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Ethnohistory
Introduction
Map i. Map of the Amazon River Region West of the Rio Negro.
contact, the region supported large settlements along the major rivers,
as well as interfluvial populations. Both riverine and riverine/interfluvial
trade characterized the regional exchange system. This pattern was over-
laid by interregional trade (see, e.g., Raymond 1988). A three-way trade
pattern made the area extremely dynamic. Interregional trade was carried
out in the west between Andean peoples and those of the Upper Amazo-
nian tributaries (including the Napo River south to the Ucayali). To the
east trade networks existed between Tupian and other peoples of the Soli-
moes (the Amazon from the Peru/Brazil border to the mouth of the Rio
Negro) and those to the north. Thus materials flowed into and out of the
region in two directions. It was from these directions, also, that Euro-
pean goods were to be traded into the region after Spanish contact. The
early colonial documents offer a picture of continued dynamic regional
and interregional trade.
Why was trade, especially long-distance trade, so significant in the
Western Amazon in the precontact period? To answer this question, we
must look first at the issue of human/land relationships in Amazonia.
Much discussion has been generated in the literature on Amazonia con-
cerning the low carrying capacity of a region characterized by generally
impoverished soils, seasonal flooding along major rivers, scarce game re-
sources, and the occurrence of nutrient-poor rivers and lakes. In view of
such deficiencies, the archeological evidence for the pre-Hispanic existence
of dense populations in parts of Amazonia remains difficult to explain (see,
e.g., Meggers 197I, Carneiro 1974, Gross 1975, Lathrap 1970, Roosevelt
1980). An examination of ecological conditions alone may be insufficient
to suggest potential population levels.
In her work on Mesoamerica, Barbara Price has observed that larger
human populations could be maintained in a given region if people de-
veloped specializations, rather than maintaining generalized economies
(Price 1978: 235). If we apply this to Amazonia, knowing especially that
trade was significant in the region (Lathrap 1973, Raymond 1988), it be-
comes clear that trade, particularly fluvial/interfluvial trade in foodstuffs
and basic resources, would have had a positive effect on human carrying
capacity of the region. In particular, this would have facilitated the devel-
opment of the large settled populations noted by the first Spanish explorers
along the Napo and Upper Amazon (Amazonas and Solimoes) rivers.
This suggestion is made here to help illuminate the process of regional
transformation that occurred after European contact and to explain the
continued significance of long-distance trade networks. Inter- and intra-
regional ties became crucial in the postcontact survival of populations. In
areas of ethnic diversity, groups survived colonial pressures through flight
to allied territories. In other areas, where strong ethnic unity existed, suc-
cessful resistance was dependent upon the ability to close off territory to
European incursion while maintaining control over interethnic exchange.
As elsewhere throughout Spanish and Portuguese colonial America,
contact brought with it both disease and new, highly desired goods,
two factors which had contradictory impacts on the regional system. In
the Western Amazon, introduction of European goods intensified inter-
regional and regional trade linkages. At the same time, disease epidemics
caused the deaths of untold numbers of people. A drastic population re-
duction would have caused a breakdown in trade if it had not been for the
introduction of novel European goods. While trade linkages were main-
tained precariously, a further destabilizing effect was felt in the European
demand for slaves. Spanish slaving (and the encomienda system), stimu-
lated flight of a large percentage of the population from areas along the
base of the Andes adjacent to the Spanish centers of colonization. On the
Amazon River, a different pattern emerged as people there initially en-
gaged in trade of European goods for slaves with the Portuguese. The
search for captives to be sold as slaves led to a marked increase in hostili-
ties and aggression along the major waterways. Indigenous people soon
realized, as Sweet (I98I: 279) has pointed out, that "the white men would
always require more slaves than [they] could ever hope to deliver without
destroying the entire regional network of intertribal relations." This situa-
tion produced a crisis in the area of the Amazon just below the mouth of
the Napo, which both Spain and Portugal claimed. Here, indigenous
peoples were forced to migrate upriver and seek refuge at Jesuit missions
to avoid the incursions of Portuguese slave raiders. Indigenous alliances
and the exchange networks they facilitated, as well as the protection even-
tually offered at Jesuit missions, became critically important to the survival
of destabilized populations.
The Jesuits arrived in the region after processes of destabilization and
change were well underway. The first part of this paper is a reconstruction
of the regional interaction system as it existed at first European contact
and as it was influenced by the Spanish and Portuguese up until the ar-
rival of the Jesuits. The second part is an exploration of the way in which
the Jesuits forged new linkages and heavily influenced the trajectory of a
re-created and transformed regional system.
Tupian Dominance
When the Jesuits entered the Western Amazon in 1638, indigenous peoples
already had experienced one hundred years of contact with Europeans.
Data for the time-period 1538-1638 are scarce and have been drawn from
the sketchy reports of explorers, as well as from more detailed accounts by
official visitors and the first Jesuit letters. From these documents emerges
a picture of the region in which the Tupian peoples, having begun migra-
tions up the Napo and Maranon prior to 500o, appear to be the domi-
nant groups in trade relations that connected this region to the Amazon.
Tupians lived by floodplain farming, seasonal fishing, and conservation of
protein resources (e.g., turtles). They had developed a system of efficient
canoe travel that permitted control of major waterways, and a system of
trade with interfluvial and other riverine peoples. Their critical and in-
creasingly dominant role in the regional system becomes evident in tracing
the development of indigenous relations with the Spanish and Portuguese
prior to missionization.
Living along major waterways, Tupian Omagua were contacted by
the first Spanish explorers in 1538 and 1540. At that time, Omagua occu-
pied the islands of the Upper Amazon and vast territories along the Napo.
