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Plain meaning rule

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Judicial interpretation
Forms

 Constitutional interpretation
 Statutory interpretation
General rules of interpretation

 Plain meaning rule

 Mischief rule
 Golden rule
General theories of interpretation

 Living Constitution/living tree

doctrine
 Originalism (original meaning)
 Original intent
(legislative intent, legislative history)
 Strict constructionism
  Textualism
 Purposive approach
 v
 t
 e

The plain meaning rule, also known as the literal

rule, is one of three rules of statutory
construction traditionally applied by English courts.
[1]
 The other two are the "mischief rule" and the "golden
rule".
The plain meaning rule dictates that statutes are to be
interpreted using the ordinary meaning of the language
of the statute. In other words, a statute is to be read
word for word and is to be interpreted according to the
ordinary meaning of the language, unless a statute
explicitly defines some of its terms otherwise or unless
the result would be cruel or absurd. Ordinary words are
given their ordinary meaning, technical terms are given
their technical meaning, and local, cultural terms are
recognized as applicable. The plain meaning rule is the
mechanism that prevents courts from taking sides in
legislative or political issues.[2] Additionally, it is the
mechanism that underlies textualism and, to a certain
extent, originalism.

Contents

 1Meaning
o 1.1Soft plain meaning rule
 2Reasons favored
 3Criticism
o 3.1Doctrine of absurdity
 4English law history
 5Other uses
 6See also
 7References

Meaning[edit]
To avoid ambiguity, legislatures often include
"definitions" sections within a statute, which explicitly
define the most important terms used in that statute.
[3]
 But some statutes omit a definitions section entirely,
or (more commonly) fail to define a particular term. The
plain meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced
with litigation that turns on the meaning of a
term not defined by the statute, or on that of a word
found within a definition itself.
According to the plain meaning rule, absent a contrary
definition within the statute, words must be given their
plain, ordinary and literal meaning. If the words are
clear, they must be applied, even though the intention
of the legislator may have been different or the result is
harsh or undesirable. The literal rule is what the law
says instead of what the law was intended to say.
Larry Solum, Professor of Law at Georgetown
University, expands on this premise:
Some laws are meant for all citizens (e.g., criminal
statutes) and some are meant only for specialists (e.g.,
some sections of the tax code). A text that means one
thing in a legal context, might mean something else if it
were in a technical manual or a novel. So the plain
meaning of a legal text is something like the meaning
that would be understood by competent speakers of the
natural language in which the text was written who are
within the intended readership of the text and who
understand that the text is a legal text of a certain type.
[4]

Soft plain meaning rule[edit]

Justices normally impose an absurdity limit on this rule,
which states that a statute cannot be interpreted
literally if it would lead to an absurd result. In the US
Supreme Court Chung Fook v. White (1924) marked
the beginning of the looser American Rule that the
intent of the law was more important than its text.
This is sometimes termed the soft plain meaning rule,
where the statute is interpreted according to the
ordinary meaning of the language, unless the result
would be cruel or absurd. For example, see Rector,
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892). Even the most vocal supporters
of textualism and the plain meaning rule have been
willing to commute "strict" plain meaning to "soft" plain
meaning to a certain extent, in some circumstances;
see, e.g. United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S.
64 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting):
I have been willing, in the case of civil statutes, to
acknowledge a doctrine of "scrivener's error" that
permits a court to give an unusual (though not unheard-
of) meaning to a word which, if given its normal
meaning, would produce an absurd and arguably
unconstitutional result.
In the United Kingdom, this is referred to as the golden
rule.

Reasons favored[edit]
Proponents of the plain meaning rule claim that it
prevents courts from taking sides in legislative or
political issues. They also point out that ordinary people
and lawyers do not have extensive access
to secondary sources.
In probate law the rule is also favored because
the testator is typically not around to indicate what
interpretation of a will is appropriate. Therefore, it is
argued, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to
vary the words used by the testator or their meaning. It
can help to provide for consistency in interpretation.

