Cruz vs Secretary of DENR Natural Resources and On February 25, 1968, Michael filed a miscellaneous sales
Environmental Law application covering the reclaimed foreshore land. On the
IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit
for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of
the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the
Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law
that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the
natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources
in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the
right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at
the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not
part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands
and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State.
However, the right of ownership and possession by the
ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the
same.
Francisco Baguio v RP, GR No. 119682, January 21, 1999 (301
SCRA 450)
Facts:
William Michael filed with the Bureau of Lands an application
for foreshore lease of a public land. The application was
recommended for approval by the land investigator who also
recommended that the applicant be granted a provisional
permit to occupy the land for one year. By virtue of the
permit, Michael made reclamation of the land introducing
improvements therein. Upon the expiration of the permit the
Highways District Engineer recommended to the Director of
Lands that the land be leased to Michael. On the other hand,
the land investigator recommended granting Michael the
authority to survey the foreshore land in view of the
completion of the reclamation made by him on the premises.
other hand, petitioner Baguio applied to the Bureau of Lands
for a free patent over the same land stating that the land was
agricultural and he has been in actual and continuous
possession of the same. A free patent was issued in Baguio’s
favor by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. The petitioner now
demands rental payment from Michael for using the land
occupied by Michael Slipways, Inc. and filed an opposition to
Michael’s miscellaneous sales application on the said land. In
turn, Michael filed a protest on the issuance of the free
patent to Baguio by the Bureau of Lands since he is the actual
possessor of the land since 1963 and introduced substantial
improvement thereon.
Upon recommendation of the Land Management Bureau of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the
government filed a petition for the cancellation of the patent
and reversion of land to the public domain. Ricardo Michael
was allowed to intervene as heir and successor-in-interest of
William Michael. The trial court cancelled the free patent of
Baguio and ordered the reversion of the land to public
domain. It ruled that the false statement that Baguio made in
his application for free patent had the effects of ipso facto
canceling the free patent granted to him. On appeal,
petitioner assails the court decision of cancelling his patent
since the action has already prescribed and that it erred in
ruling that he acted in bad faith and procured the registration
of his free patent through fraud and misrepresentation.
Issue:
Whether or not the free patent of the petitioner may be
cancelled?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court that while a Torrens Title becomes
indefeasible within 1 year after its registration the State may
still bring action for reversion of a parcel of land to the public
domain covered by a Torrens title obtained through fraud
because such action is not barred by prescription as provided
by Commonwealth 141. Public policy demands that one who
obtains title from a public land through fraud should not be
allowed to benefit from it. The declaration of the petitioner in
his application for patent
RODRIGUEZ vs. LIM
GR NO. 135817 / NOVEMBER 30, 2006
FACTS:
Lim Jr., filed a complaint for cancellation of
certificate of title and injunction against Spouses Rodriguez.
In his complaint, the former alleged that his mother, Dominga
Goyma was the owner of two parcels of land, registered
under TCT No. T-2857. Dominga Goyma died on July 19, 1971
and was survived by him, Lim Jr., a spurious son
acknowledged and recognized by her. Spouses Rodriguez,
despite their knowledge that Lim Jr is the owner of the
property, allegedly and fraudulently made it appear that they
had purchased the subject lots from persons who were not
owners thereof. Pursuant to an affidavit of loss and a
reconstitution proceeding, TCT No. T-2857 was cancelled and
TCT No. T-128605 was issued in the name of Frisco Gudani,
estranged husband of Dominga. TCT No. T-128605 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-128606 was issued in the name of
Eduardo Victa. TCT No. 128606 was cancelled and TCT No. T-
128607 was issued in the name of Spouses Rodriguez. These
three (3) TCTs are issued on the same date February 10, 1975.
Issue:
WON TCT No. T-128607 be cancelled considering the fact that
it is protected by the indefeasibility rule.
Ruling:
Yes. It has been consistently ruled that “when the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact,
had been in the possession of another person, then the
reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that
rendered such a decision has no jurisdiction. Applying the said
principle, it is apparent that TCT No. 128605 was void.
Moreover, petitioner cannot raise the defense of
indefeasibility because the said principle does not apply
where fraud attended the issuance of a certificate of title. The
Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud.
