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Evidentiality and Its Relations With Other Verbal Categories
Oxford Handbooks Online

Evidentiality and Its Relations With Other Verbal
Categories
Diana Forker
The Oxford Handbook of Evidentiality
Edited by Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald
Print Publication Date: Jan 2018 Subject: Linguistics, Pragmatics, Morphology and Syntax
Online Publication Date: Mar 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198759515.013.3
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter focuses on languages that mark evidentiality within the verbal complex. It
provides an overview of the interrelations between evidentiality and other categories
expressed on verbs. The categories investigated are tense, aspect, modality, polarity,
person agreement, mood/speech act type, finiteness, Aktionsart/semantically defined verb
classes, and mirativity. Languages worldwide exhibit many peculiarities both with respect
to the semantic as well as the formal relations between these categories and evidentiality.
Furthermore, the relationships are multivaried and often include more than two
categories, which leads to even more intricate interactions. Therefore, it is often
impossible to arrive at cross-linguistically valid generalizations, especially with respect to
the categories aspect, finiteness, and also tense.
Keywords: verbal evidentiality, aspect, modality, polarity, person agreement, mood/speech act type, mirativity
3.1. Introduction
Evidentiality, like all linguistic categories, is quite diverse and comes in many different
formal and functional guises that pose challenges for its analysis. However, the majority
of approaches agree on two points that will form the basis for this chapter: (i)
semantically, evidentiality states the information source, and (ii) formally, it is a
grammatical category in a great number of languages (De Haan 1999; Aikhenvald 2004a:
3; Plungian 2010: 17; Brugman and Macaulay 2015). I follow the commonly assumed
subdivisions within the realm of evidentiality: direct versus indirect and further
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subdivisions of direct evidentiality into visual and other sensory evidence, and indirect
into inferred versus hearsay (Willett 1988; Faller 2002: 90; Plungian 2010).
Frequently, grammaticalized evidentiality is a verbal category, which is to be expected

since it is verbs that encode information about events and situations. Information about
the referents of participants encoded by nominals can also have an evidential flavour. For
instance, this is the case in those languages in which deictic elements such as
demonstratives express (non)-visibility or even audibility (De Haan 2001b; Aikhenvald
2004a: 130–1; Dixon 2014; Aikhenvald 2015b; Jacques, Chapter 5 of his volume).
This chapter will focus on evidentiality expressed on verbs or verb phrases. Auxiliaries
and copulas with evidential meaning such as the ones found in Tibetan are included,
provided they form part of a larger class of auxiliaries/copulas. The following verbal
categories are examined in this study:
– tense (Section 3.2)

– aspect (Section 3.3)
– modality (Section 3.4)
– polarity (Section 3.5)
(p. 66) – person/gender/number agreement (Section 3.6)
– mood/speech act type (Section 3.7)

– clause type (finiteness) (Section 3.8)
– Aktionsart/or semantically defined verb classes (Section 3.9)
– other categories expressed in verbs (e.g. mirativity) (Section 3.10)
Synchronically, these categories can interact with evidentiality at various levels. It is

necessary to distinguish between the level of form, i.e. the morphosyntactic expression,
and the level of meaning. Morphosyntactic exponents of evidentiality can be formally and/
or semantically independent of other categories or they can interact. The interaction can
be manifold. First, the evidentials may take the form of portmanteau morphemes that
express more than one meaning. Second, the use of evidential morphemes can be
restricted for morphosyntactic reasons because they occupy the same slot as other
categories and are thus not able to co-occur. Third, their use can be restricted for
semantic reasons because their meaning is incompatible with the meaning of another
category. Fourth, they can acquire additional meanings in the presence of another
category.
Diachronically, there is often a relation between evidentiality and other verbal categories,
most notably tense/aspect, modality, and finiteness. Evidential morphemes can be shown
to originate from verbs, from one or the other verbal category such as the perfect,
participles, or nominalized verb forms or to develop additional uses that are typical for
verbs. This paper focuses on synchronic interactions. For an investigation of the origin of
evidentials see Friedman (Chapter 6 of this volume).
Page 2 of 24

3.2. Evidentiality and tense

The category of information source and the category of temporal reference are, in
principle, independent of each other. The temporal orientation of evidentials is usually
indeterminate and cannot take its time reference from tense. With respect to direct
evidentiality, we can have direct access to the information about events and situations
that take place at the present moment or that took place in the past. This can be reflected
in languages that have (verbal) particles that freely combine with different tense forms.
With respect to future events a direct access to the knowledge about the information
would presuppose a participation in a yet to come event, which seems, conceptually, to be
impossible. In the case of indirect information source the information about situations can
be achieved a posteriori, simultaneously (e.g. seeing a person and inferring her/his
feelings), and a priori if the evidence temporally precedes the event, e.g. in speculation
about future events from present causes, prerequisites or precursors. In the latter case
we cannot have secure knowledge. We can expect to find a correlation between
evidentiality and non-future tenses to the extent that future tenses and evidentiality
should be a typological rarity, especially in systems in which evidentials are fused with
tense morphemes. This past tense bias has been reported in typological studies: past
tenses are more likely to express evidentiality and to distinguish a higher number of
evidential values than non-past tenses (Aikhenvald 2004a: 266, 2015; De Haan 2013a;
Visser 2015). There are numerous frequently cited examples of languages (p. 67) falling
into this group, e.g. Georgian, Nakh-Daghestanian languages, Turkish, Komi-Zyrian,
Haida, Ika, Jarawara, Matses, Okspamin (see De Haan 2016; San Roque and Loughnane
2012a; Visser 2015; Aikhenvald 2015b; Forker, Chapter 23 of this volume). However,
there are also languages that have evidentials in present tenses in addition to past tenses
but not in future tenses, such as Tuyuka (Tukanoan), Tukano (Tukanoan), Tariana
(Arawak), and Mamaindê (Nambikwara). Other languages have evidentials in the present,
past, and future, e.g. Foe (Trans-New Guinea, Southern Highlands province of Papua New
Guinea), Sabanê (Nambikwara), and Bulgarian (1).
(1)
Based on data discussed in Aikhenvald (2004a: 261–3) we notice that the combination of
evidentials with futures always leads to meaning extensions that carry epistemic
overtones, which may be due to the meanings of the future tenses themselves. For
languages that can combine the expression of future with the expression of direct
Page 3 of 24