Tupian Cocama occupied the Lower Ucayali. The Omagua and Cocama
both raided and traded with their neighbors. The migration of Tupian
peoples from the Amazon westward had begun well before the arrival of
Europeans. Nevertheless, Portuguese slave raiding along the lower Ama-
zon stimulated further upward migration. A group of Tupians fled up the
Amazon and Huallaga Rivers, arriving at the Spanish town of Chacha-
poyas as early as I541.1
This migration is critical to our understanding of Tupian integration
with local indigenous populations. Tupian peoples dominated regional ex-
change networks because of their riverine base, widespread migrations,
control over desirable technologies such as cloth and canoe manufactur-
ing, and their aggressive stance toward other peoples. In the first century
of European influence, Tupian peoples were pulled between their desire for
European tools, the insatiable European demand for slaves, and the need
to flee harsh treatment by the Portuguese.
On the Ucayali, during the seventeenth century, the Cocama lived
primarily along a large lagoon near the mouth of the Ucayali or "Rio del
Cuzco" (Rodriguez 1684: 163). Their aggressiveness intensified sometime
prior to first Jesuit contact in the Marafin region. One of the early Jesuits
recorded in a letter, dated 1638, that the Cocama came upriver into the
Huallaga on a yearly basis. The trek was made during the time of annual
flooding.
The Cocama would leave the Ucayali in large groups of forty to
sixty or more canoes to attack their enemies and take heads. Once on the
Huallaga, they traded with the Cahuapanan Jevero for iron tools such as
axes, knives, and machetes in exchange for canoes and decorated woven
clothing. They also raided along the Huallaga, traveling up and down its
entire length in search of tools, captives, and heads (Cueva I890 [1638]:
389-90; Jouanen 1941: 379; Chantre y Herrera 190o: 140; ARSI 1640:
fo. Iv).
The Cocama had established a colony on the Lower Huallaga that
served to provision them on this journey. Inhabitants of that colony, the
Cocamilla, joined them on trips up the Marafi6n to the Pastaza, and also
served as a support base on the Huallaga (ARSI 1640: fo. Iv). Through
warfare, the Cocama controlled a large area between the Ucayali and the
Huallaga, as well as sections of these rivers (Izaguirre I9z7: 13).
Trade along the Upper Amazon appears to have been dominated by
the Omagua. The Omagua used their pottery and woven cloth as trade
items with other local peoples (ARSI i6zo: fo. 34). Another group of
Omagua are recorded to have reached up the Napo as far as the Spanish
town of Avila in the I570s.2
The Omagua of the Upper Napo (Coca River) region were in early
contact with the Quijos. The Quijos traded in gold, cloth, food, and slaves
at their markets (Steward and Metraux I963: 654). The Omagua wore gold
ornaments which were obtained from the Quijos (Chaumeil I98I: 80). The
Napo Omagua aided the Quijos in their rebellion against the Spanish at
Avila in 1579, later fleeing to take refuge among the Omagua of the Upper
Amazon (Oberem I98I: 361-62, 368).
Recent anthropological analyses of the Tupian historical data have
pointed to a marked increase in the level of violence experienced by the
Omagua and Cocama during the colonial period (Stocks I98I: 53-70;
Golob I98z: I73-74). This pattern began quite early. At the time of Ore-
llana's visit in 1540, the Omagua were recorded to be living in peace.
During the succeeding century, however, Omagua and Cocama were con-
stantly engaged in warfare and the taking of captives as slaves. The Cocama
were raiding on the Huallaga for captives and tools by I640. Furthermore,
the alliance between the Quijos and Napo Omagua had deteriorated by
the seventeenth century, when Omagua began raiding on the Napo.
An increase in violence is attributable to the European demand for
slaves and also the indigenous desire for European trade goods. Captives
were taken from other groups to "ransom" for trade goods. Additionally,
raids were carried out to obtain goods for groups with access to European
trade items. The terrifying experience of disease epidemics contributed to
this spiral of aggression. Any death attributable to shamanic activity could
be met with retaliation. This, coupled with starvation resulting from a loss
of productive persons and flight to avoid contagions, severely disrupted re-
lationships in the region. Throughout Amazonia, violence increased after
European contact as a result of the same forces noted here for the Western
Amazon. Patterns of warfare noted by the Jesuits and others, therefore,
were not indicative of precontact relationships (Ferguson I990).
Before the arrival of Europeans, Omagua and Cocama appear to
have dominated trade relations along the waterways eastward toward the
Middle Amazon. Additionally, Omagua appear to have traded with the
Quijos of the Upper Napo, who in turn maintained ties to the adjacent
Andean region. Although conflict probably existed to some degree, trade
relationships deteriorated into raiding warfare in much of this region after
Spanish contact.
peoples living just east of the base of the Andes who traveled and traded
between the Andes and Amazonian headwaters. After contact, the pres-
ence of colonial towns nearby gave them access to trade items such as iron
tools. Groups with direct access to European goods were able to strengthen
their links into the regional system by establishing a powerful base as inter-
mediaries to others, including Tupians. These same peoples had earlier
connections with Andeans, and the trade networks they controlled be-
came conduits for European goods. Most notable were the activities of the
Quijos, who traded with the Napo Omagua, and the Cahuapanan Jevero3
living between the Marai6n and Huallaga, who traded with the Cocama.
Jivaroans along the base of the Andes, including the Maina, also had direct
access to European goods, yet it is unclear to what extent they participated
in the regional system dominated by Tupians.
The town of Borja was established on the Marafi6n in Maina terri-
tory in I619 (Jouanen 1941: 335). Before the founding of Borja, the Maina
had maintained trade relations with the Jevero. The founding of Borja and
the forced service in encomienda to which the Maina were quickly sub-
jected appears to have disrupted trading patterns along this stretch of the
Marafi6n. While the Maina suffered under the Spanish attempts to colo-
nize the area, the Jevero were able to increase their participation in the
trade of European goods. By 1640, a group of Jevero, allied with Tupians,
was settled four days from Borja.
Jevero territory was principally interfluvial and extended upriver near
the Huallaga (Chantre y Herrera I9OI: Izz). Jevero traded regularly with
the Spanish in Moyobamba, obtaining axes, knives, and machetes in ex-
change for captives. They then traded tools to the Cocama for canoes
and Tupian clothing (ARSI I640: fo. Iv). By the mid-seventeenth century,
the Jevero served as a critical link between the Spanish town of Moyo-
bama and the peoples farther east and downriver, particularly the Cocama
and Cocamilla. As will become apparent, this position served them well
(initially) after the Jesuits entered the region.
