University of Hawai'i Press Philosophy East and West

NITOBE AND ROYCE: BUSHIDŌ AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY
Author(s): Mathew A. Foust

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 65, No. 4 (OCTOBER 2015), pp. 1174-1193
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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NITOBE AND ROYCE: BUSHIDÕ AND THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LOYALTY
Mathew A. Foust
Central Connecticut State University
foust@ccsu.edu
In recent years, scholars have increasingly paid attention to the philosophy of Josiah
Royce (1855-1916). Long lost in the shadow of fellow classical American figures
(e.g., Emerson, Pei ree, James, and Dewey), Royce's philosophy has enjoyed a re-
nascence, with a spate of publications in a variety of venues studying and apply-
ing his thought.1 Like his philosophical brethren, Royce wrote on a wide variety
of subjects, his discussions underpinned by a smattering of influences. Much has
been remarked of the various Western sources that made an impression on Royce's
thought, but comparatively little has been said of his indebtedness to Eastern sources.
Kurt Leidecker's Josiah Royce and Indian Thought 2 and Frank M. Oppenheim's
"Royce's Windows to the East"3 stand as notable exceptions, with Oppenheim's
more recent treatment offering a more comprehensive "chronological survey of
Royce's increasing interest in things Asian."4 Still, Oppenheim gives only passing
attention to the influence of Japanese thought on Royce's philosophy.5 Here, I would
like to extend the literature on Eastern influences on Royce's thought by focusing
on what is arguably the most distinctive facet of Royce's thought: his ethical the-
ory, centered on the virtue of loyalty. In particular, I would like to add detail to
what is at present a very sketchy account of the interest that Royce took in Bushidõ
ÄdrM ("the way of the warrior"). Oppenheim casts Royce's interest in Bushidõ in
these terms:
After 1904-1905, when the Japanese shocked the world with their amazing victory over
the Russians, many Americans turned eagerly to learn more about these "little people/'
Not surprisingly, then, in his most popular work, The Philosophy of Loyalty ( 1908), Royce
showed he had gained some familiarity with Japanese thought. He was fascinated by the
vigorous ethical life of the Samurai who lived by "that old moral code Bushido which
[Inazo] Nitobe has called 'the soul of Japan."'6
Nitobe's book Bushido: The Soul of Japan was originally published in 1900, more
directly on the heels of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). The surprising events
and outcome of the Russo-Japanese War (1 904-1 905), however, undoubtedly played
a role in the book's reaching its tenth English-language pressing in 1905. Indeed, in
his first allusion to Bushidõ in The Philosophy of Loyalty Royce indicates that some
interest has recently been turned toward "things Japanese," resulting from admiration
of the "absolute loyalty" of the Japanese to their national cause in the midst of "their
late war."7
1 1 74 Philosophy East & West Volume 65, Number 4 October 201 5 1 1 74-1 1 93
© 201 5 by University of Hawai'i Press
While a good deal of attention has been paid to the interest in Bushidõ in
England8 and China,9 less attention has been paid to American interest. Royce's
attraction to the subject of Bushidõ is characteristic of the interest in Japan taken by
New Englanders of his time. As Christopher Benfey observes, "Old Japan" - "Japan
as New Englanders imagined it before it was 'opened' to Western visitors and trade
in 1854" - gained appeal among New Englanders due to "a longing for a more
rooted connection to the soil, and for the aesthetic and spiritual satisfactions of a
simpler life."10 In the wake of the devastation of the American Civil War, and in the
midst of rapid industrialization, New Englanders saw in the traditions of Old Japan
an admirably austere and aesthetically cultivated lifestyle. At the same time, the
unexpected military prowess of the Japanese provoked dual sentiments of awe and
trepidation. The Japanese were an unknown commodity, and for various reasons
Americans wanted a clearer understanding of them.
By and large, accounts of Japan had come to the West from fellow Westerners
who had occasion to visit that country. Almost inevitably, their accounts treated
Japan as an exotic entity. Nitobe, on the other hand, was an insider, a Japanese inter-
preting his culture to the West. His fluency in English and agility with Western texts
and ideas facilitated his acting as a bridge across the Pacific. Any New England intel-
lectual interested in Japan would have been drawn to Nitobe's book. As for Royce, it
is not clear whether he knew that Nitobe had been awarded a Ph.D. in International
Politics from Johns Hopkins University in 1 887 - the same institution from which his
own Ph.D. in Philosophy was conferred in 1878. He certainly would have found an
affinity with the intellectual breadth evident in Nitobe's writing. Like Royce, Nitobe
unflinchingly strings together in rapid succession allusions to authors of widely di-
verse traditions. For Nitobe, this writing style carried heuristic weight; a Western
audience unfamiliar with Japanese thought and culture would be less overwhelmed
if the dissemination of these ideas was dotted with references to Browning, Schlegel,
Marx, Emerson, Nietzsche, Plato, and Shakespeare. Taken together, Nitobe and Royce
might be seen as mediating agents participating in the process of 'opening' Japan's
culture to American audiences.
Suspicions have been voiced concerning the trustworthiness of Nitobe's account
of Bushidõ. G. Cameron Hurst III has leveled what is likely the most excoriating
of criticisms, opining, "In almost every way imaginable, Nitobe was the least quali-
fied Japanese of his age to have been informing anyone of Japan's history and cul-
ture."11 In fact, Nitobe's upbringing and educational career isolated him from the
central currents of Japan and he lacked training in Japanese history and literature.
Despite the fact that no work of Nitobe's is more acclaimed than Bushido, accord-
ing to Hurst, "it is perhaps the most misleading of all his writings."12 One way in
which it is misleading is that Nitobe apparently believes that he is coining a term
with his use of 'Bushidõ.' Yuzo Ota has highlighted the fact that "it was roughly
thirty years after writing Bushido that Nitobe recognized that the word Bushido had
apparently existed before he wrote that book."13 In the words of Nitobe himself,
around 1930:
Mathew A. Foust 1 1 75
I wrote about Bushido roughly thirty years ago. Around that time, the word 'Bushido' was
seldom heard. The word apparently existed, but was not generally used. Chamberlain, a
British Japanologist, and other people who were well informed about Japanese affairs,
said that they had never heard the word 'Bushido' during their long residence in Japan
and maintained that there had not been such a thing as Bushido even in Old Japan.14
Perhaps in some sense, the origin of the word 'Bushido' is not all that significant. As
long as that which it names existed, Nitobe provided his readers a service by describ-
ing it to them. Writing in 1 905, Baron Kencho Suyematsu explains that in the Middle
Ages the phrase "'Yumi-ya-no-michi,' literally meaning 'The ways of the bow and
arrow/ came into existence, and it was the original name of Bushidõ. At first, per-
haps, the word referred more especially to the proper use of the instrument of war,
but it soon came to signify something more/'15 This "something more" pertained to
moral principles, etiquette, and modes of comportment. Certainly this constellation
of features of the samurai class is the subject matter of Nitobe's text.
However trustworthy Nitobe's account is, there is no doubt that Nitobe was
recognized - as he had aspired to be - as a bridge between Japan and the West, and
that his description of Bushidõ captivated readers in America. One can coherently
assay the influence of Nitobe's presentation of Bushidõ on Royce without scrutiniz-
ing the accuracy ofthat presentation. Before examining Royce's explicit interactions
with Nitobe's text, however, it will be instructive to see how Japan enters into Royce's
thinking immediately following the Russo-Japanese War.
Japanese Loyalty in Royce's Lectures on Modern Idealism
Allusions to Japan begin to appear with regularity in Royce's thought in his Lectures
on Modern Idealism .16 Delivered at Johns Hopkins University in 1 906 under the title
"Aspects of Post-Kantian Idealism," these lectures were compiled and published in
1 91 9 by Jacob Lowenberg, one of Royce's closest students, three years after Royce's
death. In the lecture "The Dialectical Progress of Hegel's Phaenomenologie /' Royce
parallels the view of the commonwealth that Hegel found presented in the Greek
heroic tragedy with "what we nowadays hear of the social ideals of old Japan, where
individual rights were apparently conceived wholly in terms of social station."17 Loe-
wenberg inserts a note at this juncture in the lecture: "A remarkable illustration of
this Cestalt is contained in 'The Story of the Forty-Seven' in Tales of Old Japan , col-
lected by A. B. Mitford."18 A. B. Mitford is Algernon Bertram Freeman-Mitford, also
known as First Baron Redesdale, who was the second secretary to the British lega-
tion in Japan. "The Story of the Forty-Seven," known more often as "The Forty-Seven
Ronin," is the first selection in Mitford's collection. Loewenberg's editorial insertion,
joined by Nitobe's reference to this very story,19 and to this very collection,20 suggests
the plausibility of Royce's knowing the story. The extent to which the story is, in fact,
representative of Bushidõ is a matter of debate, but it is also not a matter of urgency
for the purpose of the present essay.21
1 1 76 Philosophy East & West
In "The Story of the Forty-Seven Ronin/' a group of samurai are bereft of their
lord, Asano Takumi no Kami, who is compelled to perform hara kiri (ritual suicide)
for assaulting - after considerable provocation - a court official, Kotsuke no Suke.
The forty-seven samurai avenge their master's honor by killing Kotsuke no Suke, but
not before several months of waiting and planning and a failed attempt to persuade
him to attempt hara kiri as recompense for the death he brought upon their lord. In
turn, having committed murder, the forty-seven are sentenced to commit hara kiri , a
fate which they accept nobly. The forty-seven see it as "the duty of faithful and loyal
men"22 to avenge their master, exhibiting thoroughgoing devotion to their cause,
believing it to have value over and against that of their own individual lives. Both the
people of Old Japan and Royce in early twentieth-century America would view such
loyalty as remarkable, and perhaps even exemplary. We are loyal to our cause, Royce
writes, "just because of its own value, which it has by itself, even if you die. That is
just why one may be ready to die for his cause/'23
The context of Royce's reference to the social ideals of Japan should not be
overlooked. What might appear to be an incidental aside is, in fact, an early instance
of Royce's preoccupation with Japanese notions of loyalty. Royce's discussion of
Hegel's view of the commonwealth in the Greek heroic tragedy is part of a broader
discussion of "in what forms the self has to express itself in order to reach com-
pleteness and self-expression."24 For Hegel, the quest for completeness and self-
expression is a dialectical movement of the self, navigating its placement in relation
to the social order. "The problem of every social order," Royce asserts, "is the main-
taining of the equilibrium between individual rights and social duties."25 In language
much like that which he uses in his own discussions of the relationship between in-
dividual and society, Royce describes Hegel as holding that "the commonwealth is
conscious in and through its individuals; but they, as loyal subjects, view themselves
as its expression and instrument."26 There is no conflict for the individual self be-
tween personal rights as a free citizen over and against the public rights of the gov-
ernment, for "in this stage the loyal individual is, in ideal at least, essentially devoted
to the filling of his social station whatever that is. He has conscious rights only by
virtue of this station."27
Instead, "in such an ideal commonwealth - the ideal heroic social order of the
