Best Practices for Fossil Power Plant Outage Planning and Implementation

December 2005

Prepared for:
The National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), India

In fulfillment of:

Contract# DE–AM26-04NT41817

Prepared by:

Arun Puri

and

W. Ben O’Brien

RD S Contributor:
Radha Krishnan, Ph.D.
Senior Advisor, International Energy Projects
Science Applications International Corporation
 Disclaimer

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 Acknowledgements

The funding for the preparation of this manual was provided by the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) under its Greenhouse Gas Pollution Prevention (GEP) Project. USAID
has a Participating Agency Service Agreement (PASA) with the U.S. Department of Energy’s
(DOE) National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) to obtain technical assistance in support
of USAID energy and environmental programs and projects in the coal and power generation
sectors of India. NETL has contracted with Research and Development Solutions, LLC for
technical support of the PASA, under which this manual was prepared.

The authors wish to thank Mr. Glenn Whaley, Director, Office of Environment, Energy &
Enterprise (E3), USAID-India, Mr. Sandeep Tandon, Project Management Specialist, E3, USAID-
India, Mr. Scott Smouse, NETL’s USAID-India Program Manager, and Mr. Nelson Rekos, Acting
Division Director, NETL for their encouragement and guidance in the preparation of this manual.
The authors also wish to thank Mr. S.C. Deo Sharma, General Manager of the Center for Power
Efficiency and Environmental Protection (CenPEEP), part of India’s National Thermal Power
Corporation, (NTPC) for his valuable support and technical contributions.

We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Mr. D.K. Agrawal, General Manager, CenPEEP
for his leadership and coordination, and the entire NTPC team that contributed to the successful
development of this manual.
 FOREWORD

Reliable operation of a power plant starts with a robust plant-wide program involving assessment
and maintenance in conjunction with decisions regarding major plant component repairs,
refurbishment or replacement. It is also important to know when and how to carry out these
changes during the life-cycle of the components. In today’s competitive environment, the goal is
to maximize asset utilization. This requires an exhaustive component assessment program to
establish the extent of damage and timely, cost-effective repair and replacement strategies.

Typically, all major repairs and replacements are planned well in advance during an extended
plant outage, with outage windows identified in the long-range outage plan of the utility. This
long-range plan is necessary to provide sufficient time for:
• Component rehabilitation process designed and planned for flawless execution.
• Replacement components designed to address the root cause of damage/distress.
• Replacement components manufactured for timely delivery, 60 days prior to the start of an
outage.
• Successful execution of component rehabilitation or a replacement process.

This manual addresses the current technologies and best practices for optimizing asset value
through increased plant availability, efficiency and reduced operating and maintenance (O&M)
costs. An effective strategy requires meticulous planning and execution of planned outages.
Processes utilized for assessing and upgrading boiler, turbine and generator systems, routinely
overhauled during planned outages are discussed in detail.

Following the boiler and turbine overhauling sections, some of the advanced technologies that
have been successfully deployed to reduce outage duration as well as extending the outage
intervals are discussed. In addition, the report also covers best operational practices that are in
vogue and could be adopted by the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) for its coal-fired
power generation fleet.

Finally, a road map has been recommended for NTPC to undertake for its fossil fleet turbine-
generator overhauls. This program could be initiated by undertaking turbine valve overhauls and
gradually advancing to more complex turbine and generator sections. Even though the proposed
road map is based on the proven processes deployed at the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and
other large utilities in the United States, it has been specifically tailored to NTPC’s fleet
requirements and India’s infrastructural challenges. NTPC is at a crossroads, where its size and
impact on the Indian economy offers the opportunity to establish NTPC as a world-class turbine
generator maintenance and rehabilitation organization.

I
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the electric power industry evolves into a non-regulated industry, extreme pressures are being
placed on power plants to reduce the cost of generation to stay competitive while continuing to
enhance plant reliability and performance. The first step towards this goal is to contain operating
and maintenance (O&M) costs to levels optimal for operation with minimum forced outages.
Over the years, utilities have adopted various strategies for plant maintenance with the goal of
reducing maintenance costs without risking equipment reliability or plant worker safety.

The transition from reactive maintenance to preventive/predictive maintenance based on sound

condition assessment technologies is rapidly advancing through the use of improved diagnostic
tools and a greater understanding of the cause and effect relationships of plant component
degradation. It is also generally accepted industry-wide, that a proper mix of strategies is the key
for a cost-effective, enhanced maintenance program. There is yet another aspect of maintenance,
which is the long-term, planned maintenance that deals with the assessment, repair, refurbishment
and replacement of aging plant equipment that tends to perform below design specifications.

The best practices reviewed in this manual provide the building blocks for institutionalizing
effective processes necessary for conducting turbine-generator and boiler systems condition
assessment, developing condition-based work scopes, and executing turbine generator
repairs/rehabilitation/upgrades. These are the building blocks of successful, long-range outage
planning and routine maintenance.

This manual covers the key aspects of plant systems assessment, workscope development, outage
planning and executions. The contents of the report fall under the following sections:
• Overview of outage management and outage planning.
• Outage workscope development and execution.
• Advanced technologies.
• Strategies for extending time between outages and decreasing outage durations.
• Operational best practices.
• A road map for NTPC to establish in-house capability to conduct its own turbine/generator
overhauls.

Processes and technologies discussed in this manual are based on years of experience at the coal-
fired power plants of the TVA and other U.S. utilities. It is recommended that NTPC give serious
consideration to the following four key areas:

Outage Planning and Execution

Key to successful outage planning and execution is establishing a well thought through outage
workscope, freezing it at least nine months prior to the outage, selecting the outage vendors,
ordering all the long-term materials, selecting a capable outage team, executing a sound pre-
outage plan, identifying potential areas of concern, developing contingency plans, and finally,
executing the outage.

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All successful outages are built upon solid planning with detailed schedules for all aspects of the
outage. Successful outage managers leave nothing to chance and plan for all contingencies.
Utilities lose billions of dollars to outage extensions that can be avoided or their impact minimized
through meticulous planning. TVA relies on various outage planning processes that include pre-
shutdown checklists, a pre-outage readiness index, high-impact teams, etc., to ensure success.

Boiler
Boiler maintenance and major equipment replacement outages are routine activities at most
utilities, yet outage extensions are routinely reported for reasons that are entirely avoidable
through effective outage planning. Managing boiler tube failures is a challenge faced by utilities
around the world. In the United States, the situation has been compounded by aggressive
environmental legislation, for which compliance is achievable through a myriad of technologies
that effect plant efficiency, as well as through fuel-blending or switching – all strategies to control
various power plant emissions.

At TVA, one of the most effective approaches to reducing boiler forced outages has been through
conducting thorough boiler inspections and addressing all liabilities that have the potential of
causing a forced outage. The key to the success of this process is early discovery of all liabilities
so they can be addressed without impacting outage durations. TVA has significantly reduced its
boiler forced outage rate by implementing an effective boiler inspection program that relies upon
dedicated boiler inspectors knowledgeable of the TVA fleet, trained on boiler tube failure
mechanisms, and equipped with advanced technologies to enhance their effectiveness of detection
and information management. Improving major boiler component replacements durations is being
achieved at TVA through meticulous planning that begins 6-9 months prior to the start of an
outage.

Turbine – Generator Systems

Specific subject matter expertise on turbine-generator (T-G) systems maintenance and overhaul is
usually acquired through years of design know-how and hands-on maintenance and overhaul
experience. Developing this expertise is critical for a large organization like NTPC. This section
of the manual addresses the fundamentals of establishing this capability, a key to becoming a
world class organization. Specifically, the manual addresses the following key processes:
• Developing condition based T-G workscopes and long range outage plans. This process is
essential to progressing from a time-based overhaul structure promoted by the original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to a condition-based process that allows utilities to
advance to sectional overhauls, key to maximizing plant availability. It has taken TVA
more than 10 years to transition to this process, but it has had a major impact on reducing
the impact of planned outages on fleet availability.
• Implementing strategies for increasing time between overhauls. Proven technologies
deployed around the world have been reviewed with specific recommendations based on
experience at TVA. These technologies have provided the foundation for increasing the
time between overhauls by over 60 percent, thereby improving TVA’s fleet availability and
reducing O&M costs.
• Implementing strategies to reduce outage durations. Reducing outage durations is a
combination of meticulous outage planning and deploying effective strategies and

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 technologies. Solutions are both fleet- and country-specific. This manual provides a
balanced mix of technologies and strategies that may be customized to NTPC fleet
conditions.

Best Operational Practices

Operational practices that have withstood the test of time and have a proven track record are
reviewed in the manual.

Road Map for NTPC to Establish Turbine Generator Overhauls and Rehabilitation Capability
NTPC is one of the largest utilities in the world, and will soon surpass most. It can take advantage
of its fleet size – a limited mix of fleet types – to establish its own T-G maintenance and
rehabilitation capability. This manual provides NTPC with a roadmap for achieving this goal.
Based on years of experience, NTPC is encouraged to take a phased approach that focuses on
building both technical know-how and craft skills for developing capability to execute:
• Turbine steam path and generator condition assessment and generator.
• Turbine valve overhauls by fleet type.
• High value turbine steam path component refurbishments.
• Turbine sectional overhauls.
• Generator overhauls.

With NTPC generation assets spread across India, it would be prudent to set up regional centers
for supporting T-G overhaul capabilities. An organizational structure with functional capabilities
is recommended for such NTPC regional centers. NTPC’s entry into this field will provide
incentive to both domestic and international service providers to introduce proven technologies
and will be a catalyst for developing innovative technologies.

IV
 INTRODUCTION

Outage management is a complex task and requires meticulous planning, well defined goals and
deliverables and team work. Every utility strives to make continual improvement in planning and
executing outages without sacrificing safety, quality of work, schedule, budget and environment.
NTPC’s corporate expectations are no different, and it follows that a “standardized” approach
which could be adopted by all plants for implementing outages would ensure that the best systems,
processes, tools and technologies are adopted in every plant of the company.

The purpose of this manual is to provide a comprehensive document that outlines the current
outage practices in U.S. utilities. Many of the systems and processes used for outage management
cited in this report are those that are being used by the TVA, which has some of the oldest
operating coal-fired power plants in the United States. Over the years, TVA has developed
efficient processes for every aspect of outage management, which has paid rich dividends in terms
of achieving a high level of performance and reliability in the plants. Safety of personnel and
ensuring the future operability of equipment is high on the list for any utility’s outage. TVA has
developed well-defined safety procedures to be strictly followed by all personnel during their
outages.

This manual is organized in nine sections. Section 1.0 provides an overview of the outage
management process, and is broken down into sub-sections relating to outage planning, goals and
objectives, guidelines for preparing the outage scope, outage time window selection, outage
schedule development, outage team composition, long lead procurement items, critical spares, and
subcontracting/partnering arrangements for support during the outage.

Section 2.0 addresses pre-outage preparations. The importance of pre-outage planning and
preparations cannot be overstated. For a successful outage, it is by far the most important activity,
and planning for the outage should start two years before the outage is scheduled to occur. The
two-year time interval is normally required for capital projects where major replacements are
planned, such as boiler panels, turbine rotors, air preheater baskets, steam headers, etc., all of
which require a lengthy procurement cycle. However, for typical non-capital intensive projects, a
minimum of a one year time interval is the norm in many utilities once the Outage Manager has
been identified. The one year, nine month, six month, 30 day, 14 day milestones are part of the
pre-outage planning process, and these milestones are regularly reviewed by the outage team at
pre-determined time intervals. TVA has developed an Outage Readiness Index (ORI), which is an
easy methodology for quantifying the plant readiness for the outage, and which every Outage
Team member can use as a common platform to discuss the outage preparations. The ORI
identifies by every task the responsible person, the schedule for completion of the activity, and the
description of the work to be carried out, including the procedures to be followed and the technical
skills required to successfully and safely accomplish the work. Safety, procurement, contracting
environment, and risks and contingencies are all regularly discussed in the pre-outage meetings,
and corporate management is kept informed on all issues.

Section 3.0 deals with outage implementation, which begins when the unit is brought off- line, and
the inspection team is ready on-site to perform the necessary “as found” condition inspection of

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the equipment. In this section, the boiler inspection and condition assessment are described in
detail. The other auxiliary equipment, pulverizers, fans, air pre-heater, high energy piping, etc.,
are covered as part of the walk-down and inspection but not in any more detail.

Section 4.0 discusses the turbine inspection condition assessment and overhaul.

Section 5.0 contains some of the advanced technologies that merit consideration by NTPC for
increasing the time between overhauls and decreasing the outage duration on the turbine side.
During the past decade, significant advances in many repair techniques have emerged. This is
particularly true in cases involving welding, although the repair techniques require stringent
procedures to be adopted, and may initially seem expensive. Experience in utilities has shown that
the costs can be justified when one takes into consideration that the equipment could be brought
back to service in a short period with minimal risk. As is the case with any new technology or
process, training and exposure will be important for plant personnel to gain the skills and expertise
to enable them to reliably and safely perform these repairs on-site.

Section 6.0 addresses generator overhauling, though not in as much detail as turbine overhaul.
Typically inspection, trouble shooting, and repairs on electrical equipment require adherence to
the equipment vendor specifications and well-established codes.

Section 7.0 covers current best operational practices for boiler and turbine overhauls, addressing
only those practices that were of prime interest to NTPC, which are covered under the respective
headings.

Section 8.0 contains a proposed roadmap for NTPC’s consideration to undertake turbine overhauls
itself. As NTPC grows from its- current capacity of more than 20,000MW to 40,000MW in the
not too distant future, the company should have a strategy to perform some or most of the turbine
overhauls with its own staff. Some of the large U.S. utilities have developed and maintain the in-
house capability to do some or all of the work during a shutdown. The benefits of in-house
expertise and how to progressively achieve this goal are dealt with in this section.

Section 9.0 provides valuable approaches for reducing human performance errors, which often
result in significant cost to utilities.

The manual provides relevant examples related to Sections 1.0 through 8.0 which are compiled in
a separate document entitled Appendices. A listing of the reports that compliment the main
sections are provided within the Appendices.

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Best Practices for Fossil Power Plant Outage Planning and Implementation

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWARD.................................................................................................................................... I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ II
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................1
1.0 Outage Management Considerations.................................................................................6
1.1 Planning, Scheduling, and Implementing Outages.......................................................6
1.2 Outage Goals and Objectives..........................................................................................7
1.3 Outage Scope ....................................................................................................................7
1.4 Outage Time Window......................................................................................................8
1.5 Outage Schedule...............................................................................................................8
1.6 Outage Duration...............................................................................................................9
1.7 Outage Budget..................................................................................................................9
1.8 Outage Team ....................................................................................................................9
1.9 Long Lead Procurement Items .....................................................................................14
1.10 Critical Spares................................................................................................................15
1.11 Subcontracting/Partnering............................................................................................15
1.12 Safety and Environmental Issues .................................................................................16
2.0 Pre-Outage Readiness Review ..........................................................................................18
2.1 Outage Readiness Index ................................................................................................18
2.2 Scheduling of Outage Activities....................................................................................19
2.3 Benchmarking for Subsequent Overhauls...................................................................19
2.4 Manpower Deployment .................................................................................................20
2.5 Management Approval for Overhaul...........................................................................21
3.0 Overhauling Implementation............................................................................................22
3.1 Boiler ...............................................................................................................................22
3.1.1 Prerequisites for Boiler Inspection.......................................................................22
3.1.1.1 Reference Drawings and Documentation ........................................................22
3.1.1.2 Boiler Inspection Tools ......................................................................................22
3.1.1.3 Pre-Outage Checks and Review of Maintenance and Previous Overhaul ...24
3.1.1.4 Inspection Procedures ...........................................................................................27
3.1.1.5 Safety Concerns......................................................................................................27
3.1.2 Boiler Inspection ....................................................................................................28
3.1.2.1 Boiler Visual Inspection ....................................................................................29
3.1.2.2 Root Cause Analysis ..........................................................................................30
3.1.2.3 Inspection Report...................................................................................................31
3.1.3 Boiler Overhaul......................................................................................................31
3.1.3.1 Boiler Outage and Overhaul Work Scope Development................................31
3.1.3.2 Methodology .......................................................................................................32
3.1.3.3 Contract Services Utilized During a Boiler Outage........................................37
3.1.3.4 Lessons Learned from a Boiler Outage ...........................................................37
3.1.3.5 Training ..............................................................................................................38

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4.0 Turbine................................................................................................................................39
4.1 Steam Turbine Degradation Processes ........................................................................39
4.2 Outage Work Scope Development Process..................................................................39
4.2.1 Time-Based Planned Overhauls ...........................................................................39
4.2.2 Condition-Based Overhauls ..................................................................................39
4.2.3 Developing Detailed Condition Based Outage Workscope ................................45
4.2.3.1 Base Workscope .................................................................................................45
4.2.3.2 Updating Workscope for Unit Operating History ..........................................45
4.2.3.3 Finalizing Turbine-Generator Outage Workscope.........................................45
4.3 Long Range Rolling Outage Plan .................................................................................45
4.3.1 Developing a Draft Long Range Rolling Outage Plan........................................45
4.3.2 Developing a Working Long Range Rolling Outage Plan..................................46
4.4 Outage Contracting Practices .......................................................................................46
4.5 Outage Planning Process...............................................................................................46
4.5.1 Developing Turbine-Generator Outage Implementation Costs and Schedule 46
4.5.2 Developing Turbine - Generator Outage Schedules ...........................................47
4.5.2.1 Preliminary Turbine - Generator Outage Schedule .......................................47
4.5.2.2 Developing Turbine Outage Schedule..............................................................49
4.5.3 Outage Readiness Review Process........................................................................49
4.5.3.1 Typical Outage Readiness Review Milestone Schedule......................................49
4.5.3.2 Critical Activity Tracking Process .......................................................................49
4.5.3.3 Establishing High Impact Teams .........................................................................49
4.5.4 Pre-Outage Planning ....................................................................................................50
4.5.4.1 Establishing Outage Site Teams ...........................................................................50
4.5.4.2 Pre-Outage Mobilization .......................................................................................50
4.5.5 Turbine-Generator Outage Tools and Specialty Equipment................................50
4.5.6 Pre-Shutdown Checks ..................................................................................................50
4.5.6.1 Pre-Shutdown Check List .....................................................................................50
4.5.6.2 Pre-Shutdown Walk-Down ...............................................................................50
5.0 Advanced Technologies .....................................................................................................52
5.1 Strategies to Increase Time Between Turbine Valve Overhauls ...............................52
5.1.1 Time Between Valve Overhauls............................................................................52
5.1.2 Typical Turbine Valve Aging Related Damage...................................................52
5.1.3 Strategy for Increasing Time Between Valve Overhauls ...................................54
5.1.4 Key Elements for NTPC to Increase Fleet Time Between Valve Overhauls....54
5.2 Strategies to Increase Time Between Turbine Overhauls..........................................56
5.2.l Strategies Adopted by Utilities for Increasing Time Between Turbine
Overhauls....................................................................................................................56
5.2.2 Technologies for Reducing the Impact of Solid Particle Erosion Damage.......57
5.2.3 Technologies for Reducing In-Service Damage to Turbine Seals .....................59
5.2.3.1 Designing Turbine Tip Seals for Reduced SPE Damage................................59
5.2.3.2 Designing Turbine Shaft Seals to Mitigate Seal Rubs ....................................61
5.2.4 Turbine Sectional Overhauls ................................................................................62
5.2.4.1 Time Between Turbine Section Overhauls ......................................................63
5.3 Technologies to Reduce Turbine Outage Durations...................................................65
5.3.1 Strategies for Reducing Impact of FS-CFs on Outage Durations .....................67

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 5.3.1.1 Disassembly and Assembly Process..................................................................67
5.3.1.2 Routine Repair Scheduled at Every Overhaul....................................................68
5.3.1.2.1 Fleet Strategic Spares .........................................................................................68
5.3.1.3 Planned Fleet Component Upgrades....................................................................69
6.0 Generator Overhauls .........................................................................................................71
6.1 Typical Time Between Generator Inspections ............................................................71
6.1.1 Increasing Time Between Generator Major Overhauls.....................................71
6.1.2 Generator Assessment Technologies ....................................................................72
7.0 Best Operational Practices ................................................................................................73
7.1 Overspeed Testing of Turbines.....................................................................................73
7.2 Safety Valve Testing ......................................................................................................73
7.3 Turbine Cylinder Stud Tightening Process.................................................................73
7.4 Rotor Blast Cleaning......................................................................................................74
7.5 Turbine Generator Lube Oil System ...........................................................................74
7.6 Boiler Hydrostatic Pressure Testing ............................................................................75
7.7 Measuring Turbine Critical Pressure Indicators........................................................75
7.8 Boiler Inspections...........................................................................................................76
7.9 Boiler Liabilities Matrix ................................................................................................77
7.10 Boiler Assessment Matrix..............................................................................................77
7.11 Boiler and Turbine System Data Manager..................................................................78
7.12 Laydown Plans ...............................................................................................................78
8.0 Road Map for NTPC to Undertake Turbine-Generator Overhauls .............................80
8.1 In-House T-G Maintenance and Overhaul (M&O) Infrastructure ..........................81
8.2 Strategic Plan for Establishing T-G Maintenance and Overhaul Capability ..........83
8.2.1 Key Considerations in Developing the Strategic Plan ........................................83
8.2.2 Establishing Turbine-Generator Engineering Specialist Organization............85
8.2.3 Establishing Regional Power Service Center (RPSC) Organization
Structure .................................................................................................................86
8.2.4 Turbine-Generator Job Instructions....................................................................90
8.2.4.1 Traditional Job Instructions .............................................................................90
8.2.4.2 Three Dimensional Job Instructions ................................................................90
8.2.5 Establishing Regional Power Service Center Field Services..............................91
8.2.6 Establishing Turbine Valve Overhaul Services ..................................................92
8.2.7 On-Site Field Machining Tooling Requirements ................................................93
8.2.8 Repairing Turbine-Generator Strategic Spares .................................................94
9.0 Reducing Human Performance Errors............................................................................95
9.1 Providing Structured Workforce Skills Training.......................................................95
9.2 Establishing Job Instructions........................................................................................95
9.3 Ensure Process Compliance ..........................................................................................95
9.4 Instituting a Corrective Action Program.....................................................................95

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1.0 Outage Management Considerations
Outage management is a structured process, which requires inputs from several organizations
within the utility. A well thought-out outage plan and strict adherence to the plan are the most
important factors to keep in mind before undertaking any planned outage. Preparations for the
outage should commence early enough (at least two years before the outage) to allow sufficient
time to procure and mobilize the resources (materials and manpower) required for executing the
outage. Some of the important considerations in outage management are:
• Detailed planning and scheduling of all work to be carried out during the outage including
the roles and responsibilities of the outage team.
• Planning for contingencies in the schedule.
• Rigidly limiting emerging work, i.e., work that was not anticipated prior to the outage, but
which requires immediate attention due to its impact on plant availability, generation,
personnel/equipment and environment.
• Close interaction between the project management and outage management personnel.
• Timely receipt of material and resources on site.
• Effective employee engagement at every level throughout the outage.
• Documentation of lessons learned and corrective steps for planning future outages.
• Comparing outage success indicators with industry norms.
Standardizing the outage management process at both the corporate and plant level will
significantly improve the cost effectiveness, efficiency and safety. It is equally important to build
flexibility in the standardization process to accommodate specific plant needs from time to time.
The process needs to be updated after every outage to reflect the lessons learned and the current
best practices followed in the industry.

1.1 Planning, Scheduling, and Implementing Outages

The outage plan starts with the long-range plan, which varies among utilities, and could be
anywhere from five to ten years, depending on the size of the utility. The long-range plan contains
a short description of the planned outage and gives the expected start date, duration and major
work items for each future outage. The project management group prepares the plan in
accordance with the corporate guidelines and expectations.

The pre-outage plan is a much more detailed plan which identifies the activities that are required
to be carried out and the sequencing of all the work to be performed, along with the
responsibilities and roles of the various organizations that will be responsible for the timely
completion of the outage. The plan identifies milestone activities and sequences to allow
individual organizations to understand plant management’s expectations, as well as to provide a
baseline to measure the timely completion of these activities. Effective communication through
pre-outage orientation briefings is essential so that everyone involved in the outage knows which
activities are critical path in order to ensure that the critical path work receives the highest priority.
The pre-outage meetings also foster “ownership” at all levels and the enhanced levels of
communication create the trust, respect, understanding and team work needed to achieve high
levels of outage performance and safety. An example of a pre-outage plan with milestones,
schedule and responsibility is provided in Appendix P-1.

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1.2 Outage Goals and Objectives
Every outage plan should be developed in accordance with the following “standing” goals and
objectives:
• Outages will be performed in strict adherence to schedule and in the shortest time as
possible without sacrificing quality of work, personnel safety, and integrity of the
equipment and the environment.
• Daily documentation of the percentage work completed, deviations from planned work,
reportable injuries, and percent of budget expended.
• A Final Outage Report, documenting the work performed, schedule and milestones met,
expenditures, and lessons learned, including corrective steps for future outage, will be
issued two months after the outage.
• A Plant Systems and Equipment Performance Report will be filed when the operating units
are brought back on-line following the outage.

1.3 Outage Scope

The outage scope is prepared based on inputs from the Plant Manager, project heads, plant
technical services, and original equipment manufacturer (OEM). The project management
(corporate) and plant are jointly responsible to develop a defined outage scope with the dates
established in the pre-outage milestone schedule. The scope will be, as a minimum, the required
maintenance for continued safe and efficient operation of the plant until the next planned outage is
scheduled. Outage scope freeze dates are established in accordance with the pre-outage planning
milestones. Revisions to outage scope following the scope freeze dates should be processed
promptly to facilitate the preparations necessary to execute the identified work and should be done
only after the concurrence of the outage management.

The Outage Manager is responsible for assembling the scope documents which describe the
capital and maintenance work that have to be carried out and assigning responsible work package
managers to manage and control the work. Scope content is reviewed with the responsible task
managers prior to developing the resource requirement, detailed cost estimates and the schedule
for performing the work. The resource-loaded work packages are later merged into an Integrated
Outage Scope package.

Performing organizations are required to collect, monitor and report progress and performance
data as required by the Outage Manager. The Outage Manager is responsible for identifying,
evaluating, documenting, and communicating any required changes to the formal outage plan.
The Outage Manager will update the outage plan (scope, schedule, and budget), analyze deviations
from the plan for impacts and take proactive steps to mitigate negative impacts to the plan.
Changes to the plan will be administered according to the Outage Change Control Procedure (see
Appendix P-2).

For each area of the schedule or budget that poses a significant risk to the success of the outage, a
mitigating action plan should be in place to reduce the risk. Once the risks, mitigating actions, and
unit business case have been analyzed, an informed assessment can be made as to the best duration
and cost basis for the outage. The Outage Team is responsible for identifying risk items and for

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putting mitigating actions in place to reduce the risk to the outage. Schedule or monetary costs
associated with these risk items are not included in the target schedule or budget. Examples of
such risks and a related contingency plan may be found in the Appendix P-3 under “Outage
Planning and Management Process”.