Rufloe v. Burgos, GR 143573, Jan. 30, 2009
FACTS:
Sometime in 1978, respondent Elvira Santos forged the
signatures of Adoracion and Angel Rufloe in a Deed of Sale
dated September 8, 1978 to make it appear that the disputed
property was sold to her by the Spouses Rufloe. On the basis
of the said deed of sale, Delos Reyes succeeded in obtaining a
title in her name, TCT No. S-74933. In November 1979, the
Rufloes filed a complaint for damages against Delos Reyes
with the RTC of Pasay City alleging that the Deeds of Sale was
falsified as the signatures appearing thereon were forged
because Angel Rufloe died in 1974 which was four years
before the alleged sale in favor of Delos Reyes. They also filed
a notice of adverse claim on November 5, 1979.
On December 4, 1984, during the pendency of the case, Delos
Reyes sold the same property to the Burgos siblings. A new
title, TCT No. 135860. was then issued in their names. On
December 12, 1985, Burgos sibilings sold the said property to
their aunt, Leonarda Burgos. However the sale in favor of
Leonarda was not registered. Thus, no title was issued under
her name. The said property remained in the name of Burgos
siblings.
ISSUE:
WON respondents were innocent purchasers in good faith
and for value despite the forged deed of sale of their
transferor Delos Reyes.
Ruling:
No. A forged deed can legally be the root of a valid
title when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes. An
innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some person has a right or
interest in it, and who pays a full an fair price at the time of
purchase or before receiving any notice of another person’s
claim. In the case at bar, respondents cannot be considered
an innocent purchaser for value. For one, Rufloe filed a notice
of adverse claim and have the same annotated in the title.
Despite such notice, the Burgos siblings still purchased the
property in question.
Further, Delos Reyes was not in possession of the
subject property when she sold the same to the Burgos
siblings, but the Rufloes. Since it was the Rufloes who
continued to have actual possession of the property,
Leonarda should have investigated the nature of their
possession. Moreover, the defense of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with
notice of a flaw in the title of his transferor.
Peralta v. Abalon, GR 183448, June 30, 2014
Facts:
Lot 1679 consisting of 8,571 square meters was originally
covered by OCT No. (O) 16 and registered in the name of
Bernardina Abalon (Abalon). It appears that a Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed over the subject property in favor
of Rellama on June 10, 1975. By virtue of such conveyance,
OCT No. (O) 16 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
42108 was issued in the name of Rellama. TCT No. 42108 was
subdivided into three (3) portions and was sold in the
following manner: Lot 1679-A was sold to Spouses Peralta, for
which reason TCT No. 42254 was issued their names; Lot
1679-B was first sold to Lotivio who thereafter transferred his
ownership thereto to Andals and TCT No. 42482 was issued in
their names; and Lot 1679-C also acquired by the Andals as
evidenced by the issuane of TCT No. 42821. Claiming that the
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor of Rellama
was a forged document, and claiming further that they
acquired the subject property by succession, being the
nephew and niece of Abalon who died without issue.
ISSUE:
WON Spouses Peralta and the Andals are innocent
purchaser for value.
Ruling:
Andals are innocent purchaser for value due to the
fact that there is no evidence that the chain of registered
titles was broken in the case of the Andals. Neither were they
proven to have knowledge of anything that would make them
suspicious of the nature of Rellama’s ownership over the
subject parcel of land. Consequently, the validity of their title
to the parcel of the land bought from Rellama must be
upheld.
As for Spouses Peralta, the Supreme Court sustain
the ruling of the CA that they were buyers in bad faith. The
appellate court made a factual finding that in purchasing the
subject property, they merely relied on the photocopy of the
title provided by Rellama. The CA concluded that a mere
photocopy of the title should have made Spouses Peralta that
there was some flaw in the title of Rellama, because he was
not in possession of the original copy. This factual finding was
supported by evidence
Dy vs. Aldea, GR No. 219500, August 9, 2017, citing
Locsin vs. Hizon, GR No. 204369, September 17, 2014
FACTS:
Dy is the owner of Lot 5158 with an area of 6,738
square meters, and covered by TCT No. T-24849. In June
2005, Mamerto agreed to sell the subject land to his brothers
Nelson Dy ad Sancho Dy, Jr. After asking copies of the tax
declarations of the subject land from the Municipal Assessor’s
Office, Nelson found out that the subject land had gone
through a series of anomalous transactions. The owner’s
duplicate copy of the same TCT was declared lost. As a result,
a new owner’s duplicate copy of the same TCT was issued and
the subject land was subsequently mortgaged. Later, it was
found out that the said lot was sold to Lourdes by an
impostor Mamerto.
Issue:
WON Lourdes is an innocent purchaser for value.
