The choices facing Putin in Belarus are

all fraught with risk

Analysis by Nick Paton Walsh, CNN

Updated 1345 GMT (2145 HKT) August 16, 2020
Thousands arrested as protesters call Belarusian election rigged 02:46
(CNN)Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has been an extraordinary outlier in
the monumental change that has swept through the former Soviet Union -- for 26 years,
he's remained the pre-eminent figure in his impoverished country. Meanwhile, aging central
Asian dictators have died or stepped aside, Russian President Vladimir Putin has
weathered oligarchs, dissidents and sanctions, and neighboring Ukraine has seen two
revolutions and a civil war.

But this weekend's two phone calls with Putin -- the first sought by Lukashenko after days of
unprecedented protest following a highly contested presidential election and police violence
-- mark a turning point. And it is one fraught with a geopolitical risk significantly bigger than
the attention the crisis is currently getting in European capitals and inside the Beltway.
Reminiscent of the violent protests in 2014 in Kiev, it is a moment when a relatively
localized moment of dissent could plunge Europe into crisis.
In their Saturday call, the two autocrats agreed to "regular contacts at various levels and the
disposition to strengthen allied relations." But however much Lukashenko insisted on
Belarus's autonomy afterwards, this was the moment he stopped his erratic courtship of the
European Union, and directly turned to his harsher eastern neighbor to bail him out. The
next move is Putin's. But it is not obvious, or easy. Here are some of his options.

1. A full-scale Russian military intervention into Belarus

The nuclear option and pretty unlikely. Putin could decide the insertion of little green men
seen in Ukraine, or even Russian uniformed troops or police, would settle finally his control
of the vital neighbor. Belarus is essential to Putin's sense of regional security. In defense, it
is a territorial buffer between NATO in Poland. In offense, it provides access to the Suwalki
Gap -- the stretch of flat land from Belarus to Russian-controlled Kaliningrad -- that NATO
planners often fret Russia could swarm with tanks, cutting off the military alliance's Baltic
members from the rest of the European western mainland.
Pro-government supporters gather in Minsk on August 16, 2020 ahead of the arrival of
President Alexander Lukashenko at a rally.
Military manoeuvers is something Putin has shown himself instinctively comfortable with, if
the likely cost is limited. He may calculate -- perhaps incorrectly -- that Belarusians feel
enough proximity to their overbearing neighbor, that Moscow's men can "liberate" Belarus of
Lukashenko, dubbed "Europe's last dictator." But that would bring two huge risks. The first
being that Russian troops could simply inflame the anti-government protests, and be left
with a blunt military hammer to flatten the delicate wave of female-only protests and tractor-
factory strikes. That's not a good look domestically for the superannuated Russian regime,
wary of its own unpopularity and periodic protests in major cities.
The second is the risk of sanctions and a Western response, where the Russian march
towards the Suwalki Gap would ring huge NATO alarm bells. US President Donald Trump
may be seen as suspiciously pro-Putin in much of what he does. But Putin may also
assess, rightly, that the Kremlin shouldn't risk making retaliatory Russia-bashing a central
plank of the November presidential race. The Russian economy wouldn't handle further
pressure well. In short, there's probably more to lose from the coarse march of Russian
armor on Minsk than there is to gain.
Protesters demonstrate against presidential election results outside Belarusian state TV
headquarters in Minsk on August 15, 2020.

2. Be a bit smarter than tanks

The Kremlin is the master of the slow game, and the unexpected, underhand move. The
release of more than 30 Russian prisoners by Belarus, accused of being mercenaries,
came with the Kremlin comment the two countries' "relevant departments" -- read
intelligence services -- were now working closely together. Putin could dispatch his spooks,
practiced as they are in shutting down social media, picking up the right individual rather
than beating up a crowd, and crushing dissent. Over the coming months, this silent brutality,
coupled with a slow drop in protest enthusiasm, may win out.

3. Tell Lukashenko it's time to go, and try to own the aftermath
This is hugely risky. The Kremlin would essentially be empowering the Svetlana
Tikhanovskaya-led opposition here, and may hope that enduring ties with Russia, to which
Belarus is intimately tied economically and societally, would mean any future government
would seek warm relations with Moscow. But the larger crisis at stake would be that yet
another dictator had fallen on Russia's borders. Putin cannot afford that message of people-
power right now. Any new Belarusian government would likely also look West to the EU for
immediate assistance and ratification. The last time a Russian neighbor looked West so fast
was Ukraine, and the Kremlin invaded. There are too many likely drawbacks and risks to
make dropping Lukashenko, without a carefully planned alternative, appealing.
Demonstrators stage a "die-in" as part of protests against the results of Belarus' presidential
election in Berlin, Germany on August 15, 2020.

4. Call for new elections, and insert Russia's own, new candidate
Over a decade ago, this may have been Putin's favored option. Moscow were masters of
creating and forcing through a local election victory for their preferred option, often a
technocrat conjured seemingly out of nowhere.

Belarus leader calls Putin to reaffirm mutual cooperation, later rejects foreign mediation
offers
New elections would calm the protests, and a third option candidate for president could
assuage the Belarusian security services and elite that they might still keep a grip on the
levers of power. Yet Moscow may also be wary that giving concessions such as a new vote
to a protest crowd may encourage them to broader demands. Another, new vote that the
protesters might also conclude could be rigged, would set the crisis back to square one.

5. Do nothing, for a week or two

Let the pressure build on Lukashenko, and the dysfunction escalate, as protests begin to
affect ordinary life. Other protest movements have ebbed over time, once the violence of
the riot police has calmed, the protesters' bruises faded, and ordinary concerns become
more important. Practical concerns dominate over ideology when a population has dealt
with corrupt and repressive government for decades. The importance of jobs and salaries
will hove into view when the euphoria of free expression and revolt begins to fade. The
protesters' leader is currently in Lithuania, and so over time the crowds may lack focus and
motivation. Given how imperfect the other four above options are, this may be Putin's first
choice.