Along the Huallaga itself, more lengthy chains of trade existed that
would have connected Tupian Cocama via Cahuapanan peoples with
Andeans. The Cahuapanan Muniche of the Huallaga traded with the
Cocama, supplying them with blowgun-dart poison. Muniche in turn also
traded with the "Tabalosos" far up the Huallaga. Tabalosos had been mis-
sionized earlier by Jesuits from Lima and lived in alliance with the Lamis-
tas (Motilones) (Ibid.). They also may have traded with Upper Huallaga
peoples such as the Cholon and Hibito who traveled to the Andean center
of Cajamarquilla (an eight-day trip) to trade coca for tools and clothing
(Izaguirre I927: io). The Cholon and Hibito appear to have represented
the uppermost extent of tropical forest peoples into the Andean region
along the Upper Huallaga River (ARSI I636-37: fos. 121-122). These alli-
ances would have extended the linkage, then, from the Cocama to the
Andean region via intermediaries such as the Muniche and peoples living
at the uppermost extent of the tropical forest, such as the Motilones,
Colon, and Hibito.
The trade linkages between the tropical forest peoples and the
Andeans are more clearly documented in the Napo region. At first Spanish
contact, the Quijos had direct commercial ties with neighboring Andeans
through a system of periodic markets. Professional traders employed a
standard unit of exchange, carato (bone or shell beads) in this commerce.
The basis of trade with the Andeans was cinnamon and coca (Porras 1974:
23). Professional traders based in Quito, the mindalaes, traded westward
to the Pacific littoral and northward into the area of present-day Colombia.
Although the principal direction of exchange from Quito was westward,
contacts eastward dated to pre-Incaic times (Salomon I986: ioz, I05, io8-
io). Through professional traders, such ties would have linked this Ama-
zonian area into networks extending throughout the Northern Andes and
Pacific littoral.
Hatunquijos was a center for trade between the Andes and the Ama-
zonian region. Here weekly markets (called gato in Quichua) were held
(Porras 1974: 23, Oberem 1974: 47). The Spanish visitor Diego de Orte-
gon, writing in 1577, described these markets in which was sold food,
clothing, and slaves (Ortegon 1577: fo. z).
Tupian Omagua had settled far up the Napo by the early i6oos. In
I605, one of their caciques came to Avila to ask the Jesuits there to bap-
tize his people.4 The Jesuit record also mentions intermarriage between
the indigenous peoples of Avila (Quijos) and these Omagua (ARSI I605:
fos. 8-8v). This suggests that a linkage, perhaps dating to Incaic times,
existed between the Omagua and Andeans in this region via the Quijos.
This connection was maintained only in aggression after the Omagua fled
downriver and began raiding in the Upper Napo.
A third interregional trade linkage existed via the Rio Negro. The im-
poverished environment of this nutrient-poor river supported small, scat-
tered populations, but also larger communities which subsisted by trading
over long distances (Sweet I98I: 275). This long-distance trade had pre-
contact origins, and became a significant mechanism for the distribution
of European goods. Iron tools were traded possibly as early as 6oo00-6z5.
Both Dutch and English explored the Guyana region in the I59os and,
despite Spanish resistance, attempted to maintain settlements there. By the
mid-i6oos, they were also on the Essequibo. Along the Solimoes in the
I619 and in that year founded the city of Borja below the Pongo de Manse-
riche in Maina territory. Vaca de Vega was first received by the Maina in
peace. They accepted the Augustinian missionaries with him and offered
allegiance to the Spanish crown. Vaca de Vega contacted and "pacified"
various groups of Maina, traveling down the Marafi6n and up the Pastaza
as far as Lake Rimachuma near the mouth of the Pastaza. A few Cocama
took his son as far as the mouth of the Huallaga and Tigre Rivers. Vaca de
Vega then divided the contacted peoples into encomiendas.
Life in the encomiendas was exceedingly harsh. In the region around
the city of Borja, as many as nine out of ten persons captured and brought
in are estimated to have died soon after (Golob I98z: 142). The population
of the entire region feared capture by the Spanish. In February of 1635,
the Maina in the vicinity of Borja rose in revolt, killing many in the town
before they were driven back. The following years were witness to atroci-
ties committed against the Maina in the forest, as they were hunted down
and "punished" by soldiers sent from Borja. The Jesuit historian Joua-
nen records that "The punishments were carried out over several years
with inhuman rage and cruelty." (Jouanen 1941: 337). Ten years later only
twenty-one of the original forty-two encomiendas remained, and Spanish
enthusiasm for colonizing this area was severely diminished. It was into
this situation that the Jesuits were brought to Borja in 1636.
Thus, the first one hundred years of contact produced the establish-
ment of a few towns along the base of the Andes. Nearby populations
were brought into the encomiendas, and those farther out were subject to
periodic slave raiding. Yet it was these same populations that had direct
access to iron tools, the coveted trade goods that were to continue to bind
Europeans and indigenous peoples together over the following centuries.
Outside of these areas, the vast interior eastward experienced no sus-
tained contact with Europeans until the period of intensive Jesuit mission-
ization began in 1638. The indigenous peoples of this region living along
major rivers had a few contacts with explorers and their soldiers. Slave
raiders had a major impact on populations closer to the Spanish towns,
yet the destabilizing effects of the slave trade were felt throughout much of
the Western Amazon. Both iron tools and disease epidemics had without
doubt reached most of the region during this time, and old patterns of
interaction were shifting in response to these pressures.
In brief summary of the period 1538-I638, several points emerge. At
the time of the first Spanish contact, two sets of inter-indigenous relations
prevailed in the Western Amazon. First, Tupian Omagua and Cocama
dominated regional interaction through control of the major waterways
leading upriver from the Amazon. Second, intermediary peoples living east
of the Andean cordillera traded with both Andean and Tupian peoples.
