430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Doctrine of Res Judicata

ANNOTATION

THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA

By
Prof. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA

§ 1. Definition and Rationale, p. 430.

§ 2. Requisites of Res Judicata, p. 431
§ 3. Form of Action, p. 435
§ 4. Scope of Res Judicata, p. 436.

§ 1. Definition and Rationale.

A doctrine deeply embedded in Philippine jurisprudence,

res judicata means that when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given,
the judgment of the Court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them. The parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once.
(Municipality of Hagonoy v. Secretary of Agriculture, L-
27595, Oct, 26, 1976; Sarabia v. Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, 111 Phil. 1081; Wenzel v. Surigao
Consolidated Mining Co., 108 Phil. 530; Escudero v. Flores,
97 Phil. 240; Philippine National Bank v. Baretto, 52 Phil.
816.) It is based on the necessity that there should be an
end to litigation and that the individual should not be
vexed twice for the same cause. (PCI Bank v. Pfleider, 65
SCRA 22; Yusingco v. Ong Hian Lian, 42 SCRA 589.)
Relitigation of questions already settled by prior judgment
merely burdens the court as well as the public treasury,
creates uncertainty and confusion and puts to waste the
time and energy of the court that could be devoted to
worthier cases. (Aguila v. J. M. Tuason & Co., 22 SCRA
690.) Res judicata is an application of the public policy
against multiplicity of suits. (Aguila v. J. M. Tuason and
Co., supra.)
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The Doctrine of Res Judicata

Since it is demanded by both public and private interests

that there must be an end to litigation, there is a tendency
to broaden rather than restrict the application of res
judicata (Paz v. Inandan, 75 Phil. 608.) The principle of res
judicata attaches even if the judgment might have been
reversed had an appeal been taken. (Edwards v. Arce, 98
Phil. 688.)
The doctrine of res judicata covers two different
concepts, namely, “bar by former judgment,” and
“conclusiveness of judgment”. (Heirs of Marciano A. Roxas
v. Galindo, 108 Phil. 582; also see Bustamante v. Azarcon,
L-8939, May 28, 1957.) Conclusiveness of prior judgment in
a subsequent suit between the same parties involving the
same subject matter and with respect to the same cause of
action, pertains not only to matters which were decided in
the first action, but also to every other matter which the
parties could have properly set up in the prior case.
(Yusingco v. Ong Hian Lian, supra.) The judgment in the
prior action operates as an estoppel with respect to matters
in issue or points controverted, on the determination of
which the judgment was rendered. (Tiongson v. Court of
Appeals, 49 SCRA 429.)
Though closely related, res judicata is to be
distinguished from the “law of the case.” Whereas the latter
“applies only to the one case,” the former, on the other
hand, “forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has
been done in another case.” (21 C.J.S. 331.) The “law of the
case” simply requires that when an appellate court has
once declared the law in a case, this continues to be the
governing law of that case even on a subsequent appeal.
(Zarate v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 717.)

§ 2. Requisites of Res Judicata.

The essential requisites for the application of res judicata

are: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the
court that rendered the judgment must have jurisdiction
over the subject-matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; (4) and there must be between the
two cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and
identity of cause of action. (Ramos v. Laureano, L-27104,
Dec. 20, 1976; Municipality of Hagonoy v. Secretary of
Agriculture, supra; Benin v. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531; Pili v.
Tuason, 57 SCRA 586; Ocampo v. Buenaventura, 55 SCRA
267; Viray v. Mariñas, 49 SCRA 44; Libudan v. Gil, 45
SCRA 17; Santos v. Gabriel, 45 SCRA 288;
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432 SUPREME COURT R EPORTS ANNOTATED

