mathematical and dynamical
ideas. This distinction between the two types of cos-
mological ideas provides another framework in which
the resolution of the antinomies can be explained.
The Resolution in Terms of Reason's
General Mistake
- One of the ways that Kant resolves the conflicts
in the antinomies is by pointing out reason's general
mistake in formulating cosmological ideas. Kant calls
this the "Critical Solution" to the cosmological con-
flicts typical of reason.7 The "critical solution" of
the antinomies provides a clear account of reason's
basic error in its cosmological ideas, but it does not
account for or explain the specific solutions to the
antinomies given later on by Kant. That is, the "cri-
tical solution" of the antinomies resolves all four
antinomies by locating an error committed by reason.
This type of solution does not explain why the resolu-
tion of the first two antinomies (both sides are false)
is later shown to be essentially different from the
resolution of the last two antinomies (both sides are
true). For an account of this difference between the
resolutions of the antinomies, Kant depends on the
mathematical/dynamical distinction. Thus, it appears
that neither of these explanations of the solution to
the antinomies is sufficient by itself, but rather, a
full account of the antinomies requires both explana-
tions. Therefore, this explanation of the resolution
of the antinomies in terms of reason's general mistake
offers a partial account of the solution to the antin-
omies .

Kant's "critical solution" is closely tied to the

structure of the antinomies and it involves a recon-
sideration of the type of conflict characteristic of
the antinomies. In the first chapter of this investi-
gation, the claim was made that the conflict evidenced
by the theoretical antinomies was one of logical con-
tradiction. 8 For example, the thesis of the third an-
tinomy states "There is freedom" and the antithesis
states "There is no freedom."9 The diagrams in Chap-
ter I revealed the logical contradiction characteris-
tic of the antinomies. Kant's "critical solution"
must show why this logical contradiction is in fact
not a real contradiction.

The "critical solution" to the antinomies involves

identifying a mistake made by reason which allows the
81
apparent contradictions in the antinomies to arise.
Kant locates the error of reason by challenging the
apparent contradiction between thesis and antithesis.
Kant claims that in fact thesis and antithesis do not
stand to one another as contradictories (analytical
opposites) but as dialectical opposites.1° Thesis and
antithesis are not logically contradictory because
they are based on an inadmissible assumption of reason,
namely, that the sum of all appearances is a thing-in-
itself. H Because the antinomies are grounded in this
mistaken assumption of reason, they can be resolved by
recognizing that reason's regress from the conditioned
to the complete series of conditions and to the uncon-
ditioned is a regulative rule and not a constitutive
principle.12 it remains now to consider in more de-
tail Kant's development of this "critical solution" to
the antinomies.

There seem to be two steps in the "critical solu-

tion" of the antinomies. The first step is essentially
negative, and it involves pointing out reason's general
mistake and, in so doing, eliminating the contradic-
toriness between thesis and antithesis. The second
step restates in a positive way the task and the func-
tion of reason once it is relieved of its misdirected
task in the antinomies.
Kant begins the explanation of reason's general
mistake in the antinomies by denying the apparent con-
tradictoriness of the antinomies. He claims:
If we regard the two propositions,
that the world is infinite in magni-
tude and that it is finite in magni-
tude, as contradictory opposites, we
are assuming that the world, the com-
plete series of appearances, is a
thing in itself. . . . I f , however,
I reject this assumption . . . and
deny that the world is a thing in
itself, the contradictory opposition
of the two assertions is converted into
a merely dialectical opposition.13

If the thesis and antithesis were contradictory oppo-

sites, then one would have to be true and the other
false. But if thesis and antithesis are based on an
inadmissible condition and so are dialectical oppo-
sites, then both may be false.14 As contradictory op-
posites, thesis and antithesis assume that the series
of appearances is either infinite or finite. As
82
dialectical opposites, thesis and antithesis recognize
that the series of appearances may be neither infinite
nor finite since the series is not a thing in itself
apart from the empirical regress of appearances. Rea-
son's mistake therefore is treating its object, i.e.,
the complete series of appearances, as a thing in it-
self rather than the supposed end result of the em-
pirical regress of appearances. In terms more com-
patible with previous chapters, reason's error in the
antinomies arises from mistakenly treating the idea of
the unconditioned as a thing in itself.
Kant states specifically that this "critical solu-
tion" or the antinomies resolves all four antinomies.
He maintains:
What we have said here of the first
cosmological idea . . . applies also
to all the others. The series of con-
ditions is only to be met with in the
regressive synthesis itself, not in
the (field of) appearance viewed as a
thing given in and by itself, prior
to all regress.15

Thus, it cannot be claimed that Kant is referring in

this "critical solution" of the antinomies only to the
first two antinomies. W. H. Walsh, in his article
"The Structure of Kant's Antinomies," recognizes that
formally what goes for the first two
antinomies must go for the other two
as well: on the supposition that the
world of the senses is the only world
and that it exists absolutely, both
parties to the conflict must be dis-
missed. 16
Kant negates the apparent contradiction between thesis
and antithesis by naming them dialectical opposites.
He resolves the antinomies by showing that dialectical
opposites rest on a mistaken assumption, and as such,
both sides can be seen to be false.
Even though Kant later resolves the antinomies in
a different way, it is clear that Kant is here refer-
ring to all four antinomies. In the section on math-
ematical and dynamical ideas, Kant resolves Antinomies
1 and 2 by showing both sides to be false, and he re-
solves Antinomies 3 and 4 by showing both sides to be
true. In this "critical solution," all four antinomies
83
are resolved by revealing their two sides to be false
since they are based on an inadmissible assumption of
reason. There is no real conflict between these two
types of resolutions although they differ. Both types
of resolutions reflect possible Kantian solutions to
the conflicts in the antinomies. In terms of a dis-
tinction previously discussed (inside the world/outside
the world), both resolutions can be correct. It is
true that all the antinomies are resolved when reason
stops treating the series of appearances as a thing in
itself. Both sides of the antinomies are false since
they treat the series of appearances (i.e., an empiri-
cal series) as a thing in itself. If the emphasis is
placed on reason's attempt toconsider an empirical
series (or some part of the series) as a thing in it-
self, then all the antinomies can be resolved in the
same way on the basis of this error. However, if the
emphasis is placed on the uniqueness of the third and
fourth antinomies in raising the possibility of a mem-
ber of the series "outside the series," then a differ-
ent resolution may be suggested. Insofar as the third
and fourth antinomies refer not merely to the series
of appearances but to a member of the series "outside
the series," they state more than can be resolved by
the "critical solution."

The "critical solution" concerns solely the error

of treating the series of appearances (or some part of
the series) as a thing in itself. Since the third and
fourth antinomies also raise the possibility of a mem-
ber of the series "outside the series," they are sub-
ject to another type of resolution (in addition to the
"critical solution"). Thus, there is no real conflict
between the various types of solutions to the antin-
omies. The "critical solution" resolves the antinomies
in terms of a mistaken assumption on the part of rea-
son. The specific mention of a member "outside the
series" in the third and fourth antinomies apparently
necessitates a further resolution of the antinomies in
terms of their nature as mathematical or dynamical
ideas.

Kant concludes this first and essentially negative

step in the "critical solution" with the following
statement:
Thus the antinomy of pure reason in its
cosmological ideas vanishes when it is
shown that it is merely dialectical,
and that it is a conflict due to an
illusion which arises from our applying
84
 to appearances that exist only in our
representations . . . that idea of abso-
lute totality which holds only as a
condition of things in themselves.17
Kant's claim that the resolution of the antinomies de-
pends on dissolving the apparent contradictoriness of
their assertions is restated in other terms by Kuno
Fischer. Fischer states that the logical enigma of the
antinomies is easily solved. He says: "Their opposi-
tions are only contradictory under a false condition;
in reality they are contrary. They do not exclude,
but include, a middle course."18 Fischer's explana-
tion of what is accomplished by the "critical solution"
is that the apparent contradictions in the antinomies
are reduced to contraries, and as such, both sides can
be false.
The second step in the "critical solution" of the
antinomies is to state in positive terms the task and
function of reason so that the recurrence of the an-
tinomies can be prevented. Since reason's general mis-
take in the antinomies is treating its object as a
thing in itself, it follows that reason's attempt to
define and determine its object must be restricted.
Reason's proper task is not the determining of its ob-
ject as a thing in itself but the continuing extension
of the regress from the conditioned to the uncondi-
tioned. Kant states that the principle of reason "is
thus properly only a rule, prescribing a regress in
the series of the conditions of given appearances."19
In short, reason's advance to the unconditioned is
only a regulative rule for the extension of experience,
and it is not a constitutive principle for the exten-
sion of concepts beyond the world of possible experi-
ence. Reason cannot reveal what the unconditioned is
but only how the empirical regress tpward the idea of
this object is to be carried out.20 Thus, reason's
correct task is to continue the empirical regress to-
ward the unconditioned without ever presuming to have
reached the unconditioned.

Kant makes a further point about the nature of

reason's empirical regress and this point can be men-
tioned here although it is tangential to the subject
at issue. He says that
when the whole is given in empirical
intuition, the regress in the series
of its inner conditions proceeds in
infinitum; but when a member only of
85
 the series is given, starting from
which the regress has to proceed to
absolute totality, the regress is
onlv of indeterminate character (in
indefinitum).21

This distinction between types of empirical regress is

significant because the first antinomy (dealing with
the magnitude of the world) is said to involve a re-
gress in indefinitum while the second antinomy (deal-
ing with the division of a whole) involves a regress
in infinitum.22 By means of this distinction Kant in-
dicates that when reason prescribes a rule for the
carrying out of an empirical regress, it is not lim-
ited to a single, univocal rule.
Kant claims that reason's idea of abolute totality
can
do no more than prescribe a rule to
the regressive synthesis in the series
of conditions; and in accordance with
this rule the synthesis must proceed
from the conditioned, through all sub-
ordinate conditions, up to the uncon-
ditioned. Yet it can never reach this
goal, for the absolutely unconditioned
is not to be met with in experience.23
In addition, he concludes:
What therefore alone remains to us is
the validity of the principle of rea-
son as a rule for the continuation and
magnitude of a possible experience;
its invalidity as a constitutive prin-
ciple of appearances (viewed as things)
in themselves has been sufficiently
demons trated.2 4
These two passages summarize both reason's mistake in
the antinomies and reason's proper task. Reason's mis-
take was in treating its idea of the unconditioned as
an object in itself subject to definition by a con-
stitutive principle. In fact, reason's regress to-
ward the unconditioned is only a regulative rule for
the extension of experience and reason can never reach
its presumed object, i.e., the unconditioned. The an-
tinomies are resolved when it is shown that reason's
attempt to define the unconditioned is completely un-
founded. Reason's enterprise in the antinomies was to
86
define its highest object and this attempt takes reason
beyond its proper scope. The "critical solution" of
the antinomies points out that reason's endeavor to
define the unconditioned is misguided and thus that the
antinomies reflect reason's misinterpretation of its
task. The identification of reason's mistake (in as-
suming it is able to define the unconditioned) facili-
tates the "critical" resolution of the antinomies.
Both sides of the antinomies are false because in both
cases reason has attempted to define the unconditioned
which in fact takes reason beyond its proper task.
The Resolution in Terms of Reason's
Conformity to the Understanding
Reason will again be treated in this section in
light of the proper scope of its task. The resolution
of the antinomies can be explained in terms of reason's
proper relationship to the understanding. The relation
between reason and the understanding provides a basis
for evaluating the error present in reason's idea of
the unconditioned. It will be shown here that the
resolution of the antinomies is possible because of the
fact that reason's idea of the unconditioned fails to
correspond to any concept of the understanding.
Kant claims that reason's task in the employment
of its ideas is not to contribute to the knowledge of
objects. Reason's goal is not to aid the understanding
in its knowledge of empirical objects. Reason func-
tions not as a partner of the understanding but as a
guide for the understanding. In fact, Kant says that
since the unity of reason in mere ideas "involves a
synthesis according to rules, it must conform to the
understanding."25 The ideas of reason contribute
nothing to the understanding's determination of ob-
jects, but they can determine how the understanding is
to be employed in dealing with experience in its total-
ity. Kant concludes that even if the transcendental
ideas

cannot determine any object, they may

yet, in a fundamental and unobserved
fashion, be of service to the under-
standing as a canon for its extended
and consistent employment.^6
The ideas of reason thus guide the continued employment
of the understanding.

87
 With this in mind, reason's proper task in
the antinomies cannot be to define the uncondi-
tioned except insofar as this idea is a possible
object of experience, an object for the understand-
ing. Reason's aim is not to constitute objects,
and thus if the idea of the unconditioned cannot
be an object for the understanding then reason has
surpassed its proper task of guiding the employ-
ment of the understanding. Reason has presumably
erred in the antinomies if it claims to have de-
fined the object of its idea rather than to have
provided a rule for the regressive synthesis of
the series of conditions (to be carried out by
the understanding).
It is clear then that the point to be made
in this section is essentially the same as that
made in the last section. Both of these sections
suggest that the error in the idea of the uncon-
ditioned makes possible the resolution of the an-
tinomies. In both of these sections, the antino-
mies are resolved by specifying the mistake in
reason's idea of the unconditioned. Both of these
resolutions point out that the object of the cosmo-
logical ideas is an impossible object since it can-
not be an object of a possible experience. Because
the object is only the object of an idea, it has no
validity as an object of a possible experience.
Thus, the resolutions presented in these two sec-
tions state that^the antinomies are resolved when
it is revealed that they are based on the idea of
an impossible and empty object, i

The resolutions expounded in this and the pre-

vious section are similar in that both ground the
solution to the antinomies in the mistaken idea of
the unconditioned. Yet, the resolution to be dis-
cussed in this section differs from the previous
resolution because of the unique way it points to
the error in the idea of the unconditioned. Although
the conclusion here is the same as that in Section
One, the reasons for drawing the conclusion are
basically different. The "critical solution" to
the antinomies set forth in Section One showed the
falsity of the idea of the unconditioned by destroy-
ing the apparent contradictoriness of the antino-
mies. Reason's false assumption about the idea of
the unconditioned was revealed by eliminating the
contradictoriness of the antinomies and by specifying

88
reason's proper task. In this section, the falsity
of the object of reason will be shown in terms of
reason's proper relation to the understanding.
Both methods of resolving the antinomies point to
the error in the idea of the unconditioned. Yet,
the "critical solution" accomplishes the resolu-
tion by showing that there is no contradiction due
to reason's false assumption about the nature of
its object. The solution set forth in this section
accomplishes the resolution by exposing the error
in the idea of the unconditioned in terms of reason's
proper relation to the, understanding.
The antinomies concern reason's attempt to de-
fine its object.; Since reason is said to function
as a guide for the understanding, it is possible
to consider how the understanding views the object
of reason. This discussion will reveal that the
relationship between reason and the understanding
is in a sense violated by reason's attempt to define
its object, and thus reason's project in the antino-
mies surpasses its proper function. Both sides of
the antinomies must be false since the object of
reason's idea cannot be an object of a possible ex-
perience (i.e., cannot be an object of the under-
standing) .
Kant states clearly that the error in the an-
tinomies is located in reason's idea of the uncon-
ditioned which violates the proper relationship be-
tween reason and the understanding./ In light of
reason's true relation to the understanding, the
idea of the unconditioned must be dismissed as pro-
posing an impossible object. Kant says:
If therefore, in dealing with a cos-
mological idea, I were able to ap-
preciate beforehand that whatever
view may be taken of the unconditioned
in the successive synthesis of appear-
ances , it must either be too large or
too small for any concept of the under-
standing, I should be in a position to
understand that since the cosmological
idea has no bearing save upon an ob-
ject of experience which has to be in
conformity with a possible concept of
the understanding, it must be entirely
empty and without meaning; for its

89
 object, view it as we may, cannot be
made to agree with it.27
In short, the idea of the unconditioned that reason
offers in the antinomies is either too large or
too small for any concept of the understanding.
Reason cannot properly define objects, and thus if
its idea of the unconditioned corresponds to no
concept of the understanding, then the idea must
be rejected as meaningless. The antinomies are re-
solved when it is shown that the idea on which they
are grounded is either too large or too small for
any concept of the understanding. As Kant states,
"the fault lies with the idea, in being too large
or too small for that 2to which it is directed, namely,
possible experience." ^
Kant's assertion that the idea of the uncondi-
tioned is too large or too small for a concept of
the understanding is not merely stated in such gen-
eral terms. In this resolution of the antinomies,
Kant is not content to point out that reason's basic
error is the failure of its idea to correspond to a
concept of the understanding. Instead, reason's
idea is shown to be too large and too small for the
understanding in its claims in the antinomies. This
explicit illustration of reason's failure in the
antinomies raises an apparently insoluble problem.
At best, the problem raised by identifying reason's
idea as too large or too small for the understanding
serves to emphasize the uniqueness of the fourth an-
tinomy.

Each antinomy is treated separately by Kant in

terms of how it reveals that reason's idea is too large
or too small for the understanding. In the first an-
tinomy, the claim of the thesis that the world has a
beginning and is limited in space is too small for the
concept of the understanding.^9 This idea of a finite
and limited world is too small for the understanding
because it suggests the world is limited by something
and the law of the empirical employment of the under-
standing requires the regress to continue to this
higher condition. The antithesis of the first antin-
omy claims that the world has no beginning and is un-
limited in space. This idea of reason is too large
for any concept of the understanding because it implies
an infinite regress which in turn is too large for any
possible empirical concept.

90
 The second and third antinomies follow the same
pattern. The theses of the second and the third an-
tinomies, like that of the first antinomy, make claims
about the idea of the unconditioned which are too
small for any empirical concept of the understanding.
In the first three theses of the antinomies, reason
defines the idea of the unconditioned in a way which
prematurely cuts off the empirical regress in the
series of conditions. The antithesis of the second
and the third antinomies, like that of the first an-
tinomy, suggest that the unconditioned involves an in-
finite regress, and as such, the idea of this uncondi-
tioned is too ,large for any concept of the understand-
ing. In the antitheses of the first three antinomies,
the regress of conditions is said to be infinite and
this infinite regress is too large to be the object of
any concept of the understanding. Briefly, Kant sug-
gests that the first three antinomies fail because the
idea contained in the theses is too small to be a con-
cept of the understanding and the idea contained in
the antitheses is too large to be a concept of the un-
derstanding.