Other intermediaries traded from Tupian territory northward toward the
Caribbean (See Map z). Most of these contacts were across a series of
ethnic territories. Only in the Napo area is there evidence of a direct link
between Andean, Quijos intermediaries, and Tupian peoples. It is possible
that this occurred also in the Jivaroan area.
With the establishment of Spanish towns along the base of the Andes,
these linkages strengthened as Omagua and Cocama sought access to
European goods, especially iron tools, which greatly increased the effi-
ciency of horticultural labor. Intermediaries who controlled direct access
to these goods, such as the Quijos and Xevero, enjoyed increased regional
leverage. This advantage was, however, offset by predation by Spaniards.
Revolts by Quijos and Jivaroans altered the relations along the base of
the Andes as these peoples were subjected to terrible reprisals, while trad-
ing in the Huallaga region continued uninterrupted. At the same time,
Tupian peoples to the east along the Amazon were subject to Portuguese
slave raiding, forcing upriver migration and also stimulating warfare for
captives and for booty, including iron tools.
As we have seen, in the one hundred year period between 1538 and I638
indigenous peoples of the Western Amazon came in contact with explorers,
soldiers, traders, slavers, and colonists bent on exploiting their labor. After
1638, they had sustained contact with Jesuit missionaries whose aim was
quite different. Among European colonists, only the Jesuits, driven by the
spiritual agenda of converting the native population to Christianity, set
up residence among these peoples and both suffered and profited from the
consequences. The second part of this paper is focused on the period of
Jesuit missionization.
In the Western Amazon, the Jesuits established the missions of
Mainas. While many missionaries were murdered by local peoples irate
with their demands, the Jesuits did manage-through prodigious effort-
to create a new set of interrelationships in the region. Ironically, at the same
time they failed to convert large numbers of people into stable Christian
populations at mission centers. Of central importance to the transforma-
tion of the regional interaction sphere was the process by which Jesuits
moved from establishing a mission base with one group outward, con-
tacting allies of that group. New relationships were cemented through the
provision of European trade goods.
In 1638, one hundred years after the first recorded expedition into
the Western Amazon, the Jesuit Fathers Gaspar de Cujia and Lucas de la
Cueva arrived in Borja at the request of the governor of Mainas.s The gov-
ernor had sent for them in an attempt to bring order to Spanish as well as
Maina populations of the town and its environs.
The Jesuit arrival in Borja coincided within a three-year period with
the crushing of the Maina revolt along the Marafi6n. Father Cueva, who
was forced in his long career in the region to work between indigenous
and Spanish colonial interests, began proselytization among the Maina by
obtaining a pardon for their revolt. He moved quickly from Maina con-
tacts to the Jevero and established a mission in Jevero territory. Cueva
and several other highly energetic and dedicated missionaries were able to
establish the basic framework of the Marafin missions in the twenty years
between I640 and I66o.
Between I653 and i66o, there was a tremendous growth of missions
in this initial core area of the Marafi6n, Pastaza, and Huallaga rivers. In
about i650, the Cocama of the Ucayali accepted a Jesuit mission, which
proved difficult to maintain in part because Jesuit efforts were concen-
trated elsewhere. Later some one hundred Cocama families came from
the Ucayali to the Huallaga, "each by a distinct route," to found the base
through the Jevero (ARSI 1640: fo. Iv). Another missionary, Father Ray-
mundo de Santa Cruz, learned the Cocama language and befriended the
population located near the mouth of the Huallaga. He was able to bring
a group of Cocamilla up the Huallaga River and establish a mission there.
Through the Cocama, he was able to contact and reduce the neighbor-
ing Panoan Aguano and Mayoruna (Rodriguez 1684: 178-81). In i68z,
Father Lucero went up the Ucayali River where the Panoan Cunibos pro-
vided him with interpreters for contacting other Panoans, as well as the
Arawakan Piro.
Initial Jesuit missionization followed the pattern of indigenous trade
and alliance networks, reinforcing these networks by providing direct ac-
cess to European goods. Jesuits brought several distinct groups into each
mission settlement, and stable mission populations were comprised of
allies. The missionaries were unsuccessful in attempts to bring peoples
together outside of the indigenous alliance system (see Magnin, quoted in
Golob I982: I24). As a corollary, those peoples with access to European
goods through the Jesuits were able to strengthen their position vis-a-vis
other peoples. This was most notable with the rise of Jevero control over
the area between the Huallaga and Marafi6n. Contacts with the Jesuits
also served to strengthen Cocama hegemony in the Huallaga and Ucayali
valleys.
Equally significant, this was a militarily enforced missionization pro-
cess. During this early period, missionaries were forced to cooperate with
the governor of Borja, as he was also governor of the missions of Mainas.
Under the title of governor of the missions, Vaca de Vega had authority
to make periodic visits to the missions and, significantly, to send soldiers
on entradas to "punish" Indians who rebelled against the missionaries or
the Spanish settlers. On these expeditions, if the governor asked the Jesuits
to furnish a chaplain, the Jesuit Superior could not refuse.6 In this initial
period, also, Jesuits traveled with soldiers, ostensibly for their protection
on missionary expeditions (Chantre y Herrera 190o: 6Io; see also 584-85;
Figueroa g904 [i66i]: 43-45). Jesuit success in the region was as inextri-
cably tied to indigenous fear of the cruelty of Spanish soldiers as it was
to the role of the missions as a haven from slave raiding and the abuses
of the encomienda system, or the allegiance gained through provision of
trade goods.
Around i665 the Jesuits began their work in what was to become the
Missi6n Baja (lower missions), that area below the Pastaza dominated by
Tupian speakers. In i66i, the Omagua asked for a missionary and vol-
untarily submitted to the Spanish Crown, after being threatened by the
Portuguese with slavery (Osma 90o8: 48).