1.4 Outage Time Window

The outage time window is the period, based upon the utility’s load requirements for that period of
the year that allows a certain number of generating units to be off-line for maintenance,
modifications, inspections, etc. The decision on the time window for the outage will be made
based on the expected load requirements. Historical data is also used to study the weather patterns
and load demands in the region. Key considerations in determining an outage time window are:
• Economic impact of replacement power.
• Resources – Ready availability of manpower, materials, contractors, and partners to
support the outage.
• Confidence level of the unit returning to service on schedule.

1.5 Outage Schedule

Outage work is scheduled through a hierarchical system of interrelated schedules starting with the
overall view of the outage plan, schedule and key milestones (including shut-down and start-up) to
the detailed logic-based schedules developed for major projects or complex work evolutions in
support of summary work. Examples of logic-based, integrated schedules include Primavera,
work order management system (WOMS), and other commercial software systems. The purpose
of the logic-based schedules is to provide project management and task managers an
understanding of the job interrelationships and requirements of day-to-day management of
activities, and assist them in anticipating potential problems in executing the work.
Considerations in developing detailed, logic-based, integrated schedules include:
• Schedules should be developed under the direction of the Outage Manager or work
sponsor, and should include input from the performing organization.
• The level of activity detail is determined by the requirements of the Outage Manager or
work sponsor in conjunction with good schedule control practices.
• Detailed schedules should use only true logical assumptions unless otherwise required by
the Outage or Task Manager.

Daily updated schedules of activities provide a current status of work and an accurate basis for
schedule projections. Schedule integration is required prior to the start of the outage and the
purpose is to:
• Identify additional support needs, conflicting activities, and overall resource requirements.
• Identify high-risk work and their safety and environmental impacts.
• Optimize the outage duration (shortest time), taking into account the most efficient use of
available resources at the site (cranes, test equipment, etc).

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Schedule integration should be completed, reviewed, approved and ready to issue one month
before the scheduled start date of the outage. Examples of an outage schedule, broken down by
activity and sub-activity levels, are provided in Appendix P-4.

1.6 Outage Duration

The outage duration is arrived at by the Outage Team, based upon detailed work scopes, work
documents, past inspection, test data, and best industry practices. The work packages detail the
work, the man-hours, the delivery of materials, tools, testing, etc., to arrive at a detailed, subtask
schedule.

Once the integrated outage work scope is finalized, the outage duration is determined and
submitted to the Plant Manager and management for approval. Typically, a routine boiler outage
is for 30 days or less, and a large turbine and large boiler component replacement, or generator
rewinds is for 60 days or less. Outage durations can be decreased or increased based upon the
need of the unit’s return to service by the work schedule. Typically, boiler work is scheduled on
two ten-hour shifts and six days per week. Turbine and generator work is performed on two
twelve-hour shifts and seven days per week. The one day not worked on the boiler or auxiliary
side can be worked if needed to return the unit to service on schedule. This one day may also be
utilized for inspection, non-destructive testing (NDT) and radiograph testing to facilitate the
outage schedule. Outage durations may be reduced through meticulous pre-outage planning and
preparations that include proper staging of materials, availability of labor-savings tools, etc.
Examples on reducing outage duration on the turbine - generators are provided in Section 4.3.

1.7 Outage Budget

The outage budget includes capital or large expenditure items (materials and labor), regular
maintenance work that is required to be carried out during planned outages and all inspections and
tests (mechanical, electrical, NDT, radiography, boroscope, etc.) that are required to ensure that
the unit will operate safely and efficiently until the next planned outage. Normal wear and tear
items that are expected to be replaced (burner components, wet bottom clinkers, fan blades, duct
work, insulation, etc., are also included in the base budget. Once the scope of work is defined and
frozen and approved by the Plant and Outage Managers, the overall cost of the outage is estimated
according to company guidelines. The approved budget is then tracked by the actual costs
incurred by tasks/work performed. Cost overruns should be justified and approved during the
daily outage meetings and when necessary with concurrence from corporate management. The
actual costs incurred should be reviewed in these meetings, and deviations from the planned
budget broken down by materials, labor, and completion schedules should be included in the final
outage report.

1.8 Outage Team

The Outage Team is the core team that is responsible for planning, executing and successfully
closing the outage. It is a multi-disciplinary team with defined roles and responsibilities. The
following section contains the desired organizational elements for a typical outage.

Outage Manager
The Outage Manager has ultimate authority with approval of the Plant Manager for establishing
and implementing the outage plan. He or she reports directly to the Plant Manager or his/her

9
designee and provides direction and support to plan, execute and close the outage. The duties and
responsibilities of the Outage Manager are:
• Prepare the outage goals and objectives, incorporating input from plant staff and
management, and support organizations.
• Develop the Outage Team and the outage plan, schedule, execution, close out and critical
path that is acceptable to the plant management and support organizations.
• Ensure that the outage is conducted in accordance with the guidelines and expectations of
management.

The Outage Team would typically include an Outage Capital Project Manager, Outage Supervisor
(shift supervisors), Outage Planner, Outage Scheduler, Contract Manager, Lead System Engineers
(boiler, turbine, generator, air preheater, auxiliary equipment associated with boiler/turbine-
generators, electrical, instrumentation and controls), safety and environmental managers,
materials/supply chain coordinators, plant personnel and corporate engineering support staff, and
contractors/vendors representatives. Working together under the leadership and guidance of the
Outage Manager, this team would then:
• Establish outage goals, effectiveness measures and performance indicators for the outage.
• Develop the organizational chart for the outage showing all interfaces with functional and
corporate organizations.
• Develop staffing plans for shift coverage.
• Develop the communication plan and the chain of command.
• Develop outage scope controls.
• Develop a formalized plan for scope addition and removal from the outage scope as
necessary in conjunction with the Plant Manager.
• Identify lessons learned and self-assessment teams for incorporation in future outages.
• Manage the preparation activities and take corrective actions as deemed necessary.
• Inform management of outage pre-readiness and status of outage before, during and at
completion.
• Validate that all necessary budget, contracts, materials and other supporting functions are
available for the outage execution.
• Prepare the Outage Readiness Report for plant and management review and approval.
• Conduct outage meetings and maintain the communication channels within the functional
organizations.
• Oversee the outage work during the outage and ensure it conforms to the outage plan and
all regulatory standards.
• Prepare the final outage report and assure closure of all outage related activities.
• Organize and conduct outage critique meetings and lessons learned meetings following the
outage.

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 • Provide input to long-range outage plans detailing major activities for the next several
years.

Outage Capital Project Supervisor

The Outage Capital Project Manager should typically be an experienced plant person with intimate
knowledge of the plant equipment and good interpersonal and communications skills. His/her role
is to ensure that the capital project milestones established for the outage are met and the progress
reported directly to the Outage Manager, and that project related issues are discussed and resolved
during the daily meetings with the Outage Manager and Outage Team.

Outage Supervisors (Shift)

The Outage Supervisor reports to the Outage Manager and is responsible for all implementation of
the work as it pertains to the assigned shift. The Outage Supervisor is responsible for tag-out of
equipment before the scheduled work is performed on the equipment and for monitoring the work
in progress. As-found condition of equipment, changes required in operation procedures once the
equipment comes back on line, and deviations from normal maintenance requirements are
documented and communicated to the Plant Manager and the concerned operations and
maintenance heads. After the outage, the Outage Supervisor is responsible for release of the
equipment for return to service.

Outage Scheduler
The role of the Outage Scheduler is to develop, optimize, publish and maintain the approved
outage schedule. He/she maintains close interface with the Outage Team and the Lead System
Engineers during the outage and assists the Outage Manager in conducting routine schedule
performance reviews in the daily outage meetings. The Outage Scheduler is responsible for
managing and updating the schedule-related information listed below:
• Critical path.
• Milestone schedule.
• Integrated project schedule.
• Identify work activities by plant areas (boiler, turbine, balance of plant, etc.), by system
lead and supervisor.
• Manpower-loaded resource schedule.
• Schedule for pre-outage work.
• Define required steps and logic for integration of start-up and shut-down.
• Ensure all special testing and inspections are reviewed and incorporated in the outage
sequence.
• Include emergent work and scope changes as and when they occur.
• Contingency work.
• Trending of baseline data and processes for matching against performance indicators.
• Provide inputs for the post-review and lessons learned reports.

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Outage Planner
The Outage Planner’s responsibilities include:
• Assist in the identification of outage manpower needs and supplemental resources.
• Identify outage coding on the work order for tracking outage scope, budget and work
packages.
• Assure all work orders are properly planned by specific due dates or milestone schedule
and that health/safety/training and environmental issues are addressed in each work order.
• Identify all support services required and initiate work orders to support the activity (i.e.,
scaffolding, insulation, operational clearance, etc.).
• Identifies and plans pre-outage work orders.
• Develop contingency plans for work orders.
• Conduct work order walk downs prior to outage to update the information.
• Recommend and order all parts and supplies for the assigned work.
• Verify receipt of materials on-site and their staging in order to support a ready to work
status of the work order.
• Coordinate the formalized process of scope addition or deletion.
• Resolve issues related with work packages.
• Complete work package closures.

Outage Operations Coordinator

The Outage Operations Coordinator examines the outage order list with the Outage Manager to
ensure that all required work is included and inputs from each operating shift have been obtained
in order to issue the plant protection procedures. As the overall coordinator interfacing with the
plant operations and the Outage Team, it is the responsibility of the Outage Operations
Coordinator that: equipment is tagged, replacements for critical equipment that are being serviced
are available to continue plant operation during the outage, schedules for shutdown of load centers
motor control centers and electrical equipment are developed and alternate arrangements made to
maintain these services, meetings are conducted with all outage groups to identify special needs
(road closures, ventilators, communication channels, etc.) and provide sufficient manpower to the
Outage Shift Supervisors to complete their work in the assigned shift. Discrepancies in equipment
labeling, equipment drawings, etc., are also reported to the engineering group for revision. The
Outage Operations Coordinator is responsible to verify that all assigned work has been
satisfactorily completed and follow up orders are promptly written to address unfinished work or
new issues that may arise in the future. At the completion of the outage, before the plant returns to
service, the Outage Coordinator is responsible for verifying that all temporary arrangements made
in the electrical and plant support systems are removed and the normal feeds are returned to
service.

Outage General Supervisor

The role of the Outage General Supervisor is to ensure that there is a safe environment for work
and that all personnel and labor issues that may surface during the planning and execution of the

12
outage are amicably resolved. The Outage General Supervisor has the overall responsibility to
walk down the work order area with the craft labor to ensure that it is completed according to the
work order description. Additional responsibilities include: weekly updates of outage work
packages for inclusion into the schedule by the Outage Scheduler; coordination with the Outage
System Lead and the Materials Coordinator to ensure that sufficient quantities and types of tools
needed are available to support the work, demobilization, and job site clean up.

Outage System Lead

The Outage System Lead provides the single point of contact accountable for a specific project or
work assignment that is scheduled to be performed during an outage. Typically, the Outage
System Leads are responsible for the bid package for the work to be completed, the materials list,
budget, scheduling of work on the equipment, material or contract changes, contingency plan
supported by budget and schedule and monitoring the budget, schedule and the work during the
outage. The Outage System Engineer could be drawn from the plant undergoing the outage or
from the corporate outage team, but the selected individual must thoroughly understand the
equipment and be familiar with the drawings, clearances, specifications, and repair procedures.
The information provided by the lead system engineers to the Plant and Outage Managers forms
the basis for major decisions on repair or replacement. When the unit comes off-line, the Outage
System Engineer participates along with other technical experts from plant, engineering and
corporate to determine the as-found condition and make any necessary changes to the scope.

Materials Coordinator
The Materials Coordinator maintains the critical materials list for the outage and is responsible for
tracking all materials, tools, and supplies identified in the outage plan and their related costs, and
ensuring their timely receipt at the outage site. In the daily outage meetings, this individual
communicates information on material status, and related costs.

Safety and Environmental Coordinators

The assigned Safety and Environmental Coordinators support the site safety procedures and
environmental compliance. They identify the appropriate outage safety procedures and site
specific job requirements and communicate them to the Outage Team as part of the safety review
in the daily outage meetings. They also conduct daily inspections and walk downs to ensure that
work is performed in accordance with the approved procedures.

Contract Administrator
The responsibilities of the Contract Administrator are primarily to prepare and submit contract
requisitions, obtain the necessary approvals, make the awards and ensure that the contracts are
executed according to the agreement. The Contract Administrator is the designated representative
for all contracts associated with the assigned block of work. He/she also assists the Outage
General Supervisor in auditing the contractor charges, including tool rentals, mobilization
expenses and subcontractor fees. Attendance by the Contract Administration at the daily outage
meeting is not mandatory but definitely should be undertaken as needed. The Contract
Administrator should be supported by an analyst who verifies the time sheets, billing rates and
generates the financial reports for the Outage Team.

The organizational structure of a typical Outage Team is shown in Figure 1.1.

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 Typical Outage Team Organization Chart

Outage Manager

Financial Production Maint. Outage Union Outage Tech. Support Safety Contract Proj. Mgt. Materials SCR Project
Planners Schedulers
Coordinator Coordinator Coordinator Coordinator System Eng. Coordinator Services Leader Coordinator Manager

Boiler T/G
Main Supv.
Business Safety
Elect/Mech T/G Agenda
Tech Reps
Pipe
Max
Manpower Project Site Proj.
Protection Welding Elect. Coal/Mills
Coordinators Planners Coordinator Coordinator
Leaders
Coal/Mills Draft I&C
Mill
Scaffold Water
I&C
ESO
Insulation T/G
Boiler
Coal Silo
Long Term Air Heater T/G Backpass DC/MCC Acoustic
T/G Exp. Joint
Reliability Proj. Man. Proj. Man. Proj. Man. Proj. Man. Proj. Man.
Proj. Man.

Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj.

Coordinator Coordinator Coordinator Coordinator Coordinator Coordinator

Figure 1.1 Typical Outage Team Organization Chart

1.9 Long Lead Procurement Items

Items that require a long period to be fabricated, shipped or procured should be ordered well in
advance per the NTPC Outage Readiness Index in preparation for the identified outage.
Examples include turbine rotors, generator rotors, generator windings, condenser tubes, high
pressure heaters, blades, diaphragms, boiler headers, tube panels, tube elements, main
transformers, current transformers, air pre-heater baskets, and turbine valve components. Critical
instrumentation, specialized gaskets, alloy boiler tubing or pipe, specialized valves, valve
actuators, large quantities of lubricating oil or transformer oil should be evaluated for the entire
outage season. The entire outage season for the NTPC plants should be evaluated for the total
anticipated usage and planned procurement implemented. Normal use items should also be
evaluated to maintain the outage and routine work force.

If a multi-unit plant has back-to-back outages, the use of standard sluice or coal pipe may
suddenly become a critical outage activity. The planning of the outages should address this, along
with the quantities of welding rods, bolts, nuts, gaskets, welding gloves, tools, welding gases,
safety equipment, etc. Materials must be on hand or provisions made for on-time delivery to keep
the critical path activities of the outage on schedule, and those activities that are not critical path
from becoming critical path.

Each unit outage plan should include a standardized list of long procurement items to ensure that
the planning addresses the need for each item if the outage plan includes the repair of the piece of
equipment. The use of an Excel spreadsheet that lists the item, normal delivery time, last cost
when purchased, cost to NTPC in generation megawatt hours, and number of units that this item is
used, etc., could help define the ranking of the long procurement and critical spares. This

14
information should be placed upon the NTPC intranet for ease of reference and the ability to
retrieve the data from any NTPC location.

1.10 Critical Spares

Critical spares are those that can impact the reliability of the unit, due to long lead times of repair
or replacement, or can result in large monetary losses for NTPC, if not available in a timely
manner. The strategy for such spares is dependent upon the amount of inventory allowed by each
plant or NTPC. For example, large main transformers typically have an operating life or 20 or
more years if maintained and properly engineered. However, bushings, cooling fans or cooling
radiators do not typically have that period of operation before requiring replacement or repair.
The loss of the main transformer could cripple the electrical generation from the unit to be sent out
to NTPC’s grid and to its customers. Therefore, the categorizing of NTPC’s main transformers by
manufacturer, rating, bushing type, etc., allows NTPC to maintain a rationalized inventory of spare
bushings or even main transformers in the event of a failure, since the lead time for the
manufacture of a transformer is typically 12 months in the United States.

Spare turbine blades or rotating assemblies offer the insurance that, if a blade failure occurs, the
wait time for blade manufacturing will be alleviated. However, the ability to procure and have
available a complete turbine rotor with blades that is ready for installation allows NTPC to utilize
it not only as a critical spare, but also to reduce the duration of the outage. This will allow the
removed rotor to be inspected, repaired and made ready for the next use in a similar machine when
it is scheduled for an outage. Outage costs can be controlled by adopting such practices due to the
quick turn-around time that this approach facilitates.

The decision on how and what to have on-hand as critical spares is based on technical and
economic considerations. Typically, the lost generation, the length of time it will take to repair,
and the delivery time, all have to be assessed when deciding on how much inventory of spares
should be maintained to service the NTPC fleet. A list of all such major items must be prepared
along with the expected life of these components in the NTPC plants to plan for the spares. The
life expectancy data in NTPC should be periodically compared with industry standards to ascertain
whether or not these components are reaching normal end-of-life cycles. A spreadsheet, much
like the long lead procurement items, should be developed and maintained to manage critical
spares. The spreadsheets may also include other heavy engineering components, such as beams,
lifting attachments, specialized crane components, welding machines, stress relieving machines,
etc.

1.11 Subcontracting/Partnering
Subcontracting and partnering for outage execution can be of tremendous benefit to NTPC. The
ability to have a contractor who specializes in critical component repair or assembly can offer
tremendous savings in terms of schedule, quality and budget. A specialized tool, trained
personnel, or specialized training may be just one of the benefits that the subcontractor brings to
the outage, but the financial impact for a large utility could be significant. The ability for the
contractor to supply trained craftsmen, materials, transportation, rigging, cranes, tools, etc. could
be utilized for mutual benefit. Subcontracting may be accomplished through a fixed price
agreement based upon a defined quantity of work, or maybe a time and materials agreement.

15
The concept is widely utilized in many utilities in the United States, and merits consideration by
NTPC. Partnering brings both quality and cost savings; it also ensures that there are no surprises
if it is a fixed price agreement. Engaging subcontractors as a partnering member of the Outage
Team helps to ensure that the outage will be a success, as the subcontractor becomes a stakeholder
to the process. A request for proposals prepared jointly by all of the departments within the utility
that are engaged in the overhaul is the starting point in creating the alliance, followed by
evaluation of the partner’s strengths and capabilities, track record and willingness to share the
rewards and/or risks.

TVA has adopted the partnering concept successfully for all outages in its fossil power generation
fleet. Almost 80 percent of their total outage expenditures are with fewer than 200 key suppliers.
To put an effective alliance in place, the utility must establish what its needs will be over the long-
term, and which of the outage performance indicators cost, safety, technology, trained
personnel, spare parts (including critical spares), quality of work, etc., are enhanced by the
partnership. As an example, many of TVA’s steam turbines are old, and replacement parts are not
readily available, which often requires acquiring custom-built parts. For this reason alone, TVA
has entered into partnerships with suppliers to meet its needs. Having an alliance helps in
anticipating the need well in advance, and integrates the actual parts dimensions from the field
with the supplier’s engineering and manufacturing process. This ensures that the parts fit and are
optimized for operation. Another added benefit is that order-cycle time is reduced or eliminated,
as the order often becomes a priority in the supplier’s production schedule because of the alliance.
The selection of the partner or alliance will be defined by the requirements and needs of NTPC.

Included in Appendix P-5 is information concerning TVA’s partnership alliance with GUBMK
Constructors.

1.12 Safety and Environmental Issues

Each work package will incorporate the safety aspects that will be followed during the completion
of the work to be performed. Examples would include scaffolding, special tools, a fire hazard due
to cutting or welding, large overhead crane lifts, or falling debris. The work package should also
include a job safety analysis that addresses unexpected issues such as, the breakage of a lifting
sling, a load shift on a lifting sling, or the ignition of combustible materials from slag falling down
during cutting or welding operations. The job safety analysis allows the Outage Team and the
performing organization to plan around the potential safety and environmental issues before they
occur, and develop back-up plans in the event that the initial safeguard fails. This planning allows
the Outage Team to concentrate on the work to be performed and reduces their worrying about
how to react to a safety or environmental event that places an employee in harms way.

The use of an Outage Safety Manager should be utilized if possible coupled with Safety Captains
from all of the Outage Team organizations to promote the use of safety equipment, safe work, and
processes. TVA utilizes two employee teams to audit any safety work on their shift. They report
their findings during the daily Outage Team meeting, including the action taken if violations were
identified. The team reports both good and bad observations and praise for the good observations.
In cases where serious violations of established safety rules have been observed and documented,
strict actions may be required by management to deal with such issues. Similarly, if a partner or
OEM continually exhibits poor safety performance, it may be sufficient grounds for termination of

16
the contract, provided that the conditions for both adherence to the prevailing environment, safety
and health procedures of the host organization, and the penalty for failure to do so, have been
established within the contract’s terms and conditions.

Likewise, hazardous substances which are regulated by the environmental laws should be
identified during the pre-outage and appropriate steps with respect to handling, storage and
disposal should be documented and made available to all concerned staff that may be required to
deal with these substances in and around the work place. Risks such as spilling of oil, gasoline,
diesel fuel, or other petroleum products into water resources or onto the ground should be
evaluated and measures identified to prevent their occurrence. Work packages and safety plans
can be closely related not only to safety or health issues, but can also overlap due to the possibility
of fire, environmental accidents, low oxygen environments or combustible atmospheres. As
governmental regulations become more and more strict, the assignment of an individual to
oversee, coordinate and prepare the documentation associated with the environmental aspects of
the outage should be evaluated. This enables the environmental specialist to establish
environmental requirements and processes with the Outage Team, and to accurately monitor and
document the amount of environmentally hazardous materials removed during the outage and their
locations.

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2.0 Pre-Outage Readiness Review
Project leads and supporting members, including contractors, (as needed) should discuss the status
of the plant readiness in scheduled meetings at least once a week, and no less than six months
prior to the outage. The purpose is to discuss the following:
• Defined work scope and schedule, including regular and shift schedules, for both shut-
down and start-up.
• Manpower needs and supporting contractors and, if available, provide organization chart.
• Support development of a labor training profile.
• Material status.
• Status of impending contracts.
• Safety plan, including confined work space requirements.
• On-site support needs scaffolding, insulation, temporary power, tooling, equipment,
labor force break area accommodations, etc.
• Status of pre-outage work.
• Other work being performed on equipment in close proximity to the proposed work area.
• Contingency plans, inspection plans and resources.
• Lessons learned from previous outages and incorporation in the current outage plan.

The engineering leads discuss the work plan and how they plan to provide technical support to the
boiler, turbine, generator and other ancillary equipment and/or systems related work activities.
The Outage Team is also briefed on current equipment and systems performance, potential
add/delete items from the work scope, engineering technical procedures (for repairs/replacements),
manpower needs and deployment, inspection plan, procedures, and schedule, and result resolution.

2.1 Outage Readiness Index

One tool that can be effectively used to determine the readiness and success of an outage is the
Outage Readiness Index (ORI). The ORI was modeled after the Project Definition Rating Index
(PDRI) which was created by the Construction Industry Institute (CII) Front End Planning
Research Team. It is a simple, easy, multi-purpose tool used in all TVA plants for measuring the
degree of readiness for fossil plant outages. The ORI defines each critical element in the outage
readiness index check sheet (planning, ordering of materials, status of work packages, engineering
support, budget, schedule, etc., with well-defined milestones) and allows the plant production
support outage management to quickly predict factors impacting outage success.

The ORI process is applicable to all planned outages (short and long), regardless of the outage
duration TVA’s ORI process starts one year prior to the outage and progressively decreases in
time increments to 9 months, 6 months, 3 months, 30 days and 14 days prior to the outage. The
ORI is continually updated to reflect the current status and management is made aware of the
status of the preparations for the outage. The status of the ORI is discussed in scheduled meetings,
and the tasks and activities that are not completed by the required dates are listed as action items
and are assigned to specific individuals within the Outage Team for completion before the next
milestone status review.

18
NTPC should develop the ORI process starting with the one year milestones down to the 14-day
milestone (one year, 9 months, 6 months, 90 days, 60 days, 30 days and 14 days prior to outage)
based on the examples provided in the TVA ORI document. A staff member from the corporate
office with extensive experience in outage management would be the ideal candidate to dedicate to
initiating the ORI. Once the process is developed, it should be tried out initially in one of NTPC’s
high performing plants to fine-tune the process. Both classroom and on-site training (during the
outage) should be undertaken to make the ORI process a standard tool within NTPC for assessing
plant readiness for planned outages. Once assimilated into the NTPC outage planning, execution,
and management cycle, ORI could be used effectively for:
• Identifying potential risk areas and how to prepare for handling them.
• Functioning as a training tool for the plant, contractors and other on-site personnel
associated with the outage.
• Providing a checklist to the Outage Team.
• Monitoring progress at various steps during the outage.
• Reconciling differences among outage participants, using a common basis for outage
evaluation.
• Benchmarking a successful outage.

A complete description of the ORI process, including examples of how the system is implemented
in TVA, is provided in Appendix P-6.

2.2 Scheduling of Outage Activities

The scheduling of all outage activities is dependent upon the time required to complete the work
associated with the piece of equipment and return it to service. The number of work shifts and the
number of work days are used to estimate the total time needed to perform the work and the
critical path for the component. In large fossil outages where there are typically thousands of
work activities, there are usually from ten to twenty critical path activities. To focus on the key
critical paths, which are usually the boiler and turbine related work activities, the critical paths are
arranged based upon their total hour paths. The shortest critical path is then the #1 critical path
item. The list of the top 5 critical paths is utilized at each daily outage meeting to identify where
each organization’s work relates to the outage completion schedule. If the #1 critical path duration
actually decreases from one day to another, it will impact all the other critical paths. The Outage
Team must then evaluate what can be done to shorten the remaining critical paths. During the
outage, critical paths may change, but should, in most cases, follow the outage schedule and work
plan. A list of all activities to be performed, the order in which they need to be completed, and the
time estimated for completing each activity, is required by the Outage Scheduler to prepare the
work process flow sheet. An integrated schedule showing the critical paths should then be
prepared for use during the outage implementation.

