THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE PAST:

SOME QUESTIONS *
ALL HUMAN BEINGS ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE PAST (DEFINED AS THE PERIOD
beforethe eventsdirectlyrecordedin any individual'smemory)by
virtueof living with people older than themselves. All societies
likely to concernthe historianhave a past, for even the most
innovatory coloniesare populatedby people who come fromsome
society with an alreadylong history. To be a memberof any
humancommunity is to situateoneselfwithregardto one's (its)past,
ifonlyby rejectingit. The past is therefore a permanent dimension
of the human consciousness,an inevitable componentof the
institutions,values and other patternsof human society. The
problemforhistoriansis to analysethe natureof this "sense of the
past" in societyand to traceits changesand transformations. The
presentpapersuggests some possiblelines of discussion.

I
For thegreaterpartofhistory we deal withsocietiesand communi-
ties for which the past is essentiallythe patternfor the present.
Ideally each generationcopies and reproducesits predecessorso far
as is possible,and considersitselfas fallingshortofit,so faras itfails
in thisendeavour. Of coursea totaldominationof the past would
excludeall legitimatechangesand innovations, and it is improbable
thatthereis anyhumansocietywhichrecognizesno suchinnovation.
It can takeplace in twoways. First,whatis officially definedas "the
past" clearlyis and mustbe a particularselectionfromthe infinity
of whatis remembered or capableor beingremembered. How great
the scope of this formalizedsocial past is in any society,naturally
dependson circumstances.But it will alwayshave interstices, that
is matterswhichformno partofthesystemof conscioushistoryinto
whichmen incorporate, in one way or another,whattheyconsider
important about theirsociety. Innovationcan occurin theseinter-
stices,sinceit does notautomatically affect thesystem,and therefore
does notautomatically comeup againstthebarrier:"This is nothow
thingshave alwaysbeen done". It would be interesting to inquire
* This paper is based on my paper to the 1970 Past and Present Conference
on "The Sense of the Past and History".
4 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 55
whatkindsof activitiestendto be thusleftrelatively flexible,apart
fromthosewhichappearto be negligibleat one time,but mayturn
out notto be so at a laterdate. One maysuggestthat,otherthings
being equal, technologyin the widestsense belongsto the flexible
sector,socialorganization and theideologyor thevaluesystemto the
inflexible. However,in theabsenceof comparative historical
studies
the question must be left open. Certainlythere are numerous
extremely tradition-bound and ritualizedsocietieswhichhave in the
past acceptedthe relatively sudden introduction of new crops,new
meansoflocomotion(suchas horsesamongNorthAmericanIndians)
and new weapons,withoutanysenseof disturbing thepatternset by
theirpast. On theotherhandthereareprobablyothers,insufficiently
investigated, whichhave resistedeven such innovation.
The "formalizedsocialpast" is clearlymorerigid,sinceit setsthe
patternforthepresent. It tendsto be thecourtofappealforpresent
disputes and uncertainties:law equals custom, age wisdom in
illiteratesocieties;the documentsenshriningthis past, and which
therebyacquire a certainspiritualauthority, do the same in literate
or partlyliterateones. A community ofAmericanIndiansmaybase
its claim to communallands on possessionfromtimeimmemorial,
or on thememoryofpossessionin thepast (verylikelysystematically
passed on fromone generationto the next),or on chartersor legal
decisionsfromthecolonialera,thesebeingpreservedwithenormous
care: bothhavevalueas recordsofa pastwhichis considered thenorm
forthepresent.
This does notexcludea certainflexibility or evendefactoinnova-
tion,in so faras thenewwinecan be pouredintowhatare at leastin
formtheold containers. Dealing in second-handcarsappearsto be
a quiteacceptableextensionof dealingin horsesto gypsies,who still
maintainnomadismat leastin theoryas theonlypropermodeoflife.
Studentsof the process of "modernization"in twentieth-century
India have investigatedthe ways in which powerfuland rigid
traditional systemscan be stretchedor modified,eitherconsciously
or in practice,withoutbeing officially disrupted,that is in which
innovationcan be reformulated as non-innovation.
In such societiesconsciousand radicalinnovationis also possible,
but it maybe suggestedthatit can be legitimized in onlya fewways.
It maybe disguisedas a returnto or rediscovery of,somepartofthe
past whichhas been mistakenly forgottenor abandoned,or by the
inventionof an anti-historical principleof superiormoral force
enjoiningthe destruction of thepresent/past, forexamplea religious
revelationor prophecy. It is not clearwhetherin such conditions
 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE PAST 5