By i68z, the Jesuit Superior Lorenzo Lucero was able to record that
the Jesuits had established missions along the Upper Napo, the Pastaza,
Marai6n, and Huallaga rivers in which he estimated a total of 7,400 per-
sons resided. He estimated that successful contact had been made with
another 56,000 people (ARSI i68z: fos. 8i-8z). Nevertheless, many mis-
sions established earlier had been lost, and several missionaries had been
murdered by indigenous people angered by their presence. Additionally,
in 1663 the Cocama, allied with the Panoan Chepeo and Maparina, had
rebelled against the missionaries (Chantre y Herrera 190o: 224-27).
The events of the Cocama rebellion inform us of the dynamics of the
contact situation in the region as a whole. At this time the Cocama were
raiding up the Marafi6n, some Cocama had moved to the Huallaga, and
the missionary effort was concentrated on the Huallaga, not the Ucayali.
According to the Jesuits, the Cocama had confederated with the Panoan
Chepeo and Maparina to kill all the Spaniards and their Indian allies,
without ceasing in this intent until all settlements of the Marafi6n mission
were destroyed (Jouanen I94I: 449). This ambition was similar to that of
the Quijos and the Jivaroans at an earlier date and reflected the millenarian
vision of a world once again free of Spaniards.
In i666 the Cocama went upriver toward Borja and attacked mission
settlements along the way. They killed and took the head of the Jesuit
Father Figueroa and destroyed the mission of Jeveros, but stopped short of
an attack on Borja. Seeing the successes of the Cocama, according to Jesuit
history, the "faithful" Indians began to believe that they too could free
themselves (Ibid.: 454). This is a strong indication that the early Jesuit suc-
cesses in the region in maintaining mission populations were directly tied
to fear of military reprisal from soldiers at Borja for rebellion and flight.
Success was not, therefore, solely owing to increased access to trade goods.
In I669, an army of two hundred "faithful" Jeveros and Guallagas
(Cocamilla) (whose fathers would have witnessed Spanish cruelty toward
the Maina), and twenty Spanish soldiers from Borja and Moyobamba went
with Father Lucero to the Ucayali. There they confronted the Cocama,
killing their leader and recapturing the head of Father Figueroa. They then
slaughtered, hanged, or captured the rest of the Cocama rebels, thereby
crushing the last of the rebellions in the missions of Mainas (Ibid.: 454-
55). Events of this rebellion suggest that a reign of terror, with indige-
nous attempts to manipulate and to strengthen alliances, characterize this
period. The data for the pre-Jesuit period demonstrate that some access to
European trade goods had already been developed along indigenous trade
networks through contacts to Spanish colonial settlements.
Why, then, a rebellion by the Cocama of the Ucayali? Sweet (I98I:
zo) has noted that communal resistance to European expansion was most
frequent either on the perimeter of (or outside) the orbit of European con-
trol, or among peoples who retained a strong sense of communal identity.
The Cocama were not subject to the encomienda system nor had they been
heavily missionized or subject to slave raiding. They were, at the time,
on the periphery of European control. Furthermore, the Cocama appear
to have maintained sociopolitical control over the Marafi6n area, control
that extended to Borja (and the Huallaga). The Spanish presence in the
region surely threatened that control and would have been one factor in
stimulating the revolt.
This revolt took place in the i66os, some thirty years after the Mainas
revolt, sixty years after the Jivaroan, and eighty years after the Quijos
revolts. If Sweet is correct in concluding that revolts tended to occur at
the periphery of colonial expansion, the dates give us an idea of the pace
and direction of that expansion in the Western Amazon. (For comparative
material on the Arawakan Ashaninka [Campa], see Brown and Fernan-
dez I991.)
In stark contrast to this history of rebellions is the experience of
peoples of the Huallaga River. Parts of the Upper Huallaga had been
conquered by the Inca, and European contact produced no revolt. Never-
theless, while at first the Spaniards were tolerated, even welcomed, small
groups soon fled from Spanish abuse. The area was ethnically diverse, and
the vast system of waterways and interfluvial regions between the Andean
cordillera and the Ucayali River served as a refuge. Spaniards from Lamas
and Moyobamba ranged throughout this area and as far as the Ucayali
in their hunt for slave labor. For example, Jouanen recorded that Cahua-
panans were brought into a mission, yet some were captured by Spaniards
of Moyobamba to work as slaves while the priest was absent (Jouanen
I943: 391). Thus, the Jesuit missions downriver on the Huallaga served as
a refuge, although not a secure one, from capture and enslavement.
Much the same pattern was to be established along the Upper Ama-
zon in the territory of the Omagua, where the Portuguese were the major
threat. Jesuits there offered to protect the Omagua, Yurimagua, and
Aysuares from the Portuguese in the missions established by Father Fritz
in Omagua territory (see Fritz 19zz). The Portuguese served, unwittingly,
to force indigenous peoples to seek refuge at the Spanish missions and
contributed to the success of the Jesuits.
Hostilities with the Portuguese erupted in I693-96. At this time, the
Portuguese moved into the area to trade and barter for captives to be
sold as slaves. The Yurimagua reported to Father Fritz, their missionary,
that the Portuguese had left angry because the Yurimagua now refused
to give them captives. So refusing, they had said to the Portuguese that
the priest would be angry and that they no longer had enemies to hunt
because the priest had written down the names of all peoples and made
peace with them (Ibid.: 9I-92). The Yurimagua and Omagua continued to
suffer under pressures from the Portuguese during the eighteenth century.8
Yurimagua eventually relocated to the Huallaga, while relic populations
of Omagua went to the Napo.
From these histories it would appear that where populations were eth-
nically diverse, as along the Huallaga (and Upper Pastaza), they could sur-
vive colonial expansion through flight to allied territory. Where there was
strong ethnic unity, as with the Jivaroans, Quijos, Cocama, and Omagua,
populations remained independent to the extent that successful armed re-
sistance closed out their lands to colonial forces. The Omagua and Quijos,
anything beyond this, such as adornments for the church. The state of each
mission was precarious; when the web of economic support was broken
or disrupted, neophytes abandoned the site.