Greek tragedy - or the analogous ideal of old Japan, the antithesis between the indi-
vidual and the social order is represented by the conflict between family piety and
the demands of the existing rulers of the state."28 The conflict between these two is
one famously depicted in Sophocles's Antigone , a work to which Royce repeatedly
returns across his corpus and in unpublished writings.29 If Royce saw qualities in old
Japan that he saw embodied by the character of Antigone, then old Japan provoked
his admiration. In fact, Royce states that the conflict between family piety and the
demands of the state, "a conflict upon which the tragedy of Antigone is based . . .
might appear trivial in its detail were not a reader of our day reminded, by what he
hears of Japan, of the manifold ways in which patriotism and family honor, the duties
of daily life and the reverence for the dead, seem there to have stood in various
antitheses and to have involved tragic conflicts."30 Such antitheses and conflicts are
no doubt present in abundance in "The Forty-Seven," among other tales of Old Japan.
For Royce, Old Japan presented to him new variations on an old theme that was dear
to him: loyalty in the face of tragic conflict.31
Bushidõ and Royce: Japanese Loyalty in The Philosophy of Loyalty
One of Royce's stated motivations in The Philosophy of Loyalty is to "break up" the
"disastrous association" that has long endured between war and loyalty.32 Casting the
title of his own work as something of a response to Rudolf Steinmetz's recently pub-
lished The Philosophy of War,33 Royce presents The Philosophy of Loyalty as being,
in part, a reaction against recent discourse perpetuating the association of war and
loyalty. Without war, Steinmetz claims, there shall be no loyalty. It is a necessary
means to the end of cultivating this virtue among individuals and societies. For some-
one wishing to distance 'loyalty' from its popular association with war, Royce with
unusual frequency draws upon examples of loyalty connected with martial virtue.
The patriot inflamed with the war spirit, the knight of romance, and the Japanese
Samurai are among Royce's recurrently cited representatives of loyalty. Royce recog-
nizes this tension, and claims that he cites such examples solely on account of their
familiarity.34 It is evident, however, that such figures embody various qualities that he
deems admirable, even if these qualities portend the possibility of violent conflict.
Royce first makes explicit mention of the Japanese samurai in "Individualism,"
the second lecture of The Philosophy of Loyalty. In this lecture, Royce argues
against the notion that loyalty amounts to slavishness and thus fundamentally under-
mines the individual. On the contrary, Royce holds that the individual expresses
himself to his fullest when embodying thoroughgoing loyalty to a chosen cause. It is
here that Royce refers to the "absolute loyalty" of the Japanese to their national cause
"during their late war" and here that he first refers to Nitobe and his book on the "old
moral code Bushido."35 Taking care to avoid exclusively associating Japanese loyalty
with war, while subtly acknowledging the mixed feelings about the Japanese shared
among his audience, Royce says:
Well, whatever our other views regarding Japanese life and policy, I think that we have
now come to see that the ideal of Bushido, the ancient Japanese type of loyalty, despite
the barbarous life of feuds and of bloodshed in which it was first born, had very many
elements of wonderful spiritual power about it. Now, Bushido did indeed involve many
anti-individualistic features. But it never meant to those who believed in it any sort of
mere slavishness. The loyal Japanese Samurai, as he is described to us by those who know,
never lacked his own sort of self-assertion.36
In short, the loyal Japanese Samurai did not resign his capacity for reflection and
decision in the name of his cause. Much the opposite: loyalty to his cause involved
the exercise of such capacities, for he "often used his own highly trained judgment
regarding the applications of the complex code of honor under which he was
reared."37
1178 Philosophy East & West
Royce goes on to describe the loyalty of the Japanese Samurai as that which
"made the rapid and wonderful transformation of Japan possible/' crediting Bushidõ
as having led "to a wonderful and cordial solidarity of national spirit/'38 Rather than
having "made machines out of men/' Japanese loyalty "has given rise to a wonderful
development of individual talent" and "expressed itself in an heroic vigor of life
which the most energetic amongst those who love to assert themselves might well
envy."39 In fact, Royce confesses his envying the "spiritual peace and inner perfec-
tion" that the Japanese seem to have cultivated via their loyalty.40 Although Royce
claims to "not believe, in fact, that the Japanese have rightly conceived the true worth
of the individual"41 and that he does "not believe that the Japanese ought to be our
models,"42 these qualifications are joined by little in the way of elaboration, save for
the assertion that "Our civilization has its own moral problems, and must meet them
in its own way."43 While Royce might very well have thought that his civilization
needed to meet its own problems in its own way, he clearly saw in Bushidõ a way
that was inspirational.
Royce closes the lecture on "Individualism" by saying, "There is only one way to
be an ethical individual. That is to choose your cause, and then to serve it, as the
Samurai his feudal chief, as the ideal knight of romantic story his lady, - in the spirit
of all the loyal."44 Royce's reference to serving one's cause "in the spirit of all the
loyal" is a segue to the most critical concept in his philosophy of loyalty, the titular
subject of the next lecture, "Loyalty to Loyalty." It is in this lecture that Royce estab-
lishes a criterion for selecting among competing loyalties. Not all loyalties are mor-
ally praiseworthy, so it is not enough simply to be loyal to a cause. But what makes a
cause morally praiseworthy? A cause is good "not only for me, but for mankind, in so
far as it is essentially a loyalty to loyalty that is, is an aid and a furtherance of loyalty
in my fellows." A cause is bad if it "lives by overthrowing the loyalties of others," for
it "involves disloyalty to the very cause of loyalty itself."45
Royce's principle of loyalty to loyalty is distinctive; it is the hallmark of his ethical
philosophy. It is my view, however, that this principle is also implicit in the Japanese
loyalty with which Royce was familiar. It is possible, then, that Royce's thinking
about loyalty was in part shaped by his contact with Japanese loyalty. To support this
notion, I will juxtapose parts of Nitobe's chapter of Bushido dedicated to "The Duty
of Loyalty" with salient excerpts of Royce's The Philosophy of Loyalty
The problem of bad causes is immediately identified in the first paragraph of
Nitobe's discussion of loyalty. "I am aware that personal fidelity is a moral adhesion
existing among all sorts and conditions of men, - a gang of pickpockets owe alle-
giance to a Fagin; but it is only in the code of chivalrous honour that loyalty assumes
paramount importance."46 In The Philosophy of Loyalty Royce offers a series of com-
parable examples. He essentially repeats one of them, the one most closely resem-
bling Nitobe's example: "A robber band, a family engaged in a murderous feud, a
pirate crew, a savage tribe, a Highland robber clan of the old days - these might
constitute causes to which somebody has been, or is, profoundly loyal."47 That
Nitobe's and Royce's shared example pertains to theft is not philosophically signifi-
cant. That Royce echoes Nitobe's example, whether consciously or unconsciously,
is. More significant, however, is the connection between Nitobe's and Royce's ways
out of the theft-as-loyalty problem.
For Nitobe, it is "only in the code of chivalrous honour" that loyalty is para-
mount. For Royce, it is only when loyalty is loyal to loyalty that loyalty is paramount.
How alike are Nitobe's "code of chivalrous honour" and Royce's principle of loyalty
to loyalty? Nitobe, too, explicitly fends against the idea that the duty of loyalty is
tantamount to slavishness: "Bushido did not require us to make our conscience the
slave of any lord or king."48 While Nitobe does not exactly articulate a principle
analogous to loyalty to loyalty, he does make it clear that the samurai can and should
"use every available means" to persuade his master if he sees things differently than
he does; this is "the loyal path for him to pursue."49 At the same time, if his master
remains unpersuaded, it is the usual course for the samurai to be moved to "demon-
strating the sincerity of his words by shedding his own blood."50 Perhaps such a
display of loyalty is commensurate with loyalty to loyalty, if the alternatives would
decrease loyalty in the world, or promote loyalty less effectively. While the samurai
would go to great lengths to express his loyalty to the fullest, there is insufficient
warrant for the claim that, in the style of Royce, furthering loyalty in the world would
be among his considerations. In any case, Nitobe views honor as "implying a vivid
consciousness of personal dignity and worth," suggesting that chivalrous honor is the
expression of such dignity and worth free of disgrace. "That samurai was right who
refused to compromise his character by a slight humiliation in his youth," Nitobe
explains, for "dishonour is like a scar on a tree, which time, instead of effacing, only
helps to enlarge."51
Seeming to echo the notion of chivalrous honor as the context in which loyalty
is paramount, Royce repeatedly alludes to chivalry in summations of loyalty to loy-
alty. In a representative instance, Royce writes, "Prevent the conflict of loyalties when
you can, minimize such conflict where it exists, and, by means of fair play and of the
chivalrous attitude towards the opponent, utilize even conflict, where it is inevitable,
so as to further the cause of loyalty to loyalty."52 Chivalrous honor is thus necessary
in the midst of conflicts of loyalty, for example when my loyalty to my cause and
your loyalty to your cause place us in opposition to one another. Shortly, I will
demonstrate that Royce's allusions to chivalry in the context of his own discussions
of loyalty to loyalty persist beyond The Philosophy of Loyalty, and include renewed
references to Bushidõ.
In the closing paragraphs of the "Loyalty to Loyalty" lecture, Royce asserts that
"the usually recognized range of human duties . . . easily group themselves about the
one principle: Be loyal to loyalty/'53 What exactly he has in mind by these duties
grouping themselves about the principle of loyalty to loyalty is not entirely clear,
though it seems that Royce means that these duties are only authentic as such when
indexed to loyal service to a cause (a cause which does not engender disloyalty to
loyalty). He then goes on to demonstrate this phenomenon by considering four du-
ties: self-cultivation, assertion of rights, justice, and benevolence. At one paragraph
each, these discussions are uncharacteristically brusque, leaving the reader wanting
further explanation.54 It is useful to consider these four duties as two pairs, the former
being self-reflexive duties and the latter being other-directed duties. I contend that
Royce's comments about each of these pairs of duties are at least partly conditioned
by his contact with Japanese thought. Royce's admiration of the commonwealths of
heroic Greek tragedy and old Japan may help to elucidate his discussions of self-
cultivation and the assertion of rights. Royce believes that self-cultivation is our duty,
provided that we do not conflate self-cultivation with self-absorption. "My duty to
myself/' Royce explains, is "the duty to provide my cause with one who is strong
enough and skilful enough to be effective according to my own natural powers."55
Underscoring the difference between self-cultivation and self-absorption, Royce
asserts:
The care of health, self-cultivation, self-control, spiritual power - these are all to be mor-
ally estimated with reference to the one principle that, since I have no eyes to see or
tongue to speak save as the cause commands, I will be as worthy an instrument of the
cause as can be made, by my own efforts, out of the poor material which my scrap of
human nature provides.56
Lest there be any remaining doubt, Royce remarks unequivocally, "Self-cultivation