principlescan lack all appeal to the past,thatis

even anti-historical
whetherthe "new" principlesare normally- or always?- the
reassertionof "old" prophecies,or of an "old" genreof prophecy.
The historians'and anthropologists' is, thatall recordedor
difficulty
observed cases of such primitivelegitimizationof major social
innovationsoccur,almostby definition, whentraditional societiesare
throwninto a contextof moreor less drasticsocial change,thatis
when the rigid normativeframeworkof the past is strainedto
breaking-point and maytherefore be unableto function"properly".
Though change and innovationwhich comes by impositionand
importationfrom outside, apparentlyunconnectedwith internal
thesystemofideasaboutnovelty
socialforces,need notin itselfaffect
heldwithina community - sincetheproblemwhetheritis legitimate
is solved by force majeure - at such times even the extreme
traditionalist societymust come to some sort of termswith the
surrounding and encroachinginnovation. It may of coursedecide
to rejectit in toto,and withdrawfromit, but thissolutionis rarely
viableforlengthyperiods.
The beliefthat the presentshould reproducethe past normally
impliesa fairlyslow rate of historicchange,forotherwiseit would
neitherbe nor seem to be realistic,exceptat the cost of immense
social effortand the sort of isolationjust referredto (as withthe
Amish and similarsectariansin the modernU.S.A.). So long as
change- demographic, technological or otherwise- is sufficiently
gradual to be absorbed,as it were,by increments, it can be absorbed
into the formalizedsocial past in the formof a mythologized and
perhapsritualizedhistory,by a tacitmodification of the systemof
beliefs,by "stretching" theframework, or in otherways. Even very
drasticsinglestepsof changemaybe so absorbed,thoughperhapsat
greatpsycho-social cost,as withtheforcedconversionof Indiansto
Catholicismafterthe Spanishconquest. If thiswerenotso it would
be impossible for the very substantialamount of cumulative
historicalchangewhicheveryrecordedsocietyhas undergoneto have
takenplace, withoutdestroying the forceof this sortof normative
traditionalism.Yet it still dominatedmuch of ruralsocietyin the
nineteenthand even twentiethcenturies,though"what we have
always done" must plainlyhave been verydifferent, even among
Bulgarianpeasantsin 1850 fromwhat it had been in II50. The
beliefthat "traditionalsociety"is staticand unchangingis a myth
of vulgar social science. Nevertheless,up to a certainpoint of
change,it can remain"traditional":the mouldof thepast continues
to shape the present,or is supposedto.
6 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 55

Admittedly to fixone'seyesuponthetraditional however

peasantry,
greatits numericalimportance, is somewhatto bias the argument.
In mostrespectssuchpeasantries areoftenmerelyone partofa more
comprehensive socio-economic or evenpoliticalsystemwithinwhich
somewhere changestakeplace uninhibited by the peasantversionof
tradition,or withinthe framework of traditions allowingforgreater
flexibility,for example urban ones. So long as rapid change
somewhere within the system does not change the internal
institutionsand relationsin waysforwhichthepastprovidesno guide,
localizedchangescantakeplacerapidly. Theymayevenbe absorbed
back intoa stablesystemof beliefs. Peasantswillshaketheirheads
over city-dwellers, notoriouslyand proverbially"always seeking
somethingnew", the respectablecitydwellersover the nobilityat
court,dizzilypursuingan ever-changing and immoralfashion. The
dominanceof thepast does notimplyan imageof socialimmobility.
It is compatiblewithcyclicalviewsof historicchange,and certainly
withregression and catastrophe (thatis failureto reproducethepast).
What it is incompatiblewithis the idea of continuousprogress.