2.3 Benchmarking for Subsequent Overhauls

Benchmarking is the evaluation and comparison of similar processes or work that has
been or remains to be accomplished. Benchmarking can be accomplished during the actual
observation of the work, after the work has been completed by the final “as worked schedule and

19
final costs.” Benchmarking is generally thought of in terms of what one utility is selling its
electricity compared to another utility, or what it costs to manufacture that kilowatt of electricity
compared to a competitor. Benchmarking an outage represents what man-hours of work were
required to perform the same or similar work during different plant outages. However,
benchmarking also includes the number of people in the outage team, the level of detail in the
scoping, planning, budgeting and implementation processes. As an example, consider that the
replacement of an entire waterwall panel at one NTPC plant required 389 man-hours. The next
replacement on a subsequent unit at the same plant only took 319 man-hours. The benchmarking
from one outage to the next revealed that the Outage Team found a faster, safer and easier way to
remove the old panel out of the boiler and also to install the new panel into the boiler.

This evaluation can be carried down to work activities such as disassembling, packing, or
replacing a valve. The benchmarking of the outage activities allows the Outage Team and NTPC
management to focus on the best performance within NTPC and then replicate it throughout the
entire organization.

Benchmarking may be utilized between neighboring utilities or manufacturing companies to

improve each company’s productivity by identifying those processes that can be utilized for
continuous improvement.

2.4 Manpower Deployment

Manpower deployment at the start of the outage and during the entire outage can be planned by
utilizing the outage schedule. Utilizing a scheduling program, such as Primavera, allows the entire
Outage Team to identify the pre-outage activities and the orientation/training required for newly
hired NTPC personnel with respect to NTPC’s safety and environmental procedures, and policies
concerning the issuance of tools, house-keeping, etc.

By planning the work activities to include the amount of man-hours to complete the particular
work activity, the schedule program can identify the number of personnel needed by day and week
for the entire outage. This helps the Outage Team identify in advance if sufficient personnel are
available for the various elements of the entire outage. This also allows NTPC corporate to look at
all of the outages scheduled for the outage season and identify from a central planning perspective
if sufficient resources are available. This can include not only craft personnel, but tools, heavy
equipment, specialized electrical test equipment, specialized testing tools, contractors, partner
support, welding machines and cranes, etc. Utilizing a scheduling program such as Primavera
allows NTPC to also better schedule the use of their central engineering and support groups for the
inspection of the equipment, verification of new equipment being installed, the support of the
OEM, and the scheduling of training classes for NTPC employees.

This ability to review manpower needs and deployment within TVA, allowed its corporate office
to adjust the starting of fossil outages based upon the availability of boilermakers between two
plants in close proximity of each other. Primavera also allowed the updating of the two plants’
schedules when the one currently in outage was ahead of its critical path. The information
allowed the second plant to adjust pre-outage activities, such as the hiring of personnel, and safety
orientations to meet the updated schedule of receiving the boilermakers from the first plant.

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2.5 Management Approval for Overhaul
As part of the ORI process, the work scope of the outage for capital and O&M work should be
presented to NTPC corporate for approval. This review should include the list of work to be
performed, budget required, and schedule. Per the ORI, the outage plan, capital, and O&M work
scopes are frozen at 48 weeks. Final management approval for the outage scope, budget and
duration of the outage occurs at 12 weeks before the outage is to begin. The review occurs by an
off-site senior NTPC manager. The review verifies that estimates are aggressive, shortest
schedule duration options are identified, comprehensive risk analyses completed, work scopes are
comprehensive and adequately address targeted problems, and any scopes which could be worked
outside of the outage are minimized. After consideration of the costs, benefits, and risks, the
target outage duration is finalized. Once NTPC management has approved the outage budget and
work scope, the Outage Manager and the Outage Team many then finalize the work packages, and
schedule.

The utilization of an Outage Manager and Outage Team allows consistency within NTPC. The
use of the ORI allows the standardization of the outage process, terms, reporting, benchmarking,
and objective evaluation by NTPC corporate as to the readiness of organization for the outage and
heightened confidence that the outage will succeed in those areas needed for the unit and plant
improvement. The involvement of NTPC corporate into the ORI, Outage Team concept, and
outage plan review conveys to the NTPC plant personnel that this logical methodology of
planning, scheduling, budgeting and implementation of the outages is an important aspect of the
management and operation of the NTPC enterprise.

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3.0 Overhauling Implementation
This section addresses the actual implementation of the boiler overhaul. The scope is confined to
the boiler and does not address any peripheral systems.

3.1 Boiler
The boiler overhaul starts with the boiler inspection once the unit is brought off-line. The first
requirement for a good inspection is that the inspecting team is completely familiar with the
boiler. For this purpose, all pertinent reference drawings and documentation should be readily
available at the work site. Other equally important requirements are proper tools, the correct
documented procedures for repairing and replacing tubes or components, and a team of trained
personnel. The boiler should have multiple access ports, good lighting inside, and adequate
scaffolding that will permit the inspectors and work crew to move about safely in the boiler during
the entire outage. Compliance with all safety and environmental requirements is very essential to
ensure a safe and successful outage.

3.1.1 Prerequisites for Boiler Inspection

3.1.1.1 Reference Drawings and Documentation

The plant or corporate engineering group should provide a Project or Outage Document List at
least 60 days before the start of the outage. The list should include the latest drawing number on
file, with the issue date, revision number, and equipment name/manufacturer. This list should be
issued to all outage participants for their use. The outage participants should be informed where
the equipment and plant documentation is filed and how to gain access for information or data
required. The use of an engineer assigned to the Outage Team can provide this access and meet
the critical need for the correct drawing and equipment documentation being utilized. Hopefully,
one of the lessons learned will not be that the incorrect drawing was utilized and the wrong
material specification or clearance was used in the repair or replacement during the outage. If an
OEM partner or other outage organization is utilized to perform the boiler outage work, it is
imperative that the correct drawings are utilized to procure the boiler components and for their
installation. In the bid itself, the correct drawings should be referenced and provided with any
new boiler components.

3.1.1.2 Boiler Inspection Tools

The following is a list of recommended boiler inspection tools:
• Magnifying glasses or similar devices that enable the boiler inspector to see the surface
scale, cracks or discoloration should be used.
• Hand held measuring devices, such as micrometers, Vernier calipers, NDT ultrasonic
devices, such as those manufactured by Krautkramer Ultrasonic Systems, should be utilized
for tube thickness, tube diameter, and to determine the loss of tube material. External tube
scale thickness can be determined using these tools. Information about Krautkramer can be
found at www.geinspectiontechniques.com. TVA utilizes Krautkramer equipment for
determining material thickness and for tabulating data.
• Borescopes are used to inspect the internal condition of boiler tubes, down comers,
headers, piping, and attemperators. Video monitors and recording features allow the

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 inspector and outage and plant personnel to see actual (as-found) conditions and facilitate
documentation for future reference.
• Digital cameras provide easy reference for pre- and post-outage conditions. This also
allows a direct comparison to future tube conditions with regard to color, external scale,
and alignment. Another boiler inspector may readily see what has been previously
observed and documented and then make a better decision regarding tube health and
recommended repairs or replacement. The use of digital cameras also aids in the training
of plant engineers, craftsmen, and future boiler inspectors. For large boiler capital projects,
the use of digital photographs would enable NTPC’s upper management to visually observe
the condition of the boiler and its components, which should help to simplify project
approval and speed up the approval process.
• Radiographic X-raying, magnetic particle tests and liquid dye penetrant tests are valuable
inspection methodologies. Additional information on TVA’s use of X-raying and its
related requirements and safety concerns may be found in Appendix B-1.
• Optic surveying tools, laser levels, etc., may also be used to establish header/components
guidelines for sagging.

Once all necessary data has been collected, it should be analyzed by NTPC’s engineering
department using the OEM guidelines and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
codes to establish acceptable limits for operation. The OEM and NTPC will then be able to
determine if any correction or replacement is required. Corrections can be made by adjusting
hanger rods, support steel, adding or removing shims, etc. Replacement may require large header
and structural steel, which would involve large capital expenditure and long outages. This can be
prevented by monitoring the components and protecting their service life by maintaining proper
insulation around them as recommended by the OEM and current best practices.

Boiler quality checks include many of the same techniques used during the initial boiler
inspection. However, additional items that must be observed include:
• The use of certified welders on all boiler tube welds and pressure parts.
• Proper fit of tube outer diameters (OD), proper tube chamfering, metal surface preparation,
tube alignment, spacing, proper pre-heat treating if required, and the exclusion of dirt, dust,
and foreign material. Additional quality assurance information may be found in Appendix
B-2.
• The correct boiler tube material, diameter and thickness.
• The correct weld filler for dissimilar welds, welds at lug attachments, and header tube
welds.
• Heat treating of the welds, if required.
• 100% X-raying of all tube and pressure part welds, including repairs.

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3.1.1.3 Pre-Outage Checks and Review of Maintenance and Previous Overhaul

• Operations should have established a very detailed and defined walk-down list of the entire
unit. Use of the physical senses of hearing, touch, and smell must also be included in this
list to determine if the operating unit’s equipment is operating satisfactorily. An example
of TVA Kingston’s Unit 9 and Unit 5/8 shutdown lists may be found in Appendix B-3.
• The Operations list should include data acquisition of vibration, temperature, voltage, flow
and noise levels.
• In particular, this information is required for the turbine/generator, exciter, exciter gear box
reduction gears, turbine valve strokes, boiler feed pump and motor, pulverizer fans and
motors, booster pump and motor, force draft fan and motor, induced draft fan and motor,
and for condenser leaks, high and low pressure heater leaks, and any safety valves that are
sizzling or for which leaking is evident. The list in most cases is unit specific. The
criticality of the list is that it enables the plant Outage Team and specialists to determine at
the beginning of the outage if there are areas of concern that require immediate inspection
to ensure that all possible equipment failures are identified and all necessary action plans
implemented to ensure a successful outage at completion.
• A boiler walk-down list should be developed that includes the following information while
the unit is operating and before shut down to identify additional items for review to be
completed during the outage. They are: inspection doors that are broken or will not close,
gas leaks, corner boiler expansion buck stay joints that are misaligned, broken or bent,
structural steel integrity, stairs, hand rails, grating, the condition of the roof over the
penthouse, overhead hoists and wire rope condition. It should also be determined during
walk-down if the unit’s fire extinguishers are in good shape for the outage in case of fire,
the telephones surrounding the unit are in operating condition, and the freight and
passenger elevators have been inspected and repaired to ensure their safe and productive
use by the outage personnel.
• Since the last outage, has the unit experienced an increase in maintenance requirements for
a particular piece of equipment or a specific system on the unit? For example, have the
boiler attemperators been erratic or not cycling in the control of the steam temperatures?
Have the valves been repaired or inspected with no resolution to the problem? The system
specialist should identify, through the use of an outage request/document, the components
in the system that should be inspected or repaired before or during the outage. Again, this
should not be submitted the day before the outage begins, but well in advance, so that the
Outage Team can plan, budget and schedule the work.
• All maintenance records since the last outage should be reviewed along with the last unit
outage report. In the planning process, these work activities should be included to allow
proper planning, budgeting and scheduling. This guarantees there is enough time to
purchase and receive materials needed to support the outage.
• The ORI (see Appendix P-5) requires a formal meeting of operations, maintenance, the test
section of the plant, and the Outage Team to review any known problems that should be
addressed during the outage. In many instances, operators and maintenance personnel
know of problems that hinder the operation and maintenance of the unit. A formal, open
dialogue meeting allows this information to be transferred and utilized to address issues

24
 that will ensure that the unit is returned to its best possible condition. One of the most
important and positive aspects of this exercise is that it will show the operations and
maintenance personnel that their views and observations are respected and that they are an
integral part of the team. They will even be more inclined to take ownership of the unit. A
unified relationship is also enhanced for future communication concerning the unit and
plant.
• All unit and equipment deratings, unit outages including forced and planned should be
reviewed. All tube leaks, their causes, repair method, and long term resolution, along with
known mechanisms of failure on similar original equipment manufacturer (OEM) units
should be discussed.
• All inspection records of last main steam line inspections, high pressure hanger inspection,
forged steam blocks, safety valve setting/calibrations, high pressure steam and turbine
instrumentation calibration/inspection should also be reviewed for action during the outage.
• The specialist in charge of the high energy piping should conduct a complete walk-down of
the unit one month before the unit shuts down and while operating at full load. The
inspection should have a detailed drawing or spread sheet for capturing data to show that
the high energy piping is within the acceptable limits of movement while hot. Likewise,
the same walk-down should occur after the unit has shut down and the piping is cool. If
interference is noted during hot or cold conditions, engineering expertise may be required
to determine if there are problems with the hanger setting, piping growth, etc.
• All pre-outage and post-outage data, inspections, and communications with OEMs or
specialists must be filed in the plant files, forwarded to the Plant Manager, central
engineering of NTPC and the Outage Manager for inclusion in the final outage report.

Before the inspection, the following should be addressed by the Outage Team:
• Has there been any change in coal quality, characteristics or supplier?
• From the last outage, were there any recommendations in regards to the boiler?
• Have there been prior boiler modifications or tube replacements and are they documented?
Is the correct drawing that depicts the tube material, diameter, and thickness being utilized
and available for reference?
• Has there been any change in the pulverizers, or coal yard preparation equipment?
• Has the unit experienced any abnormal operating conditions, any sudden temperature or
pressure swings, loss of drum level, loss of station service, or very large load swings?
• Have any tube leaks occurred since the last scheduled outage? What was the cause? Is it a
different or new mechanism for this boiler group? What was the cause? High risk
mechanisms would include: high temperature creep, hydrogen damage, acid phosphate
corrosion, thermal fatigue, weld defects, pitting, graphitization, short-term overheat,
corrosion fatigue, caustic gouging, stress corrosion cracking, copper embrittlement:
erosion/corrosion and weld defects.
• Since the last scheduled boiler inspection, are there any areas or parts that are nearing their
end of life? Are there additional tube samples that should be taken?

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• During the inspection, was there any evidence of tube swelling, particularly at dissimilar
metal welds?
• During the inspection, were there any areas of the tube metal showing odd or distinct
discoloration, particularly on the fire side of the boiler?
• When was the last time the boiler had tube samples removed for analysis for deposits inside
and outside of the tube?
• Upon inspecting the steam drum internals, are all of the baffling and steam separating
equipment in their proper place and are those should be tight actually tight? Was any
analysis and calculations of the solid material in the drum made?
• During the inspection, look for blistering, swelling, or warping of the tubes. Shiny areas
indicate polishing by fly ash. The path of the fly ash erosion should be followed to the end
of the flow and any final polishing or boiler damage to headers, refractory, shields, etc.
• Does the penthouse show evidence of seal wear that is verifiable through an increase of fly
ash in the penthouse or dead air zones that was not found during the last inspection?
• What is the condition of the boiler’s insulation, particularly in the penthouse? Has the
insulation fallen off the high temperature tubes found in the penthouse? If so, the
deterioration of this insulation will eventually lead to long term overheating and creep of
the boiler support steel and hanger rods in this area of the boiler. Long term damage will
occur to these support structures, resulting in damage to the tube metallurgy, which will
allow the boiler tubes to sag, shortening the life of the tubes. Tube failures may occur in
this area and may take longer to repair because this is area of the boiler is normally very
hot, requiring a long cool-down period for repair.
• Has the boiler been mapped with regards to boiler headers/drum sagging or being level?
• Was an infrared camera used to map the boiler while it was in operation for hot spots, gas
leakage, etc?
• Has the boiler tube thicknesses in the water walls, burner areas, or direct impingement
areas of the fire ball ever been mapped?
• Do any of the boiler headers, steam line attachments or high stressed components
associated with the boiler require NDT to ensure no stress or temperature related failure
mechanisms exist? (Economizer headers or those that are exposed to gas flow in some
cases provide a means for fly ash erosion at the tube attachment of the header. Visual and
hand examination may be needed to ensure that a metal erosion is not occurring, or that a
baffle or refractory liner is needed to ensure component integrity).
• Have boiler safety valves been inspected and hydraulically pressure set within the last 10
years?
• Have the boiler safety valve drip pan drains been inspected to ensure that they are clean
and clear of debris? This ensures that if any liquid seeps from the valves or if leaks into the
pans occur externally, that the liquid level does not reach the outlet of the valves or their
joints and cause corrosion.
• Has the unit’s attemperation changed dramatically? Have there been changes associated
with the gas biasing dampers?

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 • Have there been water chemistry concerns, limits that were hard to maintain, or unusual
water chemistry parameters?
• Are the steam temperature and pressure from the boiler to the turbine per the OEM
specifications and recommendations?
• Have main or reheat steam piping hangers been inspected under hot and cold conditions for
proper loading and movement?
• Has there been any NDT inspection of main steam welds for cracks?
• On the superheat headers, has there been any inspection of the outlets of the headers for
cracks on the OEM welds? Has there been any past indication of a problem? If the units
are approaching 25 years of service or more, an inspection plan should be evaluated for
long term unit availability.
• Have the main headers, primarily those found in the heat affected zones such as the
penthouse, been baselined for sagging?
• In the penthouse, has the insulation been inspected and repaired as required to prevent high
temperature creep to the boiler components and structural steel? (Failure to inspect and
repair the insulation in this area can lead to long term creep damage to the components and
the subsequent sagging of lower boiler components due to their supports in the penthouse
weakening).

3.1.1.4 Inspection Procedures

Processes used by TVA for conducting their boiler inspections may be found in Appendix B-2.
Procedures and data sheets for the unit’s fan inspections, air pre-heater inspections, duct
inspections, wet bottom condition and other key critical components should be generated by the
plant or NTPC engineering department. All similar pieces of equipment at all plants within NTPC
should use the same inspection sheet for uniformity.

3.1.1.5 Safety Concerns

During the boiler outage, safety specialists/engineers should perform safety observations and
discourage safety violations such as outage personnel not wearing personal protective equipment
(respirators, face shields, etc.), failure to use fall protection, lack of scaffold handrails or toe
boards, etc. During any boiler inspection, repair, modification or large scale rehabilitation, the
primary safety concern is that of fall potential and falling objects. The outage plan should ensure a
safe boiler outage. Tube scaffolds inside the boiler enclosure allow access to water wall and
screen tubes. Scaffolds built up in the convection pass utilizing brackets or scaffold planks allow
easy walkway access and inspection (see Appendix B-4 for the TVA Scaffold/Work Platform
Procedure). Where tube element spacing is wide and enhances fall potential, it should be required
that full-body harnesses with lifelines and retracting cable devices be utilized to prevent personnel
from falling. Scaffolds and scaffold boards must meet industry standards. Toe boards must be
utilized to prevent slag, tools, boiler clamps, shields, etc. from sliding down the boiler arch tubes
and striking personnel working below. Additionally, steel plates should be utilized to provide an
overhead protection for those employees working in the lower slope tube area and wet bottom.

27
Lighting that allows employees in the boiler to readily see walkways, egress, and to effectively
and safely perform their work should be installed. Sufficient lighting should also be provided
outside the boiler for night-time work on the boiler. Spare bulbs or lights should be readily
available at the work area to decrease down time and maintain worker productivity.

Where a large amount of welding will be performed, it may be necessary to provide welding
curtains to protect other workers from welding flash and subsequent burns to their eyes. Welders
should wear protective arm and leg clothing, such as leather sleeves and aprons, to prevent
welding burns to their body. Hard hats with welding hoods and the availability of the correct
lenses for welding must also be available.

Educating all outage personnel and plant personnel about the requirements and dangers associated
with utilizing radioactive material in boiler weld and pressure part X-raying must be completed
before the commencement of the X-raying. Proper boundaries, flashing lights, boundary signs,
and safety personnel should be assigned to monitor the source and boundaries for possible breach.
Breaching the boundary and exposure of an outage or plant employee could pose a serious health
hazard that can result in death. While such a situation should not be expected, proper training is
required nonetheless.

Rigging for the removal and installation of new tube panels, tube elements, headers, down comers,
etc., must be engineered, approved and performed by trained personnel. Engineering calculations
must be used to ensure that proper lifting equipment is used to satisfy safety codes and safety
allowances based upon the weight of the component to be lifted.

Asbestos, arsenic, and red lead should be addressed during the scoping of the boiler outage
planning. If these are known to exist, proper planning should be performed before the outage
begins to control and remove these substances. If it is not known whether the boiler contains these
substances, then proper testing should be performed to determine if they exist and to what extent
they are found around the boiler work zones and components.

3.1.2 Boiler Inspection

Boiler inspection begins with (1) knowledge of the design and proper operation and maintenance
of the boiler, and (2) use of personnel who are familiar with the boiler history. Boiler history
should include: tube leak reports, past boiler inspection reports, and any past modifications made
to the boiler including a change in coal vendors or coal characteristics. Familiarity with the visual
signs of fly ash corrosion, long term overheat, short term overheat, coal ash corrosion,
misalignment of tubes, soot blower alignment, tube seal deterioration, soot blower erosion, and
failure at dissimilar welds are a few of the capabilities required for performing a good visual
inspection of the boiler. Inspection of the boiler drum and its internal components/parts and the
amount of material in the drum itself is also required. Sampling of the boiler tubes for deposits
and an analytical estimate of the total deposits for the entire boiler may be necessary. Boiler seals,
refractory, buck stays, roof seals, alignment steel, hanger rods, dead air zones, and penthouse areas
should also be inspected and digital photographs of each area should be made for easy reference.
As-found and as-repaired photographs will allow NTPC to map the boiler and its inspections and
repairs from one outage to the next. Infrared cameras should also be utilized to identify hot spots

28
and gas leakage or other avenues/pathways for heat or gas leakage from the boiler, duct work, or
expansion joints. Examples of TVA boiler inspections are included in Appendix B-5.

3.1.2.1 Boiler Visual Inspection

Visual inspection must be performed by competent qualified personnel. TVA utilizes craft
boilermakers, who have exhibited, through years of boiler repair, construction and maintenance,
the ability to inspect (by vision, touch and smell) the boiler, its tubes and other components, its
status and service capabilities and interpret this information and make informed decisions and
recommendations. TVA utilizes eight boiler inspectors in their corporate engineering offices.
These inspectors are primarily responsible for inspecting TVA boilers during scheduled outages.
They are also utilized during OEM boiler component replacements, boiler tube leak outages and
other boiler component work, which could include duct repair, air preheater modifications, boiler
wet bottom refractory repair, etc. TVA’s boiler inspectors receive two weeks of formalized
training per year. The training would include any changes to ASME codes, latest boiler inspection
techniques, boiler data analysis, such as Automation Technology Inc.’s (ATI)
(www.atinet.com/company) online boiler programs. ATI has two modules one for boiler
inspection and the other for boiler tube leaks. Additional information about this software can be
found on ATI’s website.

Note that OEMs can provide qualified personnel to perform boiler inspection. However, NTPC
should require verification of the experience and work history of the OEM personnel before
contracting for their services. Years of actual boiler inspection/repair and familiarity with boilers,
boiler processes and problem areas are required to perform a quality boiler inspection. A copy of
GUBMK’s (TVA’s partner) procedure for Welding, NDE, and QC manual may be found in
Appendix B-2.

Boiler inspection should be performed as soon as possible once the boiler is tagged, cleaned, and
scaffolding with adequate lighting installed.
• Correct, up-to-date boiler drawings showing the boiler elements, tube materials and
elevations should be provided for the inspection, and proper surface preparation for some
tubes must be performed for a proper inspection. Surface cleaning using air pneumatic
grinders or brushes should be utilized.
• Proper safety equipment should be worn by inspectors to protect their eyes, lungs, feet, and
hands. Coveralls are recommended. Body harnesses and safety lines are required in areas
where scaffolds or handrails cannot be provided. At no time should anyone be allowed in
the boiler without using the proper safety equipment.
• Visual examination is performed for the detection of fireside erosion and corrosion
problems, broken structures, attachments and hangers, slagging and fouling conditions, and
burner or atomizer malfunction. Tube gauging and dimensional checks can be used to
measure creep damage (swelling) and to check for misalignment. Visual inspection can
also detect color change or a pattern to the tube or tubes that indicate a temperature
excursion, wear pattern due to fly ash erosion, or a change in fireside corrosion. Visual
examination may also detect the impingement of a water or steam source, such as soot
blower supply steam, or water cooled spacers.

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 • Overheating and heat affected zones should be observed, as it is one of the most serious
causes of boiler deterioration. Tubes may become damaged by poor fluid circulation,
steam blinding or deposition of scale. The degree of damage will determine the need for
additional destructive or non-destructive testing. Swelling and discoloration are evidence
of overheating.
• Corrosion is one of the most common conditions in a boiler. Analyzing the scale of
corrosion can provide valuable information needed before a remedial action is taken. The
metal to scale surface metallurgy can also be tested to provide information regarding the
source of the corrosion. Large areas of corrosion in the boiler should be inspected by the
boiler inspector and ultra-sonic thickness (UT) measurements should be taken to determine
the remaining metal thickness of the boiler tube for safe operation.
• While pitting of the boiler tubes on a small or isolated area of the tube generally does not
weaken the tube, it can lead to future failures. Severe pitting across a large area or to a
significant depth should be investigated for the root cause and corrected.
• Exfoliation is typically found in the superheater and reheater boiler tubes, both internally
and externally, and occurs primarily during the cool down cycles of boiler operation. Once
this occurs, erosion of steam path components such as turbine nozzles and turbine blades
also occur. Tight superheat and reheat tube bends usually exhibit the first effects of
exfoliation in the form of tube leaks. Destructive testing, by removing the tube bends and
determining the amount of scale present and its chemical composition, can confirm this
phenomenon.
• Cracking, if observed, may be related to high stresses and usually initiates at the point of
stress concentration. Cracking may also be caused by welding. These cracks may occur at
fillet welds, welded attachments, and weld repairs. Manufacturing or construction
processes may also cause cracks. Operation of the boiler and its components may result in
cracking due to fatigue and cyclic flexing. Straight, sharp, open single cracks are usually
associated with very high stresses or decreased material ductility. Jagged edge cracks may
be indicative of ductile treatment or a separation of grain boundaries. Irregular shaped
cracks are often indicative of slower crack propagation. Multiple cracks are often
indicative of corrosion, stress corrosion, corrosion fatigue, thermal fatigue, or localized
trauma.

3.1.2.2 Root Cause Analysis

The purpose of a root cause analysis is to provide systematic methodology to identify component
failure, identify immediate remedies required to restore lost function, identify failure modes,
failure mechanisms and root causes of the failures, and to identify and implement replication
opportunities for solutions. Solutions include revisions or additions to processes/procedures,
preventive maintenance tasks, equipment monitoring, overhauls, and /or configuration changes
necessary to prevent this failure from recurring. These processes utilize fault tree analysis, quality
processes and “why” questions to arrive at possible root causes, with the determination through
investigation and facts instead of opinions. A team concept is utilized to identify the information
needed from the tests to determine the reason for equipment failure, any human performance
issues, and the ability and necessity of replication to all other similar equipment or plants. The
utilization of an NTPC Lessons Learned database will also allow the replication and availability of

30
information to similar units or equipment within NTPC to prevent similar events. TVA’s Root
Cause Analysis Procedure is described in Appendix B-6.

