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ANS 01
In recent years, religiously inspired nationalist movements have gained prominence in several
countries around the world. Few cases are more worthy of greater study than India—thanks both
to its size and its democratic longevity. As the world’s largest democracy, India is home to one-
quarter of the world’s voters and one-sixth of humanity.1 Political developments in India,
therefore, are likely to have broader repercussions throughout South Asia and across the
democratic world.
India is not alone in facing the challenges that accompany religious nationalism: many
democracies worldwide are witnessing a rise in such political movements. The widespread use of
religiously inspired political appeals can be detected in places as diverse as Turkey, Latin
America, Western Europe, and the post-Soviet states.2 For instance, in the 2018 Costa Rican
presidential runoff election, voters for evangelical populist candidate Fabricio Alvarado
reportedly rallied behind the mantra that “if a man of God can’t govern us, then nobody can.”3 In
his recent successful bid for the Brazilian presidency, right-wing populist candidate Jair
Bolsonaro similarly campaigned on the slogan, “Brazil before everything, and God above
all.”4 In Indonesia, meanwhile, Islamic nationalists allied with anti-Chinese xenophobes and
economic nationalists to oust Jakarta’s Christian governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama and convict
him on blasphemy charges.5
While religious nationalist movements exhibit considerable variation, they appear to share many
common attributes. First, most religious nationalist parties possess a puritanical streak that colors
their electoral platforms—and subsequent methods of governance—with a moral cadence.
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Second, in many countries, religious nationalists use moral appeals and rhetoric to advocate for
economic austerity or draconian anticorruption measures. Third, religious politics often betrays a
majoritarian nationalism, which seeks to redefine the basis of national identity in a manner that
excludes or marginalizes religious minorities. In the case of India, the commingling of religion
and politics is hardly novel. This mixing first began with state patronage of the Brahminical
Vedic tradition in which state backing of religion ensured that clerical leaders would, in turn,
protect the state.6 In India’s earliest state formations, the rajas (kings) wielded political power but
were reliant on the legitimation of brahmins (priestly caste) whom they compensated with
guarantees of safety and material resources. One unique aspect of India’s development is the
degree of moral authority brahmins enjoyed independent of the power of the state—a stark
contrast to China, for instance, where religious authorities were subservient to elites possessing
coercive and economic power.7
When India obtained independence following the ouster of the British Raj in 1947, the country’s
new constitution established a secular republic that did not feature a strict church-state
separation, as in many Western democracies, but rather a “principled distance” between religion
and the state.8 The government, under this rubric, endeavored to maintain a measured embrace of
India’s disparate religious communities without unduly favoring any one group.
The BJP’s electoral resurgence of late has once more brought an alternative nationalism to the
fore, one based not on secular principles but rather on the premise that Indian culture is
coterminous with Hindu culture.
Over the decades, politicians frequently have violated this (admittedly blurry) line, often
cynically and out of calculated political compulsion. The leadership of the Indian National
Congress (or Congress Party), which ruled India for much of the postindependence period,
traditionally has championed its commitment to secular nationalism. But, in practice, the
Congress Party often has invoked religious sentiments to suit its changing political interests—a
tendency that grew in intensity under the reign of former prime minister Indira Gandhi.
Since the late 1990s, India’s electoral milieu has seen a surge of religious content with the
electoral success of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Although the BJP’s star
dimmed for much of the 2000s, it has undergone a renaissance over the past five years under
Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The BJP’s electoral resurgence of late has once more brought an
alternative nationalism to the fore, one based not on secular principles but rather on the premise
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that Indian culture is coterminous with Hindu culture. This departure from India’s secular
tradition, which itself was initially damaged by the self-inflicted wounds of the Congress Party,
raises difficult questions about India’s political future and its long-standing commitment to the
credo of “unity in diversity.”9
A key axis of political and cultural conflict in modern India pertains to competing visions of
nationalism within the overarching framework of India’s democratic governance. When India’s
constitution was being drafted, and even before, there was a robust debate about India’s national
identity and the values and norms that should underpin the “idea of India.”10 Thanks to the
political dominance of the Congress Party and with due deference to the country’s extraordinary
diversity, secular nationalism came to define India’s post-1947 identity.
Under the tutelage of the country’s inaugural prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s
postcolonial leadership embarked on an ambitious project of nation-building by refusing to
privilege any one religion above all others—as they feared that favoring one religious group
could upend India’s nascent social compact.11 Because India’s secularists achieved such a
dominant victory in the early years of the republic, it is easy to forget that there was a dueling
nationalism that may have been defeated, but which hardly disappeared from the scene entirely.