II
When social changeacceleratesor transforms the societybeyond
a certainpoint,the past mustcease to be thepatternof the present,
and canat bestbecomethemodelforit. "We oughttoreturnto the
waysofourforefathers" whenwe no longertreadthemautomatically,
or can be expectedto. This impliesa fundamental transformation
of the past itself. It now becomes,and mustbecome,a maskfor
innovation, forit no longerexpressestherepetition ofwhathas gone
before,but actionswhichare by definition different fromthosethat
have gone before. Even iftheliteralattemptto turntheclockback
is made, it does not reallyrestorethe old days,but merelycertain
parts of the formalsystemof the consciouspast, which are now
functionally different.The mostambitiousattemptto restorethe
peasantsocietyofMorelos(Mexico)underZapatato whatithad been
fortyyearsearlier- to expungetheeraofPorfirio Diaz and returnto
the statusquo ante- demonstrates this. In the firstplace it could
not restorethepast literally,
sincethisinvolvedsome reconstruction
of what could not be accuratelyor objectivelyremembered(for
examplethepreciseboundariesof commonlandsin disputebetween
different
communities), nottomention theconstruction of"whatought
to have been" and was therefore believed,or at least imagined,to
have actuallyexisted. In thesecondplace,thehatedinnovation was
 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE PAST 7

not a mere alien body which had somehowpenetratedthe social

organismlike some bulletlodged in the fleshand whichcould be
surgicallyremoved,leavingthe organismsubstantially as it was. It
represented one aspectof a socialchangewhichcouldnotbe isolated
fromothers,and consequently couldbe eliminatedonlyat thecostof
changing farmore than the operation envisaged. In thethirdplace,
the sheer social effortof turningthe clock back almostinevitably
mobilizedforceswhich had more far-reaching effects:the armed
peasants of Morelos became a revolutionary poweroutsidetheirstate,
thoughtheirhorizonswerelocalorat bestregional.Restoration under
thecircumstances turnedintosocialrevolution. Withintheborders
of the state(at least so long as the powerof the peasantslasted) it
probablyturnedthe hands of the clockback further thantheyhad
actuallystood in the I870s, cuttinglinks with a wider market
economywhichhad existedeventhen. Seen in thenationalperspec-
tiveoftheMexicanrevolution, its effect was to producea historically
unprecedented new Mexico."
Grantedthat the attemptto restorea lost past cannotliterally
succeed, exceptin trivialforms(such as the restoration of ruined
buildings),attempts to do so will stillbe made and will normally be
selective. (The case ofsomebackwardpeasantregionattempting to
restoreall of what still existed in living memoryis analytically
comparativelyuninteresting.)What aspects of the past will be
singledoutfortheeffort ofrestoration?Historiansarelikelyto note
the frequencyof certaincalls forrestoration - in favourof the old
law, the old morality, the oldtime religion,etc. and mightwell be
to
tempted generalize from this. But before they do so theyought
perhapsto systematize theirownobservations and seekguidancefrom
social anthropologists and otherswhose theoriesmightbe relevant.
Moreover, before takingtoo super-structural a view of the matter,
theymightrecall thatattemptsto restorean actual dyingor dead
economicstructureare by no means unknown. The hope of a
returnto an economyof pettypeasant proprietorship, thoughit
might be littlemore than a big-city pastoralin nineteenth-century
Britain(itwas not,at leastinitially, sharedbytheactuallandlessrural
labourers), was neverthelessan important element in radical
propaganda,and occasionallymoreactivelypursued.
A distinction oughtnevertheless to be made,evenin theabsenceof
a usefulgeneralmodelofsuchselectiverestoration, betweensymbolic

I am indebtedto JohnWomack's splendid biographyof Zapata (New York,

1

1969) for the details of the Morelos movement.

