CASE DIGEST |1
White Light Corporation, Titanium Corp and Sta
Mesa Tourist Dev. Corp v. City of Manila
FACTS: Mayor Lim signed into law the Ordinance No.
7744 prohibiting hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses,
pensions houses and similar establishments from offering
short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or “wash-up”
rates or room rates that offer less than 12 hours or renting
of rooms more that twice a day.
White Light Corp, Titanium Corp, and Sta. Mesa Tourist
and Development Corp. filed a motion to intervene on the
ground that said Ordinance directly affects their business
interest as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in
Manila.
RTC – granted the motion to intervene and issued a TRO
directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the
Ordinance. City alleged that that it was a valid exercise of
police power; hence, the said Ordinance was
constitutional. Nevertheless, the RTC declared the said
Ordinance null and void as it strikes at the personal
liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously
guarded by the Constitution
CA – reversed the DECISION and affirmed the
constitutionality of the Ordinance arguing that it did not
violate the right to privacy or freedom of movement as it
only penalizes the owners and operators of
establishments that admit individuals for short tie stays.
The objective of the Ordinance was lawful as it aims to
curb immoral activities
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of
police power of the City of Manila.
HELD: It cannot be considered as a valid exercise of
police power, hence, unconstitutional. The Ordinance
suffers from overbreadth as makes a sweeping
intrusion into the right to liberty of the petitioner’s
clients. It is their right to patronize their establishments
for a wash-rate time frame. The test of a valid ordinance
was already established in previous cases:
1. Must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute;
2. Must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. Must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5. Must be general and consistent with public policy;
and
6. Must not be unreasonable.
In this case, the SC held that requisites for exercise of
Police Power were not met as the means of interfering a
supposed private right was unreasonable. The Ordinance
makes no distinction between places frequented by
patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons
engaged in legitimate actions. Thus, it prevents
legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or
even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the
Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of
lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit
patronage and subject them without exception to the
unjustified prohibition.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in
fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less
intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation
of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police
work would be more effective in easing the situation.
So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and
regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These
measures would have minimal intrusion on the
businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can
easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day
rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit
activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in
fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging
their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and
even apartments.
Jesus Garcia v. Hon. Alan Drilon
FACTS: Private Respondent Rosalie Garcia filed a
verified petition before RTC for the issuance of TPO
against her husband Jesus Garcia pursuant to RA 9262.
She alleged that she’s a victim of physical abuse,
emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a
result of marital infidelity of her husband, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support.
Garcia’s infidelity spawned a series of fights that left
Rosalie physically and emotionally wounded. There was
a time when Jesus grabbed Rosalie on both arms and
shook her with such force that caused bruises and
hematoma. And other series of abuse. Jesus got angry
when Rosalie informed the management of Robinson’s
Bank that she will file charges against the bank manager
who happens to be Jesus’ paramour. Jesus got angry; he
packed his things and told Rosalie that he’s leaver her for
good.
RTC – granted the TPO but the petitioner failed to
faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said
TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the
issuance of a TPO ex parte. The RTC issued a modified
TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to
comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After
the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no
longer submitted the required comment.
Jesus – filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on questioning the constitutionality of
the RA 9265 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO
for being an unwanted product of an invalid law.
CA – issued the TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but
denied the petition for failure to raise the constitutionality
in his pleadings before the RTC.
ISSUE: WON RA 9262 is violative of the due process and
the equal protection clauses
HELD: R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws. RA is based on a valid
classification and it does not favor women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends
its protection. For classification to be valid:
1. The classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences;
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and
4. It must apply equally to each member of the class.