evidence the resulting meaning is certainty, definite intention or strong directive (Sabanê,
Foe: see Visser 2015) depending on person (2).
(2)
When indirect evidentials and future co-occur, they mostly express hypotheses,
inferences, or conjectures about future events (Kolyma Yukaghir, Kalmyk, Kayardild, Foe,
Sanuma) or predictions of future events (Chinese Pidgin Russian, Meithei, Foe) (see
Aikhenvald 2004a; Visser 2015). This is to be expected: the direct evidentials indicate
epistemic certainty about future events (2), whereas the indirect evidentials do not
indicate certainty, but rather possibility or probability (3). Furthermore, Visser (2015)
notes that in her sample of thirty-six languages with tensed evidentials there were no
instances of the combinations direct sensory (non-visual) evidence + future and hearsay
+ future.
(3)
It is common for languages with evidential distinctions but no grammaticalized past tense
to express evidentiality not by means of verbal suffixes, but clitics or particles. A notable
exception is Kolyma Yukaghir, which has independent suffixes for evidentiality (direct
versus indirect) that precede the suffix for future tense and generally lacks past tenses
(Maslova 2003). (p. 68)
Visser (2015) discusses another phenomenon concerning fused tense/inferred

evidentiality morphemes. Inferred evidentials introduce a further reference point into the
discourse because in addition to the time when the reported event took place and the
utterance time there is a moment at which the results of the event were inferred or
detected by the speaker. Inferred evidentials normally refer to the event time, not to the
moment when the inference was drawn. Fleck’s (2007) study of evidentials in Matses
(Panoan) shows that there are languages that can refer to both the event time and the
inference time (4a,b).
Page 4 of 24

(4)
(4)
Visser (2015) arrives at some generalizations regarding the relationship of evidentiality

and temporal reference in those languages in which the two categories are expressed by
portmanteau morphemes. Direct evidentials expressing visual or non-evidence are about
equally fused with present and past tenses because logically direct evidence can be
gathered in the past as well as in the present. The past tense bias is found first of all with
indirect evidentials, ‘because there often has to be a finished event in the past before one
can deduce, assume, or be reported about it’ (Visser 2015: 308). Finally, hearsay
evidentiality is the least likely evidential subtype to be fused with tenses, which comes as
no surprise given the frequently attested origin of hearsay markers from verbs of speech
(Aikhenvald 2004a: 271–3).
3.3. Evidentiality and aspect

I follow Comrie’s (1976: 3) general characterization of aspect as expressing ‘different
ways of viewing the internal temporal constituency of a situation.’ A basic distinction can
be made between perfective and imperfective aspect. The former is used when the
situation is viewed as a single whole, whereas the latter indicates that attention is paid to
the internal structure of the situation. The definitions of both imperfective and perfective
aspect seem to be compatible with direct and indirect evidentiality. In fact, it is possible
to find various combinations of aspectual values and evidential distinctions in languages
with grammaticalized evidentiality and aspect if we only look at the two major aspectual
subcategories. However, this does not mean that languages possess all logically possible
combinations; normally they choose only a subset. Thus, in Oksapmin (Ok) evidentiality is
independently expressed from aspect and can be combined with it. Oksapmin
distinguishes perfective and imperfective aspect and has grammaticalized direct
evidentiality expressed by verbal suffixes used with various (p. 69) past tenses (5a, b).
Page 5 of 24

The direct evidentials distinguish two subcategories: visual evidentiality and participatory
evidentiality (the latter usually presupposes the conscious participation of the speaker).1
(5)
(5)
In Wanano (Eastern Tukanoan, Stenzel 2008a) aspect and evidentiality are fused,
occurring as verbal suffixes and distinguishing the semantic values visual+perfective,
visual+imperfective, internal evidence+perfective, and internal evidence+imperfective.
All other evidentials (hearsay, non-visual sensory experience, inference) do not express
aspect. Within the first two combinations the aspectual value has scope over the
evidential meaning. This means that with imperfective visual evidentials the access to the
source of information is unbounded whereas with perfective visual evidentials the access
is no longer available or has ceased because it is bounded. Example (6a) was spoken by
somebody who saw an evil creature taking away his mother into a log, but because the
mother is still in the log and thus not visible to the speaker, he uses the perfective aspect
in combination with the visual evidential (-re). By contrast, (6b) was spoken by an evil
creature chasing a woman, and since at the moment of speaking the creature can see the
mother, it uses the imperfective visual evidential (-ra).
(6)
(6)
Page 6 of 24