which is not related to loyalty is worthless."57
In the same vein, Royce holds that we have a duty to assert our private and per-
sonal rights, provided that these rights "are held in trust for the cause, and are, upon
occasion, to be defended for the sake of the cause. ... It is my right to protect my
service, to maintain my office, and to keep my own merely in order that I may us
my own as the cause commands."58 Rights are derived, then, from loyalty. The notion
of a private or personal right mutually exclusive of loyalty to a cause is incoherent
Again Royce summarizes tersely, "Rights which are not determined by my loyalty are
vain pretence."59
Royce's reading of Nitobe's Bushido may have shaped his brief treatment of jus-
tice and benevolence in The Philosophy of Loyalty. At the least, it seems to have in
spired his style of rhetoric in discussing them. My hypothesis is that Royce absorb
something that he encountered in reading Nitobe's Bushido. Therein, Nitobe takes
rectitude and justice to be virtual equivalents, naming one chapter "Rectitude or
Justice." Royce would not have failed to notice Nitobe's quote of Gorõ Nyüdö Masa-
mune in the nearby chapter "Benevolence, the Feeling of Distress":60 "Rectitude car-
ried to excess hardens into stiffness; benevolence indulged beyond measure sinks
into weakness."61 Indeed, it seems that Royce fell under the sway of this pithy style
of describing virtues gone astray. From Royce, we receive "Justice without loyalty i
a vicious formalism"62 and "Benevolence without loyalty is a dangerous sentimental
ism."63 Although the remarks of Masamune and Royce are not identical, the general
point of each is the same. Some regulative ideal is needed to ensure that virtues are
deployed properly. It is very likely that in all of these remarks about virtues, Royce'
meaning would better be expressed with reference to loyalty to loyalty rather than
loyalty. Royce suggests as much, proclaiming, "Whoever . . . thus comprehends what
loyalty to loyalty means, holds the key to all the familiar mysteries about the right
relation of the love of man to the strenuous virtues and to the ethics of conflict."64
Mathew A. Foust 1181
In "Conscience/' the lecture that follows "Loyalty to Loyalty/' Royce adds cour-
tesy to his list of duties that are only authentic when conjoined with loyalty. Courtesy
"may be defined as an explicit assumption of a loyal bearing. To adopt such a bearing
with a real sincerity of heart is to express, in your passing actions, loyalty to universal
loyalty/'65 Royce's similarity to Nitobe is again striking. Compare this passage with
excerpts from Nitobe's chapter on "Politeness." To begin with, the first word in Nito-
be's chapter on politeness is not 'politeness,' but 'courtesy': "Courtesy and urbanity
of manners have been noticed by every foreign tourist as a marked Japanese trait.
Politeness is a poor virtue, if it is actuated only by fear of offending good taste, where-
as it should be the outward manifestation of a sympathetic regard for the feelings of
others."66 Next, Nitobe discriminates between impoverished politeness and robust
politeness. Robust politeness, the type that is fit to be called a virtue, is that which is
characterized by sympathetic regard for the feelings of others. As the reader may
have come to expect, Nitobe puts the point succinctly: "Without veracity and sincer-
ity, politeness is a farce and a show."67 He then quotes Masamune to similar effect:
"Propriety carried beyond right bounds becomes a lie."68 If politeness and courtesy
are to be taken as interchangeable - and it seems that Nitobe treated them as
such - then Royce's comments on courtesy seem also to be inspired by those of
Nitobe.
Collecting these various points of intersection, we may now confidently claim