The alternative conception of India’s identity, Hindu nationalism, has a lineage that actually pre-
dates its secular competitor, and today Hindu majoritarianism is ascendant.12
According to political scientist Ashutosh Varshney, three competing themes have fought for
political dominance since the emergence of the Indian national movement. First, there is the
territorial notion of India, which emphasizes the fact that the land between the Indus River to the
west, the Himalaya Mountains to the north, and the seas to the south and east comprise India’s
“sacred geography.”13 A second conception, the cultural notion, is the idea that Indian society is
defined by the values of tolerance, pluralism, and syncretism. The final theme stresses religion,
which is to say that the land known as India is originally the homeland of the Hindu community.
While different religious communities may call India home, proponents of this third viewpoint
see India as fundamentally belonging to the Hindu majority.14
The two nationalisms prevalent in India today largely stem from different combinations of these
notions, Varshney argues. While both are committed to India’s sovereign territorial boundaries,
they diverge thereafter. Secular nationalism combines a commitment to territorial integrity with
the cultural notion of political pluralism, while Hindu nationalism blends territorial unity with
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Hindutva, or the belief that India is fundamentally a polity by, for, and of the majority Hindu
community. In brief, proponents of the secular nationalist vision of India maintained that the
multiplicity of ethnic and religious groups that call the country home should find a place within
its sovereign boundaries without being subject to any discrimination or prejudice. Yet India’s
variant of secularism differs quite significantly from prevailing Western notions, which enforce a
strict separation between church and state to foster civic peace and equal rights for all citizens.
As political theorist Rajeev Bhargava has argued, the Western manifestation of secularism does
not define the totality of secular doctrine the world over; the notion of a strict church-state
separation is but one possible manifestation of secularism in practice.15 The form of secularism
India’s constitutional framers chose to pursue is one that forgoes a strict separation but instead
imposes a “principled distance” between religion and the state. On the one hand, the Indian
Constitution possesses many of the attributes of a classically secular state. It endows citizens
with religious liberty and strictly prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, as well as caste,
sex, place of birth, and other factors. The country’s constitution also grants every citizen
universal suffrage without regard to one’s religion or station in life, thus departing from the
practice in most democracies (including the United States), which extended the franchise only
gradually to women, minority groups, and the lower classes. However, the Indian Constitution
also provides ample grounds for the state to interfere in religious affairs. For instance, the
constitution recognizes group rights as well as community rights, including the rights of religious
minorities. Under the law, the state is committed to aid educational institutions administrated by
religious organizations. Therefore, not only can the state legitimately interject in the country’s
religious affairs, it can also do so without the constraints of neutrality. As Bhargava points out,
the commitment to “principled distance” is not the same as “equal distance”; in other words, the
state can take measures to tackle illiberal social aspects of one religion (for example, the caste
system in Hinduism) without necessarily taking corresponding steps to address other illiberal
practices in Islam or Christianity.18 While the state might strive to take equivalent action with
regard to all faiths, its ability to do so depends on numerous factors that include prevailing
political conditions, the ability of a given religious community to reform from within, the nature
of the social ill to be remedied, and the competing obligation that the government faces to protect
minority religions. Contrary to what critics may claim, secular nationalism does not seek to
banish, dismantle, or privatize religion; in fact, India’s secular model explicitly recognizes
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religion.19 Supporters of the country’s distinct approach argue that neither outright separation nor
a full embrace of the majority religion—Hinduism—would have been sustainable ventures in
India’s diverse, democratic polity. Given India’s stunning religious and cultural diversity,
granting preferential treatment to Hinduism would have come at the cost of ensuring India’s
syncretic traditions. Taking into account the context of India’s birth amid the partition of the
subcontinent (into India and Pakistan), appeals to separatism, and the threat of foreign meddling,
a secular approach helped keep a disparate polity together at a time when the country was under
great stress. At the same time, proponents of India’s brand of secularism also maintain that the
constitution had to give powers to the state to remedy inequalities and oppressive social practices
that emerged out of certain religious traditions. Homegrown critics of the Indian variant of
secularism take issue with its interventionist qualities, especially because the primary target of
social reform—both in the constitution and in subsequent law—has been Hinduism. These critics
question, for instance, why both Muslims and Christians have been allowed to follow their own
personal law while the state undertook reforms of the Hindu civil code shortly after the country
gained independence.