Support for the missions and mechanisms for gaining allegiance dove-
tailed in the Jesuit focus on control of two critical regional commodities;
salt and blowgun-dart poison. Salt was of importance in the indigenous
trade networks of the Jivaroan and Huallaga River peoples. Salt was a
desired and perhaps significant dietary supplement where large game was
not abundant, a likely situation around large mission settlements. It also
served as a means for aiding in food preservation, although this latter
practice was probably introduced by the Spanish. Jesuit control of the salt
trade was a critical strategy in gaining hegemony in the region. Control
over the regional salt trade served two purposes. First, the Jesuits were
able to facilitate direct access to salt by all missionized people. Secondly,
salt could be mined and transported using Indian labor and it became a
valuable commodity in the colonial economy. Several of the principal salt
sources in the Upper Amazon were on or near the Huallaga River, and
another was located up the Ucayali River.9 (For comparative information
on the importance of salt among the Arawakan Campa to the south, see
Verese 1973.)
Early in the missionization of the Huallaga, Jesuits began exploiting
the salt sources commercially. After the Jeveros mission was established,
Father Cueva, in the I64os and i65os, had both Jevero and Paranapura
Indians taking the salt out for sale, which gave the region a "healthy com-
merce" (Jouanen 1941: 372). The proximity of salt sources may be one of
the major reasons why the largest Jesuit mission (Concepci6n de Xeveros)
and the seat of the Marai6n missions, and later the largest (Santiago de
La Laguna) were located in this area.
The annual trips to collect salt on the Huallaga were organized within
each mission.10 The Jesuits sent people from as far away as the Napo
and Upper Amazon to the Huallaga for salt, which was distributed by
the Jesuits to the new missions, to existing missions on the Pastaza, and
to Lamas (Uriarte 1952 [1771], I: I44). Nevertheless, it must be remem-
bered that the economic activity was for the Jesuits only a means to
another end, that of conversion of the native population to Christianity.
(See Sweet I974. For a comparative discussion on the California missions,
see Archibald 1978: I84-85.)
Significantly, the treks for salt continued after the Jesuit expulsion.
Both during and after Jesuit control of the salt trade, the indigenous people
who made these treks made many stops along the way, exchanging with
local peoples not only salt but other local specializations as well. Of par-
ticular importance was trade of salt for blowgun-dart poison made by the
Ticuna or Peba along the Amazonas or that of the Lamistas in the Huallaga
region."1 These trekking and trading patterns contributed to the reshaping
of the regional interaction sphere (See Map 3).
Demand for salt had always existed among the Quijos of the Upper
Napo, who had traded their gold with the Inca for Andean salt. In the
sixteenth century, prior to Jesuit contact, the Quijos laboriously made a
poor grade of salt from plants. In the seventeenth century this practice
was probably given up as Jesuits took over the Archidona protectorate
and brought with them salt from the mines on the Huallaga. Only later
did the Quijos begin to make their own treks to the region (Oberem 1974:
353-55).
Peoples from as far as the Upper Napo and Omaguas area came
together in the Huallaga as a result of the salt trade, exchanging also
among themselves (Uriarte 195z [1771], I: 143). After the Jesuit expulsion
these annual treks continued, either for a white trader or on their own
account, and came to include peoples from the Upper Pastaza-Bobonaza
area, such as the Canelos Quichua (Oberem 1974: 353-55).12
sionary as gifts to the mission indians and newly contacted peoples, sent
to Moyobamba and Lamas for items such as cloth, blowgun dart poison,
tobacco, and sugar" (Chantre y Herrera 19oI: 617). Missionaries were
then accused of carrying out independent businesses, which was strictly
forbidden. As a result, independent trade with colonists of Moyobamba
and Lamas was officially curtailed between 1724 and 1738 (Ibid.: 6i8).
During the mid-eighteenth century in Europe, Jesuit activities came
under increasing criticism. The Jesuits were targets of the intellectual up-
heaval that swept Europe between the i68os and I75os: the Enlightenment
period (Bangert I972: 273). More specifically, their enormously successful
plantations and haciendas, established in the New World to fund the Jesuit
colleges and to some extent the missions, were the subject of both criticism
and envy (Cushner I980: 156, I74).
Yet, with respect to regional exchange in the Province of Mainas, the
Jesuit missionaries insisted that there was little (economic) profit.15 The
motive was to gain converts. While control over indigenous trade helped
create converts, financial gain from trade was, according to the Jesuits,
made by secular white traders. "The mission [populations] exchange be-
tween themselves local products, having therefore some commerce, whose
major profit is attained by those white [traders] who take the products
outside of the region" (Requena ca. 1784: fo. i8v). In this sense, the Jesuits
explicitly contrasted not only their motive, but the economic significance
of their enterprise with that of the traders.
From their town bases, colonial traders had established linkages into
the indigenous trade networks long before the Jesuits arrived. As Jesuits
established missions in the region, the traders could also begin to travel
and traffic along the rivers. Thus while the Jesuits probably initially fol-
lowed the lead of colonial town-based traders, they had in turn established
commercial linkages deep in the Western Amazon by the mid-eighteenth
century as a result of their efforts at missionization. These linkages were
gradually taken over by white traders. Traders came to dominate economic
transactions in the region after the Jesuit expulsion in 1767. Thus the
combination of official sanctions against economic activities by religious
orders or individual missionaries and the presence of independent Spanish
(and Portuguese) traders limited the extent to which the Jesuit missions
were able to serve as critical nexuses in exchange networks.
terns. The role of dominant indigenous groups, both the Tupians and bor-
der intermediaries, was transformed (See Map 3). As has been noted, initial
Jesuit contacts followed paths of indigenous networks and strengthened
the position of peoples who had direct access to trade goods through the
missionaries. As facilitators of the outward contacts of the Jesuits, how-
ever, their position was undermined as new mission settlements were set
up in which the priest became a nexus for a locally based exchange of
forest products for European goods. The other severe pressures on the
populations notwithstanding, this process alone could have destroyed the
long-distance trade linkages in the region. The loss of power by formerly
dominant groups marked a transformation of long-distance exchange net-
works, as newly dominant peoples and significant resource bases were
established, particularly in the trade for salt. The Quijos and Middle
Huallaga peoples benefited from this new interaction. Others, such as the
Jivaroans and Cocama, chose to isolate themselves from sustained contact
with Europeans.