8 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 55

and effectiveattempts of thiskind. The call fora restoration of old

moralityor religionis intendedto be effective.If successful,then
ideally no girl will have, say, premaritalsexual intercourseor
everyonewill attend church. On the other hand the desire to
thebombedfabricofWarsawafterthesecondworld
restore,literally,
war,or conversely to pull downparticular recordsofinnovation such
as the Stalinmonumentin Prague,is symbolic,even allowingfora
certainaestheticelementin it. One mightsuspectthatthis is so
becausewhatpeopleactuallywishto restoreis too vastand vaguefor
specificacts of restoration, for example past "greatness"or past
"freedom". The relationshipbetween effectiveand symbolic
restorationmayindeedbe complex,and bothelementsmayalwaysbe
present. The literalrestoration ofthefabricofParliament on which
WinstonChurchillinsistedcouldbe justified on effective
grounds, that
is the preservationof an architectural scheme which favoureda
particularpatternof parliamentary politics,debate and ambience
essentialto the functioning of the Britishpoliticalsystem. Never-
theless,liketheearlierchoiceoftheneo-gothic styleforthebuildings,
it also suggestsa strongsymbolicelement,perhapseven a formof
magicwhich,by restoring a small but emotionally chargedpartof
a lost past,somehowrestoresthe whole.
Sooneror later,however,it is likelythata pointwill be reached
whenthepast can no longerbe literally reproducedor evenrestored.
At this point the past becomes so remotefromactual or even
rememberedrealitythatit may finallyturninto littlemorethan a
languagefordefining certainnot necessarily conservativeaspirations
of today in historicalterms. The Free Anglo-Saxonsbeforethe
Norman Yoke, or Merrie England before the Reformationare
familiarexamples. So, to take a contemporary is the
illustration,
"Charlemagne" metaphor, which has been used, ever since
Napoleon I, to propagatevariousformsof partialEuropeanunity,
whetherby conquestfromthe Frenchor Germanside or by federa-
tion,and whichpatentlyis not intendedto recreateanythingeven
remotelylike the Europe of the eighthand ninthcenturies. Here
(whetherits proponents actuallybelievein it or not),the demandto
restoreor recreatea past so remoteas to have littlerelevanceto the
presentmayequal totalinnovation, and the past thusinvokedmay
become an artefact,or in less flattering terms,a fabrication.The
name "Ghana" transfers thehistoryofone partof Africato another,
geographically remoteand historically quite different.The Zionist
claimto returnto the pre-diasporapastin the land of Israel was in
 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE PAST 9

practicethe negationof the actual historyof the Jewishpeople for

more than 2,000 years.2
Fabricatedhistoryis familiarenough,yetwe oughtto distinguish
betweenthoseuses of it whichare rhetoricalor analyticand those
which imply some genuine concrete"restoration". The English
radicalsof the seventeenth to nineteenthcenturieshardlyintended
to returnto pre-conquestsociety; the "Norman Yoke" forthemwas
primarilyan explanatorydevice,the "Free Anglo-Saxons"at best an
analogyorthesearchfora genealogy, suchas willbe consideredbelow.
On theotherhand modernnationalist movements, whichcan almost
be defined,in Renan'swords,as movements whichforgethistoryor
rather get it wrong, because their objectives are historically
unprecedented, neverthelessinsiston definingthemto a greateror
lesserextentin historicaltermsand actuallyattemptto realizeparts
history. This appliesmostobviouslytothedefinition
ofthisfictitious
or ratherto territorial
of the nationalterritory, claims,but various
formsof deliberatearchaismare familiarenough,fromthe Welsh
neo-druidsto the adoptionof Hebrewas a spokensecularlanguage
and the Ordensburgenof National-SocialistGermany. All these,
it must be repeated,are not in any sense "restorations"or even
"revivals". They are innovationsusing or purportingto use
elementsof a historicpast,real or imaginary.
Whatkindsofinnovationproceedin thismanner,and underwhat
conditions? Nationalistmovementsare the most obvious, since
historyis the most easily workedraw materialfor the processof
manufacturing novel "nations" in which they are
the historically
engaged. What othermovementsoperatein this way? Can we
say that certaintypesof aspirationare more likelythan othersto
adoptthismodeofdefinition, forexamplethoseconcerning thesocial
cohesion of human groups, those embodyingthe "sense of the
community"? The questionmustbe leftopen.

2 Such pseudo-historicalaspirationsmust not be confusedwith the attempts

to restorehistoricallyremote regimes in traditionalsocieties,which are almost
certainlyliterallymeant: for example the Peruvian peasant risings up to the
1920s which sometimes aimed to restore the Inca Empire, the Chinese
movements,last recorded in the middle of this century,to restorethe Ming
dynasty. For Peruvian peasants the Incas were in factnot historicallyremote.
They were "yesterday", separated fromthe present merely by a readily tele-
scoped succession of self-repeatingpeasant generations doing what their
ancestorshad done in so faras the gods and the Spaniards let them. To apply
chronologyto them is to introduce anachronism.
IO PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 55