The difficulty that arises with regard to this

resolution of the antinomies has to do with the fourth
antinomy. The pattern so far established (in the
first three antinomies) is that the cosmological idea
in the thesis is too small to be a concept and the
cosmological idea in the antithesis is too large to be
a concept. The fourth antinomy proceeds in the follow-
ing way. The claim of the thesis that there is a
necessary being in the world is said to be too large
for a concept of the understanding. The claim of the
antithesis that there is no necessary being is said to
be too small for any concept. As Kant says:

If we admit an absolutely necessary

being . . . we set it in a time in-
finitely remote from any given point
of time. . . . But such an existence
is then too large for our empirical
concept. . . . If, again,we hold that
everything belonging to the world
(whether as conditioned or as condi-
tion) is contingent, any and every
given existence is too small for our
concept.30
Thus, the fourth antinomy is resolved when its thesis
is shown to be too large to be a concept and its an-
tithesis is shown to be too small to be a concept.
91
 The fourth antinomy is distinct from the other
three. In the first three antinomies, the idea in the
thesis is too small to be a concept whereas the idea
in the antithesis is too large to be a concept. In
the fourth antinomy, the idea in the thesis is too
large to be a concept while the idea in the antithesis
is too small to be a concept. The fourth antinomy is
shown to be the reverse of the previous three. That
is, the idea of the unconditioned in the fourth antin-
omy manifests a relationship to the understanding un-
like the relations illustrated in the first three an-
tinomies . it is true that all four antinomies are re-
solved when reason's idea is shown to correspond to no
concept. Yet, it is undeniably more difficult to draw
any general conclusions about reason's relation to
the understanding due to the peculiarity evidenced by
the fourth antinomy.
Some attempt must be made to account for why the
claims of the fourth antinomy are too large (thesis)
and too small (antithesis) for the understanding
whereas the claims of the first three antinomies are
too small (theses) and too large (antitheses) for the
understanding. Kant himself does not notice or com-
ment on this apparent uniqueness of the fourth antinomy.
Kant's commentators are similarly of no help in illumi-
nating the reversal of the too small/too large designa-
tions in the fourth antinomy. Heinz Heimsoeth, in his
discussion of this section of the first Critique, does
not mention that in the fourth antinomy the too small/
too large designations are reversed.31 Jonathan
Bennett observes that the too small/too large designa-
tions are reversed in the case of the fourth antinomy
but he offers no possible explanation of why this is
the case.32 Norman Kemp Smith, in his discussion of
this section of the first Critique, omits mention of
the fourth antinomy so that the problem at issue cannot
even be raised.33 T. D. Weldon summarizes the point
of the too large/too small distinction but he does 4not
specifically relate it to each of the antinomies.
Again, for Weldon, the problem that the fourth antinomy
precipitates cannot even be raised.

For this investigation the fact that the fourth

antinomy relates to the understanding in a different
way than do the first three antinomies is a point of
structural interest but has no effect on the topics in
question. Even though there seems to be no systematic
way to account for the uniqueness of the fourth antin-
omy, two substantial conclusions follow from this dis-
cussion. First, unlike many commentaries on the
92
antinomies, this account has at least raised the prob-
lem of the fourth antinomy. The apparent inconsis-
tency in Kant's discussion of the antinomies as being
too large or too small for the understanding is re-
vealed in the fourth antinomy. Although the position
of the fourth antinomy within this framework of the
solution to the antinomies cannot be explained, it
does significantly reinforce the uniqueness of the
fourth antinomy as discussed in Chapter Two.35 i n
Chapter Two, it was suggested that the fourth antinomy
occupies a unique position in that its structure does
not reveal strict contradiction and in that it ex-
plicitly raises the possibility of a necessary being
"outside the world." The suggestion that the fourth
antinomy is unique is supported by this section that
resolves the antinomies in terms of the too large/too
small designations. Since the claims of the fourth
antinomy are related to the understanding in a differ-
ent way than the claims of the other three antinomies
are related to the understanding, the uniqueness of
the fourth antinomy must be treated as a point well
established.

A second accomplishment of this section has been

to explain the resolution of the antinomies in terms
of reason's conformity to the understanding. Regard-
less of the particular problem raised by the fourth
antinomy, Kant's discussion of this solution to the
antinomies remains of interest. The too large/too
small distinction provides a way of explaining reason's
error in the antinomies. Both sides of the antinomies
are false because reason's mistaken idea of the un-
conditioned leads reason into an improper relation to
the understanding. This section thus serves to em-
phasize and confirm the resolution to the antinomies
offered in Section One. Both of these sections de-
scribe a resolution to the antinomies in which all the
claims of the antinomies are false since they rest on
an error inherent in reason's idea of the uncondi-
tioned.

The Resolution in Terms of the

Mathematical/Dynamical
Distinction

The resolution of the antinomies in terms of the

matheitiatical/dynamical distinction is the third type
of solution to be suggested by Kant. The first two
ways of resolving the antinomies have in common the
claim that both sides of all the antinomies are false.
The first solution to the antinomies eliminates the
93
apparent contradiction between assertions by pointing
to the error in reason's idea of the unconditioned.
Both sides of the antinomies are false because of
reason's mistaken idea of the unconditioned. Similarly,
the second solution to the antinomies shows that reason
in its idea of the unconditioned stands in an improper
relation to the understanding. Reason's idea of the
unconditioned, which is the object of the antinomies,
is either too large or too small for any concept of the
understanding. Again, both sides of the antinomies are
false since in them reason does not stand in conformity
with the understanding. The third resolution of the
antinomies will be shown here to be essentially differ-
ent from the previous two solutions. Unlike the first
two resolutions, this solution in terms of the mathe-
matical/dynamical distinction will not reveal both
sides of all the antinomies to be false. Before turn-
ing to this resolution of the antinomies in terms of
the mathematical/dynamical distinction, it is possible
to question how Kant accounts for the difference be-
tween this resolution and the previous two. How does
Kant explain the fact that he gives two basically dif-
ferent solutions to the antinomies? (See, however,
D. P. Dryer's claim that Kant's only solution to the
antinomies is that both thesis and antithesis are
false.)36 It is of interest to consider why there are
two different resolutions to the antinomies, namely,
one which shows both sides to be false and one which
shows that both sides are false in Antinomies 1 and 2
but that both sides are true in Antinomies 3 and 4.

For the moment, it is only necessary to consider

Kant's own explanation for why these two types of
solutions both offer viable resolutions for the antin-
omies in spite of their difference. At the end of
this section, further attention will be paid to the
attempts of Kant's commentators to account for the two
types of solutions. Kant himself recognizes that the
statement of a resolution in terms of the mathematical/
dynamical distinction presents a second way of re-
solving the conflicts in the antinomies. Kant ap-
parently reconciles these two types of solutions to
the antinomies without denigrating either. The first
type of solution (both sides are false) resolves the
antinomies under the assumption that the conditions
are homogeneous with (stand in the world with) the
conditioned. The second type of solution (both sides
are false in Antinomies 1 and 2 and both sides are true
in Antinomies 3 and 4) resolves the antinomies under
the assumption that the conditions may not be homoge-
neous with (stand in the world with) the conditioned.
94
Two different solutions to the antinomies are evident
depending on the nature of the conditions for any given
conditioned.
Kant explains the two types of solutions in the
following passages.
In representing the antinomy of pure
reason, through all the transcendental
ideas, in tabular form, and in showing
that the ground of this conflict and
the only means of removing it is by
declaring both the opposed assertions
to be false, we have represented the
conditions as, in all cases, standing
to the conditioned in relations of
space and time. . . . On this view all
the dialectical representations of
totality, in the series of conditions
for a given conditioned, are throughout
of the same character. . . . Thus arose the
difficulty . . . that reason made the
series either too long or too short for
the understanding.37

Hitherto it has not been necessary

to take account of this distinction
[between a mathematical and a dynamical
synthesis of appearances]; for just as
we have been conforming to conditions
within the (field of) appearance, so in
the two mathematical-transcendental
ideas the only object we have had in mind
is object as appearance. But now that
we are proceeding to consider how far
dynamical concepts of the understanding
are adequate to the idea of reason, the
distinction becomes of importance, and
opens up to us an entirely new view of
the suit in which reason is implicated.3 8

The distinction between mathematical and dynamical

ideas gives rise to a new way of resolving the con-
flicts in the antinomies. Kant claims that the first
type of solution to the antinomies implicitly assumes
that the unconditioned stands in space and time like
the conditioned. The first type of solution correctly
shows both sides to be false in that the unconditioned
treated as appearance is either too large or too small
for the understanding. In simpler terms, in the first

95
solution, both ideas of reason are false due to their
inability to conform to the understanding.
The two types of solutions to the antinomies are
accounted for by Kant in terms of the nature of the
conditions in their regressive series. Kant says that
the first type of solution considered the unconditioned
to be homogeneous with the conditioned whereas the dis-
tinction between mathematical and dynamical ideas makes
possible the second solution wherein the unconditioned
may be heterogeneous with the conditioned. The first
solution applies to the antinomies insofar äs they as-
sume that the world of appearances is the only world.
If the world of appearances is treated as the world in
itself, then the regress of conditions can arrive only
at an unconditioned which itself appears in space and
time. On the other hand, the mathematical/dynamical
distinction allows for the possibility of an uncondi-
tioned "outside" the series of appearances. Kant con-
cludes that both types of solutions operate in such a
way as to resolve the antinomies. Both sides of the
antinomies are false if the unconditioned must be an
appearance because, as such, it would be too large or
too small for the understanding. The second solution
claims that both sides of the dynamical antinomies may
be true since they allow the unconditioned to be "out-
side" the empirical series.

More specifically, Kant grounds these two types of

solutions in his earlier discussion of the principles
of the understanding. The principles of the under-
standing are either mathematical or dynamical. The
dynamical antinomies which correspond to the dynamical
principles have two resolutions due to the ambiguity
of their object as defined by the dynamical principles.
The principles of the understanding fall into two
groups: the mathematical (concerned with the intuition
of appearances) and the dynamical (concerned with the
existence of appearances). Kant says that the latter
do not contain "that 39immediate evidence which is pecu-
liar to the former." The mathematical principles
"allow of intuitive certainty" while the dynamical
principles allow only a "discursive certainty."40 The
mathematical principles (i.e., the axioms and the an-
ticipations) have to do with the possibility of ap-
pearances . The axioms and the anticipations are prin-
ciples which can bring into being or constitute a
priori intuition. The dynamical principles (i.e., the
analogies and the postulates) have to do with the pos-
sibility of experience and they are unable to
96
constitute experience by bringing into being the exis-
tence of appearances. Thus, the mathematical princi-
ples are constitutive while the dynamical principles
are only regulative.41
The point is that mathematical principles are able
to provide rules for the constitution of empirical ap-
pearances. Dynamical principles can provide rules for
the synthesis or the unity of experience. The dynami-
cal principles attempt to order and connect empirical
appearances so that their existence falls under the\
rules of experience. Clearly, the mathematical and
the dynamical principles are distinguishable in terms
of their functions. The mathematical principles con-
stitute appearances and the dynamical principles regu-
late the existence of appearances under rules for the
possibility of experience.
The significance of this discussion in the Ana-
lytic of mathematical and dynamical principles is that
it accounts for the two types of solutions Kant later
offers for the antinomies.^ The principles of the
understanding obviously correspond to the theoretical
antinomies in that the mathematical/dynamical distinc-
tion is characteristic of both. Even more, the prin-
ciples of the understanding indicate why the dynamical
antinomies are subject to two different resolutions.
The reason why the dynamical antinomies can be
resolved in two different ways (both sides false or
both sides true) is that the nature of its object is
not necessarily sensible.; The mathematical principles
concern the constitution Jof empirical appearances, and
consequently, the mathematical antinomies can treat
only an object of a sensible intuition. The dynamical
principles on the other hand provide rules for the com-
bining of appearances and these rules may or may not be
limited to the sensible world. As Kant says, the dy-
namical principles do not enable us to "anticipate the
features" through which one empirical intuition is
distinguished from other intuitions. ^ The analogies
and the postulates do not determine objects but rather
regulate their relations to each other and to our
faculties of knowledge. Neither the analogies nor the
postulates are restricted to the sensible world in the
way that the mathematical principles are. Kant says
about the analogies:

The principles can therefore have no

other purpose save that of being the
conditions of the unity of empirical
97
 knowledge in the synthesis of appear-
ances . But such unity can be thought
only in the schema of the pure concept
of the understanding.44
The schema, as Kant previously showed, is both intel-
lectual and sensible.45 A transcendental schema must
be both homogeneous with the nonsensible concept of the
understanding and homogeneous with sensible appearances.
If the unity of experience which is to be accomplished
by the dynamical principles can be thought only in a
schema, it is clear that the dynamical principles are
not limited to the sensible world. The dynamical prin-
ciples in providing rules for experience depend on
transcendental schema, and in so doing, they affirm the
existence of an intellectual, nonsensible world.
Similarly, since the dynamical principles have to do
with rules for experience, they cannot determine the
nature of objects which again opens the way for the
idea of nonsensible objects.

The dynamical principles indicate that the under-

standing can think a noumenal realm. They need this
nonsensible realm to make possible the proposing of
rules for the connection of appearances. The two solu-
tions to the dynamical antinomies arise from the fact
that the dynamical principles make it possible to think
both a sensible and a nonsensible world. Neither the
dynamical principles nor the dynamical antinomies can
determine the nature of objects. Thus, the two solu-
tions to the dynamical antinomies take into account the
possibility of both sensible and nonsensible objects.
If the object of the dynamical antinomies is sensible,
their resolution proceeds like the resolution of the
mathematical antinomies (both sides false). If the
object of the dynamical antinomies is nonsensible,
their resolution is achieved by showing both sides to
be true. The two resolutions typical of the dynamical
antinomies can be explained by the fact that their
counterparts, the dynamical principles, do not exclude
from consideration the noumenal realm.

Another manner of describing the way Kant recon-

ciles these two types of solutions to the antinomies
is to consider reason's proper task. In the first
solution, reason is shown to be in error due to its
lack of conformity to the understanding. Reason by
restricting its idea of the unconditioned to the world
of appearances satisfies neither itself nor the under-
standing. But in the second solution, where reason en-
visions the possibility of an unconditioned "outside"
98
the empirical series, both reason and the understand-
ing can be satisfied. The second type of solution per-
haps suggests that reason has a task independent from
that of the understanding. Reason is in error when it
treats the object of its idea as an object of a pos-
sible appearance. Yet, reason does not err when it
proposes the possibility of an unconditioned "outside"
the realm of appearances. These two solutions may re-
flect to some extent two tasks of reason. Within the
realm of the sensible, reason must conform its ideas
to concepts of the understanding. Within the realm of
the supersensible where the understanding has no juris-
diction, reason can postulate an unconditioned for the
empirical series. Thus, the two solutions to the an-
tinomies are both correct in that each focuses on a
different task of the faculty of reason.

Kant's explanation of the resolution of the antin-

omies in terms of the mathematical/dynamical distinc-
tion proceeds straightforwardly and has been adequately
discussed by many commentators.46 The real signifi-
cance of this resolution, at least for the present
project, concerns its relationship to the other reso-
lutions and its ability to shed light on the practical
antinomy. This resolution of the antinomies will be
reviewed here for the purpose of showing that the
practical antinomy builds on and advances from these
solutions to the theoretical conflicts.
Kant distinguishes between the mathematical and
the dynamical ideas of reason on the basis of the table
of categories.47 The first two antinomies concern the
mathematical connection of the series of appearances in
which only homogeneous or sensible conditions are ad-
missible. The last two antinomies concern the dynami-
cal connection of the series of appearances, and in
this case, heterogeneous or purely intelligible condi-
tions can be allowed. Kant says:
Inasmuch as the dynamical ideas allow
of a condition of appearances outside
the series of the appearances, that is,
a condition which is not itself appear-
ance, we arrive at a conclusion alto-
gether different from any that was pos-
sible in the case of the mathematical
antinomy. °
In other terms, the dynamical antinomies are distin-
guished from the mathematical antinomies because they
raise the possibility of a condition "outside" the
99
world of appearances. The mathematical antinomies
treat the unconditioned as itself in space and time
whereas the dynamical antinomies locate the uncondi-
tioned in the intelligible world.
The significance of this distinction between the
mathematical and the dynamical ideas is that it makes
possible a resolution of the antinomies based on this
distinction. Since the mathematical ideas allow only
homogeneous conditions in the regress toward the un-
conditioned, all attempts to define the unconditioned
are false since the unconditioned itself would neces-
sarily be in space and time, i.e., would be condi-
tioned. The mathematical antinomies are resolved when
it is shown that by allowing only homogeneous condi-
tions in the regress of conditions, all their attempts
to define the unconditioned are false since in fact,
they define only a further conditioned. The dynamical
antinomies allow the possibility of heterogeneous
conditions, and thus their attempts to define the un-
conditioned can both be admitted as true. The dynami-
cal antinomies are resolved by allowing the possibility
of an intelligible unconditioned. The last two antin-
omies explicitly recognize two realms of experience,
and so both sides of the dynamical antinomies can be
true. The first two antinomies are restricted to the
realm of sensible appearances and consequently both
sides of the mathematical antinomies represent false
attempts to define the unconditioned.

Therefore, by distinguishing between the mathe-

matical or dynamical nature of the antinomies, Kant
specifies a type of resolution for the antinomies. The
mathematical antinomies will fail at any attempt to de-
fine the unconditioned because they consider the uncon-
ditioned to be homogeneous with other sensible condi-
tions . The dynamical antinomies have the advantage of
giving a positive sense to the idea of a nonsensible,
heterogeneous condition, and thus both sides of these
antinomies can be true if applied to different realms.
This resolution of the antinomies asserts that both
sides of Antinomies 1 and 2 are false and both sides of
Antinomies 3 and 4 are true. In all cases, the antin-
omies are resolved by showing that there is no real
contradiction between the claims of the theses and the
antitheses.

Following this review of the solution to the an-

tinomies in terms of their nature as mathematical or
dynamical ideas, it remains to reconsider how the
three types of solutions discussed in this chapter can
100
be reconciled. This chapter has discussed in its
three sections the three ways that Kant describes the
resolution of the theoretical antinomies. It has been
suggested earlier that the first two solutions can be
easily reconciled. Both resolutions solve the antin-
omies by pointing to a mistake in reason's idea of the
unconditioned which leads to a lack of conformity be-
tween reason and the understanding. Both the first
two solutions showed the antinomies to be resolved
when both thesis and antithesis were seen to be false.
The difficulty arises in determining how these resolu-
tions (which find both sides of the antinomies to be
false) can be made compatible with the third type of
resolution (which finds both sides of the dynamical
antinomies to be true).