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of
the Constitution. The fear of petitioner of being "stripped
of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds,
without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of
an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is
in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The
grant of the TPO ex parte cannot be impugned as violative
of the right to due process. In fact, he filed an Opposition
to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that
was granted two days earlier. He also filed a motion for
the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights
to his children. The RTC gave him 5 days within which to
show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or
extended, but he chose not to filed the required comment
arguing that it would be an “exercise in futility.” Having
failed to do so, he may not now be heard to complain that
he was denied due process of law.
Ciracio “Boy” Guingguing v. CA
FACTS: Cirse “Choy” Torralba was a broadcast journalist
who filed a criminal complaint for libel against Lim and
Guingguing. In 1991, Lim caused the publication of
criminal cases filed against Torralba and photographs of
the latter being arrested. These were published by means
of a one-page ad paid for by Lim in the Sunday Post, a
weekly publication edited and published by Guingguing.
Torralba argued that he had been acquitted and the cases
mentioned had already been settled; he also claimed that
the publication was also designed to degrade, malign, and
destroy him as a broadcast journalist. Lim contended that
Torralba was allegedly making scurrilous attacks against
him and his family over the airwaves. Since he had no
access to radio time, he paid ads via newspapers to
answer the attacks instead.
RTC – The publication was indeed libelous.
CA – It modified the penalty imposed but it affirmed the
RTC’s finding of guilt.
ISSUE: WON the crime of libel against Guingguing
constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to
freedom of speech and of the press.
HELD: Libelous speech does not fall within the ambit
of constitutional protection. However, the SC held that
Guingguing was not guilty of libel.
The guarantee of free speech was enacted to protect not
only polite speech, but even expression in its most
unsophisticated form. Criminal libel stands as a
necessary qualification to any absolutist interpretation of
the free speech clause, if only because it prevents the
proliferation of untruths which if unrefuted, would gain an
undue influence in the public discourse. But in order to
safeguard against fears that the public debate might be
muted due to the reckless enforcement of libel laws, truth
has been sanctioned as a defense, much more in the case
when the statements in question address public issues or
involve public figures.
Under our law, criminal libel is defined as a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
CASE DIGEST |2
memory of one who is dead. Thus, the elements of libel
are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to
another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of
the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.
The SC held that Torralba is a public figure and in order
to justify a conviction for criminal libel against a public
figure, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt
that the libelous statements were made or published
with actual malice, meaning knowledge that the
statement was false or with reckless disregard as to
whether or not it was true. As it has been established
that complainant was a public figure, it was incumbent
upon the prosecution to prove actual malice on the part of
Lim and petitioner when the latter published the article
subject matter of the complaint. Set otherwise, the
prosecution must have established beyond reasonable
doubt that the defendants knew the statements in the
advertisement was false or nonetheless proceeded with
reckless disregard as to publish it whether or not it was
true.
It should thus proceed that if the statements made
against the public figure are essentially true, then no
conviction for libel can be had. Any statement that
does not contain a provably false factual connotation
will receive full constitutional protection
A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting
a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate
interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has
become a 'public personage.'
Alejandro Estrada v. Soledad Escritor
FACTS: Alejandro Estrada filed a complaint against
Escritor for committing “disgrace and immoral conduct”
under the Revised Administrative Court. He alleged that
Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for living
with a man not her husband, and having borne a child
within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that
Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the
image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to
remain employed therein as it might appear that the court
condones her act.
Escritor contended that she was already a widow when
she entered the judiciary. She admitted that she’s living
with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage
for more than 20 yrs ago when her late husband lived with
another woman. She also admitted that they have a son.
As a member of Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society, she asserted that their
conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs and has the approval of her
congregation. In fact, after ten years of living together,
she executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.
For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows
members of the congregation who have been abandoned
by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The
Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and
binding within the congregation all over the world except
in countries where divorce is allowed.
ISSUE: WON Escritor should be found guilty of the
administration charge of disgraceful and immoral conduct.