Ruling:
No. Lourdes did not conduct a thorough
investigation and she merely instructed her uncle to check
with the Register of Deeds whether the subject land is free
from any encumbrance. Further, Lourdes met the seller only
during the signing of the two deeds of sale. Yet, she did not
call into question why the seller refused to see her during the
negotiation. For sure, an ordinary prudent buyer of real
property who would be relinquishing a significant amount of
money would want to meet the seller of the property and
would exhaust all means to ensure that the seller is the real
owner thereof.
Republic v. CA, GR L-46626-27, Dec. 27, 1979
Facts:
These two cases are about the cancellation and
annulment of the reconstituted Torrens titles whose originals
are existing and whose reconstitution was uncalled for. Lot
Nos. 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate are registered in the
name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines as shown in
TCT Nos. 34594 and 34596 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
both dated April 30, 1938. The originals of these titles are on
file in the Registry of Deeds and were not destroyed during
the war.
The reconstitution proceeding started when
Fructuosa Laborada, a widow, filed with CFI Rizal a petition
for reconstitution of title covering Lot No. 915. She alleged
that she was the owner of the lot and that the title covering
it, the number of it she could not specify was “N.A.” or not
available. The petition was granted and a new certificate of
title was issued pursuant thereto. On the other hand,
Francisco Bombast likewise filed a petition for reconstitution
with CFI Rizal covering Lot No. 918 and the same was also
granted. Bombast sold Lot No. 918 to Deo and the latter sold
the lot to A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation.
On May 25 and 26, 1970, the State filed two petitions for the
cancellation and annulment of the reconstituted titles and
titles issued subsequent thereto.
Issue:
WON the petition will prosper.
Ruling:
YES. The existence of the two titles of the
Government for Lot Nos. 915 and 918 ipso facto nullified the
reconstitution proceedings and signified that the evidence in
the said proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada
and Bombast cannot be given any credence. The two
proceedings were sham and deceitful and were filed in bad
faith. Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be
countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate rights
and benefits.
Sandoval v. CA, GR No. 106657, Aug. 1, 1996, 260 SCRA 283
Facts:
The property subject of the controversy is a parcel of
land on which a five-door apartment building stands, covered
by TCT No. 196518 in the name of Lorenzo Tan Jr., married to
Carolina Mangampo, located at QC. Lorenzo Tan Jr., was
notified of the need to present his owner’s copy of the TCT in
connection with an adverse claim. He explained that he was
still looking for his copy of the TCT. Later, he discovered that
the adverse claim of Godofredo Valmeo had been annotated
on his title in the Registry of Deeds. An impostor Lorenzo Tan
Jr., had mortgaged the property to Valmeo to secure a
P70,000 obligation.
Tan filed a complaint for cancellation of the
annotation of mortgage and damages against Bienvenido
Almeda and Godofredo Valmeo. Upon further investigation,
he discovered that someone purporting to be him, sold the
property to Bienvenido Almeda in a Deed of Sale of
Registered Land with Pacto de Retro. Subsequently, TCT No.
196518 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 326781 was
issued in the name of Bienvenido Almeda. Bienvenido sold
the property to Juan Sandoval and TCT No. 329487 was issued
unto his favour.
Issue:
WON Sandoval is a purchaser in good faith or an innocent
purchaser for value.
Ruling:
NO. The Supreme Court held that a fraudulent or
forged document of sale may give rise to a valid title if the
certificate of title has already been transferred to from the
name of the true owner to the same indicated by the forger
and while it remained as such, the land was subsequently sold
to an innocent purchaser.
It is settled that one who deals with property
registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the
same, but only has to rely on the title He is charged with
notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on
the title. The aforesaid principle admits of an unchallenged
exception: that a person dealing with registered land has a
right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense
with the need of inquiring further except when the party has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry, or
when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of
title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the
property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites
or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor
appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within
the exception can neither be denominated an innocent
purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith; and hence,
does not merit the protection of the law.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the
property of another, without notice that some other person
has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and
fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or
before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to
facts which should put a reasonable man on guard and still
claim he acted in good faith.
In the case at bar, even if Sandoval acquire the
property after it was advertised for sale in the Bulletin issue
of March 3, 1985, the court strongly doubts his claim of good
faith. In the first place, it was testified by the Registry of
Deeds of QC that there are two copies of TCT No. 196518 in
the Registry of Deeds, only one could be genuine. Secondly,
there was an error in the address of Almeda which is not
likely that Sandoval could have mistaken about the street
where his vendor allegedly resided. Thirdly, equivocations
were obviously committed by Sandoval in his testimony,
which taken together, tender to render improbable
Sandoval’s claim of good faith. Fourth, Sandoval could have
unavoidably noticed the several but varying addresses of
Almeda which were suspicious, to say the least. Lastly,
Certification appearing on the deed of sale that the property
was not tenanted was plainly untrue. The making of
untruthful certification, the contrary to which was something
well known by Almeda and Sandoval, betrayed an awareness
on their part of flaws in the transaction.