HINDU NATIONALISM
The Hindu nationalist vision of Indian democracy differs markedly from its secular counterpart.
It begins with the notion that secular nationalism is a fraudulent foreign imposition, perpetrated
by elites associated with the Congress Party at the time of independence, an imposition that
obscures India’s true Hindu identity and associated cultural sensibilities.20 Proponents of Hindu
nationalism believe that Hinduism—not the precarious balancing of all ethnic and religious
communities residing in India—is the ultimate source of the country’s identity.
According to Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, the writer and political activist whose writings are
considered foundational texts by many ardent Hindu nationalists, the Indian nation is at its core a
Hindu nation. A Hindu, in turn, is anyone who regards sovereign Indian territory as both her
fatherland (pitribhumi) as well as holy land (punyabhoomi). Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, and Buddhists
fulfill both criteria, while Christians, Jews, Parsis, and Muslims do not since members of these
religious groups do not regard India as their true holy land. In the eyes of Hindu nationalists,
India’s Hindu identity is important on its own terms and also because it has the potential to foster
the kind of coherent national community needed for both social stability and global recognition.
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To be fair, Hindu nationalists are far from a monolithic group. There is a great variety of debate
about the practical implications of Hindu nationalist ideology. According to political scientist
Kanchan Chandra, there are at least four distinct schools of thought.22 On the most moderate end
of the spectrum are those who believe that Hinduism, by virtue of being the largest and oldest of
India’s religious groups, should essentially occupy the role of first among equals. According to
this viewpoint, Hinduism in India is akin to Christianity in the United States: it should not
necessarily receive official recognition, but it should instead be accorded cultural superiority (in
the same way that Christian holidays in the United States are widely recognized and celebrated
while those associated with other religious traditions are not).
While this variant violates the Nehruvian secular ideals of maintaining principled distance from
any and all religions, it is more accommodating than the second variant of Hindu
majoritarianism. This approach would give Hindus legal superiority, effectively making non-
Hindus second-class citizens. While non-Hindus would still have access to all of the guarantees
provided under the Indian Constitution, they would have to accept the state’s endorsement of
preferential treatment for Hindus.
According to the third and more strident variant, India is a Hindu nation that is the exclusive
domain of the Hindu people. Non-Hindus would be forced to assimilate in ways that honored
Hindu cultural customs to the detriment and, eventually, the dissolution of their own
traditions.23 The fourth and final manifestation of Hindu nationalism, which enjoys very little
currency today, posits that India should be made a Hindu theocracy guided by officially
designated religious leaders. Although certain elements of the Sangh Parivar, such as some
members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), also known as the World Hindu Council, may
endorse this outcome, it finds almost no place in the political mainstream. (The Sangh Parivar is
the broader family of Hindu nationalist organizations of which the BJP is a political affiliate,
while the VHP is an ecclesiastical organization dedicated to the spiritual consolidation of Hindu
society.)
The practical result of these four formulations runs the gamut from a culturally pro-Hindu polity
to outright theocracy. But what is common to all of them is the belief that India is fundamentally
a Hindu rashtra (nation). The territory universally recognized as modern India, they argue, is
inextricably linked to an ancient religious and cultural Hindu tradition that deserves pride of
place above all other traditions found within India’s present borders. The conflation of religion
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and culture, some scholars have argued, is intentional: the two cannot be separated according to
most expositions of Hindu nationalist ideology. This mentality is at odds with the secularist
approach, which views religion and culture as distinct concepts.
ANS 02
On the World Human Rights Day, Prime Minister Imran Khan in a tweet made an appeal to the
world’s conscience and the upholders of the international law and to the UN Security Council to
act against the illegal annexation of Indian Occupied Jummu and Kashmir. In yet another tweet
he condemned the siege of IOK for the last four months and demanded an end to the gross abuse
of human rights and atrocities being inflicted on Kashmiri men, women and children by the
Indian occupation forces in violation of all international humanitarian and human rights laws. He
saluted the brave Kashmiris fighting for their right of self-determination and vowed to stand
behind them resolutely.
In his address to the UN General Assembly--which was the best ever exposition of the cause of
the people of Kashmir and the implications of the Indian action for peace and security in the
region—he also tried to stir the conscience of the world community and sought their intervention
in stopping the impending humanitarian crisis. Nobody in his right mind can take an exception to
the narrative that the Prime Minister has been trying to expound and persists with. But the
dilemma is that in the permeating global environment, conscience plays no role in addressing
humanitarian issues and conflicts which continue to consume thousands of human lives. Those
who really matter in regards to the settlement of the conflicts and observance of human rights
look at these things through the prism of their strategic and commercial interests and
consequently there is a selective application of the international law and the internationally
recognized human rights. Had it not been so, Palestine and Kashmir issues would have already
been resolved.