HELD: No, it was dismissed. The SC held that there was
no compelling state interest to override Escritor’s freedom
of religion. In fact, the Jehovah’s Witnesses have
standards and procedures which must be followed before
cohabitation without marriage is given the blessing of the
congregation. This includes an investigative process
whereby the elders of the congregation verify the
circumstances of the declarants. Also, the Declaration is
not a blanket authority to cohabit without marriage
because once all legal impediments for the couple are
lifted, the validity of the Declaration ceases, and the
congregation requires that the couple legalize their union.
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as
one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a
fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the
hierarchy of rights — "the most inalienable and sacred of
human rights," in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not
enough to contend that the state’s interest is
important, because our Constitution itself holds the
right to religious freedom sacred. The State must
articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in
preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for
only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests can limit the fundamental right to religious
freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the
Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself
Pp v. Leo Echegaray
FACTS: The SC previously rendered a Decision in the
Echegaray case affirming the conviction of Leo for the
crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The Death
Penalty Law (RA 7659) was already in effect when the
crime has been committed. Leo discharged his defense
counsel and retained the services of the Anti-Death
Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group
of the Philippines (FLAG). The FLAG questioned the
constitutionality of the said law as death penalty is a
severe and excessive penalty in violation of Art III, Sec 19
(1) of the 1987 Constitution and cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of Art III, Sec 11 of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE: WON the death penalty is a cruel, unjust,
excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments.
HELD: No. It was previously held in Harden v. Director of
Prison that punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of
death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life.
The SC emphasized that our courts are not the fora for a
protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death
sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific
and well-defined criminal acts. In Limaco Case:
"x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly
believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong
or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that
penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as
our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain
CASE DIGEST |3
cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and
apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"
Lito Corpuz v. Pp
FACTS: Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and Lito
Corpuz met in a casino in Olongapo City. Tangcoy was
then engaged in the business of lending money to casino
players and upon hearing Tangcoy had some pieces of
jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached him at the same
casino and offered to sell the said jewelry on commission
basis. Then, Tangcoy entrust certain jewelries amounting
to 98K to Corpus for the purpose of selling them. He
waited for Corpuz to remit the sale proceeds or return the
said jewelry but Corpuz failed to do so. Hence, an
information for the crime of estafa was charged against
Corpuz was filed.
RTC – convicted
CA – affirmed
Corpuz contended that the penalty imposed upon him by
the court a quo violates the equal protection clause and
the prohibition against oppressive and cruel punishment.
Thus, he asked the Court to suspend the execution of the
sentence or amend the same to accord respect to his
constitutional rights.
ISSUE: WON the incremental penalty provided under
Article 315 of the RPC violated the Equal Protection
Clause.
HELD: No. The incremental penalty is where the
punishment to be meted out to a convict increases as the
amount involved in estafa gets higher. In the present
case, the value amounted to a total of 98K, hence Corpuz
was convicted to serve imprisonment a total of 18 yrs, in
addition to the fines imposed.
In ruling for the constitutionality of the assailed RPC
provision, the Court explained that it has no authority to
modify the range of penalties, as such would constitute
judicial legislation. What the legislature’s perceived failure
in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes
cannot be remedied through the Court’s decision.
The added that besides, it has long been held that the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the
punishment rather than its severity in respect of
duration or amount, and applies to punishments
which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or
obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping
post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking
on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and
imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out
of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious
to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it
cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has
been held that to come under the ban, the punishment
must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community."

Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the
Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our
modern time.
Pp v. Ferrer
FACTS: A criminal complaint for violation of Section 4 of
the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Feliciano Co
before the CFI of Tarlac. It was alleged that Co was an
officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an
outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the
government of the Philippines
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-
Subversion Act is a bill of attainder
Meanwhile, another criminal complaint was filed against
Tayag, Casipe, Garcia, Alavado, Bie, and several John
Does (and five others) with subversion as they were
tagged as officers of the Kabataang Makabayan, a
subversion organization instigating and inciting the people
to organize and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the PH.
Tayag also moved to quash the complaint on the grounds
that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it
embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title
thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the
laws.
RTC – declared the statute void on the grounds that it is
a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and
dismissed the information against the two accused.
ISSUE: WON RA 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) is a bill of
attainder.
*A bill of attainder is an act of a legislature declaring a
person, or a group of persons, guilty of some crime - and
punishing them, often without a trial
HELD: No. The SC said it is only when a statute applies
either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment
on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of
attainder.
The SC explained that it does not specify the Communist
Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the
purpose of punishment. What it does is simple to
declare the party to be an organized conspiracy for
the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of
the prohibition.
The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues
solely for definitional purposes. In fact the act applies not
only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to
"any organisation having the same purpose and their
successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
The contention about the word “overthrow” regarding the
government (peaceful overthrowing) is clarified by the
provision of the clause: by means of force, violence,
deceit, subversion or any other illegal means.
The freedom of expression and freedom of association is
superseded by the right of the state to self-preservation.
CASE DIGEST |4
US v. Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria De Conde
FACTS: On December 30, 1915, private complainant
Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Llianco entered into a
contract with Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria De
Conde concerning a debt of Php300. The former were
obligated to pay 5% per month within the first ten days of
every month.
A complaint was presented in the CFI of Manila charging
Vicente and Apolinaria with violation of the Usury Law (Act
No. 2655). Upon said complaint, both were arrested,
arraigned, and pleaded not guilty.
RTC – Guilty. At the time of the execution and delivery of
said contract, there was no law in force in PH punishing
usury, but inasmuch as the defendants had collected a
usurious rate of interest after the adoption of the Usury
Law in the Philippine Islands (Act No. 2655), they were
guilty of a violation of that law and should be punished in
accordance with its provisions
Vicente and Apolinaria contended (a) That the contract
upon which the alleged usurious interest was
collected was executed before Act No. 2655 was
adopted; (b) that at the time said contract was made
(December 30, 1915), there was no usury law in force
in the Philippine Islands; (c) that said Act No. 2655 did
not become effective until the 1st day of May, 1916, or
four months and a half after the contract in question was
executed; (d) that said law could have no retroactive effect
or operation, and (e) that said law impairs the obligation
of a contract, and that for all of said reasons the judgment
imposed by the lower court should be revoked; that the
complaint should be dismissed, and that they should each
be discharged from the custody of the law.
ISSUE: WON the Usury Law has the retroactive effect.
HELD: No. The SC held that a law imposing a new
penalty, or a new liability or disability, or giving a new
right of action, must not be construed as having a
retroactive effect. It is an elementary rule of contract that
the laws in force at the time the contract was made must
govern its interpretation and application. Laws must be
construed prospectively and not retrospectively. If a
contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered
illegal by any subsequent legislation. If that were
permitted then the obligations of a contract might be
impaired, which is prohibited by the organic law of the
Philippine Islands.
Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the
defendant, are prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every
law that makes an action, done before the passage of the
law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and
punishes such action, is an ex post facto law. In the
present case Act No. 2655 made an act which had been
done before the law was adopted, a criminal act, and
to make said Act applicable to the act complained of
would be to give it an ex post facto operation. The
Legislature is prohibited from adopting a law which will
make an act done before its adoption a crime. A law may
be given a retroactive effect in civil action, providing it is
curative in character, but ex post facto laws are absolutely
prohibited unless its retroactive effect is favorable to the
defendant.
 CASE DIGEST |5