In the beginning of this section, Kant's recogni-

tion of these two different types of solutions was
pointed out. Kant apparently sees no conflict between
the two types of resolutions, and consequently, he
does not proceed to denounce one resolution in favor
of the other. Kant implies that both ways of resolving
the antinomies are correct. The first solution gives
an account of reason's basic error in terms of which
all the antinomies are based on an improper assumption
and so all their claims are false. The second solution
takes into account an additional consideration concern-
ing the types of conditions that can appear in the re-
gress of the series of conditions. This additional
consideration enables Kant to show that some of the
claims in the antinomies can be true. In short, Kant
finds that the two types of resolutions do not con-
flict but rather that they explain the antinomies with
different considerations in mind.

Kant's commentators have proposed several ways of

accounting for these two different types of solutions
to the antinomies. Heinz Heimsoeth, for example,
points to these two types of resolutions and says that
the antinomies are "of the same type" with regard to
their transcendental object but that they are "of an
entirely different type" with regard to their mathe-
matical or dynamical nature.49 As a way of concluding
this chapter on the resolution of the theoretical an-
tinomies , the views of several commentators will be
presented. In addition to suggesting how these com-
mentators reconcile the two types of solutions to the
antinomies, it is important to mention what effect the
two solutions to the antinomies have on the project of
this inquiry. Specifically, the second type of resolu-
tion, which emphasizes the mathematical/dynamical
101
distinction, will be shown to be of importance in pro-
viding a basis for the linking of the sensible and
supersensible realms which is accomplished in the
practical antinomy.
Graham Bird, in his book called Kant's Theory of
Knowledge, discusses the solution of the third antinomy
insofar as it contrasts with the solutions of the pre-
vious two antinomies. Bird claims that Kant asserts
in the first two antinomies "that both thesis and an-
tithesis may be regarded as false."50 But, in the
third antinomy, Bird says that Kant "is prepared to
say not that both thesis and antithesis are false, but
that they may both be true."51 Bird's assessment of
what occurs in the resolution of the antinomies is
correct if the only type of resolution possible is
that in terms of the mathematical/dynamical distinc-
tion. This chapter has consistently argued that sev-
eral types of resolutions are offered by Kant. Bird
therefore is incorrect in concluding that Kant is not
prepared to say in the third antinomy that both thesis
and antithesis are false. In terms of the first type
of solution to the antinomies, Kant does in fact state
that both the thesis and the antithesis of the third
antinomy are false. Bird's error apparently arises
from his failure to recognize the first type of solu-
tion to the antinomies which finds both sides are
false. Bird locates the resolution of the antinomies
in their nature as mathematical or dynamical ideas and
he ignores the first type of solution to the antino-
mies. Thus, because Bird recognizes only one type of
solution to the antinomies, he is not confronted with
the problem of reconciling what are in fact two types
of solutions to the antinomies.

C. D. Broad's discussion of the resolution of the

antinomies appears to be no more correct than Bird's
discussion, but it has the advantage of at least men-
tioning the two types of solutions offered by Kant.
Broad claims, in his book Kant. An Introduction, that
Kant could have given a solution of
the third antinomy on the same lines
as his solution of the first two. . . .
Kant took the other type of solution
instead of this one because of his
interest in ethics.52

Broad is claiming that Kant "could have" resolved the

third antinomy (and by implication, the fourth antin-
omy) by showing both sides to be false. Instead, says
102
Broad, Kant employs a different type of resolution and
shows that both sides of the dynamical antinomies are
true. Broad may be correct that Kant's reason for de-
veloping the second type of solution to the antinomies
is his interest in ethics. It will later be suggested
that the second resolution which allows both claims of
the dynamical antinomies to be true makes possible the
bridging of the sensible and supersensible realms which
is carried out by practical reason. Broad fails to see
that Kant not only could have but did offer the same
type of solution to the third antinomy as he did to the
previous two. Again, the issue of reconciling the two
types of solutions to the antinomies is not a problem
for Broad since he fails to recognize that two differ-
ent types of solutions are in fact suggested for the
dynamical antinomies.

A third way of dealing with the problem of recon-

ciling the two types of solutions to the antinomies is
proposed by Norman Kemp Smith. Kemp Smith's position
has several advantages not found in Bird's or Broad's
positions. First, Kemp Smith clearly acknowledges the
presence of two different types of solutions to the
antinomies. Second, Kemp Smith recognizes that Kant
himself was aware of the two types of resolutions to
the antinomies. Finally, this means that the problem
of reconciling these two types of resolutions is a real
problem for Kemp Smith. Thus, regardless of Kemp
Smith's conclusion about how the solutions are recon-
ciled, his recognition of the problem at issue reflects
the concerns of this chapter.

Kemp Smith explains the appearance of the two

types of solutions to the antinomies as manifestations
of two different periods in Kant's critical thinking.53
Kemp Smith maintains that the move from the first type
of solution (where both sides are false) to the second
(where both sides can be true in the dynamical antin-
omies) reflects the move from Kant's early theory to
his later Idealistic theory.54 Kemp Smith explains
that the two types of solutions illustrate the develop-
ment from Kant's early theory where reason has only an
empirical function to the later idealistic theory where
reason enables man to realize his noumenal affinities.
While it may be impossible to confirm Kemp Smith's
historical approach to the problem of the two types of
resolutions, still his claim about the two functions
of reason may prove valuable. It was suggested earlier
that the two types of solutions to the antinomies can
be viewed as proposing different tasks for the faculty
of reason.55 Kemp Smith may be correct that the two

10 3
types of resolutions of the antinomies propose differ-
ent tasks or reason. Kemp Smith then reconciles the
two types of solutions (and similarly, the two tasks
of reason) by claiming that they represent stages in
the development of Kant's position.
Regardless of Kemp Smith's claim that the two
types of solutions to the antinomies reflect stages in
the development of Kant's thought, it is fruitful to
observe that the two types of solutions imply different
tasks for reason. It is possible that Kant envisioned
these two tasks for reason simultaneously and not as
historical stages. The possibility that these two
types of resolutions of the antinomies are compatible
and reconcilable seems to accord best with what Kant
himself says about the solutions to the antinomies.
This chapter has attempted to dispel the notion
that any one type of solution to the antinomies pre-
cludes any other. In spite of the apparent conflict
between the two types of solutions, there seems to be
no inherent reason why the two resolutions cannot stand
together. The advantages derived from this attempt in-
clude the following. This attempt accords well with
Kant's own position which found no reason to discard
one type of resolution in favor of the other. Next,
the two types of resolutions elaborate two tasks of
reason which again do not preclude each other. Also,
this attempt requires that the reader neither ignore
one type of solution (Bird, Broad) nor construct the
notion that the types of solutions represent stages in
an historical development (Kemp Smith).

Finally, one further point can be emphasized as

giving grounds for Kant's elaboration of two types of
solutions to the antinomies. The first solution ade-
quately resolves the conflict in the cosmological ideas
which are directed "exclusively to the unconditioned in
the appearances."56 insofar as the ideas concern an
unconditioned "in the world," the first type of resolu-
tion, which points to reason's general mistake, suf-
fices to reconcile the conflicting claims in the antin-
omies. Yet, in respect of the difference between the
mathematical and the dynamical "cosmical concepts"
(Weltbegriffe), Kant states that the latter are in a
certain sense transcendent. He says that it is pos-
sible to

call the first two concepts cosmical

in the narrower sense, as referring

104
 to the world of the great and the small,
and the other two transcendent concepts
of nature. "
That is, in light of the differences between the cos-
mological ideas, the first two antinomies refer to the
world of appearances while the last two antinomies
transcend the world of appearances. It seems to follow
that Kant recognizes both the similarities and the dif-
ferences between the four antinomies. The first type
of solution to the antinomies resolves the conflicts
in terms of what the antinomies share, namely, reason's
mistaken idea of the unconditioned. The second type of
solution to the antinomies resolves the conflicts in
terms of how the antinomies differ, namely, whether the
conditions can be "in the world" or "outside the world."
Thus, two solutions are available for the antinomies:
one which emphasizes their similarities and one which
stresses their differences.

Before turning to the consideration of the practi-

cal antinomy, it is important to note again the role
that the second type of solution to the antinomies
plays in this investigation. The attempt will be made
here to understand practical reason as advancing from
the concerns raised by theoretical reason. Presumably,
the practical antinomy accomplishes the bridging of the
sensible realm (happiness) and the supersensible realm
(virtue). The theoretical antinomies function either
as"a negative or as a positive propaedeutic to the
practical antinomy. Possibly, the two types of solu-
tions to the antinomies can be seen in this light.
The first type of resolution of the antinomies finds
both sides in the conflict to be false, and conse-
quently, nothing positive can be said about reason's
idea of the unconditioned. The second type of resolu-
tion acknowledges the possibility of heterogeneous
conditions for the dynamical ideas and so allows for
something positive to be postulated about reason's idea
of the unconditioned. In short, the second type of
resolution for the antinomies is necessary in that it
makes a connection between the sensible and the super-
sensible not impossible. It functions as a positive
propaedeutic to practical reason. The project of the
practical antinomy in causally linking the sensible
and the supersensible has been made theoretically pos-
sible by the second resolution of the antinomies, which
eliminated the apparent conflict between the sensible
and the supersensible.

105
 ENDNOTES

A477/B505; translation by Norman Kemp Smith,

Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1965).
2
A478/B506; translation by Kemp Smith.
3
A479/B506; translation by Kemp Smith.
4
A481-2/B509-10; translation by Kemp Smith.
5
Note that Kant again seems to use the terms "the
unconditioned" and "totality" ambiguously. He later
refers to the object of a cosmological idea as "the
unconditioned" (A486/B514) and it is this term which I
employ consistently.
6
A484/B512; translation by Kemp Smith.
7
See the section entitled "Critical Solution of
the Cosmological Conflict of Reason with Itself,"
A497/B525; translation by Kemp Smith.
Q
See pages 15-6.
q
See page 15.
10
A504/B532; translation by Kemp Smith.
l:L
A506/B534; translation by Kemp Smith.
12
A497-8/B526; translation by Kemp Smith.
13
A504-5/B532-3; translation by Kemp Smith.

A504/B5 32; translation by Kemp Smith.

15
A505/B533; translation by Kemp Smith.
16
W . H. Walsh, "The Structure of Kant's Antin-
omies," Proceedings of the 1974 Ottawa Kant Congress,
ed. Pierre Laberge (Ottawa: University of Ottawa
Press, 1976), p. 86.
17
A506/B534; translation by Kemp Smith.
18
Kuno Fischer, A Commentary on Kant's Critick of

106
the Pure Reason, trans. Kuno Fischer (1866; rpt.New York:
Garland Publishers, 1976), p. 233.
19
A508-9/B536-7; translation by Kemp Smith.
20
A510/B538; translation by Kemp Smith.
21
A512/B540; translation by Kemp Smith.
22
A520-4/B548-52; translation by Kemp Smith.
23
A510/B538; translation by Kemp Smith.
24
A516/B544; translation by Kemp Smith.
25
A422/B450; translation by Kemp Smith.
26
A329/B385; translation by Kemp Smith.
27
A486/B514; translation by Kemp Smith.
28
A489/B517; translation by Kemp Smith.

A486-7/B514-5; translation by Kemp Smith.

30
A488-9/B516-7; translation by Kemp Smith.
31
Heinz Heimsoeth, Transzendentale Dialektik. Ein
Kommentar zu Kants Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, II (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter, 1967), 284-6.
32
Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 116.
33
Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's
"Critique of Pure Reason" (New York: Humanities Press,
1962), pp. 501-3.
T. D. Weldon, Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"
(London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 206.
35
See pages 53-62.
3 fi
D. P. Dryer, "Bennett's Account of the Tran-
scendental Dialectic," Dialogue, 15 (1976), 130-1.
37
A528-9/B556-7; translation by Kemp Smith,
Critique of Pure Reason.

107
 A529/B557; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique
of Pure Reason.

A161/B200; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique

of Pure Reason.
40
A161-2/B201; translation by Kemp Smith,
Critique of Pure Reason.
41
Kant says at A179/B221-2: "These first prin-
ciples [the mathematical] may therefore be called con-
stitutive. It stands quite otherwise with those prin-
ciples [the dynamical] which seek to bring the ex-
istence of appearances under rules a priori. For
since existence cannot be constructed, the principles
can apply only to the relations of existence, and can
yield only regulative principles."
42
Heinz Röttges, in "Kants Auflösung der Frei-
heitsantinomie," Kant-Studien, 65 (1974), 33-49, ap-
parently emphasizes the difference between the mathe-
matical and the dynamical antinomies in order to
question the validity of the latter. In discussing
the resolutions of the first three antinomies, Röttges
says that if the third antinomy were resolved like
the previous two (both sides false), fatal conse-
quences would result since Kant's theoretical and
practical philosophy would in principle be negated.
Röttges ignores the fact that Kant does offer for the
third antinomy, as one type of resolution, a resolu-
tion which finds both sides to be false. In addition,
Röttges suggests that the mathematical/dynamical dis-
tinction drawn at B200 is not systematic but only has
the nature of a remark. Thus he fails to see that the
mathematical/dynamical distinction utilized by Kant in
the resolution of the antinomies is securely rooted
in the principles of the understanding (i.e., in the
systematic ground of the critical project).
A178/B221; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique
of Pure Reason.

A181/B223-4; translation by Kemp Smith,

Critique of Pure Reason.
45
A138/B177; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique
of Pure Reason.
46
See, for example: W. Michael Hoffman, "An
Interpretation of Kant's Solution to the Third
108
Antinomy," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 13 (1975),
176-7; Fischer, pp. 236-9; A. C. Ewing, A Short Com-
mentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 225-6; and
Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant
(Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1889),. II, 59-62.
47
A529/B557; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique
of Pure Reason.
48
A531/B559; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique
of Pure Reason.
49
Heimsoeth, p. 329.

Graham Bird, Kant's Theory of Knowledge. An

Outline of One Central Argument in the "Critique of
Pure Reason" (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1962),
p. 198.
51
Bird, p. 198.
52
C. D. Broad, Kant. An Introduction, ed. C.
Lewy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978),
p. 273.
Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's "Critique
of Pure Reason," pp. 506, 511-2.
54
Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's "Critique
of Pure Reason," pp. 511-2.
55
See pages 98-9.

A419/B447; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique

of Pure Reason.
57
A420/B448; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique
of Pure Reason.

109
110
 CHAPTER IV
THE ORIGIN AND THE STRUCTURE
OF THE PRACTICAL ANTINOMY
In Chapter Two, it was shown that the antinomies
of theoretical reason could be seen to arise from an
ambiguity surrounding the object of theoretical rea-
son.! Since Kant treats theoretical reason and prac-
tical reason as two employments of pure reason, it
seems likely that the antinomy of practical reason has
close parallels with the antinomies of theoretical
reason. In the second chapter, the discussion centered
on the conceptual origin of the theoretical antinomies
and the effect this origin had on the structuring of
the antinomies. It was revealed that the origin of
the theoretical antinomies in the idea of the uncondi-
tioned could be used to account for the structure of
the theoretical antinomies. This chapter will begin
from a presumed similarity between the theoretical
antinomies and the practical antinomy. After all,
Kant begins the dialectic of pure practical reason
with the statement:

In both its speculative and its practical

employment, pure reason always has its
dialectic, for it demands the absolute
totality of conditions for a given condi-
tioned thing.2
Both theoretical and practical reason are character-
ized by this demand for the totality of conditions.
Chapter Two revealed that this demand for the total-
ity of conditions becomes for theoretical reason the
search for an unconditioned. The question which this
chapter will consider is: With regard to origin and
structure, is the practical antinomy patterned on or
a reflection of the theoretical antinomies?
Thus, Chapter Four begins as an attempt to sub-
stantiate the presumed similarity between the theo-
retical antinomies and the practical antinomy. Cer-
tainly, it is helpful to begin to discuss the prac-
tical antinomy from the perspective of its presumed
similarity to the theoretical antinomies if only to
satisfy Kant's desire for a systematic architectonic.
Probably a sympathetic reader of Kant also desires
unity or at least consistency in the dialectics of
pure reason. Consequently, this investigation

111
approaches the practical antinomy with the expectation
that the origin and the structure of the antinomy will
have obvious parallels to the theoretical antinomies.
Section One will discuss the conceptual origin
of the practical antinomy and the way that this origin
is similar to and different from the conceptual origin
of the theoretical antinomies. Section Two will con-
sider the structure of the practical antinomy and its
similarity to and difference from the structure of the
theoretical antinomies. One general observation that
will be suggested in this chapter is that the initial
similarity between the practical and theoretical antin-
omies is lost in the course of the development of the
practical antinomy. That is, the apparent similarity
between the origins of the theoretical and practical
antinomies gives way to a dissimilarity between their
structures and finally to a complete dissimilarity be-
tween the resolutions of the two types of antinomies
(see Chapter Five). These similarities and dissim-
ilarities will become evident in what follows.