In the aftermath of the Prime Minister’s address to the UN General Assembly, we have seen
muffled concerns expressed by different countries and world bodies on the situation in Kashmir
demanding ending of the lockdown but nobody has addressed the real issue of self-determination
and taken concrete steps towards the resolution of the Kashmir dispute in consonance with the
UN resolutions. The world community is not only showing criminal indifference to the
humanitarian crisis in IOK and the illegal Indian action to annex the territory but is also looking
the other way on the anti-Muslim actions of the Modi regime within India. First it deprived 1.9
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million Bengali Muslims who were residing in Assam for decades before partition and now
through the new citizenship bill which denies Muslims the right of citizenship. The bill which
has racist and xenophobic connotation has already triggered protests in several states of India.
Indian move to annex IOK, continued lockdown and echoes of claims on Azad Kashmir have
created a radically new and dangerous situation. I am sure this heinous action by India could not
have been taken without secret nod of the powers which are in strategic partnership with her. The
Indian leadership made a conscious decision knowing well that in the obtaining global
environment they could easily get away with their inhuman actions and the defiance of the UN
resolutions. Regrettably even the UN is not in a position to play any positive role without the
support of the pro-Indian powers enjoying veto power. That is a stark reality.
There seems no possibility of India retracting from the aggressive course that it has adopted by
pummeling the international law and the internationally recognized human rights unless
something dramatic happens on the global level forcing the big powers to change their stance
and support the righteous cause of self-determination rising above their strategic and commercial
interests. That seems a remote possibility.
Pakistan and India are nuclear powers, as such no military solution to the Kashmir dispute is
possible. Pakistan cannot go beyond extending moral, political and diplomatic support to the
cause of Kashmiris. In fact it cannot afford to get militarily involved in the Indian held Kashmir
unless the situation deteriorates and there is bloodshed and people start fleeing the Valley which
puts Pakistan’s restraint under unbearable stress. In such a situation Pakistan may be unable to
avoid extending material assistance to the freedom struggle of the people of Kashmir. Pakistan
surely does not want that and it was the reason that the Prime Minister warned the protestors
from crossing over to the Indian side.

Croatia to wait 2 more years before adopting euro

In the current situation even the Pakistani nuclear deterrent cannot stop India from the massacre
of the Kashmiri people. It comes into play only in a situation when god-forbid Pakistan is
directly attacked and its territorial integrity is threatened. However no rational mind would tend
to believe that India would go for the option of mutual destruction through nuclear war which
could also have disastrous consequences beyond our region and the world at large. I think those
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powers which are presently condoning inhuman actions of Modi regime in the Indian held
Kashmir are also fully aware of the consequences of such an eventuality and would be more than
inclined not to allow the things to come to such a pass.
What it all means is that for the people of Kashmir it is going to be a long drawn out struggle and
it is only them, the international community and the UN, if they ever feel their obligation
towards them as per the UN resolution that the Kashmir dispute could be resolved. Much will
actually depend on whether the people of Kashmir can continue their freedom struggle with the
same ferocity and determination under the changed circumstances are not. Pakistan for which
Kashmir is an unfinished agenda of the partition will and must continue to persist with its moral,
political and diplomatic support to the freedom struggle in IOK as long as it does not succeed.
ANS 03
The Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) historic victory in India’s 2014 general election prompted
declarations of a watershed in the behavior of the Indian voter. Upon closer inspection, the
reality is more nuanced. On some parameters, such as voting based on economic and ethnic
considerations, there were indeed discernible changes. However, the empirical evidence suggests
these shifts were well under way before 2014. In other areas—namely, support for regional
parties, dynastic politicians, and candidates associated with criminal activity—contemporary
voters demonstrated much greater continuity with the past.
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN VOTING BEHAVIOR
 Good economics can make for good politics in India. While parochial
considerations have long been thought to play a central role in shaping voters’
choices, evidence from state and national elections suggests that macroeconomic
realities are increasingly relevant.

 There has been much discussion of regional parties’ increasing influence in

Indian politics. But recent electoral trends reveal a surprising degree of stability
in the balance of power between national and regional parties.