The Doctrine of Res Judicata

Yusingco v. Ong Hian Lian, supra; Cruz v. Mossesgeld, 24

SCRA 1006; Malvar v. Pallingayan, 18 SCRA 121; Suarez
v. Municipality of Naujan, 18 SCRA 682; Abes v. Rodel, 17
SCRA 822; Philippine Farming Corp. v. Llanos, 14 SCRA
949; Ipekdjian Merchandising Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals,
9 SCRA 72; Nator v. CIR, 4 SCRA 727; Licup v. Manila
Railroad Co., 2 SCRA 267; Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co., 93 Phil. 1034; Claridad v. Novella, 92 Phil.
1066; Reyes v. Reyes, 90 Phil. 873; Lao v. Dee, 90 Phil. 869;
Aguilar v. Gamboa, 89 Phil. 532; Lim Toco v. Go Fay, 81
Phil. 258; San Diego v. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281.) It has been
suggested that the test is expressed in this question: Would
the same evidence support and establish both the present
and former causes of action? If so, the former constitutes a
ban to recovery in the others; otherwise, it does not.
(Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421.)
The doctrine of res judicata requires, among other
elements, a prior final and conclusive judgment. (Libudan
v. Gil, supra.) It cannot be pleaded where the court is
without jurisdiction and therefore the judgment is a
nullity. (Arevalo v. Benedicto, 58 SCRA 186.) An order of
the court on the issue of its jurisdiction acquire finality
upon failure to appeal and thus has the effect of res
judicata. (Rejuso v. Estipona, L-27099, Aug. 31, 1976.)
For a prior judgment to operate as res judicata, the
cause in which it was rendered must have been determined
on its merits. Hence, it would not constitute a bar to
another suit if it is a judgment dismissing an action for
want of jurisdiction. The same effect is given to judgment of
dismissal of action for reason of the pendency of another
suit between the same parties and for the same cause, or a
judgment absolving the defendant for failure to serve him
summons. In such case, there is no conclusive
determination of the controversy and judgment cannot be
said to be on the merits. (Municipality of Hagonoy v.
Secretary of Agriculture, supra; Moldes v. Mullet, 104 Phil.
731; Maxion v. Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597; Bayot v.
Zurbito, 39 Phil. 651; O’Connell v. Mayuga, 8 Phil. 422.)
Likewise, a dismissal of the complaint by the court cannot
be asserted as a bar to subsequent prosecution of the same
or identical claim where that action of the court resulted
from the plaintiff-appellants’ failure to comply with the
courts order to amend his complaint there being no basis in
law to order such amendments and therefore making it
void. The dismissal of the complaint was void as it was
based on a void order. (Caseñas v. Sanchez
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The Doctrine of Res Judicata

Vda. de Rosales, 19 SCRA 462.)

But a dismissal order of the court for failure to prosecute
has the force of res judicata against the revival of
substantially the same action originally filed in another
court. (Insular Veneer Inc. v. Plan, L-40155, Sept. 10,
1976.)
As to the identity of parties, it is not the sense of the res
judicata rule that the parties are the same absolutely;
although the parties are different, bar by prior judgment
properly applies if they represent the same interest,
provided that the court rendering that judgment had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
(Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421.) What is required is only
substantial not absolute identity of parties. (Santos v.
Gabriel, 45 SCRA 258.) Hence in a case where the
defendants-mortgagees were purchasers by title
subsequent to the filing of the first case and were therefore
merely successors-in-interest, they were considered the
same as their predecessors-in-interest for purposes of res
judicata. Since their predecessors-in-interests were parties
to the first case, the inclusion of the defendants-mortgagees
did not detract from the application of res judicata, because
they were after all bound by the first judgment as their
successors-in-interest were. (Philippine Farming Corp. v.
Llanos, 14 SCRA 949; Varsity Hill, Inc. v. Navarro, 43
SCRA 503.) To be a successor-in-interest a purchaser must
acquire title subsequent to the commencement of the
former action and not before. If action is brought against
the vendor after he had already parted with his title in
favor of a third person, the latter is not bound by any
judgment which may be rendered against the former. (De
Leon v. De Leon, 98 Phil. 589.) Even if one is not properly a
party in the earlier case, he is estopped by the judgment in
that case if he allows his interest in the property under
litigation to be considered by the court, as when he places
himself in privity with one of the parties by executing a
“deed of anticipated inheritance” which was duly
introduced in the earlier case for the purpose of negating
the defense of ownership set up by the other party. (Valdez
v. Valdez, L-11327, Oct. 31, 1958.)
The inclusion of new parties in the second action does
not remove that case from the operation of the res judicata
doctrine if the party against whom the judgment is offered
in evidence was also a party in the first action. This should
ward off the possibility of renewing the litigation between
the same parties by the mere expedient of bringing in new
parties in the second
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The Doctrine of Res Judicata

action. (Peñalosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303; Velasco v.

Velasco, 112 Phil. 631; Lasala v. Sarnate, 110 Phil. 255.)
But generally judgment in a criminal case cannot be
invoked as res judicata in a civil action. (Perez v. Mendoza,
65 SCRA 485; Ocampo v. Jenkins, 14 Phil. 681.) Thus, a
prior criminal case for falsification of private document
involving a piece of land is no bar to a civil case concerning
the ownership of that land. This situation does not achieve
the identity of parties and of subject matter, since the
petitioners in the civil case are not parties in the criminal
case and the subject matter in the criminal case—the guilt
or innocence of the accused—is different from that in the
civil action. (Perez v. Mendoza, supra; Dionisio v. Alvenida,
102 Phil. 443.)
With respect to the identity of subject matter, it has
been held that the subject matter of the previous action
concerned with recovery of damages sustained up to the
time of filing of complaint is different from the subject
matter of the action for damages sustained after the filing
of that complaint. Hence, res judicata does not operate as
bar to the second action, for want of identity of subject
matter. (Solano v. Sevilla, 29 Phil. 66.) Also, the prior
judgments compelling acceptance of rentals and dismissing
an ejectment suit do not constitute res judicata against a
subsequent action for rescission of lease contract between
the same parties, as the subject matter and cause of action
in the previous cases are distinct from those of the latter.
(Pamintuan v. Court of Appeals, 42 SCRA 344.) A decision
in a criminal case of homicide through reckless
imprudence, where there was a reservation to file a
separate civil action, cannot be held to be a res judicata bar
to a civil action filed pursuant to that reservation, against
persons who were not the accused in the criminal case,
without regard as to whether the civil case is based on
primary liability under the Civil Code or subsidiary
liability under the Revised Penal Code. The two cases are
of different nature and they affect different parties. (Canlas
v. Chan Lin Po, 112 Phil. 873.) The pendency of a land
registration case does not preclude another action for
recovery of possession of the same piece of land involving
the same parties, for the reason that an action for recovery
of possession is totally distinct from an action for recovery
of title or ownership. A judgment in the cue for recovery of
possession is only conclusive on the question of possession
and does not affect the ownership of the law. While identity
of parties is present, there