In Kashaya Pomo (Pomoan, De Haan 2016), the expression of perfective and imperfective
aspect by means of suffixes is combined with the meaning of visual evidentiality. In Shuri
(Northern Rukyuan, Shimoji 2012) the imperfective aspect expresses direct visual
evidentiality, whereas the perfective aspect does not have any evidential meaning at all.
The language has separate suffixes for aspect and for evidentiality. (p. 70)
These few examples might suggest that direct evidentiality, mostly when based on visual
perception, expresses more aspectual distinctions or can be combined with more
aspectual distinctions than indirect evidentiality. However, the opposite situation is also
common. In Japhug, the perfective is not specified for evidentiality (but it mostly implies
direct evidentiality due to its paradigmatic opposition with the inferential) and the same
is true for the past imperfective, but both forms have perfective and imperfective
counterparts that express indirect evidentiality, most notably inferences (Jacques ms.). In
Nungon (Sarvasy 2014: 371–5), the form labelled ‘inferred imperfective aspect’ combines
the meaning of indirect evidentiality and of imperfective aspect and occurs only in the
present tense. It is expressed via a specialized periphrastic construction with the
auxiliary to- ‘do’. In Chechen (Nakh-Daghestanian, Molochieva 2010), evidentiality is
restricted to the past tenses. Imperfective past tenses can only express indirect
evidentiality, whereas the perfective past tenses can express both direct and indirect
evidentiality. Thus, merely the perfective aspect features the full range of evidential
meanings. Similar observations have been made for Sanzhi Dargwa from the same
language family. In this language, only indirect evidentiality has been grammaticalized as
a verbal category whose expression is restricted to a past tense form resembling
pluperfects. This verb form can almost exclusively be obtained from perfective stems. By
contrast, in Ashti Dargwa it is imperfective verbs that preferably express non-firsthand
evidentiality (see Forker, Chapter 23 of this volume for an explanation and references).
Desano (East Tukanoan, Silva 2012) has two verbal suffixes for perfective and
imperfective aspect (-a and -di), and distinguishes six evidential values that are, except
for one, also verbal suffixes (Silva 2012: 250, 255). The expression of aspect and
evidentiality is thus formally independent and, in fact, evidential suffixes can occur
without aspectual suffixes and with evidential suffixes (7a, b). However, it seems that only
the perfective aspect suffix co-occurs at all with the evidential markers. The grammar
does not contain any examples of the imperfective suffix being followed by an evidential
suffix. Along the same lines, Lhasa Tibetan expresses evidentiality (direct versus indirect)
only within the perfective aspect (DeLancey 1986).
Page 7 of 24

(7)
(7)
In sum, although evidential constructions in individual languages are often restricted to

one or the other aspectual value, it remains a task for future research to establish
whether there (p. 71) are really typologically valid tendencies for specific combinations
as opposed to others. This concerns especially the claim that the perfective aspect
correlates with indirect evidentiality (e.g. Speas 2010: 142). The only hypothesis that
seems relatively robust suggests a (diachronic) link between perfects or resultative
aspect and indirect evidentiality, most notably inferentials as it is found in Turkic,
Bulgarian, or Georgian (see, e.g. Slobin and Aksu 1982; Bybee and Dahl 1989; Izvorski
1997; Aikhenvald 2004a: 297–81; Tatevosov 2001a, 2007a). Comrie (1976: 110) explains
this link by ‘the fact that both categories present an event not in itself, but via its results’.
3.4. Evidentiality and modality

Following Nuyts (2001a, 2006), among others, we can distinguish three semantic
subdomains of modality: (i) dynamic modality that is concerned with capacities/ability/
potential and needs/necessity/inevitability, (ii) deontic modality that is concerned with
permission and obligation, or right and wrong according to some system of rules (Portner
2009: 2), and (iii) epistemic modality that has to do with knowledge, belief, certainty,
epistemic necessity, and possibility. For the present investigation it is epistemic modality
that is especially relevant since it touches upon concepts that also play a role for
evidentiality.
Page 8 of 24

Epistemic modality is often defined in terms of degree of certainty, degree of speaker

commitment (De Haan 1999), degree of confidence, or degree of epistemic support (see
reference in Boye 2012: 2, 21; 2010d). I prefer the more general definition provided by
Nuyts (2001: 21) as ‘evaluation of the chances that a certain hypothetical state of affairs
under consideration (or some aspect of it) will occur, is occurring, or has occurred in a
possible world’. The possible world is in the default case the real world. The evaluator is
often the speaker, since epistemic modality is typically entirely speaker-oriented (in
contrast to other subtypes of modality, e.g. dynamic modality is agent-oriented). Thus,
epistemic modality involves an estimation of the likelihood that a situation is/has been/
will be true or false which may include an evaluation of the evidence for the situation.
The estimation occurs within a probability continuum ranging from absolute certainty
that the state of affairs is real to absolute certainty that it is not real. Boye (2012)
distinguishes three basic degrees of epistemic support: full (=certain), partial
(probability, likelihood, epistemic necessity), and neutral (epistemic possibility, ignorance,
lack of knowledge).
One can find different approaches to the relation of evidentiality and epistemic modality
in the literature (Brugman and Macaulay 2015; Wiemer, Chapter 4 of this volume, and a
general overview in Chapter 1 of this volume). That evidentiality and epistemic modality
are distinct categories has been advocated by numerous scholars (e.g. De Haan 1999;
DeLancey 1986; Plungian 2001; Aikhenvald 2004a, 2015b; see also Chapter 1 of this
volume). Schenner (2010) argues that at the conceptual level the two categories are
distinct but related because the type of evidence will normally have some influence on the
strength of belief in the truth of the proposition.
Another view suggests that there is a partial or a full overlap between the two semantic
domains. For instance, Garrett (2001) and Faller (2002) have proposed that modality is
part of the meaning of indirect (inferential) evidentials. Others treat evidentials as
epistemic modals. The latter approach has predominantly been taken by formal
semanticists (p. 72) (e.g. Rooryck 2001; Matthewson et al. 2007; Peterson 2010;
McCready and Ogata 2007), but also by other scholars (Palmer 1986; Willett 1988).
Epistemic modals are normally assumed to operate at the propositional level. If

evidentials are epistemic modals, they are consequently expected to operate at the same
level as the modals. In the literature, one can find two basic test types for exploring
whether evidentials and epistemic modals behave alike, the challengeability test and the
‘Evidential Moor’s paradox’ test that will be discussed briefly.
Following Faller (2006) we assume that if an element can be questioned, doubted,

rejected, or (dis)agreed with, it contributes to the truth conditions of the proposition
expressed. Otherwise it does not (or it is inscrutable). In other words, illocutionary
markers and other operators above the propositional level cannot be explicitly denied,
but the propositional content can be denied. When we look at epistemic modals, we
normally notice that they can be denied or challenged (8).
Page 9 of 24