 Dynastic politics may not be popular, but dynastic politicians are. At least one in
five members of parliament elected in 2014 came from a political family.
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 Indian voters have a long history of electing politicians who are the subject of
ongoing criminal cases. The 2014 results demonstrate an underlying demand for
politicians who can get things done—even if they are connected with
wrongdoing.

 When voters cast their vote, they do not necessarily vote their caste. Social biases
remain entrenched in India, but the transmission of those biases into the political
domain is imperfect and may be weakening.
BROADER LESSONS FOR INDIAN DEMOCRACY
Milan Vaishnav
Vaishnav’s primary research focus is the political economy of India, and he examines issues
such as corruption and governance, state capacity, distributive politics, and electoral behavior.
@MILANV
While the regional-national balance of power is steady, there has been an upheaval among
national parties. For now, the ascendant BJP has replaced the foundering Indian National
Congress as the pole around which political competition is organized.
Politicians who seek to gain strength using identity-based appeals alone have generally not fared
well. While voters may harbor deep-seated social biases, identity-based concerns and economic
evaluations are both in play. The most successful politicians have mastered the art of skillfully
combining both types of appeals.
The composition of the candidate pool does not appear to be shifting, despite an increase in the
absolute number of parties contesting elections. Voters have more choice than ever before, yet
there is little qualitative change in the nature of the candidates themselves.
It was exceptional, first and foremost, by virtue of its size. A staggering 834 million citizens
were eligible to vote, of which nearly 554 million voters actually cast their ballots on Election
Day at more than 900,000 polling stations throughout the country. This amounted to a voter
turnout rate of 66.4 percent, the highest in India’s history and a full 8 percentage points higher
than the turnout recorded in either the 2004 or 2009 national elections. When deciding whom to
vote for, India’s voters had an expansive number of options to choose from: 8,251 candidates
representing 464 political parties faced off in 543 parliamentary constituencies across 29 states
and seven union territories.1 Although the numbers are difficult to pin down, experts believe the
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2014 poll was the second most expensive election ever held, following only the 2012 U.S.
presidential election.2
The election’s outcome was also historic. Preelection polls had uniformly predicted that the
opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which held power from 1998 to 2004, would emerge as
the single largest party in parliament. Yet few foresaw the size of the victory achieved by the
BJP and, conversely, that of the defeat suffered by the ruling Indian National Congress
(INC).3 Of the 543 seats in India’s lower house of parliament (Lok Sabha) on offer, the BJP
claimed victory in 282, while its coalition allies notched wins in another 41 seats. Although it
chose to form a government with its preelection alliance partners, the BJP was not compelled to
do so; it had a clear majority in the Lok Sabha, the first time a single party has won such a
majority since 1984 and the first time ever that a single party other than the Congress has
achieved this feat.4
The Congress Party, on the other hand, saw its tally drop to a paltry 44 seats, a dramatic decline
from the 206 seats it captured in 2009 (see figure 1) and its worst-ever performance in a general
election. The party’s seat total was so small that it fell short of the minimal threshold necessary
to nominate one of its own to serve as leader of the opposition in the lower house—a designation
that requires a command over at least 10 percent of the body’s seats
The BJP victory also appears to have redrawn the political map of India (see figure 2). After
winning more than one-quarter (25.6 percent) of ballots cast and 182 seats in the 1998 general
election, the BJP experienced a secular decline on both counts. In 2009, its tally dropped to 116
seats, limited to a few select pockets of the country. This smattering of seats grew by leaps and
bounds in 2014, and now touches all four corners of the country, from Gujarat in the west to
Assam in the east, and from Tamil Nadu in the south to Jammu & Kashmir in the north.
ANS 04
India is characterized by more ethnic and religious groups than most other countries of the world.
Aside from the much noted 2000-odd castes, there are eight "major" religions, 15-odd languages
spoken in various dialects in 22 states and nine union territories, and a substantial number of
tribes and sects.
Three ethnic or religious conflicts have stood out of late: two occurred in the states of "Assam
and Punjab; another, the more widely known Hindu-Muslim conflict, continues to persist. The
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Assam problem is primarily ethnic, the Punjab problem is based on both religious and regional
conflicts, while the Hindu-Muslim problem is predominantly religious.