3.1.2.3 Inspection Report

During the boiler inspection, the boiler inspector should detail his inspections on prepared forms
depicting the boiler elements and components. Digital photographs, and measured NDT
dimensions should also be taken. When an inspected boiler area or boiler component is found to
have more than anticipated repair or damage, that information should be forwarded to the Outage
Manager as soon as possible for an assessment of its possible impact on the outage schedule and
budget. This could be labeled as a new and unanticipated work scope addition. The discovery
must be factored into the outage schedule, outage budget, and how it will affect the overall success
of the outage. Sufficient time and materials must also be allowed to repair or replace the damage,
preferably using certified welders and craftsmen to complete the work.

When inspection is completed, the boiler inspection report that includes the boiler’s as-found pre-
inspection condition, the list of work to be performed, and future recommendations, should be
forwarded to the Plant and Outage Managers. Within the list of work to be performed should be
(1) a category listing what must be performed during the outage before the unit can return to
service, (2) work that should be completed if time permits, and (3) work that should be carried
over and re-inspected for the next scheduled outage. Recommendations for areas of concern that
should be evaluated at the next outage should also be included. To help facilitate the procurement
process, the final recommendation section should include a listing of anticipated boiler tubes in
length of boiler tubing recommended, and the number of elements expected to be replaced. This
information should help the Outage Manager to plan the scope and budget for the next outage.

Tube samples removed during the boiler outage should be evaluated by a reputable company that
has state-of-the-art equipment and trained personnel to analyze boiler tubes and their metallurgy.
Test results should be archived in the plant files and included in the final outage report. TVA
utilizes its Chickamagua laboratories and Alstom’s metallurgy and testing facilities, both located
in Chattanooga, Tennessee, for boiler tube analysis. The final task for the boiler inspector is
prepare a verification report that addresses all of the work identified during the inspection was
satisfactorily performed during the outage, and includes a list of what work should be performed
and what areas should be inspected during the next outage. Appendix B-5 is an example of
TVA’s Bull Run and Widow’s Creek boiler inspection reports.

3.1.3 Boiler Overhaul

Overhauling begins with the preparation of the final detailed work scope that identifies the specific
tasks to be completed during overhaul.

3.1.3.1 Boiler Outage and Overhaul Work Scope Development

The Outage Manager will ensure that the various departments and sources within the organization
that have a stake in the outage and boiler overhaul have been interfaced with and their inputs
incorporated into the work scope. Typically, these inputs should include:
• Past boiler inspection reports and recommendations.
• History of all past failures, known wear and problem areas.

31
 • Operational problems.
• Pre-outage boiler walk-down inspection.
• Pre-outage boiler tests, infra-red scans, air leakage tests.
• Pre-outage performance tests, such as heat rate, air preheater performance, etc.
• High or low temperature steam data, attemperation changes or problems.
• Desired performance parameters required: boiler availability, steam temperature control,
boiler efficiency, boiler operability with differing coals, environmental compliance, tube
leak event reduction, replacement of boiler components due to wear or use better
technology for its components, or need for greater steam output following turbine and
generator upgrades.

The work scope for boiler overhaul should be clearly defined by needed or expected
improvements and their parameters, past inspections/recommendations, tube failure analysis, and
metallurgy tests or boiler process testing. These improvements may be in tube leak reduction,
better boiler efficiency, decreasing boiler process air/gas leaks, or increased steam control or
steam production. Once the work scope is defined, the detailed planning for the boiler overhaul
may be initiated.

3.1.3.2 Methodology
The components of the boiler that need to be replaced or repaired are first identified in the pre-
outage milestone report. Supporting information or technical data (specifications, material of
construction, fabrication method, acceptance criteria, delivery date on-site, etc.) should also
obtained from the plant procurement services. The availability of the tools and materials needed
to carry out the repairs or replacements, which includes the rigging, cranes, scaffolding, welding
machines, and tube cutting and tube preparation tools should be ensured. The manpower required
to perform the work projected in the pre-outage milestone report should then be checked against
the actual requirements based on the boiler inspection test results, which may have necessitated
final changes in the work scope.

The schedule, along with the work scope, will define skilled manpower requirements for the work.
This exercise will ensure that sufficient skilled manpower is available for the work, especially
during the outage season if several plants are down at the same time within NTPC or with
surrounding industry sites that utilize the same manpower pool. TVA utilizes this concept because
a number of its power plants are in competition with chemical plants and manufacturing or new
construction work during the boiler overhaul or scrubber construction periods.

A decision on who will perform the work can be made based upon the needs of NTPC. A request
for proposal (RFP) can be developed and made available to potential vendors once the scope has
been defined. The bid document should include specific requirements and expected results. It
should reference all applicable industry codes and requirements, as well as those specific to NTPC
and to India at large. Specific NTPC corporate requirements regarding safety and environmental
policy should also be included. Engineering of the boiler or other plant equipment components to
be replaced must be completed by NTPC or a qualified engineering or OEM company.

32
The bid document should also include specifications and drawings depicting cut lines for the
boiler component replacement, correct welding specifications to be used, welding rod selection,
any stress relieving procedures required with details, rigging points, the weight of rigging
components, any safety concerns, and technical field support. Required quality checks to be
performed on the new components from raw materials to finished dimensioned product with all
appropriate documentation should be included in the bid document. The bid should also include
the process used for foreign material exclusion (see Appendix B-7).

Once the boiler components have been awarded for manufacturing and a decision is made about
who will perform the boiler overhaul, the overall boiler schedule should be prepared, working with
the supplier of the boiler components and whoever will be performing the boiler overhaul.
The Outage Scheduler can then determine the top five critical paths of the outage. Typically, the
boiler or turbine work will be the top two critical paths. However, the breakdown of the schedule
will show what work in the boiler or turbine falls in the critical paths. This allows the Outage
Manager and the Outage Team to determine the type of improvements that can be made in these
critical paths to reduce their impact. This should be an ongoing exercise until the best schedule,
budget, manpower, and outage support requirements and supporting organizations have been
evaluated and determined to meet NTPC’s needs.

Detailed planning can now be performed by the boiler overhauler for the pre-outage activities,
such as selecting lay down areas, work areas at the boiler for tube preparation, break areas, rest
room areas, lighting requirements, and electrical supply needs for welding. Additionally, the tool
room location, rigging supplies, office trailers, first aid facilities, parking locations for the
craftsmen, and disposal plan for old boiler components should be decided. Once all of these items
have been documented and checked off, their incorporation into the ORI can be accomplished.
Assuming the boiler components and manpower needed for the overhaul are on-site and ready for
installation, the boiler can then be removed from service.

The detailed schedule should drive the outage work when it begins. Examples of Kingston Unit 6
Outage Schedule, a plot of the Kingston Unit 6 Boiler-Predecessors/Successors Plot, Widows
Creek Unit 8 Boiler Plate and Outage Schedule are in Appendix B-8.

The boiler is then removed from service and tagged according to NTPC requirements. A walk-
down of the boiler is then performed to ensure proper documentation of all pre-outage conditions.
(Examples of TVA’s Kingston Unit 9 and Unit 5/8 Shutdown lists are found in Appendix B-3).

An initial boiler tube leak check is done according to NTPC’s requirements for hydrostatic
pressure and valve/turbine configuration.

The boiler is then cleaned internally to remove any slag before workers are permitted inside the
boiler. This may be done by washing with water or by vacuuming. The boiler may be cleaned
externally based upon the corporate or plant guidelines relative to fly ash, coal dust, etc. to provide
a safer work environment for the employees and to prevent fire hazards. If the boiler casing
receives a wash-down, the auxiliary equipment attached to the boiler or surrounding the boiler
must be protected by plastic sheeting, tents, or covers, etc. In particular, electrical motors,
instrumentation, processors, computers or other sensitive equipment should be protected from the

33
water, fly ash and any other debris that could be washed down. The final elevation of the wash-
down, as well as other areas around the boiler, should be roped off with barrier tape to keep
personnel other than those performing the wash down out of the area. As the material falls to the
lowest elevation, sufficient personnel with proper safety equipment should be available to keep the
area clean. With the cleaning of the boiler completed, the boiler overhauler should inspect the
boiler for cleanliness before the installation of lighting and scaffolding begins. Boiler inspectors
should enter the boiler as soon as scaffolding and lighting installation is completed.

Internal boiler tube removal may begin, provided all safety and environmental requirements have
been met. The foreign material exclusion process must be strictly enforced and monitored during
the entire boiler outage. Foreign material that is admitted to boiler tubes, boiler drums, boiler
headers, high/low pressure steam lines, deareator (DA) tanks, high pressure heaters, etc., can and
will cause major damage to turbines/generators, boiler flow circuitry, boiler/turbine valves, and
boiler tubes. If neglected, catastrophic damage that will cause lost generation will result. Before
any craftsmen begin cutting and replacing tubes, it should be communicated to them that, if a tool,
nut, washer, or bolt is accidentally dropped down into a boiler tube, high energy pipe, or the
turbine, for example, it should be reported immediately so that it can be removed immediately.
Within TVA’s outage environment, any foreign material dropped and not reported, but later
discovered, can result in termination of appointment of the individual responsible.

The following activities are recommended to take place in the sequence in which they appear in
this document when performing replacements or repairs in the boiler.
1. Waterwall or roof tube replacement may now begin as the first element, according to the
drawings and technical requirements. In some instances, the external boiler casing may
need to be removed if asbestos or red lead is present. However, the presence of these
substances should have been identified and incorporated into the schedule.
2. Tube cut lines are identified by qualified engineers, boiler inspectors or OEM specialists
and marked. Craftsmen are then instructed as to the position of the cut lines, and the
general plan on rigging and removal of the old tubes from the boiler. Once tube removal
progresses, craftsmen may begin cutting for installation of the new tube components.
3. Quality checks of the tube cut lines, condition of the tube material to which the new tube
will be welded, as well as fitting of the new tubes, should be a continual process that
involves the OEM/partner and NTPC quality assurance personnel. GUBMK’s Quality
Control Procedure is available in Appendix B-2.
4. Typically, in U.S. utilities, a record of each welder’s performance at a power plant is kept.
Using metal stamps or quality assurance inspection, each welder is tracked to a specific
boiler location and adequate records kept as the NDT or X-raying results are received and
plotted against the performance measure. Weld statistics, such as number of tubes
prepared for welding, number of tubes receiving the first pass of tube weld, number of
tubes receiving last pass, and the number of tubes passing X-raying, as well as the number
failing to pass, should be kept on a daily basis and made available to the plant and outage
managers. Generally, a weld reject rate in excess of 5% is not acceptable in TVA. Any
rate higher than 5% or close to the 5% would be investigated to determine welder/s error/s,
the welding process being used, the welding position, ease of access to the tube to be
welded, preparation of the tube to be welded, evidence of foreign material or moisture,

34
 improper welding rods, or improper welding machine setting, or any combination of these
factors, are possible causes of the high reject rate. This data will enable the plant and
outage managers to track work completed versus planned in the outage schedule and
provide an accurate determination of schedule completion for this critical activity. If the
data shows that the OEM/partner is behind schedule early in the outage, work can be
rescheduled or additional work hours scheduled for normal off days to get back on
schedule. For outage planning purposes, use of the Primavera program allows for quick
determination of the percentage of work completed, critical path status, and projected
completion date, based upon current work progress and production rate, such as on the
boiler.
5. During the entire boiler outage, safety specialists/engineers should perform safety
observations. Safety violations such as outage personnel not wearing personal protective
equipment, failure to use fall protection, scaffolds without handrails or toe boards, not
wearing respirators or face shields when required, are but a few examples that should be
documented and immediately corrected.
6. As the boiler tube replacement progresses, the old tubes must be moved and temporarily
disposed of in the locations identified in the pre-outage plan to keep the areas around the
boiler from becoming congested and unsafe. Keeping the work area clean and well lit, and
providing easy access to the work area, will allow the employees involved in the outage to
be more productive, safe, and it guarantees easy access to the new boiler components.
7. As the boiler work continues with all the necessary quality inspections, quality
documentation, digital photographs of all activities including removal of old tubes,
installation of new tubes, tube alignments, tube shields, tube brackets and tube clamps, the
Outage Team can, during its daily outage meeting, initiate the process of testing the boiler
for final acceptance of the welding and boiler work performed. After the final welding job
is completed, tested and accepted, all necessary preparation for the boiler hydrostatic
testing should have been planned and ready to execute. The plant directive for boiler
hydrostatic testing should be reviewed and discussed with the unit operators who will
perform the testing. This may include pinning of pipe hangers, blanking of turbine valves,
and alignment of valves and vents on the boiler and turbine for the hydrostatic testing
process. The water chemistry requirements and amount of water for the boiler should have
been addressed and also anticipated.
8. When the boiler hydrostatic testing begins with the filling of the boiler, trained personnel
should be located external to the boiler to listen and watch for any external leaks. Once the
boiler is filled, the boiler pressure may be raised according to the unit’s operating
procedures and the hydrostatic testing followed according to the plant’s procedures. The
hydrostatic testing procedures used in TVA plants vary based upon the operating pressure
of each unit and OEM recommendations.
9. While all necessary inspections are being completed, any additional leaks discovered
should be inspected, the cause of the leak determined, and the leaks should be repaired, and
all duly documented in the outage report. Appropriate action must be taken by the Outage
Manager if leaks are found in old boiler welds or tubes, or in new welds or new boiler
components supplied and installed during the outage. The Outage Manager’s actions
should be dictated by the result of a root cause analysis to determine if it is an isolated

35
 event, poor quality tube material, or a boiler issue that was discovered during the boiler
inspections. The Outage Manager must also determine if it is an issue that will require a
change in the return to service of the unit, or one that may be addressed during the next
outage.
10. When the boiler hydrostatic testing is completed, the boiler inspector must perform final
inspection and acceptance of the boiler work. Then, the boiler scaffolding and lighting can
be removed, and any boiler lagging, expansion joints, boiler doors, and other boiler-related
components removed during the outage may be reinstalled. A comprehensive list of all
these components should be maintained to ensure that no component is missing or not
reinstalled. Operations personnel should begin regular walk through/down of the unit in
anticipation of its eventual start-up.
11. Pre-operation checks of the unit and its equipment may proceed based upon the release of
hold orders and the acceptance of the equipment from the outage work.
12. When it is time to fire the boiler, a walk-down by operations personnel, the Outage
Manager or his designee, and the plant engineering representative, is recommended, as is
one final inspection of the boiler to ensure that all light cords and scaffolds have been
removed, all boiler doors are closed, and all of the boiler lagging has been reinstalled.
Operations representatives should ensure that the safety valve gags have been removed,
and that any of the main steam piping has been set back to normal following the
hydrostatic pressure test. The walk-down should also ensure that no foreign material such
as trash, wooden crates, wooden boards or oxygen/acetylene bottles are located near the
boiler that would present a fire hazard to the unit during start-up and normal operation.
Examples of TVA’s Kingston Pre-Light Off Boiler Inspections for the Unit Operator and
Auxiliary Operator may be found in Appendix B-9.
13. Once all pre-operational checks have been completed and the remainder of the outage
work completed and released for service, the unit operator may be instructed to restart the
unit following NTPC’s cold start-up procedure. If boiler work involving the replacement
of the superheater or re-heater was performed, it may be necessary to install fine mesh
screens at the main turbine valves to prevent foreign material from damaging the turbine
and its components. This should be based upon the turbine OEM recommendations or
NTPC procedures. If the screens are installed, it will be necessary to remove the unit once
all the operational requirements have been met.
14. The next boiler overhaul activity is the evaluation of the boiler work. This is accomplished
with the boiler overhauler, the Outage Manager and appropriate members of the Outage
Team, the Plant Manager, and engineering and NTPC corporate representatives. The
criteria to be used for evaluation should have been planned in advance. Such criteria
should include, at a minimum, safety, environmental, schedule compliance, and budget
compliance. This process should be conducted in a positive atmosphere to preserve
cooperation, teamwork, and partnership for future outages.
15. The final activity is the preparation of the comprehensive final outage report that
documents the entire process for distribution within NTPC.

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3.1.3.3 Contract Services Utilized During a Boiler Outage
The use of partners, OEMs or specialty companies during a boiler outage should be considered by
NTPC. Examples could include the work to be performed during component replacement such as
lower slope tube panels, entire or partial superheat/reheat element replacement, replacement of the
economizer section or its header. Specialty companies could include heat treating bore scope
inspection, NDT examination, weld X-raying, welding specialties (such as automated welding),
time management study of the outage work, scaffolding installation, rigging and tube
welding/header repair.

OEMs and partners who have performed this work in the past are typically better suited for this
type of work. They have developed cost- and time-saving techniques for the scope of the work,
utilized trained personnel, and utilized proper tools, welding machines, scaffolds and processes to
complete the work safely and efficiently. Utilizing the OEM or a partner also allows NTPC to be
made aware of new boiler technology in the areas of boiler tube and header materials, latest design
in boiler attachment engineering for lugs and spacers, the latest welding technology and welding
machines, etc. Typically, the OEM will also have learned from other similar boilers their
particular peculiarities and be able to anticipate them before the outage on the boiler begins. The
OEM typically will also have specialized tools, such as for the machining and preparing of boiler
header stubs for the welding of new tubes, the welding repair of headers, repair of boiler
expansion joints, or boiler support or structural steel. The OEM can also staff sufficient
supervisory personnel for the night shifts if required to ensure that quality work is performed to
meet the schedule, budget and safety goals of the outage.

3.1.3.4 Lessons Learned from a Boiler Outage

Once captured into a database, these lessons learned are now available for access by all other
NTPC outage and plant personnel across the NTPC fossil plant fleet. This database should be
shared with, in particular, with the Plant Manager, the Outage Manager, the Maintenance
Manager, the Operations Manager, and the Engineering Manager. The information should also be
incorporated into any future or present outage scopes. The information should also be presented to
any OEM, partners or specialty vendors who will be performing work similar to that contained in
the database.

Once the database has been established, any Outage Manager can readily review all items that
apply to his outage. This could be in the areas of lay down concerns, scaffold construction and
safety, making large or hazardous lifts of components, welding techniques or improper heat
treating, proper preparation of tube ends before welding, proper storage of new boiler tubes, etc.,
for example. This information may then be accessed by or forwarded to every individual involved
with the outage for their knowledge and incorporation into their work packages and subsequent
work. Another way to utilize the Lessons Learned Database is during the outage itself. Categories
of pre-outage, boiler component removal or component installation, for example, allow the outage
personnel to emphasize to the outage workers the hazards or areas of improvement before they
actually perform the work. In the area of safety, this concept is particularly important.

One final application of the Lessons Learned Database is to incorporate it into every plant
operation or maintenance activity. TVA has found that the use of their database allows all of the
plant employees to utilize the same information across the entire TVA system. It also builds a

37
team concept in that each plant can add information from its own work process into the system.
The bottom line is that it allows the company to reduce costs, outage time, increase safety, and
increase productivity by learning from the past and making updated information readily available
to all who can benefit from it.

3.1.3.5 Training
In order for NTPC to develop the optimal system for planning and conducting outages across its
coal-fired power generation plant fleet, the following items are strongly recommended:
• A formalized training for outage planning, scheduling, budget and work packages.
• Primavera or other scheduling programs.
• Organizing and performing under an Outage Team concept.
• Formal training for all boiler inspectors and key outage personnel.
• Formal training on the proper safety aspects of scaffold construction, high load lifting and
rigging. Formal training of NTPC personnel on boiler inspection and inspection reports by
NTPC or OEMs.
• Formation of a Lessons Learned Database for NTPC for use by NTPC boiler inspectors,
outage, plant and engineering personnel.
• Boiler components, tube preparation for replacement and welding, proper welding rod
selection, welding codes, welding certification and NDT techniques should be covered.
• Training on boiler flow circuits for water and steam cycles. How the flow paths work to
produce steam, how the boiler receives prepared coal, how it burns and at what point does
the combustion take place. What are the effects to the tubes surrounding the burners, tilts,
etc? Once combustion takes place, what is the flow path through the convection pass,
through duct work, the air preheater, and on to the precipitator and stack? Where does the
waste product collect and how is it disposed of? What does the combustion process affect
if improper amounts of combustion air or fuel are loaded in the boiler? What effect does it
have on the boiler tubes, heat transfer, steam temperature control, air preheater
performance, or service? This information allows the boiler inspectors to evaluate the
physical signs from their inspection and evaluate the condition of other boilers within
NTPC.

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4.0 Turbine

4.1 Steam Turbine Degradation Processes

Turbine steam design types can be classified as impulse or reaction. The primary difference
between these machines is their steam path design. The impulse turbine takes the pressure drop
across the stationary vanes, referred to as diaphragms. A reaction turbine, on the other hand, takes
the pressure drop across the stationary and rotating blades.

4.2 Outage Work Scope Development Process

There are two fundamental approaches for scheduling planned turbine generator (T-G) and
auxiliaries’ overhauls. Utilities relying solely on their OEM recommendations tend to favor the
time-based approach. On the other hand, utilities with in-house T-G condition assessment and
maintenance expertise tend to favor the condition-based approach.

4.2.1 Time-Based Planned Overhauls

Utilities with limited in-house engineering staff tend to prefer this approach since it is generally
considered to be risk averse. OEMs typically provide guidelines for time (operating hours)
between overhauls (TBO) for major equipment. The OEM-recommended TBO has to be adjusted
for unit start/stop cycles. The downside to this approach is:
• It is usually more expensive than a condition-based approach.
• There are more frequent disassembly/reassembly cycles of equipment that may have no
indication of distress.
• Besides the added loss of generation and the cost of overhauling, there is the risk of
equipment damage through human performance (HP) errors. HP errors are a leading cause
of lost generation. Large U.S. utilities like TVA have committed significant resources to
minimize the impact of HP-related losses.

4.2.2 Condition-Based Overhauls

Condition-based overhaul (CBO) philosophy requires the utility management team to commit to
the development of critical thinking skills. These skills are necessary for understanding the root-
cause of degradation as well as the cause and effect relationships between T-G systems and the
components degradation processes.

T-G condition assessment is an ongoing process that is updated over the life of the units. There are
three phases to the condition assessment process:
1. On-line Condition Assessment
This process is the most challenging and requires establishing Fleet- and Unit- Specific
Health Status Indicators, referred to as unit Critical Indicators (CIs). Monitoring unit CIs
provides on-line information about unit performance, condition and potential threats to
generation.

NTPC needs to establish fleet-specific CIs in concert with the T-G fleet major equipment
OEMs and T-G consultants experienced in on-line condition assessment processes.
System design basis values, operating limits and their respective set points (SP) would
need to be established for each CI.

39
 Depending on the fleet/unit design and the unit state-of-art instrumentation, the unit-
specific CIs and their SP limits may need modification. For example, unit with shaft rider
probes for monitoring the T-G shaft vibration cannot provide shaft phase angle shift (∆Φ),
an essential CI for establishing changes in the T-G shaft dynamics.

An example of some typical system/component CIs, typical OEM recommended SP limits

and their cause and effect relationship to the unit condition are listed in Table 4.1.

Where applicable, utilities can either utilize the OEM-recommended CIs and their
associated SP limits or modify them to reflect their operational experience and level of risk
averseness. Collecting and evaluating the fleet data, and evaluating SP deviations and their
associated impact on unit performance, will provide the basis for the utility to improve
their fleet-specific SP limits.

2. Assessment During Unit Overhaul

Utilities usually conduct some level of component damage assessment during the
discovery and inspection phase of a planned or forced outage. During an overhaul
(planned outage) the condition assessment process should commence several weeks prior
to the unit shutdown. The T-G Overhaul condition assessment process involves the
following phases:
• Pre-Outage Shutdown Checks
• Unit Coastdown Checks
• Turbine Valves Hysteresis Checks
• Unit Disassembly Checks
• Unit Steam Path Damage Assessment
• Bearings Condition Assessment
• Generator Assessment

The assessment process provides information essential regarding system/component

condition, impact on unit reliability and the basis for developing the Run/Repair/Replace
(RRR) decisions necessary to effectively manage the T-G fleet.

Over the past decade, component damage assessment experts in the United States have
developed an in-depth understanding of the T-G component damage, potential root cause
of damage, its potential impact on the unit’s reliability and the basis for developing cost
effective RRR recommendations. These component damage assessment efforts have been
supported through a broad range of component specific studies conducted by various
consultants specializing in component damage specific issues. The Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI) is a significant player in this field by sponsoring technologies
targeted towards furthering the understanding of the root cause (RC) of the component
damage.

40
 A paradigm shift by many U.S. utility management teams is occurring to support and
encourage their T-G organizations to take an engineered approach to evaluating the
component damage, associated risks and the cost benefits of the available options. There
is a saying in the U.S. power industry that no one ever got fired for proposing an OEM
recommendation.

Outlined in Table 4.2 are typical T-G damage/degraded conditions, RC of degradation and,
where applicable, technologies utilized to establish root cause of failure.

Additional information on Condition Assessment Processes, discussed above, is reviewed

in Attachment – 1. Typical NDT equipment utilized for conducting condition assessment
processes is reviewed in Attachment – 2.

3. Assessment Part of T-G Forced Outage/Investigation

T-G forced outages (FO) are inevitable, however, they provide an excellent opportunity to
understand the root cause of the FO and form the building blocks of the RRR decision
process. Outlined in Table 4.3 are some high-profile T-G failures experienced at some
U.S. utilities, tools utilized to evaluate the RC of the failure, and RRR options developed
and implemented.