III
The problemof systematically rejectingthe past arisesonlywhen
innovationis recognized both as inescapable and as socially
desirable:when it represents"progress". This raisestwo distinct
questions,how innovation as suchis recognizedand legitimized, and
how the situationarisingfromit is to be specified(that is how a
model of societyis to be formulatedwhen the past can no longer
provideit.) The formeris moreeasilyanswered.
We knowverylittleabouttheprocesswhichhas turnedthewords
"new" and "revolutionary" (as used in the languageof advertising)
into synonymsfor "better"and "more desirable",and researchis
badly needed here. However,it would seem thatnoveltyor even
constantinnovationis morereadilyacceptedas faras it concernsthe
human controlover non-humannature,for example science and
technology, sinceso muchof it is obviouslyadvantageous evento the
most tradition-bound.Has thereever been a seriousexampleof
Luddismdirectedagainstbicyclesortransistor radios? On theother
hand,whilecertainsocio-political innovations mayappearattractive
to some groupsof humanbeings,at least prospectively, the social
andhumanimplications ofinnovation (includingtechnicalinnovation)
tend to meet with greaterresistance,for equally obvious reasons.
Rapid and constantchangein materialtechnology maybe hailedby
theverypeoplewho are profoundly upsetby the experienceofrapid
changein human(forexamplesexualand family)relations,and who
mightactuallyfindit hard to conceiveof constantchangein such
relations. Where even palpably "useful" materialinnovationis
rejected,it is generally,perhapsalways,because of the fearof the
social innovation,thatis disruption, it entails.
Innovationwhichis so obviouslyusefuland sociallyneutralthatit
is acceptedalmostautomatically, at all eventsby people to whom
technologicalchange is familiar,raises virtuallyno problem of
legitimation.One would guess (but has the subjectactuallybeen
investigated?)that even so essentiallytraditionalist an activityas
popularinstitutional religion,has foundlittledifficulty in accepting
it. We knowof violentresistanceto anychangein the ancientholy
texts,but thereappearsto havebeen no equivalentresistanceto,say,
the cheapeningof holy images and icons by means of modern
technological processes,suchas printsand oleographs. On theother
handcertaininnovations requirelegitimation, andin periodswhenthe
past ceases to provideanyprecedentforthem,thisraisesverygrave
difficulties.A single dose of innovation,howevergreat,is not so
troublesome. It can be presentedas thevictoryof somepermanent
 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE PAST II

positiveprincipleoverits opposite,or as a processof "correction"or

reason prevailingover unreason,knowledgeover
"rectification",
ignorance,"nature"overthe "unnatural",good overevil. But the
basic experienceof the past two centurieshas been constantand
continuedchange,whichcannotbe so dealtwithexceptsometimes,
at the cost of considerablecasuistry,as the constantlynecessary
applicationofpermanent to circumstances
principles everchangingin
ways which remain rather or
mysterious, byexaggerating thestrength
of the survivingforcesof evil.3
Paradoxically,the past remainsthe mostusefulanalyticaltool for
copingwithconstantchange,but in a novelform. It turnsintothe
discoveryof historyas a processof directional change,of develop-
mentor evolution. Changethusbecomesits own legitimation, but
it is therebyanchored to a transformed"sense of the past".
Bagehot'sPhysicsand Politics(1872) is a good nineteenth-century
exampleofthis;currentconceptsof "modernization" illustratemore
simple-mindedversionsof the same approach. In brief, what
legitimatesthepresentand explainsit is notnow thepast as a set of
reference-points (for example Magna Carta), or even as duration
(forexamplethe age of parliamentary but the past as a
institutions)
processof becomingthe present. Faced withthe overriding reality
of change,even conservative thoughtbecomeshistoricist.Perhaps,
because hindsightis the most persuasiveformof the historian's
wisdom,it suitsthembetterthanmost.
But whatof thosewho also requireforesight, to specifya future
whichis unlikeanything in thepast? To do so withoutsomesortof
exampleis unusuallydifficult, and we findthosemostdedicatedto
innovationoftentemptedto look for one, howeverimplausible,
includingin the pastitself,or in what amountsto thesame thing,
"primitivesociety"consideredas a formofman'spastcoexisting with
his present. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century socialistsdoubtless
used "primitivecommunism"merelyas an analyticalprop,but the
factthattheyused it at all indicatesthe advantageof beingable to
have a concreteprecedentevenforthe unprecedented, or at leastan
exampleof waysof solvingnew problems,howeverinapplicablethe
actualsolutionsof the analogousproblemsin the past. There is, of
course, no theoreticalnecessityfor specifyingthe future,but in