ETHNIC CONFLICT IN ASSAM
Of the three conflicts mentioned, Assam has attracted the largest attention of late. Not since the
1947 partition of India have so many people been killed and uprooted as a result of ethnic or
communal violence. By most available reports now, mob violence has claimed four thousand
lives, rendered about 200,000 homeless, and forced a large number to leave the state for
protection elsewhere. The immediate occasion of this bloodshed was the election held in
February, though conflict and tension have been present for the last three years. In Assam, three
culturally disparate groups have been in collision: the Assamese, the Bengalis (both of which
have segments of Hindus and Muslims) and the tribals, which are localized communities.
Historical Pattern of Migration
Assam has had the highest rate of population growth in India since the beginning of this century.
Migration into the state accounts for a substantial part of this growth. Most migrants came from
Bengal, including what is now Bangladesh (known as East Bengal before the 1947 partition and
East Pakistan from 1947-71). Bengali migrants were both Hindus and Muslims. Bengali Hindus
started arriving after the British created tea plantations in the middle of the nineteenth century.
Because of their educational advantage over Assamese, they were better suited to man the
growing administrative and professional machinery.
Bengali Muslims on the other hand, were mainly peasants. They originated predominantly in
East Bengal, a highly populated area with low agricultural productivity and a fragmented
landholding pattern incapable of supporting large families. In contrast, Assam was less
populated, many areas were unsettled, and there was less pressure on the land. Bengali peasants
made large tracts of waste, flooded and forested land habitable and productive along the southern
bank of the Brahmaputra River, an area that is also populated by indigenous tribal groups,
especially the Lalung.
Overall Bengali dominance began to manifested itself in various ways. They held urban
professions, their language was more developed and widely used in Assam, and their educational
and even numerical superiority became more than evident. With the halting spread of education
in the twentieth century, the Assamese middle class slowly emerged, and with the growth of the
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Assamese middle class, the seeds of what has been called "little nationalism" were sown in
Assam.
Post-Independence Developments
After the partition of 1947 and the transfer of a very large Bengali Muslim district of Sylhet to
East Pakistan, the Assamese middle class came to power for the first time in about a century.
Through expanded educational programs and the use of Assamese as a language in the
university, this newly acquired power, electorally buttressed, was used to consolidate the
position of the Assamese middle class against Bengali dominance in administrative services and
professions.
On the other hand, the various tribes on the lower ranges were less developed than both of these
contending communities. Depending on the preponderance of one or the other in their local
context, they felt pressured, even exploited, culturally, economically and politically by both
groups.
Despite the existence of an international border, the migration from East Pakistan continued
alongside migration from West Bengal. There is considerable dispute over the actual magnitude,
but the most comprehensive estimate shows that between 1961 and 1971 the proportion of
Assamese declined for the first time and that of Bengali speakers increased; between 1971 and
1981 itself, as many as 1.2 million migrants were added to a population of 14.6 million in 1971.
Moreover, the number of registered voters increased dramatically from 6.5 million in 1972 to 8.7
million in 1979, a rise which cannot be totally attributed to the coming of voting age to the
previously ineligible. This last discovery of the Election Commission was, in fact, the starting
point of the present phase of the organized student movement supported by large sections of the
Assamese middle class. The movement has wide-ranging demands including development of
Assam and greater share of benefits from its rich national resources, including oil, for the
Assamese. Why the issue of deportation of "illegal aliens" has come to be the focus of the
movement needs some explanation.
Despite the general anti-Bengali sentiment, the expulsion of migrants that came from West
Bengal - these migrants are predominantly Hindus - could not be brought about legally or
politically. Interstate movement and residence are perfectly legal in India, and the Assamese
economy and society, despite the antagonism, is inextricably linked with West Bengal.
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On the other hand, the "post-1947 place of origin" of migrants from Bangladesh, largely Muslim,
makes them "aliens" and their migration, for political purposes, can be called "illegal." The
students thus found a ground for demanding their expulsion. Additionally, these Muslim
migrants provided unstinted support to the Congress Party, now represented by Mrs. Gandhi, and
the party in turn patronized them, so much so that local politicians of the Congress Party seem to
have put aliens on the electoral rolls irrespective of whether or not they had Indian citizenship.
It is in this atmosphere that the elections were called. Mrs. Gandhi has been heavily criticized in
India for her decision to call the elections. Two considerations seem to have gone into her
decision: her need for an electoral victory due to the reverses her party had suffered in recent
state elections, and her intention to negotiate with a new set of elected leaders who would
possibly be more pliable than students on the issue of "aliens."
Large-scale violence and destruction of lives, property, bridges, and various other resources
resulted. In addition to the predictable attacks on Bengalis in the towns, there were massacres in
which first pro-election Boro tribals attacked Assamese villages at Gohpur and later, in the worst
massacre witnessed in independent India, another tribe, the anti-poll Lalung, reportedly with
Assamese support, killed scores of Bengali Muslims in Nellie.