The Conceptual Origin of the Antinomy

As previously stated, the origin of the theoreti-
cal antinomies was found to lie in the idea of the
unconditioned. The theoretical antinomies arise out
of an ambiguity in the object of theoretical reason.
Kant clearly suggests that the problems which underlie
the dialectics of theoretical and practical reason are
identical. He claims that in the dialectics of theo-
retical and practical reason
an unavoidable illusion arises from the
application of the rational idea of the
totality of conditions (and thus of the
unconditioned ) to appearances as if they
were things-in-themselves.3
Pure reason both theoretical and practical seems to
err in its application of the idea of the totality of
conditions or the idea of the unconditioned.
Now, practical reason is characterized in its
dialectic by the misapplication of its idea of total-
ity or of the unconditioned. Is the object of prac-
tical reason the same "idea of the unconditioned"
that is the object of theoretical reason? The answer
is "yes" in spite of some terminological differences
which prevent an easy comparison of the objects of

112
theoretical and practical reason. L. W. Beck also
corroborates this early impression that the object
of both theoretical and practical reason is the uncon-
ditioned. He claims:
Both theoretical and practical reason have
a dialectic and on the same grounds, viz.
as reason they seek the unconditioned for
all that is conditioned. . . . Dialectic is
the exposure of the illusion that the uncon-
ditioned, as required by reason, is an ob-
ject of some definite and specific cogni-
tion. 4

Thus, Beck states that due to the nature of dialectic

(in Kant's sense), both theoretical and practical rea-
son, in their dialectical employments, have the uncon-
ditioned as their object.
Kant says that practical reason "seeks the uncon-
ditioned for the practically conditioned" and one way
that this unconditioned is sought is "as the uncondi-
tioned totality of the object of the pure practical
reason, under the name of the highest good."5 Thus,
practical reason seeks the unconditioned totality of
its object and this unconditioned totality is called
the highest good. But, a problem arises with the use
of the term "unconditioned totality." It was sug-
gested in Chapter Two that confusion occurs concerning
the use of the terms "absolute totality" and "the
unconditioned." Theoretical reason in its professed
search for totality (a category) actually aims at the
unconditioned (a transcendental idea). In practical
reason, the unconditioned is sought as the uncondi-
tioned totality (called the highest good) of the prac-
tically conditioned. Klaus Düsing specifies that the
highest good, which is the essential object of finite
moral will, is the idea of unconditioned totality.6
Chapter Two suggested that the ambiguity in the defini-
tion of the unconditioned may be a result of theoreti-
cal reason's difficulty in distinguishing between
totality and the unconditioned. Similarly, since
practical reason searches for the unconditioned as an
unconditioned totality (i.e., a highest good), it may
be that practical reason too is unable to distinguish
between totality and the unconditioned and thus that
it is also subject to an ambiguity in its definition
of the unconditioned. If this reference to an "uncon-
ditioned totality" implies that practical reason is
confusing and not distinguishing between the category

113
of totality and the idea of the unconditioned, then
practical reason, like theoretical reason, is prob-
ably characterized by an ambiguity in its definition
of the unconditioned.
Before considering whether an ambiguity does in
fact arise in practical reason, it is important to
note several features of the dialectic of practical
reason. First, practical reason seeks the uncondi-
tioned just as theoretical reason in its dialectic
seeks the unconditioned. Second, the unconditioned
totality which practial reason aims at is also called
by practical reason the highest good. Theoretical
reason refers to the goal of its inquiry as the uncon-
ditioned and practical reason names the object of its
inquiry the highest good. Both types of reason have
in mind the idea of the unconditioned. Third, a fur-
ther parallel can be drawn between the ways that
theoretical and practical reason operate in their
search for the unconditioned. It was suggested in
Chapter Two that the antinomies of theoretical reason
could be understood as a conflict between two defini-
tions of the unconditioned. Kant refers in the second
Critique to "the dialectic of pure practical reason in
its definition of the concept of the highest good."7
It follows that the dialectic of practical reason (and
consequently, the practical antinomy) concerns the
definition of the highest good. In sum, both theoreti-
cal and practical reason seek the unconditioned and
both of their dialectical employments concern the
definition of this unconditioned.

In order to carry out the parallel between the

dialectics of theoretical and practical reason, it is
crucial to explicate the ambiguity characteristic of
practical reason. Two factors point to the presence
of such an ambiguity in practical reason. First,
the term "unconditioned totality" is employed to refer
to that which practical reason seeks. This term it-
self implies that practical reason, like theoretical
reason, fails to clearly distinguish between absolute
totality and the unconditioned. Second, since the
dialectic of practical reason, like that of theoreti-
cal reason, concerns the definition of the uncondi-
tioned (i.e., the highest good), it may be that prac-
tical reason, like theoretical reason, discovers an
ambiguity in the meaning of this unconditioned. It
was seen that the ambiguity in the definition of the
unconditioned gives rise to the theoretical antinomies,
and thus it is possible that a similar ambiguity in

114
the definition of the highest good may give rise to
the practical antinomy.
Kant does indeed specify an ambiguity present in
practical reason's concept of the highest good. It
is of interest that Kant explicitly refers to the two
definitions of the highest good as an ambiguity whereas,
'in the first Critique, the two definitions of the un-
conditioned were not referred to as an ambiguity by
Kant. Kant says:
The concept of the "highest" contains
an ambiguity which, if not attended
to, can occasion unnecessary disputes.
The "highest" can mean the "supreme"
(supremum) or the "perfect"
(consummatum). The former is the un-
conditional condition, i.e., the con-
dition which is subordinate to no
other (originarium); the latter is
that whole which is no part of a yet
larger whole of the same kind
(perfectissimum).8
Evidently, the highest good can have two meanings:
a supreme good (an unconditional condition which is
subordinate to no other condition) or a perfect good
(a whole which is not part of any larger whole of the
same kind). It is also evident that these two senses
of the highest good are exact correlates to the two
senses of the unconditioned present in the first
Critique. The highest good can refer either to a
highest, unconditional condition or to the whole which
is not part of a larger whole of the same kind. The
unconditioned in the first Critique can refer either
to a part to which all other parts are subordinated
or to the entire completed series. The unconditioned,
which is the object of both theoretical and practical
reason, exhibits the same ambiguity in both its theo-
retical and its practical employments.

Theoretical and practical reason thus appear to

share this ambiguity in the definition of the uncon-
ditioned. Reason's object is either: a highest part
to which all other parts are subordinated or the whole
completed series. For theoretical reason, the uncon-
ditioned can be either a highest member of the series
or the whole series itself. Analogously, for practi-
cal reason, the highest good (i.e., the unconditioned)
can be either a supreme good or a perfect good.

115
 This apparent link between the definitions of the
unconditioned employed by theoretical and practical
reason has not escaped the notice of W. H. Walsh.
Walsh claims that Kant's case for the connection of
moral reason with theoretical reason rests on the
notion of the unconditioned.^ Walsh observes that
the unconditioned is central to both theoretical and
practical reason, but he concludes that in fact the
unconditioned is employed in different ways by theo-
retical and by practical reason. He states that we
are "bamboozled by the mysterious phrase 'the uncon-
ditioned'" and that we believe there is similarity
when in reality there is difference. Walsh concen-
trates on the contrasts he finds between the uncondi-
tioned of theoretical reason and the unconditioned
of practical reason. Two of the contrasts Walsh
points out are :•'-•'•

1. To reach the unconditioned is set as

a task to theoretical reason, a task
which we know from the first can never
be fully accomplished. Morality, by con-
trast issues its commands as uncon-
ditionally binding.12
2. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant
is interested in the unconditioned
as a possible entity or existent; the
necessity which concerns him here is
the necessity of a necessary being.
But in his moral philosophy any such
notion is set aside as strictly sub-
sidiary, and the only necessity in
question is that supposed to attach
to a moral command.^
Walsh's claim is that although the unconditioned
appears to function as a notion common to both theo-
retical and practical reason, in fact, it refers to
completely different objects in these two employments
of reason. According to Walsh, the unconditioned of
theoretical reason is a possible object at which rea-
son aims. On the other hand, the unconditioned of
practical reason is achieved by reason in the issuing
of moral commands.
In light of what has been said earlier about the
unconditioned, an objection can be made to Walsh's
claims. Walsh makes a mistake in identifying the un-
conditioned of practical reason with the unconditional-

ly
ity of moral imperatives. As Kant himself states,
the dialectics of theoretical and practical reason
both attempt to apply the idea of the unconditioned
to the world of appearances. Practical reason seeks
the unconditioned for the practically conditioned and
it calls this unconditioned the highest good. Thus,
the unconditioned in practical reason also refers to
a possible object at which practical reason aims.
Walsh mistakenly concentrates on the unconditionality
attached to moral imperatives and ignores the uncon-
ditioned that is present in the concept of the highest
good. It is this latter unconditioned inherent in the
object of moral reason that is identical to the uncon-
ditioned which is the object of theoretical reason.
It is of significance that the highest good is the
object of practical reason but it is not the deter-
mining ground of the will.14 N 0 object can be the
determining ground of the will- The moral law alone
is the ground for making the highest good the object
of the will. Both the moral law and the highest good
are thus unconditioned but in different respects.
Therefore, Walsh's claim that the unconditioned of
theoretical reason differs from the unconditioned
of practical reason is based on a false comparison.
The unconditioned is treated identically by theoreti-
ical and practical reason if the comparison locates
the practically unconditioned in the highest good and
not in the moral law.15

It remains to be seen how the ambiguity in the

definition of the highest good plays a part in the
grounding of the practical antinomy. The issue now
concerns how the practical antinomy arises out of this
ambiguity in the definition of the highest good. Kant
states the antinomy of practical reason in the follow-
ing way: "the desire for happiness must be the motive
to maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be
the efficient cause of happiness."16 The antinomy has
to do with a relationship between the maxims of virtue
and happiness. If>the ambiguity in the definition of
the highest good gives rise to the practical antinomy,
then there, must be some way of connecting the two
definitions of the highest good with the explicit sub-
ject matter of the antinomy which is the relationship
between the maxims of virtue and happiness.

Kant clearly suggests how the two definitions

of the highest good-^are connected with the subject
matter of the antinomy, and thus he implies that a
confusion about the idea of the unconditioned lies at

117
the base of the practical antinomy. The highest good
can refer either to a supreme good (a condition sub-
ordinate to no other) or to a perfect good (a whole
not part of a larger whole of the same kind). Kant
claims that the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason has
shown that virtue is the supreme good but that this
does
not imply that virtue is the entire and
perfect good as the object of the faculty
of desire of rational finite beings.
For this, happiness is also required.1'
Kant says that virtue is the supreme good while vir-
tue and happiness together are the perfect good. The
first definition of the highest good (i.e., the supreme
good) refers to virtue whereas the second definition
of the highest good (i.e., the perfect good) requires
both virtue and happiness.
After Kant identifies virtue with the supreme
good and virtue and happiness with the perfect good,
a change seems to occur with regard to the use made
of the term "the highest good." Up until this point,
the highest good has been seen to be ambiguous and
to refer to either a supreme or a perfect good. After
Kant indicates that for rational finite beings both
virtue and happiness are required for the perfect
good, the term "the highest good" applies no longer
to the supreme good but only to the perfect good.
Kant says:

Inasmuch as virtue and happiness to-

gether constitute the possession of
the highest good for one person . . .
the highest good means the whole, the
perfect good, wherein virtue is always
the supreme good.m
In other words, once the supreme good is identified
as virtue and the perfect good is identified as vir-
tue and happiness together, the highest good is seen
to properly refer to the perfect good.
Several crucial observations can be made here
as a result of the identifying of the supreme good
with virtue and of the perfect good with virtue and
happiness. First, the supreme good is apparently
contained in the perfect good. Kant states that the
highest good means the perfect good wherein virtue is

118
the supreme good.19 The perfect good is not distinct
from the supreme good but in fact contains the supreme
good. Second, since the perfect good involves both
virtue and happiness, its form is necessarily one of
combination or synthesis.20 That is, the concept of
the perfect good must make clear the connection (which
Kant says must be causal connection) between virtue
and happiness. Third and most important, the ambiguity
in the concept of the highest good is resolved prior
to the exposition of the antinomy of practical reason.
The highest good can mean either the supreme or the
perfect good, but Kant claims that for finite rational
beings, the highest good means the perfect good. In
a sense then, the ambiguity in the concept of the
highest good is the result of an error rather than
indicative of an unresolvable confusion. For finite
rational beings, the two senses of the highest good
are soon shown to refer to an inadequate definition
of the highest good (the supreme good, i.e., virtue)
and an adequate definition of the highest good (the
perfect good, i.e., virtue and happiness). In a way,
the ambiguity in the idea of the unconditioned which
constitutes the theoretical antinomies is eliminated
prior to the exposition of the practical antinomy.

A question remains concerning why the ambiguity

in the idea of the highest good is able to be elimi-
nated prior to the practical antinomy. The highest
good in the dialectic of practical reason is said to
be the perfect good and not the supreme good. Why is
the supreme good (virtue) inadequate for the concept
of the highest good?
Two reasons why virtue is not treated as the
highest good can be proposed. As Kant mentions, vir-
tue has been discussed in the Analytic and has been
shown to be the supreme good. In other words, the
possibility that virtue is the highest good for prac-
tical reason has already been considered in the
Analytic. Virtue is defined there as the unending
progress of practical reason's maxims toward its
model which is the concept of holiness.21 Virtue,
insofar as it is the emulation of the concept of holi-
ness, is the object of practical reason. Kant says
later in the Analytic that "morality, subjectively
passing over into holiness, would cease to be vir-
tue. "22 virtue then is the object of practical reason
because by means of it the practical subject recog-
nizes himself as a member of a moral realm and as an
imitation of the holy will. Consequently, the pos-

119
sibility that virtue is the highest good for practical
reason has been dealt with in the Analytic.
But it is not enough to claim that the ambiguity
in the concept of the highest good is eliminated prior
to the antinomy because one side of the ambiguity was
considered in the Analytic. The reason why the supreme
good is not the highest good cannot be merely that
the supreme good was already dealt with in the Ana-
lytic. Surely the ambiguity is not eliminated solely
because the supreme good and the perfect good are con-
sidered in different sections of the second Critique.
There must be found some further explanation of why
virtue is not treated as the highest good in the
dialectic of practical reason.
The crucial reason why the ambiguity in the con-
cept of the highest good is able to be resolved prior
to the antinomy is that virtue is not sufficient by
itself to be the highest object for finite rational
creatures. Kant points already in the Analytic to
certain characteristics of practical finite beings
which make it impossible for them to focus on virtue
alone as their object. Kant says that holiness is an
ideal which finite rational beings should strive to
imitate. If a being, through the exercise of virtue,
could ever attain to this ideal (which he cannot),
then he would be free from desires that conflict with
the moral law. Creatures, says Kant, can never attain
holiness because creatures are never wholly free from
desires and inclinations that have physical causes.23
Thus, virtue, as the emulation of holiness, ignores
the inescapability of man's desires and inclinations.
Virtue, as man's attempt to imitate holiness, inade-
quately represents practical reason's highest object
because it ignores the desires and inclinations typi-
cal of practical beings. In short, virtue by itself
is not the highest good since it fails to take into
account the desires and inclinations characteristic
of practical beings. Thus, virtue is not the highest
good and the ambiguity in the concept of the highest
good is resolved prior to the antinomy because virtue
does not adequately account for the nature of the
object of finite, rational, and practical beings.

A further point of interest is that the ambiguity

in the object of practical reason is not structurally
analogous to the ambiguity in the object of theoreti-
cal reason. In theoretical reason, the two defini-
tions of the unconditioned are independent of each

120
other. In practical reason, the two senses of the
highest good are not mutually exclusive. For theoreti-
cal reason, the ambiguity occurs between two senses
of the unconditioned both of which are self-subsisting.
Practical reason contains an ambiguity between two
senses of the highest good: one of which is inade-
quate to the concept of the highest good and one of
which is adequate to the concept of the highest good.
Specifically, in theoretical reason, the ambiguity in
the idea of the unconditioned concerns a highest mem-
ber and an infinite series. In practical reason, the
ambiguity in the concept of the highest good concerns
virtue and a necessary connection between virtue and
happiness. The ambiguity characteristic of practical
reason is not a "real" ambiguity in that its two
definitions of the highest good do not stand indepen-
dently and exclusively apart. The ambiguity typical
of theoretical and practical reason was seen to involve
a contrast between a highest member and a completed
whole. Yet, when it is clear that practical reason
includes the highest member (virtue) in the whole
(virtue and happiness), then it is evident that there
are no further parallels between the structures of
the ambiguities in the two employments of reason.

It is possible to ask whether the ambiguity in

the concept of the highest good can account for the
origin of the practical antinomy. Certainly it does
not explain the origin of the practical antinomy in
the way that the ambiguity in the idea of the uncon-
ditioned explains the origin of the theoretical antin-
omies. Still, the ambiguity in the concept of the
highest good does function as the conceptual origin
of the practical antinomy, and it does make intelli-
gible the resulting structure of the antinomy. The
antinomy, which concerns the connection between vir-
tue and happiness, is made necessary by the ambiguity
in the concept of the highest good. The ambiguity is
resolved when the perfect good is shown to be the
highest good for finite rational beings who are prac-
tical, and the antinomy arises because of the need to
determine the connection between virtue and happiness
in the highest good. The practical antinomy does have
to do with the definition of the highest good but its
work can begin only after the initial ambiguity in the
concept of the highest good is resolved.

The following section will consider the structure

of the practical antinomy. In particular, it will
show how the structure of the antinomy is intelligible

121
in terms of the ambiguity in the concept of the high-
est good which gives rise to the antinomy. The prac-
tical antinomy will again be discussed in comparison
to the theoretical antinomies but this time from the
point of view of structure.
The Structure of the Antinomy
The structure of the practical antinomy is related
in an integral way to the origin of the antinomy.
The structure of the antinomy is determined by the
conflict which gives rise to the antinomy. In a sense
then, the structure of any antinomy can be seen as a
result of that which caused the antinomy to arise.
By comparing the structures of the theoretical antin-
omies and the practical antinomy, certain observa-
tions can be made regarding the ambiguities which give
rise to the antinomies. The structure of the practi-
cal antinomy will be shown to be completely unlike the
structure of the theoretical antinomies. This section
will first discuss the structural differences between
the theoretical and the practical antinomies in terms
of how the ambiguity which grounds both types of antin-
omies can enable them to exhibit such different
structures. Secondly, this section will consider
several other structural points of comparison between
the theoretical and the practical antinomies which
indicate the structural uniqueness of the practical
antinomy.

Kant states the practical antinomy concisely:

"the desire for happiness must be the motive to maxims
of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the effi-
cient cause of happiness."24 He later restates the
two propositions in the antinomy as follows: "striv-
ing for happiness produces a ground for a virtuous
disposition . . . [or] a virtuous disposition neces-
sarily produces happiness."25 clearly, the practical
antinomy is structured as a conflict between two prop-
ositions each of which asserts a causal connection
between virtue and happiness. The last section re-
vealed that virtue and happiness become the subject
matter of the antinomy because of the ambiguity in
the concept of the highest good. The two senses of
the highest good were defined as the supreme good
(virtue) and the perfect good (virtue and happiness).
For finite rational beings who are practical only the
perfect good adequately reflects the concept of the
highest good, and consequently, practical reason is
left with the problem of defining the synthetic

122
connection between virtue and happiness in the concept
of the highest good. Thus, the structure of the
practical antinomy, as a conflict between two state-
ments of causal connection, can be seen to directly
follow from the ambiguity present in the concept of
the highest good.
It was suggested in the previous section that the
same ambiguity in the idea of the unconditioned
grounds the theoretical and the practical antinomies.
At the origin of both types of antinomies lies a con-
fusion in the idea of the unconditioned (called by
practical reason "the highest good"). If the theo-
retical and practical antinomies share this common
origin, then it is natural to assume that their struc-
tures will be similar. Since the structures of the
two types of antinomies are singularly unalike, it
is crucial to discuss their different structures with
a view toward explaining how the shared origin of the
antinomies results in such different structures.
As Chapter Two revealed, the structure of the
theoretical antinomies can be understood as a reflec-
tion of the two senses of the unconditioned which
appear in what is here called the "ambiguity" of theo-
retical reason. The theoretical antinomies in their
most basic form concern a conflict between the two
senses of the unconditioned. The theses assert one
definition of the unconditioned (the unconditioned is
a highest member) and the antitheses assert the other
definition of the unconditioned (the unconditioned is
an infinite series). No such parallel is found in
the practical antinomy. The two senses of the highest
good do not account for the structure of the practical
antinomy in the way that the two senses of the uncon-
ditioned ground the structure of the theoretical an-
tinomies. The practical antinomy is not a simple con-
flict between a thesis claiming one definition of the
highest good (the highest good is virtue; originarium)
and an antithesis claiming the other definition of
the highest good (the highest good is virtue and
happiness; perfectissimum). Obviously, the ambiguity
in the idea of the highest good grounds the structure
of the practical antinomy in a way completely unlike
the way the ambiguity in the idea of the uncondi-
tioned grounds the structure of the theoretical an-
tinomies.