3 The mode of argumentof revolutionaryregimesafterthe triumphof their

revolutionswould be worthanalysingin this manner. It mightthrowlighton
the apparent indestructibilityof "bourgeois survivals" or such theses as the
intensificationof the class strugglelong afterthe revolution.
12 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 55

practicethedemandto predictor to setup a modelforit is too strong

to be shruggedoff.
Some sortofhistoricism, thatis themoreor less sophisticated and
of
complexextrapolation past tendencies into the future,has been the
most convenientand popularmethodof prediction. At all events
the shape of thefutureis discernedby searchingtheprocessof past
developmentfor clues, so that paradoxically, the more we expect
innovation,the morehistorybecomesessentialto discoverwhatit
will be like. This proceduremayrangefromthe verynaive- the
viewofthefutureas a biggerand betterpresent,or a biggerand worse
presentso characteristicoftechnological extrapolationsor pessimistic
social anti-utopias- to the intellectually verycomplexand high-
powered;butessentially history remainsthebasisofboth. However
at thispointa contradiction arises,whosenatureis suggestedby Karl
Marx's simultaneousconvictionof the inevitablesupersessionof
capitalismby socialism,and extremereluctanceto makemorethan
a few verygeneralstatements about what socialistand communist
society would actuallybe like. This is not merelycommonsense:
thecapacityto discerngeneraltendenciesdoes notimplythecapacity
to forecasttheirpreciseoutcomein complexand in manyrespects
unknowncircumstances of the future. It also indicatesa conflict
betweenan essentiallyhistoricist mode of analysinghow the future
will come about, whichassumesa continuingprocessof historical
change, and what has so far been the universalrequirementof
programmatic modelsof society,namelya certainstability. Utopia
is by nature a stable or self-reproducing state and its implicit
ahistoricism can be avoidedonlyby thosewho refuseto describeit.
Even less utopian models of "the good society"or the desirable
politicalsystem,howeverdesignedto meetchangingcircumstances,
tendalso to be designedto do so by meansof a relatively stableand
predictableframework of institutions and values,whichwill not be
disruptedby such changes. There is no theoreticaldifficulty in
defining socialsystemsin termsofcontinuouschange,but in practice
thereseemslittledemandforthis,perhapsbecausean excessivedegree
of instabilityand unpredictability in social relationsis particularly
disorienting.In Comteanterms"order"goes with"progress",but
theanalysisof theone tellsus littleaboutthe desirabledesignof the
other. Historyceases to be of use at the verymomentwhen we
need it most.4
4 Of course if we assume that "whatever is becoming, is right", or at least
inevitable,we may accept the resultsof extrapolationwith or withoutapproval,
but this does not eliminatethe problem.
 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE PAST 13

We may therefore still be forcedback upon the past, in a way

analogousto the traditionaluse of it as a repositoryof precedents,
thoughnow makingour selectionin thelightof analyticalmodelsor
programmes whichhave nothingto do withit. This is particularly
likelyin thedesignof"thegoodsociety",sincemostofwhatwe know
about the successfulfunctioningof societies is what has been
empiricallylearned in the course of some thousandsof years of
livingtogetherin humangroupsin a varietyof ways,supplemented
perhapsby the recentlyfashionablestudyof the social behaviourof
animals. The value of historicalinquiry into "what actually
happened"forthesolutionofthisor thatspecificproblemofpresent
and future,is undoubted,and has givena new lease of lifeto some
ratherold-fashionedhistoricalactivities,providedtheyare teamed
with rathernew-fangledproblems. Thus what happened to the
poor displaced by the massiverailwaybuildingof the nineteenth
century in theheartsofgreatcitiescan and oughtto throwlighton the
possible consequencesof massiveurban motorwaybuildingin the
late twentiethcentury,and the various experiencesof "student
power"in medievaluniversities5 are notwithoutbearingon projects
to changethe constitutional structureof modernuniversities.Yet
the natureof thisoftenarbitrary processof dippingintothepastfor
assistancein forecasting
thefuturerequiresmoreanalysisthanit has
so farreceived. By itselfit does not replace the constructionof
adequate social models, with or withouthistoricalinquiry. It
merely reflectsand perhaps in some instances palliates their
presentinadequacy.