The spread of urban conflict to villages seems to be partly a result of the emergence of support
for leftist parties in the previous elections. The land reform-oriented agrarian program of the left
and its attempt to create a base in the Muslim peasantry seems to have antagonized the Assamese
landlords and wealthier peasantry. The most popular party of the left, the Communist Party
Marxist (CPM), is in power in West Bengal and therefore is associated with Bengalis. Moreover,
tribals seem to be involved in the struggle over land, attacking whichever community, Assamese
or Bengali, in possession of most of the land in their respective local situations.
Hold over government, struggle for jobs, land scarcity, and population influx have thus
intensified the historical differences between Assamese and Bengali into violent ethnic
antagonisms in Assam. All of this took place in a context of acute underdevelopment of Assam
and slow economic growth. The anti-aliens agitation is an expression, among other things, of the
Assamese fear of becoming politically swamped by an ever larger Bengali presence in the state.
SIKH-HINDU CONFLICT IN PUNJAB
Starting in August 1980, mounting communal tension between Hindus and Sikhs in the state of
Punjab led to violent clashes, in the last year in particular. Unlike Assam, Punjab is a state with
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the highest per capita income. It is the seat of the Green Revolution in India, whose biggest
beneficiaries have been the rich Sikh peasants. In Punjab, Sikhs are a majority, Hindus, a
minority.
Although religious symbols have been used for the mobilization of Sikhs and the secessionist
slogan of Khalistan (a sovereign state of Sikhs) has been raised, the Sikh's charter of demands,
drawn from the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, has strong economic and political components,
unlike in Assam where the issue of aliens has sidelined economic demands.
The "major" religious demands by the Sikhs, including greater radio time for religious broadcasts
over federally controlled radio, and a separate legislative act for Sikh religious shrines, were
granted by New Delhi this past February. The major political demands are greater powers,
including financial, for the states vis-a-vis New Delhi. A commission has been appointed to
review these demands.
The economic demands include a greater share of river waters for irrigation and larger central
investment in the industrial sector of Punjab. The territorial and the waters issues are the only
unsettled points left. Other demands, minor at present, may later assume importance. The
agitation continues unabated.
Classes, Religion and Green Revolution in Punjab
According to the 1971 census, Sikhs constituted 60.2% of Punjab's population and Hindus
37.5%. In the villages, the Sikh majority was even greater, constituting 69.4 % of the total rural
population as opposed to 28.6% Hindus. In the urban areas, however, Hindus formed the
majority, 66.4 % against 30.8 % Sikhs. Trade and services, rather than manufacturing, are the
main sectors of urban economy in Punjab, and Hindu traders are dominant in both. The
agricultural sector is dominated by the Sikh cultivating castes, known as jats.
Green revolution, based as it was on biochemical and mechanical inputs in agriculture and
surplus production for market, has deeply linked trade with agriculture and made the latter
dependent on the market. Both for buying modern inputs and selling surplus produce, the rich
Sikh farmer has to go through the urban market, dominated by the Hindu trader. So long as the
economic pie kept increasing, this incongruity did not much matter, but when prices of food
grain and other crops stopped increasing, a clash of interests between the Sikh farmer and the
Hindu trader was created.
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Irrigation problems have worsened the situation. That Punjab has the best irrigated agriculture in
the country is not enough for the rich peasant; while 1.4 million hectares in Punjab are canal-
irrigated, two million hectares are dependent on tubewells. Due to its power and diesel needs,
tubewell irrigation, is "three to nine times more costly" (India Today). The prosperity of the rich
peasanty has thus slackened.
Other developments have occurred. Landlessness has increased from 17.3 percent in 1961 to
32.1 percent in 1971 and more later. The landless, mostly Untouchables and low caste Hindus
and Sikhs, have also become politicized by the leftist Agricultural Labor Union. Sikhs in urban
trades are neither economically nor numerically as dominant as the Hindus. And finally, the
proportion of Sikhs in the Army has fallen from 35 percent to 20 percent.
Amid these mounting uncertainties, religion both divides and unites.
For the rich Sikh peasantry, faced with Hindu traders on the one hand and politicized labor on
the other, religion performs a useful role. It unites the Sikh trader, who is also opposed to the
Hindu trader, and the low caste Sikh laborer by dividing the agricultural labor into low caste
Sikhs and low caste Hindus or Untouchables. Religious slogans appeal to the religiosity of the
insecure small Sikh peasant and the unpoliticized Sikh laborer.
