A critical assessment of the pluralist and solidarist visions of the English School

Within the field of IR, almost every theory is concerned with explaining either change or war or
cooperation in international politics1; it may be said, indeed, that these are the main scopes of a
theory of international relations: insofar it can explain one of the three aforementioned explananda,
a theory may be said “happy”.
However, Tolstoj reminds us that there is nothing unique about a “happy theory”, but each
“unhappy theory” is unhappy in its own way: thus, besides others, we have clashes among
neorealist on whether defensive or offensive neorealism better depicts international politics,
disagreements among neoliberals whether international regimes are independent or intervening
variables, methodological duels among “thin” and “thick” constructivists and the two contrasting
visions of international society within the English School, i.e. the pluralist conception and the
solidarist one.
This essay is aimed to critically analysing these two different visions and it is structured in
three parts: the first one is devoted to define what a pluralist and a solidarist international society
are, according to the past and present literature; in the second one, an answer is sought to each of
the following questions: what are their characteristics? What are their features? Are they related or
are they mutually exclusive? Can a society be solidarist with pluralist features? What do we have in
the contemporary era?
In the conclusion, a general overview on the two visions is presented, and their theoretical
contribution to interpret world affairs is assessed.

Introduction: coexistence and cooperation, order and justice

The so-called pluralism-solidarism debate within international society theory sparked for the first
time in 1962, when Hedley Bull faced for the first time the following conundrum: to what extent is
it possible to “pursue higher goals […] whithout undermining the more basic goal of international
order”? (Suganami 2005) . Since then, ink, blood and toil have been poured to evaluate, elucidate
and critically assess the theoretical implication of these two terms, as well as their utility and
empirical correspondence in international relations (Jackson 1990, Mayall 2000, Buzan 2004,
Vincent 2003, Linklater 1998, Linklater and Suganami 2006).
In order to better understand the meaning of a pluralist and a solidarist vision of
international society, it is important to recall what an international society, in an English School
perspective, is. The better definition, still, is provided by Hedley Bull: “A society of states (or
1 This statement is true for the so called “objectivist” theories: it cannot be fully referred, for example, to structural
theories, such as Wallerstein's and Galtung's, or to some critical theories.
international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and
common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a
common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common
institutions” (Bull 1977: 13). Two elements of this definition are of the utmost importance for fully
comprehending the two concepts of pluralism and solidarism: common interests and values on the
one hand and common set of rules on the other one.
In a pluralist international society, the common interests and values can be said to be the
Westphalian ones, i.e. the avoidance of any kind of interference in domestic affairs, the territorial
and political survival, the maintenance of the state’s position as the only legitimized subject of
international law, the relatively peaceful coexistence and the implementation of the minimal degree
of cooperation among the units in the system. The rules deputed to make these interests and values
effective and preserved are, therefore, the reciprocal recognition of sovereignty and the principle of
non-intervention. To say it in Manning's words, in a pluralist international society states are
“constitutionally insular” (1972).
Conversely, in a solidarist international society the common interests and values are said to
be much wider in scope, going beyond the mere coexistence among states but instead creating a
framework for elevating the individual to a position of subject in respect to international law and for
sustained cooperation in a larger field of issues, such as the preservation and the implementation of
human rights, the protection of the environment, the establishment of a single market and so on. It is
straightforward that in a solidarist view of international society the concepts of sovereignty and
non-intervention, the two pillars of the pluralist vision, are defined in a looser and less rigid way;
moreover, it is straightforward as well that a solidarist international society is derivative of a
pluralist one, being impossible implementing further and deeper forms of cooperation without the
necessary basis of mutual recognition among units.
These two positions resemble Bull’s former distinction between rules of coexistence and
rules of cooperation and, to a certain extent, Ferdinand Tönnies’ categories of Gesellschaft and
Gemeinschaft, especially in the instrumental or incremental aspect of cooperation: however, the two
concepts deserve to be inquired more in detail.