(8)
By contrast, in most languages evidentials cannot be denied or challenged (9), i.e. they do
not pass the challengeability test (De Haan 1997; Faller 2002; Fasola 2007; Matthewson
2011; Kalsang et al. 2013).2
(9)
The second test is called ‘Evidential Moor’s paradox’ or felicity under known truth/
falsehood (cf. Faller 2002; Peterson 2010; Matthewson 2011; Arakaki 2013; Kalsang et al.
2013). The use of evidentials is felicitous even in cases where the proposition is known by
the speaker to be false (10a,b).
(10)
(p. 73) (10)
Page 10 of 24

This is in contrast to certain epistemic modals and to simple assertions for which a denial
is impossible.
(11)
(11)
Further tests that lead in the same direction can be found in Matthewson (2011: 337–8,
341). Judging from the literature it seems that most of the evidentials to which these tests
have been applied behave like the reportative in Ryukyuan and the evidential in
St’át’imcets3 (e.g. evidentials in Tibetan, see Kalsang et al. 2013; the Gitskan evidential
n’akw, see Peterson 2010). These evidentials confirm Oswalt’s (1986: 43) observation on
the Pomoan language Kashaya that all propositions with the various types of evidentials
are presented by the speaker as certain and true, not as possibly or probably true. This
means that these evidentials do not weaken the proposition they attach to. An assertion of
a proposition with such an evidential equals the assertion of the same proposition without
the evidential with respect to the truth-propositional content. In contrast, modals weaken
assertions in the sense that they imply that the unmodalized assertion would not be
felicitous, i.e. saying Peter must be a good swimmer is a weaker assertion than saying
Peter is a good swimmer.
However, there are also a few examples of evidentials that behave in the opposite way,
e.g. the inferential in St’át’imcets (11b) and the reportative evidential in Gitskan
(Peterson 2010). Consequently, these evidentials have been analysed as modals.
To sum up, there is an obvious semantic proximity between evidentiality (= information

source) and epistemic modality (degree of certainty or speaker commitment). We may
expect that in cases of indirect information source the speaker might be less committed
to the utterance. In fact, evidentiality and epistemic modality may very often be formally
fused in the languages of the world, i.e. one and the same morphological exponent
expresses both meanings. For some subcategories of evidentiality (e.g. inference based
on pure reasoning) the changes might be greater than for others where it is expressed
together with epistemic modality. And epistemic modals often acquire evidential meaning
extensions (e.g. English must). Conversely, evidentials may acquire epistemic overtones.
However, on a conceptual level we can clearly differentiate between the two notions, and
there are languages in which the categories are also formally distinct from each other
(e.g. Tuyuka, De Haan 1999; Nakh-Daghestanian languages, see Forker, Chapter 23 of
this volume). For a detailed discussion of the relationship between evidentiality and
modality see Wiemer (Chapter 5 of this volume).
Page 11 of 24

(p. 74) 3.5. Evidentiality and polarity

The notions of evidentiality and polarity are conceptually independent. The observed
interaction can, as proposed by Aikhenvald (2004a: 257), be analysed as the general
tendency to have fewer grammatical categories in clauses with negative polarity. This
means that it is not specific to evidential marking, but occurs also in clauses without any
evidential meaning. Aikhenvald (2004a: 264, 2015) lists languages such as Udmurt and
Komi (Uralic), Kalmyk (Mongolic), Mỹky (isolate), and Luchuan Ryukyuan as examples of
languages with fewer evidential distinctions in negative clauses, which is normally due to
a reduced number of TAM forms for negated verbs.
Another debated topic is the scope properties of both categories. The question is whether
evidentiality has scope over polarity—which means that in negative clauses not the
evidential meaning, but the propositional meaning is negated—or whether the opposite
holds true and the polarity operator has the evidential meaning in its scope. The first
constellation seems to be more common cross-linguistically (De Haan 1999), and as
discussed in §3.4 has been used as a test to distinguish epistemic modality and
evidentiality. Aikhenvald (2004a: 256) cites the Sino-Tibetan language Akha as an
exception. However, in this language evidentiality is not a verbal category, but expressed
by means of an independent particle and thus falls outside the scope of this paper.
3.6. Evidentiality and person/gender/number

The relations between evidentiality and person/gender/number are multiple and diverse.
One possibility for interactions is morphosyntactic restrictions on agreement. Gender/
number agreement on verbs is not a cross-linguistically universal category. Nakh-
Daghestanian languages belong to the relatively few language families in which gender
agreement on verbs is a prominent and ubiquitous category that, however, does not show
any interactions with grammaticalized verbal evidentiality in these languages (see Forker,
Chapter 23 of this volume). In contrast, in Jarawara the firsthand evidential suffixes are
fused with past tenses and also express gender (Dixon 2003).
Morphosyntactic constraints on person agreement with evidentials are typical for those
languages in which evidentiality is expressed by portmanteau morphemes that also
convey tense and person. Aikhenvald (2004a: Chapter 7, 2015b) mentions Estonian and
Trio as having neutralized person agreement in reported (Estonian) and indirect
evidentials (Trio). For both languages it seems that there is a diachronic explanation for
the suppression of person marking because the evidentials originate from nominalized
verbs forms/participles. By contrast, in the Algonquian language Cheyenne evidentials
also express person independently of the normal person prefixes. Cheyenne evidentials
and markers of illocutionary mood such as imperative and interrogative suffixes form a
Page 12 of 24

single morphological paradigm and are therefore in complementary distribution. Person

agreement of hearsay evidentials is regulated by a hierarchy that differs from the
hierarchy used (p. 75) for the person prefixes such that the verb can have two diverging
person markers (12). The same language has two more evidentials that show restricted
person agreement: the narrative evidential lacks forms for first and second person, and
the conjectural (or inferential) evidential agrees only in animacy without exhibiting
person distinctions (Murray 2010a: 25–6).
(12)
A second possibility is semanto-pragmatically based restricted person marking with some