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 CI = Critical Indicator CI-SP = Critical Indicator Set Point CFD = Cubic feet per day
Cause & Effect for SP Deviation
System CI Typical
CI-SP Condition Probable Root Cause (PRC) Risk
H2 leak rate gradually Hydrogen Seals Leaking Forced outage
trending up Seals wearing due to poor oil condition H2 increases to unacceptable levels
300 to 400 to 500 to 1000 H2 regulators leaking H2 explosion
G Hydrogen Leak 300 CFD CFD Lube /Seal oil tank floats hanging up Unit derated
E Rate Generator cable penetrations seals leaking Decrease H2 pressure to control H2
N H2 leak rate ramps up Damaged H2 Seal System leakage
E rapidly Generator Upset resulting in seals unseating &
R 300 to 3000 CFD hanging up
A H2 regulator seal blown out
T
O Normal Increase of 25~100°C over Deteriorating CT/Bus connections Electrical fire resulting in forced
R Electrical System Thermal normal operating conditions Fouled connections (oil leak etc) outage
Thermograph Signature Loose connections Electrical fire causing H2 explosion
Signature 50 ~75°C leading to serious gen. damage
Gradual increase since last Indicates normal wear of HP nozzle and stages Drop in unit η
H unit OVHL ahead of 1st stage pressure tap Schedule HP overhaul – economic
P decision

T Deposits on HP nozzle and stages ahead of 1st stage Drop in unit η

U pressure tap No risk to HP reliability
R First Stage Unit Specific Gradual decrease and rise of Copper deposits that built up and peel off Schedule HP overhaul – economic
B Pressure pressure Water quality upset decision
I - Cyclic in nature Condenser leak – salt water cooled Will need to clean the HP throat
N passages of copper deposits
E

Blockage of HP nozzle and stages ahead of 1st stage Drop in unit η

Sudden increase pressure tap
Foreign objects (FO) jammed into nozzles
FO damage causing inlet passages to close
Schedule HP outage if there is more
than 20% drop in pressure
Condition could have damaged the
rotor blades and have a risk of in-
service failure

Table 4.1 Examples of Typical T-G Critical Indicator Set Points Cause & Effect of SP Deviation

42
 Component Degradation/Damage PRCs Technologies for RCA Typical R/R/R
HP Turbine Nozzle block vane cracks TFD Dye Penetrant Exam Cracks < 25% of airfoil
Steam Path Video probe Monitor crack propagation
Cracks >25% of airfoil
Conduct detailed assessment with OEM
input
Schedule replacement
HP/RH/IP Rotor cracks at disc-shaft TFD Dye Penetrant Exam Shallow cracks can be hand-blended
Turbine radii Hand excavate to Cracks > 3 mm
Rotors establish max depth Machine out using a complex radii
Crack depth gauge – not
reliable
HP/RH/IP Moderately worn tenon SPE Visual inspection Map damage
Turbine Cover tenon hole not Steam path audit - take Reassess at next outage - 30,000 hrs
Rotors exposed wear measurement
>25% tenon height
remaining

Severe tenon erosion SPE Visual inspection Map damage

Cover tenon hole partially Steam path audit - take Assess potential of in-service cover failure
exposed wear measurement If risk is high consider following:
< 25% tenon height Weld repair tenons and replace new covers
remaining Carefully remove covers and install fox-
holed covers
Install new blades

Table 4.2 Examples of T-G Component Degradation/Damage Potential Root Cause Technologies Available
for Root Cause Analysis (RCA)
SPE: Solid Particle Erosion TFD: Thermal Fatigue Damage HCF: High Cycle Fatigue PRCs: Potential Root Causes

43
 Catastrophic RCA Process
Failure
TVA Bull Run IP Document history of failures with
turbine 12th stage 6, 8 and 12 blade groups
cover failures All failed in < 3 years of operation
Independent blade code analysis of
12th stage bladed disc group
Process showed only an integral
blade group would work
TVA Cumberland LP L-0 blade failed in service
(CUF) LP L-0 stage TVA conducted independent
blade failure analysis of L-0 stage blades
All failure modes were assessed
including stall flutter and un-
stalled flutter
Process reviewed with OEM
TVA CUF BFPT Bladed disc analysis conducted
11th stage blade Analysis showed blades had
failure exhausted their fatigue life
Second tangential mode
contributed to shorter than desired
fatigue life
TVA Widows Creek Bladed disc analysis showed high
Unit 7 LP L-0 stage tenon stresses from 1st tangential
blade cover failure mode
Table 4.3 Catastrophic T-G Failures at U.S. Utilities – RCA Process – PRCs – R/R/R Options
Verified RC
Original blade design grouping was
inadequate
Analysis showed an integral blade group
would have a design life of >25years
A free-standing blade had adequate design
life, but caused severe steam loss
Blades did not fail from a design deficiency.
Stall flutter was ruled out as a failure mode
Un-stalled flutter mode showed the blades
could fail from this mode, provided the blades
had a initiation site at the base of the airfoil
Failed blade analysis showed a large pit at the
location indicated by the stall flutter analysis.
Blade failure analysis showed a fatigue failure
with beach marks indicative of slow crack
growth.
Several cracked blades were found that not
yet failed. All had beach marks.
Failure analysis showed cracked tenons
R/R/R Options
Redesign blade group for an integral blade
design
Solution could only be implemented in 2
years
For the interim period, convert the current
design to free-standing blades by removing
the cover
Replacement integral blade design
implemented in 2002
Return unit to service with 2 spare rotors
and refurbish the balance rotor L-0 blades
Refurbishing process involved removing
the fatigue damaged material from the
blade foil base (failure location) and
coating airfoil base with a nickel aluminide
coating to mitigate formation of pits
Replace 11th stage blades on all three
BFPTs
Remove all covers
Weld build up tenons and reinstall covers
Repairs have lasted over 9 years
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4.2.3 Developing Detailed Condition Based Outage Workscope

4.2.3.1 Base Workscope

Utility turbine specialists would have the prime responsibility of developing the T-G workscope
documents. The CBO workscope development process is a continuous process that needs to be
updated routinely. Upon completion of an outage, the Base Workscope should be established to
reflect the following:
• Routine turbine sectional (HP/RH/LP/Generator/Valves) overhaul scopes activities
conducted.
o Open/Clean/Close.
o Routine replacement parts – based on the unit history.
Turbine seals/gaskets.
Expected percentage (chart) of cylinder and valve body bolts and studs
damaged during removal.
o Expected repairs scheduled and executed during the overhaul.
• Include specific liabilities not addressed during the last overhaul.
o Identify expected repair scope at next scheduled overhaul.

4.2.3.2 Updating Workscope for Unit Operating History

Unexpected changes in the units CIs (Table 4.1) should be evaluated to gain understanding about
the unit’s condition. Root cause analysis should be performed to understand the impact on unit
reliability and the expected workscope necessary to address the condition. The Base Workscope
should be updated annually to reflect the change in unit condition. This approach provides the
basis for:
• Shifting (move up or delaying) the planned outage schedule and duration.
• Ordering long-lead items, such as turbine blades, to support the unit overhaul.
• Publishing utility fleet outage schedules and durations.

4.2.3.3 Finalizing Turbine-Generator Outage Workscope

The unit T-G workscope should be finalized one year prior to the outage. Workscopes should be
updated to reflect the degraded conditions found during the unit pre-shutdown walk-down and
during the unit coast-down. Examples of turbine-generator workscope developed for the TVA
Paradise plant, Units 2 and 3 are provided in Appendix T-1.

4.3 Long Range Rolling Outage Plan

Utilities should develop a system level Long Range Rolling Outage Plan (LRROP) (10~15
years) for addressing turbine, generator and boiler planned unit outages. This process is essential
for sound financial planning.

4.3.1 Developing a Draft Long Range Rolling Outage Plan

The first step towards developing a draft LRROP is for each plant to define unit-scheduled
outages (T-G and boiler) based on expected time between overhauls. Plants should use their
historical database and OEM recommendations. The utility system draft LRROP is an integrated
schedule that may need adjustment to reflect the following system constraints:

45
 • System generation requirements and goals.
• System availability goals.
• System labor (machinists, fitters, electricians, insulators etc) pool availability constraints.
• Specialty services providers’ ability to support the outages.

Since the above constraints are beyond the control of NTPC, it is necessary to update the
LRROP annually and fine-tune it for each outage season.

4.3.2 Developing a Working Long Range Rolling Outage Plan

Making adjustments to the draft plan for the following conditions develops the working LRROP:

1. Reducing Scheduled T-G TBO (Interval) to Reflect any Known Liabilities that need to be
corrected prior to the scheduled outage. This decision should be supported by a root
cause analysis identifying the risk to operation. Both the industry fleet data and OEM
recommendations should be taken into account when developing strategies for shortening
TBOs.

2. Reducing the Typical TBO Interval to Reflect Higher Than Normal Critical Component
Wear Rates (turbine blade covers, valve stems etc.) experienced in previous years of
operation. This condition can be compounded by unit startups, which impact the rate of
solid particle erosion.

3. Updating the LRROP Annually and Before Each Outage Season to Reflect the Following
Annual System Objectives and Constraints:
• System generations goals
• System availability goals
• System labor pool (machinists, fitters, electricians, insulators, etc.) availability and
constraints.
• Specialty services providers’ ability to support the outages

4.4 Outage Contracting Practices

(See Boiler Section 3.0)

4.5 Outage Planning Process

This section addresses the various elements of the T-G outage planning processes.

4.5.1 Developing Turbine-Generator Outage Implementation Costs and Schedule

Traditionally, the plants are responsible for developing and managing the T-G overhaul
implementation costs and schedule. The plants rely upon their implementer(s) to provide the T-
G outage costs and execution schedule.

At NTPC, the newly established Turbine Services Group (TSG) could be charged with the
execution of T-G overhauls. Until TSG establishes its internal T-G overhaul capabilities, it
would develop the outage costs and schedules by securing costs and schedules from OEMs and
other service providers pre-qualified by TSG. As TSG establishes its infrastructure for providing

46
T-G support services, it would integrate these with the services procured from its prime
contractors.

TSG would need to establish long-term regional alliances with various specialty subcontractors
and the OEM(s) for various services it intends to contract out. This process allows TSG to focus
on its key elements of the business and rely on its alliance partners to provide reliable, cost-
effective, knowledge-based engineering and technical support services. As TSG expands its in-
house expertise to undertake turbine valve overhauls and other key T-G overhaul support
services, it would reduce its reliance on its alliance partners and subcontractors.

Based on its business strategy, TSG may elect to subcontract the low-technology, labor-intensive
support services, and utilize its alliance partners for more critical, knowledge-based engineering
and technical services requiring in-depth technical know-how of T-G design, operation and
limits of acceptability.

The TSG process for establishing the T-G overhaul costs and schedule would typically involve
the following:
• Breakdown of T-G workscope into services to be provided by TSG in-house resources,
alliance partners and their subcontractors.
• In-depth discussions with its alliance partners and subcontractors to review their scope
and have each organization provide their costs and schedule.
• Collaborate with the OEMs and other strategic parts suppliers to develop the outage
spares parts list, cost and delivery schedule.
• Develop an integrated outage schedule with costs and review it with the plant outage
management team.

4.5.2 Developing Turbine - Generator Outage Schedules

4.5.2.1 Preliminary Turbine - Generator Outage Schedule

(Historical / Template)
TSG would establish plant outage schedules on a software platform, such as Primavera, which
can support outage schedule and manpower loading requirements.

In order to capture and build upon its experience, TSG should make it a priority to establish
templates for overhauling each of its T-G fleets. These templates would become the building
blocks for developing and customizing T-G outage schedules and provide valuable historical
data for activity durations and associated manpower requirements.

Typical T-G templates and their key components are:

a) Turbine valves overhaul modules by individual and groups of valves overhauled during
typical valve outages. Each module will include the following typical activities:
• Open, clean, close module - for each valve type
o Disassemble components, inspect and re-assemble
• Conduct valve repairs as these capabilities are added
o Valve head seat machining

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 o Valve seat replacement
o Valve seat weld repair and machining
o Re-sleeve valve linkage beatings

b) Turbine HP/IP/LP Sectional Overhaul Modules

• Turbine train (all sections overhauled during outage) open, clean, close activities -
excluding any major repairs
o Disassembly of components
HP, IP, LP couplings
Sectional cylinder, rotors and diaphragms
Bearings
o Component inspections
Rotors and diaphragms
Cylinders (outer and inner)
Bearings
Bolts, etc.
o Re-assembly of above cylinders
o Turbine train alignment
• Turbine sectional (HP, RH, IP, LP) open, clean, close modules - excluding any major
repairs
o Disassembly of each section as a stand-alone activity
Couplings
Cylinder, rotor and stationaries
Cylinder bearings
o Component inspections
Rotor and diaphragms
Cylinder (outer and inner)
Bearings
Bolts, etc
o Re-assembly of turbine section
• Turbine sectional repair and replacement modules
o Diaphragm repairs
o Nozzle box repair and replacement
o Turbine bearings inspection
o Rotor Repairs
Replace 1, 2, etc., rows of blades blades on hand
Rotor shaft straightening, etc.
• Turbine rotor and cylinder alignment
o Turbine sectional alignment
o Turbine train alignment
• Coupling alignment

c) Generator modules
• Generator open, clean, close module - without rotor removal
o Stator end winding inspections
o Generator hydrogen seal system inspection

48
 oGenerator bearing inspection
• Generator open, clean, close module - with rotor removal
o Stator inspections
o Generator hydrogen seal system inspection
o Rotor inspection
o Generator bearing inspection
• Generator rotor alignment
• Coupling alignment

4.5.2.2 Developing Turbine Outage Schedule

Adding the specific overhaul activities to the T-G open, clean, close templates develops unit
specific outage schedules.

4.5.3 Outage Readiness Review Process

TVA has effectively used the ORR process (details provided in Section 2.0) to track key
milestone activities of plant projects such as:
• Plant upgrade and replacement projects - inception to completion.
• Plant outages including boiler, T-G and BOP workscopes.
• Individual T-G outages and their associated projects, etc.

This process is very effective in identifying activities tied to the projects, their required
completion date, individual responsible and routine status. Management can focus attention on
the critical activities that have the potential of impacting the outcome of the project.

4.5.3.1 Typical Outage Readiness Review Milestone Schedule

(See Boiler Section 3.1)

4.5.3.2 Critical Activity Tracking Process

As a subset of the ORR process, some project managers establish Critical Activity Tracking
(CAT) processes as a vehicle to track activities that are critical to meeting the project goals.
Typical examples of activities tracked by a CAT process are:
• Reducing along-duration outage by a specified percentage to meet plant availability
target.
• Reducing generator rotor rewind duration from its traditional 35-50 days to 21 days.
• Securing critical parts for an outage.
• Setting up a process to ensure zero injuries, etc.

4.5.3.3 Establishing High Impact Teams

High Impact Teams (HITs) can be established to address critical activities identified for the CAT
process. Each HIT is self-directed, highly focused and has a team leader with considerable
authority to make decisions supporting the HIT goal. The HIT reports to the Outage Manager
and provides regular updates on their progress. The Outage Manager can reset the HIT goals if
he finds the goal is unachievable or can be further improved upon.

49
4.5.4 Pre-Outage Planning

4.5.4.1 Establishing Outage Site Teams

Site outage teams are established to facilitate the development of effective outage schedules and
ensure all critical activities necessary for the success of the outage are tracked and completed.
The Outage Team can establish a HIT on an as-needed basis to address specific issues that are
critical to the success of the outage.

4.5.4.2 Pre-Outage Mobilization

The outage management team and the outage service providers need to mobilize to the plant site
about 7-10 days prior to the start of the outage to effectively establish the site-specific turbine
generator processes necessary for the effective execution of the outage. A typical sampling of
these processes could include the following:
• Plant specific safety training requirements.
• Plant specific equipment lockout training for the T-G outage contractor.
• Plant/utility crane operator training and certification.
• Establish T-G lay-down plans.

T-G lay-down plans are critical to the workflow management during the outage. Well thought-
through plans minimize multiple rigging and can minimize crane activity impact on the outage’s
critical path. An example of a lay-down plan used for TVA’s Paradise Unit 1 major overhaul is
shown Attachment 3

4.5.5 Turbine-Generator Outage Tools and Specialty Equipment

NTPC would establish T-G outage tools and specialty equipment requirements based on fleet-
specific overhaul (open, clean, inspect, close) requirements and available technologies to support
these functions. This aspect of the best practices would be addressed by NTPC as it builds up its
T-G overhaul capability. It would be an integral part of the enterprise development and
management process.

4.5.6 Pre-Shutdown Checks

4.5.6.1 Pre-Shutdown Check List

Pre-Shutdown check lists are fleet-specific and are developed based on the OEM-recommended
set-points for the various T-G systems. They are monitored as part of the pre-shutdown walk-
down and unit coast-down. A typical pre-shutdown checklist developed for a General Electric
650 MW cross-compound unit is shown in Attachment 1.

4.5.6.2 Pre-Shutdown Walk-Down

T-G assessment engineers from the TSG and plant would team up to perform pre-shutdown
checks per the fleet-specific pre-shutdown checklist. Typical pre-outage shutdown walk-down
process steps and objectives are:
1) Interview plant operators to identify:

50
 • T-G system deficiencies that impact unit generation goals.
• Outstanding work orders that must be completed to support outage objectives.
• Discrepancies between planned auxiliary workscope and unit operating conditions.
• Scope changes necessary to address known deficiencies.
2) Walk-down T-G systems and identify:
• Specific deficiencies in the system components (pumps, servo motors, valves, bearings,
etc.) by comparing expected design values versus actual.
• Workscope necessary to restore T-G systems to expected design levels.
3) Review the as-found conditions with the team and validate against the planned workscope to
verify:
• Is the task part of the planned workscope?
• Would the condition be corrected upon executing the planned workscope?
4) Identify necessary changes (addition or deletion) to the planned workscope
5) Team processes changes and recommends changes to workscope.
6) Plant management team reviews recommendations and establishes final workscope.

As part of the pre-shutdown walk-down the team would evaluate the following conditions:
• Operating status of the unit auxiliaries.
o Lube oil system.
o Generator seal oil skid.
o Hydrogen dryer skid, etc.
• Record and assess the unit CIs.

In the event there is an unexpected change in the CI it should be evaluated to assess the likely
root cause for the shift and the potential impact on unit outage workscope. Typical CIs are listed
in Table 4.1.

51
5.0 Advanced Technologies

5.1 Strategies to Increase Time Between Turbine Valve Overhauls

Turbine Valve Overhaul (TVO) intervals are set by the OEMs to ensure safe, reliable operation
of the valves. OEMs establish the valve-to-stem bushing clearance to allow for 18-24 months of
operation between overhauls. For a base-loaded unit, as the valve stem clearance closes (due to
chrome ferrous oxide build-up) the valve stem can bind, resulting in a bent stem. This condition
can result in the failure of the valve to close properly for a steam-tight seal.

On the other hand, on a load follow unit, the valve stem clearance can open up due to oxide scale
being dislodged as a result of frequent valve stem movements. This condition results in steam
leaks past the valve stem.

The above conditions can be avoided by conducting the TVOs according to the OEM’s
prescribed Time Between Valve Overhauls (TBTVO).

5.1.1 Time Between Valve Overhauls

Time Between Valve Overhaul (TBVO) intervals are driven by the following key principles:
• Turbine valve stem and bushing surfaces exposed to steam will build up a hard, chrome
ferrous oxide (referred to as “blue blush”) that grows at a fixed rate for given valve stem
material. This oxide scale grows both into and out of the metal surface.
• This oxide layer forms on the valve stem outer diameter (OD) and their mating bushing
internal diameter (ID) surfaces. Over time, as the oxide scale grows in thickness, the
stem-to-bushing clearance will decrease.
• The design valve stem-to-bushing clearance is typically set at 0.15-0.2mm to ensure no
steam leak past the stem during unit operation. The TBVO is established based on the
expected rate of valve-to-bushing clearance closure due to oxide buildup. Typically, the
OEMs schedule for the TBVO is based on an expected stem-to-bushing clearance closure
to about 0.1mm.
On base-loaded units, if the TBVO is increased without any design improvements, the clearance
can reduce to zero, and result in valve stem binding. On load-follow units, the stem movement
will cause the oxide scale to exfoliate and, over time, there will be a localized increase in
clearance, resulting in steam leaks.

5.1.2 Typical Turbine Valve Aging Related Damage

As the turbine fleet ages, the turbine valve body experiences thermal fatigue and creep damage.
Thermal Fatigue (TF) damage results in shallow cracks in the valve body at the geometry
transition areas and valve seats. In most cases, the TF cracks in the valve body are not
detrimental to the integrity of the valve body and should not be ground out, since the TF cracks
would re-appear. In some cases, the TF cracks can progress deep into the valve body and may
need to be weld repaired. TF cracks in valve seats are usually caused by thermal shocks
resulting from cooler steam quenching the valve seats during a hot start-up.

52
Main stop valve (MSV) seat cracks, if severe, can impact the ability of the turbine to safely shut
down. Serious cracks in the control valve seats impact the unit operation and, in conjunction
with cracked MSV seats, can result in a runaway turbine after the generator is taken off the grid.
Turbine valve seat cracks are considered serious if there is risk of a piece of the seat, usually
manufactured from satellite or satellite overlayed, to break away and thus provide a significant
steam leakage with the valve closed.

Radial hairline cracks, on the other hand, routinely occur in valve seats. Radial cracks greater
than 12mm apart do not pose any serious threat of a piece of seat breaking loose. More closely
occurring radial cracks can result in pieces of the seat breaking loose and limit the valve to shut
off steam.

In order to ensure safe, reliable operation of the turbine train, all turbine valve seat cracks should
be carefully evaluated by damage assessment specialists and a run, repair or replace decision
made. On some valve seat designs, the cracked seats can be replaced without a major effort, and
these seats should be replaced whenever serious cracks appear that pose the threat for a runaway
turbine.

On some valve seat designs, the seats cannot be replaced without a major effort. Using
specialized tools can take upwards of 2-3 weeks to replace the valve seat. On many General
Electric units, the valve seats cannot be replaced without a very major effort.

In order to avoid significant outage delays, TVA partnered with an industrial welding specialty
firm to develop in-situ valve seat weld repair technology to refurbish these seats. The process
involves:
• Mapping the valve seat profile.
• Machining out the old, damaged stellite seat.
• Weld-buildup of the seat using Stellite® 21.
• Re-machining the seat to the original profile.

This program has been very successful and today it is used in utilities across United States to
restore turbine valve seats.

Turbine Valve Creep Damage (CD) typically does not impact the integrity of the valves, but can
impact their functionality. As the valve body creeps, it distorts radially to a larger dimension. A
1-2% creep elongation, which is within the material creep limits, can result in the following
conditions:
• Mushrooming of the valve studs, or
• Distortion of the valve head compression gasket seat face.

Both conditions can be restored to as good as new condition without replacing the valves. This
approach was pioneered by TVA and has been widely used by TVA and many U.S. utilities to
refurbish their aging valve fleets.

53
5.1.3 Strategy for Increasing Time Between Valve Overhauls
In support of increasing TBVOs, NTPC should conduct a condition assessment of their turbine
valve fleet. As discussed in Section 4.1.2, turbine valves age from creep damage and can
experience thermal fatigue damage that can impact the reliable operation of the turbine train.
Prior to attempting to increase the TBVO, it is imperative that any valve reliability issues be
addressed. Failure to do so will offset any technology enhancements made to increase TBVO.
The key strategy to increase the TBVO is to select valve stem and bushing material with the
following improvements over the original material properties:
• Select materials with significantly low oxidation rate – less than 10% of original material.
• The selected material should have a 25% or higher creep rupture strength over the original
material to ensure the valve stem does not lose its creep strength and bend over the
extended TBVO.
• In the event the valve stem/disc is experiencing solid particle erosion (SPE) damage, the
following approach can be taken:
o Select material with higher SPE resistance. Note: materials exhibiting higher
creep rupture strength usually have a lower resistance to SPE damage.
o Install SPE-resistant surface treatment on the valve stem and disc surface
experiencing SPE damage. Two reliable options are:
• Applying an SPE-resistant coating, such as Gaterguard, or
• Applying a stellite weld overlay over the SPE-damaged areas.

5.1.4 Key Elements for NTPC to Increase Fleet Time Between Valve Overhauls
Outlined below are the critical elements of the strategy for NTPC to establish an effective
program for increasing the TBVOs:

• Tabulate the valve stem/bushing/disc materials utilized at the various NTPC fleet types.
• Establish by fleet type the TVO and replacement parts (valve stems, bushings, discs, etc.)
costs over three TVO interval cycles.
• Select the valve fleet type providing the maximum return on investment based on the
above fleet upgrade costs.
• Conduct a study to establish the oxide growth data for the selected fleet valve
stem/bushing and disc materials by:
o Researching industry database and selecting material type/s for which the oxide
scale growth data is available. Some adjustment may have to be applied to
establish the equivalent oxide growth values.
o If equivalent oxide growth data is not available, NTPC would need to sponsor
oxide scale growth tests to establish the fleet specific data. This is an involved
process requiring a test facility that can evaluate the materials exposed to the
valve operating steam conditions and stress for a 6-month period. The average
oxide scale growth can be established by measuring the oxide scale growth over
the test duration.

54
• Characterize surface treatment placed on the original valve stem/disc parts. For example:
o Stellite weld overlay.
o Case hardening requirements.
o SPE coatings.
• Establish the creep rupture strength of the NTPC fleet valve stem materials. If a direct
comparison is not available, an equivalent value can be calculated from the available
database.
• Select the upgrade material that provides a significantly lower oxide scale growth rate and
improved creep rupture strength.
• Select the valve stem surface treatment that protects the valve stem/disc integrity over the
increased TBVOs.
• Once the material and surface treatment have been selected, NTPC would need to work
with valve parts suppliers and an independent consultant for providing replacement parts.
This involves the following key steps:
o Assessing past valve parts failures and premature degradations. This process can
be accomplished in parallel with the valve material and surface coatings selection.
o Consult with valve parts specialists to develop design upgrades to ensure the new
valve parts do not experience premature failures due to the previously identified
failure mechanisms.
o Based on the existing valve part drawings, develop new drawings that reflect the
valve design and material upgrades.
o Incorporate any surface treatment requirements in the valve drawings. Depending
upon the treatment selected, the valve dimensions (prior to receiving the
treatment) will have to be adjusted.
o Manufacture at least two sets of the valve parts for trials at a selected fleet plant.
• Install the upgraded valve components during a routine valve outage and monitor the
performance by:
o Taking a valve outage per the original TBVO schedule.
o Disassemble the valve parts (stems, bushings, and disc).
o Measure the stem/bushing clearance and verify it against the expected change.
• Carefully examine the valve components for any damage:
o Valve stem and disc SPE damage.
o Bent stem.
o Any sign of galling at the stem and bushing mating surfaces.
o In the event there is considerable SPE damage in areas not previously identified, it
may be necessary to replace the valve parts with the second set.

55
 o Consult with the valve parts supplier and valve upgrade consultant on the
inspection results and make the necessary adjustments to the upgraded valve
parts.

Since the above process requires considerable subject matter expertise it is imperative that
NTPC engage a reputable consultant and valve manufacturer to execute these upgrades.

5.2 Strategies to Increase Time Between Turbine Overhauls

For decades, utilities adopted the time-based approach to turbine overhauls and overhauled all
turbine sections during an outage. This approach was promoted by the OEMs who had no
incentive to optimize maintenance costs or take an engineered approach that may involve some
level of risk.

The OEMs promoted the concept of inspecting the turbine steam path, especially the rotor
forging and blades, every 35,000 hours of service. This was based on their inherent belief that
rotor inspections were necessary to avoid in-service rotor failures. Even though there have been
relatively few turbine rotor failures in the world’s power generating T-G fleets the OEMs have
projected grave risks of operating rotors beyond the recommended overhaul intervals, which are
based on operating hours and unit start stop cycles.

In countries where the electric grid was not very stable and the grid frequency fluctuated with the
load demand, there have been considerable low pressure (LP) turbine blade failures of their last
two stages. The tall, last two stage blades, referred to as the L-0 and L-1 stage blades, were most
susceptible to in-service failures caused by large grid frequency fluctuations. These design
limitations exist on LP turbine rotor/blades designed until the early 1990s. With the advent of
advanced turbine blade design capabilities, LP blade designs have become more robust and are
more tolerant of the grid frequency fluctuations. As the Indian grid becomes more robust, LP
blade failures will continue to decline, especially within the NTPC operated fleet.