Jivaroan response, in particular, appears to have created increased
insularity. The Shuar and other Jivaroans of the Morona-Santiago region
successfully repulsed all Spanish attempts to establish settlements in this
region except a few along the base of the Andes. The Maina were forced
to retreat after the rebellion of 1635 and, although a few small missions
were established, the populations were not stable. Maina maintained trade
links to the Spanish of Moyobamba and Lamas, but the Spaniards trav-
eled down the Huallaga to them. The Cocama also isolated themselves,
retreating to the Ucayali, although they maintained some contact into the
mission redistributive system via their population at La Laguna.
The Quijos were less affected by missionary activity than by the Span-
ish encomienda system. The trade pattern described by Ortegon in 1577
for the Quijos did not survive into the eighteenth century (Oberem 1974:
356). Gone were the weekly markets and the professional traders. New
forms of trade into the Andes were shaped around the presence of the colo-
nial market in Quito. While the Quijos managed to maintain interregional
exchange with Andeans in an altered form, much of the population was
subjected to excessive labor demands, and many fled from Spanish contact.
Additionally, the former alliance between the Quijos and the Omagua had
deteriorated into hostilities. Significantly, however, as the Jesuits estab-
lished their mission system and began commerce in salt, the Quijos re-
vitalized their exchange links to downriver peoples through participation
in annual treks to the Huallaga for salt.
The majority of the Napo Omagua had fled downriver after the
Quijos revolt. Following this, the Omagua increased hostilities with their
Conclusions
efforts. The second part is an exploration of ways in which the Jesuits ex-
ploited the regional exchange system; how it shaped their missionization
strategy and, in turn, how that strategy contributed to the transforma-
tion of intergroup relations and the general nature of exchange within the
region.
The historical documentation has pointed to the continued signifi-
cance of long-distance trade in the Western Amazon. While it has been
argued that this region, and Amazonia in general, could have supported
dense populations with difficulty, it is suggested that dynamic, regional,
riverine-interfluvial trade, in particular, would have permitted the (perhaps
unequal) exploitation by various groups of resources available in both re-
gions. The complexity of these multi-ethnic relationships was illuminated
in the varied responses to colonial expansion. We can hypothesize that in
Amazonian prehistory during periods of population growth, these link-
ages would have intensified, as would have contacts to other regions. After
Spanish contact, and the concomitant demographic collapse, the trade
linkages in the Western Amazon were re-formed as a survival strategy of
destabilized populations. Thus the maintenance of multi-ethnic exchange
networks appears to be critical in the region during periods of population
stress.
guay and the Llanos de Moxos in Bolivia indicates that ecological factors
differentially affected the level of self-sufficiency attained by the missions.
Conditions in Amazonia made large-scale cattle raising and agriculture
impossible. Reliance on trade networks was therefore all the more critical.
Comparisons between regions can offer insights, as well, into the dynamics
of conquest and cultural appropriation in general.
Through the window of long-distance trade networks we can glimpse
the framework within which shifts in intergroup relations take place. A
readily retrieved data set, such as that on economic exchange, allows us
to build from the historical documentation a framework from which more
intangible processes of interaction may be understood. Such an approach
could be useful for understanding postcontact transformations in regional
relationships in areas outside Amazonia, such as the Andes, and coastal re-
gions into which Amazonian trade networks were linked. The framework
is the first step in an inquiry into the cultural dynamics through which
intergroup relationships are created and transformed over time.
Notes
Research for this paper was funded by grants from the American Philosophical
Society and the Mellon Foundation: Vatican Microfilm Library, St. Louis Univer-
sity. I gratefully acknowledge this support. I would like to thank Norman Whitten,
Jr. for his consistent encouragement in the pursuit of this research. I wish to thank
the participants of the Fifteenth South American Indian conference at Bennington
College for their helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. In particu-
lar, I wish to thank Gertrude Dole for her detailed and insightful commentary on
both its form and content. James Gibb helped greatly with his comments and the
patient editing of several drafts. Finally, suggestions by reviewers were helpful in
strengthening some sections of the paper.
i According to the Tupians' own account, as recorded by the Spanish, this mi-
gration was a major exodus in which many died fleeing Portuguese oppression.
These Tupi explained to the Spanish that they had been looking for new land
and had fought many enemies along the way. They could not return, so were
forced onward (Jimenez de la Espada 1897: cxxxiii-cxxxiv).
z The Omagua on the Napo were distinct from those on the Amazon. The
Omagua of the Upper Napo-Coca River area are referred to in the historical
documents by various names, such as Sumagua (ARSI I605), Arianas (Rumazo
I946: 70), Tapaca, Magua, and Eguata (Ortegon I577: fo. 8v). Napo Omagua
territory extended from above the confluence of the Rio Coca to a little below
the confluence of the Napo and Maran6n.
3 Jevero here is synonymous with Chebero, the classification given by Steward
and Metraux (I963: 606). Jevero is written Xevero in early documents, thus
the mission name La Concepci6n de los Xeveros. The Jevero are not to be
confused with the Jivaro, a Jivaroan people.
4 Jesuits were in the Napo area early, but with the notable exception of Father
Ferrer's ultimately fatal efforts in the Macas-Quijos region, particularly with
the Cofane, the Jesuits at this time remained in colonial centers. Only much
later did this region become part of the Jesuit missions of Mainas.
5 Soon after their arrival, the two Jesuit Fathers obtained from the governor
a general pardon for the Mainas Indians, as the Spanish had by then "exe-
cuted grave punishments and judged many." They proclaimed the pardon in
the Pastaza region, to which Cueva traveled, as well as in the city of Borja
(Figueroa 1904 [I66I]: 9-10). In this way, the Jesuits began to gain the favor
of indigenous peoples.