evidentials compared to non-evidential forms which leads us to the first-person effect.
Non-firsthand evidentials can either not be used with first person at all or if they are used
then the interpretation is adjusted resulting in non-volitionality, i.e. the first person
referent is not described as a conscious agent, but as being involuntary and
unintentionally involved in the situation in question or as acting without control or full
knowledge (Curnow 2003). This means that s/he got to know about his/her actions only
post factum (e.g. via inference or hearsay). The following example from the Turkic
language Tatar (13) occurs in a context in which the speaker is aware of his actions, but
not aware about the person he caught.
(13)
The adjustment effect has been claimed to be restricted to sentences with past time
reference in which the first person pronoun functions as a subject (Curnow 2002a), but
this does not seem to be the case for all languages. In Sanzhi Dargwa (Nakh-
Daghestanian), a first person singular pronoun in the comitative case can trigger the
first-person effect (Forker, Chapter 23 of this volume).
A third way for evidentiality and person to interact within verbal paradigms is
egophoricity (also called conjunct/disjunct marking). San Roque et al. (2012c) define
egophoric marking as reflecting ‘the coincidence of argument roles and the epistemic
authority of a given speech act.’ This characterization has been broadened in San Roque,
Floyd, and Norcliffe (forthcoming) as to involve not only personal knowledge and
Page 13 of 24

participation in the situation, but also volition and agency to some degree. Thus, there is
a certain overlap between the first-person effect and egophoricity.
The epistemic authority is the speaker in assertions and the addressee in questions, (and
the author of the speech report in embedded speech acts). This means that egophoric
marking cross-cuts the person categories through identical marking of first person in
declaratives and second person in interrogatives. In most of the cases this marking
encodes the subject argument. And since egophoric marking involves the perspective
shift between the speaker in statements and the addressee in questions, not only person
but also illocutionary force as a further linguistic category is included (14a–d). (p. 76)
(14)
(14)
(14)
(14)
Conceptually, egophoricity is not identical to evidentiality, although egophoricity has been

frequently categorized as evidentiality, for instance in Tibetan (San Roque, Floyd, and
Norcliffe forthcoming; see also DeLancey, Chapter 27 of this volume; and Hyslop, Chapter
28 of this volume). To be the epistemic authority does not equal having direct access to
information about the respective situation. However, if egophoric marking is analysed as
evidentiality, then the non-egophoric form that encodes the addressee in assertions and
the speaker in questions marks information sources other than the personal embodied
experience. This comprises indirect information sources, but also visual direct
evidentiality when the speaker has observed the action of another person. Within this
approach, egophoric marking is viewed as a special subcategory of direct evidentiality,
Page 14 of 24

sometimes called ‘participatory evidentiality’ (Loughnane 2009) that indicates that the
speaker is directly involved in the event in question.
In their overview of egophoricity San Roque, Floyd, and Norcliffe (forthcoming) show that
at the formal level there are languages such as Wutun or Guambiano in which egophoric
marking stands in a paradigmatic relationship with evidential morphemes, i.e. they
belong to the same formal category (paradigm) and are in complementary distribution. In
some languages there is also a diachronic relationship and it seems that the natural path
of development is from some form of direct evidentials to egophoric marking. For
instance, in Oksapmin, Fasu, and Foe participatory evidentials developed into egophoric
markers (San Roque and Loughnane 2012a), and in Manghuer and other Mongolic
varieties egophoric markers evolved from a direct evidential marker that, in turn, goes
back to an old perfective aspect marker (San Roque, Floyd, and Norcliffe forthcoming). As
San Roque, Floyd, and Norcliffe (forthcoming) further argue, there are languages that
have only egophoricity or only evidentiality, and in other languages both categories co-
occur but are formally independent, such that the precise nature of the interaction
between the two categories needs to be investigated at a language-particular basis. A
more detailed discussion of the interplay between evidentiality and person can be found
in Sun (Chapter 2 of this volume). (p. 77)
3.7. Evidentiality and mood in main clauses

Non-indicative moods such as imperatives, subjunctives, interrogatives, and the
concomitant speech act types other than assertions (e.g. commands, questions) provide
various possibilities for interaction with evidentiality.
It has been noted that the expression of evidentiality in imperatives is cross-linguistically

rather reduced and that this is in line with a general reduction of grammatical categories
in commands (Aikhenvald 2004a: 250–3, 2015). According to Aikhenvald (2015b), most
evidentials found in imperatives are hearsay markers, and since hearsay is frequently
expressed by non-verbal evidentials we can conclude that only very few languages overtly
mark evidentials on verbs in clauses with imperative mood (see Aikhenvald 2004a: 250
for an example and further references).
Evidentiality and its interplay with interrogativity has been investigated in detail by San
Roque et al. (2017) (see also Aikhenvald 2004a: 242–9). The overt expression of verbal
evidentiality in questions is far more common than in commands, probably because the
interrogative mood is frequently marked by intonation or particles/clitics, which do not
automatically lead to morphosyntactic interactions between the two categories or
constraints on their co-occurrence (e.g. Qiang, Duna, Tsafiki, see San Roque et al. 2017
for further references). In the Tsezic languages Khwarshi, Hinuq, and Tsez the evidential
categories that can occur in questions are the same as those found in declarative clauses,
but the direct evidential (which corresponds to the simple past in Hinuq) occurs in the
Page 15 of 24

same slot as the verbal interrogative suffix (Comrie and Polinsky 2007; Khalilova 2011;
Forker 2014). Therefore, there exists an alternation between the tense/evidentiality
suffixes and the interrogative suffix in clauses denoting direct evidentiality that is not
found when expressing indirect evidentiality (15), (16).
(15)
(15)
(16)
(16)
(p. 78)
In other languages (e.g. Tariana, Cheyenne) interrogative clauses have a reduced set of
evidentials compared with their declarative counterparts, and there are also languages
that prohibit evidentials in questions (San Roque et al. 2017; see also Aikhenvald 2004a:
242).
Evidentials indicate a relation between an individual, the evidence holder (also called
‘evidential origo’), and a proposition. In declarative clauses, the evidence holder is the
speaker. It is his/her evidence that is marked by the use of evidential morphemes. In
questions, the evidential origo is typically the addressee—that is, we have a perspective
shift from the speaker perspective to the addressee perspective as illustrated by the
following examples from Korean (17a, b).
Page 16 of 24