that Nitobe's Bush ido was of more than passing fascination to Royce. It appears to
have been among the influences giving shape to his philosophy of loyalty. Royce's
discussions of the relations of various duties or virtues to loyalty clearly find a con-
ceptual forerunner in Nitobe's presentation of Bushidõ. Royce is even influenced
stylistically by Nitobe, mimicking his (and Masamune's) terse assertions. What re-
mains to be established is whether Nitobe's influence remained with Royce beyond
The Philosophy of Loyalty.
Bushidõ and Royce : Beyond The Philosophy of Loyalty
Much of Royce's writing after The Philosophy of Loyalty involves the development or
application of the ideas put forth therein. Reflective of Royce's preoccupation with
questions concerning loyalty and community, Race Questions , Provincialism , and
Other American Problems was the second book of Royce's to be published in 1 908.
Among the essays included in this collection is "Some Relations of Physical Training
to the Present Problems of Moral Education in America," an address originally pre-
sented to the Boston Physical Education Association. At Royce's time, athletic train-
ing was part of social reform movements aimed at transforming hardscrabble urban
environments into those conducive to growth and citizenship. Royce cites as an ex-
ample the Young Men's Christian Association, a group with religious and ethical
motives that regard their gymnasiums as essential components of their work. Royce
sees this movement of his day as of a piece with traditional ways of seeing the rela-
tions among religious, moral, and physical aspects of life. In support of his view, and
in the opening paragraph of his address, Royce alludes to Bushidõ: "Physical training
has repeatedly had, in the past, a place in the religious life of various peoples, and
systems of secular training have often so much the more followed analogous lines.
Chivalry in Europe, Bushido in Japan, were systems of conduct which were insepa-
rable from various plans for physical training/'69 By pairing chivalry in Europe with
Bushidõ in Japan, Royce is undoubtedly following Nitobe's example. On repeated
occasions, Nitobe describes Bushidõ as a Japanese analog to European knighthood,
asserting in the closing chapter of Bushido , "Few historical comparisons can be more
judiciously made than between Chivalry of Europe and the Bushido of Japan/'70
In stressing the link between virtue and the motor activities whereby humans
express their will, Royce states, "This you all see; and you know that the Japanese
long ago saw it also, so that an essential part of their training in Bushido - that is,
in their ancient code of chivalrous loyalty - was a training in the physical arts of a
Samurai."71 Royce would have gleaned as much from the chapter of Nitobe's book
dedicated to "The Education and Training of a Samurai," in which one learns that the
curriculum of the samurai consisted of "fencing, archery, jiujutsu or yawara, horse-
manship, the use of the spear, tactics, calligraphy, ethics, literature, and history."72
Perhaps the title of Nitobe's chapter on this subject inspired Royce's selection of
"Training for Loyalty" as the title for his lecture concerning moral education of the
loyal. Here too, Royce speaks of "training the muscles as well as the souls of our
youth to loyalty."73
Of the samurai's sword, Nitobe discloses that the boy would have learned to
wield it by the age of fifteen. At this time, "being given independence of action, he
can now pride himself upon the possession of arms sharp enough for any work. The
very possession of the dangerous instrument imparts to him a feeling and an air of
self-respect and, responsibility. . . . What he carries in his belt is a symbol of what he
carries in his mind and heart, - loyalty and honour."74 In The Problem of Christianity
(1 91 3), Royce shows that he has not forgotten this point. "The knight or the samurai
regarded his sword as part of himself,"75 Royce notes, and "when the warrior regards
his sword as part of himself, he does so because his sword is the instrument of his
will, and because what he does with his sword belongs to his literal or ideal life."76
In each of these references to Bushidõ, Royce explicitly associates it with chiv-
alry. In "Some Relations of Physical Training to the Present Problems of Moral Edu-
cation in America," Royce issues a slight edit of a refrain from The Philosophy of
Loyalty : "Justice, kindliness, chivalry, charity, - these are all of them forms of loyalty
to loyalty."77 It is reasonable to think that Royce is thinking of loyalty more explicitly
in terms of chivalry upon reading Nitobe's Bushido. Whereas Nitobe follows his
chapter on the education and training of the samurai with one titled "Self-Control,"
Royce goes on to emphasize the role of self-control in physical training and its rela-
tion to loyalty:
As a skilful and difficult physical exercise demands that one should keep his head in the
midst of efforts that, by reason of the strain, or of the excitement, - by reason of the very
magnitude and fascination of the task, would confuse the untrained man, and make him
lose a sense of what he was trying to do, even so the work of the effectively loyal person
is always one which requires that he should stand in presence of undertakings large
enough to threaten to cloud his judgment and to crush his self-control, while his loyalty
still demands that he should also keep his head despite the strain, and should retain
steady control of his personality, even in order to devote it to the cause.78
Such comportment in the face of strain is certainly reminiscent of the "discipline of