6 This situation sometimes produced serious conflicts. For example, in 1654,
another Spanish attempt at conquering the region was made, this time by Don
Martin de la Riva Herrera, the corregidor of Cajamarca. He began the conquest
by subjugating the Motilones and Tabalosos living near the Huallaga, founding
in their lands in I655 the city of Lamas. From there he went with Father Cueva
down the Huallaga, visiting several peoples, including the "Barbudos" (Mayo-
runa) and Aguano. In i656 he founded a Spanish settlement called Santander
on the Pastaza. Here Roamaina were brought into encomienda and suffered
such violent treatment that Father Cueva was impelled to travel to Lima to
request that Riva Herrera's commission be revoked. He was successful in his
appeal, even as the effects of this misadventure were long felt on the Pastaza
(Jouanen 1941: 417-26; Golob I982: I69).
7 Fritz was a special target of the Portuguese because he ardently fought their
claim to the vast stretch of river occupied by the Omagua, Yurimagua, and
Aysuares. He wished Portugal to adhere to the original line as established in
the treaty of Tordesillas (I493) and reaffirmed again in Lisbon in I58I (Fritz
I922: 87). On a trip to Para (owing to illness) he had made a very detailed
map of the Amazon River (Ibid.: 143), undoubtably to facilitate the process of
establishing proper claims.
8 An early-eighteenth-century document recorded that the Omagua were suffer-
ing at the hands of the Portuguese and no longer wanted to trade with them.
Many Omagua reacted by fleeing upriver, going to the mouth of the Napo
where a relic population settlement was formed five days upriver. All lived
in fear of the Portuguese. "If at the appearance of the troppa [annual slaving
expedition], the Omagua flee in fear, it gives the Portuguese an opportunity
to seize them, and if they demonstrate any contrariness, to take them captive"
(ARSI ca. I700: fo. 71). The Omagua were reluctant to move further up the
Marafi6n owing both to former hostilities with the Cocama (ARSI 1620: fo.
33), and to fear that they would lose out on their important trade connection
to the Rio Negro and Orinoco for European tools.
9 The Jesuit missionaries soon learned to exploit the salt pools on the Cachiyacu
(salt river in Quichua), a tributary of the Huallaga (Zarate I904 [1739]: 386,
ARSI 1687: fo. 3). Along the Paranapura River, a tributary of the Huallaga,
were found deposits of natural rock salt. Rock salt was also available on the
Huallaga at an outcrop above the [future] site of the Yurimaguas mission
(Magnin 1940 [1740]: 50). So successful was the Jesuit strategy here that Father
Rodriguez, dreaming of further expansion, wrote in 1684 that the Lower Ama-
zonian Tupinamba trade with their neighbors for salt. He then stated that "if
[the location of the salt sources used by the allies of the Tupinamba] were dis-
covered, it would be of great use for the conquest and population of the River
[Amazon]" (Rodriguez 1684: 135).
io The Jesuit Manuel Uriarte described the trip from the Omagua mission as
follows: fifteen Indians were sent in a large canoe, taking two months on the
Marafi6n and Huallaga to Yurimaguas, and another ten days upriver to the
Cachiyacu. These men also were charged with making purchases in Lamas
such as tobacco, cloth, and sugar. These were purchased in exchange for local
products such as laurel wax, as well as items from Quito. Returning to the
mission in October, each man gave the missionary one large piece of rock salt
and two baskets of salt. The rest was theirs to keep. The salt trade was suffi-
ciently important that around 1760 the government of Mainas attempted to tax
it, demanding that for each man sent, three "rocks" of salt, or three arrobas,
be deposited in the cabildo at La Laguna for the governor, a demand that the
Jesuits found scandalous (Uriarte I952 [1771] I: 143-44, i6i, z34).
11 The Peba, Ticuna, and Lamistas produced blowgun-dart poison that was traded
throughout the entire region. The Ticuna blowgun-dart poison was the most
highly esteemed (Uriarte 1952 [I771], I: 92-93).
iz In the i85os, the trade slowed because of border problems between Peru and
Ecuador, resumed around 1914, but finally stopped because of border prob-
lems in 1941 (Oberem 1974: 354). Jouanen noted that after ca. 1870, the trade
route was no longer safe. Napo Indians still pursued it, but suffered "not a few
offenses [injuries] and vexations from the Peruvians" (Jouanen I977: 174).
13 Uriarte described the Omagua trek for turtle eggs. Each year at the appropriate
season, some fifteen or sixteen men embarked in canoes laden with ten or so
tinajas (storage jars) and went up to the beaches of the Ucayali. The turtle eggs
were gathered from the beaches and smashed in the canoes. The oil that came
to the surface was then collected using a conch shell and placed in the large
tinajas. This was then boiled in a cauldron and, with the addition of a little
salt, left to cool. After cooling, it was stored in the tinajas, the mouth of which
was sealed over with large leaves. The men returned in fifteen or twenty days,
bringing also some tinajas filled with baby turtles. These turtles were kept in
pens, fed and fattened, and served as a reserve protein source (Uriarte 195z
[I77I], I: I4z).
14 The route from the Andes via the Bobonaza to the Pastaza was occasion-
ally used by individual travelers, as when the Jesuit Magnin traveled to the
Marai6n in I744 (ARSI 1744), but it never became a major commercial link.
5I For example, wax was one of the products sought in commerce. Uriarte wrote
that four old Indian men were given permission to leave the mission for two
weeks to collect wax. For every three pounds of wax they brought back, they
received an axe or machete. For one pound, they were provided with a knife
(Uriarte I95z [1771], I: I60). Uriarte noted that the Indians had to walk sev-
eral weeks in the forest to gather two or three pounds of wax. In this way he
defended against accusations that the Jesuits found this a profitable enterprise.
"I have been eighteen years in the mission, and have barely been able to send
to Quito, in some years, two or three arrobas [of wax] with which to purchase
something for the church" (Ibid. II: 132).
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