IV
These casual remarksare farfromexhaustingthe social uses of
the past. However,thoughno attemptto discussall otheraspects
can be made here,two specialproblemsmaybe mentionedbriefly:
thoseof the past as genealogyand as chronology.
The sense of the past as a collectivecontinuityof experience
remainssurprisingly important,even to those most dedicatedto
innovationand thebeliefthatnoveltyequalsimprovement: as witness
the universalinclusionof "history"in the syllabusof everymodern
educationalsystem,or the searchfor ancestors(Spartacus,More,
Winstanley)by modernrevolutionaries whose theory,if they are
Marxists,assumes their irrelevance. What preciselydid or do
5 See, for example, Alan B. Cobban, "Medieval Student Power", Past and
Present,no. 53 (Nov. 1971).
14 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 55

modernMarxistsgain fromthe knowledgethat therewere slave

rebellionsin ancientRome which,evensupposingtheiraimsto have
been communist, wereby theirown analysisdoomedto failureor to
produce results which could have littlebearingon the aspirationsof
moderncommunists ? Clearlythe sense of belongingto an age-old
traditionof rebellionprovidesemotionalsatisfaction, but how and
why? Is it analogous to the sense of continuitywhich infuses
historysyllabuses and makes it apparently desirable for school-
childrento learnof theexistenceof Boadiceaor Vercingetorix, King
Alfredor Joanof Arc as partof thatbodyof information which(for
reasonswhichare assumedto be valid but rarelyinvestigated) they
are "supposedto knowabout" as Englishmenor Frenchmen? The
pull of the past as continuity and tradition,as "our ancestors",is
strong. Even the pattern tourismbears witnessto it. Our
of
instinctive sympathy withthesentiment shouldnot,however,lead us
to overlookthe difficulty of discovering whythisshouldbe so.
This difficulty is naturallymuch smallerin the case of a more
familiar formof genealogy, thatwhichseeksto buttressan uncertain
self-esteem.Bourgeoisparvenusseek pedigrees,new nations or
movementsannex examplesof past greatnessand achievementto
theirhistoryin proportion as theyfeeltheiractualpast to have been
lacking in these things - whetherthis feelingis justifiedor not.6
The mostinteresting questionconcerning suchgenealogicalexercises
is, if or whentheybecomedispensable. The experienceof modern
capitalistsocietysuggeststhat they may be both permanentand
transitional.On the one hand late twentieth-century nouveaux-
richesstillaspireto the characteristics of the lifeof an aristocracy
which,in spiteof its politicaland economicirrelevance, continuesto
the
represent highest socialstatus (thecountry chdteau, Rhineland
the
managingdirectorhuntingelkand boarin theimplausiblesurround-
ings of socialistrepublicsetc.). On the other,the neo-medieval,
neo-Renaissanceand Louis XV buildingsand decor of nineteenth-
century bourgeoissocietygavewayat a certainstageto a deliberately
"modern"style,whichnot onlyrefusedto appeal to the past, but
developeda doubtfulaestheticanalogybetweenartisticand technical
innovation. Unfortunately the onlysocietyin historywhichso far
gives us adequate materialfor studyingthe comparativepull of
ancestorsand novelty,is westerncapitalistsocietyin the nineteenth

6 The stress of Russian historicalpopularization

on the priorityof Russian
inventors during the later Stalin years, so excessive as to provoke foreign
ridicule, actually concealed the altogether remarkable achievements of
nineteenth-century Russian scientificand technologicalthought.
 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE PAST 15

and twentieth centuries. It would be unwiseto generalizeon the

strength of a sampleof one.
Finally,theproblemof chronology, whichtakesus to theopposite
extremeof possiblegeneralization, since it is hard to thinkof any
knownsocietywhichdoes notforcertainpurposesfindit convenient
to recordthedurationoftimeand thesuccessionofevents. Thereis,
of course,as Moses Finleyhas pointedout,a fundamental difference
between a chronologicaland a non-chronological past: between
Homer's Odysseusand Samuel Butler's,who is naturallyand quite
un-Homericallyconceivedas a middle-agedman returningto an
ageingwifeaftertwentyyears'absence. Chronologyis, of course,
essentialto the modern,historical, sense of the past,sincehistoryis
directionalchange. Anachronismis an immediatealarm-bellfor
the historian,and its emotional shock-valuein a thoroughly
chronological societyis suchas to lenditselfto easyexploitation in the
arts: Macbethin moderndresstodaybenefitsfromthisin a wayin
whicha JacobeanMacbethobviouslydid not.
At firstsightit is less essentialto the traditional sense of the past
(patternor model for the present,storehouseand repositoryof
experience,wisdomand moralprecept). In such a past eventsare
not necessarily believedto existsimultaneously, liketheRomansand
Moors who fightone anotherin SpanishEasterprocessions,or even
out of time: theirchronologicalrelationto each otheris merely
irrelevant. WhetherHoratiusoftheBridgecontributed his example
to laterRomansbeforeor afterMucius Scaevola,is of interestonly
to pedants. Similarly(to take a modernexample)the value of the
Maccabees, the defendersof Masada and Bar Kokhba for modern
Israelishas nothingto do withtheirchronological distancefromthem
and fromone another. The momentwhenreal timeis introduced
intosucha past(forexamplewhenHomerand theBibleare analysed
by themethodsof modernhistoricalscholarship)it turnsintosome-
thingelse. This is a sociallydisturbing processand a symptomof
socialtransformation.
Yet forcertainpurposeshistoricalchronology, forexamplein the
formof genealogiesand chronicles,is evidentlyimportant in many
(perhaps in all?) literate,or even illiterate,societies,thoughthe
abilityofliterateonesto maintainpermanent written recordsmakesit
possible for them to devise uses for them which would seem to be
impracticable in thoserelyingon purelyoral transmission.(How-
ever, though the limits of oral historicalmemoryhave been
investigated fromthepointofviewoftherequirements ofthemodern
scholar,historianshave givenless attentionto the questionhow far
16 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 55