(17)
(17)
Evidentials that do not undergo a perspective shift can also be found, e.g. in Yukaghir and
Eastern Pomo (Aikhenvald 2004a: 244). On the basis of the often observed functional
overlap between interrogative pronouns and indefinite pronouns (i.e. interrogative
pronouns can be used as specific indefinite pronouns), Korotkova (2015) claims that
examples of polar questions in which there is no perspective shift and that thus have the
speaker as information source merely illustrate ignorance readings. This would mean that
they are at most conjectural questions that invite but do not require an answer and are
used when the speaker is wondering about something. However, the claim by Korotkova
(2015) requires further investigation since not all examples of evidentials without
perspective shift provided by Aikhenvald (2004a) and San Roque et al. (2017) have
conjectural readings. Other possibilities of perspective shifts with evidentials are also
mentioned by Aikhenvald (2004a) and San Roque et al. (2017), but most of these are non-
verbal evidentials.
In terms of their combinability with other modalities within the domain or irrealis, we find
situations similar to those described for imperative and interrogative. In many languages
there are restrictions due to morphosyntactic reasons such as the occurrence in the same
verbal slot, but in Jamul Tiipay, Yukaghir, Turkic languages, and Abkhaz at least some
non-indicative modalities co-occur with evidentials (Aikhenvald 2004a: 257–8).
3.8. Evidentiality and finiteness

In principle, one might expect that it should be possible for evidentiality to be expressed
not only in main clauses, but also in subordinate clauses. In subordinate clauses generally
fewer verbal categories can be expressed than in main clauses (Cristofaro 2003), but we
have to distinguish between syntactic and semantic subordination, which do not always
go hand in hand. In many languages with verbal evidentials, these are restricted to main
clauses and (p. 79) cannot occur in syntactically subordinate clauses headed by non-finite
verb forms such as participles or converbs. This is normally due to morphosyntactic
constraints because evidential markers and the morphemes marking non-finite verb
forms may occur in the same slot or may be incompatible with each other (see, e.g.
Page 17 of 24

Murray 2016 on Cheyenne; Forker 2014 on Hinuq; and Aikhenvald 2004a: 253–6 for more
examples and references).
We might expect differences between the three basic types of subordinate clauses, i.e.
complement clauses (including reported speech), adverbial clauses and relative clauses.
Thus, reported speech constructions might show no indications of syntactic subordination
and simply consist of a quote and the verb of speech with its arguments. There are a
number of languages that allow the use of evidentials in reported speech constructions.
Often such a use triggers a shift in the evidential ego similar to what has been described
for the use of evidentials in questions (in Section 6; see San Roque et al. forthcoming for
examples and discussion). By contrast, indirect evidentials in Bulgarian complement
clauses of verbs of speech and cognition have been analysed as not undergoing a
perspective shift (Sauerland and Schenner 2007).
There are a number of languages in which certain subtypes of subordinate clauses admit
the presence of evidential markers, but often the evidential semantics is absent. For
instance, the Turkish indirect evidential -miş occurs in finite complement clauses with
evidential meaning and certain non-finite complement clauses, but in the latter it has only
counterfactual meaning (Coşkun 2010; Schenner 2010). Similarly, the Korean direct
evidential marker -te (see also example (17a, b), §3.7) can occur in irrealis conditional
clauses, but does not convey evidential meaning. Thus, the semantics of (18b) is not ‘if I
saw that he had found her yesterday, … ’, but it is simply an irrealis conditional clause
(see also Kwon 2013 for the full account of evidentials in Korean conditional clauses).
(18)
(18)
Schenner (2010) provides guidelines for the investigation of evidentials in complement

clauses, and lists Estonian, Qiang, Tibetan, and Bulgarian as languages that allow for
embedded verbal evidentials. But occasionally evidentials can also be found in other
types of subordinate clauses. Aikhenvald (2004a: 253–6) mentions Tukano and Tariana as
examples of languages with evidentials in purposive and apprehensive clauses and also
notes the lack of evidentials in other types of subordinate clauses in Tariana (e.g. relative
clauses, complement clauses). Though, as mentioned above, non-finite complement
Page 18 of 24

clauses in Turkish cannot convey evidential semantics, Turkish evidentials can occur in
certain types of relative clauses and adverbial clauses with their full evidential meaning
(Schenner 2010) (19). (p. 80)
(19)
In Qiang, evidentials occur in some embedded clauses (20), direct speech complements
and other complex clause constructions, but not in relative clauses and not in conditional
clauses (LaPolla 2003: 74–5). It might, however, be the case that not all the examples
show syntactic subordination.
(20)
There are also a few languages that allow for evidentials in realis or irrealis conditional
clauses, e.g. Yukaghir (Maslova 2003: 227), Ashti Dargwa (see Forker, Chapter 23 of this
volume) and Chechen (Molochieva 2010: 231–6). The latter language also has some other
subordinate clause types that can be marked for evidentiality, e.g. relative clauses (21).
(21)
To sum up, evidentiality is not frequent in subordinate clauses, but there are languages
that can express this category in non-main clauses. It seems that complement clauses
with verbs of speech and cognition are the most probable candidates for inferential
marking and relative clauses are the least probable candidates. As for the type of
evidentiality expressed, this seems to be entirely a language-specific matter and no
generalizations could be made so far. Diachronically, non-finite forms such as participles
or other nominalized verb forms may be used as or may develop into markers of indirect
information source. For instance, in Estonian and Livonian (Finno-Ugric), as well as in
Page 19 of 24