fortitude" to which Nitobe refers, "inculcating endurance without a groan."79
Sandwiched between Race Questions , Provincialism , and Other American Prob-
lems and The Problem of Christianity in Royce's corpus are two books, William
James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life (1911) and The Sources of Religious
Insight ( 1912). In each of these texts, Royce finds occasion to allude to Bushidõ. In
the context of the former, Royce refers to Bushidõ in "Loyalty and Insight." Therein,
Royce describes loyalty to country as more than devotion to a crowd of fellow citi-
zens. Rather, loyalty to country is devotion to an invisible but perfectly real spiritual
unity. To illustrate his meaning, Royce draws on a source from Japan:
General Nogi, in a recent Japanese publication about Bushido, expressed his own
nation [al] ideal beautifully in the words: "Here the sovereign and the people are of one
family and have together endured the joys and sorrows of thousands of years." It is that
sort of being whereof one speaks when one expresses true loyalty to the country. The
country is the spiritual entity that is none of us and all of us, - none of us because it is our
unity; all of us because in it we all find our patriotic unity.80
Royce does not intimate any further details about his Japanese source, but whatever
it might have been it is evident that Royce continues to maintain an active interest in
Bushidõ, and Japanese thought continues to shape, or at least reinforce, his thinking
about loyalty. Royce's dual identification of his notions of the community of memory
and of patriotism as consonant with related notions from Japan is an observation
worth future development at a later time.81
In the chapter of The Sources of Religious Insight dedicated to "The Religion
of Loyalty," Royce again weaves Bushidõ into his narrative of the nature of loyalty.
References to the warrior as an exemplar of loyalty are strewn throughout this discus-
sion, conjoined with other examples that Royce favors. "The lighthouse tender, the
mother, the warrior, the patriot, the martyr, the true lover, the scientific investigator,"
Royce enumerates, "they all may show, I insist, this same essential spirit."82 What
spirit, exactly? Just before this remark, Royce takes the lighthouse tender83 and the
warrior in tandem:
The first test that the warrior and the lighthouse tender are moved by the same spirit is
furnished by the fact that those warriors who are rightly filled with this spirit are as well
able to live by it in peace as in war; are, for instance, even able to surrender to the foe,
when fortune and duty require them to do so. . . . That is, the warrior, if rightly inspired, is
as ready for life as for death, is as ready for peace as for war; and despises defeat as much
as danger - fearing only sloth and dishonour and abandonment of the service. The other
test is whether the warrior is ready to recognize and to honour, with clear cordiality, this
same spirit when it is manifested in another calling, or in another service, and, in partic-
ular, is manifested by his enemy. ... If the spirit of the warrior bears these tests, his faith-
fulness is of the type that can be shown as well by the lonely light-tender in her grief as
by the hero for whom glory waits.84
While it is not altogether clear that the examples of the lighthouse tender and the
warrior are commensurate, it is evident that Royce thinks they are, or at least wants
others to think so. Consistent with the desire to disassociate 'loyalty' from 'war/
Royce attempts to valorize more ordinary, but no less loyal, embodiments of loyalty.
While the success of his attempts to disassociate 'loyalty' from 'war' may be an open
question, Royce does succeed in showing that the relationship posited by Steinmetz
is incorrect. With so many admirable instances of loyalty abounding in ordinary
existence, the notion that without war there can be no loyalty is simply false.
Bushidõ and Royce: Loyalty East and West
It is tempting to think that the influence of Bushido on Royce's philosophy of loyalty

is even more prevalent than I have indicated. From The Philosophy of Loyalty on-
ward, Royce repeatedly refers to disloyalty as "moral suicide"85 and stresses, espe-
cially in The Problem of Christianity the importance of atonement for one's acts of
disloyalty.86 Are these the results of his contact with Nitobe's chapter on "The Institu-
tions of Suicide and Redress"? Perhaps there is something to this thought, but Royce
was clearly uncomfortable with some aspects of Japanese loyalty. In The Philosophy
of Loyalty he hesitates to give Bushidõ a wholesale endorsement, stating that it is
"universally agreed that this ideal of loyalty has been conceived in Japan as requiring
a certain impersonalism, a certain disregard of the central importance of the ethical
individual. And I myself do not believe, in fact, that the Japanese have rightly con-
ceived the true worth of the individual."87 Moreover, as we have seen, Royce states,
"I do not believe that the Japanese ought to be our models. Our civilization has its
own moral problems, and must meet them in its own way."88 Noticing that Royce
makes these criticisms in the midst of an otherwise effusive appropriation of Japa-
nese ideas, it is possible that Royce capitulates in his endorsement of Bushidõ to
avoid appearing to be too much of an ally to Japan. At the same time, Royce un-
doubtedly did think that America had its own problems and could not hope to solve
them merely by mimicry of another culture.
In a section of The Problem of Christianity in which Royce engages with the
thought of Schopenhauer, we find words that Royce might have written in response
to the heralding of hara kiri as an ultimate display of loyalty:
[An individual] may repent of his sins; but not of being himself. He may, in his hatred of
ill-fortune, resort even to suicide. But such suicide is merely a revolt against disaster. It
only affirms in its own passionate way the longing for some life which is not indeed the
present life of the rebel who seeks suicide, but which, in all his condemnation of his own
deeds or of his own misadventures, he still longs to live, if only death and the universe
will yet permit him to express himself/'89
For Royce, suicide seems to be a wrongheaded and self-defeating way of loyally