ANDREA M. MOSCOSO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and MAXIMINA L.MORON, respondents.
No. L-46439. April 24, 1984
Facts
Sometime on March 22, 1966, petitioner applied for land
registration of a 1,147 square meters residential lot. Her
application substantially stated that petitioner is the owner in
fee simple of the land and improvements thereon as her
acquisition by inheritance from her father, the late Pascual
Monge who died on June 9, 1950, and that the same parcel of
land is her share in a partial partition of estate she and her
brothers and sisters executed on May 22, 1964; that she and
her predecessors in interest have been in continuous, public,
actual and adverse possession of the land applied for since
time immemorial until the present.
After due publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing of the
petition in the Official Gazette, only the Highway District
Engineer of Leyte as public oppositors, and Concordia
Lanuncia, Flaviano L. Marchadesch, Jr., and herein private
respondent Maximina L. Moron as private oppositors
appeared for the initial hearing before the trial court.
A judgment was hereby rendered ordering the registration of
title in the name of the petitioner with ¾ share and of
respondent Moron, for 1/12 share, among others.
The trial court gave significant weight to the carbon copy of a
power of attorney executed and signed by the late Pascual
Monge on February 11, 1945 in favor of Maximina L. Moron,
wherein he stated that Maximina is his daughter and
appointed her as his Attorney-in-Fact to transact with the
United States Armed Forces in the Philippines in his behalf for
the collection of rentals and other war damage claims due
and payable to him. The court ruled that the power of
attorneywas an authentic writing wherein Maximina Lanuncia
was voluntarily recognized as the daughter of Pascual Monge.
Petitioner assailed the Court’s decision in her motion for
reconsideration. Acting upon the
aforesaid motion for reconsideration, the Court modified its
decision giving 13/14 share to Moscoso and 1/14 share to
Moron. Not satisfied with the amended judgment, petitioner
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
judgment of the lower court. Hence, the
instant petition before Supreme Court.
Issue
The lower court erred in making judicial pronouncements
that Maximina Lanuncia Moron as the
acknowledged natural child of Pascual Monge conferring
upon her legal right to inherit from the
whole estate of the late Pascual Monge
Ruling
Petitioner’s contention that the Court of First Instance, acting
as a land registration court, has no
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue whether the oppositor is
the acknowledged natural child of
Pascual Monge, is untenable.
The proceedings for the registration of title to land under the
Torrens system.
NOTES:
Concept of Jura Regalia
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of whatever
classification and other natural resources not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership belong to
the State. The State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated private person by the State remain part of the
alienable public domain.
Does Regalian Doctrine negate native title?
No. In the case of Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, GR No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347
SCRA 148, the Supreme Court institutionalized the
recognition of the existence of native title to land, or
ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a
claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent
of any grant from the Spanish crown, as an exception to the
theory of jura regalia.
Exception
A person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on
the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need
of inquiring further except when the party has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the
purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his
vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent
man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in
litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses
suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing
on the face of the said certificate. One who falls within the
exception can neither de denominated an innocent purchaser
for value nor a purchaser in good faith and, hence, does not
merit the protection of the law.

Purpose of the Torrens system

The real purpose of the Torrens system as expressed in the
Legarda vs. Saleeby, GR No. 8936, October 2, 1915, is to quiet
title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the
legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the
time of the registration in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto.

Principle of indefeasibilty:
The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of
registration. The title once registered, with very few
exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered,
changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in some
direct proceeding permitted by law.
However, the Torrens system does not furnish a shield for
fraud, nor permit one to enrich himself at the expense of
others, otherwise its acceptability is impaired. The
indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by
fraud and misrepresentation. (Baguio vs. Republic, GR No.
119682, January 21, 1999)

Mirror doctrine
Mirror doctrine provides that every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged to
go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
property. Consequently, every registered owner and every
subsequent purchaser for value in good faith holds the title to
the property free from encumbrances except those noted in
the certificate. As such, a defective title, or one the
procurement of which is tainted with fraud and
misrepresentation may be the source of a completely legal
and valid title, provided that the buyer is an innocent third
person, who in good faith, relied on the correctness of the
certificate of title, or an innocent purchaser for value (Dy vs.
Aldea, GR No. 219500, August 9, 2017, citing Locsin vs. Hizon,
GR No. 204369, September 17, 2014)