Latvian and Lithuanian (Baltic) participles, infinitives, and action nominals are used for
the expression of evidentiality (Wälchli 2000).
3.9. Evidentiality and semantically defined verb

classes
At a language-individual basis semantically defined verb classes such as Aktionsart
classes (dynamic versus stative verbs, telic versus atelic verbs) but also other classes
such as experiencer verbs often show differences in the way in which they can be used in
clauses (p. 81) expressing evidentiality (Aikhenvald 2004a: 324–9). In the latter case the
interaction also involves person because what is relevant here is the difference between
how one knows about her/his own emotions and cognitive activities (first person) versus
how one gets to know about the emotions and thoughts of others. Thus, we find a
perspective shift between speaker and addressee/other (in assertions) that resembles the
way egophoric systems work and it is therefore not surprising that egophoric
constructions can be sensitive to semantic verb classes. For instance, Standard Tibetan is
commonly analysed as having egophoricity (see §3.6, see also the analysis by DeLancey
(Chapter 27 of this volume) who stresses that evidentiality and egophoricity are different
categories). It has a copula ‘dug expressing direct (visual, other sensory, or testimonial)
evidence when used with second and third person subjects, as in (22a). The same copula
can be used with first person subjects, but only if the subject has the semantic role of an
experiencer and the predicate expresses inner sensations or emotions that only the
experiencer herself/himself can have direct access to (22b).
(22)
(22)
Aikhenvald (2004a: 325) mentions that in Tariana (Arawak), Tukano, and Tuyuka (Eastern
Tukanoan) non-visual evidentials are used to describe one’s own feelings or states. When
speakers talk about other people’s feelings they typically use inferentials or visual
evidentials. In Eastern Pomo, the non-visual sensory evidential is used to refer to
sensations, feelings, and emotions (McLendon 2003: 102–3).
Page 20 of 24

In the case of inferential evidentiality the speaker has direct access to the evidence, i.e.
to a situation that is distinct from the original event and concludes from the resulting
second situation that a certain event took place, takes place, or will take place. Based on
Nikolaeva (1999a), we can distinguish trivial from non-trivial results and define a trivial
result as ‘a component of the lexicographical description of the verb.’ Verbs referring to
events with trivial results are mostly telic, e.g. open, come, arrive, put, stand up, etc. The
events expressed by atelic verbs (stand, sing, hang, walk, snore) do not have trivial
results. Trivial results are unique for each event and predictable from it, and the resulting
states share at least one participant with the preceding event. Non-trivial results are
context-dependent and not part of the semantics of the verbs. They are highly dependent
on subjective factors, they are not associated with certain verb classes, an event can have
more than one non-trivial result, and the result and the preceding event itself do not
necessarily involve the same set of participants. The distinction can be partially reflected
in evidential systems. For example, in Nakh-Daghestanian, the perfect frequently has
indirect evidential readings, but their availability depends on the semantics of the verbs
used. Thus, with stative verbs such as like or know the perfect often conveys only present
time reference. With verbs denoting changes of state (e.g. sit down, get sick) it only has a
resultative meaning and refers to present states (Forker, (p. 82) Chapter 23 of this
volume). Similarly, in Komi-Zyrian non-firsthand past forms of telic verbs have resultative
meaning with no additional evidential semantics (23a); with other verbs indirect
evidential meaning is expressed (23b).
(23)
(23)
In Qiang (LaPolla 2003: 67), stative verbs have a mirative meaning when they are used
with the inferred evidential. The inferential meaning of the same verb forms is obtained
with dynamic verbs. In Tibetan, only verbs denoting telic events can be used with the
direct evidential shag (Kalsang et al. 2013: 541), whereas the direct evidential ‘dug can be
used with verbs that express telic and atelic events (Kalsang et al. 2013: 538).
Furthermore, inference based on trivial results can only be expressed by means of shag
(Kalsang et al. 2013: 531). With stative verbs in Japhug, the inferential imperfective can
be used without any restrictions, whereas with dynamic verbs its use is restricted to
concessive and counterfactual clauses and to the co-occurrence with the progressive
prefix (Jacques ms).
Page 21 of 24

In sum, there is an interaction between evidentiality and the Aktionsart structure of the
event or the access to information source (direct personal access to one’s own feelings
versus access based on visual observation or inference when talking about the feelings
and inner states of others).
3.10. Evidentiality and other verbal categories

Most other categories marked on verbs such as voice and valency change, location/
direction, and politeness do not seem to show interactions with evidentiality. The only
notable exception is mirativity. Mirativity can be defined as ‘the grammatical marking of
unexpected information’ (DeLancey 1997). It is the linguistic reflex of surprise and
unexpectedness, of not yet integrated information or information that cannot be easily
assimilated (see DeLancey 1997; Hengeveld and Olbertz 2012; Aikhenvald 2012b;
Peterson 2015 for definitions and discussions concerning the term mirativity). Aikhenvald
(2012b) provides a list of different semantic aspects of mirativity such as sudden
discovery, unprepared mind, and counterexpectation. What a mirative statement typically,
though not necessarily, expresses is the surprise of the speaker. In some languages this is
reflected through a connection between mirativity and first person, in the sense that only
statements with first person participants have mirative readings.
There is an ongoing discussion about whether mirativity represents a linguistic category

in its own right or whether it is part of other categories such as evidentiality or modality
(see (p. 83) the papers in Linguistic Typology 16, 2012). I assume that mirativity is, from
a semantic point of view, an independent category, though it is cross-linguistically not
often grammaticalized (much rarer than evidentiality). In a number of languages
mirativity is realized independently of evidentiality, but there are also many languages
where it is epiphenomenal and can be considered a ‘side-effect’ of evidentiality. This
brings us to the correlation between the two categories. In a range of languages, non-
firsthand evidentials—typically those with an inferential meaning—have mirative
extensions, i.e. can have mirative readings in certain contexts, though their basic
meaning is non-firsthand evidentiality. This can be tested by means of the witnessing test
(Peterson 2015), whereby a non-firsthand evidential is used to express surprise in a
situation where the information source is clearly direct, e.g. the Turkish suffix -miş (Aksu-
Koç and Slobin 1986: 159). Furthermore, mirativity and evidentiality frequently have a
common origin and partly share grammaticalization paths (Hengeveld and Olbertz 2012).
Page 22 of 24