There is one feature of the ambiguity in the con-

cept of the highest good which seems to explain why

123
the structure of the practical antinomy differs from
the structure of the theoretical antinomies. As the
previous section showed, the two senses of the high-
est good are not mutually exclusive in the way that
the two senses of the unconditioned seem to be.
Theoretical reason sets these two definitions of the
unconditioned in contrast to one another as if the
two are incompatible. Practical reason suggests that
the two definitions of the highest good are neither
mutually exclusive (the perfect good contains the
supreme good) nor do they stand in contrast to one *
another (since one definition is inadequate and the
other is adequate). In short, the ambiguity in the
idea of the unconditioned serves a different purpose
in theoretical reason than it does in practical reason.
The theoretical antinomies owe their structure di-
rectly to the contrast between two types of uncon-
ditioned. The practical antinomy owes its structure
not directly to the ambiguity between two types of
the highest good but to reason's attempt to expli-
cate the nature of the adequate sense of the highest
good.

Briefly stated, there is one extra step in the

dialectic of practical reason which does not occur
in the dialectic of theoretical reason. For practical
reason, there is a step between the ambiguity in the
object of practical reason and the antinomy. This
extra step allows for a judgment to be made about the
ambiguity. Theoretical reason, by contrast, proceeds
from the ambiguity in the idea of the unconditioned
straight to the antinomies which illustrate the con-
trasts between the two senses of the unconditioned.
Practical reason begins with the same ambiguity that
characterizes theoretical reason. But because prac-
tical reason judges the senses of the highest good
not to be mutually exclusive and not to stand in con-
trast to one another, the structure of the practical
antinomy arises from a different source.

The extra step that occurs between the ambiguity

in the object of practical reason and the practical
antinomy seems to be the addition of the phrase "the
object of the faculty of desire of rational finite
beings." It appears to be this qualification which
enables practical reason to judge that the highest
good in fact refers to the perfect good and not to the
supreme good.26 The ambiguity in the object of prac-
tical reason is resolved when it is pointed out that

124
the search is for "the object of the faculty of desire
of rational finite beings."27 The ambiguity in the
object of practical reason can be eliminated if the
object is restricted to an object for the faculty of
desire in rational finite beings. Consequently, the
two senses of the highest good do not stand in con-
flict to each other because the restriction that the
object of practical reason be an object of desire for
rational finite beings makes one sense of the highest
good inadequate. Because the object of practical
reason must be an object for the faculty of desire in
rational finite beings, there are no longer two pos-
sible senses of the highest good but only one adequate
definition and one inadequate definition. Thus, it
appears to be the addition of the phrase "the object
of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings"
that eliminates the ambiguity in the object of prac-
tical reason prior to the practical antinomy.
Clearly, the structure of the theoretical antin-
omies illustrates the contrast between the two senses
of the unconditioned. ^The structure of the practical
antinomy reflects two ways of interpreting the ade-
quate sense of the highest good. That is, practical
reason drops the sense of the highest good as supreme
good (originarium) because of its inadequacy as a prac-
tical object for rational finite beings. The object
of practical reason is the perfect good which involves
a necessary connection between virtue and happiness.
The practical antinomy develops as two apparently con-
flicting ways of interpreting the necessary connection
between virtue and happiness. The practical antinomy
debates between two different ways of understanding
the causal connection between virtue and happiness
(i.e., either happiness produces a ground for virtue
or virtue necessarily produces happiness).

Two points need to be reiterated after this at-

tempt to account for the different structures of the
theoretical and practical antinomies. First, the fact
that the structure of the practical antinomy differs
from the structure of the theoretical antinomies does
not negate the earlier claim that they have a common
origin. Both theoretical and practical reason are
characterized by an ambiguity which is stated in nearly
identical terms in the dialectics of theoretical and
practical reason. This ambiguity between senses of
the unconditioned is typical of both theoretical and
practical reason and functions as that which gives
rise to their antinomies. In both theoretical and

125
practical reason, it is this ambiguity in the idea of
the unconditioned which is the motivating force behind
the conflicts of reason with itself. Second, this
common point of origin of the antinomies appears to
be their strongest point of similarity. At the begin-
ning of this chapter it was suggested that apart from
their common point of origin, the theoretical and
practical antinomies are essentially different. Al-
ready it is clear that practical reason resolves the
ambiguity in its object in a way that theoretical rea-
son does not. The ambiguity typical of theoretical
and practical reason grounds the structure of the theo-
retical antinomies in a much more direct way than ip
grounds the structure of the practical antinomy. Thus,
it would be incorrect to infer too great a degree of
similarity between the theoretical and practical an-
tinomies on the basis of their shared origin.

Several additional observations can be made con-

cerning the structure of the practical antinomy.
First, one obvious fact about the structure of the
practical antinomy is that it is not stated in the
form of a logical contradiction. The antinomy reads:
"the desire for happiness must be the motive to maxims
of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the efficient
cause of happiness."28 Certainly the statements "the
desire for happiness must be the motive of virtue" and
"virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness" do
not stand in logical contradiction to one another.
In Chapter One, it was shown that the structure of the
theoretical antinomies in their simplest form could
be labeled "X" and "not-X."29 These logical labels
cannot be applied to the two propositions in the prac-
tical antinomy since the two propositions do not stand
to one another as "X" and "not-X." There is no logi-
cal contradiction between the statements "the desire
for happiness produces a ground for virtue" and "vir-
tue necessarily produces happiness."

One reason why there is no logical contradiction

between the two propositions in the practical antinomy
is that the propositions both assert positive causal
connection. Both of the propositions in the practical
antinomy claim that a certain causal relationship
exists between virtue and happiness. The goal of the
antinomy is to discover what type of causal relation-
ship links virtue and happiness. Thus, the two prop-
ositions in the antinomy assert a causal connection
between virtue and happiness. The two propositions
are not logically contradictory because one is the

126
inverse of the other. One proposition states that
"happiness produces a ground for virtue." The inverse
proposition states that "virtue necessarily produces
happiness." ^f_ the propositions in the practical an-
tinomy were logically contradictory, they would appear
in one of the two following forms:
Happiness produces a ground for virtue,
or happiness does not produce a ground
for virtue.
Virtue necessarily produces happiness,
or virtue does not necessarily produce
happiness.
But the practical antinomy states neither of these two
conflicts. The practical antinomy involves no logical
contradiction because there is no logical conflict
between its claims that happiness produces virtue and
virtue necessarily produces happiness.
Kant however does believe that the practical an-
tinomy exhibits the "conflict of a practical reason
with itself."30 He refers to "the self-contradictions
of pure practical reason"31 that must be resolved in
the dialectic of practical reason. Although the prop-
ositions in the practical antinomy are not logically
contradictory in the way that the claims of the theo-
retical antinomies are, they are contradictory, says
Kant, in a certain sense. Kant's reason for calling
the conflict of practical reason an "antinomy" can
be traced to his claim that the practical antinomy
exhibits a type of contradiction.
The structure of the theoretical antinomies in
their simplest form can be labeled "X or ^X." The
theoretical antinomies form a strict disjunction in
which one term is the negation of the other. The
structure of the practical antinomy is "(H •+ V) or
(V •+ H) " where H = happiness and V = virtue. The
practical antinomy too is stated as a disjunction but
this time, the members of the disjunction are not
logically contradictory. The theoretical antinomies
manifest the strong "or" in that both disjuncts appar-
ently cannot be true. If "X" is true, then "%X" is
false; and if "X" isl, false, then "MC" must be true
(and similarly with 'vX") . The practical antinomy,
however, seems to utilize the weak "or." The two dis-
juncts may not exhaust all the possibilities and there
is no logical reason why both cannot be true. In this

127
case, if one of the disjuncts is true, it is impos-
sible to conclude anything about the truth or falsity
of the other disjunct. Yet, if one disjunct is false,
the truth of the other can be stated with certainty.
Now, what is of significance about the disjunc-
tions in the theoretical and practical antinomies is
the way they manifest contradiction. Kant says in his
Logic that disjunctive judgments have a peculiar char-
acter. He says:
The members of a disjunction are alto-
gether problematic judgments of which ,
nothing else is thought but that they,
taken together, are equal to the sphere
of the whole as parts of the sphere of a
cognition. . . . In one of these prob-
lematic judgments must be contained
the truth . . . because outside of
these judgments the sphere of cogni-
tion under the given conditions com-
prises nothing else, and one is opposed
to the other; consequently, there can
be true neither anything else outside
them, nor more than one among them.JZ

It seems therefore that Kant does not recognize the

weak sense of "or" that characterizes the practical
antinomy. Kant implies that a disjunctive judgment
is subject to the principle of excluded middle. He
claims that a disjunctive judgment includes as its
members opposite judgments which together form a^whole.
Only one of these opposite judgments in a disjunctive
judgment can be true. Thus, Kant characterizes dis-
junctive judgments in such a way as to require the
operation of the principle of excluded middle.
Consequently, both the theoretical and the prac-
tical antinomies are disjunctions, and as such, they
both imply the principle of excluded middle. Kant
specifically links disjunctive syllogisms with the
principle of excluded middle in section §78 of the
Logic. The two opposite disjuncts in the theoretical
antinomies serve to define a whole and only one of the
two can be true. It is immediately evident that "X"
and "^x" are opposite judgments which "together occupy
the whole sphere of the knowledge in question."33 The
theoretical antinomies illustrate a logical contradic-
tion between mutually exclusive propositions.

128
 Kant's belief is that the disjunction in the
practical antinomy reveals a similar type of contra-
diction between two mutually exclusive propositions.
He states in the section prior to the practical an-
tinomy that virtue and happiness constitute the high-
est good and that the relation between the two is one
of causal connection. On these grounds, the disjuncts
in the antinomy (H •+ V) and (V -»• H) together represent
the whole sphere of the knowledge in question. Be-
cause the principle of excluded middle seems to func-
tion in all disjunctions, the two disjuncts in the
practical antinomy represent the whole sphere of
knowledge of the highest good and one (but only one)
of them must be true. Thus, the propositions in the
practical antinomy do not seem to be logically con-
tradictory in the same way that the propositions in
the theoretical antinomies are logically contradictory.
Without the addition of the principle of excluded
middle, the practical antinomy appears not to be con-
tradictory. Nevertheless, it is clear that within
Kant's discussion of disjunctive judgments, both the
theoretical and the practical antinomies manifest
contradictoriness in that only one of two mutually
exclusive propositions can be true.

L. W. Beck notes that the propositions in the

practical antinomy are not contradictory, and from
this, he concludes that the practical antinomy is not
an antinomy "in any strict sense."34 Beck claims that
in spite of his [Kant's] statement
that he is concerned with the "self-
contradiction of pure practical reason,"
the two propositions are not contra-
dictories. 35
Beck correctly observes that there is no strict logi-
cal contradiction between the propositions in the /
practical antinomy. But he fails to notice that with
the addition of the principle of excluded middle,
Kant is able to show that of the two mutually exclu-
sive propositions, one (but only one) is true. As
for Beck's further claim that the practical antinomy
cannot strictly be called an antinomy, it has been
argued in Chapter One that the practical antinomy is
unique. If by antinomy "in a strict sense" Beck means
a strict logical contradiction of reason with itself,
then surely, the practical antinomy does not qualify
as an antinomy. (Beck does point to two other
peculiarities of the practical antinomy in order to

129
justify his conclusion that the practical antinomy is,
not an antinomy in the strict sense. These other
points will be considered in Chapter Five.)
A second observation about the practical antin-
omy provides a second reason for why there is no strict
logical contradiction between the two propositions in
the practical antinomy. Not only are the two proposi-
tions in the antinomy asserting causal connection but
they are asserting different types of causal connec-
tion. That is, the practical antinomy does not state:
happiness produces virtue or virtue produces happi-
ness. Instead it states: i

the desire for happiness must be the

motive to (die Bewegursache) maxims
of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must
be the efficient cause of (die wirkende
Ursache) happiness.36
The causality that the practical antinomy is concerned
with is not a univocal causality. The propositions in
the practical antinomy claim that the desire for happi-
ness must be the moving cause of virtue or virtue must
be the efficient cause of happiness. There is no
contradiction between these propositions because one
asserts that the desire for happiness exerts moving
causality while the other asserts that the maxim of
virtue exerts efficient causality. There seems to be
no contradiction and in fact no conflict at all be-
tween the statements "the desire for happiness must
be the Bewegursache of virtue" and "the maxim of vir»*
tue must be the wirkende Ursache of happiness." To
this extent, there is no conflict of reason with it-
self.

The disparity can be noted in two features of the

practical antinomy. First, there is the difference
already alluded to between "Bewegursache" and "wirkende
Ursache." It is certainly of significance that Kant
employs two different words to talk about the causal-
ity in the antinomy. Kant must have intended to refer
to different types of causality because of the fact
that he chose two different words to refer to that
causality. Kant has shattered the obvious parallelism
of the practical antinomy by choosing to employ two
different words for the causality in question. Now,
the reason for the employment of these two terms for
causality unfortunately escapes the English reader.
"Bewegursache" and "wirkende Ursache" both translate,

130
into the more or less equivalent English words "moving
cause" and "efficient cause." Although the particular
difference between these two terms is apparently lost,
still the fact that Kant has employed two terms to
refer to the causality in the practical antinomy means
that two different types of causality may be present
in the practical antinomy. (Neither Eisler's Kant-
lexicon^ 1 nor Mellin's Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch Der
Kritischen Philosophie^ make any mention of the dis-
tinction between "Bewegursache" and "wirkende
Ursache.")
The second factor which may destroy the parallel-
ism of the practical antinomy is the reference to the
"desire" for happiness and to the "maxim" of virtue.
A question arises as to whether the "desire" for happi-
ness is an appropriate correlate to the "maxim" of
virtue. Assume for a moment that "Bewegursache" and
"wirkende Ursache" are synonymous terms meaning effi-
cient cause. The two statements of the antinomy
would then read: the desire for happiness must be the
efficient cause of the maxims of virtue, or the maxim
of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness.
It can be asked whether the "desire for happiness" and
the "maxim of virtue" are efficient causes in any
analogous way. Does the "desire for happiness" have
the same kind of acting force or moving causality that
the "maxim of virtue" has? Surely, it is not self-
evident that a "desire" and a "maxim" can act in ana-
logous ways as efficient causes. It is at least
questionable whether the desire for happiness can act
as an efficient cause in the same way that the maxim
of virtue acts as an efficient cause.

Kant may intend the "desire" for happiness and

the "maxim" of virtue to refer to comparable practical
principles. In the Critique of Practical Reason, the
desire for happiness is identified with subjective
grounds of determination and it is set in contrast
to the practical law.39 Kant similarly defines a
maxim as a subjective practical principle and opposes
it to the practical law which is an objective practi-
cal principle.40 It may be that the "desire" for
happiness and the "maxim" of virtue are analogous sub-
jective practical principles, and as such, both evi-
dence the same type of causal efficacy. Nevertheless,
the explicit statement of the practical antinomy does
not make clear the relation between a "desire" and
a "maxim." Because of this failure, there may be a

131
possible disparity between the types of causality
provided by each.
A related fact about the practical antinomy has
to do with what is said about happiness. The antinomy
states: the desire for happiness must be the motive
to maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be
the efficient cause of happiness (my emphasis).
Either the desire for happiness causes the maxim of
virtue or the maxim of virtue causes happiness. Again,
the statement of the practical antinomy reveals the
lack of conflict between its two statements since one
speaks of the desire for happiness and the other speaks
of happiness.

These two features of the practical antinomy il-

lustrate the difficulty involved in trying to inter-
pret the structure of the practical antinomy. Both
types of difference, that between "Bewegursache" and
"wirkende Ursache" and that between "the desire for
happiness" and the "maxim of virtue," suggest that the
practical antinomy is not a simple conflict between
two propositions. Consequently, the structure of the
practical antinomy is revealed to be unlike the
structure of the theoretical antinomies in that there
is no conflict of reason with itself.
As a final point, certain conclusions follow from
this comparison of the theoretical and the practical
antinomies. From the point of view of structure, it
may be argued that the practical antinomy can be under-
stood as a development of the theoretical antinomies.~""v'
In their simplest form, the theoretical antinomies are
structured as a debate between two different defini-
tions of the unconditioned. Theoretical reason when
confronted with these two definitions of its highest
object determines that it is in conflict with itself.
The antinomies are structured as contradictions which
reflect the fact that theoretical reason is in con-
flict with itself.

The suggestion here is» that it is possible to

interpret the practical antinomy as a development of
the theoretical antinomies. In a sense, the practical
antinomy develops out of the problems raised by the
theoretical antinomies. Even more, the practical
antinomy represents a more highly evolved antinomy,
and as such, it can be seen as a further application
of the issues first raised in the theoretical antin-
omies. Briefly stated, the practical antinomy does

132
not mirror the theoretical antinomies because it in-
stead builds on the theoretical antinomies.
The claim here is that the practical antinomy
makes an advance over the theoretical antinomies. In
concrete terms, the advance occurs due to the addi-
tional consideration that the object of the highest
good must be an object for "the faculty of desire of
rational finite beings." Practical reason with the
addition of this practical limitation redirects rea-
son's search for the unconditioned. Theoretical rea-
son has abstractly considered that to which the defin-
ition of the unconditioned may apply. Practical rea-
son by adding a practical limit (that the object must
be an object for the faculty of desire of rational
finite beings) effectively redirects the concerns of
the theoretical antinomies and concentrates on a pos-
sible relationship between the two definitions of the
unconditioned. Practical reason limits the ideas of
the unconditioned to ideas that are practically pos-
sible for finite rational beings. By doing so, the
notion of the unconditioned becomes more concretely
developed by the practical antinomy than it was by the
theoretical antinomies. Because the unconditioned
need not be either a highest member or a whole series
(as the resolutions of the theoretical antinomies
show) it may be a relationship between the two (as the
practical antinomy considers).