Criticism[edit]
This is the oldest of the rules of construction and is still
used today, primarily because judges may not legislate.
As there is always the danger that a particular
interpretation may be the equivalent of making law,
some judges prefer to adhere to the law's literal
wording.
Opponents of the plain meaning rule claim that the rule
rests on the erroneous assumption that words have a
fixed meaning. In fact, words are imprecise, leading
justices to impose their own prejudices to determine the
meaning of a statute. However, since little else is
offered as an alternative discretion-confining theory,
plain meaning survives.
Doctrine of absurdity[edit]
Further information: Doctrine of absurdity and Strict
constructionism
In law, strictly literal interpretations of statutes can lead
to seemingly absurd results. The doctrine of absurdity
holds that commonsense interpretations should be
preferred in such cases, rather than literal readings.
Under the absurdity doctrine, American courts have
interpreted statutes contrary to their plain meaning in
order to avoid absurd legal conclusions.[5][6][7] It is
contrasted with literalism.[8]
The common sense of man approves the judgment
mentioned by Pufendorf [sic. Puffendorf], that the
Bolognian law which enacted "that whoever drew blood
in the streets should be punished with the utmost
severity", did not extend to the surgeon who opened
the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit.
The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by
Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts
that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of a
felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out
when the prison is on fire – "for he is not to be hanged
because he would not stay to be burnt".[9]

English law history[edit]

An explanation of the rule was given in the Sussex
Peerage Case (1844; 11 Cl&Fin 85). "The only rule for
construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be
construed according to the intent of the Parliament
which passed the Act. If the words of the Statute are in
themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more
can be necessary than to expound those words in that
natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves
alone do, in such a case, best declare the intention of
the law giver."
However, use of the literal rule may defeat the intention
of Parliament. For instance, in the case of Whiteley v.
Chappel,[10] the court came to the reluctant conclusion
that Whiteley could not be convicted of impersonating
"any person entitled to vote" at an election, because
the person he impersonated was dead. Using a literal
construction of the relevant statutory provision, the
deceased was not "a person entitled to vote".
This, surely, cannot have been the intention of
Parliament. However, the literal rule does not take into
account the consequences of a literal interpretation,
only whether words have a clear meaning that makes
sense within that context. If Parliament does not like
the literal interpretation, then it must amend the
legislation.

Other uses[edit]
The "plain meaning rule" has sometimes been applied
to the interpretation of contracts, particularly in
conjunction with the parol evidence rule. Such a use is
controversial.[11]

See also[edit]
 Legal formalism
 Letter and spirit of the law § See also
 Pepper v. Hart [1993] AC 573
 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917),
 Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443 (1924)
 Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893)
 United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868)
 Textualism

References[edit]
1. ^ "The notion has long prevailed that three different rules or
approaches may be employed in ascertaining the meaning of a
statute. First, there is said to be the "purpose" approach or
"mischief rule"....Then there is said to be the "literal" approach or
 "plain meaning" rule....Finally there is what is called the "golden
rule".... Source: Elmer Driedger, Construction of Statutes.
Toronto: Butterworths, 1983, p. 1.
2. ^ "Plain Meaning Rule Law & Legal
Definition". Definitions.uslegal.com. Retrieved 2016-04-01.
3. ^ See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §1531(b) (defining "partial-birth
abortion" as comprehended by the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
of 2003).
4. ^ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on December
14, 2005. Retrieved November 20, 2005.
5. ^ The Absurdity Doctrine, Harvard Law Review, John F.
Manning, Vol.116, #8, June, 2003, pp. 2387-2486, [1]
6. ^ "Delaware Corporate & Commercial Litigation Blog  :
Highlights & Analysis of Key Decisions from Delaware's
Supreme Court & Court of Chancery". Delawarelitigation.com.
2007-04-29. Retrieved 2016-04-01.
7. ^ Staszewski, Glen (2006-04-13). "Avoiding Absurdity by
Glen Staszewski". SSRN 896310.
8. ^ Veronica M Dougherty. "Absurdity and the Limits of
Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory
Interpretation". American University Law Review. 44: 127.
Retrieved 2016-04-01.
9. ^ Dougherty, Veronica M. "Absurdity and the Limits of
Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory
Interpretation 44 American University Law Review 1994-
1995". American University Law Review. 44: 127.
Retrieved 2016-04-01.
10. ^ Whiteley v. Chappel (1868; LR 4 QB 147)
11. ^ Linzer, Peter (2002). "The Comfort of Certainty: Plain
Meaning and the Parole Evidence Rule". Fordham Law
Review. 71: 799. Retrieved August 5,2014.
Categories: 
 Common law rules
 Common law legal terminology
 Legal doctrines and principles
 Legal interpretation
 Statutory law
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