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
DECLARATION OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND
DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC
FACTS: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly
recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit
corporation created under the land, filed a petition for
declaratory relief praying for a determination of the validity
if Sec. 8(a) of RA 6132 –
Section 8. Prohibited Acts. In addition to and
supplementing prohibited acts provided for in the
Revised Election Code, in the election of delegates:
22, 1975 be applicable to a crime committed on October
16, 1974.
HELD: No. The SC held that the penalty of prision mayor
medium, or eight years and one day to ten years, imposed
by Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to
swindling by means of issuing bouncing checks
which was committed or after October 22, 1975.
Increased penalty does not apply to the estafa committed
by Puerto on October 16, 1974. To apply it to Puerto
would make the decree an ex post facto law. Its
retroactive application is prohibited by articles 21 and
22 of the Revised Penal Code and section 12, Article
IV of the Constitution

(a) No candidate or delegate to the convention shall

represent or allow himself to be represented as
being a candidate of any political party or any
other organization, and no political party, political
group, political committee, civic, religious,
professional or other organization or organized
group of whatever nature shall intervene in the
nomination of any such candidate or in the filing
of his certificate of candidacy or give aid or
support, directly or indirectly, material or
otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign
for election.

According to them, the paragraph violates the due

process clause, right of association, and freedom of
expression, and that is an ex post facto law.

ISSUE: WON Sec 8(a) of RA 6132 is an ex post facto law.

HELD: No. While it is true that Section 18 penalizes a

violation of any provision of R.A. No. 6132 including Sec.
8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts
committed after the approval of the law and not those
perpetrated prior thereto.

There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that

Sections 8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall
apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the
contrary, Section 23 directs that the entire law shall be
effective upon its approval.

Pp. v. Hon. Rolando Villaraza and Caesar Puerto

FACTS: After Ceasar Puerto waived the second stage of

the preliminary investigation, City Judge Vilaraza directed
to elevate the case of Caesar Puerto for trial. Puerto was
charged with estafa

The CFI of Misamis Oriental returned the case to the city

court because in its opinion the case falls within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts and, the city court,
as the first court which took cognizance of the case,
should try it.

Hon. Villaraza directed the re-elevation of the case. His

view is that the case falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the CFI because estafa committed by the
accused is punishable by prision mayor medium under
Presidential Decree No. 818 which took effect on October
22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code.

ISSUE: WON the penalty of prision mayor medium, or

eight years and one day to ten years, imposed by
Presidential Decree No. 818 which took effect on October