Features, relations, applications of the two visions

Now that the “definitional framework” has been established, we can look more closely at what a
pluralist and a solidarist international society are made of, are concerned with and bound by.
A profitable way to critically assess the two concepts under examination is to put them in
relationship both with (normative) international political theory and international law, two
disciplines that strongly inform the theoretical body of the English School. Indeed, international law
has been defined as “the bedrock institution on which the idea of international society stands or fall”
(Mayall 2000: 94).
As far as the relationship with international political theory is concerned, a pluralist
international society is essentially realist in character, a society in which states look at each other as
potential rivals and, therefore, agree on a very limited number of rules of coexistence in order to
survive; this kind of relationship may be called “lockeism”, as states perceive to live in an anarchic
system but decide to consider certain rights as sacrosanct: the right to life (survival) and that of
property (sovereignty).
Morality is not part of the realist/pluralist vocabulary: since every state has its own
conception of morality, justice and “good life”, a pluralist international society preserves the
diversity and the order of the system against the potential disruption coming from a forced
homogenization or from an external imposition of “what is right”. Having in mind the famous
tripartition operated by Wight in the construction of the English School theory, a pluralist
international society is an ontology far closer to an international system rather than to a world
society: what differentiates the two, however, is the feeling, among states, that certain rules and
norms of conduct must be obeyed if survival and recognition are to be pursued.
On the other hand, a solidarist international society is on the cosmopolitan side of
international political theory: since the main referent object in international relations is not the state
but the individual, it assumes that there is a universal standard of justice towards which the society
of states tends, and that the state cannot be seen as inviolable if the rights of individuals are
threatened, especially if the threat comes from inside the state itself. In the English School
tripartition, conversely, a solidarist international society tends to the (potential) formation of a world
society2. However, wheter a solidarist international society leads teleologically to a world society of
not has always been a matter of debate (Vincent 2003, Buzan 2004).
In an international law perspective, a pluralist international society relies heavily on a
positive conception of law, that is, it considers as “law” just that produced and made effective by
states, thus denying the existence of a hypothetical natural, or even divine, law; such a conception
can be referred to that of Vettel, Oppenheim, Kelsen, who are the forbearers of this juridical view.
Since law is the product of states' common practices and treaties, only states have the power to
define what law is and what is not. In Knudsen's words, “[a]ssuming that only the most basic
international principles, such as those concerning sovereign jurisdiction, non-intervention,
diplomatic interaction and the rules of war and neutrality, will remain a manageable subject of
regulation, the pluralist doctrine is upholding a defensive, conservative and relatively uncritical

2 This aspect of solidarism has been put in relations with Linklater’s progressive theory (1998)
conception of international law” (2000: 16). In sum, here law is “an autonomous social practice,
distinct from morality and religion” (Mapel and Nardin1999: 6)
On the contrary, a solidarist international society is said to have a strong “naturalistic” or
“grotian” component, that is to say it emphasizes the existence of a “pre-given”, natural, self-
evident and undeniable set of rights of the individual, common to everyone and transcending the
individual state's juridical will: this conception was born through the works of Grotius, Gentili,
Vitoria, Suarez and, more recently, Lauterpacht. Morality and reason inform states' practices, and
may lead to international progress and enlightenment. Here, law is the reflection of a common
morality, product of a common mankind.
The results of this preliminary analysis can be summed up in the typology (1) below3:

International Pol Theory

Political Realism/Lockeism Cosmopolitanism/Kantism
International Law
Pluralist international society
Positivism Pluralist international society moving towards
a solidarist one
Solidarist international society
Naturalism/Grotianism moving towards Solidarist international society
a pluralist one

Now that the features of the two versions of international society, after having been treated
in the first section, have been fully described, we can look at what constitutes a real conundrum in
English School theory: are a pluralist international society and a solidarist one mutually exclusive,
as Jackson suggests (1990), or can they be related, following Buzan's opinion (2004)?
In order to find a correct answer to this question, it is important to preliminarily identify a criterion
with which to assess the exclusion or the relationship between the two concepts.
Can the criterion be the number of issues on which there is strong cooperation? This may be
attractive due to its empirical simplicity, but it is analytically weak: however important it is, how do
we identify the exact number after which a society becomes solidarist from pluralist? And, most of
all, are we able to do that? How do we know that, for example, 50 issues are sufficient to render a
society of states solidarist? Why not 49, or 32, 5 or even 1?
Another one may be how the rules are internalized within the actors: Buzan (2004) speaks of
coercion, calculation and belief, and considers the third one as the signpost of a solidarist
international society. The problem here is that belief may refer to pluralism as well: if the
preservation of the system of states and the maintenance of sovereignty are believed to be the
foundation of order in international relations, a pluralist international society may be configured on