Knowledge of known liabilities that impact the safe reliable operation of a specific turbine fleet
is the foundation of moving from fixed time-dependent overhaul schedules to condition-based
turbine overhauls. Having transitioned to condition-based overhaul workscopes, utilities can
start to increase their TBTOs.

5.2.l Strategies Adopted by Utilities for Increasing Time Between Turbine Overhauls
Utilities in the United States and Europe have adopted various strategies for increasing their
TBTOs. In the early 1990s, TVA established a strategy to increase its T-G fleet TBTOs. This
has proven to be successful over the years and has been the basis of their reducing TBTOs by 25-
40 percent. Outlined below are the key elements of this strategy:
• At each scheduled overhaul, conduct a condition assessment of the turbine section steam
path.
• Evaluate all premature damage/failures and establish their root cause.
• Move to a condition-based overhaul approach versus the traditional time-based approach
and transition to turbine sectional overhauls as opposed to the traditional turbine line
overhaul approach.

56
 • Implement technologies that help to reduce in-service erosion damage of steam path
components from SPE. This is further discussed in Section 4.2.2.
• Implement technologies to reduce turbine rotor and stationary seal degradation, thereby
reducing steam leakage losses and slowing the degradation of the turbine sectional
efficiency. These technologies are further discussed in Section 4.2.3.

Reducing the SPE damage of the steam path and minimizing the damage to the turbine seals
during the unit start-up and shut-down is the crux of the strategy for maximizing the TBTOs.

5.2.2 Technologies for Reducing the Impact of Solid Particle Erosion Damage
SPE damage of steam path components impacts the degradation rate of the turbine sectional
efficiencies and reduces the available margin to safe operation of the steam path components.
HP and reheat (RH) sections of the turbine typically experience the maximum impact of SPE
damage, which results in a drop of their turbine sectional efficiency. OEMs and specialty
technology providers have developed technologies and strategies to reduce the ravages of SPE
on the HP and RH sections. Some of the successful approaches implemented by the utilities are:

Utilizing Fine Mesh Screens

Institute the policy of utilizing fine mesh screens for both the HP and RH stop valves after a
boiler overhaul during which major work has been carried out. The objective of the fine mesh
screens is to keep foreign objects, like weld beads and large volumes of exfoliation particles, out
of the turbine steam path. Units with a full blow-down capability would not need fine mesh
screens since the foreign matter would be discharged during the blow-down process.

Utilities in the United States have adopted the practice of utilizing fine mesh screens to minimize
the damage to the steam path following a major boiler tube replacement outage. The two most
common approaches are:
• The majority of utilities install a fine mesh screen onto the existing valve strainers by
welding the screen over the coarse mesh screen.
• Some utilities, like TVA, have purchased separate strainers with fine mesh screens for
their larger units (>500 MW).

Depending on the design of the fine mesh screen, it must be removed within 10-30 days of unit
operation. Long-term operation with fine mesh screens is not recommended since the screen
wire would fail in service from SPE and pieces of the screen could pass through the coarse mesh
screen, causing foreign object damage to the turbine steam path. U.S. utilities have optimized
the fine mesh removal valve outage sequence and can accomplish the process in 7-10 days,
breaker-to-breaker.

Upgrade the HP and RH first stage diaphragms to an SPE resistant setback design
SPE damage is caused by solid particles being bounced back and forth between the rotating
blades and stationary vanes. The impact energy (½ MV2) is proportional to the square of the
distance traveled between the rotating and stationary component faces. The set-back design
moves the diaphragm airfoils further away from the rotating blades, thereby reducing the SPE

57
damage. TVA and other U.S. utilities have installed set-back design diaphragms for larger units
(>500MW).

Utilizing SPE-Resistant Coatings

SPE-resistant coatings have been demonstrated to significantly reduce SPE damage. EPRI
conducted rainbow tests of various coatings and recommended their use as an effective approach
to reducing SPE damage. TVA started installing SPE coatings on turbine valve discs in early
1991. Based on their success and potential benefit of these coatings, TVA installed a coating
facility at its Muscle Shoals Service Center. TVA’s extensive experience with SPE-resistant
coatings has resulted in a standardized approach for coating the following steam path
components:
• HP and RH diaphragm vanes inlet face.
• HP and RH rotor covers to protect the blade tenon erosion.
• Turbine valve discs and valve stem areas experiencing severe SPE damage.

Utilizing Advanced SPE Resistant Steam Path Designs

OEMs in the United States and Europe offer modern designs with HP efficiencies of 93-95% and
a degradation rate of less than 1% per 8,000 hours of operation. TVA has replaced their large
steam turbine (>500MW) HP steam path (rotor and diaphragms) with these modern designs.
These advanced steam path designs utilize 3D rotor blade airfoils and stationary vane profiles
that have lower steam bypass losses and thus offer higher initial and sustained HP/RH sectional
efficiency.

Advanced SPE Resistant Diaphragm Spill Strip Designs

Upgrade turbine diaphragm spill strips to a scroll design that allows the SPE particles to pass
through without damaging the seals. (See Section 5.2.3.1.) These spill strip designs utilize one
the following strategies:
• Designs utilizing dual teeth spill strips have an unintended consequence of trapping the
solid particles, thereby causing SPE damage to the spill strips, blade covers and tenons.
Eliminate the down stream spill strip to reduce SPE damage. TVA has successfully
conducted this modification on most of their units.
• The upstream face of the spill strip can be coated with an SPE-resistant coating to
improve its life-cycle. TVA has successfully implemented this approach. This
technology, combined with the above approach to eliminating the trailing edge strip, is an
effective approach to maximizing spill strip life-cycle.

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5.2.3 Technologies for Reducing In-Service Damage to Turbine Seals
Turbine seals serve a key function in reducing the steam bypass leakage from one stage of the
steam path to another without performing useful work. As the seals wear, the turbine sectional
efficiency degrades. OEMs and specialty suppliers of seals have developed technologies to
reduce the in-service damage to the seals, thereby reducing the rate of drop of turbine sectional
efficiency.

Steam that leaks past the rotor blades without performing work results in lost energy and lower
stage efficiency. Turbine tip seal design clearances are established to minimize steam losses
without resulting in rubs during unit start-up and shut-down events. During these events, the
turbine shaft (coupled) transitions through its 1st and 2nd critical speeds at which the rotor shaft
experiences the maximum peak-to-peak deflections.

Significance of Turbine Train Critical Speeds (1st and 2nd mode)

OEMs establish the turbine shaft characteristics by performing critical speed evaluation. It is
essential to rapidly transition through the critical speeds. Failure to do so can cause significant
damage to the turbine seals and may cause a catastrophic shaft failure. OEM operating
procedures specifically identify these critical speeds and require the operators to rapidly
transition through these speeds to avoid shaft failure.

Typical Turbine Rotor Tip Seal Clearances

OEMs establish the rotor tip seal clearances to avoid seal rubs during the unit start-up and shut-
down. Turbine sectional seal clearances are a function of the individual rotor stiffness. Typical
tip seal clearances of 1-1.2 mm have been utilized by OEMs. These clearances can be reduced
for stiffer rotors that exhibit smaller deflection characteristics.

In-service damage to turbine seals occurs from two primary mechanisms:

• SPE damage of the stationary tip seals (See Section 5.2.3.1)
• Stationary and rotor seals (inter-stage and gland) damage from rubs incurred during the
unit start-up and shut-down events. (See Section 5.2.3.2).

5.2.3.1 Designing Turbine Tip Seals for Reduced SPE Damage

Tip seals tend to trap exfoliated oxide scale solid particles as they pass through the turbine.
These trapped solid particles wear out the seal tips, referred to as teeth, resulting in an increase in
the seal clearances that increases the steam seal leakage rate, (allows more steam to bypass the
stage without performing useful work) thereby resulting in a reduction in turbine sectional stage
efficiency.

There have been many approaches to reducing the SPE damage to tip seals, some more effective
than the others. Outlined below are some innovative approaches evaluated by TVA and other
utilities in the United States and Europe:

Utilizing Scoop Seal Design

Designing small scoops with holes through the seals facilitates the solid particles passing through
the seal with minimum seal damage. This technology was pioneered by Dr. Brandon and
referred to as the “Brandon Scoop Seal”.

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TVA tested this technology at its Paradise and Bull Run units. Examination of the seals during a
routine overhaul, 8 years later, revealed the seals had severely eroded around the scoop holes.
The technology was effective in passing the solid particles through the seals, but had unexpected
consequences. The elongated holes impacted the seal integrity. Even though the seals did not
tear out of the cylinder, there was serious concern about their integrity and these seals were
replaced.

The Brandon tip seal design with scoop/holes to pass the solid particles is not recommended for
use by NTPC.

Applying SPE Resistant Coating to the Tip Seals Upstream Face

SPE-coated seals significantly reduce the rate of SPE damage, thereby slowing the degradation
of the tip seal clearances. TVA utilized this approach on some of its GE fleet. Unfortunately,
the upgrade was implemented in conjunction with the scoop seal design and was discarded when
the seals with the scoops were removed.

Coating the upstream seal face with an SPE-resistant coating is recommended since it will reduce
the seal wear rate.

Changing the Tip Seal Design from Dual Tooth to a Single Tooth Design
Turbines with tenon/cover blade design utilized the dual tooth seal design by placing the seal
teeth on either sides of the tenon. This design traps the solid particles between the two seals,
which causes SPE damage to the tenon head and the seal tips. After bouncing around for some
time, the solid particles finally pass through to the next stage. By eliminating the downstream
tooth, the SPE damage to the tenon head is reduced significantly. The single tooth design is
more efficient in that it reduces the leakage rate across the seal. A single tooth has a reduced
vena contracta (narrowest central flow region of a jet), resulting in reduced steam leakage.
General Electric proposed this modification on their larger steam turbine fleet. TVA
successfully implemented this upgrade on its GE fleet.

Utilities can remove the downstream tooth without impacting the sectional stage efficiency and
with the added benefit of significantly reducing tenon erosion. This is a recommended upgrade
for implementation by NTPC.

Installing a Scroll Tip Seal Design

Creating turbulence upstream of the tip seal has the desired effect of reducing the steam leakage
rate. Turbo Parts Inc., a New York-based, U.S. specialty turbines supplier,
(http://mdaturbines.com/tp/index.html) successfully developed a seal design with dimples
punched into the seal face. This design, referred to as the TPI - Scroll Tip Seal Design, has been
demonstrated to be effective in reducing the steam leakage rate. The impact of SPE damage to
these seals has not been evaluated, but the experience review by utilities utilizing this design has
been positive and no measurable increase in seal wear rate has been recorded. Utilizing the TPI-
Scroll Tip Seal Design may reduce the SPE damage but, by increasing the stage efficiency above
the design value, it essentially supports the goal of increasing the TBTOs.

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TPI-Scroll Tip Seals are recommended as an essential strategy for consideration by NTPC for
increasing the time between overhauls.

5.2.3.2 Designing Turbine Shaft Seals to Mitigate Seal Rubs

During unit start-up and shut-down cycles, the turbine rotor shaft operates at critical speeds at
which the rotor vibration amplitudes are the maximum. Typical turbine rotor shaft seals, referred
to as gland seals, are firmly attached to the diaphragms and can experience rubs during start-up
and shut-down if the rotor shaft amplitude exceeds the seal clearance.

This condition is amplified in situations where the turbine cylinder has developed an out-of-
round condition or the rotor has a bow. These turbine sections can experience rubs even when
the seal shaft amplitudes are well below the seal design clearance. OEMs and aftermarket seal
designers have considered various approaches to overcome gland seal rubs, some more effective
than the others.

Outlined below for consideration by NTPC are various advanced seal designs that mitigate seal
rubs and which have been used by TVA and other U.S. utilities:

Retractable Packing Designs

These designs are most effective on impulse design units. GE, and after market seal developer
Dr. Brandon, developed their own versions of retractable seal designs. TVA evaluated both
designs and selected the Brandon design over the GE design. TVA was concerned about the
potential of the GE retractable seals getting fouled up by solid particles and thus failing to close
per design.

Dr. Brandon developed the first retractable packing design that kept the gland seals in their
retracted position during the unit start-up and coast-down. The seals remained in their retracted
position until the unit output reached approximately 20 MW. During unit shut-down, the seals
retracted as the unit steam flow dropped. The seals operated on the principle of the pressure
differential across the seal. As the steam flow/pressure increased, the pressure across the seal
increased, causing the seals to close. A more detailed explanation of the seal operations can be
obtained from the manufacturer.

TVA has effectively utilized the Brandon Retractable Seal design for its GE fleet. Some teething
issues with the design were resolved and it is today considered to be an effective approach to
mitigating gland seal rubs. TurboCare, (http://www.turbocare.com/index.html), headquartered in
Massachusetts, offers this seal design upgrade. TVA no longer utilizes the retractable seal
design.

Floating Seal Design

Another very innovative approach to avoiding gland seal rubs was developed by Turbo Parts
Inc., and is referred to as the Guardian® Seal. The Guardian® Seal housing utilizes two
Nitralloy floating seals in concert with the traditional high low “V” seal teeth. The floating seals
are positioned at the outer edges of the seal housing and have a lower clearance than the inner
“V” tooth seals. During start-up and shut-down cycles, the floating seals can come in contact
with the shaft, thus allowing the seal housing to move in concert with the shaft orbit.

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Unlike the “V” teeth, the floating seals have a rectangular cross-section that avoids concentrated
loading of the shaft. The floating seals have a rectangular profile manufactured from Nitralloy, a
wear resistant material with lubricating properties. This design feature allows the seals to rub
against the rotor without causing hot spots during the short periods the floating seals come in
contact with the shaft. The traditional “V” tooth seals have a slightly larger clearance and are
protected by the floating seals during unit startup and shutdown transients.

The Guardian® Seal offers another significant advantage over the retractable packing by
reducing the steam leakage past the gland seals. Two critical design features achieve this
function:
• Reduced floating seal clearance lowers the steam by-pass leakage.
• The floating seals’ rectangular profile – flat seal face – provides for a smaller throat
opening (reduced vena contracta) thereby further reducing the stage steam by-pass
leakage.

TVA and other U.S. utilities have effectively utilized the Guardian® Seal to increase the TBTOs
and improve the turbine sectional efficiency. Guardian® Seals are significantly more cost
effective than the retractable packing designs and offer advantages beyond their ability to protect
the gland seals during unit startup and shutdown transients. This seal design is recommended as
an effective approach to increasing time between overhauls and improving turbine sectional
efficiency.

5.2.4 Turbine Sectional Overhauls

Utilities engaged in the Time Based Overhaul (TBO) conduct Turbine Line Overhauls (TLO) of
all the turbine sections during an outage. Generator overhauls are at times included with the
turbine sections. As utilities move to the Condition Based Overhauls (CBOs) process, they have
the option of conducting Turbine Sectional Overhauls, since the turbine sections (HP, RH, IP,
LP) will not have the same interval between their TBOs. Sectional overhauls are usually adopted
by utilities that have a mature T-G assessment staff that has transitioned to a CBO approach.

There are some significant advantages of the TSOs over the TLOs. Some of the benefits derived
from years of experience of U.S. utilities are outlined below:
• Over a 5-10-year outage cycle, the TSOs are the lowest cost option and can significantly
improve the utility’s fleet Effective Availability (EA). Turbine sections can usually be
overhauled in conjunction with the boiler overhauls, thereby improving the plant
availability.
• Since only one sectional shaft is removed at a time, this approach minimizes the risk of
turbine line coupled shaft misalignment.
• Utilities can reduce their fleet Equivalent Availability Loss (EAL) by moving to the
TSOs.

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 • TSOs reduce the plant site outage manpower requirements. However, on a system level,
there may be an increase in the outage management staff.
• Turbine crane loading during a TLO can significantly impact turbine overhaul critical
path. During a TLO, the use of jib cranes and/or “A” frame cranes can minimize turbine
crane critical path impact on outage duration. However, moving towards sectional
outages can provide the greatest improvement in reducing turbine crane impact on the
outage critical path. Introducing the use of specialty jib cranes into the TSO plan can
further reduce outage duration and eliminate the impact of turbine crane on the
outage/overhaul critical path.

5.2.4.1 Time Between Turbine Section Overhauls

As discussed above, shifting from Time Based Overhauls (TBO) to Condition Based Overhauls
(CBO) provides for the largest improvement in the utility’s equivalent availability (EA).

There are no firm standards for Time Between Turbine Section Overhauls (TBTSOs) taken up as
part of broader strategy of moving to the CBO process. One can establish TBTSO targets based
on the industry experience. However, utility-specific TBTSOs should be developed based on the
following utility specific fleet-by-fleet issues:

Steam Path Degradation Rate

Turbine section steam path degradation lowers the turbine sectional efficiency. At some point in
time, the cost of megawatt loss due to lower sectional efficiency will be greater than the cost to
conduct the sectional overhaul. This would be the economic breakeven point to conduct the
turbine sectional overhaul.

Turbine Section Liabilities

Sectional liabilities impact unit reliability. The condition assessment process discussed in
Section 5.2.4 is an effective approach to identifying these liabilities and their potential impact on
unit reliability. There are some general guidelines for establishing turbine steam path component
reliability; however, these have to be customized for the specific fleet, based on its operating
history of failures and degradation rates observed over the years of operation. This task must be
conducted by turbine steam path damage assessment specialists. Leaving it to chance can result
in increased risk to unit reliability.

Typical OEM-recommended TBO durations for time based overhauls and target goals for
TBTSOs are outlined in Table 5.1.

The turbine sectional overhaul (TSO) economic model should consider the following elements:
• Direct cost to perform the overhaul. This should include cost for open, clean, inspect,
close and routine replacement parts like seals, studs etc. This cost should exclude
following:
o Costs associated with lost generation.
o Installed cost for capital parts (rotor, rotor blades, diaphragms, etc.) justified for
addressing a specific liability or component upgrade.

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• Cost associated with lost generation when the TSO schedule exceeds the boiler overhaul
schedule duration.
• Post-overhaul sectional efficiency recovery associated with:
o Routine repairs.
Replacement of damaged/worn turbine seals.
Cleaning of steam path to remove oxide layer impacting sectional
efficiency.
o Major component repairs to restore steam path degradation from SPE.
Restoring nozzle box throat openings.
Restoring diaphragm throat openings.
• Replacing degraded components with known risk of in-service failure.
o Replacing worn-out rotor blade stages (airfoils, tenons, covers).
o Replacing rotor with a refurbished spare rotor.
o Replacing diaphragms or nozzle box with new or spares.

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 Section TBO TBTSO -
Time Goal Comments
Based Condition
(X1000) Based
Hours (X1000)
Hours
Depending on the SPE damage experienced
at 45-50K hrs of operation, some SPE
mitigation measures would be required to
HP 45 - 50 80 - 100 support this goal.
Usually requires upgraded steam path
components.
1st stage nozzle
Blade tenon / cover design
Depending on the SPE damage experienced
at 45-50K hrs of operation, SPE mitigation
RH 50 80 - 100 measures would be required to support this
goal.
SPE damage to the RH section frequently
occurs as a result of degraded RH boiler
tubes that experience overheating during unit
start-up.

IP section η does not drop significantly over

time. Loss in IP η is compensated by the
drop in RH sectional η, which translates into
higher energy input into the IP section.
The IP section overhaul has to be justified
IP 60 100 ~ 120 based on the known expected degradation.
Increasing the TBO is greatly influenced by
the condition assessment process.

Table 5.1 Typical OEM Recommended TBO and TBSO

5.3 Technologies to Reduce Turbine Outage Durations

Prior to deploying specific strategies to reduce outage durations, utilities should establish their
T-G Fleet Specific Critical Factors (FS-CFs) impacting outage durations. FS-CFs are unique for
each fleet type and are based on the operating and maintenance history of the world wide
operating fleet experience. In developing this matrix one has to consider the conditions that
impact the sectional overhaul critical path. Each activity is critically evaluated to gain
understanding of the following factors:
• Is the activity part of normal teardown/assembly? If so, address the following:
o Activity duration impacting critical path.

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 o Evaluate the activity as a standalone or if it can be integrated with other activities.
• Can the activity duration be shortened by:
o Enhancing component design.
o Upgrading disassembly/repair/re-assembly tooling.

The goal is to develop the Reason for Improvement (RFI) for each critical path activity. Utilities
may need to establish High Impact Teams (HIT) to evaluate these options. In each case the HIT
will need to work with the OEM and technology specialists to evaluate the available alternatives
and conduct a cost benefit analysis.

• Is this activity a routine scheduled repair conducted during every overhaul? If so, address
the following:
o Impact of repair on the outage duration.
Repair options should include in-situ repairs or repairs conducted on-site or
repairs at an off-site facility.
o Can component design be upgraded to increase the run time between repairs?
Consider design upgrades that either address the root cause of the damage or
effectively slow down the rate of degradation.
The evaluating team would need to assess the above by engaging with:
• The OEM to assess available design upgrades.
• Non-OEM designs in service and their operating experience, particularly the world-wide
fleet experience of these designs.
• A world-wide repair specialist to evaluate available repair options to increase time
between repairs.
This information would facilitate the cost benefit analysis of the available alternatives.

• Is this activity associated with planned component upgrades? If so, address the following:
o Single unit upgrade
There are limited options for a single unit component requiring upgrade.
However, by critically evaluating the upgrade process and working closely with
the vendor supplying the upgrade (OEM or specialty vendor), one can reduce the
impact on the outage duration. The HIT team would need to develop available
options and conduct a detailed cost benefit evaluation.
o Multiple unit fleet upgrades
Whenever multiple units in a fleet are being upgraded, the following should be
considered:
• Procure a fleet spare and refurbish the old component off critical path for
installation into the next unit.

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 • The last unit component can be refurbished to generate a refurbished fleet
spare.
• The refurbishment process needs to be conducted to tight mating tolerance
limits to ensure future interchangeability of the fleet spare with all units in
the fleet.

5.3.1 Strategies for Reducing Impact of FS-CFs on Outage Durations

Utilizing High Impact Teams (HITs) focused on specific FS-CF issues has proved to be an
effective approach to minimizing their impact on outage durations. Brief discussions on
available strategies associated with potential improvements are provided below.

5.3.1.1 Disassembly and Assembly Process

The T-G disassembly and assembly process is a significant component of outage duration.
Outlined below are examples of available processes and technologies for reducing the impact of
key aspects of the disassembly and assembly process:

Hydraulic Coupling Bolts

Replace standard coupling bolts with hydraulic coupling bolts to reduce the coupling
disassembly/reassembly time. This approach saves TVA approximately 3 days per outage on
sectionalized overhauls.

Specialty Tooling - Hydrogen Seal Disassembly /Reassembly

TVA developed an innovative process utilizing holding straps to facilitate the disassembly and
reassembly generator hydrogen seals. This inexpensive innovative process saved TVA one shift
per the disassembly and reassembly process of hydrogen seals. Additionally, the process
minimized the potential for damaging the seals. This approach is depicted in the “Hydrogen Seal
3D Job Instruction Module”.

Specialty Tooling – Turbine Valve Gasket Compression Measuring

TVA developed an innovative turbine valve gasket compression gap measurement tool that
saved TVA one shift during the inspection cycle and provided accurate data, first time, thus
eliminating the need for re-checking and eliminating errors during installation. This tool is
depicted in the “Turbine Main Stop Valve 3D Job Instruction Module”.

Specialty Tooling – Measuring Oil Bore Readings

This innovative tool is designed to rapidly record accurate oil bore data during rotor
disassembly/reassembly, eliminating errors, thereby reducing critical path impacts during the
rotor assembly and coupling alignment process. It is estimated that this tool has saved TVA one
to two shifts during each turbine major outage. Shaft alignment errors have been greatly
minimized.

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5.3.1.2 Routine Repair Scheduled at Every Overhaul
TVA and various U.S. utilities have worked with specialty contractors to develop approaches to
reducing the impact of routine repairs required for restoring the steam path efficiency during
overhauls. Outlined in the following sections are some examples of successful approaches and
technologies adopted by TVA and other U.S. utilities.

5.3.1.2.1 Fleet Strategic Spares

Establishing Fleet Strategic Spares is the most effective approach to removing long lead repairs
from the outage critical path. Strategic spares can be restored to their original design limit, and
specific measures can be implemented to reduce the impact of SPE damage. This approach
could facilitate the component time between overhauls to be extended beyond the overhaul cycle.

Fleet Strategic Spares should be considered as an effective approach under the following
circumstances:
• When components wear rates are severe enough that repairs are required during every
outage cycle.
• Component cannot be repaired on-site and the impact on critical path, for conducting
repairs, is unacceptable.

Typical examples of Fleet Strategic Spares include:

• HP nozzle box.
• Reheat nozzle box.
• HP section diaphragms for stages requiring major repairs at each overhauls (fleet
specific).
• HP rotor for fleets greater than five units and ones requiring significant rotor work at each
HP overhaul.
• Stop valve drop-in valve assemblies.
• Control valve drop-in assemblies – where applicable.

The following key factors must be considered in establishing strategies for managing Fleet
Specific Spares:
• Have there been any equipment changes that will require unit-specific changes to be made
to the mating components of each of the fleet units?
• A strict refurbishment process would need to be followed to ensure the component
interface (mating surface) tolerances are not violated. Failure to maintain interface
tolerances would impact:
o Fleet Spare interchangeability.
o Outage duration.

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Technologies utilized for increasing time between turbine valve and turbine sectional overhauls
should be implemented as an integral part of establishing fleet-specific strategic spares. These
technologies are discussed in Section 4.0.

By deploying the technologies utilized to reduce SPE damage, the time between repairs could be
moved beyond one outage cycle, thereby minimizing the need for strategic spares by either
reducing the quantity required or eliminating the requirement altogether. Similarly,
implementing technologies designed to reduce turbine seal damage reduces the need to replace
the seals at every outage, thus reducing the need for rotor or diaphragm spares.

5.3.1.3 Planned Fleet Component Upgrades

Utilities routinely decide to upgrade large components to achieve improved reliability or increase
turbine sectional efficiency. Outlined below are examples of such upgrades and available
options:

Turbine cylinder repairs and generator stator rewinds

In both cases, it is important to think outside the box to develop creative strategies for the
disassembly/reassembly processes. Using HIT teams to seek out of the box solutions was critical
to TVA success in this area.

Stator Disassembly Process

In the case of stator rewinds, one could consider sawing off the end windings, thereby
significantly accelerating the disassembly process.

Stator Re-Assembly Process

Giving the prime contractor wide discretion with financial incentives to optimize the process is
an effective tool used by many U.S. utilities. Some U.S. utilities even have manufactured mock-
ups to test out specific options and choreograph activities.

Using the above processes a 1,100 MW nuclear plant generator rewind schedule was decreased
from the typical 42 days to 21 days, an industry best record.