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The Doctrine of Res Judicata

is no identity of cause of action or rights. The judgment

that may be rendered in one case will not necessarily
operate as res judicata in the other case. (Medina v.
Valdellon, 63 SCRA 284.) On the same rationale, there is
no reason for dismissing a case for specific performance of a
contract of sale on account of a previous decision in an
ejectment case adverse to the plaintiff in that second case.
An action for ejectment is no bar to another suit contesting
ownership, as the decision in the first case is not decisive
on the ownership. (Iñigo v. Estate of Maloto, 21 SCRA 246.)
The identity of causes of action is determined by the
question as to whether the same evidence would support
and establish both the previous and present causes of
action. If so, the former judgment should bar the second by
reason of res judicata. (Viray v. Mariñas, 49 SCRA 44.)

§ 3. Form of Action.

The identity of causes of action does not depend on

similarity or difference in the form of the two actions. A
party cannot escape the operation of res judicata by
resorting to a variation in the form of action or by Aclopting
a different form of presenting his case. (Yusingco v. Ong
Hian Lian, supra; Rasay-Lahoz v. Leonor, 38 SCRA 48;
Clemente v. H.E. Heacock Co., 20 SCRA 115; Roa v. De la
Cruz, 55 O.G. 6187; Sarabia v. Secretary of Agriculture and
Nat Resources, 111 Phil. 1081; Evangelista v. CAR, 109
Phil. 957; Cayco v. Cruz, 106 Phil. 65; Aguirre v. Atienza,
104 Phil. 477; Francisco v. Blas, 93 Phil. 1; Chua v. Del
Rosario, 57 Phil. 411; Labarro v. Labitonia, 54 Phil. 845;
Juan v. Go Cotoy, 29 Phil. 328; Penalosa v. Tuason, supra.)
For this reason, a final judgment of the court denying the
petition for habeas corpus bars the petitioner from
resorting to a subsequent action of declaratory relief, it
appearing that the right of petitioner alleged to have been
violated in both cases, is the same. (Lewin v. Galang, 109
Phil. 1041.) And an administrator of the estate cannot be
allowed to avail of a separate civil action in an ordinary
court to annul the judicial sale ordered by the probate court
and executed by the sheriff according to law and approved
by that court, because previously a suit based on the same
ground was filed before the probate court and the same was
dismissed. (Roa v. De la Cruz, 103 Phil. 116.) Thus,
differences in forms of action are irrelevant for
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436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Doctrine of Res Judicata

purposes of res judicata. (Kidpalos v. Baguio Gold Mining

Co., 14 SCRA 913; Malabon Restaurant v. Department of
Labor, 16 SCRA 159.)

§ 4. Scope of Res Judicata.

The doctrine of res judicata applies to all cases and

proceedings including land registration and cadastral
cases. (Yusingco v. Ong Hian Lian, 42 SCRA 589.) It should
be noted, however, that judgment in a criminal case cannot
be pleaded as res judicata in a civil action. (Perez v.
Ocampo, 65 SCRA 485.) It has been held that a decision in
a naturalization case does not become res judicata (Tan
Teng Hen v. Republic, 58 SCRA 500).
Under this doctrine, the judgment on the merits in the
first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent
action not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but also
to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose, including all matters that could
have been properly adjudged in the case (Tiongson v. Court
of Appeals, 49 SCRA 429), or such matters which the
parties could have set up in the prior case. (Yusingco v.
Ong Hian Lian, supra; Florendo v. de Gonzales, 87 Phil.
631.) This coverage should mean to include all matters
properly belonging to the subject of the controversy and
within the scope of the issue. (NAMARCO v. Macadaeg, 50
O.G. 182; Penalosa v. Tuason, supra.)
Issues not resolved by the prior judgment are of course
not subject of res judicata. (Filipino Legion Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, 56 SCRA 674.) This doctrine precludes a
subsequent litigation only on “point which was actually and
directly in issue in a former suit, and was there judicially
passed upon and determined.” (De Luna v. Valle, 48 SCRA
361.) Where the only issue involved in the judgment
denying the plaintiff’s right to expropriate the land
belonging to the defendants is the property or impropriety
of expropriation, the latter’s right to damages not having
been litigated, the judgment cannot operate as res judicata
as to the matter of damages. Hence, damages may still be
 proved and recovered in a subsequent action. (Republic v.
Baylosis, 109 Phil. 580.)

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