serving one's cause. One ceases to be able to serve one's cause when one is no
longer living. Royce would thus resist the Bushidõ notion of hara kiri as "a process
by which warriors could expiate their crimes, apologise for errors, escape from
disgrace, redeem their friends, or prove their sincerity/'90 While Royce would un-
doubtedly appreciate Bushidö's concern for atonement in response to disloyalty or
lack of loyalty where it was needed, Royce would reject this ritual as a laudable or
even acceptable way of expressing one's loyalty.91 Willingness to die in the service
of one's cause is admirable, but hastening that death is not.
At the time that he wrote Bushido, Nitobe lamented that so little common ground
was shared among Japanese and non-Japanese when it came to holding loyalty in
high regard. "Loyalty as we conceive it," Nitobe wrote, "may find few admirers else-
where, not because our conception is wrong, but because it is, I am afraid, forgotten,
and also because we carry it out to a degree not reached in any other country."92
Nitobe would have been greatly encouraged to find a fellow lover of loyalty in Royce.
In fact, while it is not clear either when Nitobe read The Philosophy of Loyalty or
whether Nitobe detected the degree to which Royce had absorbed his own ideas
and style, it is evident that Nitobe did read The Philosophy of Loyalty In a chapter
of Japan: Some Phases of Her Problems and Development (1 931 ), dedicated to "The
Thought Life of the Japanese People," Nitobe revisits the influence of Bushidõ on
Japan. Much of what Nitobe says here echoes or repeats content from Bushido. One
addition that stands out, however, is his recognition of Royce. Summarizing the per-
spective of the samurai, Nitobe writes, "Loyalty may be viewed as the beginning and
end of all moral life. 'Loyalty to loyalty' has been demonstrated as such by Royce."93
Because Nitobe uses 'loyalty to loyalty' in a looser sense than Royce's specialized
use of the phrase, one should not infer from Nitobe's comment that Royce's principle
of loyalty to loyalty appears in Bushidõ. Nonetheless, the Samurai's preoccupation
with loyalty to his master, to his king, and to his conscience is so engrossing and
encompassing that, in a more general manner of speaking, his life is indeed charac-
terized by loyalty to loyalty.
Conclusion
From Nitobe and Royce we receive theories of loyalty from the East and the West.
During their lives, it would have seemed to many that the ideas of each ought to be
exotic to the other. As I have argued, the ideas of each are much more alike than they
are in conflict. Indeed, although Royce's philosophy of loyalty is not identical to that
found in Nitobe's presentation of Bushidõ, Nitobe's account of Bushidõ seems to
have directly influenced Royce, conceptually and rhetorically. As for Nitobe, one can
expect that he was gratified to see his discussion of Bushidõ absorbed in the ethical
writings of Royce, a prominent Harvard philosopher.
One of the most important functions of comparative philosophy is demonstrat-
ing how similarly illuminating and useful that ideas from the East and West can be,
despite their differences in context. The moral philosophies championed by Nitobe
and Royce are, for the most part, complementary. Although we are in the midst of a
resurgence of attention to Royce's corpus, the same is not so of Nitobe. Perhaps it is
time for a renewal of focus on Nitobe's thought. The subjects of his writing are many
and varied, his prose lively and compelling. Although not a philosopher by training,
Nitobe's analyses of Japanese and American relations and essays on morality and
society are philosophically incisive and undoubtedly shaped, in part, by his contact
with Western philosophy. There is autobiography in Nitobe's marvel at "How many
Japanese minds have come under the spell of men like Kant and Hegel, Spencer and
Mill, Tyndall and Huxley, Scott and Wordsworth, Gibbon and Macaulay, Shakespeare
and Bacon, Carlyle and Ruskin, Longfellow and Emerson!"94
Additionally, it is worth asking whether the systemic loyalty-affirming resources
of Bushidõ and Royce's philosophy of loyalty offer useful responses to the recent lit-
erature in moral psychology and ethical theory casting doubt on the value of this
virtue. Simon Keller argues in The Limits of Loyalty, for instance, that loyalty "is not
morally pure, and it is not morally reliable/' so it "is not the foundation of moral
thinking, and it should not be given a fundamental role in ethical theory."95 Nitobe
and Royce both acknowledge the lack of 'purity' of loyalty, suggesting that it cannot
stand alone as a guide to moral action. At the same time, they offer cogent justifica-
tions for loyalty's occupying a foundational place in the moral life. Nitobe's Bushidõ
and Royce's philosophy of loyalty might also offer theoretical underpinning for de-
fenses of loyalty in the face of such a critique. For example, Eric Feiten argues in
Loyalty : The Vexing Virtue , "Too few loyalties and our lives are shallow, thin, and
unsatisfying; too many loyalties and we end up with a cacophony of claims, a disso-
nance that leaves our lives more muddled than meaningful. We need to take loyalty
seriously enough to find the right balance."96 It is an understatement to say that
Nitobe and Royce take loyalty seriously. Moreover, each manifests this seriousness
by seeking just such a balance of loyalties. These are just two ways in which contem-
porary scholars might draw on the trenchant thought of Nitobe and Royce.
Notes
I gratefully acknowledge the advice of Oleg Benesch, Mark A. Jones, Franklin D.

Rausch, and two anonymous reviewers for this journal. The input of each has led to
improvement of the quality of this article.
1 - The titles of two recent volumes speak to Royce's renewed popularity. See Kelly
A. Pärker and Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński, eds., Josiah Royce for the Twenty-first
Century : Historical Ethical and Religious Interpretations (Lanham, MD: Lex-
ington Press, 2012); Kelly A. Parkerand Jason Bell, eds., The Relevance of Royce
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2014).
2 - Kurt F. Leidecker, Josiah Royce and Indian Thought (New York: Kailas Press,
1931). Scant and scattered scholarship on Royce and Indian thought has ap-
peared since the publication of Leidecker's text. See Dale Riepe, "Josiah Royce's
Transaction with Indian Philosophy," Personalist 48 (1967): 217-223; Robert
A. McDermott, "The Absolute as a Heuristic Device: Josiah Royce and Sri
Aurobindo," International Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1972): 171-199; H. L.
Chourasia, A Comparative Study of the Philosophy of Josiah Royce and Rad-
hakrishnan (New Delhi: Oriental Publishers and Distributors, 1979); Steven A.
Miller, "Consonances between Indian Thought and Josiah Royce's Developing
Absolute," The Pluralist 8, no. 2 (2013): 60-77.
3 - Frank M. Oppenheim, S.J., "Royce's Windows to the East," Transactions of the