In more ordinary terms, the practical antinomy

can be understood as an advance over the theoretical
antinomies because it considers the possible relation
between definitions previously thought to be mutually
exclusive. Theoretical reason began from the assump-
tion that the two definitions of the unconditioned
were incompatible and in fact contradictory. The
resolutions of the third and fourth theoretical an-
tinomies show that the two definitions of the uncon-
ditioned can both be true. The two definitions of the
unconditioned are only apparent contradictories. The
third and fourth theoretical antinomies resolve this
apparent contradiction by assigning one sense of the
unconditioned to the noumenal world and the other
sense of the unconditioned to the phenomenal world.
The only way that theoretical reason can acknowledge
or explain its two senses of the unconditioned is by
assigning them to different worlds.

Now, practical reason discovers a more satisfac-

tory solution to the problem of the relationship

133
between the two senses of the unconditioned. The task
of practical reason, understood as a continuation of
the task of theoretical reason, is to reconcile these
two definitions of the unconditioned. Speaking
anthropomorphically, practical reason has "learned"
from theoretical reason that the definitions of the
unconditioned are not contradictory but neither can
they be brought together "in one world" by theoreti-
cal reason. Practical reason in its antinomy finds
that it can bring together the two senses of the un-
conditioned for practically rational, finite beinas.
With the addition of this practical limitation (that
the object must be an object for the faculty of desire
of rational finite beings), practical reason can
accomplish what theoretical reason was unable to ac-
complish, namely, the reconciling of reason's two
ideas of its highest object. The practical antinomy
shows that the two senses of the unconditioned can
be related to each other in the practical world for
practically rational, finite beings.

It is this relating of the two senses of the

unconditioned in the practical world that represents
practical reason's "advance" over theoretical reason.
The claim made here is that in this light the practi-
cal antinomy can be understood as building on the con-
clusions of the theoretical antinomies. The antinomy
of practical reason could not occur systematically
before the antinomies of theoretical reason because
it arises as a development and as a further application
of the conflicts which are first of all theoretical.

134
 ENDNOTES

Recall that Kant himself does not refer to the

two definitions of the unconditioned as constituting
an ambiguity. See pages 48-9.
1
2
Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Königlich Preus-
sische Akademie der Wissenschaften; hereafter referred
to as KGS), V (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1913), 106-7;
translation by Lewis White Beck, Critique of Practical
Reason (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956),
p. 111.
3
KGS, V, 107; translation by Beck, p. 111.
4
Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's
Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 239.
KGS, V, 108; translation by Beck, Critique of
Practical Reason, p. 112.

Klaus Düsing, "Das Problem des höchsten Gutes

in Kants praktischer Philosophie," Kant-Studien, 62
(1971), 32.

KGS, V, 109; translation by Beck, Critique of

Practical Reason, p. 113.
o
KGS, V, 110; translation by Beck, Critique of
Practical Reason, p. 114.
q
W. H. Walsh, "Kant's Concept of Practical
Reason," Practical Reason, ed. S. Körner (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1974), p. 201.
10
Walsh, p. 201.

The enumeration that follows is mine not

Walsh's.
12
Walsh, p. 200.
13
Walsh, p. 201.
14
K G S , V, 109; Beck, Critique of Practical
Reason, p. 113.

W. T. Jones notes that Kant uses the uncondi-

135
tioned in the second Critique to refer both to the ob-
ject of practical reason and to the necessity attach-
ing to moral commands. Jones says, in Morality and
Freedom in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (London:
Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 70, that: "Kant
unfortunately and quite unnecessarily uses the same
expressions to describe the unconditioned character
of this [necessary] end that he uses to describe the
categorical form which some acts have." Jones too
would recognize that Walsh's discussion of the uncon-
ditioned is based on a false comparison.

KGS, V, 113; translation by Beck, Critique of

Practical Reason, pp. 117-8.

KGS, V, 110; translation by Beck, Critique of

Practical Reason, p. 114.
18
K G S , V, 110-1; translation by Beck, Critique of
Practical Reason, p. 115.

KGS; V, 110-1; Beck, Critique of Practical

Reason, p. 115.
20
K G S , V, 112-3; Beck, Critique of Practical
Reason, p. 117.
21 . .
KGS, V, 32; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason,
p. 33.
22
KGS, V, 84; translation by Beck, Critique of ^
Practical Reason, p. 87.
23 ..
KGS, V, 84; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason,
p. 86.
24
KGS, V, 113; translation by Beck, Critique of
Practical Reason, pp. 117-8.
25
KGS, V, 114; translation by Beck, Critique of
Practical Reason, p. 119.
26
K G S , V, 110-1; Beck, Critique of Practical
Reason, p. 115.
27
KGS, V, 110; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason,
p. 114.
28
KGS, V, 113; translation by Beck, Critique of
Practical Reason, pp. 117-8.
136
 29
See pages 14-5.
30
KGS, V, 115;_translation by Beck, Critique of
Practical Reason, p. 119.
KGS, V, 109; translation by Beck, Critique of
Practical Reason, p. 113.
32
K G S , IX (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de
Gruyter & Co., 1923), 107; translation by Robert S.
Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz, Logic (New York: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1974), p. 113.
•5-3

A73/B99; translation by Norman Kemp Smith,

Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1965).
34
Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of
Practical Reason, p. 247.
35
Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of
Practical Reason, p. 247.
36
K G S , V, 113; translation by Beck, Critique of
Practical Reason, pp. 117-8.
37
Rudolf Eisler, Kant-lexikon; Nachschlagewerk zu
Kants sämtlichen Schriften, Briefen und handschrift-
lichem Nachlass (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1961).
38
Georg Samuel Albert Mellin, Encyclopädisches
Wörtenbuch Der Kritischen Philosophie, V, Part 2
(180 3; rpt. Bruxelles: Culture et Civilisation,
1968), and I, Part 2 (1798; rpt. Bruxelles: Culture
et Civilisation, 1968).
39
p. 24 KGS, V, 25; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason,
40 KGS, V, 19; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason,
17.

137
 ^v

138
 CHAPTER V
THE RESOLUTION OF THE PRACTICAL ANTINOMY
The goals of this chapter are twofold. In the
first place, the structural resolution of the practi-
cal antinomy must be stated and then compared to the
resolution of the theoretical antinomies. By diagram-
ming the structure of the practical antinomy in its
logical form, the nature of its resolution can be
revealed. The diagram of the structure of the prac-
tical antinomy shows both what is required for the
resolution of the practical antinomy and how this
resolution compares to the resolution of the theoreti-
cal antinomies. The explicit point to be made by this
chapter is that the resolution of the practical antin-
omy is unique; that is, it is unlike any of the types
of solutions to the theoretical antinomies. Yet, the
very possibility of the resolution of the practical
antinomy depends on the prior resolution of the theo-
retical antinomies. The primary aim of this chapter
is to focus attention on the relationship between the
resolutions of the theoretical and the practical
antinomies.

In the second place, this chapter supports a more

far-reaching claim about the nature of the relationship
between the theoretical and the practical antinomies.
This comparison of the solutions to the theoretical
and practical antinomies is of significance both in
itself and for what it may imply about the relation
between theoretical and practical reason. The antin-
omies provide the location for an extensive consider-
ation of the relationship between theoretical and
practical reason. The implicit goal of this chapter
is to suggest that the antinomies and their respective
resolutions make intelligible the relation between
theoretical reason and practical reason. This compar-
ison of the resolutions of the theoretical and prac-
tical antinomies shows that to an extent the practical
antinomy depends on the theoretical antinomies. The
practical antinomy's indebtedness to the theoretical
antinomies may reflect a similar indebtedness on the
part of practical reason to theoretical reason. In
short, the comparison of the theoretical and practi-
cal antinomies reveals a certain harmonious relation-
ship between theoretical and practical reason. In
any case, the resolution of the practical antinomy is

139
grounded in and requires the prior resolution of the
theoretical antinomies.
The present concern is to analyze the resolution
of the practical antinomy. To this end, the chapter
will proceed in two sections. The first section en-
titled "The Structural Resolution of the Practical
Antinomy" includes a diagram showing how the resolu-
tion of the practical antinomy is accomplished. It
describes the resolution of the practical antinomy
and points to the factors that make the resolution
possible. The second section is entitled "The Resolu-
tion of the Practical Antinomy as it relates to the
Resolution of the Theoretical Antinomies." In this
section, the conclusion will be reached that the
resolution of the practical antinomy is both unlike
the resolution of the theoretical antinomies and
dependent on the prior resolution of the theoretical
antinomies.

The Structural Resolution of

the Practical Antinomy
The practical antinomy was shown in Chapter Four
to have as its origin the attempt to define the high-
est good. The highest good, which is the object of
practical reason, is said to be the synthetic connec-
tion of virtue and happiness.! The antinomy arises
as an attempt to determine precisely what type of
synthetic connection is possible between virtue and
happiness. The goal of the practical antinomy is thus
not solely to resolve the conflict between its two
propositions (striving for happiness produces virtue
or virtue produces happiness) but also to discover
which proposition insures that the highest good is a
possible object for practical reason. Practical rea-
son's "interest" in this antinomy is more than just
the desire to eliminate the self-contradiction of its
propositions. Practical reason intends to determine
in the resolution of its antinomy the proper defini-
tion of the highest good.

What is here being called practical reason's

"interest" in the antinomy is significant because of
the way it structures the resolution of the antinomy.
Kant speaks in the second Critique of the interest of
practical reason as equivalent to "moral interest."2
Moral interest is an interest in obedience to the law.
This interest in obedience to the law does not con-
flict with what is here called practical reason's

140
"interest" in the resolution of its antinomy. Moral
interest is practical reason's desire to carry out the
moral law. What is here called practical reason's
"interest" in the antinomy is practical reason's desire
to establish an object for the moral law. Practical
reason is not indifferent to the resolution of its
antinomy since the resolution will determine whether
or not the highest good is a possible object for prac-
tical reason. The moral law which commands that the
highest good be furthered has been shown to be a fact
of experience in the Analytic.3 Therefore, if the
practical antinomy cannot be solved in such a way as
to make the highest good a possible object, then the
moral law (and practical reason's claim to objective
reality) will be shown to be false.
However, it may be suggested that practical
reason's "interest" in the antinomy has no effect on
the structuring of the practical antinomy since the
structure of the practical antinomy resembles the
structure of the mathematical antinomies of theoreti-
cal reason. Practical reason claims that if^ the high-
est good is a practical object then happiness causes
virtue or virtue causes happiness. The mathematical
antinomies of theoretical reason can be interpreted
as claiming that _if_ the unconditioned is a theoretical
object then it is the highest member of the series or
it is the infinite series as a whole. The practical
antinomy is resolved when both sides are shown to be
impossible (unmöglich)4 and the mathematical antin-
omies are similarly resolved when both sides are shown
to be false.5 Thus far, the resolution of the prac-
tical antinomy seems to be proceeding analogously to
the resolution of the mathematical antinomies. The
difference lies in the fact that practical reason is
not satisfied with this conclusion that the highest
good is not a practical object. Practical reason is
already convinced prior to the antinomy that the high-
est good (the object of the moral law) must be a pos-
sible practical object, and thus the resolution which
finds both definitions of the highest good to be impos-
sible must be amended by further considerations. In
short, the "interest" of practical reason requires
that one side of the antinomy not be absolutely false.
In contrast, theoretical reason is satisfied when both
sides of the mathematical antinomies are said to be
false. Theoretical reason has no "interest" in trying
to confirm that the idea of the unconditioned is a pos-
sible theoretical object by adding further consider-
ations. The resolution of the practical antinomy can

141
be expected to proceed in an unusual way because of
practical reason's underlying "interest" in establish-
ing the highest good as the object of the moral law
and of practical reason. As Kant says, theoretical
reason's only interest consists in the knowledge of
objects while practical reason's interest lies "in the
determination of the will with respect to the final
and perfect end."6 The interest of practical reason
is said to have primacy over the interest of theoreti-
cal reason.? This interest of practical reason cannot
be satisfied unless the highest good is shown to be
a possible practical object.
Another indication of the peculiar structure of
the resolution of the practical antinomy is that the
section in which both sides of the antinomy are said
to be impossible is not the section called the "Criti-
cal Resolution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason."8
Apparently, the initial solving of the antinomy by
showing both sides to be impossible is not an adequate
resolution of the antinomy because it has not made
the highest good a possible practical object. Never-
theless, this consideration of the solution to the
practical antinomy will include both of the stages
in the resolving of the antinomy.

A final clue to the uniqueness of the resolution

of the practical antinomy is given in the German text.
Kant uses the phrase "kritische Entscheidung" to refer
to the critical solution of the theoretical antin-
mies.9 Yet, he uses the phrase "kritische Aufhebung"
to refer to the critical resolution of the practical
antinomy.I" The difference between "Entscheidung"
and "Aufhebung" may be reflected in the differences
between the resolutions offered for the theoretical
and the practical antinomies.H
The resolving of the practical antinomy seems to
begin in the following way at V, 113-4 (not yet called
the Critical Resolution of the antinomy). The follow-
ing diagram is employed as an aid for clarifying the
structure of the solution to the antinomy and not as
the complete logical formalization of the antinomy's
structure.

142
 C = concept of the highest good
H = happiness
V = virtue

1. C •+ ( [H -i- V] v [V •* H] )
2. (H ->- V) -• (p & ^p)
3 . M H -* V) MT
4 . (V -> H) ->-(p & ^ p )
5 . M V •*• H) MT
6 . M [H -* V] V [V ->• H] ) Conj., DM
7 . -VC MT
Yet, C
In ordinary terms, this diagram summarizes the
solution of the practical antinomy insofar as both
sides of the antinomy are said to be impossible
(unmöglich) and false (falsch). Both sides of the
antinomy ( [H ->• V] and [V -»- H] ) are false because they
result in false or contradictory consequents. In
spite of what the diagram seems to suggest, the con-
tradictions that follow from (H •*• V) and (V •*• H) are
not identical. (H -»• V) is false because if it were
true it would contradict the moral law. (V •*• H)
is false because if it were true it would contradict
the laws of the sensible world. If neither type of
causal connection is possible then the highest good
is impossible. Finally, if the highest good is impos-
sible then the moral law is an empty illusion. How-
ever, the Analytic has proven the fact of the moral
law, 12 an< j that the object of the moral law is the
highest good,13 a n d that virtue and happiness together
constitute the highest good.l 4 In order to satisfy
the "interest" of practical reason, the resolution of
the antinomy is reconsidered with the goal of making
possible the concept of the highest good.

Kant does not state in the section "The Antinomy

of Practical Reason" that the concept of the highest
good is a possible practical object. That is, the
structure of the solution diagrammed here reflects
the explicit structure of the resolution except for
the last step (Yet, C) which is an implicit part of
the proof. In this section, Kant is speaking hypothet-
ically of "C" but it is implicitly clear that "C" is
to be the result of the resolution in order to insure
the validity of the moral law. Thus although this
first solution to the practical antinomy shows that
"C" is an impossible concept, the critical resolution
of the antinomy must dispel the apparent falseness

143
of both sides of the antinomy to guarantee the pos-
sibility of "C." The resolution is in a sense a two-
step resolution. First, the apparent contradiction
between the propositions in the antinomy is eliminated
by showing both propositions to be false. (This first
step is identical to the resolution of the mathemati-
cal antinomies of theoretical reason.) Second, the
apparent falsity of the two propositions in the antin-
omy is eliminated to insure the practical possibility
of the concept of the highest good.
These two steps in the resolution of the prac-
tical antinomy indicate that the practical antinomy
is in effect an antinomy within an antinomy. The
"real" practical antinomy that is finally subject to
a critical resolution is a modified version of what
is stated to be the practical antinomy. There are two
steps in the resolution of the antinomy because there
are in fact two versions of the practical antinomy.
The practical antinomy is first stated in the follow-
ing way: C •+( [H -»• V] v [V -»• H]) . "C" is a hypothet-
ical here; its truth or falsity is not known. The
conflict between the claims (H •* V) and (V -*- H) is
resolved when both sides are shown to be false. The
modified version of the practical antinomy (which Kant
apparently considers to be the "real" practical antin-
omy) formulates the antinomy in the same way but
treats "C" not as a hypothetical but as a true state-
ment. The conflict between (H -*• V) and (V -»• H) in this
modified version of the antinomy is solved by means
of the critical resolution which finds (V -+ H) to be
true in a certain sense. Thus, the distinction be-
tween these two steps in the resolution of the prac-
tical antinomy makes possible a similar distinction
between two versions of the practical antinomy and
therefore supports the claim that the practical antin-
omy is an antinomy within an antinomy.

There must be some considerations which make it

possible for practical reason to achieve in its criti-
cal resolution what it was unable to achieve in the
first step of its solution. Some factors apparently
enable practical reason to move beyond the proof of
the impossibility of "C." The discovery of these
additional considerations will indicate the extent to
which practical reason is indebted to theoretical rea-
son. The second attempt to resolve the practical
antinomy (i.e., the critical resolution) can effec-
tively guarantee the possibility of "C" due to these
factors it brings to bear on the antinomy.

144
 The critical resolution of the practical antinomy
which substantiates the "Yet, C" claim is described
by Kant as follows:
The first of the two propositions, viz.,
that striving for happiness produces a
ground for a virtuous disposition, is
absolutely false; the second, viz., that
a virtuous disposition necessarily pro-
duces happiness, is not, however, abso-
lutely false but false only in so far as
this disposition is regarded as the form
of causality in the world of sense.
Consequently, it is false only if I
assume existence in this world to be
the only mode of existence of a rational
being, and therefore it is only condi-
tionally false.15
Thus, the claim that virtue produces happiness is only
conditionally, not absolutely, false. "Virtue pro-
duces happiness" is conditionally false because it
is false only in the sensible world. "Happiness pro-
duces virtue" is absolutely false because it conflicts
with the moral law. If finite rational beings have a
mode of existence in a world other than the sensible,
then "virtue produces happiness" may be true in that
other world. The establishing of the possibility of
the highest good depends then on a distinction between
a sensible and a nonsensible world. The concept of
the highest good is a practical object because by
postulating the existence of a nonsensible world,
"virtue produces happiness" can be made true. As Kant
says:

we see ourselves obliged to seek at

such distance—namely, in the context
of an intelligible world—the pos-
sibility of the highest good.l°
In short, the possibility of the highest good depends
on reason's ability to distinguish between a sensible
and a supersensible world.
Thus, in one sense, the consideration which when
added to the proof of the practical antinomy makes
possible the highest good is the idea of an intelli-
gible world. The antinomy is critically resolved when
the idea of a nonsensible world makes one definition
of the highest good possible. "Yet, C" is the result

145
of the critical resolution of the antinomy even though
the proof structure of the antinomy shows "C" to be
impossible in the world. The practical antinomy is
resolved in a way that satisfies the "interest* of
practical reason by the distinction between a sensible
and an intelligible realm of experience. Kant says
that "happiness produces virtue" is absolutely false
but that "virtue produces happiness" is only condi-
tionally false since if rational beings have a nonsen-
sible mode of existence, then "virtue produces happi-
ness" can be true.-*-'
Kant speaks in an even more specific fashion
about this idea of an intelligible world which insures
the possibility of the highest good. Kant is concerned
to show that the postulation of an intelligible world
is not an arbitrary or an ungrounded assumption. In
other words, the critical resolution of the antinomy
includes a justification of the idea of an intelligible
world. Since the idea of a nonsensible realm of
experience guarantees the possibility of the highest
good, it remains to ask what guarantees the possibil-
ity of this nonsensible realm of experience. In a
sense then, the possibility of the highest good rests
on this larger question concerning what grounds the
possibility of an intelligible realm of experience.