3.11. Position of evidential morphemes within

the verbal paradigm and combinations of
verbal evidential markers
As cross-linguistically well attested, evidential morphemes adhere to the preference for
suffixes. Evidential prefixes are rare, but see Jacques (ms.) for verbal evidential prefixes
in Japhug. Within the verbal template evidential suffixes appear directly attached to the
stem most often when they are fused with tense markers, as in the Tsez examples in (15)
and (16). If evidentiality and tense are expressed by separate morphemes, then tense can
occur closer to the stem than evidentiality (e.g. Kayardild, Evans 1995: 525–6), but the
opposite ordering is also found (e.g. Yukaghir, Maslova 2003; Karitiana, Everett 2006).
For separated tense and polarity morphemes it is polarity that precedes evidentiality (e.g.
Desano, Sabanê). The same can be said about the ordering of aspect versus polarity: the
former precedes the latter (e.g. Yukaghir, Desano). By contrast, verbal categories that
follow evidential suffixes are person markers (e.g. Desano, Qiang, Matses, Mapuche) and
mood/speech act type markers (e.g. Mapuche, Korean, Mamaindê, but in the latter
language person precedes evidentiality, see Visser 2015: 304). In a number of languages
such as Abkhaz or Wanano the evidential suffixes occupy the right-most position. These
generalizations largely confirm Cinque’s (1999) remarks about the position of evidential
morphemes within the verbal complex: they occur closer to the stem than affixes that
mark speaker evaluations or speech act type, but all other TAM morphemes appear even
closer to the verbal stem than evidential affixes.
Combinations of verbal evidential suffixes are rare, but Eastern Pomo (24) provides an
example in which the sensory evidential is followed by the hearsay suffix.
(24)
(p. 84) 3.12. Summary and concluding remarks

This chapter focuses exclusively on languages that mark evidentiality within the verbal
complex. It provides an overview of the interrelations between evidentiality and other
categories expressed on verbs—namely tense, aspect, modality, polarity, person
Page 23 of 24

agreement, mood/speech act type, finiteness, Aktionsart (or semantically defined verb
classes), and mirativity.
With respect to some of these categories such as aspect and finiteness and, to a lesser
degree, tense, it is often impossible to arrive at cross-linguistically valid generalizations.
Instead, languages exhibit many peculiarities both with respect to the semantic relations
as well as the formal relations. Furthermore, the relationships are varied and often
include more than two categories, leading to even more intricate interactions.
Notes:
(1) The indirect evidentials come as particles and enclitics, combining with the direct
evidentials (5a) and also with the aspectual distinctions.
(2) But see Peterson (2010) for a critique of this test.
(3) Matthewson (2011) nevertheless argues for a modal analysis of the St’át’imcets
evidential lákw7a.
Diana Forker
Diana Forker teaches general linguistics at the University of Bamberg and Caucasian
Studies at the University of Jena. She completed her PhD at the Max Planck Institute
for Evolutionary Anthropology. Her main interests are languages of the Caucasus,
typology, and morphosyntax and sociolinguistics. She currently works on the
documentation of the Nakh-Daghestanian language Sanzhi Dargwa. Among her
recent publications are A Grammar of Hinuq (2013) and several articles on different
aspects of Nakh-Daghestanian languages.
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Evidentiality and Its Relations With Other Verbal Categories

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Abstract and Keywords

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

Frequently, grammaticalized evidentiality is a verbal category, which is to be expected

– tense (Section 3.2)

– mood/speech act type (Section 3.7)

Synchronically, these categories can interact with evidentiality at various levels. It is

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

3.2. Evidentiality and tense

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Visser (2015) discusses another phenomenon concerning fused tense/inferred

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

Visser (2015) arrives at some generalizations regarding the relationship of evidentiality

3.3. Evidentiality and aspect

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

In sum, although evidential constructions in individual languages are often restricted to

3.4. Evidentiality and modality

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Epistemic modality is often defined in terms of degree of certainty, degree of speaker

Epistemic modals are normally assumed to operate at the propositional level. If

Following Faller (2006) we assume that if an element can be questioned, doubted,

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(p. 73) (10)

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To sum up, there is an obvious semantic proximity between evidentiality (= information

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

(p. 74) 3.5. Evidentiality and polarity

3.6. Evidentiality and person/gender/number

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

single morphological paradigm and are therefore in complementary distribution. Person

A second possibility is semanto-pragmatically based restricted person marking with some

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

Conceptually, egophoricity is not identical to evidentiality, although egophoricity has been

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3.7. Evidentiality and mood in main clauses

It has been noted that the expression of evidentiality in imperatives is cross-linguistically

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

3.8. Evidentiality and finiteness

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

Schenner (2010) provides guidelines for the investigation of evidentials in complement

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

3.9. Evidentiality and semantically defined verb

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Subscriber: Gothenburg University Library; date: 03 July 2018

3.10. Evidentiality and other verbal categories

There is an ongoing discussion about whether mirativity represents a linguistic category

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3.11. Position of evidential morphemes within

(p. 84) 3.12. Summary and concluding remarks

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(2) But see Peterson (2010) for a critique of this test.

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