3 IPT has been considered “stronger” than IL since IL, as commonly understood, is the product of the political will
of states
the basis of beliefs as well.
More effective seems another criterion, that of sovereignty: much of whether pluralism and
solidarism are mutually exclusive or not hinges on how we define it. If sovereignty is seen as a
synonym of property, something given, exogenous, “essential”, then it is straightforward that any
intrusion, penetration or perforation of it would mean to break it, moving into a solidarist realm: in
this view, pluralism and solidarism are distinctive features of an international society. If, on the
contrary, sovereignty is seen as a synonym of responsibility, in a more contractual view, and as a
product of the international society itself, then it becomes a more malleable concept, allowing for
degrees of variations: thus, pluralism and solidarism may be configured as ends of a spectrum 4
(Buzan 2004). Since the second reading of the concept of sovereignty seems more congruent with
the current status of international relations and international law, it may be concluded that the two
concepts are not mutually exclusive, but two potential statuses of the same ontology, i.e. an
international society, varying in degree and depth of cooperation.
If this view is taken, then what kind of norms becomes important as well: if the norm shared
implies a superficial concession of sovereign competencies, then we can speak of pluralism; if, on
the contrary, the norm requires a high degree of commitments, we are on a more solidarist side.
Thus, according to this view, a pluralist international society is made up of a “low, or
narrow, degree of shared norms”, whereas a solidarist one consists of a “high, or narrow, degree of
shared norms” (Buzan 2004: 49).
This conception of the tension between pluralism and solidarism allows for answering
another important question, that is, can a solidarist international society be pluralist at the same
time, and viceversa (Almeida 2002)? The answer, if we consider them as ends of a spectrum, is yes:
a society may have strong solidarist linkages while preserving a strong pluralism on certain issues,
as China and other states are showing nowadays, refusing for example any forms of cooperation on
human rights issues but playing a significant role in the global economy and international trade.
One last question remains to be answered, namely what kind of society is the contemporary
one, according to what said so far.
As it has been rightly argued (Knudsen 2000, Clark 2001), it is undeniable that the society of
states is moving towards a solidarist dimension, as numerous indicators seem to suggest: the
concept of human security, the idea of a “responsibility to protect”, the renewed notion of just war,
as well as the creation of many legal bodies and institutions empowered to prosecute as well as
protect individuals (e.g. the International Criminal Court, the European Court for Human Rights or
the recent attempt to allow the individuals to recur to the European Court of Justice).
However, two facts don't allow to be excessively happy: the first one is that there is no

4 The second and the third quadrants of the typology (1) represent this idea of a continuum.
consensus among the great powers on these developments, nor any will of opening on these issues
is identifiable: China's position on human rights has already been mentioned, and that half of the
UN Security Council, namely the US, China and Russia, has not signed the ICC Statute should be
remembered. The second one is that, still nowadays, many of the issues considered as “solidarist”
are seen as serving Western countries' interests, and thus have been politicized and opposed: thus,
paraphrasing a very famous title, it might be said that the present international society is pluralist in
the intellect and solidarist in the will (Wheeler and Dunne 1996).

Conclusion

The concepts of pluralism and solidarism have had the merit, beyond any doubt, to keep the debate
on and within the English School alive, although it may be agreed that the debates on them have
been too much focused on human rights and intervention, neglecting important issue areas such as
world trade and IPE (Buzan 2005).
If we look at pluralism and solidarism as parts of the wider theoretical architecture of the
English School, we might recognize that not only they represent the grotian via media introduced by
Wight and Bull, as these two visions go beyond the realist-idealism static division, but also suffrage
the fact, too often neglected, that different ontologies are present, at the same time, in international
politics: an international system, an international society and a world society (Bull 1977).
Their intellectual and theoretical potential can be fruitfully crafted to deepen our
understanding of international political theory and international law, as well as reinforcing and
revitalising academic and political debates on current important global questions, such as the human
rights regime, the liberal international economic order and globalisation's pressures.
To conclude, the world seems to be moving towards a solidarist dimension: looking at the
typology (1), we are currently in the second quadrant. However, as shown, strong pluralist elements
still characterize states' conduct, thus halting the stretch of states' opinio juris and the wider
“solidarist dream” (Wheeler 2000). Which of the two visions is morally better or preferable is still
uncertain: what is certain is that applying the two categories of pluralism and solidarism does not
already mean to make a choice, but still to “allow for the tensions and contradictions of the world of
experience: […] humanity as well as sovereignty, interests and equity, desire and duty, virtue and
expediency, goals and rules, and the rest” (Jackson 1992: 281).

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