Kant says the following about what grounds the

assumption of an intelligible world.
But not only since I am justified in
thinking of my existence as that of a
noumenon in an intelligible world but
also since I have in the moral law a
pure intellectual determining ground
of my causality (in the sensuous world),
it is not impossible that the morality
of intention should have a necessary
relation as cause to happiness as an
effect in the sensuous world; but this
relation is indirect, mediated by an
intelligible Author of nature.I"

Kant points to several considerations that make pos-

sible the causal relation "virtue produces happiness"
(and consequently that make possible the highest
good). A restating of the above paragraph would read:
"Virtue produces happiness" is not impossible since
I can think myself as a noumenon, since the moral law
shows a causal relation between the intelligible and

146
the sensible, and since an intelligible Author of nature
mediates the "virtue produces happiness" relation.
The three considerations which ground the possibility
that virtue produces happiness are: the noumenal
existence of rational beings, the fact of the moral
law, and the existence of an intelligible Author of
nature.
The question remains as to what grounds these
three considerations that guarantee the possibility
of the highest good. Kant appeals to these three con-
siderations as if they are established facts which can
function in turn to establish the possibility of the
highest good. Consequently, there must be grounds for
introducing these three notions at this point.
Kant appeals to noumenal existence, the moral
law, and an intelligible Author of nature because
their justification has been given in earlier parts
of the critical system. These three notions can be
used in the practical antinomy to insure the possibil-
ity of the highest good since the notions themselves
have been guaranteed by previous arguments in the
Critiques. Specifically, noumenal existence has been
made possible in the third antinomy of theoretical
reason. That antinomy showed that freedom and the
laws of nature were both true if the intelligible
world is distinguished from the sensible world. The
third antinomy of theoretical reason made possible
and grounded the notion of noumenal existence that
appears in the resolution of the practical antinomy.
Similarly, the moral law has been accounted for
in the Analytic of Practical Reason. The moral law
can function as a reason for concluding that "virtue
produces happiness" is true because the moral law has
been established in the Analytic as a fact of experi-
ence. Finally, an intelligible Author of nature has
been made possible in the fourth antinomy and in the
Ideal of theoretical reason. The fourth antinomy of
theoretical reason makes possible the idea of a neces-
sary being outside the world. Nothing in theoretical
reason can prove the impossibility of this intelligible
necessary being. Thus, again, these considerations
(i.e., the moral law, and an intelligible Author of
nature) that are brought forward to prove the possibil-
ity of the highest good have been previously justified
by Kant.

The three considerations which are necessary to

147
prove the possibility of the highest good have all
been established in previous sections of the Critiques.
It is of interest that the critical resolution of the
practical antinomy depends to such a great extent on
specific conclusions from earlier sections. Kant says
that the critical resolution of the practical antinomy
requires the postulation of an intelligible world.19
But more precisely, the resolution of the practical
antinomy is shown to depend on the possibility of
noumenal existence, of the moral law, and of an intel-
ligible Author of nature. It is the third theoretical
antinomy, the Analytic of Practical Reason, and the
fourth theoretical antinomy and Ideal which serve
respectively to prove the possibility of noumenal
existence, the moral law, and an intelligible Author of
nature. Then, noumenal existence, the moral law, and
an intelligible Author of nature serve in turn to
prove it is possible that "virtue produces happiness."
Finally, since "virtue produces happiness" is true in
a certain sense, the concept of the highest good is
proven to be a possible practical object. The criti-
cal resolution of the practical antinomy rests on con-
siderations from previous sections which confirm the
possibility of an intelligible world.

In sum, the resolution of the practical antinomy

is structured in the following way. Kant first states
that both sides of the antinomy ("happiness produces
virtue" and "virtue produces happiness") are impos-
sible, and thus, the highest good is impossible and
the moral law is false. The diagram given previously
in this section revealed the logical structure of
this stage in the antinomy's resolution. Next, the
critical resolution claimed that "happiness produces
virtue" is absolutely false whereas "virtue produces
happiness" is only conditionally false. On the assump-
tion that sensible existence is not the only mode of
existence, it may be true that "virtue produces happi-
ness." This assumption of a supersensible world,
which is necessary to make the highest good possible,
is not an ungrounded supposition. Three considera-
tions are offered which support practical reason's
appeal to a supersensible world. Noumenal existence
(made possible in the third theoretical antinomy) con-
firms the assumption of a supersensible world as do
the moral law (proven in the Analytic of Practical
Reason) and an intelligible Author of nature (made
possible in the fourth theoretical antinomy). These
three considerations confirm the notion of a super-
sensible world, and thus they strengthen the claim

148
that "virtue produces happiness" is only conditionally
false and may be true. As Kant says:
From this solution of the antinomy of
practical pure reason, it follows that
in practical principles a natural and
necessary connection between the con-
sciousness of morality and the expecta-
tion of proportionate happiness as its
consequence may be thought at least
possible, though it is by no means
known or understood.20

The assumption of a supersensible world finds support

from three considerations, and it in turn makes pos-
sible the "virtue produces happiness" connection.
Finally, because it is possible that "virtue produces
happiness," the concept of the highest good is made
possible.
This brings to an end the discussion of the
structural aspects of the resolution of the practical
antinomy. One point made here was that the proof
showing both sides of the antinomy to be impossible
represents a stage in the resolution of the antinomy.
It is practical reason's "interest" in establishing
the concept of the highest good that makes this first
attempt to resolve the antinomy not satisfactory.
Also, it was suggested here that the critical resolu-
tion of the antinomy depends to some extent on the
third and fourth theoretical antinomies and on the
Analytic of Practical Reason which offer support for
practical reason's assumption of a supersensible world.
The section to follow will consider in more detail
how the resolution of the practical antinomy relates
to the resolution of the theoretical antinomies.

The Resolution of the Practical Antinomy

as It Relates to the Resolution
of the Theoretical Antinomies
There are two major reasons for comparing the
resolution of the practical antinomy to the resolution
of the theoretical antinomies. One reason is to point
out their similarities and differences. The resolu-
tion of the practical antinomy may be shown to be
both similar to and different from the resolution of
the theoretical antinomies. This comparing of the
practical and theoretical resolutions makes it possible
to judge whether or not the practical resolution is

149
unique. The second reason for comparing the resolu-
tions of the practical and the theoretical antinomies
is to reveal the role of the latter with regard to
the former. The resolution of the theoretical antin-
omies plays a role in the resolving of the practical
antinomy and this role can be revealed by a comparison
of the two resolutions. Thus, the reasons for compar-
ing the resolutions of the practical and the theoreti-
cal antinomies are to show their similarities and dif-
ferences and to show what role the theoretical resolu-
tion plays in the practical resolution.
Kant himself is interested in the relationship
between the resolutions of the theoretical and the
practical antinomies at least insofar as he notes a
similarity between the two resolutions. He specifi-
cally compares the critical resolution of the practi-
cal antinomy to the resolution of the third theoreti-
cal antinomy. Kant says in the section called the
"Critical Resolution of the Antinomy of Practical
Reason":
In the antinomy of pure speculative reason
there is a similar conflict between
natural necessity and freedom in the
causation of events in the world. It
was resolved by showing that there is
no true conflict if the events and even
the world in which they occur are
regarded as only appearances (as they
should b e ) . . . . It is just the same
with the present antinomy of pure prac-
tical reason.21
Kant's point is that the third theoretical antinomy is
resolved when a distinction is made between appear-
ances and things in themselves. The third theoretical
antinomy is resolved by showing that there is no true
conflict between its claims if the distinction between
phenomena and noumena is drawn.
According to Kant, the resolution of the practi-
cal antinomy is just the same as the resolution of the
third theoretical antinomy. The practical resolution
is the same as the resolution of the third theoretical
antinomy because both are accomplished by distinguish-
ing between phenomena and noumena. Edward Caird
reiterates Kant's point when he says of the practical
antinomy:

150
 It is an antinomy that can be solved,
however, by the same distinction between
phenomena and noumena which enabled us,
in the Critique of Pure Reason, to get
over the antinomy between natural ne-
cessity and freedom.22
Earlier discussions also substantiate Kant's claim
that the resolution of the practical antinomy, like
the resolution of the third theoretical antinomy,
depends on separating the phenomenal from the noumenal
(or the sensible from the supersensible)."
Yet, several problems arise from this comparison
which suggest that Kant may have oversimplified the
relationship between the resolutions of the theoreti-
cal and the practical antinomies. One problem is why
Kant chose to compare the practical resolution to
the resolution of the third theoretical antinomy when
in fact all the theoretical antinomies are solved by
means of a distinction between appearances and things
in themselves.24 The theoretical antinomies are
resolved (all sides are false) when it is shown that
they mistakenly treat their object as a thing in it-
self rather than as a possible appearance.25 Yet,
the third and fourth antinomies also employ the phenom-
ena/noumena distinction in a stronger sense as refer-
ring to realms of experience in which their conflicting
claims can both be true.

Perhaps Kant chose the resolution of the third

antinomy because its claims were dynamical not math-
ematical. Assuming this to be the case, it can be
asked how the resolution of the third antinomy is more
like the resolution of the practical antinomy than is
the resolution of the mathematical antinomies. Per-
haps the resolution of the practical antinomy is just
the same as the resolution of the third theoretical
antinomy with regards to the truth or falsity of its
claims. Another possibility is that the resolution
of the practical antinomy is like the resolution of
the third antinomy because the conflicting sides of
the antinomy are assigned to different realms.
All of these problems make it imperative to recon-
sider Kant's assertion that the resolution of the prac-
tical antinomy is just the same as the resolution of
the third theoretical antinomy. The raising of these
difficulties indicates that there may be more differ-

151
ences than similarities between the resolution of the
practical antinomy and the resolution of the third
theoretical antinomy. Specifically, since Kant chooses
to compare the practical antinomy to the third theoret-
ical antinomy, their similarities (and differences)
must be considered in some detail.
The problem is to determine why Kant identifies
the resolution of the practical antinomy with the
resolution of the third theoretical antinomy. One
possibility is that the dynamical nature of the third
antinomy makes its resolution a better pattern for the
practical resolution than is the resolution of the
mathematical antinomies. There are two characteris-
tics typical of the resolution of the dynamical antin-
omies that may be reflected in the resolution of the
practical antinomy. One factor typical of the resolu-
tion of the dynamical antinomies is that both thesis
and antithesis are found to be true.2^ The third
theoretical antinomy is resolved when both its con-
flicting claims are shown to be true.
Clearly, it is not this point in the resolution
of the third antinomy that leads Kant to say that the
theoretical resolution functions as a pattern for the
practical resolution. In the resolution of the prac-
tical antinomy it is not the case that both its con-
flicting claims are shown to be true. The critical
resolution of the practical antinomy finds one side
of the antinomy to be absolutely false and the other
side to be conditionally false.27 To insure the
possibility of the highest good, the resolution of
the practical antinomy sees that the claim which is
conditionally false is also true in a certain sense.
Thus, the resolution of the practical antinomy ulti-
mately shows that one of its claims is absolutely
false and the other is true in a certain sense.

In short, there is no similarity whatsoever be-

tween the resolutions of the dynamical antinomies and
the practical antinomy with regard to the truth or
falsity of their claims. There is only difference
between the resolution of the third antinomy (both
sides are true) and the resolution of the practical
antinomy (one side is false, the other is true in a
certain sense) in regard to the truth of their claims.
Thus, Kant could not have been referring to this aspect
of the resolution of the third antinomy when he stated
that the practical antinomy's resolution was just like
the third antinomy's resolution.

152
 This point of difference between the resolution
of the third antinomy and that of the practical antin-
omy has been noted by Victor Delbos. In his discus-
sion of the practical antinomy, Delbos says:
even though Kant works hard to present
the solutions of these two antinomies
[the third theoretical and the prac-
tical] as corresponding and symmetrical,
in reality he institutes a new way of
escaping from the conflict between the
thesis and the antithesis.28

Delbos reiterates the conclusion of the previous

paragraph. Although Kant claims there is similarity
between the resolutions of the third theoretical and
the practical antinomies, the similarity is not to
be found in the way that their self-contradictory
claims are reconciled. Kant in fact offers in the
practical antinomy a new way of resolving the conflict
between assertions. As Delbos suggests, it is only in
the practical antinomy that the resolution is accom-
plished by revealing one claim to be false and the
other to be true in a certain sense. (The resolution
of the mathematical antinomies shows both claims to
be false and the resolution of the dynamical antin-
omies shows both claims to be true.)^9

There is a second factor typical of the resolu-

tion of the dynamical antinomies (and so of the third
antinomy) that may explain why Kant identified the
practical antinomy's resolution with the third antin-
omy's resolution. The resolution of the dynamical
antinomies is accomplished by assigning its self-
contradictory claims to different realms of experi-
ence. That is, the conflict between its assertions
is eliminated by assigning one assertion to the realm
of the sensible and the other to the realm of the
supersensible.30 Perhaps it is this activity of
assigning its self-contradictory claims to different
realms of experience that makes the resolution of the
third antinomy the pattern for the resolution of the
practical antinomy.

Yet, it seems that this characteristic of the

solution to the third antinomy again points to its
difference from rather than its similarity to the
resolution of the practical antinomy. The resolution
of the third antinomy uses the phenomena/noumena dis-
tinction in order to eliminate the conflict between

153
thesis and antithesis by assigning them to the distin-
guishable phenomenal and noumenal realms. There is
no comparable step in the resolution of the practical
antinomy. The solution to the practical antinomy does
not employ the phenomena/noumena distinction in order
to establish appropriate realms of experience for both
its conflicting claims. In fact, the resolution of
the practical antinomy shows that there is no realm
of experience in which its claim "happiness produces
virtue" can be true. Thus, the resolution of the prac-
tical antinomy is not like the resolution of the third
antinomy in terms of the use to which it puts the phencm-
ena/noumena distinction. The practical antinomy in
its resolution uses the phenomena/noumena distinction
to insure the possibility of its claim "virtue pro-
duces happiness." The third theoretical antinomy
uses the phenomena/noumena distinction in its resolu-
tion to insure the possibility of both of its claims.

Lewis White Beck also points to this difference

between the resolution of the third antinomy and the
resolution of the practical antinomy. Beck suggests
that the analogy Kant draws between the two resolutions
is not in fact achieved. Beck's criticism of Kant's
analogy between the practical antinomy and the third
antinomy is included in a statement containing his
general objections to the practical antinomy. (Parts
of this statement have been cited previously.)31
But it should be obvious that we do not
have here an antinomy in any strict
sense. First, in spite of his [Kant's]
statement that he is concerned with the
"self-contradiction of pure practical
reason," the two propositions are not
contradictories. Second, each does
not have an independent warrant; one of
them is false on its face. The whole
antinomy is devised and artificial.
Third, its resolution is not what one
would expect from the proffered analogy
to the third antinomy. For there the
antithesis is vindicated in the phe-
nomenal world and the thesis in the
noumenal; here the thesis is not vin-
dicated at all.32

All three of Beck's claims have been substan-

tiated in the course of this investigation and to-
gether they give evidence for his conclusion that the

154
practical antinomy is not an antinomy in any strict
sense. Certainly, the present difficulty in locating
the similarity between the practical antinomy and the
third antinomy lends support to Beck's claim that the
practical antinomy is not in a strict sense an antin-
omy. Yet, Beck's conclusion can be put into perspec-
tive by recalling that it is Beck himself who enumer-
ates these three criteria for a "strict" antinomy.
Kant does not suggest that the theoretical antinomies
or these three criteria function as standards for the
practical antinomy. Beck fails to account in Kantian
terms for why the practical antinomy is called an
antinomy. This investigation explores in greater
detail the relation between the theoretical and the
practical antinomies with the purpose of giving an
account of their similarities and differences in
Kantian terms.
The first possible reason why Kant chose to com-
pare the practical resolution to the third antinomy's
resolution was due to the latter's dynamical nature.
Two factors characteristic of the resolution to the
dynamical antinomies (i.e., both conflicting claims
are true, the claims are assigned to different realms
of experience) have been discussed here and shown to
be not characteristic of the resolution of the prac-
tical antinomy. Kant's assertion that the practical
resolution is just like the resolution of the third
antinomy has been considerably weakened by the previ-
ous attempts to locate their points of similarity. One
additional conclusion follows from these attempts to
locate the similarity of the two resolutions in the
dynamical nature of the third antinomy. Even if some
similarity were found between the resolutions of the
dynamical antinomies and the practical antinomy,
nothing in particular would be proven about the third
antinomy. At best the previous discussion could
have revealed a similarity between the resolution of
the dynamical antinomies and the resolution of the
practical antinomy. It still would have suggested
no reason why Kant chose the third antinomy's resolu-
tion rather than that of the fourth antinomy as the
pattern for the practical antinomy's resolution.

A second and more likely reason why Kant compared

the resolution of the practical antinomy to the resolu-
tion of the third theoretical antinomy is that the
phenomena/noumena distinction functions in both antin-
omies to insure freedom. The resolution of the prac-
tical antinomy is like the resolution of the third

155
theoretical antinomy in that it makes possible freedom.
The resolution of the third antinomy validates in a
sense the idea of transcendental freedom.33 Similarly,
the solution of the practical antinomy affirms the
possibility of the moral law and thus the existence
of practical freedom. One factor that the resolutions
do seem to have in common is the prominence they accord
the idea of freedom. Kant apparently chose to compare
the practical antinomy's resolution to the third
antinomy's resolution not because of the latter's
dynamical nature but because the latter's dynamical
nature functions in a way that makes transcendental
freedom logically possible. The practical resolution
is like the third antinomy's resolution not merely
because both employ the phenomena/noumena distinction.
What sets the resolution of the third antinomy apart
from the resolutions of the other theoretical antin-
omies is that it makes transcendental freedom possible.
The practical resolution is just the same as the third
antinomy's resolution in that both use the idea of a
noumenal realm to make freedom possible.

