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Forum For Modern Language Studies Volume 4 Issue 4 1968 (Doi 10.1093/fmls/4.4.347) Connerton, P. - Alain Robbe-Grillet - A Question of Self-Deception
Forum For Modern Language Studies Volume 4 Issue 4 1968 (Doi 10.1093/fmls/4.4.347) Connerton, P. - Alain Robbe-Grillet - A Question of Self-Deception
ALAIN ROBBE-GRILLET :
A QUESTION OF SELF-DECEPTION ?
I should like to suggest an explanation for this. Before doing so, how-
ever, I shall review the interpretations offered by Robbe-Grillet himself.
These are sometimes misleading and even contradictory ; nevertheless, they
raise issues and point to motives which must be in some way unified in
any complete picture of his work.
These theoretical writings fall, roughly speaking, into two periods. His
early position—best represented by two essays, " Une Voie pour le Roman
Futur " (1956) and " Nature, Humanisme, Tragedie " (1958)—is significantly
modified in later expositions, particularly in " Temps et Description dans
le Recit d'Aujourd-Hui " (1963) and " Du Realisme a la R4alite " (1965).
In the first period he claims that his main concern is to purge descriptive
language, so far as possible, of all anthropological implications. In the
second, however, he chiefly emphasizes the subjectivity of his descriptions.2
The early theories attack the literary expression of an empathic relation-
ship between man and his environment—the attempt to seek for something
beyond a purely material description. For example, a novelist may speak
of a stone as " indifferent " or a mountain as " majestic ". But then he
may begin to believe that the stone is indifferent, that the mountain is
majestic. For a metaphor is never an innocent expression. It may furnish
indications about the physical properties of things ; but it always does more
than this. When, for instance, a novelist speaks of a village as " nestled "
in the fold of a valley, he is no longer wholly a spectator ; at least for the
duration of that sentence, he, and with him the reader, becomes the village ;
they feel themselves into its situation; and this leads them eventually to
•Alain Robbe-Gnllet, Pour «n Nouveau Roman (Paris, Les Editions de Admit,
1963).
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suppose that the object of their attention is something more than the purely
material thing that it in fact is. But then the novelist may decide to abandon
these illicit pathetic fallacies. Let us suppose that he now firmly believes
the universe to be indifferent to his feelings and values. No matter : he
may still be seduced by his metaphorical conceits and fall, as did Sartre
and Camus, from dootrinal purity. For if Sartre in La Nausie asoribes
viscosity to the world that is because, for him, this is no mere material
attribute but possesses moral and metaphysical qualities. And if Roquen-
tin's gaze is drawn by the ambiguities of colour—the restaurant manager's
braces, the root of the chestnut tree—it is because they evoke sensations
analogous to those of touch : by their equivocation, their refusal to be classi-
We can watch this " twofold movement of getting created and getting
stuck ", for instance, both in the overall structure and in the particular
movements of Le Voyeur. Here we have the study of an unsuccessful but
ever-renewed flight from an insoluble problem. At its centre—in the break
between Part I and Part II of the narrative—there is a void. At the opening
of the novel, Mathias, a commercial traveller, lands on the island of his
birth; once he has disembarked, he hires a bicyole and goes off to sell his
wares. For some time his movements are clear ; then, at the end of Part I,
he arrives at a crossroads and takes a path towards the cliffs. When the
narrative begins again he is standing at the same crossroads and does not
seem at first able to remember what he has been doing. We later learn that,
during the gap in the action, a girl who had been looking after sheep on
the cliff-top has disappeared ; her body is later discovered at the bottom of
the cliff. We come to suspect that Mathias has committed a murder. Or,
if he is not guilty, he is at least the kind of man who might have committed
the crime; and he knows this, and so must bear the burden of negative
proof. From this time onwards, therefore, partly in conversation with
others and partly to himself, he tries retrospectively to fill up the empty
hour that has elapsed between the time at which he first passed the cross-
roads and the time at which he returned to the same place. He wishes to
give a plausible and complete account of his actions which would eliminate
all allusion to the murder—which he might have committed. But he is
unable to produce such an account; for he cannot know when, where, or
by whom he might have been seen, and he has an ever-growing conviction
of having been observed, yet without having absolute proof. He can produce
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flawed hypotheses—cannot indeed refrain from doing so—but no definitive
solution.
Moreover, his position is marred throughout by his inability to establish
contact with people. In this he is characteristic of all Eobbe-Grillet's pro-
tagonists. When occasionally they speak with others they converse only in
generalities and platitudes. Dialogue is for the most part stripped of its
conventional weight as conveying information or intention, as expressing
something ; it tends to become more an aural phenomenon, a succession of
sounds, than a means of communication. And, in precisely the same way,
what he sees of other people has an optical but scarcely any cognitive
definition. He notices the slightest of details : the movement of eyes and
This is, surely, the same self-containedness of which Roquentin also had
fleeting intimations. His nausea—produced by the indiscreet closeness of
things which swarm and burst their boundaries—reveals to him the formless-
ness and gratuitousness of existence. If you don't pay attention to objects,
he tells us, you might believe that they are simple and reassuring, that there
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is a real blue and a real red ; but as soon as you focus your gaze upon them
and try to hold onto them for an instant, and particularly if you touch
them, this feeling of comfort gives way to a deep uneasiness ; for colours,
tastes and smells are never themselves and nothing but themselves. Things
escape the scheme of references in which we try to enclose them ; existing
things never have the inoffensive air of abstract categories, and the names
he murmurs to himself lose all relationship with the objects he perceives.
Roquentin wishes he could experience things in some other way, as
logically necessary : like a mathematical figure, pure and clear. Or like his
favourite gramophone record, with its rigorous purity and inevitability,
which nothing in this world can either break or interrupt. And he aspires