Charles S. Peirce Society 43, no. 2 (2007): 288-31 3.
4 - Ibid., p. 298.
5 - What is more, Oppenheim mistakenly states that "Ha Tai Kim's study, 'Nashida
[sic] and Royce,' presents clearer glimpses of Royce's entry into Japanese Bud-
dhism than Royce himself revealed in his Philosophy of Loyalty" ("Royce's Win-
dows to the East," p. 314). Kim's study presents only clear glimpses of Nishida's
entry into Royce's thought; see Ha Tai Kim, "Nishida and Royce," Philosophy
East and West 1 , no. 4 (1 952): 1 8-29.
6 - Oppenheim, "Royce's Windows to the East," p. 299. Although I am uncertain

of the source of the "little people" portion of this quotation, the remainder is
derived from Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (Nashville: Vanderbilt
University Press, 1995), p. 35. Royce does refer to Nitobe's "little book," un-
doubtedly referring to its brevity (p. 35).
7 - Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, pp. 34-35. Royce again refers to this conflict
in War and Insurance (1914): "The comparatively recent controversy between
Japan and Russia concerning the future of Korea, suggests a type of controversy
which is not easily to be ruled out of the world, if various nations continue to
prosper at all" (Josiah Royce, War and Insurance [New York: Macmillan, 1 91 4],
p. 90).
8 - Colin Holmes and A. H. Ion, "Bushidõ and the Samurai: Images in British Pub-
lic Opinion, 1894-1914," Modern Asian Studies 14, no. 2 (1980): 309-329.
9 - Oleg Benesch, "Wang Yangming and Bushidõ : Japanese Nativization and its
Influences in Modern China," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36, no. 3 (2009):
439-454.
1 0 - Christopher Benfey, The Great Wave: Gilded Age Misfits, Japanese Ecce
and the Opening of Old Japan (New York: Random House, 2003).
11 - G. Cameron Hurst III, "Death, Honor, and Loyality [sic]: The Bushidõ Ide
Philosophy East and West 40, no. 4 (1 990): 5 1 1 -52 7, at p. 5 1 1 .
12 - Ibid., p. 512.
13-Yuzo Ota, "Mediation between Cultures," in Nitobe Inazo: Japan's Br
Across the Pacific, ed. John F. Howes (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p.
14 - Quoted in Ota, "Mediation between Cultures," p. 242. Nitobe is referrin

Basil Hall Chamberlain.
1188 Philosophy East & West
15 - Baron Kencho Suyematsu, The Risen Sun (London: Archibald Constable and
Co., 1905), p. 187.
1 6 - Josiah Royce, Lectures on Modern Idealism (New Haven and London: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1 964).
17 -Ibid., p. 202.
1 8 - Ibid. See A. B. Mitford, Tales of Old Japan (London: Macmillan and Co., 1 874),
p. 26.
1 9 - Nitobe refers to the story by the name "The Forty-Seven Cishi," translating this
title as "The Forty-Seven Faithfuls," indicating that 'gishi' may be understood -
seemingly at odds with Mitford's description - as "a man of rectitude" (Inazo
Nitobe, Bushido: The Soul of Japan, vol. 1 of The Works of Inazo Nitobe (Tokyo:
University of Tokyo Press, 1969), p. 37.
20 - Ibid., p. 94.
21-1 suspect that the matter of whether "The Forty-Seven Ron in" is representative of
Bushidõ turns on the question of whether Bushidõ existed at the time of its ori-
gin. In a chapter on "Japanese Morality," in which the story is retold and inter-
preted in terms of Japanese moral ideals, R. B. Peery never refers to 'Bushidõ.'
Peery's book was published two years prior to Nitobe's, however, so if 'Bushidõ'
was an obscure term before Nitobe popularized it, this is not necessarily a sur-
prising observation. Again, the absence of the word 'Bushidõ' need not entail
the absence of that which the term denotes. See R. B. Peery, The Cist of Japan
(New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1897), pp. 112-115. For a more contempo-
rary study engaging "The Forty-Seven Ronin" with reference to Bushidõ litera-
ture, see Olivier Ansart, "Loyalty in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century
Samurai Discourse," Japanese Studies 27, no. 2 (2007): 139-154.
22 - Mitford, Tales of Old Japan, p. 1 6.
23 - Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 1 1 .
24 - Royce, Lectures on Modern Idealism, p. 1 87.

25 - Ibid., p. 201.
26 - Ibid. For a treatment of the Hegelian nature of Royce's philosophy of loyalty, see
John J. Kaag, "American Interpretations of Hegel: Josiah Royce's Philosophy of
Loyalty," History of Philosophy Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2009): 83-101.
27 - Royce, Lectures on Modern Idealism, pp. 201-202.
28 - Ibid., p. 202.
29 - Royce's admiration of Antigone can be seen as early as the commencement
address that he delivered, "On a Passage in Sophocles," as he completed his
undergraduate studies at the University of California in Berkeley in 1875, and
as late as remarks made in his 1915-1916 Extension Course on Ethics. Royce
died in 1916.
30 - Royce, Lectures on Modem Idealism , p. 203. In the midst of a discussion of
American holidays in "Loyalty as a Factor in American Life/' the fourth and last
of his Urbana Lectures of 1 907, Royce seems to have the same aspect of Japa-
nese culture in mind:
We have, to be sure, another national holiday which is of a far higher type than our
present Fourth of July. It is the only holiday which tends at present to keep alive a senti-
ment that seems to me to be genuinely expressive of vital loyalty to the nation as a
whole. It is the one holiday, namely, which is associated with such a memory of the dead
as enters into the Japanese patriotic religion. It is Memorial Day.
The majority of this unpublished lecture is missing or no longer extant; see

Josiah Royce, "Loyalty as a Factor in American Life," 1907 Urbana Lectures,
Josiah Royce Papers, HUG 1755, Box 76, Harvard University Archives, p. 19.
31 - For more on the role of tragedy in Royce's thought, see: Mathew A. Foust,
"Tragedy and the Sorrow of Finitude: Reflections on Sin and Death in the
Philosophy of Josiah Royce/' The Pluralisti, no. 2 (2007): 106-1 14; James Fla-
herty, "Josiah Royce and the Tragic Sense of Life," The Modern Schoolman 85,
no. 2 (2008): 143-161.
32 - Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 7.
33 - Sebald Rudolf Steinmetz, Die Philosophie des Krieges (Leipzig: J. A. Barth,

1907).
34 - Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty p. 48. Royce then reminds his audience that
he also cited as an example the loyal captain standing by his sinking ship. Each
of these examples are of figures so loyal to their cause that they are willing, if
necessary, to die in serving it.
35 - Ibid., p. 35.
36 - Ibid.
37 - Ibid.
38 - Ibid., p. 36.
39 - Ibid.
40 - Ibid.
41 - Ibid.
42 - Ibid., p. 37.
43 - Ibid.
44 - Ibid., p. 47.
45 - Ibid., p. 56; emphasis in original.
46 - Nitobe, Bush ido, p. 74.
47 - Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty p. 51 .
48 - Nitobe, Bush ido, p. 80.
49 - Ibid.
50- Ibid.
51 - Ibid., p. 69.
52 - Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 74. See a similar passage on p. 76.
53 - Ibid., p. 67.
54 - For an analysis of this portion of Royce's text, see Mathew A. Foust, Loyalty to
Loyalty: Josiah Royce and the Genuine Moral Life (New York: Fordham Univer-
sity Press, 2012), pp. 63-66.
56 - Ibid., p. 68.
57 - Ibid.
58 - Ibid.
59 - Ibid.
60 - With this chapter title, Nitobe alludes to Mencius' view that the feeling of
distress is the root of benevolence. See Nitobe, Bushido, pp. 48-49. One
chapter, on courage, separates Nitobe's chapter on justice and his chapter on
benevolence.
61 - Nitobe, Bushido, p. 48.
63 - Ibid., p. 69.
64 - Ibid., p. 76.
65 - Ibid., p. 73.
66 - Nitobe, Bushido, p. 54.
67 - Ibid., p. 61.
68 - Ibid. In a later "editorial jotting" titled "The Quality of Loyalty" (1930), Nitobe
refers to "a small old book known as the Canon of Loyalty," featuring several
remarks of this ilk (e.g., to exercise benevolence without loyalty is to grant per-
sonal favor; to be wise without being loyal is to cover treachery; to act coura-
geously without being loyal is to create disturbance). See Nitobe, "The Quality
of Loyalty," in Editorial Jottings, vol. 5 of The Works oflnazo Nitobe, pp. 98-99.
69 - Royce, Race Questions, Provincialism, and Other American Problems, ed. Scott
L. Pratt and Shannon Sullivan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009),
p. 146.
70 - Nitobe, Bushido, p. 135. Nitobe reaffirms the connection in "Samuraiism: The
Moral Ideas of Japan" (1 901 ): "If I were to designate in English the ensemble of
Japanese ethical ideals, I would use, as I have been doing all along, the term
Mathew A. Foust 1191
Chivalry, this coming nearest to what is known among us as Bushido" (Nitobe,
"Samuraiism: The Moral Ideas of Japan/' in Bushido > p. 413; emphasis in
original).
71 - Nitobe, Bushido > p. 151.
72 - Ibid., p. 82; emphasis in original.
75 - Royce, The Problem of Christianity (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of