In spite of this point of similarity between the

resolutions of the practical and the third theoreti-
cal antinomies, the fact remains that the differences
outweigh the similarities. The resolution of the
practical antinomy appears to be essentially different
in kind from the resolution of the theoretical antin-
omies. What causes the differences between the two types
of resolutions is apparently a difference in the
status of their respective claims. The claims of the
practical antinomy are not self-contradictory even
though the conflict is eliminated by finding one claim
to be false and the other to be true in a certain
sense. The claims of the theoretical antinomies are
logically self-contradictory although their conflict
is eliminated by showing both claims to be false (in
the dynamical antinomies, both claims can also be
true). The solution to the practical antinomy employs
the phenomena/noumena distinction in order to make one
of its claims true. However, the solution to the
dynamical antinomies uses the phenomena/noumena dis-
tinction to make both of its claims true. These dif-
ferences between the resolutions of the theoretical
and practical antinomies indicate clearly that the
solving of the practical antinomy is not structurally
analogous to the prior solving of the theoretical
antinomies. The resolution of the practical antinomy
is unique in that no structural analogue is present
in the resolution of the theoretical antinomies.

156
 This comparison of the resolution of the theoret-
ical antinomies with the resolution of the practical
antinomy makes possible a consideration of the impor-
tance of the former for the latter. It is not suf-
ficient to show that the resolution of the practical
antinomy is unique and does not structurally reflect
the resolution of the theoretical antinomies. In spite
of their lack of similarity, the resolution of the
theoretical antinomies plays a role in facilitating
the solution to the practical antinomy. (This role
has been alluded to on pages 148-9.) The resolution
of the practical antinomy depends on the prior resolu-
tion of the theoretical antinomies in the following
two ways.
First, the theoretical antinomies play an impor-
tant role in the resolving of the practical antinomy
because they suggest the possibility of linking the
sensible and supersensible worlds. It is the dynami-
cal antinomies which first raise the possibility of
an unconditioned "outside" the world, and therefore
certain assertions not true in the sensible world can
be postulated as true in the supersensible world. The
theoretical antinomies suggest that something which is
false or impossible in the sensible world (i.e., there
is freedom, there is a necessary being) may well be
true or possible in the supersensible world. The
resolution of the theoretical antinomies makes the
nonsensible realm of experience accessible to the ideas
of reason.

By recognizing that reason has access to although

it cannot know the supersensible world, the resolution
of the theoretical antinomies makes possible the
critical resolution of the practical antinomy. The
practical antinomy first discovers that both its
assertions are impossible in the sensible world. The
critical resolution of the practical antinomy finds
however that "virtue produces happiness" may be true
in the supersensible world. Thus, the resolution of
the theoretical antinomies sets a precedent in allow-
ing reason access to the supersensible world, and the
practical antinomy takes advantage of this precedent
in order to resolve the conflict between its asser-
tions. In the practical antinomy, the possibility of
connecting happiness and virtue is realized because
the theoretical antinomies have granted reason access
to the supersensible. The theoretical antinomies play
an important role for the practical antinomy since

157
their indication of reason's capabilities makes pos-
sible the linking of happiness and virtue.
Second, the theoretical antinomies play an
important role in the resolving of the practical an-
tinomy because they confirm the reality of the highest
good. That is, the theoretical antinomies not only
make it possible that "virtue produces happiness" (by
suggesting reason's access to the supersensible), they
also confirm the reality that "virtue produces happi-
ness" (by functioning as evidence for the reality of
this connection). In a general way, the theoretical
antinomies facilitate the resolution of the practical
antinomy by suggesting reason's access to the super-
sensible. In a more specific way, the theoretical
antinomies (at least the dynamical antinomies) offer
evidence for the truth of the claim that "virtue pro-
duces happiness." "Virtue produces happiness" is
true, says Kant, because it is justified by noumenal
existence, the moral law, and an intelligible Author
of nature.34 These three ideas of practical reason
serve as support for the claim that virtue produces
happiness. The ideas of noumenal existence and of an
intelligible Author of nature arose and were made
possible in the third and fourth theoretical antino-
mies. The reality of the concept of the highest good
thus depends to a large extent on the evidence pro-
vided for it by the third and fourth theoretical
antinomies. The resolution of the practical antinomy
follows from and in a real sense depends on the dynam-
ical antinomies because the latter make possible the
connecting of happiness and virtue and insure the
reality of that connection. Therefore, even though
the resolution of the practical antinomy is unique
(i.e., essentially different from the resolution of the
theoretical antinomies), it is indebted to and depen-
dent on the prior resolution of the theoretical
antinomies.

158
 ENDNOTES
Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Königlich Preus-
sische Akademie der Wissenschaften; hereafter referred
to as KGS), V (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1913), 113;
translation by Lewis White Beck, Critique of Practical
Reason (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956),
p. 117.
2
KGS, V, 79; Beck, p. 82.
3
KGS, V, 43, 47; Beck, pp. 44, 48.
4
KGS, V, 113; Beck, p. 118.
5
A529-30/B557-8; translation by Norman Kemp
Smith, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1965).
6
KGS, V, 120; translation by Beck, p. 124.
7
KGS, V, 121; Beck, p. 126.
8
K G S , V, 1 1 3 - 4 ; Beck, pp. 117-8.

A 4 9 7 / B 5 2 5 ; translation by Kemp Smith.

10
K G S , V , 1 1 4 ; translation by Beck, p . 118.

In the third C r i t i q u e , Kant uses yet another

term to refer to the resolution of the aesthetic and
teleological antinomies. At K G S , V, 339, 388, he calls
the resolution an "Auflösung."
12
K G S , V, 47; Beck, p . 48.
13
K G S , V, 4 3; Beck, p . 45.
14
V, 112;: Beck, p . 117.
KGS,
15
KGS, v, 114;t translation by Beck, p . 119.
16
KGS, v, 115;: translation by Beck, p. 119.
17
K G S , V, 114;; Beck, 119.
18
K G S , V, 114- -5; translation by Beck, p. 119.
19
- ^ K G S , V, 115;; Beck, p . 119.

159
 20
K G S , V, 118-9; translation by Beck, p. 123.
21
K G S , V, 114; translation by Beck, p. 118.
22
Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Im-
manuel Kant (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1889),
II, 292.
23
See pages 145-6.
24
See pages 81-5.

A505-6/B533-4; translation by Kemp Smith.

See pages 99-100.

27
K G S , V, 114; Beck, p. 119.
28
Victor Delbos, La Philosophie Pratique de Kant,
ed. Fdlix Alcan (Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer-
Bailliere et Cle., 1905), p. 476. It is my translation
from the French.
29
See page 100.
30
See page 100.
31
See pages l, 129.
32
Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's
Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 247.
33
A533-41/B561-9; translation by Kemp Smith.
34
KGS, V, 114-5; Beck, Critique of Practical
Reason, p. 119.

160
 CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
To complete the investigation of the antinomies
of theoretical and practical reason, attention must
be focused on what this investigation has revealed.
The detailed analyses of the origin, structure, and
resolution of the antinomies have been carried out in
order to shed light on the relationship between theo-
retical and practical reason. The analysis of the
antinomies of theoretical and practical reason pro-
vides the occasion for a consideration of the rela-
tionship between theoretical and practical reason.
Previous chapters have suggested that the antin-
omy section of the first Critique is of special impor-
tance. W. H. Walsh says:
Taken at its author's estimate, the
Antinomy chapter must count as the
boldest, most provocative and most
original in the whole of the first
Critique.!
These concluding pages will specify what grounds have
been given in the course of this investigation for
recognizing, as Kant apparently did, the significance
of the antinomy chapter.
In particular, the previous comparison of the
theoretical and practical antinomies results in a
specific conclusion about the relationship between
theoretical and practical reason. It is clear that
there is no conflict between the employments of theo-
retical and practical reason since, as Kant states,
they are two employments of the same faculty.^ Thus,
no matter what the task of the third Critique is to
be (presumably, it is to mediate nature and freedom
via purposiveness), its task need not concern the
mediating of theoretical and practical reason. Fur-
thermore, theoretical reason (and by extension, the
Dialectic of the first Critique) is not merely a neg-
ative propadeutic to the next stage of the critical
system, but instead, it is the positive foundation of
that stage. Frederick Van de Pitte says that "the
first Critique is the necessary step which makes pos-
sible [the] philosophy of the highest end."3 In other
words, the first Critique (or more accurately.

161
theoretical reason) makes possible the second Critique
(or, the constitutive functioning of practical reason).
The aim of the subsequent pages is to substantiate
the claim that the analysis of the antinomies has
revealed the positive role played by theoretical rea-
son in the critical system as it stands.
One way that the discussion of the antinomies
indicates the importance of theoretical reason is by
showing that theoretical reason makes possible the
discovery of the object and the task of practical
reason. That is, theoretical reason first manifests
its positive role in the critical system by suggesting
that the object of reason (theoretical or practical)
may be an unconditioned apart from the empirical
series. Kant says in the Prolegomena that "our rea-
son, as it were, sees in its surroundings a space for
knowledge of things in themselves."4 Theoretical rea-
son plays a role in the defining of the object of
practical reason and because of this role, it can be
said that theoretical reason facilitates the function-
ing of practical reason.

The part that theoretical reason plays in formu-

lating the task of practical reason is revealed by the
following two features of theoretical reason in the
antinomy chapter. First, the ambiguity which char-
acterizes the object of theoretical reason also char-
acterizes the object of practical reason.5 in a sense
then, the ambiguity which grounds the theoretical
antinomies can be used in an analogous way as a mode
of explaining the origin of the practical antinomy.6
At least in the antinomy chapter, theoretical reason
serves as a model for practical reason. The object
of practical reason is like the object of theoretical
reason in that both are subject to the same ambiguity
which then gives rise to antinomies. Theoretical rea-
son is significant in that the ambiguity characteris-
tic of its object accounts for the origin of the prac-
tical antinomy and the difficulty in defining the ob-
ject of practical reason. Thus, the importance of
theoretical reason in the critical system is revealed
by the fact that the ambiguity which grounds the ori-
gin of the theoretical antinomies similarly grounds
the origin of the practical antinomy.

Second, theoretical reason operates in its antin-

omies in a way that foreshadows the working of prac-
tical reason. In other words, the functioning of
theoretical reason in the antinomies proposes or

162
suggests what is to be the realm of practical reason.
In Chapter Three, it was claimed that the resolutions
of the theoretical antinomies indicate two different
tasks for theoretical reason.' One method of resolv-
ing the theoretical antinomies shows that theoretical
reason falls into error because of its lack of con-
formity to the understanding.8 Consequently, theo-
retical reason's proper task must require the restric-
ting of its ideas to the sensible world of the under-
standing. Yet, the other method of resolving the
theoretical antinomies indicates that both reason and
understanding can be satisfied when theoretical reason
posits its ideas in the supersensible world.* Theo-
retical reason's task (in its dynamical ideas) does
not apparently require the restriction of its ideas
to the sensible world.
These two tasks of theoretical reason, indicated
by the resolutions of the theoretical antinomies,
describe a negative and a positive task for theoreti-
cal reason. The claim that theoretical reason prop-
erly conforms to the understanding suggests a negative
task for theoretical reason by limiting its employment
to the confines of the understanding. The claim that
theoretical reason has a possible employment outside
the realm of the sensible suggests a positive task for
theoretical reason by enabling it to posit the super-
sensible realm. The specification of this positive
task for theoretical reason in the antinomies offers
evidence for the positive role played by theoretical
reason in the developing of the critical system. In
effect, this positive task for theoretical reason
grants reason access to the supersensible realm. Kant
recognizes this positive task for theoretical reason
when he states that theoretical reason

presupposes the knowledge which is

obtained by the understanding and
which stands in immediate relation to
experience, and seeks for the unity of
this knowledge in accordance with ideas
which go far beyond all possible
experience.10
The recognition of theoretical reason's access to the
supersensible realm is the first step toward acknowl-
edging practical reason's legislating power in the
supersensible realm. Theoretical reason in its posi-
tive employment posits the supersensible realm and
by doing so, it makes possible practical reason's

163
legislation of the supersensible realm. Thus, the com-
pletion of the critical project is aided by theoretical
reason in its antinomy chapter which makes possible the
occupation of the supersensible realm by theoretical
and practical reason.
A second way that the discussion of the antinomies
indicates the importance of theoretical reason is by
showing that theoretical reason makes possible the
resolution of the practical antinomy. Previous chap-
ters have located two features characteristic of theo-
retical reason in its antinomy chapter that facilitate
the resolution of the practical antinomy. These two
traits of theoretical reason, which make possible the
solving of the practical antinomy, indicate that theo-
retical reason plays a positive role in the carrying
out of the critical project.
The first feature of theoretical reason which
functions in a way to facilitate the resolution of the
practical antinomy is its idea of a supersensible realm.
The fact that theoretical reason in its dynamical an-
tinomies proposes the idea of a supersensible realm
enables practical reason to use the idea of such a
realm to solve its antinomy. The practical antinomy
is resolved (and the highest object of practical
reason is made possible) by means of the assumption
of a supersensible (or intelligible) realm.H Kant
states specifically that three considerations ground
this assumption of a supersensible realm which is
necessary for the resolution of the practical an-
tinomy. 12 The three considerations which support the
assumption of a supersensible realm are: thinking my
existence as a noumenon, the moral law, and the idea
of an intelligible Author of nature.13

Two of the three considerations which help make

possible the solving of the practical antinomy (i.e.,
thinking my existence as a noumenon and the idea of an
intelligible Author of nature) are ideas of theoretical
reason brought forward in the theoretical antinomies.
That is, the ideas of noumenal existence and of an
intelligible Author of nature first arose as possible
ideas in the third and fourth theoretical antinomies.
One type of resolution of the dynamical antinomies
showed that both these claims (and their opposing
claims) can be said to be true.l4 These "true" cos-
mological ideas of the third and fourth antinomies are
then carried over to the second Critique in order to
offer evidence for the assumed reality of the super-

164
sensible realm. In short, two ideas of theoretical
reason (noumenal existence, an Author of nature) are
employed to help accomplish the critical resolution of
the practical antinomy.15 Theoretical reason con-
tributes in an explicit way to the resolving of the
practical antinomy.
The second feature of theoretical reason which
functions in a way to facilitate the resolution of the
practical antinomy is its suggestion that the sensible
and the supersensible can be connected. One result of
the solution to the dynamical antinomies of theoretical
reason is the indication that no conflict exists be-
tween the empirical conditions of the sensible realm
and an unconditioned in the supersensible realm.16 i n
the dynamical antinomies, both thesis and antithesis
can be said to be true and thus theoretical reason pro-
poses that it is possible to relate the series of con-
ditions in the sensible realm with an unconditioned in
the supersensible realm. "Freedom" and "Laws of
Nature" do not in fact conflict but represent the laws
of causality of a being from two different points of
view.17 Thus, the dynamical antinomies show that a
relationship is possible between the sensible and the
supersensible realms (i.e., they are not contradictory)
and the practical antinomy proceeds to consider what
type of relationship is possible.

Chapters Four and Five indicated that the prac-

tical antinomy concerns the attempt to define the
causal relationship between happiness (a good in the
sensible world) and virtue (the supreme good in the
intelligible world).18 It can be argued that practical
reason's attempt in its antinomy to define the causal
relationship between happiness and virtue arises from
theoretical reason's claim that such a relationship
between sensible conditions and a supersensible
unconditioned is possible. Consequently, the resolu-
tion of the practical antinomy (that there is a rela-
tion between happiness and virtue) is a direct result
of theoretical reason's indication in the dynamical
antinomies that the sensible and the supersensible can
be related.

On the basis of what the previous chapters have

revealed about the antinomies of theoretical and prac-
tical reason, it is apparent that there is no conflict
between theoretical and practical reason and that the
employment of theoretical reason makes possible the
employment of practical reason. Theoretical reason

165
plays an important and often overlooked role in aiding
practical reason to accomplish its tasks. Thus, con-
trary to Van de Pitte's claim, the first Critique is
not merely a "ground-clearing operation."TS The first
Critique does not function merely as a negative
propadeutic to the second Critique since theoretical
reason makes possible in a positive way the object of
practical reason. This investigation also gives evi-
dence which supports G. J. Warnock's claim that Kant's
professed respect for practical reason should instead
have been a respect for reason as a whole.20 Warnock
says that the natural outcome of Kant's theory should
have been a respect for reason as a whole.21 This
investigation goes beyond Warnock by indicating why
reason is deserving of respect. To the extent that
theoretical reason aids in the defining of the object
and the task of practical reason, it seems to be worthy
of the respect that Warnock claims Kant reserves for
practical reason.

In spite of the fact that Kant specifies no

"theory of the antinomy," this investigation showed
that precise comparisons can be drawn among the an-
tinomies and that certain conclusions follow from
those comparisons. The attempt was made to develop
some criteria for a Kantian antinomy and to carry out
the analysis and comparison of the origin, structure,
and resolution of the antinomies of theoretical and
practical reason. Finally, the result of this an-
alysis pointed to theoretical reason as that faculty
which operates in a positive way to ground and to
facilitate the functioning of practical reason.

166
 ENDNOTES
W. H. Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1975), p. 196.
2
Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Königlich Preus-
sische Akademie der Wissenschaften; hereafter referred
to as KGS), V (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1913), 121;
translation by Lewis White Beck, Critique of Practical
Reason (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc.,
1956), p. 125.
3
Frederick Van de Pitte, Kant as Philosophical
Anthropologist (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971),
p. 38.
4
KGS, IV (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1911), 352;
translation by Lewis White Beck, Prolegomena to Any
Future Metaphysics (New York: The Liberal Arts Press,
Inc., 1950) , p. 101.
5
A417/B445; translation by Norman Kemp Smith,
Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1965) and KGS, V, 110; translation by Beck,
Critique of Practical Reason, p. 114.

See pages 112-8.

7
See pages 98-9.
8
A504-5/B532-3; translation by Kemp Smith.
Q
A530-1/B558-9; translation by Kemp Smith.
A662/B690; translation by Kemp Smith.

KGS, V, 115; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason,

p. 119. See also pages 145-6.
12
K G S , V, 114-5; Beck, Critique of Practical
Reason, p. 119.
13
K G S , V, 114-5; Beck, Critique of Practical
Reason, p. 119.
14
A531-2/B559-60; translation by Kemp Smith.
15
See pages 147-9.

167
 A531/B559; translation by Kemp Smith.
A538/B566; translation by Kemp Smith.
18
KGS, V, 110-1; Beck, Critique of Practical
Reason, pp. 114-5. See also pages 117, 140.
19
Van de Pitte, p. 38.
20
G. J. Warnock, "The Primacy of Practical
Reason," Proceedings of the British Academy, 52
(1966), 263.
Warnock, p. 263.

168
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