Cylinder Refurbishment Process

Traditionally HP inner cylinder re-rounding is conducted at an off-site facility with heat
treatment and machining equipment to execute the process. Off-site shipping can add upwards
of two weeks to the process. A 400 MW HP cylinder re-rounding project was evaluated with a
goal of completing the process in less than 2 weeks instead of the typical experience of four
weeks. The project and candidate processes were carefully evaluated and the following
processes utilized:
• Completely executed the refurbishment on-site by creating an on-site gas/oil heated oven
to execute the stress relieve process and used specialized machine tools to reface the
horizontal joint.
• A creative tapered wedge process was developed to mitigate the need of expensive re-
rounding rings. The Arun Puri Process was successfully implemented, and the
refurbishment was completed in 11 days, which avoided impacting the outage schedule.

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Turbine/generator rotors, HP nozzle blocks, diaphragms, etc.
In situations of multiple fleet units, utilities should consider purchasing a seed replacement
component to offset the need to execute the repairs during the outage duration. Procuring a seed
replacement would allow the first fleet unit component (rotor, NB, etc.) to be replaced with
minimum impact on the outage. The removed component would be repaired at the OEM or
vendor facility and be available for the next fleet unit. This process will generate a spare
component which, if upgraded, would provide a System Fleet Spare. TVA has successfully used
this process to upgrade its fleet of generator and turbine rotors and has established spares for
these fleets.

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6.0 Generator Overhauls
Generator overhauls can be classified into the following categories:
• Generator inspection overhaul - rotor not removed.
• Generator inspection overhauls - rotor removed.
• Generator upgrade/repair overhauls requiring rotor removal.
o Stator rewind - full or partial.
o Stator core repair - requires stator winding disassembly with partial stator rewind.
o Stator rotor rewind/repair.
• Generator upgrades/repairs without removal of rotor.
o Hydrogen seal repair/refurbishment.
o Generator bearing repairs/replacement.

All of the above generator inspections/overhaul/repair activities can be conducted independent of

the turbine overhaul or integrated with the turbine overhaul. Usually, if the generator overhaul is
being conducted as a stand-alone outage, it is prudent to overhaul some of the turbine valves and
auxiliaries to ensure reliable operation to the next turbine overhaul.

6.1 Typical Time Between Generator Inspections

OEMs traditionally set generator inspection intervals at approximately 35,000 hours of
operation. At this interval, utilities conduct a thorough inspection of the rotor, stator and
auxiliaries. Experience has shown this inspection interval to be very conservative. Inspection
intervals should be based on the age of the rotor stator windings and an in-depth condition
assessment of the generator components. TVA and many other U.S. utilities have successfully
increased their generator inspection/overhaul intervals to 80,000 hours and beyond.

6.1.1 Increasing Time Between Generator Major Overhauls

Increasing time between generator major overhauls essentially is one of the most common
approaches to reducing generator disassembly/reassembly related human errors. Generator rotor
removal and installation is one of the most risky operation performed and has the highest risk of
causing damage to the generator stator windings and core.

Undertaking partial generator inspections that do not involve the removal of the rotor is an
effective approach to extending the time between generator major overhauls. Partial inspections
typically can be conducted by removing the upper half of the generator end bells, upper inner
end shields and rolling out the bearings. During partial inspections, the following can be
evaluated:
• Inspecting the bearings/journals.
• Inspecting hydrogen seals.
• Partial inspection of the end windings.
• Tightening the end windings, if needed.

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 • Inspecting the end wedges of the core. End wedges are critical to the tightness of the
stator windings and usually are the first to loosen.

This assessment information is very useful in establishing the condition of the generator stator,
rotor bearings and seals. Additionally assessing the generator critical indicators, such as
hydrogen consumption and any changes in its ability to carry reactive load, should be the basis
for establishing the need for a major generator overhaul.

TVA has successfully used this process to extend the generator overhauls intervals to over
80,000 hours. Some larger units (>800MW) have been operating reliably beyond 100,000 hours
without a major overhaul.

6.1.2 Generator Assessment Technologies

Typical technologies utilized for the assessment and repair of a Shawnee Unit 6 generator are
discussed in Appendix T-2.

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7.0 Best Operational Practices
Outlined are some Operational Best Practices adopted by TVA and many U.S. and European
utilities.

7.1 Overspeed Testing of Turbines

OEMs have traditionally recommended routine turbine over speed tests to be performed to
ensure the trip systems are functioning properly.

This approach has the unintended consequence of causing low cycle fatigue damage to turbine
components, especially in cases of units with operating hours in excess of 100,000 hours.
Components impacted by frequent (routine) over-speed tests are:
• Low Pressure L-0 (last stage) and L-1 blade roots.
• Generator tooth tops under the retaining rings (end rings).
• Rotor blade covers with worn-out tenons.

TVA and many world-wide utilities have adopted the following approaches for ensuring turbine
trip system reliability and achieving the OEM goals without causing damage to turbine blades:
• Conduct a simulated over-speed trip test, otherwise referred to as oil injection test. The
test procedure is unique for each fleet type. Simulated tests are conducted on-line once
each month. The trip mechanism (lever) is manually held to avoid unit trip.
• In addition to the oil injection tests, the trip devices should be checked using the
automatic turbine trip tester.
• During a scheduled turbine overhaul, when the front standard is disassembled, the
governor table should be send out to a governor test/refurbishment facility for checking
and setting the over-speed trip limits.

7.2 Safety Valve Testing

Plants are advised to test their safety valves during each boiler outage using a simulated test
executed with a hydraulic tester. This approach is safer and less damaging to the valve
components than any other approach.

7.3 Turbine Cylinder Stud Tightening Process

Turbine cylinder studs are designed for an average operating life of 200,000 hours. Over the
years, TVA has experienced turbine cylinder stud failures. Careful examination of the stud
failures, their hours of operation, number of tightening cycles, stud material and fracture
analysis, has narrowed the primary and contributing root causes of stud failures to be the
following:
• Over-tightening the studs is considered to be the primary cause of premature stud fatigue
damage leading to stud failure.

• Stud overheating during the de-tensioning and re-tensioning cycle is a significant

contributor to stud damage and premature failures.

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Based on many stud failure investigations carried out by TVA, it has adopted the following
process to mitigate premature stud failures:
• Discontinue the use of gas heaters for heating the studs. This process is prone to human
error, causing excessive local overheating and associated stud damage. The following
bolt heating technologies can be utilized in lieu of the gas heaters:
o 220 V electric bolt heaters that heat the bolt hole ID through radiation heating.
o Induction heating process that heats the bolt rapidly via an induction coil inserted
into the bolthole.
o 440 V bolt heaters that heat the bolthole using conduction heating. These heaters
have a close fit within the bolt ID to maximize heat transfer and make the process
effective. This system is just as effective as the induction heating process and is
considerably cheaper. Some U.S. utilities are replacing their low voltage heaters
with these high voltage heaters.
• Avoid stud over-tensioning by using the flats method that ensures pre-established angular
rotation of stud nut and ensures studs are not over-tensioned. The OEM maintenance
manual usually provides this information. Attempting to measure the stud extension is
usually a futile effort since this requires very precise data recording of stud elongation.

7.4 Rotor Blast Cleaning

Aluminum grit is the most effective media for removing oxide scale from rotor surfaces. Grit
blasting of turbine diaphragms and rotors is a critical path activity during a turbine overhaul. It
is necessary to have an effective grit blast process that achieves the desired cleanliness level in
the shortest time period.

TVA has installed a state-of-the-art grit blast facility at its service center. This facility has rotor
stands with motors that can turn the rotors at slow rpm for effective cleaning. Diaphragms are
supported on special stands that allow both sides to be blast-cleaned without the need for
repositioning.

NTPC should consider installing grit blast cleaning facilities at its regional service centers.

As a precautionary measure one should not use liquid media for cleaning rotors. Even minute
levels of chlorides in the liquid media can result in corrosion pits in blade root attachment areas.

7.5 Turbine Generator Lube Oil System

The Turbine Generator Lube Oil System (LOS) is the most critical system for maintaining the
integrity of the T-G systems. The following general guidelines are recommended for
maintaining the LOS:

• Routinely check the oil quality by taking a sample from the main and auxiliary oil tanks.
Sample should be drawn from a valve (tap) located close to the bottom of the tank since
the water/impurities in the oil tend to gravitate to the bottom. Taking a sample from the
top of the tank may provide misleading information.

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 • If the unit did not come with a lube oil system purification system, the plants should
consider installing a system that effectively removes moisture from the oil. Typical
systems are installed to process the oil in parallel (kidney loop) and should be designed to
process about 100-200 gallons per minute. These systems will pay for themselves by
reducing the damage to the turbine bearings.
• On larger units (>400MW), utilities should install an in-line bearing filtration system that
has in-line filters for each of the T-G bearings. These systems are designed to ensure
particles no larger than 5 microns in size enter the bearings.
• During routine overhauls, the LOS should be cleaned and LOS systems in the tank
checked for integrity. The following is process is used by TVA and many U.S. utilities:
o Pump out the oil to a storage tank.
o Suction the bottom sludge out into oil tanks.
o Inspect the tank for any foreign objects that may have come off the pumps and
valves in the tank.
o Inspect all pumps and valve to ensure there are no loose or missing bolts.

7.6 Boiler Hydrostatic Pressure Testing

Boilers are hydrostatic pressure tested following a planned or forced outage during which the
boiler pressure part boundary is violated. This process serves two primary purposes:
• Check the integrity of any boiler pressure part repairs conducted during the outage.
• Check for additional leaks besides the one that caused the forced outage.
• Identify any potential pressure part weakness that could fail during unit operation.

Units with known boiler tube degradation should not be tested to above 110% of rated boiler
pressure. Many unit operators limit the hydrostatic pressure test to 100% boiler pressure.
Certain boiler codes may require the hydrostatic test to be performed to a pressure greater than
110% of rated pressure.

7.7 Measuring Turbine Critical Pressure Indicators

Outlined in Table 7.1 are the typical turbine critical pressures that can provide valuable
information on the condition of the turbine section steam path.

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 Item Turbine Pressure Monitoring Objective
1 Turbine Bowl Pressure In conjunction with the first stage pressure,
provides the pressure drop the nozzle box.
2 Stop Valve Upstream In conjunction with the stop valve upstream
Steam Pressure pressure, provides the pressure drop across
the valve. Sudden change in pressure drop
is an indication of valve damage or
blockage.
3 HP and IP Turbine This information, in conjunction with the
Exhaust Pressure inlet steam pressure, is critical to
establishing the change in HP/IP sectional
efficiency.
Sudden changes are indicative of steam path
damage.

Table 7.1 Typical Turbine Critical Pressures

7.8 Boiler Inspections

TVA uses dedicated boiler inspectors with one lead inspector assigned to each plant. A total of
eight inspectors inspect all TVA boilers. The goal of TVA Inspection Services is to complete all
inspections within 2 weeks of the unit’s shutdown. During an outage season, these inspection
teams move from one unit to the next. The inspection process is designed to identify the boiler
liabilities that can result in a boiler tube leak or derating till the next outage. The inspection
process utilizes following NDT processes:
• Visual inspection to detect fly ash and soot blower erosion.
• Wall thickness measurement using “D” meter.
• MT or PT to inspect for header tube stub OD cracks.
• Water wall wastage using a “D” meter with data logger.
• Digital photograph documentation of damage.

TVA and many U.S. utilities have transitioned to an AWARE-based inspection process jointly
developed by TVA and Automation Technologies Inc (ATI). This AWARE-based inspection
process has the following salient features:
• Boiler inspectors utilize pick lists to select.
o Element and tube number.
o Primary damage mechanism.
o Wall thickness (did it violate minimum wall criteria).
o Repair recommendations.
• Hand-held devices are used to log the data.
• Inspection data is downloaded from the data logger.

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 • Reports are generated (pre-formatted).
• Process is web-based, located on the TVA intranet.
• All stakeholders can view the data as soon as the reports are posted.
• Inspection data (damage, repairs) can be tracked from:
o Unit’s history of inspections.
o TVA fleet inspection history.
o Comparing damage levels within the fleet units.

A sample of the reports generated at TVA’s Shawnee Unit Fall 2005 inspection is provided in
Appendix T-3.

7.9 Boiler Liabilities Matrix

Power boilers are subjected to extreme conditions (thermal/pressure loadings and
chemical/combustion processes) that impact boiler pressure parts and combustion systems
integrity. Over the years of operation boilers develop liabilities that must be corrected to ensure
reliable operation. Most plant operators find themselves dealing with more liabilities than they
have the budget to address them. In order to maintain the desired level of reliability it is
essential for the plants to prioritize their unit liabilities based on their risk to reliability and
safety.

A boiler liability matrix is an effective tool to document boiler liabilities and identify plans for
addressing them. Liability matrix is a living document that needs to update following each boiler
outage.

TVA has established liability matrices for all its units and utilizes these as a planning tool to
develop boiler outage maintenance work packages. Used in conjunction with an assessment
process these liability matrices are an effective tool to develop long range boiler component
replacement (partial or full) strategies.

A typical liability matrix developed for the TVA Bull Run Plant is shown in Appendix T-4.

7.10 Boiler Assessment Matrix

Boiler inspections are the first level of a boiler assessment process. In addition to the boiler
liabilities identified through the boiler inspection process one has to establish the remaining life
of boiler components subjected to creep, creep/fatigue, corrosion fatigue, hydrogen damage and
low NOx combustion control process.

Plants should establish assessment plans to establish boiler liabilities, identified in the liability
matrix, impacting component reliability, life consumption rate and remaining life. Assessment
plans are typically established for a specific outage to establishing the extent of component
damage and its impact on boiler reliability.

The assessment matrix should identify the component liability, assessment methodology, surface
preparation and the assessment sample size.

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Typical examples of assessment matrices for the Bull Run unit and Widows Creek Unit 7 are
shown in Appendix T-4.

7.11 Boiler and Turbine System Data Manager

TVA has transitioned to an AWARE Data Management System developed by ATI for:
• Recording the turbine generator assessments findings:
o T-G damage assessment data by section and component.
o Recommendations for outage.
o Long-term recommendations.
o History of damage/failures tracked over unit’s history and across the fleet type.
Examples of turbine condition assessment reports generated using this process are provided in
Appendix T-5
• Recording Boiler tube failures on boiler CAD drawings.
o BTFs are located on the boiler component CAD drawings.
o BTF location provides all related information.
Root cause of failure.
Impact on generation (MW lost).
Repair actions taken.
Metallurgical report.
o 2D view of BTF failures by:
All failures in a section of boiler
Failure mechanism.

7.12 Laydown Plans

Material flow is critical on all major boiler and turbine outages. This element of the process is
frequently neglected, failure to do so results in poor outage materials handling and multiple
staging of materials. Sound outage planning requires a laydown plan that reflects the outage
work flow during the disassembly, rework and reassembly phases.

An effective laydown plan minimizes the impact on the cranes utilized to move the work pieces
and depicts locations for power, air and water to support the various outage requirements.

Examples of typical laydown plans developed for the TVA Paradise Plant turbine generator
outages are shown in Attachment-3.

The Paradise unit 1 turbine generator outage involved the following major activities:
• Refurbishment of the front standard, mid-standard and # 2 standard foundations.
Foundation base plates were replaced.

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 • Removal of both the HP and RH turbine outer and inner cylinders to facilitate the
foundation restoration process.
• Installation of a new HP steam path, rotor and inner cylinder, requiring significant outer
cylinder machining to accommodate the new inner cylinder.
• HP and RH sections were completely rebuild on a stands and were dropped into place as
finished assemblies.
• Generator stator rewind and an upgraded stator cooling system requiring significant
generator machining.
• Refurbishment of three control valve seats and main stop valve seat. In-situ weld repair
process was utilized. This was not a planned activity.

Except for the machining of the standards all works were conducted on site and required an
effective laydown plan. The laydown plan was developed based on well choreographed work
flow process. The outage was executed flawlessly in 71 days.

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8.0 Road Map for NTPC to Undertake Turbine-Generator Overhauls
The backbone of the Indian power generation sector, NTPC has an installed capacity of
approximately 24,000 MW generated by a fleet of 31 plants, with 88 units located across India.
Its operational statistics would be the envy of most utilities across the world. NTPC expects to
add another 20,520 MW by 2010, making it one of the largest fossil fuel generating utilities in
the world. NTPC’s generation mix is shown in Table 8.1.

NTPC has a well-trained operations staff that effectively manages its growing fleet. It has
implemented operational and maintenance practices to achieve one of the highest plant
equivalent availability factors in the industry.

At present, NTPC relies on its OEMs to provide Turbine Generator (T-G) Maintenance and
Overhaul services. Additionally, the OEMs provide the expertise for evaluating the T-G
components and generating recommendations for repairs and replacement of components. The
majority of the T-G fleet repairs and replacements are conducted by or under the direction of the
OEMs.

The goal of the NTPC management team is to provide the Indian power sector with reliable
power at the lowest cost. As one of the largest utilities in the world, it is in a unique position to
take advantage of its fleet size and limited fleet types to establish an infrastructure for
undertaking T-G overhauls. This is a natural outgrowth of its desire to incorporate world-class
best practices for maintaining and operating its growing fleet.

The OEMs are not efficiently structured to provide timely, cost-effective support for NTPC’s
large operating fleet. Utilities have to routinely balance the risks of operating their fleet with
known liabilities. OEMs, on the other hand, are not in the business of taking risks on behalf of
the utilities. Their recommendations are frequently weighted by their desire to take no risk,
minimize repairs and sell spares. TVA, and other large U.S. utilities, recognized this dilemma,
and have developed an independent infrastructure to support their fleet condition assessment and
overhaul needs.

Undertaking turbine - generator overhauls is a very serious undertaking that will require a long-
term commitment by the NTPC management team. Owing to the complexity of the T-G
overhauls and technical know-how needed to effectively execute them, NTPC should consider a
staged approach for undertaking their T-G fleet overhauls.

NTPC needs to develop a Five-Year Strategic Plan that provides for a structured approach to
taking on T-G overhauls. The Strategic Plan will identify the organizational structure needed to
meet NTPC’s mission statement and provide a staged approach to acquiring the knowledge
necessary to overhaul the various components of the T-G systems.

Turbine valves are not as complex as the turbine sections, and are considered to be stand-alone
components. Many utilities that are not equipped to undertake major T-G overhauls have
established the capability to undertake turbine valve overhauls (TVOs).

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A prudent Strategic Plan for NTPC would build upon the success of its self-performed TVOs and
gradually establish the infrastructure to undertake T-G overhauls without compromising NTPC
T-G fleet performance.

8.1 In-House T-G Maintenance and Overhaul (M&O) Infrastructure

There is a compelling rationale for large utilities like NTPC to consider establishing an
infrastructure for undertaking T-G maintenance and overhauls. The rationale for having such in-
house capabilities is:
• Provides the building blocks for establishing world-class in-house engineering and
maintenance talent to:
o Provide the most cost-effective recommendations for fleet asset management.
o Develop and implement fleet-based asset management strategies.
o Evaluate and deploy world-class state-of-the-art technologies for:
Assessing component reliability.
Component repairs.
Component upgrades.
o Establish and monitor leading indicators to ensure fleet reliability.
• Establishes in-house condition-based fleet maintenance and overhaul schedules that are
not impacted by lack of OEM/external resources. This allows OEMs and other suppliers
to be utilized to:
o Effectively supplement in-house capability.
o Benchmark internal capabilities by contracting a percentage of T-G overhauls.
• Establishes regional centers for supporting T-G fleet M&O.

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 NTPC Generating Fleet (2005)
(Source-NTPC)
Fleet Type Fleet Size Generation

Classification Plants Gen Net

Rating Total Av. EAL
Mfg Licensee Op. Capacity Gen. % Of NTPC
MW Units (%)
Fuel Type Fleet MW MW
500 BHEL Siemens Coal ST 5 25 12,500 90% 11,250 46.60%
200 BHEL LMZ Coal ST 7 20 4,000 87% 3,480 14.42%
110 BHEL Coal ST 6 10 1,100 65% 715 2.96%
60 GE Coal ST 5 6 360 68% 245 1.01%
30 Coal ST 3 6 180 65% 117 0.48%
500 BHEL Siemens Oil GT-CC 3 6 3,000 90% 2,700 11.18%
300 BHEL Alstom Oil GT-SS 2 10 3,000 75% 2,250 9.32%
0 0 0.00%
Total (2005) 31 83 24,140 20,757 85.99%

NTPC Generating Fleet (2010)

Units Under Construction Added Capacity Net
Gen. % Of NTPC
Rating Expected Net Cap
Mfg Licensee Fuel Type Units MW MW
MW EAL Added
500 BHEL Siemens Coal ST 30 15,000 90% 13,500 24,750 65.95%
500 BHEL Siemens Gas GT-CC 10 5,000 90% 4,500 7,200 19.19%
300 BHEL Alstom Oil GT-SS 10 3,000 75% 2,250 4,500 11.99%
Other 0 0 1,077 2.87%
Total (2010) 50 23,000 20,250 37,527 100.00%
Table 8.1 NTPC’s Generation Mix

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8.2 Strategic Plan for Establishing T-G Maintenance and Overhaul Capability

8.2.1 Key Considerations in Developing the Strategic Plan

T-G maintenance and overhauling is a complicated business that requires specialized skills at
many levels. These skills can be built as knowledge-based building blocks that will require
NTPC to gradually phase in the various aspects associated with the T-G condition assessment
and overhaul capability. NTPC can either gradually grow this capability or speed up the process
through the acquisition of established service providers.

Unlike in the United States or Europe, outside of the OEMs, there are very limited T-G full
service providers to be found in India. NTPC would do best to develop this capability from the
ground up. Even though this may appear to be a slow process, it will provide a solid foundation
for becoming a reliable best-in-class service provider.

Owing to the inefficient transportation system in India, establishing Regional Power Service
Centers (RPSC) with comprehensive, field-deployable mobile services would improve the
responsiveness of the NTPC Turbine Services Group (TSG) for both planned and forced outages.

The NTPC strategic plan would address the following key aspects:
• RPSC Mission, for example
o High Value Add Supplier of Choice for NTPC T-G Fleet Maintenance
o Responsive Organization
The TVA Power Service Center prides itself on being able to respond to any
emergency at TVA’s fossil and hydroelectric plants within 24 hours. NTPC can
achieve this goal by strategically locating its RPSCs throughout India.
o T-G Maintenance / Overhaul Processes Technology Leader
• RPSC Investment Sources
The Strategic Plan should define the funding requirements for the various aspects of this
program. NTPC needs to carefully evaluate the funding options for the various phases of
the program. It is crucial for NTPC to have a fully-funded program to prevent faltering
due to lack of funds.
• The following are some sources for funding:
o Self-funded - This could be a combination of funding from NTPC revenues and
NTPC bonds.
o Special government funding.
o Private co-funded alliance.
• RPSC Regional Locations
Consistent with the NTPC mission statement, the RPSC locations would need to be
carefully evaluated to ensure the services can be mobilized rapidly. In order to achieve
this goal, the following aspects would need to be considered:

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 o Proximity to infrastructure (roads).
o Proximity to the NTPC fleet clusters.
• Milestones for Reaching Operational Readiness
o Selecting RPRC sites.
o Establishing scope of services to be provided and associated milestones - phased
approach.
o Establishing plant assessment services.
Comprehensive condition assessment services.
• Turbine steam path damage assessment.
• Generator assessment.
• Boiler pressure parts damage / life assessment.
In-service diagnostic services.
• Vibration assessment.
• Balancing recommendations.
• Plant systems performance assessment.
o Turbine section efficiency - enthalpy drop.
o Condenser efficiency.
o Boiler efficiency.
NDT Services
• Level II NDT {VT / MT / PT / UT}
• Level III NDT {UT, EC}
o Establishing RPSCs.
o Establishing turbine valve overhaul services capability.
o Establishing unit start-up services.
Valve line-up.
Vibration assessment and trim balancing.
o Establishing turbine sectional overhaul services capability.
o Establishing generator overhaul services capability.
• Strategic Alliances
o NTPC Fleet OEMs
It would be prudent for NTPC to discuss its Strategic Plan with its OEMs,
especially BHEL. As NTPC systematically implements its Strategic Plan, the
OEMs would continue to provide valuable support in the maintenance and

84
 overhaul of its fleet. BHEL and other OEMs could become significant Strategic
Alliance Partners as NTPC implements its Plan.
o Specialty Service Providers
Additionally, NTPC would benefit from discussing its Strategic Plan objectives
with non-OEM suppliers of specialized services. These discussions would be the
basis for establishing strategic alliances that can support systematic build-up of
NTPC capabilities.
o Subject Matter Experts - Advisors
In addition to the above alliances, NTPC would benefit from establishing long-
term relations with T-G subject matter experts. These experts would be the brain
trust NTPC would rely upon to guide its management teams engaged in the
implementation of the Strategic Plan.
• Organizational Structure
NTPC’s organizational structure will need to be adapted to meet its Strategic Plan goals.
The following capabilities would need to be addressed in order to meet the Strategic Plan
goals for in-house T-G maintenance and overhaul capability:
o T-G engineering specialists.
o RPSC T-G outage engineers.
o RPSC field supervisors.
o Specialty craft.

8.2.2 Establishing Turbine-Generator Engineering Specialist Organization

NTPC, like many utilities, relies on its OEMs to evaluate the condition of its T-G fleet and
provide the maintenance/overhaul services to maintain availability. NTPC T-G engineers need
specialized skills to perform the condition assessment and support Run/Repair/Replace decision-
making. In addition to the knowledge obtained from the OEMs and from published data, some
of the skills would have to be developed through close interaction with the subject matter experts
engaged by NTPC. NTPC will be making a significant investment into the development of this
capability. It is essential for NTPC to establish a sustainable technical cadre by providing the
financial incentive and prestige for personnel to remain technical and not move on to the
management cadre. Typical incentives considered by U.S. companies are:
• Pay structure compatible with the management cadre.
• Performance incentives.
• Extended retirement age as consultants.
Developing Condition Based Workscopes would be the first step towards establishing an NTPC
infrastructure for executing T-G overhauls. NTPC needs an organization staffed with the
following specialties:
• Turbine specialists with following specializations:
o Turbine rotor and stationary damage assessment.

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 o Turbine valve.
o Turbine controls.
• Auxiliary systems specialists
o Steam seal systems.
o High energy pumps - feed water pumps, condensate pumps, etc.
o Heat exchangers - condenser, HP/LP heaters, etc.
• Generator specialists with following specializations:
o Generator electrical systems assessment.
o Generator auxiliary systems.
Generator hydrogen seal systems.

Effective damage assessment is as much an art as it is a science, and involves taking calculated
engineered risks. The extent of risk one is willing to take is a function of the value of the asset to
the NTPC fleet. On large consequential units (key to the NTPC generating fleet) one would take
less risk than on the smaller units. It will take both structured and hands-on training under the
guidance of subject matter experts to develop the necessary skill sets to become an effective
damage assessment specialist. Damage assessment specialists have an in-depth understanding of
component design basis, materials performance and impact of component life cycle changes.