theyare inadequateto thesocialrequirements oftheirownsocieties.)

In the broadestsense all societieshave mythsof creationand
development,which implytemporalsuccession: firstthingswere
thus,thentheychangedthus. Conversely, a providential
conception
of the universealso impliessome kind of successionof events,for
teleology(evenif its objectshave alreadybeen achieved)is a kindof
history. Moreover,it lends itselfexcellently to chronology, where
such exists: as witnessthe various millennialspeculationsor the
debates about the year IOOOA.D.,whichpivoton the existenceof
a systemof dating.' In a more precise sense, the process of
commenting on ancienttextsofpermanent validity,or ofdiscovering
the specificapplicationsof eternaltruthimplies an elementof
chronology(for example the search for precedent). It is hardly
worthmentioning thateven moreprecisecalculationsof chronology
maybe requiredfora variety ofeconomic,legal,bureaucratic, political
and ritualpurposesat least in literatesocietieswhichcan keep a
recordof them,including,of course,theinventionof favourable and
ancientprecedentsforpoliticalpurposes.
In someinstancesthedifference betweensuchchronology and that
of modernhistoryis clear enough. The lawyers'and bureaucrats'
search for precedentis entirelypresent-oriented.Its object is to
discoverthelegalrightsof today,thesolutionofmodernadministra-
tiveproblems,whereasforthehistorian, howeverinterested in their
relationto the present,it is the difference
of circumstances whichis
significant.On the otherhand this does not seem to exhaustthe
characterof traditionalchronology.History,the unity of past,
presentand futuremaybe something thatis universallyapprehended,
howeverdeficient thehumancapacityto recallandrecordit,and some
sort of chronology,howeverunrecognizableor impreciseby our
maybe a necessarymeasureofit. But evenifthisshouldbe
criteria,
so, where are the demarcationlines drawnbetweenthe coexisting
non-chronological and chronologicalpast, betweenthe coexisting
historicaland non-historical chronologies? The answersare by no
meansclear. Perhapstheymightthrowlightnot onlyon the sense
of the past of earliersocieties,but on our own, in which the
hegemonyof one form (historicalchange) does not exclude the
persistence,in different
milieuxand circumstances, ofotherformsof
the sense of the past.

7 The number-magic which seems to be a natural by-product of at least

written chronologies, even in very sophisticated societies, may be worth
investigation:even today historiansfindit hard to escape fromthe "century"
or otherarbitraryunit of dating.
 THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE PAST 17

It is easierto formulatequestionsthananswers,and thispaperhas

takentheeasierwayratherthanthemoredifficult.And yet,perhaps
to ask questions,especiallyaboutthe experienceswe tendto takefor
granted,is nota valuelessoccupation. We swimin thepastas fishdo
in water,and cannotescape fromit. But our modes of livingand
movingin thismediumrequireanalysisand discussion. The object
of thispaper has been to stimulateboth.
Birkbeck College, E. J. Hobsbawm
University of London

OPEN MEETING
SATURDAY, 8 JULY, 1972 at 10.30 a.m. in
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON

Professor Lawrence Stone (Princeton University)will

read a paper on:
MARRIAGE, SEX AND THE FAMILY IN
EARLY MODERN ENGLAND

The paper will be followed by a general discussion on the

subject.
Anyoneinterestedis invitedto attend.Thereis no registration
fee.

THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF THE PAST

AND PRESENT SOCIETY will be held on the occasion
of the Open Meeting.