Sibal v. Valdez, 50 Phil 512, G.R. No.

26278, 4 August 1927

Doctrine:

For the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, "growing fruits"
have the nature of personal property.

The existence of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were, in advance,
rendering the crop movable.

Facts:

Vitaliano Mamawal, Deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the CFI of
Pampanga, attached several properties of Leon Sibal including a sugar cane planted by the latter on seven parcels of
land. Mamawal then sold the aforementioned properties at a public auction to Emiliano Valdez.

Within one year from the date of attachment and sale, Sibal was able to redeem the lands but when he tried to
redeem the sugar cane planted thereon, defendant Valdez refused to accept the redemption money, alleging that
the sugar cane in question had the nature of personal property, therefore not subject to redemption.

Lower court issued the preliminary injunction prayed for by Sibal. But, by way of counterclaim Valdez, alleged that
because of the preliminary injunction he was unable to gather the sugar cane, sugar-cane shoots and palay in said
parcels of land, representing loss and damages to him. Consequently, lower court now rendered judgment in favour
of Valdez, holding that the sugar cane in question was indeed a personal property and not subject to redemption.

Plaintiff Sibal appealed alleging that under the civil code “ungathered products” are considered as real property.

Hence, this case.

Issue:

WON the sugar cane is classified as a personal property.

Ruling:

Yes.

Generally, sugar cane falls under the classification of “ungathered products” mentioned in par.3 of Art. 334 of the
CC: “Trees, plants, and ungathered products, while they are annexed to the land or form an integral part of any
immovable property." However, this article has received in recent years an interpretation by the Tribunal Supremo
de España, which holds that, under certain conditions, growing crops may be considered as personal property.

In some cases "standing crops" may be considered and dealt with as personal property. In the case of Lumber Co.
vs. Sheriff and Tax Collector (106 La., 418) the Supreme Court said: "True, by article 465 of the Civil Code it is provided
that 'standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered and trees before they are cut down . . . are considered as
part of the land to which they are attached, but the immovability provided for is only one in abstracto and without
reference to rights on or to the crop acquired by others than the owners of the property to which the crop is
attached. . . . The existence of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were
in advance, rendering the crop movable quoad the right acquired therein. Our jurisprudence recognizes the
possible mobilization of the growing crop."

Act No. 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognizes that growing crops are personal property. Section 2 of said
Act provides: "All personal property shall be subject to mortgage, agreeably to the provisions of this Act, and a
mortgage executed in pursuance thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage." Section 7 in part provides: "If growing
crops be mortgaged the mortgage may contain an agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself properly
to tend, care for and protect the crop while growing.

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that Act No. 1508 was enacted on the assumption that "growing crops" are
personal property. This consideration tends to support the conclusion hereinbefore stated, that paragraph 2 of
article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by section 450 of Act No. 190 and by Act No. 1508 in the sense that
"ungathered products" as mentioned in said article of the Civil Code have the nature of personal property. In other
words, the phrase "personal property" should be understood to include "ungathered products."

The lower court, therefore, committed no error in holding that the sugar cane in question was personal property
and, as such, was not subject to redemption.