It may be beneficial to engage engineers with OEM experience and provide them specialized
damage assessment skill building. OEM engineers have good design basis knowledge but
usually lack in-depth understanding of component damage assessment. The United States has a
rich pool of professionals who would be ideal for training the NTPC organization.

Developing this specialization takes years and is the primary argument for establishing a
technical cadre that that parallels a management cadre. NTPC can locate its T-G Condition
Assessment Specialists at its central headquarters, while it may be effective to locate some of the
support services at each of the selected RPSCs, which would improve the responsiveness of the
organization.

8.2.3 Establishing Regional Power Service Center (RPSC) Organization Structure

NTPC’s RPSC organizational structure would need to be in-sync with the NTPC mission
statement, “Establishing an organization for delivering low cost, high value, responsive and
reliable service to NTPC plants”. This is a tall order for any organization.

The key to TVA’s success has been its history of a developing highly trained workforce,
supported by efficient processes for delivering reliable and responsive service. TVA’s
centralized Power Service Shops (PSS) was strategically located to take advantage of an efficient
transportation infrastructure to allow it to launch crews and equipment to any TVA plant within
24 hours. Since India does not have an efficient transportation infrastructure, TPC would benefit
from setting up Regional Power Service Centers (RPSCs) located in the proximity of NTPC’s
plant clusters. The proposed RPSC organizational structure could be a microcosm of TVA’s
PSS structure. The key elements of the RPSC organizational structure are shown in Figure 7.2.3.

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Note, the T-G Engineering Specialists Organization discussed in Section 7.2.2 is not shown in
this organizational chart.

87
 PSC
Plant Manager
Western Region

Engineering Manager Field Services Manager Shop Manager

Manpower Shipping
Planning & Outage Shop Support Mechanical Electrical Fabrication
Scheduling ENgineers Engineering Staff Shop Shop Shop

Region 1 Region 2 Filed

Schedulars Turbine Turbine Machining
Engineers Repairs

Filed Filed Filed

Generator Electrical Supervisors Supervisors Supervisors
Elect. Sys Geneneraor {Outage {Outage Craft
Engineers Transformer Managers} Managers}
Motors

Figure 8.1

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RPSC Engineering
Three critical components of RPSC engineering, which is structured to support the T-G outages, are:
• Planning and Scheduling
The planning and scheduling section has the responsibility for developing outage and shop
schedules. The outage engineers and the field supervisors provide outage overhaul details to
schedulers to develop outage overhaul schedule, critical path and manpower loading. After a
few outage cycles the schedulers will establish baseline schedule modules for standard outage
activities, such as:
o Turbine valve overhauls by fleet and valve type.
Disassemble, clean, inspect and re-assemble module.
Various repair and replacement modules.
o Turbine sectional overhauls by fleet and sections.
Disassemble, clean, inspect and re-assemble module.
Various repair and replacement modules.
o Generator overhauls.
Disassemble, clean, inspect and re-assemble module.
• Without removing generator rotor.
• With removing generator rotor.
Various repair and replacement modules.
o Bearing modules for each of the bearing types.
o Alignment modules.
T-G train, by fleet type.
Sectional modules.
Shop schedules for components shipped to the shop for repairs during the outage would be developed as
part of the shop loading and the field outage schedule.
• Shop Engineering
Shop engineers are responsible for establishing Job Instructions (JIs) for the repairs executed at
the shop. Shop engineers work closely with the T-G specialists and shop foreman to develop
reliable repair plans. Component repair/operational tolerances are established based on OEM
recommendations, experience and industry subject matter experts working with NTPC.
• T-G Field Engineering
Outage engineers are responsible for developing T-G component overhaul JIs for executing the
overhaul activities and providing on-site technical direction to the field crews. Developing JIs
for executing specific overhaul tasks is essential to ensuring reliable service with minimum to
zero human errors. Outage engineers work closely with the T-G engineering specialists
evaluating the component condition to develop and implement run/repair/replace
recommendations. Outage engineers also work closely with their procurement specialists,
OEMs, and other parts suppliers to ensure timely supply of parts.

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RPSC Field Services
Field service capabilities (personal and specialized tooling) will be developed in concert with the RPSC
Strategic Plan. RPSC management is encouraged to engage consultants (subject matter experts) familiar
with the requirements of the desired services to develop the specialized tooling requirements and
provide the necessary craft training. As discussed in Section 7.2.4, the use of 3D JI modules can be a
valuable tool for the training of the craft personal and field engineers.

RPSC Shop Services

The scope of shop services will depend on the RPSC strategic plan for both the field deployed and shop
repair services. These options are discussed in Section 7.2.5.

8.2.4 Turbine-Generator Job Instructions

Developing JIs has been an evolutionary process at TVA and at other U.S. utilities. Industries (utility,
automotive, aerospace, defense, etc.) are gradually transitioning from the traditional written job
instructions to 3D visually illustrated JI modules.

8.2.4.1 Traditional Job Instructions

RPSC outage engineers are responsible for developing JIs. Owing to their complexity, and the
specialized skills necessary for developing JIs, RPSC should consider engaging subject matter experts to
support the development of JIs and establish teams to review their content. JIs are considered living
documents that must be updated to reflect the outage lessons learned improved process information as
they become available. JIs should provide all the information needed to perform the outage overhaul
task. Examples of traditional JIs developed for the General Electric 200 MW steam turbine are provided
in Appendix T-6.

8.2.4.2 Three Dimensional Job Instructions

Industries using JIs have strived to reduce human factor related errors, a key factor impacting
component repair process reliability. Visual illustrations have always been a part of JIs, but the
availability of advanced three-dimensional (3D) animation software industries have led to the
development of improved JIs that rely on animation process to provide the user with clearly understood
process steps. In 2002, TVA started developing JIs based on 3D solid modeling technology. Some of
the key advantages of these 3D JI modules are:
• Serve as a valuable training tool for both outage engineers and field craft. Craft with no prior
knowledge of overhauling a component can readily become proficient in the process.
• Provides step-by-step instructions with visual aids to minimize human errors.
• Animations included in the module provide easy to grasp information on the assembly, inspection
and reassembly of the components.
• At each critical step, all related information (drawings, OEM bulletins, etc) is hot-linked to the
module for ready access.

Visually illustrated 3D JIs require some initial investment to develop but, once a prototype is
established, other similar modules can be developed and deployed with minimal investment. These
modules would be invaluable to NTPC as both a training tool and for on-the job instruction. 3D JI
modules have two components:

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 • A 3D Video Module
This provides an animated look at the assembly, inspection and disassembly process steps.
These modules are developed from existing component cross-sectional drawings and instructions
found in traditional OEM operating instruction manuals. They do not require detailed
dimensions or actual hardware. Modelers work in close concert with the outage engineers
knowledgeable of the disassembly/inspection/assembly steps. These video modules are AVI
files that require a 3D modeling software platform. TVA utilized AutoDesk Inventor®, an
AutoCAD product, as its platform. One can use SolidWorks® or other similar products. These
modules are available to the craft supervision and engineers to facilitate the training.
• Step By Step JI Module
This module is created from the above 3D video module. The step-by-step instructions are
provided in a power point file with the necessary sign offs to support QA/QC process. The file
provides both visual and step-by-step instructions for each of the process steps.

A few examples of these JIs for the GE 200 MW unit’s valve overhauls is provided in Appendix T-7).

8.2.5 Establishing Regional Power Service Center Field Services

Some utilities in the United States and Europe conduct the majority of their T-G repairs on-site using
portable machining centers. This approach avoids the shipment of critical components. The following
options are available to NTPC for structuring the RPSC field services:

Conduct Minimum Repairs On-Site

Under this scenario, the field services providers would be primarily engaged in the disassembly,
inspection, reassembly and re-inspection of the components. Valve assemblies could be disassembled,
inspected and re-assembled at the site or sent to RPSC. Valve body repairs would be accomplished on-
site using portable machining centers. All turbine rotor and diaphragm work would be shipped to RPSC
or its alliance partner.

Conduct Light Machining Repairs / Services at Site Using Portable Machining Centers
This approach would be suitable for the RPSC since its initial thrust should be to overhaul the turbine
valves and gradually transition to the turbine sectional overhauls. The following services should be field
deployed:
• Turbine valve overhauls.
• Turbine valves assembly, inspection, rebuild and re-assembly.
• Valve body repairs using in-situ machining and welding technologies.
• Valve head repairs.
• Valve seat repairs.
• Portable turbine diaphragm repairs.

This service can be started prior to taking on turbine sectional overhauls. The service could include the
following:
• Airfoil weld repairs.
• Diaphragm seals repairs - patch rings.

91
 • Diaphragm dishing condition restoration.

All heavy machining and electrical repairs should be carried out at RPSC.

Conduct Majority of T-G Overhaul Works On-Site

This approach is suited to the Indian road infrastructure so as to avoid long transportation delays. In
addition to the portable tooling for valve overhauls, this approach would require the use of extensive
portable machining centers for conducting turbine steam path repairs. These additional on-site repairs
would include:
• Rotor repairs.
o Re-blading and associated works.
o Blade tenon weld rebuilding, machining and installing new covers.
o Replacing rotor covers using:
Fox hole covers.
Tenon rebuild.
• Diaphragm repairs.
• Coupling repairs.
o Re-facing coupling.
o Line boring coupling.
• Cylinder re-rounding repairs.
• Generator rotor rewinds.

Highly specialized portable machining centers can be procured by NTPC. These can be customized to
handle NTPC fleet specific requirements. This approach utilizes RPSC as a facility for:
• Field Services portable machining centers maintenance and deployment.
• Developing specialized repair processes to be executed in the field.
• Training center for field services crews.

8.2.6 Establishing Turbine Valve Overhaul Services

It is recommended that NTPC take on TVO maintenance and overhaul services as a staged approach
prior to undertaking turbine - generator section overhauls. As NTPC starts to transition to condition-
based overhauls, it would schedule TVOs based on their condition. This would be essential if NTPC
adopts technologies to increase the time between turbine valve overhauls (TBVOs). Condition Based
Turbine Valve Overhaul (CBTVO) process allows NTPC to conduct the TVOs as stand-alone activities
or an integral part of the T-G overhauls. Specialized TVO tooling requirements would have to be
tailored to the fleet type and the typical damage expected for this fleet type.

As the turbine fleet ages, the turbine valve bodies experience thermal fatigue (TF) and creep damage
(See Section 4.1.2 for an in-depth discussion). Strategies for refurbishing the damaged valves are an
integral part of the TVO services and need to be addressed as part of the technology and tooling

92
requirements for NTPC’s TVO service strategy. NTPC needs to tailor the TVO services tooling and
capabilities, depending on the age of the fleet and fleet objectives for increasing the time between valve
outages (TBVO). In addition to the conventional tooling needed for the disassembly, inspection and
reassembly of turbine valves, NTPC should consider tooling enhancements that minimize human errors
and provide a significantly more reliable valve overhaul.

8.2.7 On-Site Field Machining Tooling Requirements

This capability requires the following:
Routine Turbine Valve Overhaul (TVA) Tooling
(Excluding seat and valve head repairs.)
Sampling of tools needed:
• High-torque tools (Power packs and sockets)
o Ensure safe removal of studs - minimizes damage to studs.
o Re-torque of studs to proper torque limits.
o Tools and jigs to remove and install valve bushings.
o Inspection tools to check valve stem condition.
o Tri-bar to check for alignment, etc.
Turbine Diaphragm Airfoil Weld Repairs
This capability requires following equipment and tools:
• Portable welding machines with foot-operated variable power supply to weld the airfoil sections.
• Pre-engineered diaphragm throat contour gauges.
• Portable grinding and polishing tools.

It is worth noting that one of the authors, Arun Puri, procured the above-listed from Europe for the Tata
TVA Group.

Turbine Diaphragm Seals Restoration

The diaphragms have both axial and radial seals. The seals can be weld repaired using the portable
welding systems discussed above. Using a temper bead weld repair process or an Inconel 82 weld repair
would eliminate the need for post-weld heat treatment, thus avoiding the need for large, portable stress
relieving ovens. Machining of the weld built seals would require a vertical turning lathe (VTL) center
for machining the seals after weld buildup.
It is worth noting that one of the authors, Arun Puri, procured the above-listed equipment from Europe
for the Tata TVA Group.
Rotor Re-Blading and Associated Repairs
This capability will require:
• Portable Lathe System (PLS)
The PLS would need to be capable of handling the largest rotor in the region. The lathe would be
used to:

93
 o Position the rotor during re-blading process.
o Facilitate the installation of the blade covers by peening the blade tenons over the covers.
o Machining the covers to the desired profile.

It is worth noting that one of the authors, Arun Puri, procured a 100-ton portable lathe for Tata Electric.
The lathe was designed and manufactured in Sweden under the supervision of the world-renowned
portable lathe designer, Len Henstrom. The lathe was designed to be transported over the Indian
roadways and can be readily set-up on the turbine floor.

Portable Low Speed Balancing System

Either a balancing attachment can be procured for the portable lathe or a stand-alone portable balancing
system can be procured. The portable balancing systems are designed to withstand the ravages of travel
over the Indian roads and can be set up readily on the turbine floor.

Turbine Cylinder Bore

This process requires:
• Boring bars – small and large sizes.
• Specialty jigs to fixtures.
• Specialty measuring devices.

Turbine Sectional Overhaul (TSO) Tooling

These requirements will be addressed in future discussions as NTPC moves on to turbine sectional
overhauls.

8.2.8 Repairing Turbine-Generator Strategic Spares

In the event that NTPC procures strategic spares, such as drop-in valve assemblies, bearing modules and
rotors, the RPSC shop could be set up to repair these components during off-peak times. Some of the
field crews could also be used to support these repairs during their off-peak times.

94
9.0 Reducing Human Performance Errors
Human performance (HP) errors are a significant cost to utilities and can be reduced significantly by
making structural changes to the organization’s approach to conducting its business. TVA and other
major U.S. utilities engaged in executing their T-G and boiler overhauls have significantly reduced their
HP errors by implementing very structured strategies focused at enhancing workforce performance. Key
approaches to reducing human performance errors are:

9.1 Providing Structured Workforce Skills Training

Utilities investing into workforce training reap the rewards of improved fleet performance and high
worker morale. TVA has established a training center equipped with tools, 3D training modules and
full-size turbine components to facilitate craft personnel skill training, all resulting in personnel
receiving certification for specific demonstrated skills.

9.2 Establishing Job Instructions

Establishing detailed step-by-step written procedures for all work performed by craft is the most
essential element of having a skilled workforce perform work with minimal errors. See Section 7.2.4 on
Job Instructions (JI).

9.3 Ensure Process Compliance

The workforce needs to clearly understand the goals of management goals for JI compliance and the
penalties for failure to comply. At TVA, craft personnel are instructed not to execute a process that does
not have specific written instructions. It is the task of the field engineers to provide these instructions.

9.4 Instituting a Corrective Action Program

TVA has implemented a Corrective Action Program (CAP) that facilitates the documentation of all
deviations and actions taken to correct the deviation. All CAPs are incorporated into the JIs to ensure
the errors are not repeated. CAP lessons learned are applied to all impacted procedures to ensure the
same errors do not repeat over time.

95
 Attachment - 1
Condition Assessment Processes
Pre-Shut-Down Checks

Pre-Outage Shut-Down Walk-Down Objectives

a) Interview plant operators for any known deficiencies in the T-G systems
i) Identify deficiencies that impact unit production goals
ii) Review outstanding work orders, SNOW lists
iii) Review the planned auxiliary workscope against the unit condition
iv) Identify changes in scope necessary to address know deficiencies
v) Identify if plant staff plan to address the specific deficiency

b) Perform a walk-down with plant staff of each of the T-G systems to establish their performance
compared to their design values.
i) Identify specific deficiencies in the system components (pumps, servo motors, valves,
bearings, etc.)
ii) Information gathered will be utilized to facilitate the rehabilitation process

c) Discussion with plant staff (boiler engineer, maintenance supervisor, etc.)

i) Review the as-found conditions with the team and validate against the planned workscope
ii) Is the task part of the planned workscope?
iii) Will the condition be corrected upon executing the planned workscope?
iv) Have the team identify the necessary changes (addition or deletion) to the workscope.

96
 Attachment 1 (Continued)

Operator Interview - Typical – TVA Colbert Plant

Systems: ALL Turbine Generator Systems

Objective: Interview Unit Operators for Their Input on Unit Performance Issues
Date: August 26, 2002
Item System / Issue Identified Corrective Action Plan
Component
1 Vapor • System is operating well • None required
Extraction • 10” of vacuum at the tank
System
2 Steam Seal • Regulator is operating well • None required
Regulator • Not been for some years

3 Crossover • Right side was replaced • One needs to investigate if this

Bellows • Left side scheduled for
replacement
• There has been only one failure on
F-4 units
• Failure was diagnosed as fatigue
initiated
4 LP Hood Spay • The sprays are operational
• Spray pressure indication in the
control room has failed
scope can be moved to a turbine
overhaul so the crossover
removal would be part of the
scope.
• With only one failure in the
system, it would be logical to
assume that there is a minimal
risk of bellows failure to the
next overhaul cycle.
• Restore pressure indication in
control room

5 MSV and CV • The servos are operating well with • Revisit the basis for the scope
Hydraulic no issues to overhaul all servos.
Actuators • Walkdown showed no signs of oil • Suggest the servos be drained to
leaks remove any water or sediment
• The oil analysis of 8-22-02 shows • This process should be
excellent oil quality conducted when the unit is
down and needs to be repeated
every six months.

6 Main Turbine • Main turbine TG does not stay • Condition can be corrected
(A&B Lines) engaged for extended periods during next outage --- Added
Turning Gears • TG motor wiring has a temporary scope
repair Complete permanent repairs to
the wiring.
7 Bearings • There are no significant issues • No action required
with the bearings Bearings can be rolled out and
inspected during the outage.

97
Item System / Issue Identified Corrective Action Plan
Component
8 Intercept valve • Limit switch problem • Correct the problem during
outage

9 Turbine Drain • These are all manual drains • Restore the reach rod linkage
Valves • Drain valves with the reach rods during the valve outage
are not operating. (MS, RHS,
Intercept)

10 Non Return • Have not checked this valve for a • Check out the valve during the
valve very long time outage

11 MS, RH and • There are no known problems with • Routine value overhaul
Intercept these valves
valves • These valves scheduled to be
overhauled during this outage.
• The plant is scheduled to stroke
these valves on 9/03/02

12 Control Valves • These valves were overhauled • Evaluate the potential of

during the Summer 2002
emergency outage
• The valves were returned to
service with no known issues
• The current plan calls for replacing
the valve stems/bushings with the
Incolloy material.
moving the value upgrade to
the next valve outage
• This will allow Colbert plant to
shift resources to other critical
areas

13 Main and • The DC oil pump remains on • This is a serious condition and
Auxiliary Oil and has been manually turned the pump must be restored at the
Pumps off next unit outage

14 Generator • The control room does not have • Investigate the potential of
correct hydrogen cold gas restoring temperature readings
temperature readings during the next outage
• All readings are too high
• This condition has persisted for a
while

15 Unit steam • There appears to be calibration • Restore temperature readings

temperatures issue with the steam temperature during the next outage
read outs
• These readings are too low

98
 Item System / Issue Identified Corrective Action Plan
Component
16 Unit 1 • Unit 1 is ready but has not been • Unit 1 oil analysis shows
TurboToc Oil operational. Plant intends to turn excellent oil quality. Prudent to
Conditioning on the unit after the outage have the unit operational.
System • Examining the filters after week
of operation should provide a
good understanding of any
contaminants in the oil.
• It would beneficial to tie this
Turbotoc to units 1 & 2. The
unit could be switched back and
forth at a weekly interval.

17 Unit 3 • Unit 3 Turbotoc had stopped on • Change filters and return unit to
TurboToc Oil low flow. service.
Conditioning • Typical cause would be a blocked • It would beneficial to tie this
System filter Turbotoc to units 3 & 4. The
unit could be switched back and
forth every other week.
18 Hydrogen • Hydrogen purity was reported to be • Have the dryer units connected
Purity good to provide a reliable approach
• The Hydrogen dryers bought for for maintaining hydrogen purity.
these units are not in service due
some power supply issue

Performed By: _Arun Puri and Kelvin Green Date __8/26/02__

Reviewed By:__________________________ Date ____________

99
 Attachment 1 (Continued)

Unit Coast-Down Checks

System Component Condition Monitored Comment

CI Design Actual
T-G Lube AC Pump - A Pump Startup Pr. Monitor after unit trip
Oil AC Pump - B
DC Pump - A
DC Pump - A
T-G #1 Bearing oil Pr Before Aux pumps
Bearings #2 Startup
Oil #3
Pressure Etc
T-G #1 Max Vibration Check for vibration
Bearing #2 Level spikes during coast
Vibrations #3 (read strip chart) down
Etc

100

Non-Destructive Test Equipment For Condition Assessment
Item Objective
Check for OD and near
surface (0.1mm) cracks
• Cylinder cracks
• Cylinder / Valve studs
• Valve body and internal
1 component cracks
• Rotor shaft cracks
• Diaphragms cracks
• Rotor blade damage
Low Cycle & High Cycle
Fatigue cracks
• Turbine blade roots
• Blade Airfoil cracks
• Blade root fatigue cracks
2 designed to inspected
ID and internal crack
detection
• Bearing Babbitt damage
3 • Turbine steam piping
• Valve body ID cracks
checked from OD
4 Condenser Assessment
• Condenser tube damage
• Tube Sheet damage
Condenser Assessment
• Condenser tube damage
Tube Sheet damage
Attachment 2
NDT Process NDT Equipment Comments
Preferred Method Magnaflux MPI equipment • More effective than
• Magnetic Particle • 4000 amp unit DPI
Insp. (MPI) • 6000 amp unit for rotors • Detects near surface
and diaphragms cracks (0.1mm below
surface)
DPI kits • Limited for surface
Alternate method cracks
• Dye Penetrant Testing • Process is slow.
(DPT)
Preferred Methods Magnaflux MPI equipment MPI process may not
• Magnetic Particle • 4000 amp unit detect very small edge
Inspection (MPI) • Hand held yokes cracks (< 0.05 mm)
• Eddy current process
using specially Eddy Current System EC coils designed to very
designed coils • Requires special probes shallow tight fatigue
cracks.
for small edge cracks in Probes used to detect LP
blade root face last stage blade root
cracks
Alternate Method DPI kits Owing to the edge effect
Dye Penetrant Testing and proximity of the
(DPT) turbine disc, the process
is not very effective.
Ultrasonic Testing (UT) • Krautkramer UT Equip. Straight beam tip
• Straight beam, crack o Digital Thickness diffracted signal is
tip diffraction method measurement effective process to size
• Shear wave crack tip o Digital Shear Wave cracks in valve / cylinder
diffraction method System bodies from OD surface.
• Others UT manufactures
Shear wave tip diffraction
provides is effective on
pipes where the signal can
be captured
Off-Line • Krautkramer Digital EC Both approaches are
• Eddy current process Systems with probe effective.
for tube damage pushers and data
assessment analyzers. The vacuum box test
o Wall thickness • Vacuum test boxes using various box sizes is
mapping made to fit condenser effective in isolating a
• Flood testing for tube tube pattern region of tube leak and
sheet & tube leaks then positively identifies
the leaking tube.
On-Line Helium Testers
• Helium testing prior to
shutdown Vacuum test systems
• Vacuum testing after
isolating a module
101
 Attachment 3
Laydown Plans

GE Tool Trailer

GE Tool Trailer
Rigging
Hole

Unit 1
Clean Room

Valve Work
Clean Room

Clean Room

G E Welding Services
Turbine Floor and
Mezzanine

LC-3 LC-19 LD-1 LC-27

102
 Attachment 3
Laydown Plans

1 Smoking Area 2

Break Area Tool Trailer TVA

Nuts & Bolts Hole to Nuts & Bolts

Storage Basement Storage
Cleaning Area Cleaning Area

BFPT
Work Area
And Laydown Unit 2

Unit 1 BFPT’s

Governor Laydown Area

Insulation Storage Area
Unit 1 Control Room
LC-53 LC-69 LD-2 LC-77

103
 Attachment 3
Laydown Plans

2 3

Office FES / GE
Office
CV Work Area

Temp. Staging
Area

Freight
Elevator Sand Blast Area
RH Rotor

RHT
“A” X-over U/H
Outer
Exciter

Storage
Unit 2 BFPT’s LC-116

“B” X-over
Machine Shop

104
 Attachment 3
Laydown Plans

3 4

Hole to
Basement

Unit 3
Storage Valves
Unit 3 BFPT’s

Unit 3
Valves

LC-315 LC-316 LD-3 LC-317

105
 Attachment 3
Laydown Plans

4
Legend

Crane Emergency Stop

Fire Extinguisher

Fire Extinguisher

110 Electrical Outlet

440 Electrical Outlet

Raw Water Outlet

Service Air Outlet

Telephone

Water Fountain

Lagging Structural Column

Door

Electrical Panel

Air Bottle

Safety Stretcher

Floor Plate ( Heavy Load )

Rail road Track

Fans LC-31

106
 Attachment 3
Laydown Plans

GE Tool Trailer

GE Tool Trailer
Rigging
Hole

Unit 1
Clean Room

Valve Work
Clean Room

Clean Room

G E Welding Services
Turbine Floor and
Mezzanine

LC-3 LC-19 LD-1 LC-27

107
 Attachment 3
Laydown Plans

1 Smoking Area 2

Break Area Tool Trailer TVA

Nuts & Bolts Hole to Nuts & Bolts

Storage Basement Storage
Cleaning Area Cleaning Area

BFPT
Work Area
And Laydown Unit 2

Unit 1 BFPT’s

Governor Laydown Area

Insulation Storage Area
Unit 1 Control Room
LC-53 LC-69 LD-2 LC-77

108
 Attachment 3
Laydown Plans

2 3

Office FES / GE
Office
CV Work Area

Temp. Staging
Area

Freight
Elevator Sand Blast Area
RH Rotor

RHT
“A” X-over U/H
Outer
Exciter

Storage
Unit 2 BFPT’s LC-116

“B” X-over
Machine Shop

109
 Attachment 3
Laydown Plans

3 4

RHT
L/H
Outer Hole to
Basement

New New
HP HP
L/H L/H
Inner Inner

Unit 3
Storage Valves
Unit 3 BFPT’s

Unit 3
New HP Rotor Valves
New HP Diaphragms

LC-315 LC-316 LD-3 LC-317

110
 Attachment 3
Laydown Plans

4
Legend

Crane Emergency Stop

Fire Extinguisher

Fire Extinguisher

110 Electrical Outlet

440 Electrical Outlet

Raw Water Outlet

Service Air Outlet

Telephone

Water Fountain

Lagging Structural Column

Door

Electrical Panel

Air Bottle

Safety Stretcher

Floor Plate ( Heavy Load )

Rail road Track

Fans LC-31

111