America Press, 2001), p. 254.
76 - Ibid., p. 255. Royce seems to have been particularly fascinated by the sword of
the samurai, having composed a fictional short story (undated and unpublished)
titled "The Japanese Sword." See Josiah Royce Papers, Harvard University
Archives, HUG 1755, Box 116, Folder 10.
77 - Royce, Race Questions , Provincialism , and Other American Problems , p. 156.
78 -Ibid., pp. 157-158.

80 - Royce, William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life (New York:
Macmillan, 1911), p. 80.
81 - It is likely that Royce learned of Nogi's suicide by hara kiri in 1912, but there is
no apparent extant record of his reaction to this news, if indeed it came to him.
82 - Royce, The Sources of Religious Insight (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University

of America Press, 2001), p. 195.
83 - Royce tells of two women lighthouse workers, known to his audience for their
exceptional loyal service to their cause. They are Ida Lewis and Mrs. Daniel
Williams. Ida Lewis had for fifty years been the official keeper of the Lime Rock
lighthouse at Narragansett Bay. Mrs. Daniel Williams continued to tend the light
station in Little Traverse, Michigan, even immediately following the death of her
husband, who perished in an attempt to rescue a ship's crew in distress. She
remained at her post for over forty-one years (ibid., pp. 1 90-1 92).
84 -Ibid., pp. 193-194.

85 - See, for instance, Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty p. 105.
86 - Royce, The Problem of Christianity pp. 1 65-1 86.
87 - Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty p. 36.
88 - Ibid., p. 37.
89 - Royce, The Problem of Christianity p. 352.
91 - A caveat is in order, as hara kiri may be undertaken voluntarily, but may also be
imposed by the law as punishment, and it is the former circumstance that I am
more confident that Royce would rebuff. In certain scenarios, the latter circum-
stance would seem consistent with what Royce has in mind when he applauds
those who are willing to die for a cause (e.g., a ship captain whose loyalty per-
sists in the direst of circumstances, going down with his ship). One can imagine
a bushi loyally serving his cause, finding himself sentenced to hara kiri, and
accepting this fate rather than acting dishonorably in order to escape it. This
imagined scenario calls to mind the situation of Socrates, an individual whom
Royce clearly admired and whose demise is succinctly discussed by Nitobe: "If
suicide meant no more than dying by one's own hand, Socrates was a clear
case of suicide. But nobody would charge him with the crime; Plato, who
was averse to it, would not call his master a suicide" (Nitobe, Bushido, p. 94).
Nitobe also writes, "Did not Socrates, all the while he unflinchingly refused to
concede one iota of loyalty to his daemon , obey with equal fidelity and equa-
nimity the command of his earthly master, the State? His conscience he fol-
lowed, alive; his country, he served, dying" (ibid., p. 79).
92 - Ibid., p. 75.
93 - Inazo Nitobe, Japan: Some Phases of Her Problems and Development , vol. 3 of
The Works of Inazo Nitobe (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1972), p. 366.
Nitobe cites " The Philosophy of Loyalty, Ch. III."
94 - Nitobe, "Character of the Occidentalization of Japan," in Bushido > p. 461 .
95 - Simon Keller, The Limits of Loyalty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2007), p. 218. See also Keller, Partiality (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2013).
96 - Eric Feiten, Loyalty: The Vexing Virtue (New York: Simon and Schuster, 201 1),
p. 272.

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NITOBE AND ROYCE: BUSHIDŌ AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY

Author(s): Mathew A. Foust

Japanese Loyalty in Royce's Lectures on Modern Idealism

1 1 76 Philosophy East & West

Bushidõ and Royce: Japanese Loyalty in The Philosophy of Loyalty

1178 Philosophy East & West

1 1 80 Philosophy East & West

Lest there be any remaining doubt, Royce remarks unequivocally, "Self-cultivation

Mathew A. Foust 1181

Collecting these various points of intersection, we may now confidently claim

Bushidõ and Royce : Beyond The Philosophy of Loyalty

1 1 82 Philosophy East & West

Such comportment in the face of strain is certainly reminiscent of the "discipline of

1 1 84 Philosophy East & West

Bushidõ and Royce: Loyalty East and West

It is tempting to think that the influence of Bushido on Royce's philosophy of loyalty

For Royce, suicide seems to be a wrongheaded and self-defeating way of loyally

1 1 86 Philosophy East & West

I gratefully acknowledge the advice of Oleg Benesch, Mark A. Jones, Franklin D.

3 - Frank M. Oppenheim, S.J., "Royce's Windows to the East," Transactions of the

6 - Oppenheim, "Royce's Windows to the East," p. 299. Although I am uncertain

14 - Quoted in Ota, "Mediation between Cultures," p. 242. Nitobe is referrin

1188 Philosophy East & West

23 - Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 1 1 .

24 - Royce, Lectures on Modern Idealism, p. 1 87.

The majority of this unpublished lecture is missing or no longer extant; see

32 - Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 7.

33 - Sebald Rudolf Steinmetz, Die Philosophie des Krieges (Leipzig: J. A. Barth,

1 1 90 Philosophy East & West

52 - Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 74. See a similar passage on p. 76.

55 - Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 67.

61 - Nitobe, Bushido, p. 48.

62 - Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 68.

Mathew A. Foust 1191

71 - Nitobe, Bushido > p. 151.

72 - Ibid., p. 82; emphasis in original.

73 - Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 124.

74 - Nitobe, Bushido > p. 105.

75 - Royce, The Problem of Christianity (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of

77 - Royce, Race Questions , Provincialism , and Other American Problems , p. 156.

78 -Ibid., pp. 157-158.

82 - Royce, The Sources of Religious Insight (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University

84 -Ibid., pp. 193-194.

86 - Royce, The Problem of Christianity pp. 1 65-1 86.

87 - Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty p. 36.

90 - Nitobe, Bushido > p. 94.

1 1 92 Philosophy East & West

94 - Nitobe, "Character of the Occidentalization of Japan," in Bushido > p. 461 .

95 - Simon Keller, The Limits of Loyalty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

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