Power, Electoral Politics and Religion
It is unlikely that these links would have automatically led to political action without the
mediation of political parties. This mediation did not simply reflect the emerging socio-economic
divisions; it deepened them. The two main rural parties, the ruling Congress and the Akali Dal, a
party dominated by the rich Sikh peasanty, have contributed much towards this deepening.
Scholars have noted the schizophrenic character of Punjab politics. It has a "dual political system
and a dual political area," one secular and the other religious and confined to Sikhs.
Since the exhaustion of the green revolution in Punjab, this is the first time that Akalis have not
been in power. Although they had their first relatively stable rule from 1977 to 1980, Congress
returned to power in 1980. The Akali elite, when in power, did not take up any of its present
demands with New Delhi where its partner in electoral alliance, the Janata Party, ruled, but soon
after the rival Congress returned, agitations were launched in support of the demands. The power
implications seem reasonably clear: unless the enhanced economic power of the rich Sikh
peasantry is matched with political power, peace will be difficult to maintain in Punjab. Either
political power should compensate for the halt in its economic prosperity, or greater economic
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incentives must return as expressed in the river waters issue. Interests of the Akali political elites
have thus coincided with those of the discontented peasantry. Religion is a particularly effective
vehicle of political mobilization in such a situation, for that alone can prevent the increasing
differentiation in the Sikh community from fragmented and weak political expression.
The ruling Congress has also played an electoral game. In an effort to weaken Akali Dal, it has,
in the recent past, supported rabidly communal factions, including the present messiah Sant
Bhindranwale, in the SGPC elections. The Congress is clearly not interested in settling the
problem unless some political or electoral gains are likely, or unless the violence reaches
explosive proportions.
THE HINDU-MUSLIM PROBLEM
Of all the religious and ethnic issues in contemporary India, history has cast its deepest shadow
on Hindu-Muslim relations. The most critical contemporary phase of this history was the
partition of 1947. A Muslim sovereign state of Pakistan was born amidst ghastly communal
violence but almost as many Muslims as there were in the new constituted Pakistan, for various
reasons, stayed in India. The partition did not solve the Hindu-Muslim problems; it caused the
situation of the Muslims in India to deteriorate. They were blamed for the division of the
country, their leadership had left and their power was further weakened by the removal of all
Muslim-majority areas except Kashmir. Most of all, the conflict between India and Pakistan kept
the roots of the communal tension perpetually alive and pushed Muslims into the unfortunate
situation of defending their loyalty to India. Even 36 years after independence, the problem has
not been overcome; Hindi-Muslim riots have in fact increased in the last few years.
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the entire Muslim community in India has been
under pressure. First, even though a minority (according to the 1971 census, 11.2 percent of the
Indian population was Muslim as opposed to 61.2 percent caste Hindus), Muslims are in a
majority in one state and constitute 13.5 to 24 percent population in five states. There are 39
districts in India in which they comprise from between 20 percent to 94 percent of the
population. Many cultural differences exist among them. Only 45 percent speak Urdu and there
are caste and sect divisions. As many as 73 percent live in villages; only 27 percent are urban.
This is particularly important, after 1947 the Hindu-Muslim riots occurred for the most part, in
urban centers. Most of these towns are modernizing, middle-size towns such as Aligarh,
Moradabad, Meerut, Ranchi, Baroda, Hyderabad, Trivandrum. In the big and/or industrialized
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cities such as Bombay, Delhi, Ahmedabad, the communal fury, whenever it has erupted, has
remained confined to the older parts of the city. Villages have remained largely undisturbed.
Acute communal consciousness occurs largely in the middle class; its most fertile bases lie in the
lower middle classes of growing middle size towns of sizeable Muslim populations.

References:
1. PN Chopra; BN Puri; MN Das; AC Pradhan, eds. (2003). A Comprehensive History Of
Ancient India (3 Vol. Set). Sterling. pp. 200–202. ISBN 978-81-207-2503-4.
2. ^ History of Ancient India: Earliest Times to 1000 A.D. by Radhey Shyam Chaurasia p.
237
3. ^ Kulke & Rothermund 2004, p. 115.
4. ^ Keay 2000, p. 215: The Cholas were in fact the most successful dynasty since the
Guptas ... The classic expansion of Chola power began anew with the accession of
Rajaraja I in 985.